EN
BANC	
                                        [G.R.	No.	L-9572.		July	31,	1956.]	
         JOAQUIN	GUZMAN,	Petitioner,	vs.	THE	HONORABLE	COURT	OF	APPEALS,	Respondent.	
		
                                                   D	E	C	I	S	I	O	N	
                                                                                                    REYES,	J.B.L.,	J.:	
Appeal	by	certiorari	from	the	decision	of	the	Court	of	Appeals	finding	Appellant	Joaquin	Guzman	guilty	of	
the	crime	of	qualified	theft.	
The	facts,	as	found	by	the	Court	of	Appeals,	are	as	follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary	
“That	accused	Joaquin	Guzman	was	a	travelling	sales	agent	of	the	New	Life	Commercial	of	Aparri,	Cagayan.	
On	March	2,	1903,	Guzman	left	Manila	with	45	cases	of	different	assortments	of	La	Tondeña	wine,	in	a	
truck	driven	by	Andres	Buenaventura,	with	Federico	Cabacungan	as	washing	(helper),	on	their	return	trip	
to	Aparri,	by	way	of	Ilocos	Norte.	Along	the	route,	the	accused	made	various	cash	sales	of	wine	and	when	
they	reached	Ballesteros,	Cagayan,	at	about	3	o’clock	in	the	afternoon	of	March	5,	1953,	said	accused	had	
in	his	possession	the	amount	of	P4,873.62.	Here,	they	parked	their	truck	at	the	Sambrano	Station	and	the	
accused	left	his	companions	until	supper	time	at	past	7:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary00	p.m.	When	they	
retired	 for	 the	 night,	 driver	 Buenaventura	 and	 the	 accused	 occupied	 the	 driver’s	 compartment	 of	 the	
truck,	Buenaventura	lying	on	the	driver’s	seat	and	the	accused	taking	the	upper	deck	with	which	the	truck	
was	provided	(see	photograph	Exhibit	A).	The	washing,	Cabacungan,	slept	in	the	body	of	the	truck	where	
the	wines	were	kept.	There	was	a	wall	between	the	body	of	the	truck	and	the	driver’s	compartment;	chan	
roblesvirtualawlibraryand	on	that	night	all	the	windows	were	locked	from	inside.	In	the	morning	of	March	
6,	1953,	accused	Guzman	told	the	driver	that	he	lost	the	amount	of	P2,840.50,	and	his	firearm	license.	
Upon	the	advice	of	the	driver,	said	accused	reported	the	matter	to	the	Chief	of	Police	of	Ballesteros,	who	
gave	him	a	certificate	of	loss	of	his	firearm	license.	They	were	proceeding	to	their	home	journey	when,	at	
the	outskirts	of	Ballesteros,	they	were	met	by	a	tax	collector	and	policeman	Mariano	David	who	told	the	
accused	to	return	to	Ballesteros	and	execute	an	affidavit	regarding	the	alleged	theft.	Before	the	accused	
returned	to	Ballesteros,	he	entrusted	to	the	driver	Buenaventura,	the	amount	of	P1,630	in	cash	and	a	
check	for	P403.12	under	the	proper	receipt	(Exhibit	C),	with	the	sales	invoices,	for	delivery	to	the	manager,	
Enrique	Go,	of	the	company	of	Aparri.	Driver	and	washing	continued	the	trip	and	arrived	at	Aparri	between	
3	and	4	o’clock	in	the	afternoon	of	the	same	day.	The	driver	delivered	the	money	and	invoices	to	Enrique	
Go	and	informed	the	latter	of	the	loss.	Go	reported	the	matter	to	the	Philippine	Constabulary.	The	PC	
investigators	and	Go	picked	the	accused	at	his	house	at	Aparri	at	8	o’clock	in	the	morning,	on	March	7,	
1953,	 after	 having	 failed	 to	 see	 him	 (accused)	 at	 Ballesteros	 the	 previous	 night.	 Questioned	 at	 the	 PC	
barracks	as	to	how	much	money	he	still	had,	the	accused	stated	that	he	had	only	P3,	in	his	person.	On	
March	10,	1953,	the	accused	wrote	to	Go,	requesting	him	to	defer	the	filing	of	the	criminal	complaint	until	
March	16,	1953,	on	which	date	he	promised	to	refund	the	amount	lost	(Exhibit	G).	On	March	17,	1953,	
the	said	accused	paid	the	amount	of	P1,500	to	Go.	On	April	1,	1953,	the	accused	was	prosecuted	for	theft	
for	the	shortage	of	P804.70.”	(Appellant’s	Brief,	pp.	13-15.)	
