Case No: 16

Title: AGAPITO MAGBANUA et al vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT, DIEGO PEREZ AND NENA
PEREZ
G.R No: 137 SCRA 328
Date: June 29, 1985

FACTS:

The plaintiffs filed a petition against the respondents all surnamed Perez, alleging that they are
shared tenants of the defendant, and that the latter divert the flow of water from their farm lots
which caused the drying of their landholdings and asked to vacate their areas for they could not
plant palay due to lack of water. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs and
ordered the defendants to pay moral damages and exemplary damages amounting to ten thousand
pesos and attorney’s fee for five thousand pesos. The defendants appealed to the Intermediate
Appellate Court which the latter affirmed by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to
be awarded to the plaintiffs. Upon the reinstatement of the IAC, the trial court did not agree in its
decision because the former believed that as a shared tenants, they are entitled to be maintained as
agricultural lessees in peaceful cultivation of their respective landholding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the tenants of defendants were entitled to moral and exemplary damages.

HELD:

The petition is granted and the decision under review is modified and each of the plaintiffs is entitled
to receive award of moral and exemplary damages by the defendants.

Under the law, the land owners has an obligation to keep the tenant in a peaceful and continuous
cultivation of his landholding. In this case it shows that petitioners were denied irrigation water for
their farm lots in order to make them vacate their landholdings. The defendant violated the
plaintiffs’ rights and caused prejudice to the latter by the diversion of water. Under Article 2219 (10),
the Civil Code permits the award of moral damages for act mentioned in Article 21 of the Civil Code
which provides, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, god customs, and public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The
defendants acted in an oppressive manner which is contrary to the morals of the petitioners and
therefore they are liable for the compensation to the latter. Exemplary damage amounting to five
hundred pesos (P500), one thousand pesos (P1,000) for moral damage, one thousand pesos (P1,000)
attorney’s fee.
Case No: 36
Title: JUAN G. FRIVALDO vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RAUL R. LEE
RAUL R. LEE vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO
G.R No: 120295, 123755
Date: JUNE 28, 1996

FACTS:
Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the 1995
elections. Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be
disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen
of the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled
Comelec promulgated a Resolution granting the petition. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted
for during the elections held on said date. Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of
the election returns and a Certificate of Votes showing the following votes:
Juan G. Frivaldo
73,440
Raul R.Lee
53,304

Lee filed a supplemental petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of
Sorsogon. According at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995 Lee was proclaimed governor of
Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the annulment of proclamation of Lee and
for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his
oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725
which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted."
As such there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation of Frivaldo as governor. He
averred that pursuant the case of Labo vs. Comelec, the vice-governor, not Lee, should occupy said
position of governor
Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution holding that Lee, "not having
garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected
governor; and that Frivaldo" having garnered the highest number of votes, and having reacquired his
Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
725, Frivaldo is qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon. It further contends that
assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m.
of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code
"must exist on the date of his election if not, when the certificate of candidacy is filed,"

ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged repatriation of respondent was valid and retroactive in effect as to cure
his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor.
HELD:
Validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this case.
All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
The court also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the filing of his
application on August 17, 1994. Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a
registered voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been
repatriated--i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a
voter is likewise deemed validated as of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of
his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local
Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?"
We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really
stateless at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor.
In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenship long before May 8, 1995.” At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim when he
abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino
citizenship.

The court ruled that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by
an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office
to which he has been elected. It further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the
present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's
repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and effective. By reason
of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status
and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up
his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his
repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the
pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation
of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office
of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition
of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to
have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with its
holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to
run for and hold public office. And once again, it emphasize in its previous rulings recognizing the
Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.

PRINCIPLE:
Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in
the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.

Lis mota- the cause or motivation of a legal action or lawsuit.

