Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her

husband, Placido Alipio, had passed away on December 1, 1988. She 2 

SECOND DIVISION based her action on Rule 3, §21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which then
provided that "when the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest
G.R. No. 134100               September 29, 2000 thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially
PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner, provided in these rules." This provision has been amended so that now
vs. Rule 3, §20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. JARING, represented by his
Attorney-In-Fact RAMON G. JARING, respondents. When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract,
express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment
DECISION in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it
shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry
of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein
MENDOZA, J.:
shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.
The question for decision in this case is whether a creditor can sue the
surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed by the
The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since
conjugal partnership of gains, or whether such claim must be filed in
petitioner was herself a party to the sublease contract, she could be
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent. The trial
independently impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel spouses
court and the Court of Appeals ruled in the affirmative. We reverse.
and that the death of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from
the case. The Manuel spouses failed to file their answer. For this reason,
3 

The facts are as follows: they were declared in default.

Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in

1 
On February 26, 1991, the lower court rendered judgment after trial,
Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a period of five ordering petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the
years ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he subleased unpaid balance of ₱50,600.00 plus attorney's fees in the amount of
the fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido ₱10,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
and Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel.
The stipulated amount of rent was ₱485,600.00, payable in two
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial
installments of ₱300,000.00 and ₱185,600.00, with the second
court erred in denying her motion to dismiss. In its decision rendered on
4 
installment falling due on June 30, 1989. Each of the four sublessees
July 10, 1997, the appellate court dismissed her appeal. It held:
signed the contract.
The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon
The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the
must be dismissed when the defendant dies before final judgment in the
sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of
regional trial court, does not apply where there are other defendants
₱50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply with
against whom the action should be maintained. This is the teaching
their obligation, so that, on October 13, 1989, private respondent sued
of Climaco v. Siy Uy, wherein the Supreme Court held:
the Alipio and Manuel spouses for the collection of the said amount
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Dinalupihan, Bataan. In the
alternative, he prayed for the rescission of the sublease contract should Upon the facts alleged in the complaint, it is clear that Climaco had a
the defendants fail to pay the balance. cause of action against the persons named as defendants therein. It was,
however, a cause of action for the recovery of damages, that is, a sum of
money, and the corresponding action is, unfortunately, one that does not
survive upon the death of the defendant, in accordance with the JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. JARING. 7

x x x           x x x          x x x The petition is meritorious. We hold that a creditor cannot sue the

surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the
However, the deceased Siy Uy was not the only defendant, Manuel Co collection of a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal partnership
was also named defendant in the complaint. Obviously, therefore, the and that the proper remedy is for him to file a claim in the settlement of
order appealed from is erroneous insofar as it dismissed the case against estate of the decedent.
Co. (Underlining added)
First. Petitioner's husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten
Moreover, it is noted that all the defendants, including the deceased, months before private respondent filed the collection suit in the trial court
were signatories to the contract of sub-lease. The remaining defendants on October 13, 1989. This case thus falls outside of the ambit of Rule 3,
cannot avoid the action by claiming that the death of one of the parties to §21 which deals with dismissals of collection suits because of the death
the contract has totally extinguished their obligation as held in Imperial of the defendant during the pendency of the case and the subsequent
Insurance, Inc. v. David: procedure to be undertaken by the plaintiff, i.e., the filing of claim in the
proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate. As already noted,
We find no merit in this appeal. Under the law and well settled Rule 3, §20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now provides that the
jurisprudence, when the obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may case will be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable
bring his action in toto against any of the debtors obligated in solidum. judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein will then be enforced in the
Thus, if husband and wife bound themselves jointly and severally, in case manner especially provided in the Rules for prosecuting claims against
of his death, her liability is independent of and separate from her the estate of a deceased person. The issue to be resolved is whether
husband's; she may be sued for the whole debt and it would be error to private respondent can, in the first place, file this case against petitioner.
hold that the claim against her as well as the claim against her husband
should be made in the decedent's estate. (Agcaoili vs. Vda. de Agcaoili, Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses,
90 Phil. 97).5 signed the sublease contract binding themselves to pay the amount of
stipulated rent. Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on June 4, Manuels) is one which is chargeable against their conjugal partnership.
1998. Hence this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
6  Under Art. 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for
¾
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN APPLYING CLIMACO v. SIY UY, 19 SCRA 858, IN All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
SEEKING THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AGAINST purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership. 8