Appellant	Guzman	claims,	first,	that	under	the	above	findings	of	fact,	he	had	committed	only	the	crime	of	
estafa;	chan	roblesvirtualawlibraryand	second,	as	the	crimes	of	estafa	and	theft	are	essentially	different	
offenses,	he	should	be	acquitted	of	the	present	charge	for	qualified	theft,	although	proceedings	may	be	
filed	anew	against	him	for	the	proper	offense.	
We	agree	with	Appellant	that	under	the	above	facts,	the	Court	of	Appeals	erred	in	holding	that	he	“had	
only	the	material	or	physical	possession	of	the	said	merchandise	or	its	proceeds,	because	he	was	not	the	
owner	 thereof;	 chan	 roblesvirtualawlibraryhe	 was	 simply	 holding	 the	 money	 for	 and	 in	 behalf	 of	 his	
employer”.	
While	 it	 is	 true	 that	 Appellant	 received	 the	 proceeds	 of	 his	 wine	 sales	 as	 travelling	 salesman	 for	 the	
complainant,	for	and	in	behalf	of	the	latter	as	his	principal,	and	that	possession	of	the	agent	is	possession	
of	the	principal,	an	agent,	unlike	a	servant	or	messenger,	has	both	the	physical	and	juridical	possession	of	
the	goods	received	in	agency,	or	the	proceeds	thereof,	which	takes	the	place	of	the	goods	after	their	sale	
by	the	agent.	His	duty	to	turn	over	the	proceeds	of	the	agency	depends	upon	his	discharge,	as	well	as	the	
result	of	the	accounting	between	him	and	the	principal;	chan	roblesvirtualawlibraryand	he	may	set	up	his	
right	of	possession	as	against	that	of	the	principal	until	the	agency	is	terminated.	
The	 case	 cited	 by	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeals	 (People	 vs.	 Locson,	 57	 Phil.,	 325),	 in	 support	 of	 its	 theory	
that	Appellant	only	had	the	material	possession	of	the	merchandise	he	was	selling	for	his	principal,	or	
their	proceeds,	is	not	in	point.	In	said	case,	the	receiving	teller	of	a	bank	who	misappropriated	money	
received	by	him	for	the	bank,	was	held	guilty	of	qualified	theft	on	the	theory	that	the	possession	of	the	
teller	is	the	possession	of	the	bank.	There	is	an	essential	distinction	between	the	possession	by	a	receiving	
teller	of	funds	received	from	third	persons	paid	to	the	bank,	and	an	agent	who	receives	the	proceeds	of	
sales	of	merchandise	delivered	to	him	in	agency	by	his	principal.	In	the	former	case,	payment	by	third	
persons	 to	 the	 teller	 is	 payment	 to	 the	 bank	 itself;	 chan	 roblesvirtualawlibrarythe	 teller	 is	 a	 mere	
custodian	or	keeper	of	the	funds	received,	and	has	no	independent	right	or	title	to	retain	or	possess	the	
same	as	against	the	bank.	An	agent,	on	the	other	hand,	can	even	assert,	as	against	his	own	principal,	an	
independent,	 autonomous,	 right	 to	 retain	 the	 money	 or	 goods	 received	 in	 consequence	 of	 the	
agency;	chan	roblesvirtualawlibraryas	when	the	principal	fails	to	reimburse	him	for	advances	he	has	made,	
and	 indemnify	 him	 for	 damages	 suffered	 without	 his	 fault	 (Article	 1915,	 new	 Civil	 Code;	 chan	
roblesvirtualawlibraryArticle	1730,	old).	
As	Appellant	converted	to	his	own	use	proceeds	of	sales	of	merchandise	delivered	to	him	as	agent,	which	
he	received	in	trust	for	and	under	obligation	to	deliver	and	turn	over	to	his	principal,	he	is	guilty	of	the	
crime	of	estafa	as	defined	by	Article	315,	paragraph	1,	subparagraph	(c),	of	the	Revised	Penal	Code.	This	
has	been	the	consistent	ruling	of	this	Court	in	cases	where	a	sales	agent	misappropriates	or	fails	to	turn	
over	to	his	principal	proceeds	of	things	or	goods	he	was	commissioned	or	authorized	to	sell	for	the	latter.	
