TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92-1

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Foreword
The U.S. Army faces numerous challenges in our current and near-term future operational
environments. None will be more difficult than conducting operations in the world’s urban
areas. We need only cast our eyes over recent historical events to see that those operations will
span the scope of possible contingencies: large scale combat operations (Baghdad and Mosul,
for example), counterinsurgency (Kabul, Kandahar, and Iraq’s cities once again),
counterterrorism (9/11, London, Paris, and Mumbai), humanitarian assistance/disaster relief
(Great East Asian Earthquake and the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear reactor failure), and others. In
short, our Soldiers will confront both nature’s raw power and enemies’ use of increasingly
sophisticated technologies and tactics that will at times constrain employment of our own
capabilities to maximum effect. Employment of innovative concepts applicable to both
competition and armed conflict contingencies such as those inherent in Multi-Domain
Operations will underlie our preparations, operations, and ultimate successes.

Technology will be an ally. Combat proficiency will be essential. Soldiers of every rank will
also be diplomats: ambassadors to urban populations that are characterized more by how
different their members are from us – and each other…even in the same city – than they are
alike. As General Brown, Commanding General of U.S. Army Pacific noted recently, the most
supportive urban areas still have criminal, terrorist, enemy, or other elements that seek to oppose
us. Even if they represent only one percent of the population, that’s 20,000 individuals in an
urban population of 2 million. How much the other ninety-nine percent is behind us – or chooses
instead to support our foes – will greatly depend on the decisions we make and choices we take.
Nowhere else will a Soldier’s actions have such immediate and longer-term effects at not only
the tactical but the strategic level.
Like its parent document – U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-92,
The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Warfare – the assessment in the
pages that follow does not seek to predict the future. Rather, it strives to describe the future
operational environment. It is fundamental that we understand what challenges the future
operational environment will present to our leaders and other Soldiers. This in-depth look at
urban operations to come should cause us to consider their implications for the competition,
armed conflict, and return to competition components of multi-domain operations. This
publication provides a solid foundation for our thinking regarding the future operational
environment, and its companion publications will help us further shape how the Army thinks,
decides, competes, and fights for decades.

Army Strong!
THEODORE D. MARTIN
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
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Department of the Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92-1
Headquarters, U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command
Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604-5700

9 April 2020

Military Operations

The Changing Character of Warfare: The Urban Operational Environment

FOR THE COMMANDER:

THEODORE D. MARTIN
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Deputy Commanding General/
OFFICIAL: Chief of Staff

WILLIAM T. LASHER
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-6

History. This is a new U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command pamphlet.

Summary. This pamphlet provides the future urban operational environment that Army forces
will encounter as described by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command G-2. It presents
a continuum divided into two distinct timeframes: The Era of Accelerated Human Progress
(2017-2035) and the Era of Contested Equality (2035-2050), which depict different doctrinal and
technological challenges that the U.S. Army will face in the near to mid-future.

Applicability. This pamphlet applies to all Department of the Army activities that develop
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and
policy capabilities.

Proponent and exception authority. The proponent of this document is the U.S. Army
Training and Doctrine Command, Deputy Chief of Staff G-2, 950 Jefferson Avenue (ATIN),
Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604-5763.

Suggested improvements. Submit changes for improving this publication on Department of the
Army Form 2028 to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Deputy Chief of Staff G-2,
950 Jefferson Avenue (ATIN), Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604-5763.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92-1

Distribution. This pamphlet is available in electronic media only on the TRADOC

Administrative Publications website (https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil/).

Summary of Change

TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92-1

The Changing Character of Warfare: The Urban Operational Environment

This is a new pamphlet, dated 9 April 2020.

o This is a new publication intended to describe the future urban operational environment the
Army will face now through 2050 in collaboration with U.S. Army Futures Command.

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Contents
Page
Foreword ........................................................................................................................................ iii
Chapter 1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................5
1-1. Purpose ............................................................................................................................... 5
1-2. Scope .................................................................................................................................. 5
1-3. References .......................................................................................................................... 5
1-4. Explanation of abbreviations and terms ............................................................................. 5
1-5. Records management requirements .................................................................................... 5
Chapter 2 The Changing Character of Warfare: The Urban Operational Environment .................6
2-1. Considering the Future of Urban Operations ..................................................................... 6
2-2. Select assumptions .............................................................................................................. 8
Chapter 3 A Constantly Urbanizing World ....................................................................................8
3-1. Context: The urban world .................................................................................................. 8
3-2. The urban world challenges and opportunities ................................................................... 9
Chapter 4 Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical
Environment, and Time and Urban Operations at the Strategic Level ..........................................10
4-1. Strategic political implications of urban operations ......................................................... 10
4-2. Strategic military implications of urban operations ......................................................... 10
4-3. Strategic economic implications of urban operations....................................................... 11
4-4. Strategic social implications of urban operations ............................................................. 11
4-5. Strategic information implications of urban operations ................................................... 11
4-6. Strategic infrastructure implications of urban operations................................................. 12
4-7. Strategic physical environment implications of urban operations.................................... 13
4-8. Strategic time implications of urban operations ............................................................... 13
Chapter 5 Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical
Environment, and Time and Urban Operations at the Operational Level .....................................13
5-1. Operational level political implications of urban operations............................................ 13
5-2. Operational level military implications of urban operations ............................................ 14
5-3. Operational level economic implications of urban operations ......................................... 14
5-4. Operational level social implications of urban operations ............................................... 14
5-5. Operational level information implications of urban operations ...................................... 15
5-6. Operational level infrastructure implications of urban operations ................................... 15
5-7. Operational level physical environment implications of urban operations ...................... 16
5-8. Operational Level Time Implications of Urban Operations ............................................. 16
Chapter 6 Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical
Environment, and Time and Urban Operations at the Tactical Level ...........................................16
6-1. Tactical political implications of urban operations .......................................................... 16
6-2. Tactical military implications of urban operations ........................................................... 17
6-3. Tactical economic implications of urban operations ........................................................ 17
6-4. Tactical social implications of urban operations .............................................................. 18
6-5. Tactical information implications of urban operations..................................................... 18
6-6. Tactical infrastructure implications of urban operations .................................................. 18
6-7. Tactical physical environment implications of urban operations ..................................... 19
6-8. Tactical time implications of urban operations ................................................................ 19

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6-9. Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment,

and Time summary ................................................................................................................... 20
Chapter 7 Mission Command Considerations during Urban Operations .....................................20
7. The criticality of mission command during urban operations ............................................. 20
Chapter 8 Technological Challenges and Initiatives during Urban Operations ...........................21
8. Technology and the urban environment .............................................................................. 21
Chapter 9 Urban Operations Training at all three Levels of War .................................................23
9-1. Urban operations training overview ................................................................................. 23
9-2. Urban training facilities .................................................................................................... 24
9-3. Home station urban operations training............................................................................ 24
9-4. Maneuver combat training centers ................................................................................... 25
9-5. Other urban operations training facilities ......................................................................... 25
9-6. The future of U.S. Army urban operations training facilities ........................................... 26
9-7. Urban operations training challenges ............................................................................... 26
Chapter 10 Urban Operations Modeling and Simulations ............................................................27
10-1. Current urban operations modeling and simulations capabilities and status ..................27
10-2. Urban operations M&S challenges ................................................................................. 27
10-3. Planned initiatives........................................................................................................... 28
10-4. Final modeling and simulations observations ................................................................ 29
Chapter 11 Concluding Observations and Summar ......................................................................29
11-1. Concluding observations ................................................................................................ 29
11-2. Concluding summary...................................................................................................... 30
Appendix A ....................................................................................................................................31
References ......................................................................................................................................31
Glossary .........................................................................................................................................32

Figures
Page
Figure 2-1. The era of contested equality ...................................................................................... 6
Figure 2-2. Twelve trends being monitored by G-2, TRADOC .................................................... 7
Figure 2-3. Demographics and urbanization implications for the operational environment ......... 7
Figure 10-1. Late 2018 status of urban functionality in Army modeling and simulations .......... 27
Figure 10-2. Army directed CFT pilots ....................................................................................... 29

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Chapter 1
Introduction

1-1. Purpose
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-92-1 describes the
conditions future Army forces will face when operating in the world’s urban areas across two
distinct timeframes as described just below. It characterizes near-term advantages adversaries
may have as well as breakthroughs in technology and convergences in capabilities in the far term
that are likely to change the character of warfare. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92-1 accounts for
both timeframes to allow Army forces to train to an accurate and realistic future operational
environment.

1-2. Scope
This pamphlet supports the collaborative Army transition to an operational environment (OE)
developed by TRADOC and U.S. Army Futures Command (AFC). Critical inputs, thoughts, and
lessons about the future resulted from a number of sources. A sampling in this regard includes
historical and current literature on urban areas and the output from two megacity conferences,
the first held in New York City (April 2018), the second in Tokyo (July 2019). The result draws
on the expertise and experiences of cutting-edge leaders and thinkers from academia, media,
nongovernmental and inter-governmental organizations, and the U.S. military and government
to provide insights and recommendations regarding past and present urban operations as they
advise preparations for future contingencies in these environments. Work from across the
TRADOC G-2, particularly the monitoring and assessment of 12 key trends and technological
game changers, further added to the body of knowledge for this pamphlet.

