2018
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW II
TOPIC- CONCEPT OF
EQULITY
SUBMITTED TO- MR. ASAD
MALIK
SUBMITTED BY- AAMIN BINT
KHURSHID
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
In the name of Almighty Allah,
I express my sincere gratitude to our Crimes teacher, Mr. Asad Malik
for his continuous inspiration and encouragement, valuable
suggestions, and untiring support. His endless creative ideas have
been an important source of my work. I appreciate academic
inspiration and personal help he provided to me.
I am pleased to acknowledge the valuable contribution made by Prof.
(Dr.) Nuzhat Parveen Khan, Head Faculty of law , for allowing me to
use the resources available in the University, which helped me in
completion of thisp roject. I would also like to express my sincere
thanks to all other Teachers and Staff of Faculty of law who directly
or indirectly helped me in completing this work successfully.
Last but not the least, I would like to thank my parents, my sisters for
their affectionate encouragement and support all throughout this
project. I would also like to thank my friends for their support.
1
INTRODUCTION
“Every official from the Prime Minister down to constable or a
collector of taxes is under the same responsibility for every act done
without any legal justification as any other citizen.” Dicey has
beautifully drawn out an explanation as to how every citizen is equal
in the eyes of law irrespective of his rank or class.
Articles 14 to 18 of the constitution guarantee the right to
equality to every citizen of India. Article 14 embodies the general
principles of ‘equality before law’ and prohibits unreasonable
discrimination between persons. Article 14 embodies the idea of
equality expressed in the Preamble. The succeeding Articles 15, 16,
17 and 18 lay down specific application of the general rules laid down
in Article 14. Article 15 related to prohibition of discrimination on
grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Article 16
guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.
Article 17 abolishes ‘Untouchability’. Article 18 abolishes ‘Title’.
Article 14 of the Indian Constitution:
The state shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal
protection of laws within the territory of India.
‘Equality before law is somewhat negative concept implying the
absence of any special privilege in favour of individuals and the equal
subject all classes to the ordinary law.
2
‘Equal protection of the law’ is a more positive concept implying
equality of treatment in equal circumstances. Thus, in substance the 2
expressions mean one and the same thing.
‘State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar’1
The Court rightly observed that the second expression is the corollary
of the first and it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the
violation of equal protection of laws will not be the violation of the
equality before the law. Thus, in substance, the two expressions mean
one and the same thing.
In ‘Re Special Courts Bill’, 19782,
Chandrachud, J., observed: “The underlying principle of the
guarantee of Art. 14 was that all persons similarly circumstanced
should be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities
imposed.”
EQUALITY AND RULE OF LAW:
Edward Coke was the founder of Rule of law. He believed in
government of law not of men. During James I Reign, he said “King
must be under God and Law”.
In 1885, Prof Dicey gave the concept of Rule of law and according to
Dicey it means that ‘no man is above law and that every person
whatever be his rank or conditions is subjected to the jurisdiction of the
ordinary courts.
Prof Dicey gave 3 meaning of Rule of law:
1. Supremacy of law- It means that the absolute supremacy of law
as opposed to the arbitrary power of the Government. In other
1
AIR 1952 SC 75
2
AIR 1979 SC 478
3
words, “a man may be punished for a breach of law bit he can
punished for nothing else”. Law is the supreme, nobody is over
and above the law.
2. Equality before law- It means subjection of all classes to the
ordinary law courts. This means that ‘no one is above the law
with the sole exception of the monarch who can do no wrong’.
Everyone in England, whether he is an official of the state or
private individual is bound to obey the same law. Thus, public
officials do not hold a privileged position in Great Britain. In
Great Britain there is one system of law and one system of
courts for all, i.e., for public officials and private persons.
France is not having Rule of law, they are having two different
courts for public and private individuals.
3. Pre-dominance of legal spirit- It means that the source of the
right of individuals is not written in the Constitution but the
rules are defined and enforced by the courts.
