1 Tito M. Villaluna for respondents.

Republic of the Philippines MAKASIAR, J.:

SUPREME COURT
Manila This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance
of Manila, Branch XIII, dated December 16, 1968 dismissing petitioners'
EN BANC complaint for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985 Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its
PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28,
minors ROMULO and NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and ERLINDA 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the
FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA, JR., CELSO S. mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of
FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S. FLORESCA and government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to
CARMEN S. FLORESCA; take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men
working underground. Portion of the complaint reads:
LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on
behalf of her minor children LINDA, ROMEO, ANTONIO JEAN and xxx xxx xxx
ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS
MARTINEZ; 9. That for sometime prior and up to June 28,1967, the
defendant PHILEX, with gross and reckless negligence
SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the required
behalf of her minor children JOSE, ESTELA, JULITA SALUD and precautions for the due protection of the lives of its men
DANILO, all surnamed OBRA; working underground at the time, and in utter violation of
the laws and the rules and regulations duly promulgated
LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on by the Government pursuant thereto, allowed great
behalf of her minor children EDNA, GEORGE and LARRY III, all amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit
surnamed VILLAR; area at the mine above Block 43-S-1 which seeped
through and saturated the 600 ft. column of broken ore
and rock below it, thereby exerting tremendous pressure
DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and
on the working spaces at its 4300 level, with the result
on behalf of her minor children EDITHA, ELIZABETH, DIVINA,
that, on the said date, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon,
RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and AURELIO, JR. all surnamed LANUZA;
with the collapse of all underground supports due to such
enormous pressure, approximately 500,000 cubic feet of
EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on broken ores rocks, mud and water, accompanied by
behalf of her minor children JOSE, LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS surface boulders, blasted through the tunnels and flowed
and FELIX, all surnamed ISLA, petitioners, out and filled in, in a matter of approximately five (5)
vs. minutes, the underground workings, ripped timber
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, supports and carried off materials, machines and
Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, equipment which blocked all avenues of exit, thereby
respondents. trapping within its tunnels of all its men above referred to,
including those named in the next preceding paragraph,
Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners. represented by the plaintiffs herein;
 10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
working at defendant PHILEX's mine on the said date, another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust; for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
22 were rescued within the next 7 days; and the rest, 21 no pre- existing contractual relation between the parties,
in number, including those referred to in paragraph 7 is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
hereinabove, were left mercilessly to their fate, of this Chapter.
notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a great many of
them were still alive, entombed in the tunnels of the mine, Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also
but were not rescued due to defendant PHILEX's decision applicable to a quasi-delict.
to abandon rescue operations, in utter disregard of its
bounden legal and moral duties in the premises; (b) Art. 1173—The fault or negligence of the obligor
consists in the omission of that diligence which is required
xxx xxx xxx by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions
the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the duly of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.
constituted authorities as set out by the Special
Committee above referred to, in their Report of Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x
investigation, pages 7-13, Annex 'B' hereof, but also failed
completely to provide its men working underground the In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the
necessary security for the protection of their lives obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be
notwithstanding the fact that it had vast financial reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the
resources, it having made, during the year 1966 alone, a obligation.
total operating income of P 38,220,254.00, or net
earnings, after taxes of P19,117,394.00, as per its llth
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
Annual Report for the year ended December 31, 1966,
granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
and with aggregate assets totalling P 45,794,103.00 as of
December 31, 1966;
After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent Judge issued
an order dated June 27, 1968 dismissing the case on the ground that it
xxx xxx xxx
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation
Commission. On petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said order,
(pp. 42-44, rec.) respondent Judge, on September 23, 1968, reconsidered and set aside
his order of June 27, 1968 and allowed Philex to file an answer to the
A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that complaint. Philex moved to reconsider the aforesaid order which was
the causes of action of petitioners based on an industrial accident are opposed by petitioners.
covered by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act
3428, as amended by RA 772) and that the former Court of First Instance On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of
has no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an opposition dated jurisdiction and ruled that in accordance with the established
May 27, 1968 to the said motion to dismiss claiming that the causes of jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation Commission has exclusive
action are not based on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation original jurisdiction over damage or compensation claims for work-
Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of actual, connected deaths or injuries of workmen or employees, irrespective of
moral and exemplary damages, particularly: whether or not the employer was negligent, adding that if the employer's
negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries, the employer
shall, pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, pay petitioners pursued in the regular court, refers to the employer's liability
additional compensation equal to 50% of the compensation fixed in the for reckless and wanton negligence resulting in the death of the
Act. employees and for which the regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate
the same.
Petitioners thus filed the present petition.
On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are
In their brief, petitioners raised the following assignment of errors: compensable exclusively under the provisions of Sections 5 and 46 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, which read:
I
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.—The rights and
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of
PLAINTIFFS- PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT FOR LACK a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall
OF JURISDICTION. exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the
employee, his personal representatives, dependents or
nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code
II
and other laws because of said injury ...
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
SEC. 46. Jurisdiction.— The Workmen's Compensation
CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN
Commissioner shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear
CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE
and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's
AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE
Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.
Court, ...
A
Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. 855 [1956])
where it was held that "all claims of workmen against their employer for
In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower court has damages due to accident suffered in the course of employment shall be
jurisdiction over the cause of action since the complaint is based on the investigated and adjudicated by the Workmen's Compensation
provisions of the Civil Code on damages, particularly Articles 2176, 2178, Commission," subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.
1173, 2201 and 2231, and not on the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. They point out that the complaint alleges gross and
Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent, does not
brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take the necessary
remove the case from the exclusive character of recoveries under the
security for the protection of the lives of its employees working
Workmen's Compensation Act; because Section 4-A of the Act provides
underground. They also assert that since Philex opted to file a motion to
an additional compensation in case the employer fails to comply with the
dismiss in the court a quo, the allegations in their complaint including
requirements of safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. In fact, it
those contained in the annexes are deemed admitted.
points out that Philex voluntarily paid the compensation due the
petitioners and all the payments have been accepted in behalf of the
In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that respondent deceased miners, except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca who insisted that
Judge failed to see the distinction between the claims for compensation they are entitled to a greater amount of damages under the Civil Code.
under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the claims for damages
based on gross negligence of Philex under the Civil Code. They point out
In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo,
that workmen's compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss
then Atty. Edgardo Angara, now President of the University of the
resulting from injury, disability or death of the working man through
Philippines, Justice Manuel Lazaro, as corporate counsel and Assistant
industrial accident or disease, without regard to the fault or negligence of
General Manager of the GSIS Legal Affairs Department, and
the employer, while the claim for damages under the Civil Code which
Commissioner on Elections, formerly UP Law Center Director Froilan On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito
Bacungan, appeared as amici curiae and thereafter, submitted their Floresca filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that they have amicably
respective memoranda. settled their claim with respondent Philex. In the resolution of September
7, 1978, WE dismissed the petition only insofar as the aforesaid
The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26, petitioners are connected, it appearing that there are other petitioners in
1976, is: this case.

Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the
that of his heirs in case of his death under the Workmen's case,
Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative,
that is to say, whether his or his heirs' action is exclusively It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for
restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided compensation based on the Workmen's Compensation Act but a
under the Workmen's Compensation Act or whether they complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount
have a right of selection or choice of action between of eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners
availing of the worker's right under the Workmen's did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to
Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under entitle them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation appeared
the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or in the complaint that the employees died from accident arising out of and
exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or in the course of their employments. The complaint instead alleges gross
fault) of the employer or of his other employees or and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to
whether they may avail cumulatively of both actions, i.e., protect the lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in
collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's occurred resulting in the death of the employees working underground.
Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the Settled is the rule that in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action
regular courts. is in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or a claim for damages
pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or
There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97
that an injured employee or worker, or the heirs in case of his death, may Phil. 100).
initiate a complaint to recover damages (not compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act) with the regular court on the basis of In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased
negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. Atty. employees a contractual relationship. The alleged gross and reckless
Angara believes otherwise. He submits that the remedy of an injured negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part of
employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it may be held liable for
accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, while damages. The provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract
Atty. Bacungan's position is that the action is selective. He opines that when there is fraud or bad faith, read:
the heirs of the employee in case of his death have a right of choice to
avail themselves of the benefits provided under the Workmen's Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may
Compensation Act or to sue in the regular court under the Civil Code for award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a
higher damages from the employer by virtue of negligence of the latter. wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
Atty. Bocobo's stand is the same as that of Atty. Bacungan and adds that manner.
once the heirs elect the remedy provided for under the Act, they are no
longer entitled to avail themselves of the remedy provided for under the Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages
Civil Code by filing an action for higher damages in the regular court, and for which the obligor who acted in good faith is able shall
vice versa. be those that are the natural and probable consequences
of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have
 foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time Commission, is strengthened by the fact that unlike in the Civil Code, the
the obligation was constituted. Workmen's Compensation Act did not contain any provision for an award
of actual, moral and exemplary damages. What the Act provided was
In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the merely the right of the heirs to claim limited compensation for the death in
obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be the amount of six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos plus burial expenses of
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the two hundred (P200.00) pesos, and medical expenses when incurred
obligation. (Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's Compensation Act), and an additional
compensation of only 50% if the complaint alleges failure on the part of
Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all the employer to "install and maintain safety appliances or to take other
kinds of damages, as assessed by the court. precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational disease"
(Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case at bar, the amount sought to be
recovered is over and above that which was provided under the
The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's
Workmen's Compensation Act and which cannot be granted by the
Compensation Act differs from that in giving damages under the Civil
Commission.
Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of compensation
distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under the acts
being made as compensation and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation
Compensation is given to mitigate the harshness and insecurity of benefits should be paid to an employee who suffered an accident not due
industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is liable to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of his employer but
whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. caused by factors outside the industrial plant of his employer. Under the
Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable wrong Civil Code, the liability of the employer, depends on breach of contract or
on the part of the employer (99 C.J.S. 36). tort. The Workmen's Compensation Act was specifically enacted to afford
protection to the employees or workmen. It is a social legislation
designed to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an
In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to
accident causing his death or ailment or injury in the pursuit of his
pay compensation benefits for loss of income, as long as the death,
employment (Abong vs. WCC, 54 SCRA 379).
sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated, even if the
death or injury is not due to the fault of the employer (Murillo vs.
Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand, damages are awarded to one WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or
as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action
recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his person, between availing themselves of the worker's right under the Workmen's
property or relative rights, through the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code
452). for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by
virtue of that negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may
avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited
The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in
the causal relation between the defendant's negligence and the resulting
addition for damages in the regular courts.
injury as well as the damages suffered. While under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, there is a presumption in favor of the deceased or
injured employee that the death or injury is work-connected or work- In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus
aggravated; and the employer has the burden to prove otherwise (De los Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker has a choice of
Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the
Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228). Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action
against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both
courses of action simultaneously.
The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's
Compensation Commission then, now Employees Compensation
In Pacaña WE said:
In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma, Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil.
involving the application of Section 6 of the Workmen's 582), applies to third-party tortfeasor, said rule should likewise apply to
Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to sue the employer-tortfeasor.
third- party tortfeasors in the regular courts, Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, again speaking for the Court, pointed out Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as already
that the injured worker has the choice of remedies but stated, the petition has been dismissed in the resolution of September 7,
cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and 1978 in view of the amicable settlement reached by Philex and the said
thus balanced the relative advantage of recourse under heirs.
the Workmen's Compensation Act as against an ordinary
action. With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion
to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of
As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio
maintain his action for damages against the respondents Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino Martinez submitted notices and
(defendants below), because he has elected to seek claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law, Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of August
and his claim (case No. 44549 of the Compensation 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be
Commission) was being processed at the time he filed paid in installments (pp. 106-107, rec.). Such allegation was admitted by
this action in the Court of First Instance. It is argued for herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May
petitioner that as the damages recoverable under the Civil 27, 1968 (pp. 121-122, rec.) in the lower court, but they set up the
Code are much more extensive than the amounts that defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen's Compensation
may be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the committee created to
Act, they should not be deemed incompatible. As already investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence and
indicated, the injured laborer was initially free to choose violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director
either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set of Mines to the then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated
by the Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an October 19, 1967 only (p. 76, rec.).
ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher
damages. While perhaps not as profitable, the smaller WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits
indemnity obtainable by the first course is balanced by the under the Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not preclude them
claimant's being relieved of the burden of proving the from bringing an action before the regular court because they became
causal connection between the defendant's negligence cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual
and the resulting injury, and of having to establish the obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation
extent of the damage suffered; issues that are apt to be under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of
troublesome to establish satisfactorily. Having staked his government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they
fortunes on a particular remedy, petitioner is precluded would not have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation
from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The
claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission. choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact,
Anyway, under the proviso of Section 6 aforequoted, if the which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case
employer Franklin Baker Company recovers, by derivative should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
action against the alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the
the compensation he may have paid the herein petitioner, lower court, the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act
the excess accrues to the latter. should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.

B
Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court does not self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure,
legislate in the instant case. The Court merely applies and gives effect to and just and humane conditions of work. (emphasis
the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 supplied).
of Article 11 and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and
now by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article 11 of the DECLARATION OF The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the
PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution, as aforementioned articles of the New Civil Code cannot be impliedly
amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173 of the New Labor
2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950. Code. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (before it was
amended by R.A. No. 772 on June 20, 1952), predecessor of Article 173
To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that: of the New Labor Code, has been superseded by the aforestated
provisions of the New Civil Code, a subsequent law, which took effect on
Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well- August 30, 1950, which obey the constitutional mandates of social justice
being and economic security of all the people should be enhancing as they do the rights of the workers as against their
the concern of the State (Art. II). employers. Article 173 of the New Labor Code seems to diminish the
rights of the workers and therefore collides with the social justice
Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor, guarantee of the Constitution and the liberal provisions of the New Civil
especially to working women, and minors, and shall Code.
regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and
between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture. The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and 9 of
The State may provide for compulsory arbitration (Art. Article II of the 1973 Constitution are statements of legal principles to be
XIV). applied and enforced by the courts. Mr. Justice Robert Jackson in the
case of West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, with
The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social characteristic eloquence, enunciated:
justice to insure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people "...
regulate the use ... and disposition of private property and equitably The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw
diffuse property ownership and profits "establish, maintain and ensure certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
adequate social services in, the field of education, health, housing, controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
employment, welfare and social security to guarantee the enjoyment by and officials and to establish them as legal principles to
the people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II, 1973 be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and
Constitution); "... afford protection to labor, ... and regulate the relations property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship
between workers and employers ..., and assure the rights of workers and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
to ... just and humane conditions of work" (Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973 submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
Constitution, emphasis supplied). elections (319 U.S. 625, 638, 87 L.ed. 1638, emphasis
supplied).
The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor institutionalized
in Section 9 of Article 11 of the 1973 Constitution and re-stated as a In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New
declaration of basic policy in Article 3 of the New Labor Code, thus: Labor Code, both the New Labor Code and the Civil Code direct that the
doubts should be resolved in favor of the workers and employees.
Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.—The State shall afford
protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as Presidential
equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, Decree No. 442, as amended, promulgated on May 1, 1974, but which
and regulate the relations between workers and took effect six months thereafter, provides that "all doubts in the
employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including
its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor" Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands
(Art. 2, Labor Code). for work outside the same shall stipulate with such
laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall
Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the apply to injuries received outside the Island through
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the law-making accidents happening in and during the performance of the
body intended right and justice to prevail. " duties of the employment. Such stipulation shall not
prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the
More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the
"In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be accident occurs, should such law be more favorable to
construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer." them (As amended by section 5 of Republic Act No. 772).

Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor
1952, Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provided: impliedly the applicable provisions of the New Civil Code, because said
Article 173 provides:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and
remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.- Unless otherwise
a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund under
exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other
employee, his personal representatives, dependents or liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents
nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on
and other laws, because of said injury (emphasis behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment
supplied). of compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of
benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven
Employers contracting laborecsrs in the Philippine Islands
hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act
for work outside the same may stipulate with such
Numbered One hundred eighty- six, as amended,
laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall
Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as
apply exclusively to injuries received outside the Islands
amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred
through accidents happening in and during the
Sixty-four, as amended, and other laws whose benefits
performance of the duties of the employment; and all
are administered by the System during the period of such
service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this
payment for the same disability or death, and conversely
section shall be presumed to include such agreement.
(emphasis supplied).
Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation
As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed
Act No. 3428, was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20,
only Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, R.A. No. 1161, as
1952, thus:
amended, C.A. No. 186, as amended, R.A. No. 610, as amended, R.A.
No. 4864, as amended, and all other laws whose benefits are
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and administered by the System (referring to the GSIS or SSS).
remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of
a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall
Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as aforequoted,
exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the
Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not even remotely, much less
employee, his personal representatives, dependents or
expressly, repeal the New Civil Code provisions heretofore quoted.
nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code
and other laws, because of said injury.
It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code for from the employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's Compensation
damages arising from negligence, is not barred by Article 173 of the New Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for
Labor Code. And the damages recoverable under the New Civil Code are greater damages; but he cannot pursue both courses of action
not administered by the System provided for by the New Labor Code, simultaneously. Said Pacana case penned by Mr. Justice Teehankee,
which defines the "System" as referring to the Government Service applied Article 1711 of the Civil Code as against the Workmen's
Insurance System or the Social Security System (Art. 167 [c], [d] and [e] Compensation Act, reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case of Valencia vs.
of the New Labor Code). Manila Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724, June 30,1969) and the 1958 case of
Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), both penned by Justice J.B.L.
Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Reyes. Said Pacana case was concurred in by Justices J.B.L. Reyes,
Supreme Court form part of the law of the land. Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Villamor.

Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides: Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a
re-statement of the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws Compensation Act, as amended, and does not even refer, neither
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of expressly nor impliedly, to the Civil Code as Section 5 of the Workmen's
the Philippines. Compensation Act did, with greater reason said Article 173 must be
subject to the same interpretation adopted in the cases of Pacana,
Valencia and Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid
The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People vs.
three (3) cases is faithful to and advances the social justice guarantees
Licera ruled:
enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that
It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
justice in the American Federal Constitution, nor in the various state
Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system.
constitutions of the American Union. Consequently, the restrictive nature
These decisions, although in themselves not laws,
of the American decisions on the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot
constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The
limit the range and compass of OUR interpretation of our own laws,
application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a
especially Article 1711 of the New Civil Code, vis-a-vis Article 173 of the
law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of
New Labor Code, in relation to Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of
the said law since the Court's application or interpretation
Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution then, and now Sections 6, 7 and 9 of
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of Article II of the 1973
that the construed law purports to carry into effect" (65
Constitution.
SCRA 270, 272-273 [1975]).
The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property
WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same
rights of the employer. The right to life is guaranteed specifically by the
authority as the statute itself (Caltex vs. Palomer, 18 SCRA 247; 124
due process clause of the Constitution. To relieve the employer from
Phil. 763).
liability for the death of his workers arising from his gross or wanton fault
or failure to provide safety devices for the protection of his employees or
The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation workers against the dangers which are inherent in underground mining, is
Act, before and after it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to recover
June 20, 1952, limited the right of recovery in favor of the deceased, indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the consequent loss to
ailing or injured employee to the compensation provided for therein. Said his family without due process of law. The dissent in effect condones and
Section 5 was not accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court therefore encourages such gross or wanton neglect on the part of the
in the 1970 case of Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA 442) employer to comply with his legal obligation to provide safety measures
when WE ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover
for the protection of the life, limb and health of his worker. Even from the generated so much hatred and drew so much precious blood on
moral viewpoint alone, such attitude is un-Christian. American plains and valleys from 1861 to 1864.

It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of "Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being.
the Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, The spirit of the law insures man's survival and ennobles him. In the
is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."
to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation
aforementioned. C

The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case. It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts
cannot legislate.
It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional
provision. That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which
provides that "No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. "
Article 173 of the New Labor Code subvert the rights of the petitioners as
surviving heirs of the deceased mining employees. Section 5 of the Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil
Workmen's Compensation Act and Article 173 of the New Labor Code Code, recognizes that in certain instances, the court, in the language of
are retrogressive; because they are a throwback to the obsolete laissez- Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in the law;
faire doctrine of Adam Smith enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth of because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and
Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 21, p. 93, 1964), which has been therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply
discarded soon after the close of the 18th century due to the Industrial Nor has the human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all situations.
Revolution that generated the machines and other mechanical devices
(beginning with Eli Whitney's cotton gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code, the
steamboat of 1807) for production and transportation which are founding fathers of the American Constitution foresaw and recognized
dangerous to life, limb and health. The old socio-political-economic the eventuality that the courts may have to legislate to supply the
philosophy of live-and-let-live is now superdesed by the benign Christian omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the American Constitution and
shibboleth of live-and-help others to live. Those who profess to be the statutes.
Christians should not adhere to Cain's selfish affirmation that he is not his
brother's keeper. In this our civilization, each one of us is our brother's
'Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation
keeper. No man is an island. To assert otherwise is to be as atavistic and
may be justified but denies that the power of the Judiciary to nullify
ante-deluvian as the 1837 case of Prisley vs. Fowler (3 MN 1,150 reprint
statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny (The Federalist, Modern Library,
1030) invoked by the dissent, The Prisley case was decided in 1837
pp. 503-511, 1937 ed.). Thomas Jefferson went farther to concede that
during the era of economic royalists and robber barons of America. Only
the court is even independent of the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs. American
ruthless, unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic reactionaries continue to pay
Sash Company, 1949 335 US 538).
obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine. The Prisley rule humiliates man
and debases him; because the decision derisively refers to the lowly
worker as "servant" and utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution likewise
"employer." It robs man of his inherent dignity and dehumanizes him. To share the same view. Chief Justice Marshall pronounced: "It is
stress this affront to human dignity, WE only have to restate the quotation emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial department to say what
from Prisley, thus: "The mere relation of the master and the servant never the law is (Marbury vs. Madison I Cranch 127 1803), which was re-stated
can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the by Chief Justice Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is what the
servant than he may reasonably be expected to do himself." This is the judge says it is (Address on May 3, 1907, quoted by President Franklin
very selfish doctrine that provoked the American Civil War which Delano Roosevelt on March 9, 1937). This was reiterated by Justice
Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt the limits for the judge are The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish
narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in and divide fields of black and white. Even the more
the law. " (The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 113). In the language of specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra
Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, "The only limit to the judicial legislation is shading gradually from one extreme to the other. x x x.
the restraint of the judge" (U.S. vs. Butler 297 U.S. 1 Dissenting Opinion, When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still
p. 79), which view is also entertained by Justice Frankfurter and Justice more obvious that they must be received with a certain
Robert Jackson. In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter, "the courts breathe latitude or our government could not go on.
life, feeble or strong, into the inert pages of the Constitution and all
statute books." To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who
but for such action would be free from it is to legislate yet
It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of it is what the judges do whenever they determine which
the Workmen's Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code of two competing principles of policy shall prevail.
is limited to death, ailment or injury caused by the nature of the work,
without any fault on the part of the employers. It is correctly termed no xxx xxx xxx
fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as
amended, or Article 173 of the New Labor Code, does not cover the It does not seem to need argument to show that however
tortious liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot
negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by the law for carry out the distinction between legislative and executive
the protection of the life, limb and health of the workers. Under either action with mathematical precision and divide the
Section 5 or Article 173, the employer remains liable to pay branches into waterlight compartments, were it ever so
compensation benefits to the employee whose death, ailment or injury is desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is,
work-connected, even if the employer has faithfully and diligently or that the Constitution requires.
furnished all the safety measures and contrivances decreed by the law to
protect the employee.
True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not
legislate, but grudgingly concede that in certain cases judges do
The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman." In the legislate. They criticize the assumption by the courts of such law-making
epigrammatic language of Mr. Justice Cardozo, "the law has outgrown its power as dangerous for it may degenerate into Judicial tyranny. They
primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign include Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, Justice Black, Justice Harlan,
talisman, and every slip was fatal" (Wood vs. Duff Gordon 222 NW 88; Justice Roberts, Justice David Brewer, Ronald Dworkin, Rolf Sartorious,
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 100). Justice Cardozo Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. But said Justices, jurists or legal
warned that: "Sometimes the conservatism of judges has threatened for commentators, who either deny the power of the courts to legislate in-
an interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. ... Precedents established between gaps of the law, or decry the exercise of such power, have not
in those items exert an unhappy influence even now" (citing Pound, pointed to examples of the exercise by the courts of such law-making
Common Law and Legislation 21 Harvard Law Review 383, 387). authority in the interpretation and application of the laws in specific cases
that gave rise to judicial tyranny or oppression or that such judicial
Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he legislation has not protected public interest or individual welfare,
pragmatically admitted, although with a cautionary undertone: "that particularly the lowly workers or the underprivileged.
judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially they
are confined from molar to molecular motions" (Southern Pacific On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of
Company vs. Jensen, 244 US 204 1917). And in the subsequent case of Rights and statutory enactments expanding the scope of such provisions
Springer vs. Government (277 US 188, 210-212, 72 L.ed. 845, 852- 853), to protect human rights. Foremost among them is the doctrine in the
Justice Holmes pronounced: cases of Miranda vs. Arizona (384 US 436 1964), Gideon vs. Wainright
(372 US 335), Escubedo vs. Illinois (378 US 478), which guaranteed the
accused under custodial investigation his rights to remain silent and to working man. The law fixing maximum hours of labor was invalidated.
counsel and to be informed of such rights as even as it protects him Justice Holmes was vindicated finally in 1936 in the case of West Coast
against the use of force or intimidation to extort confession from him. Hotel vs. Parish (300 US 377-79; 81 L. ed. 703) where the American
These rights are not found in the American Bill of Rights. These rights are Supreme Court upheld the rights of workers to social justice in the form of
now institutionalized in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. guaranteed minimum wage for women and minors, working hours not
Only the peace-and-order adherents were critical of the activism of the exceeding eight (8) daily, and maternity leave for women employees.
American Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren.
The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as
Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the double well as the rule on political questions have been evolved and grafted into
jeopardy provision was developed by American judicial decisions, not by the American Constitution by judicial decisions (Marbury vs. Madison,
amendment to the Bill of Rights on double jeopardy (see Justice Laurel in supra Coleman vs. Miller, 307 US 433, 83 L. ed. 1385; Springer vs.
People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260, 261-268). And these judicial decisions Government, 277 US 210-212, 72 L. ed. 852, 853).
have been re-stated in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as well as in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 1964 It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be against judicial
Revised Rules of Court. In both provisions, the second offense is the legislation, penned a separate concurring opinion in the case of Coleman
same as the first offense if the second offense is an attempt to commit vs. Miller, supra, affirming the doctrine of political question as beyond the
the first or frustration thereof or necessarily includes or is necessarily ambit of judicial review. There is nothing in both the American and
included in the first offense. Philippine Constitutions expressly providing that the power of the courts
is limited by the principle of separation of powers and the doctrine on
The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. political questions. There are numerous cases in Philippine jurisprudence
They were also developed by judicial decisions in the United States and applying the doctrines of separation of powers and political questions and
in the Philippines even before people vs. Ylagan (58 Phil. 851-853). invoking American precedents.

Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine
vs. Ferguson (163 US 537) as securing to the Negroes equal but Constitutions expressly vest in the Supreme Court the power to review
separate facilities, which doctrine was revoked in the case of Brown vs. the validity or constitutionality of any legislative enactment or executive
Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294), holding that the equal act.
protection clause means that the Negroes are entitled to attend the same
schools attended by the whites-equal facilities in the same school-which WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS
was extended to public parks and public buses. HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS
REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A
De-segregation, not segregation, is now the governing principle. GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF
HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM
Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted in the PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE
case of People vs. Pomar (46 Phil. 440) by a conservative, capitalistic DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.
court to invalidate a law granting maternity leave to working women-
according primacy to property rights over human rights. The case of SO ORDERED.
People vs. Pomar is no longer the rule.

As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US 45, 76,
49 L. ed. 937, 949), Justice Holmes had been railing against the
conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of due process to
protect property rights as against human rights or social justice for the
 Republic of the Philippines The defendants appealed to the defunct Court of Appeals which in a
SUPREME COURT decision dated May 22, 1979, affirmed in toto that of the trial court. (Rollo,
Manila p. 48.) However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the
defendants-appellants, the Court of Appeals, in a resolution dated June
SECOND DIVISION 19, 1981, modified its judgment thus:

G.R. No. L-62988 February 28, 1985 WHEREFORE, the decision rendered in this case is
hereby modified insofar as the judgment ordering the
FELINA RODRIGUEZ-LUNA, JOSE R. LUNA and ROBERTO R. LUNA, defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the sum of P
JR., petitioners, 1,650,000.00 to plaintiffs with legal interest from July 5,
vs. 1973, is concerned. In lieu thereof, defendants are hereby
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE E. DELA ordered to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum of
ROSA and LUIS DELA ROSA, respondents. Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P450,000.00) as
unearned net earnings of Roberto R. Luna, with legal
interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint
Ezequiel S. Consulta for petitioners.
until the whole amount shall have been totally paid.
David M. Castro for respondents.
The rest of the other dispositions in the judgment a quo
stand. (Rollo, pp. 33-34.)
 
Both parties filed separate petitions for review of the appellate court's
ABAD SANTOS, J.: decision.

This is a petition to review a decision of the defunct Court of Appeals. In G.R. No. 57362, the petition for review of Jose and Luis dela Rosa was
The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a denied for lack of merit on October 5, 1981. Subsequently, they informed
vehicular collision. The collision took place on January 18, 1970, at the that the decision sought to be reviewed was not yet final because the
go-kart practice area in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. Those Lunas had a pending motion for reconsideration. For prematurity, this
involved were the go-kart driven by the deceased, a business executive, Court set aside all previous resolutions. On February 16, 1983, acting
and a Toyota car driven by Luis dela Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had upon the motion and manifestation of the petitioners, they were required
no driver's license. to file an amended petition within thirty days from notice. On June 20,
1983, this Court resolved: "For failure of the petitioners to file an
In a suit for damages brought by the heirs of Roberto R. Luna against amended petition as required, this case is hereby DISMISSED and the
Luis dela Rosa and his father Jose dela Rosa, the Court of First Instance dismissal is final."
of Manila in Civil Case No. 81078, rendered the following judgment:
The instant case — G.R. No. 62988 — is the separate appeal of the
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing Lunas. Their petition contains the following prayer:
the defendants Luis dela Rosa and Jose dela Rosa to
pay, jointly and severally, to the plaintiffs the sum of 1. That the petition be given due course;
P1,650,000.00 as unearned net earnings of Roberto
Luna, P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, and
2. That after notice and hearing, judgment be rendered,
P50,000.00 for the loss of his companionship, with legal
setting aside or modifying the RESOLUTION of
interest from the date of this decision; plus attorney's fees
respondent Court of Appeals dated June 19, 1981,
in the sum of P50,000.00, and the costs of suit. (Record
attached as Annex "A" to the petition, only insofar as it
on Appeal, p. 35.)
 reduced the unearned net earnings to P450,000.00, s make an inventory of personal properties was thwarted by guards and
as to affirm the trial court's finding as to the unearned net this Court had to direct the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to assist
earnings of the deceased in the amount of in enforcing the writ of execution. The execution yielded only a nominal
P1,650,000.00; amount. In the meantime, Luis dela Rosa is now of age, married with two
children, and living in Madrid, Spain with an uncle but only casually
3. Ordering that the award of attorney's fees shall also be employed. It is said: "His compensation is hardly enough to support his
with interest, at the legal rate. (Rollo, p. 27.) family. He has no assets of his own as yet." (Rollo, p. 208.)