1-3. References
See appendix A.

1-4. Explanation of abbreviations and terms

See the glossary.

1-5. Records management requirements

As mandated by AR 25–400–2, the records management (recordkeeping) requirements for all
record numbers, associated forms, and reports are included in the Army’s Records Retention
Schedule-Army. Detailed information for all related record numbers, forms, and reports
associated with this regulation are located in RRS–A at https://www.arims.army.mil.

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Chapter 2
The Changing Character of Warfare: The Urban Operational Environment

2-1. Considering the Future of Urban Operations

Taking a holistic approach when anticipating trends is essential when considering the future
character of warfare and operational environment. It is no less fundamental to understand what
lies ahead for urban operations. We are currently in an era of accelerated human progress, a
period in which we, our adversaries, and other parties seize on new technologies, doctrine, means
of communication, and revised concepts to enhance (in our case) or challenge U.S. military
advantages. It is also a time of increasing urbanization. Fifty percent urbanized some 10 to 15
years ago, estimates expect 60 percent of the planet’s population to be living in urban areas
within the next decade and a half.

a. These evolutions will have – already have had – significant security implications for the
United States and its global partners. At times challengers go toe-to-toe with U.S. capabilities;
think enemy uses of unmanned aerial vehicles in 2017 Iraq. Other advantages are sought in
entirely different competition spaces in order to avoid head-to-head confrontations given the
extent of U.S. dominance. Foes’ use of social media to undermine domestic U.S. support is an
example. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment and the Changing
Character of Warfare (the parent document to that here), informs us that this period of
accelerated human progress will continue. Another era will join it circa 2035: an era of
contested equality, an event that will likely see advances in technology and capabilities
significantly, even dramatically, altering the nature of warfare as we know it today. See figure 2-
1, for a description of this era.

The era of contested equality [will be] marked by significant breakthroughs in

technology and convergences in terms of capabilities which lead to significant
changes in the character of warfare. During this period, traditional aspects of
warfare undergo dramatic, almost revolutionary, changes which at the end of
this timeframe may even challenge the very nature of warfare itself. In this era,
no one actor is likely to have any long-term strategic or technological
advantage, with aggregate power between the U.S. and its strategic competitors
being equivalent, but not necessarily symmetric.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92
Figure 2-1. The era of contested equality

b. Twelve trends are of particular note with respect to both the era of accelerated human
progress and that of contested equality. See figure 2-2 for the twelve trends being monitored by
G-2, TRADOC.

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Emerging S&T trends

• Power generation and storage
• Technology, engineering, and manufacturing
• Robotics

Information, space, cyber, and computing

• Big data
• Cyber and space
• Artificial intelligence
• Human computer interaction

Society, biomed, and performance

• Collective intelligence
• Increased level of performance

Strategic world
• Climate change and resource competition
• Demographics and urbanization
• Economic rebalancing

Figure 2-2. Twelve trends being monitored by G-2, TRADOC

c. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92-1 focuses on one of these trends, “Demographics and

Urbanization,” in order to consider its implications for future operational environments. Figure
2-3, details these implications.

Our adversaries will operate in and among populations and in complex terrain,
and endeavor to mitigate many of our own traditional technological advantages
and force us to operate with degraded capabilities and take advantage of the
infrastructure and other resources cities offer. They will adopt hybrid strategies
that take advantage of a range of capabilities that deny us a conventional force-
on-force fight unless the situation is advantageous to the adversary. They will
use proxy forces that provide plausible deniability yet directly allow them to
not only shape the battlespace, but even achieve their objectives without risking
a wider conflict.
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92
Figure 2-3. Demographics and urbanization implications for the operational environment

d. Further complicating responses to urban challenges is the requirement to prepare for

operations anywhere along the range of military operations. Release of sarin nerve agent in the
Tokyo subway in 1995; the 9/11 attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C.; more recent
acts of terrorism in London, Paris, Boston, and elsewhere; and events targeting those working or
residing in other urban areas verify that prominent cities are lucrative targets for an adversary
wishing America and its partners ill. Yet it is stability and humanitarian operations, those at the
other extreme of that range, that will prove more common – assistance rendered domestically or
to a partner nation in the aftermath of a natural disaster, for example. The following pages
consider the full scope of potential operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

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2-2. Select assumptions

a. Urban areas of the future will retain the key feature of density in structures, people,
networks and infrastructure. These densities will present a number of challenges and
opportunities during combat and other operations. This is true even though public policy
decisions have driven a reduction in some urban areas’ densities despite increases in those cities’
populations as built-up areas expand geographically. This trend could hasten its pace in the
future given advances in information technology and decentralization in producing and
delivering consumer goods.

b. Urban operations – particularly those in many of the planet’s largest urban areas –
inherently have global consequences due to the interconnectedness of the information, social,
and economic spheres. These linkages will increase during the next 30 to 40 years.

c. The growth of urban areas and their influences on munitions (both lethal and nonlethal);
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems; and additional capabilities will
reinforce their centrality to military operations as foes seek the cover and concealment offered.

d. Urban areas serve as hubs for major transportation infrastructure (airports, ports, rail, and
road systems), further reinforcing the conclusion that cities will inevitably be foci for military
undertakings if for no other reason than a military force must move personnel, equipment, and
logistical support through them.

Chapter 3
A Constantly Urbanizing World

3-1. Context: The urban world

The U.S. population became more urban than rural in 1920. The world did the same during the
first decade of this millennium. Over half of the planet’s politically significant urban areas lie
within 100 kilometers of a coast, a situation of notable consequence given the coincidence of
coastal areas’ vulnerability to powerful storms, likelihood of being in an earthquake zone (many
are located along the Pacific rim), and projected estimates of sea level rise during this century.
These exposures put hundreds of millions of people at risk, but true recognition of the extent of
that risk comes only with understanding urban areas’ potential to impact the lives and security of
others thousands of miles distant from a particular densely populated center. While India is de-
urbanizing in some locations due to public policies guaranteeing minimum income to farmers,
the world writ large continues its march toward increased urbanization. This is somewhat ironic
from a historical perspective given past fears that too great a concentration of national treasures
in one location was strategically unwise (recall the dispersal of economic and other hubs born of
Cold War nuclear targeting concerns). Virtually all countries have now cast such fears aside in
the face of urban consolidation’s efficiencies of scale and inexorable human migration. Urban
disasters – a consequence of Mother Nature or human malfeasance – will have consequences
well beyond a built-up area as will, potentially, military responses to affected areas. As observed
by former U.S. Pacific Command combatant commander Admiral Locklear, it is responses in
the aftermath of natural disasters that are the more likely for our Army and its partners. That

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disasters natural in origin will worsen in intensity is a near-given for select coastal cities as sea
levels rise.

a. This interconnectedness means it will be difficult to determine the impact military

operations will have on an urban area. Unfortunately, ascertaining higher-order effects in urban
environments is particularly hard. We might think of rural operations as a pool table on which
sit two or three numbered balls. Striking the cue ball might impact one, two, or all three of those
numbered spheres…or, quite possibly, none. Regardless, determining the immediate and
consequent effects of the interactions would be fairly straightforward. Now allow a full rack of
numbered balls to represent 1 million urban residents. Using the popular definition of a
megacity as one with 10 million or more in population, the higher-order effects become all but
impossible to determine when one strikes the cue ball on a table with 10, 15, or more racks of
numbered balls. Among the many factors comprising this complexity is the presence of multiple
political and other authorities. Consider the megacity of Los Angeles. The political entity that is
the City of Los Angeles (estimated population just short of 4 million in mid-2017) has a city
government encompassing its police and fire authorities and many other organizations. The
much larger entity that is the megacity of Los Angeles (2017 population over 15 million)
contains numerous county, city, town, state, federal, and additional organizations.

b. The result. A very large number of governing authorities a coalition commander must deal
with during future contingencies. Add to this the frequent non-line-of-sight interruptions
imposed by structures above, below, and at ground level; the difficulty of distinguishing between
noncombatants and enemy forces; the density of people, structures, and vehicles; and further
factors and the magnitude of the challenge becomes all too apparent. Furthermore, weather and
environmental effects such as rising sea levels, corruption, vulnerability to infrastructure
interruptions, and the susceptibility of individuals to disinformation are sure to further burden
any leader having to operate in these densely populated environments.

c. Fortunately, there are opportunities among an urban areas’ buildings and populations.
They are information-rich surroundings with every urban resident a potential source for
intelligence. Cities are also wealthy in other potential resources: building supplies; means of
communication; civilian vehicles; and members of police, fire, and other authorities who will
have intimate knowledge of their environments.