FACTS:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodora Bellones. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodora was shot by Pepito resulting to her death. One year and eight months thereafter, Pepito
and respondent Norma Bayadog got married without license. Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit stating that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years thus
exempted from securing a marriage license. Pepito died on a car accident. Petitioners, after their
father's death filed for a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging
that the marriage was void for lack of marriage license. Case was filed on the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of second marriage would affect petitioners’ successional rights.

The private respondent filed a petition to dismiss on a ground that petitioners have no cause of
action since they are not the person who could file an action for “annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code. Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the RTC Branch 59 of Toledo City, Cebu
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is “ rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to
resolve the issue.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not plaintiffs have cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration
of the nullity of marriage.
2) Whether or not the second marriage of the plaintiffs' deceased father with the defendant is
null and void ab initio.

HELD:

1) The Lower Court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare their father’s
marriage null and void before his death. Applying Artie 47 of the Family Code which
enumerate the time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code cannot be applied even
by analogy to petitioners for declaration of nullity of marriage. Article 47 pertains to the
grounds, periods, and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of
nullity of marriage. The code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare nullity of
marriage.

2) A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
absence of which renders the marriage ab initio. However, there are several instances
recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, provided in the
Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period or at
 least five years. Thus, it cannot be said that they have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with the respondent, only about twenty months had
elapsed. Their five-year cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It
should be in the nature of perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect
only by the absence of a marriage contract. Having determined that the second marriage
involved in this case is not covered by exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it
is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

Ab initio- from the beginning, from the first act.

FACTS:

The accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima contracted a marriage with a cetain Maria Gorrea
in Cebu. After nine years, while his marriage with Gorrea was subsisting, the accused under the
name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol in Iloilo City.

The sponsors of the accused was Eulogio Giroy and Emilio Tomesa who are employees of the Office
of the Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo. The couple established residence in Iloilo. As the accused was
the a traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu
where he maintained his firt wife, Maria Gorrea, who died in Cebu five years after his second
marriage. The Accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu, where she worked as a teacher-nurse.

The accused and Maria Faicol seemingly did not live a happy marital life for it appears that during
their two year stay in Cebu, Maria Faicol suffered injuries in her eye because of the physical
maltreatment from the accused. The accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo for allegedly the purpose of
undergoing eyesight treatment. During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with
Jesusa C. Maglasang. Although the accused made an attempt to deny his marriage with Faicol, the
court belives that the attempt is futile for the fact that the second marriage was established by a
certificate and a testimony of Faicol and Giroy, one of the sponsors.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of bigamy.

HELD:

Section 29 of the marriage law or Act No. 3613 makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any
person during the lifetime of his spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree
is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. It is to be
noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the
appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was
entered into. The marriage was a valid one and appellant’s prosecution for contracting this marriage
cannot prosper. The judgment appealed from was reversed and the defendant-appellant was
acquitted.
Case No: 96
Title: ERLINDA K. ILUORIO vs. ERLINDA BILDNER and SILVIA K. ILUSORIO
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA BILDNER and SILVIA K. ILUSORIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO
G.R No: 139789, 139808
Date: May 12, 2000

FACTS:

Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of
pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and President of
Baguio Country Club. Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted marriage and lived together
for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed
reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila
and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand,
Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.

Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda
Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).

Upon Potenciano’s arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in
Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda, alleged that during this time, their mother gave
Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by
his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence, Potenciano’s health deteriorated. On February 25,
1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the
person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor
eyesight and impaired judgment.

On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not
return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati.

On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the
custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents refused petitioner’s demands to
see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a wife may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in
conjugal bliss.

HELD:

The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be
enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.

The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person if such restraint is illegal.
It is issued when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising legal custody
over another person. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal
or moral.

The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him
mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the
capacity of the individual to discern his actions. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he
was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, the court has no
reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.

With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the
subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to
privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right.

The petition for habeas corpus was DENIED for lack of merit.

The court grants the petition and nullifies the decision of the Court if Appeals insofar as it gives
visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio.

PRNCIPLE:

"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the
body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his capture and
detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ shall
consider in that behalf."

