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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986

EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.

Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984
elections. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed,
allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders.

It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true to form. Owing to
what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission
on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent
was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to the Supreme Court,
arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en
banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath
as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.

The case was still being considered by the Supreme Court when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down
in cold blood and in broad daylight. The nation, already indignant over the obvious manipulation of the presidential
elections in favor of Marcos, was revolted by the killing, which flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by the assailants
who apparently believed they were above the law. This ruthless murder was possibly one of the factors that strengthened
the cause of the Opposition in the February revolution that toppled the Marcos regime and installed the present
government under President Corazon C. Aquino.

ISSUES
1.)WON the Motion to dismiss the case for reason that it has become moot and academic be
granted?

2.) WONthe Second Division of the Commission on Elections is authorize to

promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the
winner in the election?

3.) WON Commissioner Opinion’s refusal to inhibit himself on the ground that he
was formerly a law partner of the private respondent denied the petitioner due
process of law?
HELD:

1.)The Supreme Court stated that were it not for the supervening events that have legally rendered it moot and academic,
this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as
violative of the Constitution.

The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and the
private respondent-both of whom have gone their separate ways-could be a convenient justification for dismissing this
case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal
ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not
disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and
academic.

The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. The
citizen comes to it in quest of law but it must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times
when it cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law.
But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be
resolved. Justice demands that the Supreme Court act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though
gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.

2.) WONthe Second Division of the Commission on Elections is authorize to

promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the
winner in the election?
No. In providing that the Commission on Elections could act in division when deciding election cases, the Constitution was
laying down the general rule. The exception was the election contest involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa,
which had to be heard and decided en banc.   The en banc requirement would apply only from the time a candidate for
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the Batasang Pambansa was proclaimed as winner, for it was only then that a contest could be permitted under the law.
All matters arising before such time were, necessarily, subject to decision only by division of the Commission as these
would come under the general heading of "election cases."

The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.

Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:

(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all member of the
 Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.

Section 3 provides:

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and
decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard
and decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety
days from the date of their submission for decision.

.The Court believes that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the
Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters
related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.

It is worth observing that the special procedure for the settlement of what are now called "pre-proclamation controversies"
is a relatively recent innovation in our laws, having been introduced only in 1978, through P.D. No. 1296, otherwise known
as the 1978 Election Code. Section 175 thereof provided:

Sec. 175. Suspension and annulment of proclamation.-The Commission shall be the sole judge of all pre-
proclamation controversies and any of its decisions, orders or rulings shall be final and executory. It
may, motu proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing order the suspension of the
proclamation of a candidate-elect or annul any proclamation, if one has been made, on any of the grounds
mentioned in Sections 172, 173 and 174 thereof.

The Court interpret "cases" as the generic term denoting the actions that might be heard and decided by the Commission
on Elections, only by division as a general rule except where the case was a "contest" involving members of the Batasang
Pambansa, which had to be heard and decided en banc.

Incidentally, in making the Commission the "sole judge" of pre- proclamation controversies in Section 175, supra, the law
was obviously referring to the body sitting en banc. In fact, the pre-proclamation controversies involved in Aratuc vs.
Commission on Elections,   where the said provision was applied, were heard and decided en banc.
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3.) WON Commissioner Opinion’s refusal to inhibit himself on the ground that he
was formerly a law partner of the private respondent denied the petitioner due
process of law?
Commissioner Opinion's refusal to inhibit himself and his objection to the transfer of the case to another
division cannot be justified by any criterion of propriety. His conduct on this matter belied his wounded protestations of
innocence and proved the motives of the Second Division when it rendered its decision.

This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the
indispensable imperative of due process.   To bolster that requirement, it has held that the judge must not only be
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impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just.  The
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litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge
who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his
sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking
his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter
calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice.

The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law to the prejudice
of a just decision. Where this is probable or even only posssible, due process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if
only out of a sense of delicadeza. For like Caesar's wife, he must be above suspicion. Commissioner Opinion, being a
lawyer, should have recognized his duty and abided by this well-known rule of judicial conduct. For refusing to do so, he
divested the Second Division of the necessary vote for the questioned decision, assuming it could act, and rendered the
proceeding null and void.  17

SO ORDERED.

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