3-2. The urban world challenges and opportunities

Understanding current and future political, military, economic, social, information,
infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT) considerations during urban
operations requires thinking of these environments in terms of challenges and opportunities
offered at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels while constantly keeping possible second
and higher order effects in mind. This will mean recognizing and ever-improving our
comprehension of cities as systems. They are systems consisting of many subsystems. Each
urban area is also a subsystem of its immediate environs and the country of which it is a part. It
may also be a component of broader regional or even more far-flung systems. In no other setting
will a coalition need to so persistently and consistently maintain focus on near-, mid-, and long-
term objectives to maximize the likelihood that today’s actions support rather than undermine
those of tomorrow.

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Chapter 4
Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment,
and Time (PMESII-PT) and Urban Operations at the Strategic Level

4-1. Strategic political implications of urban operations

a. The potential strategic consequences of decisions made and actions taken by U.S. Soldiers
during urban operations will reverberate politically well beyond the battlefield. They may also
do so diplomatically with these political and diplomatic implications being both domestic and
international. This is all the truer when the city is a major one: a capital, megacity, notable
cultural center, or, as may be the case, all three. Reactions to the accidental bombing of the
Chinese embassy in Belgrade and dramatic impact of the 9/11 attacks on New York and
Washington, D.C., provide two examples. Similarly, identifying and responding appropriately to
those segments of a population most in need of assistance during or in the aftermath of a disaster
will set the tone for domestic and international public opinion regarding military operations.
Bringing the appropriate authorities onside will be critical to coalition success in both the
immediate and long terms.

b. And what of the world’s most influential cities’ political influence in 10, 20, or 30 years’
time? As select cities account for a growing percentage of their country’s gross domestic
product, concentration of social elites, and ties to international counterparts, urban areas less
constrained by centralized national or sub-state (for example, province) level governments may
assert increasing degrees of autonomy. This evolution is most likely where sub-national political
entities retain significant independence in terms of taxation authority, setting social policy, and
economics. Yet more centralized country-level governments could also find themselves
following a major urban area’s lead; consolidation of influential social elites in major urban areas
and the economic leverage these individuals wield could increasingly dictate national policies
favoring the cities in which the wealthy and powerful live. This is all the more likely if the many
separate political authorities that constitute larger urban areas recognize the value in cooperating
rather than competing for resources, thereby creating synergies that magnify their collective
power.

4-2. Strategic military implications of urban operations

Armed forces’ responsibilities demand simultaneous responses to competing requirements.
Failure lurks at all three levels of war for any force that merely views operations sequentially:
win the battle, then address noncombatant concerns. In addition to understanding the immediate
strategic consequences of combat actions, military leaders must realize that every yard of
advance toward tactical victory represents three feet of increased noncombatant security and
welfare responsibilities. Ideally these responsibilities will remain with the local government; in
reality, a coalition will likely find itself supporting if not answerable for guaranteeing
noncombatant security and providing aid/sustainment. Effective strategic level objective,
mission, and commander’s intent statements will be crucial to execution of mission command at
the operational and tactical levels to preclude tactical-strategic objective disconnects. So too will
being able to compete successfully in influencing key audiences as the many parties seeking to
sway opinions employ increasingly sophisticated ways of spreading their version of truth or
other propaganda. These will often appear in combination with traditional coercive means that

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include use of para-military or armed civilians to influence situations via use of violence against
friendly forces or members of the noncombatant population.

4-3. Strategic economic implications of urban operations

a. Strategic urban economic implications are a function of a city’s size and role. Smaller
urban areas tend to have local economic interactions with only limited reach beyond their
immediate surroundings. Broader strategic issues are therefore less likely to arise than in larger
cities.

b. Economic power translates into political, social, and therefore nation-wide influence,
possibly resulting in dominant urban areas dictating policy to less well-financed or influence-
constrained national governments. The result will be a virtual Medusa’s head of challenges for a
coalition leader: Which receives priority, the suffering members of an urban area’s
noncombatant population or those communities and infrastructures whose recovery will hasten
local, national, and perhaps regional economic recovery, recovery that itself will influence
citizen survival? Does the influential urban area continue to receive disproportionate aid even as
less powerful, more dispersed, and thus difficult to service rural areas lack critical resources?

4-4. Strategic social implications of urban operations

Urban areas are ultimately and primarily social constructs. Analysis must consequently be
viewed through a social lens. Adversaries and other interested parties will be aware of the
preeminence of the social arena and attempt to influence an urban population accordingly. The
increasing sophistication of influence capabilities is a notable concern in this regard. Improving
means of targeting specific audiences with disinformation or biased reporting poses a threat to
urban stability, thereby establishing conditions for inciting panic or undermining legitimate
authorities’ directives. For example, employing techniques such as Russian efforts to influence
select audiences during the 2016 U.S. federal elections that capitalized on existing social
fissures. Larger urban areas’ populations will be particularly attractive in this regard as they may
offer ethnic, cultural, economic, and other potential frictions ripe for manipulation. Internally
displaced persons and others with a sense of alienation – those who recently moved into a city,
for example – could be particularly vulnerable to such exploitation.

4-5. Strategic information implications of urban operations

Information is both an incalculable strategic asset and continuous headache for a force operating
in urban areas. Urban areas tend to concentrate traditional media thanks to cities being
transportation hubs and their capacity to house and offer other amenities to representatives of the
vocation. As such, coalition members and host nation government authorities will have greater
opportunity to communicate a narrative for consumption by nearby, national, and international
audiences. Contrarily, maintaining a consistent narrative will be difficult given the number of
authorities and coalition members present and with what are often conflicting objectives. For
example, of local versus national politicians or between various members of a coalition. Added
to this challenge is the need to account for the narratives of coalition adversaries. Furthermore,
social media resources allow virtually any member of an urban population to report on, post
photos of, or otherwise present their version of ongoing activities. These will vary from
supportive to antipathetic. A particular source’s effectiveness in influencing key audiences will

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often be indiscernible until after the fact. It is crucial to understand what means of
communicating with target audiences will be most effective. Radio? Television? Newspapers?
Social media? (If so, which social media platforms?) Word of mouth? Other? Nor are
informational considerations limited only to communications of the spoken or written sort. The
most effective communications may take the form of action rather than words. Early 21st-
century Shia murders and other forms of intimidation in Baghdad’s Sunni neighborhoods
provided messages impossible to misinterpret. A civilian infrastructure-crippling cyberattack
coinciding with a coalition’s arrival would undermine a population’s trust even without
accompanying threat disinformation in support.

4-6. Strategic infrastructure implications of urban operations

The complexity of today’s urban interconnectedness – and urban areas’ nature as systems – is
nowhere more evident than in the realm of infrastructure. Recognition that infrastructures
include both physical and social components is fundamental. The two are not so much linked as
inextricably intertwined. An example from the 1991 Persian Gulf War demonstrates this
relationship. Coalition forces struck military targets, avoiding the bombing of Baghdad’s
hospitals in the interest of humanitarianism. Fuel supplies, power generation facilities, and
transportation nodes of potential use to Iraqi armed forces suffered while medical facilities
remained untouched. The result: hospitals lacked the power needed to function. Backup
generators ran out of fuel. Doctors, nurses, and patients could not reach their place of work. The
physical infrastructure elements (petroleum storage, electrical plants, bridges, hospitals) were
parts of Baghdad’s medical care system. The social components (for example, providers,
patients, and maintenance personnel) could not function without the supporting physical
infrastructure despite medical structures themselves remaining intact.

a. What does this mean for future urban targeting or operational security? More
sophisticated use of critical path method-type target analyses must become the norm. Urban
areas’ hyper-complexity means that artificial intelligence (AI) will inevitably find use here. For
example, adversaries employing AI should be better able to:

(1) Identify single or multiple physical infrastructure nodes along critical paths, (in other
words, nodes that will maximize desired effects when targeted and thus must be protected if we
are in a defensive mode);

(2) Gauge higher-order effects able to provide synergistic consequences of targeting, for
example recognizing that a strike miles distant or different in character can neutralize an ultimate
target (for example, destroying a pump station servicing a neighborhood magnifies the effects of
bombing as firefighters cannot extinguish the flames); and

(3) Obtain complementary effects by targeting key components of both physical and
social infrastructures, thereby making defense and recovery more difficult.

b. Sophisticated AI-supported analysis may eventually additionally allow adversaries (or

friendly forces) to perform “boutique targeting,” targeting that affects only those parties or
creates only those effects that best service targeter ends.

