G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012 EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III vs.
ISABEL
COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
PEREZ, J.:
The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched imbroglio over the estate of Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued. We issued a Decision in the dispute as in Inter Caetera. We now find a need to
replace the decision.
FACTS: The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was survived by
her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including
herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and
Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration over Cristina’s estate.
Federico, opposed the petition. Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of administration on
the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild
of the latter as a result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null and void. However, in Suntay v.
Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel and her siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage
as opposed to a void marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate children of
Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.
Undaunted by the setback, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent’s estate on his behalf in the event letters
of administration issues to Federico.
On 13 November 2000, Federico died. Almost a year thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as
administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate: WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is DENIED and the
Opposition-in-Intervention is GRANTED.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III,
and appointed respondent as administratrix of the subject estate.
As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate court. We decided to
include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his interest in Federico’s estate.
In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ Decision in favor of her sole administratorship based
on her status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to administer.
Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the order of preference for the
issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed. Isabel further
asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to become a
co-administrator thereof.
ISSUE: Who is better qualified to administer the estate of the decedent?
HELD: Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo- Suntay shall solely issue to respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond to be set by the RTC, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan.
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules
of Court.
Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment of an administrator. This order
of preference, which categorically
seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been
reinforced in jurisprudence.
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is the prospective
administrator’s interest in the estate. This is the same consideration which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in
establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is
that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative,
suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential
motive to administer the estate correctly. In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be
appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest
therein greater than any other candidate.
It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the appointment of administrator of a decedent’s
estate, that the appointment of co- administrators has been allowed, but as an exception. We again refer to Section 6(a)
of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving
spouse and the next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court which say
that "x x x when an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may
administer the trust alone, x x x."
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an
interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests
necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section 6, Rule
78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned
with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the
estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio
III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion
of the Court and depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case.