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the
rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person
continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is
denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and
where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy
and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom
Case No: 116
Title: SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
Branch 25, Iloilo City and SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS and TEODORA AYSON
G.R. No: 125465
Date: June 29, 1999

FACTS:

On December 3, 1990, petitioners, the spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for
damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. In said complaint,
petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land in the town of Jamindan, Province of
Capiz, as shown by OCT No. 0-2124, issued pursuant to the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, dated April 12, 1984 which modified the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, in a
land registration case filed by private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros. Petitioners as a result of the
filing of the land registration case; were deprived of income from the land that such income
consisted of rentals from tenants of the land in the amount of P66,000.00 per year from 1968 to
1987, and P595,000.00 per year thereafter; and that private respondents filed the land registration
case and withheld possession of the land from petitioners in bad faith.

In their answer, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that private
respondent Hontiveros was a widower while private respondent Ayson was single and denied that
they had deprived petitioners of possession of and income from the land. On the contrary, they
alleged that possession of the property in question had already been transferred to petitioners on
August 7, 1985, by virtue of a writ of possession issued by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial
Court of Capiz the return thereof having been received by petitioners' counsel and since then
petitioners have been directly receiving rentals from the tenants of the land, that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action since it did not allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise had
been made, considering that petitioner Augusto Hontiveros and private respondent Gregorio
Hontiveros are brothers; that petitioners' claim for damages was barred by prescription with respect
to claims before 1984; that there were no rentals due since private respondent Hontiveros was a
possessor in good faith and for value; and that private respondent Ayson had nothing to do with the
case as she was not married to private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros and did not have any
proprietary interest in the subject property. Private respondents prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint and for an order against petitioners to pay damages to private respondents by way of
counterclaim, as well as reconveyance of the subject land to private respondents.

Petitioners filed an Amended Complaint to insert therein an allegation that "earnest efforts towards
a compromise have been made between the parties but the same were unsuccessful." In which the
private respondents denied. The trial court denied petitioners' motion. At the same time, however, it
dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint was not verified as required by Art. 151 of the
Family Code and, therefore, it did not believe that earnest efforts had been made to arrive at a
compromise.
ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the trial court could dismiss the complaint motu proprio for failure to comply with
Art. 151 of the Family Code after denying petitioners' motion for judgment on the pleadings,
2) Whether or not Art. 151 applies to this case.

HELD:

1) The trial court itself found that judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate not only for the fact
that private respondents in their answer, specifically denied the claim of damages against them, but
also because of the rule that the party claiming damages must satisfactorily prove the amount
thereof. Under the rules, if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed, the
trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party. When
there are actual issues raised in the answer, such as one involving damages, which require the
presentation of evidence and assessment by the trial court, it is improper for the judge to render
judgment based on the pleadings alone. In this case, aside from the amount of damages, the
following factual issues have to be resolved, private respondent Teodora Ayson's participation and
liability, if any to petitioners and the nature, extent, and duration of private respondents ' possession
of the subject property. The trial court, therefore, correctly denied petitioners' motion for judgment
on the pleadings.

2) No, the inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as
plaintiff takes the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the
phrase "members of the same family" refers to the husband and wife, parents and children,
ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood. Sisters-in-law and
brothers-in-law are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family.
Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of
respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner
Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151.

The petition is granted and the Order is set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.

Muto proporio- on his own impulse. Describes an official act taken without a formal request from
another party. 
Case No: 136
Title: MANUEL DE ASIS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GLEN CAMIL ANDRES DE ASIS represented by
her mother/guardian VIRCEL D. ANDRES
G.R. No. 12757
Date: February 15, 1999

FACTS:

Vircel D. Andres, (the herein private respondent) in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor,
Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-935 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94,
alleging that the defendant Manuel de Asis (the petitioner here) is the father of subject minor Glen
Camil Andres de Asis, and the former refused and failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter,
despite repeated demands.

