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Monday, December 20, 2010
MARIO FL. CRESPO, vs. HON.
LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL G.R.
No. L-53373, June 30, 1987
Crespo vs. Mogul
G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987
Doctrine: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal
actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the fiscal. The institution
of a criminal action depends upon the sound
discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the
criminal prosecution under the direction and
control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or
unfounded prosecution by private persons.
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
1. On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K.
de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal
filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl.
Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena
City.
2. When the case was set for arraignment the
accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on
the ground that there was a pending petition for
review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the
resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for
the filing of the information.
3. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding
judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied
the motion. A motion for reconsideration of the
order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977
but the arraignment was deferred to August 18,
1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the
matter to the appellate court.
4. A petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed
by the accused in the Court of Appeals. In an
order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals
restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the
arraignment of the accused until further orders of
the Court.
5. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor
General he recommended that the petition be
given due course.
6. On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by
the Court of Appeals granting the writ and
perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing
his threat to compel the arraignment of the
accused in the case until the Department of
Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for
review.
7. On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of
Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the
petition for review reversed the resolution of the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the
fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the
information filed against the accused.
8. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of
evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated
April 10, 1978 with the trial court, attaching
thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary
Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978 the
private prosecutor was given time to file an
opposition thereto.
9. On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the
motion and set the arraignment, stating that “the
motion’s trust being to induce this Court to resolve
the innocence of the accused on evidence not
before it but on that adduced before the
Undersecretary of Justice, a matter that not only
disregards the requirements of due process but
also erodes the Court’s independence and
integrity.”
10. The accused then filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or
temporary restraining order in the Court of
Appeals.
11. On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was
issued by the Court of Appeals against the
threatened act of arraignment of the accused until
further orders from the Court. In a decision of
October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition and lifted the restraining order of
January 23, 1979.
12. A motion for reconsideration of said decision
filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of
February 19, 1980.
13. Hence this petition for review of said decision.
Petitioner and private respondent filed their
respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be
reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered
to dismiss the information.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court, acting on a motion
to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial
Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of
Justice to whom the case was elevated for review,
may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the
arraignment and trial on the merits?
RULING: YES.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a
complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the prosecution
of criminal cases even while the case is already in
Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on
what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to
the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation
whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be
disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of
Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from
the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court. The
matter should be left entirely for the determination
of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Lex at 10:45 PM
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