The first 2 aspects apply to Indian system but the third aspect of the
Dicey’s rule of law does not apply to Indian system as the source of
rights of individuals is the Constitution of India. The constitution is
the Supreme law of the land and all laws passed by the legislature
must be in consistent with constitution.
‘Equality before law’- The concept of equality does not mean
absolute equality among human beings which is physically is not
possible to achieve. It is a concept of implying absence of any special
privilege by reason of birth, creed or the like in favour of any
individual and also the equal subjection of all individuals and classes
to the ordinary law of the land.
4
‘Equal protection of the laws’- The guarantee of equal of equal
protection of laws is that all persons in similar circumstances shall be
treated imposed by the laws. Equal law should be applied to all in the
same situations and there should be no discrimination between one
person and another.
Thus, the rule is that the like should be treated alike and not that
unlike should be treated alike.
‘Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain’3
The Rule of law embodied in Article 14 is the basic structure of the
Indian Constitution and hence it cannot be destroyed even by an
amendment of the Constitution under Article 368 of the constitution.
Any person- In Article 14 of the constitution denotes that the
guarantee of the equal protection of laws is available to any person
which includes any company or association or body of individuals.
The protection of article 14 extends to both citizens and non-citizens
and to natural persons as well as legal persons.
The equality before law is guaranteed to all without regard to race,
colour or nationality, corporations being juristic persons are entitled
to the benefit of Article 14.
Thus, the two expressions in Article 14 make the concept of equal
treatment a binding principle of State Action. In Sri Srinivasa
Theatre v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court explained that
the two expressions equality before the law and equal protection of
law do not mean the same thing even if there may be much in
common between them. Equality before the law is a dynamic concept
having many facets. One facet is that there shall be no privileged
person or class and that none shall be above law. Another facet is the
obligation upon the State to bring about, through the machinery of
3
AIR 1975 SC 229
5
law, an equal society or, equality before the law can be predicated
meaningfully only in equal society.
ARTICLE 14 PERMITS REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION BUT
PROHIBITS CLASS LEGISLATION
Article 14 does not mean that all laws must be general in character or
that the same laws should apply to all persons or that every law must
have universal application, for, all persons are not, by nature,
attainment or circumstances, in the same positions. The State can treat
different persons differently if circumstances justify such treatment.
In fact, identical treatment in unequal circumstances would amount to
inequality. The legislature must possess the power to group persons,
objects and transactions with a view to attaining specific aims. So, a
reasonable classification is not permitted but necessary if society is to
progress.
By the process of classification, the State had the power of
determining who should be regarded as a class for purposes of
legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject.
Classification meant segregation in classes which had a systematic
relation, usually found in common properties and characteristics. It
postulated a rational basis and did not mean herding together of
certain persons and classes arbitrarily.
The class legislation is that which makes an improper discrimination
by conferring particular privileges upon a class of persons arbitrarily
selected. And no reasonable distinction can be found justifying the
inclusion of one and exclusion of other from such privilege. While
Art. 14 forbids class legislation, it permits reasonable classifications
of persons, objects, and transactions by the legislature for the purpose
of achieving specific ends. In other words, what Art. 14 prohibits is
class legislation and not a classification for the purpose of the
legislation.
TEST OF REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION
6
Article 14 forbids class legislation; it does not forbid reasonable
classification of persons, objects, and transactions by the Legislature
for the purpose of achieving specific ends. Classification to be
reasonable should fulfil the following two tests:
1. It should not be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. It should be based
on an intelligible differentia, some real and substantial
distinction, which distinguishes persons or things grouped
together in the class from another left out of it.
2. The differentia adopted as the basis of classification must have
a rational or reasonable nexus with the object sought to be
achieved by the statute in question.
‘State of Bihar v. Bihar 10+2 lecturer association’
“….that the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna
was not right in holding that there is no distinction between trained
lecturers on the one hand and untrained lecturers on the other hand
and no different pay scales can be prescribed for trained and untrained
lecturers and such fixation of pay scales would violate Article 14 of
the Constitution….”
