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Porphyrogenitus · D. Popović, On Two Lost Medieval Serbian
Reliquaries · D. Kovačević Kojić, Serbian Silver at the Venetian
Mint · A. Fotić, Coping with Extortion on a Local Level · L. Höbelt,
Balkan or Border Warfare? Glimpses from the Early Modern Period ·
P. M. Kitromilides, Spinozist Ideas in the Greek Enlightenment
· M. Ković, Great Britain and the Consular Initiative of the Great
Powers in Bosnia and Herzegovina · M. Bjelajac, Humanitarian
Catastrophe as a Pretext for the Austro-Hungarian Invasion of Serbia
1912–1913 · F. Guelton, Avec le général Piarron de Mondésir:
Un aller-retour de Brindisi à Valona · D. Bakić, The Serbian Minister
in London, Mateja Bošković, the Yugoslav Committee, and Serbia’s
Yugoslav Policy in the Great War · G-H. Soutou, The Paris
Conference of 1919 · B. Milosavljević, Drafting the Constitution
of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1920) · M. Vasiljević,
Carrying Their Native Land and Their New Home in Their Hearts · S.
G. Markovich, The Grand Lodge of Yugoslavia between France
and Britain (1919–1940) · V. G. Pavlović, La longue marche de
Tito vers le sommet du parti communiste · K. Nikolić, Great Britain,
the Soviet Union and the Resistance Movements in Yugoslavia, 1941 · Y.
Mourélos, Les origines de la guerre civile en Grèce · A. Edemskiy,
Additional Evidence on the Final Break between Moscow and Tirana
in 1960–1961 · Lj. Dimić, Yugoslav Diplomacy and the 1967 Coup
d’Etat in Greece · K. V. Nikiforov, The Distinctive Characteristics
of Transformation in Eastern Europe · B. Šijaković, Riddle and
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ANNUAL OF THE INSTITUTE FOR BALKAN STUDIES

ISSN 0350-7653
UDC 930.85(4-12) BELGRADE 2019 eISSN 2406-0801

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 https://doi.org/10.2298/BALC1950427N
UDC 316.423(4-11)"1989/..."
323(4-11)"1989/..."
Original scholarly work
http://www.balcanica.rs
Konstantin V. Nikiforov*
Institute of Slavic Studies
Russian Academy of Sciences

The Distinctive Characteristics of Transformation in Eastern Europe

A Combination of Democracy and Nationalism

Abstract: Transformation in the eastern part of Europe began following the “velvet” rev-
olution and continued after the “colour” revolutions. These two types of transformative
revolution have many things in common, first of all a form of mass protest combining
democracy and nationalism at its roots. However, nationalism did not begin to appear
immediately after the fall of communism but rather after the first halting and unsuccessful
democratic changes. In other words, nationalists did not take over from communists, but
from democrats.
Keywords: nationalism, democracy, transformative revolutions

T he prominent Polish dissident and later influential public figure Adam Mi-
chnik described nationalism as the final stage of communism. These fa-
mous words are usually interpreted in the sense that communist regimes in the
former socialist countries are first replaced by nationalism, an ideology that is
cruder and easier to understand by the masses, and then by democracy, a much
more complex system to comprehend and implement. Admittedly, the opposite
is also known to happen. Authoritarian communist leaders employ nationalism
as the last means of staying in power and preventing major changes. The most
striking example of this is Milošević’s Serbia. In both cases, however, national-
ism is an obstacle to democratic change.
Unlike these widespread conclusions, some researchers see a positive as-
pect in the rise of nationalism during the collapse of communist regimes. They
believe that nationalism acted as a sort of catalyst of change in Eastern European
countries and as the only force capable of uniting and mobilizing the masses in
the struggle against institutions of totalitarianism. Having resolved this prob-
lem, a nationalist coalition inevitably crumbles and its factions appear as politi-
cal rivals, leading to a functional pluralistic society.1

* nikiforov@inslav.ru
1 R. Tomas, Srbija pod Miloševićem. Politika devedesetih (Belgrade: Samizdat, 2002), 27.
428 Balcanica L (2019)

