No.
10-CV-724
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
________________
DARRYL L. BEASLEY,
Appellant
v.
ROWE CONTRACTING SERVICES, INC.
Appellee
Initial Brief of Appellant Darryl L. Beasley
On Petition for Review from District of Columbia Superior Court
Filed by:
___________________
DARRYL L. BEASLEY,
Pro Se Appellant
851 Lake Shore Drive
Mitchellville, MD 20721
(301) 221-1132
1
CERTIFICATE OF PARTIES, RULINGS UNDER REVIEW, AND
RELATED CASES PURSUANT TO CIRCUIT RULE 28 (a) (1)
1. Parties. Parties to this action are Petitioner Darryl L.
Appellant, Pro Se and Appellee Rowe Contracting Services
represented by Amy K. Walburn, of Brown Rudnick, LLP, 601
Thirteenth St., N.W., Ste. 600, Washington D.C., 2005.
2. Rulings Under Review. The petition for review states
that the Superior Court of the District of Columbia erred by
dismissing Appellant’s case.
3. Related Cases. There are no related cases.
2
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Superior Court entered a final order on this case on May 5, 2010,
dismissing the Appellant’s complaint. Because the Superior Court order
was a final decision, Appellant appeals to this court pursuant to DCCA 3,
Appeal as of Right.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CERTIFICATE OF PARTIES, RULINGS UNDER REVIEW, AND
RELATED CASES PURSUANT TO CIRCUIT RULE 28 (a) (1)..........2
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT.................................................3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.........................................................4
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES...................................................6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE......................................................6
STATEMENT OF FACTS...........................................................7
ARGUMENT...........................................................................8
STANDARD OF REVIEW................................................................8
II. THE SUPERIOR COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ROWE
CONTRACTING SERVICES MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON FAILURE
TO STAT E A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED......10
III. THE SUPERIOR COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ROWE
CONTRACTING SERVICES MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. ..........................................................12
A. The issue sought to be precluded was not the same as that involved in
a prior action...........................................................................................13
B. The issue has not been determined by a valid, final judgment on the
merits...................................................................................................... 13
D. The determination was essential to the judgment..............................16
CONCLUSION....................................................................... 17
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE..............................................18
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.....................................................19
3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Arnoff v. Lenkin Co., 618 A.2d 669, 684 (App. D.C. 1992)...........................8
Atkins v. Industrial Telecommunication Ass’n 660 A.2d. 885, 891 (App.
D.C. 1995)...................................................................................................7
Cauman v. George Washington Univ., 630 A.2d 1104 (App. D.C. 1993)......6
Duncan v. Children’s National Medical Ctr., 702 A.2d 207, 212, (App. D.C.
1997)............................................................................................................6
Dyer v. Williams S. Bergman & Assocs. 635 A.2d 1285, 1287 (App. D.C.
1993)..........................................................................................................10
Flavor Corp. of Am. v. Kemin Indus., 493 F.2d 275, 279 ( 8th Cir. 1974)... .10
McBryde v. Amoco Oil Co., 404 A.2d 200, 203 (App D.C. 1979).................8
Oubre V. District of Columbia, 630 A.2d 699, 703 (App. D.C. 1993)........11
Owens v. Tiber Island Condominium Ass’n, 373 A.2d 890, 891 (App. D.C.
1997)............................................................................................................7
4
Smith v. Jenkins, 562. A. 2d 610, 613 (App. D.C. 1989)................................7
Vincent v. Anderson,. 621 A.2d 367, 372 (D.C. App. 1993)..........................7
5
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether the Superior Court erred in granting Appellee’s Motion to
Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
2. Whether the Superior Court erred in granting Appellee’s Motion to
Dismiss that was granted on the basis of collateral estoppel, as the elements
required for a proper showing of collateral estoppel were not met.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Beasley, hereinafter referred to as “Appellant” was
terminated from employment with Appellee Rowe Contracting Services,
hereinafter referred to as “Appellee”. Appellant sought unemployment
relief benefits but was denied by the District of Columbia Office of
Administrative Hearings. Appellant then filed a complaint alleging libel,
slander, malice, and gross negligence by the Appellee towards him, in the
District of Columbia Superior Court. The trial court on the basis of
collateral estoppel dismissed appellant’s petition. The Superior Court also
6
mentioned but never made a ruling on whether or not the complaint was
actually being dismissed on the basis of failure to state a claim as well.