‘R.K. Ghosh v.J.G. Rajput’
In this case, a lawyer who had become a judge in a client’s case who
he once represented was questioned on the ground of Article 14 and
considered to be in violation of it and natural justice as well.
‘D.S. Nakara v. UOI’
In this case, the pension rule was questioned where different benefits
were given to those who were retiring before a date and different to
those who were retiring after the date. It was held that it was not a
reasonable classification.
‘Maneka Gandhi v. UOI’
7
Here, the impounding of the passenger was held arbitrary. Fair press
was also involved in this case also, action of the passport authority
was held violative of article 14.
‘R.D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority’
‘K.A. Abbas v. UOI’
Here, in this case the constitutional validity was challenged on the
ground of Article 14. Cinematography act was challenged as well.
The court held, it was not a violation of article 14 as there is a diverse
type of audience out there. Different kinds of certificated i.e., UA and
A are for different age groups of the audience. Hence, not a violation.
In essence, therefore the difference would appear to be more of a
drafting nature than of substance. For sometimes, a new orientation is
being given to Art. 14. As has been explained by Bhagwati, J., in
‘Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab’, Rule of law which permeates the
entire fabric of the Indian Constitution excludes arbitrariness.
“Whenever we find arbitrariness or unreasonableness there is the
denial of rule of law”. Art. 14 enacts primarily a guarantee against
arbitrariness and inhibits state action, whether legislative or executive,
which suffers from the vice of arbitrariness. “Every state action must
be non-arbitrary and reasonable. Otherwise, the court would strike it
down as invalid.”
This new dimension of Art. 14 transcends the classificatory principle.
Art. 14 is no longer to be equated with the principle of classification.
It is primarily a guarantee against arbitrariness in state action and the
doctrine of classification has been evolved only as a subsidiary rule
for testing whether a particular state action is arbitrary or not. It a law
is arbitrary or irrational it would fall foul of Art. 14.
A common tendency in modern democracies is to confer a
discretionary power on the government or administrative officers. In
order to ensure that discretion is properly exercised, it is necessary
that the statute in question lays down some norms or principles
according to which the administrator has to exercise the discretion.
8
Many a time the statutes do not do this and leave the administrator
free to exercise his power according to his judgment. This creates the
danger of official arbitrariness which is subversive of the doctrine of
equality. To mitigate this danger, the courts have invoked Art. 14. In
course of time, Art. 14 has evolved into a very meaningful guarantee
against any action of the Administration which may be arbitrary,
discriminatory or unequal.
‘Air India V. Nargesh Meerza’
In this case, a regulation made by Air India International, a statutory
corporation, providing for termination of service of an air hostess on
her first pregnancy has been held to be arbitrary and abhorrent to the
notions of a civilized society. The regulation also fixed the normal
age of retirement of air hostess at 35 years but authorized the
managing directors to extend the same to 45 years at his option
subject to other conditions being satisfied. The regulation was held
bad as it armed the managing director with uncanalized and unguided
discretion to extend the age of retirement of an air hostess. No
guidelines, principles or norms were laid down subject to which the
power was to be exercised. Nor was there any procedural safeguard
available to an air hostess who was denied the extension. It was
insulting to the womanhood.
‘Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujeeb’
In this case, 33.5% of marks were being awarded for oral test. It was
challenged in the court of law and was held arbitrary and
discretionary, the court further held that the percentage of marks
awarded should be not more than 15% for oral test.
‘Sapru v. State of Jammu and Kashmir’
Similarly here, 30% of marks were being awarded for viva voce. It
was held that the marks awarded should be not more than 15%.
‘Leela Dhar v. State of Rajasthan’
9
It was questioned whether or not 25% marks for interview for Judicial
Services valid? The court held it to be valid because the people
coming for jobs are expected to be more experienced than the
students in school. Hence it was held valid.