Let me attempt a more in-depth exploration of these problems. As we

know, the process of abandoning the socialist path in Eastern European coun-
tries took the form of so-called “velvet revolutions” of 1989.
The forms of these “revolutions” could be very different – peaceful pro-
tests as well as revolts that included violence or round tables of the leading po-
litical forces or the organization of the first multiparty elections after a longer
hiatus.2 The period of “velvet revolutions” in Eastern Europe lasted ten years
and essentially came to its end with the “October” or “Bulldozer” revolution in
Serbia in 2000.
This revolution was of a twofold nature. On the one hand, it was the last
in the series of “velvet revolutions” that had begun in 1989; on the other hand,
it opened a series of new revolutions known as “colour revolutions”. This was
in fact a re-edition of “velvet revolutions” in countries where the implemented
changes proved insufficient and incomplete, failing to achieve the objectives of
previous revolutions. The aim of these new “colour revolutions” is to put an end
to the corruption and bureaucratic arbitrariness of the new regime, as well as
to social insecurity, gaping stratification, and the astronomical profits of ruling
clans often built on familial relations.3
A characteristic of the “coloured revolutions” of the early twenty-first cen-
tury is that they usually took place in periods of election – hence they are also
known as “electoral revolutions”. At the end of the twentieth century, multiparty
elections were the main device of the opposition’s struggle for their electoral win
and the mechanism of regime change in many Eastern European countries. An
attempt to challenge or even neutralize these electoral victories has often proved
the last straw.
In other words, “colour revolutions” of the early twenty-first century were
meant to finish what the “velvet revolutions” had left unfinished. This is precisely
the reason that new revolutions tend to occur in relatively underdeveloped coun-
tries – in the Balkans and in the former USSR. Secondly, “colour revolutions” are
focused on resolving the contrasts that emerged already during the post-socialist
transformation; they “achieved a stable character and began to exert moderate
influence on further development”.4

2 See, e.g., Istoriia antikomunisticheskih revolutsii kontsa XX veka. Tsentral’nia i Iugo-Vostoch-

naia Evropa (Moscow: Nauka, 2007); Revoliutsii i reform v stranah Tsentral’noi i Iugo-Vostoch-
noi Evropy: 20 let spustia (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2011); Konets epokhi. SSSR i revoliutsii v
stranah Vostochnoi Evropy 1989–1991 gg. Dokumenty (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2015).
3 V. Inozemtsev, “Trudnyi vozrast elity. Novye ‘narodnnye revoliutsii’ kardinal’no otlichaiut-

sia ot sobytii, imevshikh mesto shestnadtsat’ let nazad”, Nezavisimaia gazeta , 6 April 2005.
4 A. Riabov, “Moskva prinimaet vyzov ‘tsvetnykh’ revoliutsii”, Pro et contra ( July–August

2005), 19–20.
 K. V. Nikiforov, Distinctive Characteristics of Transformation in Eastern Europe 429

Hence, in my view, both the first and the second revolution are phenom-
ena of the same type and should be regarded as a single process. They can col-
lectively be termed “transformative revolutions”.5
One revolutionary shift, it should be understood, is often insufficient to
achieve a full transition to a new democratic system, particularly in underdevel-
oped countries. And although one revolutionary impulse was enough for Cen-
tral European states such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary,
for Serbia and some post-Soviet countries new revolutionary upsurges proved
necessary.
For example, in Russia, to facilitate the beginning of real transforma-
tion two revolutionary shifts were needed: firstly, the August Coup of 1991, the
suppression of which put an end to the Communist monopoly on power; and
secondly the events of October 1993, which ended the Soviet organization of
power. In Ukraine, the “velvet revolution” did not make much of an impact, but
it was immediately followed by two “colour” uprisings: the Orange Revolution of
2004 and the so-called Euromaidan of 2013–2014.
Again, this is hardly unusual. Let us remember that in many Western
European countries a whole series of revolutions was needed to fully establish
the bourgeois system. The most illustrative, textbook example is provided by
French history.
Let me note once again that the two types of transformative revolutions
highlighted here – “velvet” and “colour” – have a lot in common: above all mass
protests with a combination of democracy and nationalism at their roots. We
need to understand how this works.
Firstly, nationalism does not seem to emerge immediately after the demise
of communism, as might perhaps be understood from Michnik’s above-quoted
formula; rather, it seems to appear after the first – uncertain and unsuccessful
– democratic changes. More specifically, the nationalists did not take over from
the communists, but from the democrats. Secondly, shifts such as these occurred
not only during the most recent transformative turnarounds or immediately af-
ter them, but also a long time before any “velvet” or “colour” revolutions.
Let me mention just two examples from the history of Yugoslavia, begin-
ning with the events in Croatia in the early 1970s. During a discussion on con-
stitutional amendments, there emerged in Croatia the so-called MASPOK (an
abbreviation of masovni pokret [mass movement]), also known as the Croatian
Spring to analogize the Prague Spring.