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4-7. Strategic physical environment implications of urban operations

An urban area’s physical environment consists of both natural and manmade terrain. As with
physical and social infrastructure, the two are interwoven. Tactical and operational targeting can
have immediate strategic implications. These include the difficulty of precluding noncombatant
casualties due to innocents seeking shelter in buildings and the resultant international pressures
to cease further operations. Adversaries use of proscribed targets for cover and concealment
(hospitals, religious structures), and foes positioning themselves adjacent to or in civilian
housing and similar features can result in similar calls for constraining or ceasing further action.
Interruptions in normal air, ground, and sea traffic will also have local consequences for
sustaining operations and supporting local populations. Further, as noted in the discussion of
strategic economic implications just above, larger cities in particular will have both local and
broader interdependencies, for example, the implications of interrupting commerce in Los
Angeles will quickly impact food, medical supplies, and additional goods and services not only
in the United States but also worldwide. Pressures to reopen key transportation nodes will be
significant. The difficulties will be more severe in years to come. Sea level rises mean the
consequences of natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and tsunamis will be greater in
magnitude, broader in geographic scope, and more far-reaching in negative consequences for the
urban populations suffering their vagaries.

4-8. Strategic time implications of urban operations

The variable of time underlies many of the above strategic observations. To reiterate what is the
critical consideration in this regard, orchestrating coalition member activities such that actions
taken and decisions made today are optimized in light of mid- and long-term objectives is
essential to avoid undercutting ultimate success. There is also a cultural element to time.
Authorities in some cultures will require extensive demonstrations of social courtesy before
addressing questions at hand. In other cases, those meeting with coalition leaders may have to
converse with peers, confirm with superiors, or generate community support before providing a
decision. Such cultural mores will differ between urban neighborhoods; in some cases,
processes will vary even within a neighborhood. Such delays will be frustrating for leaders, but
patience in the short-term may well hasten cooperation in the longer.

Chapter 5
PMESII-PT and Urban Operations at the Operational Level

5-1. Operational level political implications of urban operations

The difficulty of determining possible second- and higher-order effects means orchestrating
tactical actions in the service of strategic objectives is rarely more difficult than during urban
operations. The highly politicized nature of urban environments adds to the challenge, the more
so when the city in question is a national capital or urban area with extraordinary international
influence in one or more sectors. Ensuring multi-disciplinary consideration during planning and
execution is essential and requires substantive participation by a whole-of-government and
broader team. This will be no less a truth in 2035 and 2050 than today, just as it has been
consistently since the beginnings of World War II, yet achieving even a modicum of the full
potential of this cooperation remains elusive.

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5-2. Operational level military implications of urban operations

Leaders at the operational level benefit from clear and regularly-adapted strategic mission
command guidance. They in turn need to provide similarly helpful direction to military
subordinates to keep them abreast of evolving political, diplomatic, and other strategic
considerations. The compartmentalized character of tactical operations in cities requires senior
leaders to wisely craft missions and intents for their subordinates. This guidance needs to be
broader in scope than is the case in most other environments given that units at even the lowest
echelons are likely to find themselves quickly transitioning between combat, stability, and
noncombatant support activities if not conducting all three simultaneously. Similarly, urban
operations will often see the multi-domain operations (MDO) stages of competition, armed
conflict, and return to competition occurring simultaneously in time and space. An inevitable but
thus far unaddressed challenge: instilling mission and intent such that both are accurately
incorporated into AI analysis and – as we achieve singularity in various fields – automated
decision-making. (Singularity refers to the point at which AI or other technological capabilities
exceed human intelligence.)

5-3. Operational level economic implications of urban operations

Operational level leaders must remain aware of the economic implications of tactical activities as
they seek to orchestrate the immediate, interim, and distant-in-time goals of the many parties
involved. Remaining aware of economic consequences helps decision-makers by identifying
which commercial processes are most important to sustaining operations and minimizing the
resources needed during recovery (for example, food availability, employment for
noncombatants) or facilitating quick return of private sector functions in this regard, thereby
reducing coalition support and urban recovery burdens. Alternatively, both offensive targeting
and operational security will demand understanding of primary and higher-order effects so that
the goals sought are achieved with acceptable collateral damage or critical nodes are defended in
light of both immediate and higher-order effects. Savvy targeting (or defense) in key urban areas
will recognize which and what types of strikes – cyber, informational, or others via lethal or
nonlethal means – will have the impact desired locally, nationally, and internationally in the
economic arena.

5-4. Operational level social implications of urban operations

Favorably influencing social perspectives and related behaviors is an unceasing struggle during
urban operations regardless of the level of war. The social and information components of
PMESII-PT will constantly be bonded, demanding that course of action evaluations and red
teaming efforts include relevant urban populations’ perspectives. (It must be populations’,
plural, as an urban population should never be considered a homogeneous whole. Course of
action evaluations and red team processes have to include identification of mission-relevant
civilian individuals and groups, thereafter representing their views and interrelationships
separately or collectively during war-gaming as environmental conditions dictate.) Capabilities
to mold perceptions via ever more sophisticated marketing tools, hyper-realistic animation, and
spoofing of legitimate information sources will proliferate just as have other communications
technologies during the past generation. (AI may assist in this regard in the future.) This poses
what is perhaps the primary threat to coalition operations in the 20 to 30 years to come. As with
higher-order effects, meeting this challenge will be complicated by the virtual impossibility of
pre-recognizing the potential effects of messages on various recipients, both those initially

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targeted and others who receive messages via retransmission. Intelligence requirements will
include identifying intra-population fault lines on which an adversary or our forces can capitalize
to exacerbate social divisions, for example, separating key supporters from a government or
other group as was done in isolating the regime of Slobodan Milosevic from Serbian elites circa
2000.

5-5. Operational level information implications of urban operations

The information realm potentially extends the reach of even low-level tactical influence
initiatives far beyond any geographic control measure. Virtually every tactical event can have
positive or negative effects on operational level or strategic narratives. Tactical-level decisions
will impact how those events influence strategic narratives. The operational level by default
must become the adjustable lens through which these tactical actions and messages pass to
audiences worldwide, a task that will be increasingly demanding as means of influencing
populations become more sophisticated.

5-6. Operational level infrastructure implications of urban operations

Understanding higher-level interactions between infrastructure components has proved
surprisingly difficult in the past. It will become a greater challenge yet in those urban areas
where currently competing political authorities increase cooperation, thereby magnifying the
complexity of infrastructure systems linked across wider geographic and social spectrums.
Effective coordination at the upper tactical and operational echelons could preclude resource
wastage and local lack of confidence in coalition initiatives. For example, unit funding of water
supply or sewage removal piping should not be initiated unless it is destined to be linked to a
system-wide design that ensures those pipes are connected to pumping stations and subsystem
components (a seemingly obvious observation yet one violated in practice during Operation Iraqi
Freedom). Understanding that cities today often obtain water from sources tens if not hundreds
of kilometers distant from the urban area itself means higher-level headquarters will need to
synchronize infrastructure initiatives that influence multiple units’ areas of operation.
Construction of school buildings without consideration of cultural norms (can male and female
students be taught together?); the ability to fund furniture, textbooks, latrines, water, and other
needs; local presence of teachers and assurance of their salaries; and post-construction facility
maintenance by local authorities is only a sample of the types of issues that accompany planning
for any structure. Here again, the essentiality of maintaining a systems perspective comes to the
fore. Operational-level commanders will find that this systems approach demands managing the
efforts of multiple organizations and funding streams, a complicated task given that recent
history shows even identification of relevant parties can prove daunting. Consideration must
also include urban areas’ role as nodes in larger infrastructure systems. Leaders having to
allocate resources to an urban area can expect plentiful “assistance” as some in better-connected
urban communities seek precedence over others in greater need. As with water supplies, the
vulnerabilities of urban areas to cyber and other forms of attack against power-generating
infrastructure components that may be distant from an urban area will pose management
challenges beyond tactical-level capabilities. Cyber or physical targeting of ports, airfields,
telecommunications facilities, fuel distribution, or other resources can have immediate and far-
reaching security and stability consequences. As means of performing such attacks become
more refined and varied, so too must our ways of denying success to adversaries and overcoming

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their efforts to conceal their identities. For example, through the use of robots or surrogate
computers used unbeknownst to their owners.

5-7. Operational level physical environment implications of urban operations

Physical environment considerations at the operational level will require orchestration of tactical
initiatives throughout an urban area (as alluded to in the infrastructure discussion above
regarding water-delivery systems). Use of waterways, reservoir and lake water, airspace, and
perishable resources such as wooded areas must be coordinated across the geographic and social
space while maintaining an eye on longer-term objectives and the urban area’s recovery.

5-8. Operational Level Time Implications of Urban Operations

As is evident from review of the strategic implications of time, it is operational level leaders who
will have to mold guidance and provide necessary supervision to ensure actions taken today
promote further success tomorrow while ensuring that time’s changing demands are addressed to
maximum effectiveness.

