ISSUE: W/N mere classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be

deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State.

Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos, 7 Menguito v. Republic8 and

Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as
alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that
Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith
that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with
the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that consequently, the ten-year
period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the
application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of
the land for almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared
alienable and disposable by the State.

HELD (RESOLUTION)

Classifications of land according to ownership

Land, which is an immovable property, 10 may be classified as either of public dominion

or of private ownership.11 Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is
intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. 12 Land
belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no
longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property
of the State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private
individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into
the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal
Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain belong to the State. 15 This means that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.16

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain
unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons. 17

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on
the classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural,
timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of
the public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation
that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the
classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral,
but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according
to the uses to which they may be devoted. 21 The identification of lands according to their
legal classification is done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive
Department.22

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that
may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural
lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a)
patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under
Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or
the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands
must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or
national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are
reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable
such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under
existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. 26 If, however,
public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national
park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development
of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public
dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law to that effect. 27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises
its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares
that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to
wit:

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as
follows, and not otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease; and

 (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in
relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by
a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public
domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that
lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of
patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What
the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and
disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of
the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing
in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the
following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in

possession and occupation of the property subject of the application;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and

notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership;
 4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945,
or earlier; and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the

public domain.

Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to
classify lands of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of
the application for registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of
the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is
already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine
applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as
laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the
requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
classification or reclassification of a public land as agricultural.

The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable
and disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or
earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification
produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be
minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy
concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent be respected.

We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the
requisite possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the
determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that
said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent
appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the
Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law as written by the
legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that
Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should
have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the
applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of
the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain
determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.

Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his

predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed
statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the
period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the
public domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by
operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed
by the Public Land Act. 30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the application
of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as
alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is
necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is inalienable.

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point
at which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being
confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason
of the applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant
by the Government are complied with through actual physical, open, continuous,
exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right
to a grant, but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate
of title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts. 31

If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and
quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their
occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law 32 will be
defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a
fairly recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation
(Republic Act No. 10023) 33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures
in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly residential
lands, subject to area limitations.34

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or
for the development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President,
thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable
provision concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against the State.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land
or lands of the public domain, namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly
under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore,
may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
 (a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and
disposable through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section
11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land
subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and
disposable as of the time of the application, provided the applicant’s
possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant arises, 36 and
the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or
incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of
the public domain and has become private property. 37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no

longer intended for public use or for the development of national wealth
are removed from the sphere of public dominion and are considered
converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be
alienated or disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether
ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted
to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is
a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil
Code) that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be
the object of prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that
they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June
12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession -
possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since
June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private
property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues
a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the
respondent's Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.