5 There is still no established name for these revolutions. The terms “velvet” and “colour” have
little actual meaning. They are sometimes defined by negation, for example as “anti-commu-
nist”. But where these revolutions lead and what their purpose is remains unclear from these
terms.
430 Balcanica L (2019)

Protests and rallies took place throughout the republic. It all began with
the question of the Croatian language and culture and ended in the glorification
of the fascist Independent State of Croatia and accusations of unitarism against
the federation and of “Great Serbdom” against the Serbs. There were demands
to immediately re-evaluate foreign trade and the monetary and banking system
of Yugoslavia in favour of Croatia. Serbs living in Croatia began to be discrimi-
nated against in daily life, employment etc.
The nationalist forces rallied around Matica Hrvatska (Matrix Croati-
ca) – the leading cultural and educational republic-level institution, as well as
around the University of Zagreb. The movement was headed by the leadership
of the League of Communists of Croatia: S. Dabčević-Kučar, M. Tripalo, and P.
Pirker. F. Tudjman, who would go on to become the first president of indepen-
dent Croatia, actively participated in MASPOK. Tito took his time, made no
moves for a while, and then finally came out and said that he had been deceived.
The Croatian nationalists had indeed glorified him in the press as a “Croat” and
organized opulent receptions for him. However, as MASPOK began to ac-
quire increasingly nationalist overtones and get out of hand, Tito intervened in
December 1971, arresting the movement’s leaders and removing the Croatian
leadership.6
All of this is well known. But here it is important to underline that the
initial democratism of the Croatian movement rather quickly took on a nation-
alist and anti-state character.7
Another example is provided by Serbia, which after Tito’s death under-
went processes that were in many respects reminiscent of the Soviet Perestroika.
The catalyst for the activities of Serbian opposition intellectuals was the regime’s
ban of Gojko Djogo’s poetry book Vunena vremena [Woollen Times] in April
1981. The poet had targeted Tito himself in his poems. Djogo’s subsequent ar-
rest led to a wave of protests of the Serbian intelligentsia; group letters were
written and “solidarity evenings” organized in his defence. These initiatives grew

6 For more detail see B. Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1978 (Belgrade: Nolit, 1981),
580–582; Tsentral’no-Vostochnaia Evropa vo vtoroi polovine XX veka, in 3 vols. (Moscow:
Nauka, 2002), vol. 2, 495–496; I. Goldstein, Hrvatska 1918–2000 (Zagreb: Znanje, 2008),
532–552. See also I. V. Rudneva, Khorvatskoe national’noe dvidzenie: konets 1960/kh – nachalo
1970/kx gg. (Moscow: Institut slavianovedeniia RAN; St. Petersburg: Nestor, 2014).
7 Goldstein, Hrvatska, 538, writes that “two main ideas were dominant in the movement –

the national and the liberal-democratic idea. In some participants and in some circumstances
one or the other was more prominent, but usually it was an amalgamation of both with a
dominant national component”. However, it should be noted that democratization in Croatia
primarily meant the expansion of the autonomous rights of the Croatian people. This was
another difference between Croatia and Serbia, where it primarily meant the democratiza-
tion of political life, see Z. Radelić, Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji 1945–1991: Od zajedništva do razlaza
(Zagreb; Školska knjiga; Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2006), 379–380.
 K. V. Nikiforov, Distinctive Characteristics of Transformation in Eastern Europe 431

into a protest against the economic situation, political and constitutional system,
the lack of political freedoms and freedom of the press etc. In May 1982 the
Association of Writers of Serbia formed the Committee for the Protection of
Artistic Production, which quickly became the symbol of the democratic protest
against the regime.8
Many scholars of a range of humanities, primarily those who had pre-
viously worked with the famous Yugoslav magazine Praxis (in publication
1964–1975), took part in the criticism of the regime and the entire communist
past and present. Serbs were once again the most active: philosophers Ljubomir
Tadić and Mihailo Marković; economist Kosta Mihajlović; legal scholars Vo-
jislav Koštunica and Kosta Čavoški. The last two co-wrote the book Partijski plu-
ralizam ili monizam [Party Pluralism or Monism], which denied the legitimacy
of the communists’ rise to power in Yugoslavia and their implementation of a
one-party system. In this period a special role was played by the book Saveznici
i jugoslovenska ratna drama [The Allies and the Yugoslav War Drama] by the
Serbian historian Veselin Djuretić, which portrayed the Četnik movement as an
anti-fascist force for the first time in academic literature.9
The main myths of socialist Yugoslavia gradually began to crumble. The
Partisans were no longer seen as the only anti-fascist movement of the war years
and Yugoslavia itself was no longer seen as a country that had built a very differ-
ent and more progressive type of socialism. It was revealed that the revolution
in Yugoslavia had been carried out following the Bolshevik model and that even
after 1948 local Stalinists – genuine or alleged – had been treated by Stalinist
methods. A little while later, the author A. Isaković demanded a re-evaluation
of Tito’s personal cult, just as it had been done after Stalin’s or Mao’s death; Lj.
Tadić argued that, denying the dogma of the infallibility of Stalin as their former
supreme authority, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia had not rejected
these dogmas but had merely nationalized them.10
The regime cannot be said to have been completely inactive. It tried to
stop these emerging processes using its usual methods. In April 1982, twenty-
eight Serbian intellectuals were arrested, with six of them later tried in court.
However, like Djogo, almost all were soon released.
The Belgrade intelligentsia advocated human rights, not only in Serbia
but throughout Yugoslavia. The centre of these activities was the Committee
for the Defence of Freedom of Thought and Expression led by the eminent au-
thor Dobrica Ćosić. Representatives of the Slovene and Croatian intelligentsia