REMAINING DEFENDANTS BUT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO

THE CLAIM FOR PAYMENT AGAINST HER AND HER When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was
HUSBAND WHICH SHOULD BE PROSECUTED AS A MONEY automatically dissolved and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in
9 

CLAIM. the settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, §2

which states:
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN APPLYING IMPERIAL INSURANCE INC. v. DAVID, Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. ¾ When the marriage
133 SCRA 317, WHICH IS NOT APPLICABLE BECAUSE THE is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property
SPOUSES IN THIS CASE DID NOT BIND THEMSELVES shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof
paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If
both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in administration or request that administration be granted to some other
the testate or intestate proceedings of either. person. 14

As held in Calma v. Tañedo, after the death of either of the spouses, no

10 
The cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in support of its ruling,
complaint for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the namely, Climaco v. Siy Uy and Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David, are
15  16 

conjugal partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse. based on different sets of facts. In Climaco, the defendants, Carlos Siy
Instead, the claim must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation Uy and Manuel Co, were sued for damages for malicious prosecution.
and settlement of the conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon Thus, apart from the fact the claim was not against any conjugal
the death of one spouse, the powers of administration of the surviving partnership, it was one which does not survive the death of defendant Uy,
spouse ceases and is passed to the administrator appointed by the court which merely resulted in the dismissal of the case as to him but not as to
having jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings. Indeed, the
11 
the remaining defendant Manuel Co.
surviving spouse is not even a de facto administrator such that
conveyances made by him of any property belonging to the partnership With regard to the case of Imperial, the spouses therein jointly and
prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal partnership property is severally executed an indemnity agreement which became the basis of a
void.12
collection suit filed against the wife after her husband had died. For this
reason, the Court ruled that since the spouses' liability was solidary, the
The ruling in Calma v. Tañedo was reaffirmed in the recent case surviving spouse could be independently sued in an ordinary action for
of Ventura v. Militante. In that case, the surviving wife was sued in an
13 
the enforcement of the entire obligation.
amended complaint for a sum of money based on an obligation allegedly
contracted by her and her late husband. The defendant, who had earlier It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal
moved to dismiss the case, opposed the admission of the amended partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife
complaint on the ground that the death of her husband terminated their is chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership
conjugal partnership and that the plaintiff's claim, which was chargeable which is primarily bound for its repayment. Thus, when the spouses are
17 

against the partnership, should be made in the proceedings for the sued for the enforcement of an obligation entered into by them, they are
settlement of his estate. The trial court nevertheless admitted the being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal
complaint and ruled, as the Court of Appeals did in this case, that since partnership and not as independent debtors such that the concept of joint
the defendant was also a party to the obligation, the death of her or solidary liability, as between them, does not apply. But even assuming
husband did not preclude the plaintiff from filing an ordinary collection suit the contrary to be true, the nature of the obligation involved in this case,
against her. On appeal, the Court reversed, holding that ¾ as will be discussed later, is not solidary but rather merely joint,
making Imperial still inapplicable to this case.
as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates
upon the death of either spouse. . . . Where a complaint is brought From the foregoing, it is clear that private respondent cannot maintain the
against the surviving spouse for the recovery of an indebtedness present suit against petitioner.  Rather, his remedy is to file a claim
1âwphi1

chargeable against said conjugal [partnership], any judgment obtained against the Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
thereby is void. The proper action should be in the form of a claim to be petitioner's husband or, if none has been commenced, he can file a
filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. petition either for the issuance of letters of administration or for the
18 

allowance of will, depending on whether petitioner's husband died

19 

In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the intestate or testate. Private respondent cannot short-circuit this procedure
spouses, there is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does not by lumping his claim against the Alipios with those against the Manuels
mean, however, that the conjugal partnership continues. And private considering that, aside from petitioner's lack of authority to represent their
respondent cannot be said to have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of conjugal estate, the inventory of the Alipios' conjugal property is
the Revised Rules of Court, he may apply in court for letters of necessary before any claim chargeable against it can be paid. Needless
administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of the deceased . . . if to say, such power exclusively pertains to the court having jurisdiction
after thirty (30) days from his death, petitioner failed to apply for over the settlement of the decedent's estate and not to any other court.
Second. The trial court ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses to amount shall be paid to the Sub-Lessor by the Sub-Lessees in the
pay private respondent the unpaid balance of the agreed rent in the following manner, to wit:
amount of ₱50,600.00 without specifying whether the amount is to be
paid by them jointly or solidarily. In connection with this, Art. 1207 of the A. Three hundred thousand (₱300,000.00) Pesos upon signing this
Civil Code provides: contract; and