(U.	 S.	 vs.	 Reyes,	 36	 Phil.,	 791;	 chan	 roblesvirtualawlibraryU.	 S.	 vs.	 Lim,	 36	 Phil.,	 682;	 chan	
roblesvirtualawlibraryPeople	vs.	Leachon,	56	Phil.,	737).	
The	next	question	is	whether	the	present	information	for	qualified	theft	alleges	sufficient	facts	to	sustain	
a	conviction	for	estafa	under	Article	315,	paragraph	1,	subparagraph	(b),	of	the	Revised	Penal	Code.	The	
information	reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary	
“The	undersigned	accuses	Joaquin	Guzman	of	the	crime	of	Qualified	Theft,	defined	and	penalized	under	
Articles	 308	 and	 309,	 No.	 3	 in	 connection	 with	 Article	 310	 of	 the	 Revised	 Penal	 Code,	 as	 amended	 by	
Commonwealth	 Acts	 Nos.	 273	 and	 417	 and	 Republic	 Act	 No.	 120,	 committed	 as	
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary.	
That	on	or	about	the	6th	day	of	March,	1953,	in	the	municipality	of	Aparri,	province	of	Cagayan,	and	within	
the	jurisdiction	of	this	Honorable	Court,	the	said	accused	Joaquin	Guzman,	while	in	the	employ	of	Enrique	
Go	 and	 with	 grave	 abuse	 of	 confidence	 did	 then	 and	 there,	 willfully,	 unlawfully,	 and	 feloniously,	 with	
intent	to	gain	but	without	violence	against	or	intimidation	of	persons	nor	force	upon	things,	without	the	
consent	of	the	owner	Enrique	Go	alias	Ngo	Yat,	take	and	carry	away	for	his	personal	use	and	benefit	the	
sum	of	eight	hundred	four	pesos	and	seventy	centavos	(P804.70)	to	the	damages	and	prejudice	of	said	
Enrique	Go	alias	Ngo	Yat,	in	the	amount	of	P804.70.”	(Original	Records	p.	22.)	
Article	315,	paragraph	1,	subparagraph	(b),	on	the	other	hand,	provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary	
“Swindling	(estafa).	—	Any	person	who	shall	defraud	another	by	any	of	the	means	mentioned	hereinbelow	
shall	be	punished	by:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary	
                                       x	x	x																				x	x	x																				x	x	x	
(2)		With	unfaithfulness	or	abuse	of	confidence,	namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary	
                                       x	x	x																				x	x	x																				x	x	x	
(b)		By	misappropriating	or	converting,	to	the	prejudice	of	another,	money,	goods,	or	any	other	personal	
property	received	by	the	offender	in	trust	or	on	commission,	or	for	administration,	or	under	any	other	
obligation	involving,	the	duty	to	make	delivery	of,	or	to	return	the	same,	even	though	such	obligation	be	
totally	or	partially	guaranteed	by	a	bond;	chan	roblesvirtualawlibraryor	by	denying	having	received	such	
money,	good,	or	other	property;	
Under	 the	 above	 definition	 of	 estafa,	 it	 is	 an	 essential	 element	 of	 the	 crime	 that	 the	 money	 or	 goods	
misappropriated	or	converted	by	the	accused	to	the	prejudice	of	another	was	received	by	him	“in	trust	or	
on	commission,	or	for	administration,	or	under	any	other	obligation	involving	the	duty	to	make	delivery	
of,	or	to	retain	the	same”.	No	such	allegation	appears	in	the	above	information.	Consequently,	we	agree	
with	Appellant	that	he	cannot	be	convicted	thereunder	of	the	crime	of	estafa	as	defined	by	the	article	
above.’	
Wherefore,	the	decision	appealed	from	is	reversed,	and	Appellant	Joaquin	Guzman	acquitted	of	the	crime	
of	qualified	theft.	Appellant	should,	however,	be	held	in	custody	pending	the	filing	of	another	information	
against	 him	 for	 estafa	 under	 Article	 315,	 paragraph	 1,	 subparagraph	 (b),	 of	 the	 Revised	 Penal	 Code.	
Without	costs	in	this	instance.	SO	ORDERED.	
Paras,	C.J.,	Bengzon,	Padilla,	Montemayor,	Reyes,	A.,	Bautista	Angelo,	Labrador,	Concepcion,	
Endencia,	and	Felix,	JJ.,	concur.