8 D. Jović, Jugoslavija: država koja je odumrla. Uspon, kriza i pad Kardeljeve Yugoslavije (1974–
1990) (Zagreb: Prometej, 2003), 336–337.
9 D. Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest (Zagreb: Golden marketing, 1999), 698–700; To-

mas, Srbija pod Miloševićem, 56–57.

10 Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest, 698–699.
432 Balcanica L (2019)

refused to join the Committee despite being expressly invited. Regardless of

this, the Committee voiced its protest against the arrest of Alija Izetbegović and
other Bosnian Muslims in Sarajevo and demanded the release of Vlado Gotovac
and other MASPOK members incarcerated in Croatia. The Committee also
defended the Kosovo Albanians convicted after the developments of 1981. In
the period 1984–1989 the Committee sent out over a hundred letters protesting
against the violation of basic democratic rights in Yugoslavia.11
Immediately following the events that unfolded in Kosovo, the Serbian
authorities once again tried to broach the question of constitutional changes.12
However, Serbia’s opponents in the Yugoslav leadership from other republics
saw every such attempt as a return to etatism, centralism and aspirations to a
“Great Serbia”. Any constitutional changes were blocked. However, it was pre-
cisely the “political system established by the Constitution of 1974 that deep-
ened the ongoing crisis and made it more serious and hopeless”.13
The lack of a legal mechanism to resolve the problem of the Constitution
of 1974 could not but result in the gradual radicalization of the mood among the
Serbs. The old conflict in the Central Committee of the League of Communists
of Serbia between the “liberals” spearheaded by I. Stambolić and the proponents
of a radical solution for existing quarrels also intensified.
Then, in 1984, Slobodan Milošević – the main protagonist of Serbian
history in the 1990s – appeared on the political scene of Serbia. The “liberals”
in the ranks of the Serbian communists were defeated and a few years later
the “radicals” made Milošević the leader of the party. The Serbian historian Lj.
Dimić believes that at the time when the totalitarian model – including ideo-
logical utopianism and unlimited power of the party elite with its charismatic
leaders – began to lose momentum in Europe, it began to solidify in Serbia,
previously the most liberal among the Yugoslav republics.14
It could be said that the regime in Serbia – after already having collapsed
in Eastern Europe – underwent a revival and was fundamentally re-established
with Slobodan Milošević’s rise to power. Interestingly, the “party that had ruled
for 40 years, now governed through a new, ‘purified’ (to borrow the term used
at the time) leadership, becoming both the government and the opposition at

11 Ibid. 698–699.
12 Ibid. 339.
13 Attempts to reconsider the Constitution were launched by Serbia in 1975, 1981, 1984
and 1985. See, e.g., Lj. Dimić, “Srbija 1804–2004 (suočavanje sa prošlošću), in Lj. Dimić,
D. Stojanović and M. Jovanović, Srbija 1804–2004: tri vidjenja ili poziv na dijalog (Belgrade:
Udruženje za društvenu istoriju, 2005), 102.
14 Ibid. 100.
 K. V. Nikiforov, Distinctive Characteristics of Transformation in Eastern Europe 433