On June 27, 1983, the petition was given due course. (Rollo, pp. 122- 1. On the amount of the award.
123.)
The award of P1,650,000.00 was based on two factors, namely: (a) that
In the light of the foregoing, the resolution stated: the deceased Roberto R. Luna could have lived for 30 more years; and
(b) that his annual net income was P55,000.00, computed at P75,000.00
It thus appears that the questions in esse are with respect annual gross income less P20,000.00 annual personal expenses.
to the award for unearned net earnings — should the
award be P450,000.00 only or should it be P1,650,000.00 This is what the trial court said on Luna's life expectancy:
as originally adjudged; and whether the award for
attorney's fees shall also be with interest at the legal rate. According to the American Experience Table of Mortality,
at age 33 the life expectancy of Roberto Luna was 33.4
The Court takes notice that the wrongful death occurred years, and under the Commissioner Standard Ordinary,
as early as January 18, 1970, and that until now the used by our domestic insurance companies since 1968
process of litigation is not yet over. In the meantime the for policies above P5,000.00 his life expectancy was
value of the Philippine peso has been seriously eroded so 38.51 years. Dr. Vicente Campa, medical director of San
that the heirs of the deceased may ultimately have a Miguel Corporation, testified that he was the regular
greatly depreciated judgment. In the interest of justice, the physician of Roberto Luna since his marriage to Felina
private respondents are hereby ordered to PAY to the Rodriguez in 1957. He said that except for a slight anemia
petitioners within thirty (30) days from notice the following which he had ten years earlier, Roberto Luna was of good
amounts adjudged against them: P450,000.00 for health. Allowing for this condition, he could reasonably
unearned net earnings of the deceased; (P12,000.00 as expect to have a life expectancy of 30 years. (Record on
compensatory damages; P50,000.00 for the loss of his Appeal, p. 33.)
companionship with legal interest from July 3, 1973; and
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals in sustaining the trial court's conclusion said:

Still to be resolved shall be the following: whether the We have not been persuaded to disturb the conclusion
award for unearned net earnings shall be increased to that the deceased had a life expectancy of thirty years. At
P1,650,000.00; and whether the award for attorney's fees the time of Luna's death, he was only thirty-three years
shall also be with interest at the legal rate. The costs will old and in the best of health. With his almost perfect
be adjudged as a matter of course. (Rollo, p. 123.) physical condition and his sound mind, the expectation
that he could have lived for another thirty years is
The private respondents failed to pay the amounts and when required to reasonable, considering that with his educational
explain they said that they had no cash money. Accordingly, this Court attainment, his social and financial standing, he had the
directed the trial court to issue a writ of execution but the attempt of the means of staying fit and preserving his health and well-
special sheriff to enter the private respondent's premises so that he could being. That he could have lived at least until the age of
 sixty-three years is an assessment which is more on the of life should be "one of the factors affecting the value of mortality table in
conservative side in view of the testimony of Dr. Vicente actions for damages;" and, consequently, concluded that Luna could not
Campa that the general life expectancy nowadays had have lived beyond 43 years. The result was that the 30-year life
gone up to seventy years. (Rollo, p. 45.) expectancy of Luna was reduced to 10 years only.

The Court of Appeals likewise sustained the trial court in respect of Further on the motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals ruled in
Luna's annual income and expense. This is what the trial court said: respect of Luna's annual personal expenses:

Roberto Luna was 33 years old when he died, and was ... . Considering the escalating price of automobile gas
survived by his wife Felina Rodriguez-Luna, and two which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social
children, Roberto Jr., 13 years, and Jose, 12 years. His standing, We should increase that amount to P30,000.00
wife was 35 years old at the time. He declared a gross as the would be personal expenses of the deceased per
income of P16,900.00 for 1967 (Exhibit I), P29,700,000 annum. (Rollo, p. 33.)
for 1968 (Exhibit H) and P45,117.69 for 1969 (Exhibit G).
He had investments in various corporations amounting to The Court of Appeals then determined the amount of the award thus:
P136,116.00 (Exhibits K, M, M-1, N, N-1 to N-3, O, O-1, P75,000.00 annual gross income less P30,000.00 annual personal
P, Q and R) and was the president and general manager expenses leaves P45,000.00 multiplied by 10 years of life expectancy
of Rodlum Inc.; general manager of Esso Greenhills and the product is P450,000.00.
Service Center; Assistant manager of Jose Rodriguez
Lanuza Sons; director of Steadfast Investment The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred when by its
Corporation; chairman and treasurer of Greenhills resolution of June 19, 1981, it reduced Luna's life expectancy from 30 to
Industrial Corporation; vice-president of Oasis, Inc.; 10 Years and increased his annual personal expenses from P20,000.00
director of Nation Savings Association; director of Arlun to P30,000.00. We sustain the petitioners.
Taxi; and treasurer of National Association of Retired Civil
Employees.
The Court of Appeals, in reducing Luna's life expectancy from 30 to 10
years said that his habit and manner of life should be taken into account,
... . His income tax returns show an increase in his i.e. that he had been engaged in car racing as a sport both here and
income in the short period of three years. It is reasonable abroad - a dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life
to expect that it would still go higher for the next fifteen expectancy. That Luna had engaged in car racing is not based on any
years and reach a minimum of P75,000.00 a year. The evidence on record. That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the
potential increase in the earning capacity of a deceased correct statement but then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a
person is recognized by the Supreme Court. ... the court dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung, low powered
believes that the expected gross earnings of Roberto vehicles, only slightly larger than foot-pedalled four wheeled
Luna should be fixed in the sum of P75,000.00 a year for conveyances. It was error on the part of the Court of Appeals to have
the period of his life expectancy of 30 years, but disturbed the determination of the trial court which it had previously
deducting his personal expenses which, because of his affirmed.
business and social standing the court in the amount of
P20,000.00 a year, in accordance with the rulings of the
Similarly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to reduce the net annual
Supreme Court. (Record on Appeal, pp. 32-34.)
income of the deceased by increasing his annual personal expenses but
without at the same time increasing his annual gross income. It stands to
Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by the dela Rosas, the Court reason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because of
of Appeals took into account the fact "that the deceased Roberto R. Luna the "escalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R.
had been engaged in car racing as a sport, having participated in Luna's social standing" [a statement which lacks complete basis], it would
tournaments both here and abroad;" it said that Luna's habit and manner
not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would also increase Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, * JJ., concur.
considering the manifold sources thereof.
Makasiar (Chairman), J., I reserve my vote.
In short, the Court of Appeals erred in modifying its original decision.

2. Attorney's fees — with or without interest at the legal rate.

The trial court awarded attorney's fees to the petitioners in the sum of
P50,000.00. This award was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its
decision of May 22, 1979. The resolution of June 19, 1981, reaffirmed the
award. The two decisions as well as the resolution do not provide for
interest at the legal rate to be tacked to the award.

The petitioners now pray that the award of attorney's fees be with interest
at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaint. There is merit
in this prayer. The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of
damages in a quasi-delict case and under the circumstances interest as
part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court. (See Art.
2211, Civil Code.) As with the other damages awarded, the interest
should accrue only from the date of the trial court's decision.

The private respondents invoke Elcano vs. Hill, L-24803, May 26,1977;
77 SCRA 98, where it was held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code applied
to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
Reginald Hill, his son but since Reginald had attained age, as a matter of
equity, the liability of Atty. Hill had become merely subsidiary to that of his
son. It is now said that Luis dela Rosa, is now married and of legal age
and that as a matter of equity the liability of his father should be
subsidiary only.