Chapter 6
PMESII-PT and Urban Operations at the Tactical Level

6-1. Tactical political implications of urban operations

As has been noted, larger urban environments have multiple formal political authorities. There
will also be many less formal but nonetheless politically-influential leaders and organizations, to
include neighborhood associations, unions, faith-based organizations (FBOs), and other
stakeholders. Understanding local dynamics allows units to operate more effectively during
armed conflict, low-intensity contingencies, or when in support of reconstruction efforts. The
ability to understand the political landscape aids commanders in their decision-making process
and limits confusion in these complex environments. Ground commanders should know the
form of government and the relevant actors within their respective areas of responsibility
regardless of operation type. They should also understand the limitations of local governments
and end goals of all relevant local players in the context of U.S. objectives. Additionally,
commanders should focus on understanding the relationship a population has with its
government and any baseline expectations its members have regarding support from host nation
or multinational participants. Knowing where the enemy enjoys popular support helps
commanders and staff during planning and abets understanding of requirements needed from
potential partners as well as informing force ratio decisions (and, conceivably, where to assign
coalition assets to greatest effect). Supporting these ends means Army leaders must similarly
cultivate a broad grasp of operational and strategic objectives in their subordinates down to the
lowest tactical levels. (Though doctrinal guidance has long been that subordinate leaders should
be aware of their seniors’ intents two levels above, the potential for even the lowest level tactical
actions to have strategic consequences during urban operations suggests this might no longer be
an acceptable minimum.) They thereby develop perceptive leaders whose decisions and actions
support rather than undermine coalition goals. Such leaders epitomize what U.S. Marine Corps
General Charles Krulak hoped to find in his “strategic corporals,” those in charge of sections,
squads, and other lower echelon units whose decisions can have dramatic strategic consequences.

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6-2. Tactical military implications of urban operations

Dense urban environments consist of multiple military components spanning the continuum from
adversarial through neutral to friendly. These may include militia (government-, faction-, or
individually-sponsored) or other organizations manned by members of the local population that
will oppose or support friendly forces or seek to serve what they see as a neutral function such as
defending their neighborhoods. Tactical ground commanders must understand how to employ
manmade structures, local infrastructure, underlying terrain, and communications to their
advantage while also cultivating popular support. They must be equally savvy regarding how
other military and civilian parties are likely to do so. The density of features in urban terrain
means that each bomb, bullet, and missile carries with it a potential for collateral damage causing
increased hostility or diminished support from the civilian populace. An artillery strike might
make eminent sense in terms of the immediate tactical situation while creating rubble that later
impedes maneuver, provides the foe an effective defensive position, or turns popular support
away from coalition forces. Barring a significant near-term leap forward (for example, small
arms munitions capable of honing in on designated individual cell phone signals), engagements
will inevitably unintentionally wound or kill. Only by recognizing potential second and higher-
order effects can a commander hope to mitigate risks to force and mission while establishing a
foundation for ultimate success at all levels of war. Tactical patience, precision effects, and the
judicious application of lethality or nonlethal capabilities will remain the hallmarks of successful
tactical commanders during combat operations. Similar restraint will underlie effective action
when missions do not involve combat.

6-3. Tactical economic implications of urban operations

a. Tactical leaders must likewise be aware of local economic conditions. They should seek
both to minimally disrupt civilian economic pursuits and support timely post-disaster recovery.
Sustaining life can be a fragile state of affairs in today’s cities, especially so for the most
destitute of urban poor. Seemingly minor disruptions of economic functions can create life and
death situations for those living hand to mouth on a daily basis. Loss of a single sheep, truck, or
house is an unfortunate but limited-impact event in rural environments. (However, Soldiers
should not be surprised to find crops and livestock in urban areas; the former are common even
in developed world megacities as residents seek to provide alternative food sources.) Such
limited damage will unfortunately be less common during operations in cities due to close
proximities imposed by urban densities. Damage to infrastructure, food chains, or community
housing compounds will have magnified consequences when throughput capacity at air and sea
ports of debarkation is strained as will often be the case during active operations. Leaders must
also understand that the impact of their operations will be amplified for better or worse when
interacting with particularly influential individuals or groups.

b. Integrating civil affairs and maintaining a whole of government approach that includes
other government agencies such as U.S. Agency for International Development and
nongovernmental/inter-governmental organizations increases knowledge of local conditions
while at the same time bringing additional capabilities to bear in the service of common or
overlapping objectives, to include noncombatant welfare. Locations of banks and financial
centers may be named areas of interest worthy of special consideration when developing rules of

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engagement for lethal, cyber, or other forms of engagement, particularly when those or similar
institutions are connected with national, regional, or global markets.

6-4. Tactical social implications of urban operations

The cohesiveness and volatility found in an urban environment is largely determined by its social
dynamics. Chances of mission accomplishment are enhanced if leaders understand the character
and relationships of groups and sub-groups within their areas of responsibility. While social
groups in rural environments are often delineated by ethnicity, religion, or tribe, divisions in
larger cities can be more subtle. Understanding these dynamics helps commanders interpret the
actions of and determine information requirements regarding the people within areas of
operations. Commanders need to know who the influential members of various groups are to
understand formal and informal power structures.

6-5. Tactical information implications of urban operations

a. Leaders will discover that information moves quickly through these social infrastructures,
easily outpacing ground force maneuver. The numerous of ways of communicating and urban
areas’ population densities mean coalition (and other) messages can reach farther faster.
Matching means to message and target audience will be crucial. A new billboard in a small town
noticeably impacts the information environment; twenty new billboards in a city the size of
Jakarta is likely to have negligible effect while blanket text messaging can reach throughout its
population in a matter of minutes.

b. Tactical commanders will find the information environment no less contested than a
battlefield. As seen in Iraq during the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, enemy
combatants will use platforms such as Twitter to mobilize supporters, coordinate tactical
activities, and intimidate. Understanding how to co-opt messengers (to include those re-tweeting
messages) or influence local narratives will be significant during information campaign
competition. The playing field is not a level one. Adversaries and other significant influencers
(often remote from an area of operations) will spread disinformation to discredit U.S. forces or
otherwise advance their own goals. The global interconnectedness of cities also increases the
likelihood that near-peer competitor states such as Russia and China will monitor and attempt to
influence coalition force actions, to include via direct communication with our and host nation
domestic populations. Operational and information security both become increasingly difficult
due to the ubiquitous flow of information.

6-6. Tactical infrastructure implications of urban operations

a. Cities require massive infrastructure to maintain their populations, meaning commanders

must be aware of the consequences of damage to these critical systems. Vital infrastructure such
as power plants, dams, hospitals, and water supplies may constitute key terrain for tactical
commanders. The flow and connectedness inherent in urban environments include providing
residents’ food and other resources that are fundamental to survival. These lifelines need to be
preserved. Unfortunately, most military leaders have only limited training or experience
regarding the processes underlying successful civil administration. Host nation elements will be
key to understanding integrated processes and identifying which aspects of the infrastructure

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require the most attention, conditions that will change over time depending on season and other
factors. Cyber and telecommunications can be among the most important infrastructure
elements. Recent examples in Ukraine and Egypt demonstrate that disrupting the information
infrastructure can lead to civil uprisings or panic, either of which further complicates operations.
Commercial and public security concerns regarding node vulnerabilities may influence the
character of future power, water, sewerage, communications, and other distribution as
organizations seek to avoid loss of these vital services due their current reliance on a limited
number of distribution points.

b. A trend likely to pick up pace in the coming years: more building down to accompany that
going up. Building down – whether for security purposes as with Pyongyang’s deep subway or
Tokyo’s massive underground flood control system – means infrastructure below ground will
offer new threats and opportunities. The likelihood of future expansion in this direction is
evident in the Tokyo government’s dictates that define land or property rights more than 40
meters underground.

6-7. Tactical physical environment implications of urban operations

Urban environments’ physical environment characteristics present unique challenges in any of
their three dimensions of above, below, or at ground level. Maneuver, protection, intelligence
gathering, communications, fires, and battle damage assessment are among the issues. Vertical
and subterranean features will disrupt line-of-sight (LOS), complicating situational awareness,
increasing risk, and requiring adaptive leaders trained and practiced in the nuances of mission
command. Concentrations of tall buildings mask potential target areas and create taxing angles,
thereby complicating employment of fires. Obstacles also complicate access to landing zones.
Bridges and tunnels canalize movement. Drainage and utility conduits run under roadways, on
the underside of bridges, and along the sides or ceilings of tunnel features. The weight or size of
military vehicles may exceed the capacity of such structures, especially in developing countries,
necessitating the use of smaller vehicles that lack armor. The physical environment can
dramatically influence force ratios as commanders find themselves dealing with greater densities
of potential firing positions, mobility corridors, and other tactical features than are apparent on a
map. Additionally, the effects of weather in urban environments can be even more unpredictable
and damaging than in an open environment (for example, flooding of subterranean and already
canalized areas due to heavy rain, creation of heat islands and micro-scale wind patterns between
buildings impacting unmanned aerial vehicle operations, and smog obstructing surveillance).

6-8. Tactical time implications of urban operations

Urban environments tend to increase the tempo of military operations. Further, the complexity
of urban environments combines with its dynamic nature to make maintaining situational
awareness a never-ending challenge. Terrain features – moveable and immovable – can change
rapidly over time thanks to construction, vehicle traffic, and population movement, making
intelligence analysis a process akin to weather forecasting. Daily events such as rush hour
complicate even basic movement. Work-day cycles determine where and when population
numbers will spike, offering clever adversaries concealment for nefarious activities. Holidays,
celebrations, special events, and religious practices further influence urban population behaviors.
Unit rotation complicates understanding in this regard; year-long or shorter tours mean Soldiers

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experience an annual event once, if at all. It took multiple deployments for many tactical
commanders in Iraq to adapt effectively to key events like Ramadan.