once”.15 It was precisely the fact that Milošević managed to “ride” this wave of
nationalism that lent such stability to the regime.16
In late 1988, with the help of protests against the local bureaucracy which
he had conisderably inspired, Milošević managed to replace the leadership of
Vojvodina and Montenegro with his own protégés. Similar attempts were made
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but with little success. These shifts were called “anti-
bureaucratic revolutions”. Of course, they had little to do with the “velvet revolu-
tions” that swept Eastern Europe in 1989. As communism counted its last days
throughout Eastern Europe, the old regime in Serbia, under the slogan of an
“anti-bureaucratic revolution”, managed to consolidate its power.
The boom of nationalism in Serbia, spearheaded by Milošević, was also
boosted by the concurrent rise of nationalism in Yugoslavia’s north-western re-
publics – Slovenia17 and Croatia. This was followed by the rapid deterioration
of the Yugoslav economy and, even more importantly, by the events in Kosovo,
where the position of the local Serbian population was becoming increasingly
difficult. In order to attract attention, the Serbs of Kosovo began sending collec-
tive petitions to the higher government organs and organizing protest marches
to Belgrade.
In the context of this topic, it is important to note that the developments
in Kosovo had a decisive impact on the fact that the Yugoslav democratism of
the Serbian opposition intelligentsia increasingly gave way to nationalist ideas.
While many pro-opposition figures, including Dobrica Ćosić, had previously
believed that the Yugoslav federation was the best solution for the Serbian ques-
tion, they now began to see it as a suppression mechanism directed at all things
Serbian.18 The pattern observed above came to the fore – the replacement of
initially democratic tendencies by national or even nationalist ones.
A similar pattern can be observed in the territory of the former USSR.
For example, in many Soviet republics, particularly in the Baltic states, popular

15 D. Stoianovich, “Porochnyi krug serbskoi oppozitsii”, in Serbiia o sebe (Moscow: Evropa,

2005), 117. For more detail see Jović, Jugoslavija, država koja je odumrla, 423, 430, 449.
16 The words of Slobodan Jovanović used to describe an earlier period in Serbian history

come to mind and seem as current as ever: “Serbia did not create an intellectual and political
elite with a modern understanding of nation. The semi-intellectual became prevalent, leech-
ing on nationalism as the only tradition, even when it was no longer so.” Quoted in L. Perović,
“Iskustvo sa drugim narodima”, in Jugoslavija u istorijskoj perspektivi (Belgrade: Helsinški od-
bor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2017), 207.
17 According to Jović, Jugoslavija, država koja je odumrla, 423, 430, 449, Slovene nationalism

was no weaker than Serbian. Like in Serbia, the Slovene leadership was becoming increas-
ingly tolerant towards its opposition and in the end a pan-Slovene bloc of sorts emerged in
this republic. Like in Serbia, the Slovene communists could become both the government
and the opposition.
18 S. K. Pavlović, Srbija: istorija iza imena (Belgrade: Clio, 2004), 218, 227.
434 Balcanica L (2019)

fronts were organized as informal coalitions of very diverse forces opposed to

the monopolist position of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).
Generally speaking, they were led by democratic convictions and enjoyed the
support of both the titular and the Russian-speaking population. However, in
time, and particularly after coming to power, these organizations or political par-
ties and the coalitions that had emerged from them took up extremely national
or even nationalist positions. For example, it is well known that many Russians
and native speakers of Russian in Latvia and Estonia, even those born in these
states, did not receive Latvian or Estonian citizenship.
At a very different time, in the period 2011–2013, very different events
took place at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow. Mass protests were held against the
alleged falsification of the results of parliamentary and then presidential elec-
tions. For the purposes of this paper it is important to note that nationalist
forces gradually began to emerge and become prominent in the joint democratic
movement of protesting citizens. Although certainly in the minority, these forces
were far more united and better organized than the others. It can be assumed
that they could have completely taken over the initiative if the government had
not quelled the protests.
Finally, another example is the abovementioned Ukrainian Euromaidan
– the political crisis that erupted in the country in 2013–2014. The protests
began with democratic demands and were aimed against social injustice, the low
standard of living, rampant corruption etc. only to quickly radicalize, with the
leading role taken over by nationalist and even extreme nationalist forces that
glorified Nazi fascist collaborators in the Second World War.
Let me underline once again: nationalism, as we have seen, tends to enter
the stage in times of democratic changes, while democratic ideas are clearing
their path but still remain underdeveloped and have yet to win the final victory
and become deeply embedded. In this case nationalism makes use of new pos-
sibilities that have emerged, among other things, owing to democratization pro-
cesses. I am of the opinion that this is one of the obvious patterns of democratic
transformations, which always bring a very real danger of the rise of national-
ism. Encouraging nationalism in the name of the struggle against totalitarian
or authoritarian regimes always means playing with fire. Nationalism will not
necessarily yield the positions it has won to democracy.
 K. V. Nikiforov, Distinctive Characteristics of Transformation in Eastern Europe 435

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