‘K. Nagraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh’
Here, A. P. Government reduced the age of superannuation of its
employees from 58 to 55 by A.P. Public Employment (Regulation of
Age of Superannuation) Act, 1984, as amended by the Act of 1985.
But soon after this, the government realised that serious injustice has
been made to its employees and reversed its decision and substituted
58 to 55 years. The employees, who had retired during this period
after having attained the age of 55 years, were deprived of the benefit
of the higher age of superannuation.
It was held that the action of the government was arbitrary and
discriminatory and violative of Article 14. There was, however, no
reason to pick out a class of persons who deserved the same treatment
from the benefits.
‘Mithu v. State of Punjab’
Here in this case, section 303 of IPC was challenged on the ground
being violative of Article 14. The court held the section as ultra vires.
‘Pradeep Jain v. UOI’
This case is related to the reservation of admission criteria whether it
should be based upon the domicile. It was held the domicile was a
wrong criteria to choose in higher education. Hence, the merit should
be the criteria for admission.
‘Javed v. State of Haryana’
10
There was a rule made by the Panchayat that a person having more
than 2 children should not be allowed to contest the election. This rule
was held arbitrary and violative of Article 14 also, it was said that
Islam gives the liberty to have 4 wives, why not more than 2 children?
The court held the rule not arbitrary or violative of article 14.
‘Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association’
In this case, the women were not allowed to serve liquor at night. The
court held that it is as unconstitutional as it is the duty of government
to provide security to them.
‘Host Restaurent Association v. State of Maharashtra’
Here, Maharashtra government made a rule that in above 3 star hotels,
dance would be allowed and not in below 3 star hotels. Also, it was
said that it was this way because ‘5 star people are more civilized’.
The court held it as irrational and discriminatory.
Article 15- Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion,
race, caste, sex or place of birth
(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds
only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex,
place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability,
restriction or condition with regard to
(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and palaces of public
entertainment; or
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public
resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to
the use of the general public
11
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any
special provision for women and children
(4) Nothing in this article or in clause ( 2 ) of Article 29 shall prevent
the State from making any special provision for the advancement of
any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(5) Nothing in this article or in sub clause G of clause 1 of article 19
shall prevent the state from making any special provisions, by law, for
the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes
of citizens and scheduled castes or tribes in so far as such special
provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions
including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided
by the state, other than the minority educational institutions referred
to in clause 1 of article 30.
Article 15 (1) and (2) prohibit the state from discriminating any
citizen on ground of any religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or
any of them. These articles provide that there shall be no restriction on
any person on any of the above bases to access and use the public
places such as shops, restaurants, hotels, places of public
entertainment etc. or use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and
places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds
or dedicated to the use of the general public.
From article 15(3) onwards, the constitution starts protective
discrimination. Article 15(3) empowers the state to make special
provisions for women and children. Article 15(4) empowers the state
to make special provisions for advancement of socially and
educationally backwards or SC/STs. Article 15(5) goes one step
further and empowers the state to make reservation in admission into
education institutions including private schools or colleges whether or
not aided by government. Only minority educational institutions (such
as Madarsas) have been left out of this provision. Thus, article 15(3)
and 15(4) are foundational bricks of reservation in the country.
12
Article 15 is valid for the citizens only.
‘Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narowttam Das Harsora’
In this case, the word ‘respondent’ will only mean an adult male. The
words ‘adult male’ in Sec 2(q) of the act should stand deleted since
these words do not square with Article 19 as such violence in gender
neutral.
‘State of Maharashtra v. Christian Welfare Association’
Here, Supreme Court issued guidelines that no female can be arrested
after the sunset or before the sunrise. Section 46 of Cr.PC was
amended and it was added that female constables can only arrest the
females and if it is necessary to arrest a female at night, prior
permission of Magistrate is required.
‘Boddhis Gautam v. Shubhra Chakraborty’
In this case, compensation of Rs. 1000 was given by the courts until
the charges have been decided by the court.