The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in B. One Hundred Eight-Five Thousand Six-Hundred (₱185,6000.00)
one and the same obligation does not imply that each one of the former Pesos to be paid on June 30, 1989.
has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render,
entire compliance with the prestations. There is a solidary liability only Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation
when the obligation expressly so estates, or when the law or the nature of the Manuel and Alipio spouses is chargeable against their respective
of the obligation requires solidarity. conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance of ₱50,600.00 should be
divided into two so that each couple is liable to pay the amount of
Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the ₱25,300.00.
contrary does not appear, an obligation is presumed to be only joint, i.e.,
the debt is divided into as many equal shares as there are debtors, each WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Bienvenido Manuel and
debt being considered distinct from one another. 20
Remedios Manuel are ordered to pay the amount of ₱25,300.00, the
attorney's fees in the amount of ₱10,000.00 and the costs of the suit. The
Private respondent does not cite any provision of law which provides that complaint against petitioner is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of
when there are two or more lessees, or in this case, sublessees, the a claim by private respondent in the proceedings for the settlement of
latter's obligation to pay the rent is solidary. To be sure, should the estate of Placido Alipio for the collection of the share of the Alipio
lessees or sublessees refuse to vacate the leased property after the spouses in the unpaid balance of the rent in the amount of ₱25,300.00.
expiration of the lease period and despite due demands by the lessor,
they can be held jointly and severally liable to pay for the use of the SO ORDERED.
property. The basis of their solidary liability is not the contract of lease or
sublease but the fact that they have become joint tortfeasors. In the case
21 

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

at bar, there is no allegation that the sublessees refused to vacate the
fishpond after the expiration of the term of the sublease. Indeed, the
unpaid balance sought to be collected by private respondent in his
collection suit became due on June 30, 1989, long before the sublease
expired on September 12, 1990.
Footnotes
Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of lease that when
there are more than two lessees or sublessees their liability is solidary. Although in the Court of Appeals Rollo and in the pleadings in
1 

On the other hand, the pertinent portion of the contract involved in this this Court private respondent is referred to as Romeo Jaring, it
case reads: 22 appears that his correct name is Romero Jaring as indicated in a
document signed by him.
2. That the total lease rental for the sub-leased fishpond for the entire
period of three (3) years and two (2) months is FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT- Records, p. 11.
2 

FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (₱485,600.00) PESOS, including all

the improvements, prawns, milkfishes, crabs and related species thereon Id., p. 37.
3 

as well all fishing equipment, paraphernalia and accessories. The said

 Per Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and concurred in by Justices
4  22 
Records, p. 4. (Emphasis added)
Jaime M. Lantin and Buenaventura J. Guerrero.

CA Decision, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 28-29. (Emphasis in the original)

5 

Rollo, p. 32.
6 

Petition, p. 7; Rollo, p. 15.

7 

Substantially reproduced under the FAMILY CODE, Art. 121(2).

8 

CIVIL CODE, Art. 175(1), now Art. 126(1) of the FAMILY CODE.
9 

10 
66 Phil. 594, 598 (1938).

11 
Id. at 597.

Corpuz v. Corpuz, 97 Phil. 655 (1955). See also Ocampo v.

12 

Potenciano, 89 Phil. 159 (1951). Under the Family Code (Art.

124), both the husband and the wife now act as co-administrators
of the conjugal partnership property.

13 
G.R. No. 63145, Oct. 5, 1999.

14 
Id. at 13.

15 
19 SCRA 858 (1967).

16 
133 SCRA 317 (1984).

17 
See Castillo, Jr. v. Pasco, 11 SCRA 102 (1964).

18 
RULES OF COURT, Rule 79, §2.

19 
Id., Rule 76, §1.

20 
See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1208.

See Abalos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106029, Oct. 19,

21 

1999.