6-9. PMESII-PT summary

Urban areas are replete with challenges for the twenty-first-century Soldier. Yet the shrewd
leader and perceptive operator will see plentiful opportunities where others see only difficulty.
Recall that a numerous and dense population provides myriad eyes and ears that can provide
invaluable input to intelligence collectors. The same hum of daily activity potentially shielding
an adversary’s wicked intentions offers coalition forces equal opportunity. The larger the urban
area, the greater the number of surface, subterranean, and super-surface approaches available to
flank or envelop enemy defenses. Innovation, initiative, and discipline will favor the bold.

Chapter 7
Mission Command Considerations during Urban Operations

7. The criticality of mission command during urban operations

a. Properly employing mission command is nowhere more critical than in urban

environments. Interruptions of communications will be commonplace. See Army Doctrine
Reference Publication 6-0, were mission command is defined as “the exercise of authority and
direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the
commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land
operations.… [It] emphasizes centralized intent and dispersed execution.” “Mission orders” are
in turn defined as “directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how
they are to achieve them.” The same non-line-of-sight challenges complicating communications
and fires will also impede situational awareness. This will prove true even with employment of
unmanned aerial or ground vehicles and yet-to-be-fielded information and communications
technologies given that many activities take place in subterranean cavities, building interiors, or
amongst noncombatant concentrations. Monitoring will be difficult due to the narrowness of
streets and use of tarps, corrugated metal, and other materials to block overhead monitoring and
entryways to alleys in slums, refugee camps, and similar features. While AI and other means of
more effectively accessing, compiling, and analyzing the extensive data will enhance situational
awareness to an extent – thereby allowing commanders to better “see” the character of the
environment than has previously been possible – clear guidance in the form of excellent mission
and commander’s intent statements will continue to be crucial given the dynamic nature of urban
operations and their associated environments.

b. As there is an ever-increasing need to partner with other-than-military (and other-than-

government) organizations during urban contingencies, it is fortunate that some non-military
organizations apply forms of command and control akin to mission command. Some police
departments, firefighting organizations, and nongovernmental organizations routinely employ a
form of mission command. Its fundamental elements – clear mission and intent statements;
decentralization based on trust; adapting the extent of guidance and freedom of action based on a
subordinate’s proven performance and a leader’s familiarity with the individual; subordinates’
recognizing that the boss needs to check even the most able of more junior leaders; and those

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subordinates also keeping seniors informed to the extent feasible – are integral to the
convergence sought during undertakings in urban environments. An absence of effective
mission command means those at lower echelons are denied the flexibility essential to keeping
pace with dynamic circumstances. With it, however, a coalition can practice what Chief of the
Australian Army, Major General Rick Burr, called “combat Darwinism.” (See Russell W.
Glenn, et al., Where None have Gone Before: Operational and Strategic Perspectives on Multi-
Domain Operations in Megacities.) According to Burr, it may well be the agile organization
able to meet urban operations’ ever-evolving operational demands rather than the strongest that
succeeds. Training, intelligence, and other preparations cannot identify every possible
contingency. What they can do via mission command is groom men and women to respond
effectively when conditions change and new challenges arise. (See Where None have Gone
Before: Operational and Strategic Perspectives on Multi-Domain Operations in Megacities,
2018.)

Chapter 8
Technological Challenges and Initiatives during Urban Operations

8. Technology and the urban environment

a. Urban operations will at times require significant adaptation of existing equipment.

Modeling and simulations (M&S) capabilities will need frequent review and updating given
urban environments’ dynamic character. Innovative, even radically new, technologies will in
some cases be essential in order for the Army to conduct future urban operations effectively.
These capabilities must address requirements throughout the range of possible contingencies.
Such technologies’ introduction may in addition require adaptation of one or more doctrine,
organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy
elements.

b. Urban areas’ sprawl and density present challenges across all warfighting functions. The
three-dimensional nature of their environments degrades and can completely interdict
communications, ISR systems, sensors, munitions trajectories, maneuver, and global positioning
capabilities. Those employing various technologies will need to account for ever-changing
environmental factors, both physical and social. Receptiveness to a technology’s employment
may differ given cultural norms, requiring commanders and staffs to be aware of potential
counterproductive responses. Tactics, techniques, and procedures will accordingly need
adjustment.

c. The aforementioned LOS restrictions will present among the most difficult technological
hurdles. LOS communications are in particular highly susceptible to degradation if not outright
denial. Pending development of communications capable of penetrating or bypassing obstacles,
units and personnel will be reliant on relays to maintain reliable, secure, low-probability-of-
intercept signals. This is especially true once a unit enters structure interiors or subterranean
features. Convoluted navigation routes, movement between floors, and both the thickness and
density of building materials can require high numbers of signal relays. Reliance on non-
autonomous unmanned systems will compound difficulties. Barring development of new

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technologies, solutions will have to draw on capabilities such as atomic clocks and inertial
guidance systems in addition to relays. Electronic warfare activities, both signals collection and
jamming, will similarly be impacted. Smaller, networked, remote jammers and collection
systems will be needed to overcome these restrictions.

d. Sensors supporting intelligence operations, targeting, and command and control will also
require solutions to overcome these issues. Capable of overcoming problems posed by
subterranean and vertical terrain, they must also be sufficiently difficult to detect or displace to
avoid neutralization by human interference or routine urban environmental factors such as
vehicle-induced vibration. Geospatial intelligence will be required to accurately represent
complex terrain, including that subterranean and internal to structures. Sensors capable of
“seeing” through walls and other visual barriers and others with resolution and multi-functional
capabilities beyond those currently available would be invaluable for both mapping and detection
purposes (for example, providing a visual image while simultaneously testing the environment
for the presence of explosive residue). Regardless, even as we reach this century’s midway
point, it will be the millions of human eyes and ears whose owners live in, work in, and visit the
world’s largest urban areas that remain key sensors. Technologies allowing better filtering of
legitimate from proscribed targets will increasingly be in demand as foes seek to shield their
human and equipment means of delivering lethal fires and soft influence while immersed in an
urban areas’ mass of citizenry and structures.

e. LOS directly impacts engagement systems as well. Structures block munitions trajectories
and impede aviation operations. Flight path planning and predicting indirect fire trajectories will
be challenging; continuous updating of maps, photo images, and other resources will be
fundamental to monitoring what are constant changes to urban landscapes. The former is
exacerbated by difficulties in detecting counter-air systems amidst urban physical and signals
clutter. Extreme variances in building elevations and urban canyons create challenges for
airspace control, deconfliction, and mission planning, a problem made more difficult in the
presence of commercial and private air traffic and increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles.
Turbulence induced by urban micro-climates adds to these complications.

f. Noncombatants can number in the millions during major force-on-force urban combat
operations. Avoiding their injury to the extent possible may be fundamental to strategic success.
Positive identification will be far more difficult than in most rural terrain given civilians residing
in buildings or other structures and in close proximity to enemy forces. Avoiding collateral
casualties is further complicated by munitions effects that differ depending on building material
properties and structural designs. Future lethal systems will ideally be capable of discerning
between combatant and non-combatant. Munitions capable of scalable effects could additionally
reduce the likelihood of collateral injury to innocents and infrastructure.

g. Many benefits will accrue from being able to exploit the physical and social infrastructures
of a modern, highly connected city. Knowledgeable systems managers and engineers can exploit
the former. The Army must possess the ability to conduct cyber intelligence preparation of the
battlefield and ISR; leverage social media and other information sources; and conduct focused,
comprehensive information operations in ways favorable to mission accomplishment.