Collateral estoppel was not a valid basis of dismissal of Appellant’s
complaint. The action brought in Superior court couldn’t have been
considered in an Administrative hearing because litigation of tort claims is
grounded in the jurisdiction of the Superior court. The Administrative
Board could only consider and did only consider whether or not Appellant
was eligible for unemployment benefits and not the issues presented by
Appellant’s complaint.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant Beasley filed a complaint against the Appellees alleging that he
had been the victim of libel, slander, malice, and gross negligence.
(Complaint). 1 The appellant had previously been denied unemployment
benefits. On January 25, 2010 appellee filed a motion to dismiss alleging
that Appellant’s complaint did not state sufficient ground upon which to
base relief. (Motion to Dismiss, 1/25/2010). The court denied that motion
and granted Appellant time to amend his complaint. (Order dated
1
Appellant had previously filed for unemployment benefits and was denied as a
result of a hearing at the District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings Case
no. ES=P=09-114596.
7
2/23/2010). Appellant filed an Amended complaint on March 6, 2010
(Amended Complaint). On March 19, 2010 the Appellee filed another
motion to dismiss alleging that the Appellant’s claims were barred by
collateral estoppel and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. (Motion to Dismiss, 3/19/2010). The Superior Court dismissed the
Appellants claims based on the fact that the unemployment hearing
constituted a final hearing on the case and implying that the complaint
requested the court to institute a review of an administrative order. (Order
dated 5/10/2010).
ARGUMENT
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate review of a superior court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim is de novo. Duncan v. Children’s National Medical
Ctr., 702 A.2d 207, 211 (App. D.C. 1997). When considering a motion to
dismiss for failure to statue a claim, the court [must] construe the facts on
the face of the complaint in a light most favorable to the Appellant and its
allegations as true. Cauman v. George Washington Univ., 630 A.2d 1104
8
(App. D.C. 1993). A complaint will be deemed sufficient as long as it fairly
puts the Appellee on notice of the claim against him or her. Duncan v.
Children’s National Medical Ctr., 702 A.2d 207, 212, (App. D.C. 1997).
Liberal rules of pleading will normally protect a Appellant from dismissal at
the pleading stage if all inferences are drawn in the Appellant’s favor. Id.
Dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is
impermissible unless it appears beyond doubt that the Appellant can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim, which would entitle him to relief.
Owens v. Tiber Island Condominium Ass’n, 373 A.2d 890, 891 (App. D.C.
1997). The appellate court will apply the same standard as the trial court,
basically accepting all allegations as true and construing all facts and
inferences in favor of the Appellant. Atkins v. Industrial Telecommunication
Ass’n 660 A.2d. 885, 891 (App. D.C. 1995).
When the Court of Appeals is called upon to review a case that deals
with collateral estoppel, the correct standard of review will also be denovo.
Smith v. Jenkins, 562. A. 2d 610, 613 (App. D.C. 1989). In effect this means
that the Court of Appeals is not bound by the findings of the trial court.
Owens v. Tibor Island Condominium Ass’n, Id. at 892.
9
II. THE SUPERIOR COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ROWE
CONTRACTING SERVICES MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON
FAILURE TO STAT E A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF
COULD BE GRANTED.
The District of Columbia Superior Court rule 12(b) (6) states that a
motion to dismiss for failure of the pleadings to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted is a defense that can be asserted via motion. A
compliant cannot be dismissed under this section unless it appears that a
Appellant can provide no facts in support of the claim, which would entitle
the Appellant to relief. Vincent v. Anderson, 621 A.2d 367, 372 (D.C. App.
1993).