Section 47 Cr.PC- …..if any such place is an apartment in the actual
occupancy of a female (not being the person to be arrested) who,
according to custom, does not appear in public, such person or police
officer shall, before entering such apartment, give notice to such
female that she is at liberty to withdraw and shall afford her every
reasonable facility for withdrawing, and may then break open the
apartment and enter it.
Section 51 Cr.PC- …(2) Whenever it is necessary to cause a female
to be searched, the search shall be made by another female with strict
regard to decency.
Police cannot enter the premises owned by Pardanashin woman, he
has to give her chance to withdraw herself from the premises.
13
Section 327 Cr.PC- Trial of rape cases should be done in closed court
in camera.
Section 160 and 161 of Cr.PC- Woman and child cannot be asked to
come to the police station for recording statement, police should go to
their homes.
‘Pawan Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh’
Supreme Court held that one is compelled to think as constraint to
deliberate why women in India are not allowed to live in peace and
live a life that is empowered with dignity and freedom. It has to be
kept in mind that she has a right to life and entitled to love according
to her choice which has been legally recognized. It has to be socially
respected. No one can compel a woman to love, she has a complete
right to reject.
‘Mukesh v. NCT Delhi’
SC held that offences against women are not just women’s issue alone
but human right’s issue. Increased rate of crime against women is an
area of concern for the law makers and it points out an emergent need
to study in depth the root of the problem and remedy through a strict
law and order regime. There are number of legislations and numerous
legal provisions to punish the offender of violence against women.
However it becomes important to assure that gender justice does not
only stay on papers.
‘State of Madras v. Champakam Durrajan’
Government issued an order for reservation, claimed it was according
to Article 46 (Directive Principle). It was contended it was violative
of Article 29 (Fundamental Right). Court did not allow and held it
violative of Fundamental Rights.
Article 15(4) was added by the First Amendment.
14
Coming to Article 16, the articles 16 (1) and (2) give a general rule
that there shall be equal opportunity for all citizens in government
jobs. However, article 16(3), 16(4), 16(4-A) and 16 (4-B) provide
further strength to all sorts of discrimination among the people on
account of their unequal status.
Article 16(3) allows the state to make any law making residence
qualifications necessary in the case of government jobs, thus
making the domicile provisions stronger.
Article 16(4) allows the state to make reservation for any
backward class of citizens which in the opinion of the state is
not adequately represented in services. This opens door for OBC
reservations.
Article 16(4-A) empowers the state to make reservation in
Promotions also for SCs, STs and OBCs.
‘Mohd. Sadiq v. Darwara Singh Guru’
Can a person born in a Muslim family which practice Islamic rights
claimed to have converted to a Scheduled Caste in Sikhism and
contest Assembly Election from a seat reserved for Scheduled caste.
Punjab High Court in this case held that he will not be entitled to
contest the election. But Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s
judgement. Held that caste certificate issued to Sadiq by authority
after his conversion to Sikhism in 2006 had not yet been cancelled.
Nomination for election was filed 5 years later. The court held that it
will not be mandatory for a person to change his name after
conversion.
‘M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore4’
4
AIR 1963 SC 649
15
Order issued by GOI regarding reservation 68% to backward classes
(20% to OBC, 10% to more backward classes and 18% to SC/ST)
The question raised here was whether reservation can be given on the
basis of class.
Supreme Court held that, Capping on 50% reservation. Caste of the
person can be the sole or even pre dominant basis to ascertain whether
that class should be taken to be backward for the purpose of Article
15(4). 68% is excessive and unconstitutional and the amount of
reservation will vary case to case.
“Thus, there is no doubt that Article 15(4) has to be read as a proviso
or an exception to Articles 15(1) and 29(2).”
This view, that Articles 15(4) and 16(4) were exceptions to Articles
15(1) and
16(1), was again reiterated in Triloki Nath v. State of Jammu and
Kashmir5 and in State of A.P. v. U.S.V. Balram6.