We are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this case because
to do so will not serve the ends of justice. Luis dela Rosa is abroad and
beyond the reach of Philippine courts. Moreover, he does not have any
property either in the Philippines or elsewhere. In fact his earnings are
insufficient to support his family.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 19,

1981, is hereby set aside; its decision dated May 22, 1979, is reinstated
with the sole modification that the award for attorney's fees shall earn
interest at the legal rate from July 5, 1973, the date of the trial court's
decision. Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines On September 24, 1973, the bank gave Remolado up to ten o'clock in the
SUPREME COURT morning of October 31, 1973, or 37 days, within which to repurchase (not
Manila redeem since the period of redemption had expired) the property (Exh. I-
1; 32, Record on Appeal). The bank did not specify the price.
SECOND DIVISION
On October 26, 1973 Remolado and her daughter, Patrocinio Gomez,
G.R. No. L-62051 March 18, 1985 promised to pay the bank P33,000 on October 31 for the repurchase of
the property (Exh. X or 9; 64, Record on Appeal).
RURAL BANK OF PARARAQUE, INC., petitioner,
vs. Exhibits 1-1 and X do not evidence any perfected repurchase
ISIDRA REMOLADO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. agreemi6nt. Even if it is assumed that the bank's commitment to resell
the property was accepted by Remolado, that option was not supported
  by a consideration distinct from the price (Art. 1479, Civil Code). Lacking
such consideration, the option is void (Southwestern Sugar & Molasses
Co. vs. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Company, 97 Phil. 249).
AQUINO, J.:
Contrary to her promise, Remolado did not repurchase the property on
This case is about the repurchase of mortgage property after the period
October 31, Five days later, or on November 5, Remolado and her
of redemption and had expired. Isidra Remolado, 64, a widow, and
daughter delivered P33,000 rash to the bank's assistant manager as
resident of Makati, Rizal, owned a lot with an area of 308 square meters,
repurchase price. The amount was returned to them the next day,
with a bungalow thereon, which was leased to Beatriz Cabagnot (86-7,
November 6, 1973 (Exh. V, W and 11). The assistant manager had no
record on Appeal).
intention of receiving the money. It was just left with her by Remolado
(Exh. 10; 42, Record on Appeal). At that time, the bank was no longer
The lot is located at 41 Molave Street, United Parañaque, Rizal. In 1966 willing to allow the repurchase.
she mortgaged it to the Rural Bank of Parañaque, Inc. as security for a
loan of P15,000. She paid the loan.
On that day, November 6, Remolado filed an action to compel the bank
to reconvey the property to her for P25,491.96 plus interest and other
On April 17, 1971 she mortgaged it again to the bank. She eventually charges and to pay P35,000 as damages. The repurchase price was not
secured loans totalling P18,000 (Exh. At D). the loans become overdue. consigned. A notice of lis pendens was registered.
The bank foreclosed the mortagage on July 21, 1972 and bought the
property at the foreclosure sale for P22,192.70. The one-year period of
On November 15, the bank sold the property to Pilar Aysip for P50,000. A
redemption was to expire on August 21, 1973.
new title was issued to Aysip with an annotation of lis pendens (Exh. P
and 12; 649, Record on Appeal).
On August 8, 1973 the bank advised Remolado that she had until August
23 to redeem the property (Exh. U or 6; 53, Record on Appeal). On
The trial court ordered the bank to return the property to Remolado upon
August 9, 1973 or 14 days before the expiration of the one-year
payment of the redemption price of P25,491.96 plus interest and other
redemption period, the bank gave her a statement showing that she
bank charges and to pay her P15,000 as damages. The Appellate Court
should pay P25,491.96 for the redemption of the property on August 23
affirmed the judgment. The bank appealed to this Court. It contends that
(Exh. F). No redemption was made on that date.
Remolado had no more right of redemption and, therefore, no cause of
action against the bank.
On September 3, 1973 the bank consolidated its ownership over the
property (Exh. H). Remolado's title was cancelled. A new title, TCT No.
We hold that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in ordering the
418737, was issued to the bank on September 5 (Exh. 0).
reconveyance of the property, There was no binding agreement for its
repurchase. Even on the assumption that the bank should be bound by
its commitment to allow repurchase on or before October 31, 1973, still
Remolado had no cause of action because she did not repurchase the
property on that date.

Justice is done according to law. As a rule, equity follows the law. There
may be a moral obligation, often regarded as an equitable consideration
(meaning compassion), but if there is no enforceable legal duty, the
action must fail although the disadvantaged party deserves
commiseration or sympathy.

The choice between what is legally just and what is morally just, when
these two options do not coincide, is explained by Justice Moreland in
Vales vs. Villa, 35 Phfl. 769, 788 where he said:

Courts operate not because one person has been

defeated or overcome by another, but because he has
been defeated or overcome illegally. Men may do foolish
things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable
judgment, and lose money by them-indeed, all they have
in the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene
and restore. There must be, in addition, a violation of law,
the commission of what the law knows as an actionable
wrong before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the
situation and remedy it.

In the instant case, the bank acted within its legal rights when it refused
to give Remolado any extension to repurchase after October 31, 1973. It
had given her about two years to liquidate her obligation. She failed to do
so.

WHEREFORE, the Appellate Court's judgment is reversed and set aside.

The complaint and counterclaim are dismissed. The notice of lis pendens
is cancelled. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Makasiar (Chairman), J., took no part.

4
 Republic of the Philippines improvements worth not less than P20,000.00 at the time of the filing of
SUPREME COURT the complaint. 4
Manila
On May 5, 1947, the same land covered by Original Certificate of Title
FIRST DIVISION No. 3019 was sold by Marcos Mata to defendant Fermin Z. Caram, Jr.,
petitioner herein. The deed of sale in favor of Caram was acknowledged
G.R. No. L-28740 February 24, 1981 before Atty. Abelardo Aportadera. On May 22, 1947, Marcos Mata,
through Attys. Abelardo Aportadera and Gumercindo Arcilla, filed with the
FERMIN Z. CARAM, JR., petitioner, Court of First Instance of Davao a petition for the issuance of a new
vs. Owner's Duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 3019, alleging as
CLARO L. LAURETA, respondent. ground therefor the loss of said title in the evacuation place of defendant
Marcos Mata in Magugpo, Tagum, Davao. On June 5, 1947, the Court of
First Instance of Davao issued an order directing the Register of Deeds
FERNANDEZ, J.:
of Davao to issue a new Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title No. 3019 in
favor of Marcos Mata and declaring the lost title as null and void. On
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of December 9, 1947, the second sale between Marcos Mata and Fermin
Appeals promulgated on January 29, 1968 in CA-G. R. NO. 35721-R Caram, Jr. was registered with the Register of Deeds. On the same date,
entitled "Claro L. Laureta, plaintiff-appellee versus Marcos Mata, Codidi Transfer Certificate of Title No. 140 was issued in favor of Fermin Caram
Mata and Fermin Caram, Jr., defendants- appellants; Tampino Jr. 5
(Mansaca), et al. Intervenors-appellants," affirming the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Davao in Civil Case No. 3083. 1
On August 29, 1959, the defendants Marcos Mata and Codidi Mata filed
their answer with counterclaim admitting the existence of a private
On June 25, 1959, Claro L. Laureta filed in the Court of First Instance of absolute deed of sale of his only property in favor of Claro L. Laureta but
Davao an action for nullity, recovery of ownership and/or reconveyance alleging that he signed the same as he was subjected to duress, threat
with damages and attorney's fees against Marcos Mata, Codidi Mata, and intimidation for the plaintiff was the commanding officer of the 10th
Fermin Z. Caram, Jr. and the Register of Deeds of Davao City. 2 division USFIP operating in the unoccupied areas of Northern Davao with
its headquarters at Project No. 7 (Km. 60, Davao Agusan Highways), in
On June 10, 1945, Marcos Mata conveyed a large tract of agricultural the Municipality of Tagum, Province of Davao; that Laureta's words and
land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3019 in favor of Claro requests were laws; that although the defendant Mata did not like to sell
Laureta, plaintiff, the respondent herein. The deed of absolute sale in his property or sign the document without even understanding the same,
favor of the plaintiff was not registered because it was not acknowledged he was ordered to accept P650.00 Mindanao Emergency notes; and that
before a notary public or any other authorized officer. At the time the sale due to his fear of harm or danger that will happen to him or to his family,
was executed, there was no authorized officer before whom the sale if he refused he had no other alternative but to sign the document. 6
could be acknowledged inasmuch as the civil government in Tagum,
Davao was not as yet organized. However, the defendant Marcos Mata The defendants Marcos Mata and Codidi Mata also admit the existence
delivered to Laureta the peaceful and lawful possession of the premises of a record in the Registry of Deeds regarding a document allegedly
of the land together with the pertinent papers thereof such as the Owner's signed by him in favor of his co-defendant Fermin Caram, Jr. but denies
Duplicate Original Certificate of Title No. 3019, sketch plan, tax that he ever signed the document for he knew before hand that he had
declaration, tax receipts and other papers related thereto. 3 Since June signed a deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was in
10, 1945, the plaintiff Laureta had been and is stin in continuous, adverse possession of the certificate of title; that if ever his thumb mark appeared
and notorious occupation of said land, without being molested, disturbed in the document purportedly alienating the property to Fermin Caram, did
or stopped by any of the defendants or their representatives. In fact, his consent was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation for the
Laureta had been paying realty taxes due thereon and had introduced defendant Mata is illiterate and ignorant and did not know what he was
signing; and that he did not receive a consideration for the said sale. 7
The defendant Fermin Caram Jr. filed his answer on October 23, 1959 answer in intervention, counterclaim and cross-claim of
alleging that he has no knowledge or information about the previous the Mansacas.
encumbrances, transactions, and alienations in favor of plaintiff until the
filing of the complaints. 8 The Court makes no pronouncement as to costs.