In his Answer, petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor and theorized that he cannot
therefore be required to provide support for him. Private respondent Vircel D. Andres, through
counsel, sent in a manifestation the pertinent portion of declaring that the said minor child is not his
and that he has no obligations to the plaintiff. By virtue of the said manifestation, both the plaintiff
and the defendant agreed to move for the dismissal of the case.

Another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against Manuel A. de Asis, praying for
support in arrears which defendant failed to provide plaintiff shortly after her birth and other reliefs.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground of res judicata, alleging that Civil Case C-
16107 is barred by the prior judgment which dismissed with prejudice Civil Case Q -88-935. The trial
court ruled that res judicata is inapplicable in an action for support for the reason that renunciation
or waiver of future support is prohibited by law. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari, the latter dismissed the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in upholding the denial of the motion to dismiss by the trial court, and holding
that an action for support cannot be barred by res judicata.

HELD:

No, the court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and dismissed the petition. The right to
receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person, Article 301 of the Civil
Code. Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. In the case at bar,
respondent minor's mother, who was the plaintiff in the first case, manifested that she was
withdrawing the case as it seemed futile to claim support from petitioner who denied his paternity
over the child. Since the right to claim for support is predicated on the existence of filiation between
the minor child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to believe that such manifestation
admitting the futility of claiming support from him puts the issue to rest and bars any and all future
complaint for support. It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be
shown between the claimant and the parent. However, paternity and filiation or the lack of the same
is a relationship that must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or
absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.

PRICIPLE:

The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence, he is
not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving
up of life itself. The right to life cannot be renounce; hence, support which is the means to attain the
former, cannot be renounced. To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family
right of a person to support is virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a
public burden. This is contrary to public policy.

Res judicata- a matter already decided on its merits by acourt having a competent jurisdiction and
not subject to litigation again between the same parties.
Case No: 150
Title: IN THE MATTER OF CHANGES OF NAME OF GERTRUDES JOSEFINA DEL PRADO, THRU HER
NATURAL GUARDIAN CORAZON ADOLFO CALDERON vs. REPUBLIC
G.R No: L- 18127
Date: April 05, 1967

FACTS:

Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, a minor, through her mother filed a petition to the court of First
Instance of Davao praying that her name “Gertrudes Josefina del Prado” be changed to “Gertrudes
Josefina Calderon”. The petition is an alleged illegitimate child out of a bigamous marriage
contracted by Manuel del Prado with Corazon Adolfo; that the surname del Prado is a stigma of
illegitimacy and would give cause to a constant irritation in her relations with other people.
Petitioner is living with her mother who is now married to Engineer Romeo C. Calderon and the
petitioner desires to change her surname from “del Prado” to “Calderon” which is the surname of
her foster father. The Solicitor General opposed to the petition on the ground that the change of
surname is unwarranted considering that the petitioner is born out of bigamous marriage and that
the change of surname would be prejudicial to the rights and interest in which she has by the virtue
of the judgment of the annulment of her parents’ marriage.

After hearing the court granted the petition and ordered the change of the name of the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court’s decision to grant the petition is based upon “proper and
reasonable cause” as required by Section 5 of Rule 103 of the new Rules of Court.

HELD:

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, the petition to change the name should be
granted only where to do so for the best interest of the child. The Solicitor General contends that
the evident purpose of the petitioner seeking to change her surname is to conceal her status as an
illegitimate child and that any attempt to conceal illegitimacy cannot be motivated by good faith and
an honest purpose. The court does not agree with the idea of the Solicitor General, justice dictates
that every person is allowed to avail any opportunity to improve his social standing as long as in
doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interest of the State or of the people. The
Purpose of the law in allowing a change as contemplated in the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to promote his interest.

Principle:

A change of name under Rule 103 does not by itself define or affect a change in one’s existing family
relations, or in the right or duties flowing therefrom, nor does it create new family rights and duties
where none before was existing.