The only issues on review of a dismissal made pursuant to 12 (b) (6)
are the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Arnoff v. Lenkin Co., 618 A.2d
669, 684 (App. D.C. 1992). D. C. Superior Court Rule 8 governs the
sufficiency of pleadings. In pertinent part, a pleading must (1) contain a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction unless
the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional
support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
Appellant is entitled to relief; (3) a demand for the relief sought, which can
contain alternative or different types of relief.
Appellant was pro se and therefore his complaint did not contain the
10
nuances and lingo of that of a skilled attorney. However, upon amending his
complaint the cases continue to proceed. The order dismissing the case
almost relied solely on the issue of issue preclusion and not that of the
insufficiency of the Appellant’s complaint. In fact in one order the judge
noted that the D.C. jurisdiction is a notice pleading state, and that Appellant
had made met his basic burden of pleading. Appellant’s complaint was
sufficient to put the Appellee on notice of the relief being sought and the
legal causes of action in which the Appellant was pursuing. If the facts
within the Appellant’s complaint are viewed in a light most favorable to the
Appellant, it is clear that the Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim
was error. The court is not to look at the Appellant’s complaint to determine
if he or she is going to succeed at trial. A complaint should not be dismissed
under subdivision (b)(6) because the Court doubts that the Appellant will
prevail in the action. McBryde v. Amoco Oil Co., 404 A.2d 200, 203 (App
D.C. 1979).
The parties never entered the discovery process, nor did the court
engage in any type of fact finding that would meet the burden required to
dismiss Appellant’s complaint.
11
III. THE SUPERIOR COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ROWE
CONTRACTING SERVICES MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL.
The Superior Court incorrectly held that collateral estoppel, or issue
preclusion bars Appellee Appellant’s claims in this case. The District of
Columbia court of appeals will find that an issue is barred by the principal of
collateral estoppel when (1) the issue is actually litigated and (2) determined
by a valid, final judgment on the merits; (3) after a full and fair opportunity
for litigation by the parties; (4) under circumstances where the determination
was essential to the judgment, and not merely dictum. Davis v. Davis, 663
A.2d 499, 501 (App. D.C. 1995). As the following discussion shows, the
issue litigated in the District of Columbia Administrative Hearings Office
was not brought again in the Superior Court action. Therefore, collateral
estoppel is not applicable to the current case. The court viewed the
Appellant’s complaint as a bid for review of an administrative hearing, and
denied jurisdiction. However the issues presented by the complaint (libel,
slander, gross negligence, and malice) were ones that could not possibly
have been considered by the administrative board because they didn’t have
jurisdiction to decide them.
12
A. The issue sought to be precluded was not the same as that involved in a prior
action
In order for collateral estoppel to apply, the issue that is sought to be
barred must be the same as the issues that were actually litigated. The D.C.
court of appeals has taken this to be issues that have been preclusively
resolved in an earlier proceeding. Id. at 501.
When Appellant brought an action for wrongful termination with the
District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings, the only issue that
was presented was whether or not Appellant was entitled to unemployment
benefits. The action brought in the Superior Court dealt with the employers
conduct towards Appellant for libel, slander, malice, and gross negligence.
These issues were not litigated nor even addressed in Appellant’s
administrative hearing. The only issue considered dealt with Appellant’s
actions in the workplace and had no bearing on the employers conduct
toward Appellant. Therefore the issues brought forth in Appellant’s superior
court complaint were not actually litigated in the OAH case, nor were they a
request for review of the administrative boards ruling.
B. The issue has not been determined by a valid, final judgment on the merits.
Collateral estoppel also requires that the issue has been previously
determined by a valid final judgment. It long has been the principle that
13
to be final and therefore reviewable, an order must dispose of the whole
case on its merits, so that the court has nothing to do but execute the
judgment or decree already rendered. Dyer v. Williams S. Bergman &
Assocs. 635 A.2d 1285, 1287 (App. D.C. 1993)
Where the second action between the same parties is upon a
Different cause or demand, the principle of res judicata, is
applied more narrowly. In this situation, the judgment in the
prior action operates as estoppel, not as to matters which might
have been litigated and determined, but only as to those matters
in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which
the finding or verdict was rendered… Since the cause of action
involved in the second proceeding is not swallowed by
judgment in the prior suite, the parties are free to litigate points
which were not at issue in the first proceeding, even though
such points might have been tendered and decided at that time.