‘General Manager Southern Railway v. Rangachari7’
Power of reservation conferred to state not only in appointment but
also in Promotions. Held Article 15(4) of the Constitution of India to
be an exception to Article 15(1). The relevant portion is reproduced
hereunder:
“Article 15(4) which provides, inter alia, for an exception to the
prohibition of discrimination on grounds specified in Article 15(1)
lays down that nothing contained in the said Article shall prevent the
State from making any special provision for the advancement of any
socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes”
The majority of a 7-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in
State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas8 , introduced a change in the concept
of equality. It held that Articles 14, 15, and 16 are all equality rights,
5
AIR 1969 SC 1
6
AIR 1972 1 SCC 660
7
AIR 1962 SC 36
8
AIR 1976 2 SCC 310
16
and that the scheme of equality sought to achieve real equality. It was
held that Articles 15(4) and Article 16(4) are not exceptions to
Articles 15(1) and 16(1) respectively.
Hon’ble Supreme Court settled this issue in Indra Sawhney v. Union
of India, where the majority upheld the principle laid down in
Thomas’ case that Articles 15(4) and 16(4) were not exceptions to
Articles 15(1) and 16(1), but were an emphatic statement of equality.
Therefore, equality, as guaranteed in our Constitution, not only
conceives of providing formal equality but also to provide for real and
absolute equality. Articles 14 and 15(1) enable and contemplate
classification to achieve the Constitutional Objective of real equality.
Articles 15(4) and 16(4) flow out of Articles 15(1) and 16(1)
respectively, and can never be considered as exceptions to Article
15(1) and Article 16(1).
Once this is established, that Article 15(4) and 16(4) are not
exceptions to the mandate of equality but are concrete measures to
bring about the mandate of equality enshrined in Article 14, the effect
of this is that the State is obliged to remove inequalities and
backwardness. This obligation of the State has its source in the
mandate of equality itself under Article 14.
In Thomas’ case, it was held that Government has an affirmative duty
to eliminate inequalities and to provide opportunities for the exercise
of human rights and claims Fundamental rights as enacted in Part III
of the Constitution are, by and large, essentially negative in character.
In Indira Sawhney’s case, Sawant, J concurring with the majority
observed that to bring about equality between the unequals, it was
necessary to adopt positive measures to abolish inequality. The
equalising measures would have to use the same tools by which
inequality was introduced and perpetuated. Otherwise, equalisation
will not be of the unequals. These equalising measures would be
validated by Article 14 which guarantees equality before law.
The majority held that the backward class of citizens contemplated in
Article 16(4) is not the same as socially and emotionally backward
classes referred to in Article 15(4). It is much wider, clause (4) does
not contain the qualifying words “Socially and educationally” as does
17
clause (4) of Article 15. The backward classes of citizens in Article
16(4) takes in SC’s and ST’s and all other backward classes. Thus,
certain classes may not qualify for article 15(4) but they may qualify
for 16(4). Accordingly, the court ruled the Balaji case on this point in
which it was held that the backward class of citizens in Article 16(4)
is the same as the socially and educationally backward classes, SC’s
and ST’s mentioned in Article 15(4).
Also held in Indira Sawhney, Creamy layer must be excluded from
backward classes. Article 16(4) permits classification of backward
classes into backward and ore backward classes. A backward class
citizen can only be identified with reference to economic criteria.
Also, reservation should not exceed more than 50% and it may be
relaxed in certain exceptional circumstance and no reservation in
promotion as it will affect the efficiency (Overruled the case of
Thomas and upheld Balaji).
By the decision of Indira Sawhney Government inserted 16(4)(A) by
77th Amendment Act,1995.
‘R.K. Sabarwal v. State of Punjab’
It was nullified by Article 16(4)(B). No carry forward rule.
Article 17 is considered one of the earliest manifestations of
India’s effort towards bringing social reforms. By enacting this
Article, the government of independent India acted earnestly to
abolish the scourge of caste discrimination. The purpose behind this
legislation is the liberation of society from orthodox beliefs and
rituals that have lost both legal and moral base. The Constitution-
makers not only provided for criminalising any form of social
discrimination but also punishing those who practice such
discriminations.