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h. Sustainment operations are an area of specific concern during urban operations. Isolated
units and those operating in a highly dispersed manner will complicate support operations
already hindered by the vulnerability of street-level supply lines. Robotic vehicles capable of
delivering supplies autonomously or in conjunction with manned systems will mitigate these
challenges, the more so when they can autonomously select routes in real time where interdiction
is less likely. (This capability will be no less effective in delivering munitions to otherwise
difficult to strike or otherwise inaccessible targets. The operational security and deception
opportunities inherent in the pending ubiquity of robots is ripe terrain for future research.)
Vertical resupply of forces operating in high-rise buildings, subterranean navigation and
movement, and the ability to penetrate barriers (for example, interior walls) when necessary will
enhance such systems’ value. Similar capabilities will prove valuable for casualty evacuation.

i. High-rise urban canyons can create pockets of micro-climates – local weather conditions
distinct from those in more open areas. Swirling winds, updrafts, and other phenomena will
impact manned and unmanned air activity; degrade sensor employment; limit visibility or
acoustic reflection; influence the movement of chemical, biological, and radiological
agents/materials; or generate other effects. Subterranean features such as basements, utility
tunnels, and subway systems offer maneuver opportunities even as they similarly present risks
such as asphyxiation, sudden flooding, and enemy infiltration. Those operating in urban areas
will therefore benefit from the fielding of small, autonomous weather and hazardous
material/agent sensors. The last may be encountered due to deliberate or inadvertent release;
industrial areas contain hazardous chemicals that can be accidentally dispersed due to friendly
force fires. Radioactive materials are commonly found in urban areas given uses that include
nuclear medicine and radioactive imaging. Early identification of sites containing such potential
hazards and unmanned delivery of sensors to provide early detection are both desirable.
Reliance on subterranean features for storage, housing medical units, headquarters, troop rest, or
other purposes will merit reconsideration if a foe possesses heavier-than-air agents.

j. AI will be fundamental in compiling and analyzing information from human, vibratory,

visual, audio, signals, and other sources, thereafter translating it into a quality and quantity
consumable by human decision-makers. Humans will increasingly be removed from select
decision-making processes in pending decades as faith in AI “judgment” and capabilities
increases, reducing if not eliminating the time those humans need to make, disseminate, and put
decisions into effect.

Chapter 9.
Urban Operations Training at all three Levels of War

9-1. Urban operations training overview

a. Tactical level urban operations training continues to improve thanks to recognition given
the inevitability of such operations in the future. Terrain walks in major U.S. cities emphasizing
various security challenges are becoming commonplace, allowing leaders and led to grasp the
nature of these environments. This increased familiarity with real world environments
complements exercises at the many purpose-built training sites around the country and

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internationally, revealing opportunities during which Soldiers could use covered and concealed
passageways. (Similar approaches may have value when moving noncombatants through
contaminated urban terrain or that under fire.) There is an outstanding need for modeling and
simulation to effectively represent encounters with enemy personnel; noncombatants of various
(and, perhaps, varying) sympathies toward coalition, adversary, or other parties; and members of
other coalition organizations, those unassociated with the coalition, and local authorities. These
simulations would also be valuable in demonstrating the spectrum of responsibilities junior-most
leaders will confront in tomorrow’s cities. These include calls for simultaneously conducting
combat operations, preserving stability (for example, preventing looting or controlling riots), and
providing relief to noncombatants. Well-designed training and simulations will need to
demonstrate links between actions taken now and consequences in coming months and years just
as they will the consequences of those actions on operational and strategic objectives.

b. There is as of yet little training available to prepare leaders for contingencies at the
operational and strategic levels. Managing combat operations will sometimes prove of
secondary importance to other diplomatic, informational, military, or economic elements.
Integrating these interdependent considerations will be fundamental to converting battlefield
successes into lasting victories. Whether training involves experts of appropriate gravitas from
all PMESII-PT arenas in a live environment or leaders being forced to face the complexity of
urban operations and their local, national, and broader implications via simulation, scenarios
must cover the full range of military operations to include contingencies when combat operations
are of subordinate concern.

9-2. Urban training facilities

In the Army, the word “urban” when referencing training areas has typically indicated a facility
with a cluster of man-made structures replicating a village or town. These are often instrumented
using global positioning system trackers and cameras to provide feedback during after action
reviews (AARs). Due to various limitations, most Army urban training areas fail to meet the
scope of environments inclusive of large towns or cities due to their lack of representing the
implications inherent in extensive systems such as sanitation, utilities, communications, and
housing. Most also do not create significant channelizing terrain as buildings are often set too
far apart. Finally, most do not have a consistent, dedicated opposing force (OPFOR) or role-
players in sufficient numbers. Army Training Circulars 25-8 and 90-1, for management of Army
ranges, including urban training areas.

9-3. Home station urban operations training

Focusing on non-live-fire capabilities generally, combined arms collective training cacilities
(CACTF) as found on many installations have several common features. Each consists of 20-26
buildings one of which is three stories tall and three of which are two stories. Any may have
basements and/or be connected by a tunnel or sewer system. Most buildings are separated from
each other by enough space to allow vehicles to pass between them. The entire facility is
generally uncluttered by vehicles, furniture, and other common items found where people reside.
Most CACTFs have limited instrumentation and AAR capabilities. They do not have dedicated
OPFOR or role-players. The CACTF merely provides man-made terrain for training that can be
incorporated into battalion-sized field training exercises (FTXs).

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9-4. Maneuver combat training centers

Each of the maneuver CTCs has multiple urban training capabilities. These range from very
small villages to fairly robust large towns with multi-story structures. While they only provide
limited channelization and have fairly simple replications of infrastructure such as cyber access,
wireless phone capabilities, and basic utilities, their most significant difference when compared
to CACTF is the presence of professional role-players that interact with training units. These
role-players, often speaking a foreign language, require the use of an interpreter, have well-
developed biographies and roles that they portray, and add considerable complexity to the
training scenario.

a. Another significant CTC capability is the presence of a large, well-trained professional

OPFOR. These Soldiers are capable of representing conventional and unconventional forces.
Their familiarity with the environment greatly adds to their lethality and training realism.
Furthermore, CTC facilities are tied into a robust instrumentation system with a professional
team of observer coach trainers to facilitate AARs.

b. The greatest limitation of CTC facilities is the dedication to monthly brigade combat team
training rotations. This precludes any unit not associated with the particular brigade combat
team (BCT) or its rotation from training at these facilities.

9-5. Other urban operations training facilities

Some other locations provide more complex facilities. These include (but are not limited to) the
Zussman Urban Combat Training Center at Fort Knox and Muscatatuck Urban Training Center
in Indiana. The Zussman facility is CACTF in size and includes clutter such as abandoned
automobiles and furniture in some buildings. Additional details exist, to include rubbled
buildings; simulated downed power lines; and enhanced sounds, smells, and other effects. It was
specifically designed to facilitate the integration of combat vehicles. Zussman also has some
capacity for AARs and can support battalion training exercises.

a. The Muscatatuck Urban Training Center is currently the largest and most robust urban
training facility in the United States. Consisting of over 200 structures and 1000 square acres of
training space, its realism is specifically enhanced by its portrayal of support systems, including
subterranean tunnels, cyber, and Wi-Fi capabilities. However, despite the presence of tall
buildings (including five- and seven-story structures), the facility is largely suburban in
organization. There is relatively little channelizing terrain. Additionally, role players are a
separate funding requirement when units request use of Muscatatuck facilities. Muscatatuck has
robust AAR facilities available and can support larger training exercises.

b. The U.S. Marine Corps has established a large urban training center at Twentynine Palms,
California. Consisting of numerous concrete structures, there are nonetheless limited
instrumentation, force-on-force training, role player participation, and professional OPFOR
resources.

c. Both Israel and Germany have established very large urban training facilities. Israel’s
Urban Warfare Training Center outside of Beersheba closely resembles a Middle Eastern town
with plentiful channelizing terrain. It’s over 600 structures and 5000 acres of maneuver space

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present a realistic urban environment. However, complex systems may not be represented to the
extent desired and role players are largely absent. Further, instrumentation and AAR capacity
are limited.

d. The German Army’s urban training facility at Schnoggersburg will, on completion, be the
largest in Europe. Schnoggersburg incorporates numerous three-story and taller buildings (one
of 7 floors), canals, tunnels, and other infrastructure. Up to fifty percent of its buildings can be
instrumented at any time.

9-6. The future of U.S. Army urban operations training facilities

U.S. Army leaders have begun efforts to upgrade urban terrain facilities at Fort Irwin,
California’s National Training Center and that at Fort Polk’s Joint Readiness Training Center,
specifically, adding taller structures to better replicate core downtown areas in larger cities.

9-7. Urban operations training challenges

a. The greatest limitation in current Army urban training physical facilities is the inability to
realistically replicate urban densities over a sufficiently large area. Joint Publication (JP) 3-06,
identifies the “urban triad” as consisting of the man-made physical terrain, population of
significant size and density, and infrastructure. JP 3-06 also specifically identifies density as
“the overriding aspect of the urban environment.” Current Army urban training capabilities by
and large fail to realistically represent density in terms of man-made physical terrain or
population. Human social systems cannot be effectively analyzed when the number of role
players encountered is less than two percent of what would be expected in a dense urban
environment. JP 3-06 states that “information is the pervasive backdrop of the urban
environment;” there should be a corresponding density of media and messages of all types in
dense urban training settings. At CTCs, the US Army’s highest fidelity training environments,
such operational variables are currently too often simplistically portrayed with single
representations of information systems, unsophisticated economic systems, and social and
political systems of limited depth.

b. In summary, most domestic and international urban training facilities offer only limited-
space man-made terrain. CTCs have larger facilities with OPFOR, role-players, and some
infrastructure systems. Yet neither CTCs nor other facilities described yet provide the density or
complexity of an urban environment as one would find in even the smallest of cities. Some of
these shortcomings may be addressed via the introduction of hologram role players and other
features, augmented reality eyewear, and advances in modeling and simulations capabilities.
Such innovations will fall short of addressing the full spectrum of urban operations training
needs barring a thus far nonexistent coherent and systematic approach to enhancing individual
and unit preparation.