The trial court rendered a decision dated February 29, 1964, the SO ORDERED.
dispositive portion of which reads: 9
10
The defendants appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals.
1. Declaring that the deed of sale, Exhibit A, executed by The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. NO. 35721- R.
Marcos Mata in favor of Claro L. Laureta stands and
prevails over the deed of sale, Exhibit F, in favor of The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on January 29, 1968
Fermin Caram, Jr.; affirming the judgment of the trial court.

2. Declaring as null and void the deed of sale Exhibit F, in In his brief, the petitioner assigns the following errors: 11
favor of Fermin Caram, Jr.;
I
3. Directing Marcos Mata to acknowledge the deed of
sale, Exhibit A, in favor of Claro L. Laureta;
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT IRESPE AND APORTADERA
4. Directing Claro L. Laureta to secure the approval of the WERE ATTORNEYS-IN-FACT OF PETITIONER CARAM
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on the FOR THE PURPOSE OF BUYING THE PROPERTY IN
deed, Exhibit A, after Marcos Mata shall have QUESTION.
acknowledged the same before a notary public;
II
5. Directing Claro L. Laureta to surrender to the Register
of Deeds for the City and Province of Davao the Owner's
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
Duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 3019 and the
CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED IN
latter to cancel the same;
THE TRIAL COURT CONSTITUTE LEGAL EVIDENCE
OF FRAUD ON THE PART OF IRESPE AND
6. Ordering the Register of Deeds for the City and APORTADERA AT TRIBUTABLE TO PETITIONER.
Province of Davao to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-140 in the name of Fermin Caram, Jr.;
III
7. Directing the Register of Deeds for the City and
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
Province of Davao to issue a title in favor of Claro L.
COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN HOLDING
Laureta, Filipino, resident of Quezon City, upon
THAT KNOWLEDGE OF IRESPE AND APORTADERA
presentation of the deed executed by Marcos Mata in his
OF A PRIOR UNREGISTERED SALE OF A TITLED
favor, Exhibit A, duly acknowledged by him and approved
PROPERTY ATTRIBUTABLE TO PETITIONER AND
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
EQUIVALENT IN LAW OF REGISTRATION OF SAID
and
SALE.
8. Dismissing the counterclaim and cross claim of Marcos
IV
Mata and Codidi Mata, the counterclaim of Caram, Jr., the
 THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN Atty. Aportadera for the sale of the same property to
NOT HOLDING THAT AN ACTION FOR Caram, Jr., represented by Irespe as attorney-in-fact.
RECONVEYANCE ON THE GROUND OF FRAUD Ining Mansaca was with the two — Irespe and Mata — to
PRESCRIBES WITHIN FOUR (4) YEARS. engage the services 6f Atty. Aportadera in the annulment
of the sale of his land to Laureta. When Leaning Mansaca
The petitioner assails the finding of the trial court that the second sale of narrated to Atty. Aportadera the circumstances under
the property was made through his representatives, Pedro Irespe and which his property had been sold to Laureta, he must
Atty. Abelardo Aportadera. He argues that Pedro Irespe was acting have included in the narration the sale of the land of
merely as a broker or intermediary with the specific task and duty to pay Mata, for the two properties had been sold on the same
Marcos Mata the sum of P1,000.00 for the latter's property and to see to occassion and under the same circumstances. Even as
it that the requisite deed of sale covering the purchase was properly early as immediately after liberation, Irespe, who was the
executed by Marcos Mata; that the Identity of the property to be bought witness in most of the cases filed by Atty. Aportadera in
and the price of the purchase had already been agreed upon by the his capacity as Provincial Fiscal of Davao against
parties; and that the other alleged representative, Atty. Aportadera, Laureta, must have known of the purchases of lands
merely acted as a notary public in the execution of the deed of sale. made by Laureta when he was regimental commander,
one of which was the sale made by Mata. It was not a
The contention of the petitioner has no merit. The facts of record show mere coincidence that Irespe was made guardian ad
that Mata, the vendor, and Caram, the second vendee had never met. litem of Leaning Mansaca, at the suggestion of Atty.
During the trial, Marcos Mata testified that he knows Atty. Aportadera but Aportadera and attorney-in-fact of Caram, Jr.
did not know Caram. 12 Thus, the sale of the property could have only
been through Caram's representatives, Irespe and Aportadera. The The Court cannot help being convinced that Irespe,
petitioner, in his answer, admitted that Atty. Aportadera acted as his attorney-in-fact of Caram, Jr. had knowledge of the prior
notary public and attorney-in-fact at the same time in the purchase of the existing transaction, Exhibit A, between Mata and Laureta
property. 13 over the land, subject matter of this litigation, when the
deed, Exhibit F, was executed by Mata in favor of Caram,
The petitioner contends that he cannot be considered to have acted in Jr. And this knowledge has the effect of registration as to
bad faith because there is no direct proof showing that Irespe and Caram, Jr. RA pp. 123-124)
Aportadera, his alleged agents, had knowledge of the first sale to
Laureta. This contention is also without merit. We agree with His Honor's conclusion on this particular
point, on two grounds — the first, the same concerns
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court, said: 14 matters affecting the credibility of a witness of which the
findings of the trial court command great weight, and
second, the same is borne out by the testimony of Atty.
The trial court, in holding that appellant Caram. Jr. was
Aportadera himself. (t.s.n., pp. 187-190, 213-215,
not a purchaser in good faith, at the time he bought the
Restauro).
same property from appellant Mata, on May 5, 1947,
entirely discredited the testimony of Aportadera. Thus it
stated in its decision: Even if Irespe and Aportadera did not have actual knowledge of the first
sale, still their actions have not satisfied the requirement of good faith.
Bad faith is not based solely on the fact that a vendee had knowledge of
The testimony of Atty. Aportadera quoted elsewhere in
the defect or lack of title of his vendor. In the case of Leung Yee vs. F. L.
this decision is hollow. There is every reason to believe
Strong Machinery Co. and Williamson, this Court held: 15
that Irespe and he had known of the sale of the property
in question to Laureta on the day Mata and Irespe,
accompanied by Leaning Mansaca, went to the office of One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a
defect or lack of title in his vendor can not claim that he
 has acquired title thereto in good faith, as against the true Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall
owner of the land or of an interest therein, and the same belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts recordered it in the Registry of Property.
which should have put him upon such inquiry and
investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with Should there be no inscription, the ownership shag
the defects in the title of his vendor. pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person
In the instant case, Irespe and Aportadera had knowledge of who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
circumstances which ought to have put them an inquiry. Both of them (1473)
knew that Mata's certificate of title together with other papers pertaining
to the land was taken by soldiers under the command of Col. Claro L. Since Caram was a registrant in bad faith, the situation is as if there was
Laureta. 16 Added to this is the fact that at the time of the second sale no registration at all. 19
Laureta was already in possession of the land. Irespe and Aportadera
should have investigated the nature of Laureta's possession. If they failed The question to be determined now is, who was first in possession in
to exercise the ordinary care expected of a buyer of real estate they must good faith? A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there
suffer the consequences. The rule of caveat emptor requires the exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. 20
purchaser to be aware of the supposed title of the vendor and one who Laureta was first in possession of the property. He is also a possessor in
buys without checking the vendor's title takes all the risks and losses good faith. It is true that Mata had alleged that the deed of sale in favor of
consequent to such failure. 17 Laureta was procured by force. 21 Such defect, however, was cured
when, after the lapse of four years from the time the intimidation ceased,
The principle that a person dealing with the owner of the registered land Marcos Mata lost both his rights to file an action for annulment or to set
is not bound to go behind the certificate and inquire into transactions the up nullity of the contract as a defense in an action to enforce the same.
existence of which is not there intimated 18 should not apply in this case.
It was of common knowledge that at the time the soldiers of Laureta took Anent the fourth error assigned, the petitioner contends that the second
the documents from Mata, the civil government of Tagum was not yet deed of sale, Exhibit "F", is a voidable contract. Being a voidable
established and that there were no officials to ratify contracts of sale and contract, the action for annulment of the same on the ground of fraud
make them registerable. Obviously, Aportadera and Irespe knew that must be brought within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. In
even if Mata previously had sold t he Disputed such sale could not have the case at bar, Laureta is deemed to have discovered that the land in
been registered. question has been sold to Caram to his prejudice on December 9, 1947,
when the Deed of Sale, Exhibit "F" was recorded and entered in the
There is no doubt then that Irespe and Aportadera, acting as agents of Original Certificate of Title by the Register of Deeds and a new Certificate
Caram, purchased the property of Mata in bad faith. Applying the of Title No. 140 was issued in the name of Caram. Therefore, when the
principle of agency, Caram as principal, should also be deemed to have present case was filed on June 29, 1959, plaintiff's cause of action had
acted in bad faith. long prescribed.