Flavor Corp. of Am. v. Kemin Indus., 493 F.2d 275, 279 (8th
Cir. 1974).
The OAH hearing was an administrative cause of action solely for the
purpose of determining whether or not Appellant was eligible for
unemployment and insurance benefits. It was only these issues upon which
a valid, final judgment was entered. The issues that Appellant pleaded to in
the Superior Court Action. As a matter of fact the issues that Appellant
sought to have resolved in the superior court arose out of the workplace but
that was the extent to the crossover and inclusion of same.
14
C. There was no full and fair opportunity for litigation of the subject issues by the
parties.
In order for a party to have been given a full and fair opportunity for
litigation of the subject issues, certain occurrences must have taken place.
For instance there must be an opportunity to make opening and closing
statement, to call witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce
exhibits. Also pivotal is whether or not there were findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the issues. Oubre V. District of Columbia, 630 A.2d
699, 703 (App. D.C. 1993).
Appellant without question was given full and fair opportunity for
litigation of the issue that dealt directly with the availability of
unemployment benefits. However, this was not the legal issue focus of the
instant action. Appellant’s claims of malice, libel, and slander were not
given a full and fair opportunity for litigation. There was no discovery had,
there were no procedural actions as far as making opening and closing
statements, calling witnesses, or any other items that might be construed as
full and fair opportunity for litigation of the aforestated issues.
The sum total of the actions in the Superior Court dealt with procedural
issues such as motions to dismiss, and motions to vacate judgments, or
allowing the Appellant to amend his complaint. There was never a hearing
15
on any of the claims that Appellant made in his original and/or amended
complaint. Appellant was never able to present any evidence, or even begin
the discovery process to provide more information that could tend to show
or support the allegations made within his complaint. Appellant was at all
times aware that for the issues that he wanted to bring against the Appellee
he couldn’t seek the jurisdiction of the OAH, because they had none.
Appellant had no choice, considering the nature and elements of the
causes of action he alleges he is owed just recompense for, but to file for an
action in Superior Court. The OAH is a court of limited jurisdiction. Even if
all of the aforestated issues were before them, legally the only order they
could render or final judgment they could pass down was that on denying
Appellant unemployment benefits.
D. The determination was essential to the judgment.
The determination by the OAH was not even related to the judgment that
was handed down by the Superior Court. The issue of unemployment
benefits does not “lay at the heart of the parties controversy”, Davis v.
Davis, 663 A.2d 499, (App. D.C. 1995). The heart of the parties’
controversy in the Superior court dealt with the actions that the employer
took against Appellant. This behavior or these actions were alleged by
16
Appellant to rise to the level of actionable offenses. The action in the OAH
was in no way related to the causes of action alleged in the Superior Court
complaint, nor was the appellant seeking to have them revisited.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant is requesting that this matter be
remanded back to the Superior Court and his Petition reinstated.
Dated:
September 2, 2010
Respectfully submitted by:
___________________________
Darryl L. Beasley
17
Pro Se Appellant
851 Lake Shore Drive
Mitchellville, MD 20721
(301) 221-1132
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and (7)(B), that the
foregoing brief was prepared in 14 point Times New Roman font and
contains 2,569 words, excluding the parts exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)
(7)(B)(iii) and Cir. R. 32(a)(1)
Dated: September 2, 2010
18
___________________________
Darryl L. Beasley
Pro Se Appellant
851 Lake Shore Drive
Mitchellville, MD 20721
(301) 221-1132
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 25 (c) that on September _,
2010, the foregoing was Fedexed to the Clerk of Court. A copy of the
foregoing brief was also sent to Appellee’s counsel at the following address:
Amy Kingston Walborn
Brown Rudnick, LLP
601 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Suite 600
Washington, D.C. 20005
19
Dated: September ________, 2010
___________________________
Darryl L. Beasley
Pro Se Appellant
851 Lake Shore Drive
Mitchellville, MD 20721
(301) 221-1132
20