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Chapter 10
Urban Operations Modeling and Simulations

10-1. Current urban operations modeling and simulations capabilities and status
See Army Regulations 5-11 and 350-2, for regulatory responsibilities regarding delivery of the
operational environment. TRADOC G-2 conducts OE-based assessments of legacy M&S
capabilities across the Army M&S enterprise.

a. Legacy systems include:

1) The Joint Land Component Constructive Training Capability (JLCCTC) with

Warfighters’ Simulation (WARSIM) replicating ground operations;

2) One Semi-Automated Force (OneSAF) simulation. This includes the Battle Lab
Collaborative Simulation Environment (BLCSE) variant;

3) Virtual Battle Space 3 (VBS3); and

4) Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS).

b. Under review at the time of writing are the Advanced Warfighter (AWARS) Simulation,
Combat XXI, and the Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Tactical Proficiency Trainer.

c. The Army M&S enterprise in this context includes the acquisition, analysis,
experimentation, intelligence, test and evaluation, and training considerations of M&S-enabled
communities. Assessment of models, simulations, and related tools within this enterprise reveals
critical gaps in the representation of a holistic OE. This is especially true as applies to the
portrayal of megacity fidelity, subterranean features, patterns of life, and PMESII-PT
characteristics and behaviors. See Figure 10-1, where red means “no representation” and green
indicates “sufficient representation.”

Figure 10-1. Late 2018 status of urban functionality in Army modeling and simulations

10-2. Urban operations M&S challenges

These shortfalls have particular impact on urban operations replication given the recent inclusion
of PMESII-PT operational variables within the readiness standards of standards for training
proficiency and need to span live, virtual, constructive, and gaming training domains. Add to
this the move from an AirLand Battle paradigm to an emergent requirement to represent MDO

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and the gaps only widen and become more complex. (MDO includes holistic consideration of
the land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains.) Some progress has been made to
incorporate science and technological advances, but even these efforts have significant shortfalls
that require too great a reliance on master scenario events list injects and other workarounds.
This method unfortunately also provides no means of establishing the accountability, causality,
or traceability needed to effectively train commanders.

a. Urban terrain and other features are constantly evolving. Synthetic representation must
therefore be dynamic to provide realistic training. For example, portrayal of buildings within the
urban environment is fundamental. A training audience must be able to move, shoot, and
communicate within, around, and – often – beneath them. Construction, maintenance, and
related activities combine with variations in pedestrian and vehicle traffic, weather conditions,
and other factors that mean even a fixed structure takes on different characteristics depending on
the time of day, week, or year. Other urban operations M&S challenges include but are not
limited to accurately representing:

(1) Bandwidth and fidelity mission demands,

(2) Joint and coalition interoperability, and

(3) Training that effectively addresses PMESII-PT variables.

b. No model or simulation can represent all requirements for operating in an ever-changing

operational environment, nor do they always need to in great fidelity, but those determined most
critical should be incorporated. Constant updating in terms of threats will further be essential.
In order to gain an advantage – or at least remain competitive – the Army and its joint and
multinational partners must adopt new science and technology approaches and otherwise adapt to
mitigate these adversarial challenges. Army M&S has to provide commanders, their staffs, and
the Soldier with realistic and relevant OE training opportunities. Modeling and simulation
provides the most cost effective, efficient, and traceable means for commanders to evaluate their
unit’s ability to meet objectives.

10-3. Planned initiatives

a. Initiatives such as the AFC cross-functional team standup, standards for training
proficiency employment, and MDO concept development represent some of the Army’s recent
efforts to move toward a more realistic representation of the capabilities required to remain
competitive against future adversaries. TRADOC G-2 is also working in partnership with both
legacy and future M&S proponents – for example, the synthetic training environment in the case
of the latter – to mitigate gaps and move toward more effective representations of urban
environments.

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Figure 10-2. Army directed CFT pilots

b. AFC will oversee the Army-directed effort to standup the eight cross-functional team pilot
programs. See figure 10-2, that, when completed, will first, be integrated horizontally and
vertically and second, improve the quality and speed of material development via a cooperative
warfighter-developer process. The CFT efforts will play a major part in developing the M&S
functionality needed to mitigate urban operations’ replication gaps in a quicker and more
efficient manner than experienced heretofore.

10-4. Final modeling and simulations observations

There are gaps in megacity and other forms of urban environment representation across the
Army M&S enterprise. Fortunately, the Army has a good understanding of what these gaps are
and is currently working gap mitigation efforts with the proponents of both legacy and future
M&S initiatives. TRADOC G-2 continues to deliver the OE to ensure M&S efforts in support of
Army leadership development, training, education, and readiness provide a relevant and realistic
representation of urban considerations.

Chapter 11
Concluding Observations and Summary

11-1. Concluding observations

There are plentiful reasons to believe that urban-related PMESII-PT challenges will become
more complex as urbanization continues during the eras of accelerated human progress and
contested equality. Many of the challenges identified – for example, the cost of building and
maintaining urban training sites, the need for more sophisticated urban modeling and simulation
capabilities, and the extraordinary difficulty inherent in targeting foes amidst an urban
population – have long been recognized yet thus far remain insufficiently addressed. The U.S.
Army has in other cases recognized that serendipitous advances in various areas have positive
spillover benefits, Soldier use of commercial gaming replications being but one example.

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11-2. Concluding summary

The next 10, 20, or 30 years will see exacerbation of known challenges such as sea level rise
magnification of storm surges and others new, for example, enemies’ increased sophistication in
manipulating urban populations’ attitudes via misinformation, disinformation, and manipulation.
Meeting these challenges will demand adaptive thinking, innovative evolution of U.S.
capabilities, and establishing coalitions beyond those with military and whole-of-government
members alone. No less than in other environments, adversaries confronting our superior
capabilities in one PMESII-PT element will cultivate counters in others to avoid our strengths.
Employing systems perspectives during analysis, looking beyond the immediate consequences of
actions to account for second- and higher-order effects, and exercising mission command at all
levels will be keys to future Army success. Acceleration of our Soldiers’ capabilities such that
they excel not only in key head-to-head competitions but in new ways that allow them to
outmaneuver adversary advances in the land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains will be desirable.
Potential adversaries will seek to contest equality in the dominions they believe will provide a
competitive advantage. Our response should include maneuvering through multiple domains at
various echelons such that a foe’s achieving equivalence in one arena leaves him vulnerable via
assaults from others. The complexity of the urban environment and its many interconnected
systems offers fertile ground for innovative forms of armed conflict and competition in the
coming decades.

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Appendix A
References

Section I
Required Publications

This section contains no entries.

Section II
Related Publications

A related publication is a source of additional information. The user does not have to read it to
understand these implementation procedures.

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0

Mission Command

Army Regulation 5-11

Management of Army Modeling and Simulation

Army Regulation 350-2

Operational Environment and Opposing Force Program

Army Training Circular 25-8

Training Ranges

Army Training Circular 90-1

Training for Urban Operations

Glenn, Russell W., Achieving Convergence during Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
Operations in the World’s Largest Urban Areas: Proceedings of the “Current and Future
Operations in Megacities” Conference, Tokyo, Japan, July 16-18, 2019, Fort Eustis, VA: U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command, October 1, 2019,
https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/mad-scientist/m/tokyo-megacities-conference-
2019/294569.

Glenn, Russell W., et al., Where None have Gone Before: Operational and Strategic
Perspectives on Multi-Domain Operations in Megacities - Proceedings of the ‘Multi-Domain
Battle in Megacities’ Conference, April 3-4, 2018, Fort Hamilton, New York, Fort Eustis, VA:
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, July 20, 2018,
https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/mad-scientist/m/multi-domain-battle-mdb-in-
megacities/244661.

Joint Publication 3-06

Joint Urban Operations

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Section III
Prescribed Forms

This section contains no entries.

Section IV
Referenced Forms

This section contains no entries.

Glossary

Section I
Abbreviations

AAR after action report

AFC U.S. Army Futures Command
AI artificial intelligence
AWARS Advanced Warfighter Simulation
BCT brigade combat team
BLCSE Battle Lab Collaborative Simulation Environment
CACTF combined arms collective training facility
CTC combat training center
DA Department of the Army
FOE future operational environment
FTX field training exercise
HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JCATS Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation
JLCCTC-WARSIM Joint Land Component Constructive Training Capability – Warfighters’
Simulation
JP joint publication
LOS line-of-sight
M&S modeling and simulation
MDO multi-domain operations
NC3I Network Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
OE operational environment
OneSAF One Semi-Automated Force
OPFOR opposing force
PMESII-PT political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure - physical
environment, and time
TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
VBS3 Virtual Battle Space 3

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Section II
Terms

This section contains no entries.

Section III
Special abbreviations and terms

This section contains no entries.

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