The ostensible objective was to put an end to humiliation and
harassment faced by the dalits and backward classes and ensure that
their fundamental rights are preserved. Although Article 17 doesn’t
18
define the term ‘untouchability’, it generally means the “social
restrictions” imposed on certain sections of society when it comes to
accessing public places, offering prayers and performing religious
services, and getting to enjoy fundamental rights.
It is not self executory and in order to execute it there must be laws
made by the Parliament.
‘Babita v. State of UP’
The court held the Suprintendent must provide immediate protection
if anyone tries to disturb their Peaceful living.
‘Dr. Manohar v. UOI’
It was prayed that the nomenclature ‘Dalit’ be prohibited in Govt.,
non govt., and private organisations because the same is not used in
the Constitution or any other statute.
Article 18 Abolition of titles:
Article 18(1): No title, not being a military or academic
distinction, shall be conferred by the State.
Article 18 (2): No citizen of India shall accept any title from
any foreign State.
Article 18(3): No person who is not a citizen of India shall,
while he holds any office of profit or trust under the State,
accept without the consent of the President any title from any
foreign State.
Article 18(4): No person holding any office of profit or trust
under the State shall, without the consent of the President,
accept any present, emolument, or office of any kind from or
under any foreign State.
Article 18 prevents the state from confirming any title except military
and academic distinction. Article 18 prohibits the Indian citizens from
receiving titles from any foreign state. The foreign nationals holding
19
the office of profit under the state may accept titles from the foreign
government with the consent of President. In a true democracy, there
is no space for artificial distinctions among the same society. Titles
such as Rai Bahadur, Sawai, Rai Sahab, Zamindar, taluqdar etc were
prevalent in medieval and British India. All these titles were
abolished by article 18 of the constitution.
“A title is a appellation(name, title or designation) given to a person
or family as a sign of privilege or distinction or profession; as the
title of LORD. It is something that hangs to ones's name as an
addition. The recent conferment of Honours as Bharat Ratna,
Padma Vibhushan(Dusra Varga) , Padma Bhushan(Tisra Varga), etc.
are not to be treated in this category of title, for these distinctions are
not means to be used as a appendages before one's name."
In Indian Constitution, as its Preamble states, wanted to rebuild a
cohesive and integrated society by providing for equality of status.
This is what ARTICLE 18 does and is all about. Historically
speaking, In the creation of society which seeks to establish political,
social and economic equality and thereby aspires to become truly
democratic, there is no room for some Individuals to hold titles thus
creating artificial distinction among the members of the same society.
Recognition of the titles and the consequent creation of a hierarchy of
aristocracy had been denounced as an anti- democratic practice as
early as the eighteen century by both the American and the french
revolutions. A democracy should not create titles and titular glories.
Dr. B. R. Ambedkar explained in the constituent assembly that Article
18 did not create a justiciable right.
"One of the conditions is that he must not accept a title, if he did, it
would be open for Parliament to decide by law what should be done
to persons who violate the provisions of this article. One of the
penalties may be that he may lose the right of citizenship."
Thus, under Article 18 not only is the State in India prevented from
conferring titles on any person, but Indian citizens are forbidden to
accept any title from a foreign State without the consent of the
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President of India.
The prohibition applies not only to the acceptance of titles but also to
that of any present, emolument or office of any kind from any foreign
State by any person holding an office of profit or trust under the State.
Another British dependency, Ireland, on establishing its
independence, followed suit and its Constitution too prohibits the
conferring of titles by the State. India and Burma were the next to
follow the example; the former despite the fact that it decided to
continue to be a member of the Commonwealth of Nations whose
head was the British monarch.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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1. Bare act Constitution
2. Constitutional Law of India, J.N. Pandey
3. Indian Kanoon
4. SCC Online
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