Article 1544 of the New Civil Code provides that: The petitioner's conclusion that the second deed of sale, "Exhibit F", is a
voidable contract is not correct. I n order that fraud can be a ground for
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to the annulment of a contract, it must be employed prior to or simultaneous
different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to to the, consent or creation of the contract. The fraud or dolo causante
the person who may have first taken possession thereof must be that which determines or is the essential cause of the contract.
in good faith, if it should be movable property. Dolo causante as a ground for the annulment of contract is specifically
described in Article 1338 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines as
"insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties" which
induced the other to enter into a contract, and "without them, he would SO ORDERED.
not have agreed to".

The second deed of sale in favor of Caram is not a voidable contract. No

evidence whatsoever was shown that through insidious words or
machinations, the representatives of Caram, Irespe and Aportadera had
induced Mata to enter into the contract.

Since the second deed of sale is not a voidable contract, Article 1391,
Civil Code of the Philippines which provides that the action for annulment
shall be brought within four (4) years from the time of the discovery of
fraud does not apply. Moreover, Laureta has been in continuous
possession of the land since he bought it in June 1945.

A more important reason why Laureta's action could not have prescribed
is that the second contract of sale, having been registered in bad faith, is
null and void. Article 1410 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides
that any action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a
contract does not prescribe.

In a Memorandum of Authorities 22 submitted to this Court on March 13,

1978, the petitioner insists that the action of Laureta against Caram has
prescribed because the second contract of sale is not void under Article
1409 23 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which enumerates the kinds of
contracts which are considered void. Moreover, Article 1544 of the New
Civil Code of the Philippines does not declare void a second sale of
immovable registered in bad faith.

The fact that the second contract is not considered void under Article
1409 and that Article 1544 does not declare void a deed of sale
registered in bad faith does not mean that said contract is not void. Article
1544 specifically provides who shall be the owner in case of a double
sale of an immovable property. To give full effect to this provision, the
status of the two contracts must be declared valid so that one vendee
may contract must be declared void to cut off all rights which may arise
from said contract. Otherwise, Article 1544 win be meaningless.

The first sale in favor of Laureta prevails over the sale in favor of Caram.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied and the decision of the

Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
 Republic of the Philippines decision had already become final and executory. On motion of the
SUPREME COURT plaintiffs, the trial court then issued a writ of execution on December 2,
Manila 1974, amended the following day, pursuant to which the properties held
by the defendants were levied upon and sold at public auction to the
FIRST DIVISION plaintiffs as the highest bidders. 3

G.R. No. L-48335 April 15, 1988 The acts of the trial court were questioned by the defendants in a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction, which was
JUAN AGUILA, petitioner, denied by the Court of Appeals. So was their motion for reconsideration.
vs. The defendants then came to this Court in a petition for review by
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BATANGAS, BRANCH I, SPOUSES certiorari which was also denied. An "amended" petition was considered
JUAN HERNANDEZ and MAGDALENA MALALUAN, GAVINA a motion for reconsideration and was likewise denied. On August 16,
HERNANDEZ and BONIFACIO LIMBO, MAGDALENA HERNANDEZ 1976, another motion for reconsideration was also denied with finality,
and BENITO DIMACULANGAN, ELEUTERIO HERNANDEZ and with the warning that no further motions would be entertained . 4
LAURA BRIONES, DEMETRIA HERNANDEZ and CONRADO
CASTILLO, and AVELINO, NESTORIO and CARMEN, all surnamed Nothing daunted the defendants tried again, this time by filing on June 8,
HERNANDEZ, respondents. 1977, a complaint for reconveyance of the properties acquired by the
defendants in the earlier action for partition. This new complaint was
  docketed as Civil Case No. 1728 in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas. In their answer, the defendants alleged res judicata as one of
their affirmative defenses, arguing that the complaint was barred by the
CRUZ, J.:
prior judgment in Civil Case No. 1552. After preliminary hearing of this
defense, the trial court considered the objection well-taken and dismissed
Juliana Matienzo had two husbands in succession, namely, Escolastico the case. 5 The petitioner then came to this court to challenge the order.
Alabastro and, after his death, Daniel Aguila. The petitioner is claiming
the disputed property as the only surviving child of the second marriage.
The petitioner does not seriously dispute that requisites of res judicata
The private respondents are resisting this claim as the children of Maria
are present, to wit: (1) the presence of a final former judgment; (2) the
Alabastro, the sole offspring of the first marriage. 1
court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) the former judgment must be on the merits; and (4)
In an earlier action between them, docketed as Civil Case No. 1552 in there must be, between the two cases, Identity of parties, Identity of
the Court of First Instance of Batangas, the private respondents had sued subject matter and Identity of causes of action. 6 He says in fact that "he
for partition and damages against the herein petitioner and his wife, does not seek to do away with the rule of res judicata but merely
alleging that some properties held by them pertained to the first marriage proposes to undo a grave and serious wrong perpetuated in the name of
as Juliana and her second husband had not acquired anything during justice." 7
their marriage. Judgment was rendered on January 7, 1974, in favor of
the plaintiffs after the defendants were precluded from presenting their
What he does contend in his brief is that, as a mere technical defense,
own evidence owing to what they later called "the gross ineptitude of their
res judicata showed not prevail over his right to substantial justice, and
counsel," who had failed to appear at two scheduled hearings. 2 A motion
specifically to due process. The petitioner claims he was denied this
for reconsideration and a second motion for reconsideration and/or to
constitutional protection when the defendants were deprived of the
present their evidence were both denied by the trial court. On September
opportunity to submit their evidence in the said Civil Case No. 1552 and
5, 1974, the defendants were given an extension of twenty days to file
later to appeal the decision of the trial court.
their record on appeal and on September 24, 1974, another extension of
fifteen days was granted. On November 21, 1974, the trial court denied
the defendants' record on appeal and appeal bond on the ground that the
As a matter of fact, he was not denied that opportunity, which is precisely replacement before it was altogether too late. He did not. On the
– and only – what due process guarantees. The records show that he did contrary, he continued to retain his counsel through the series of
have that opportunity to be heard and to have the decision reviewed but proceedings that all resulted in the rejection of his cause, obviously
forfeited the right because of his own counsel, whom he criticized as through such counsel's "ineptitude" and, let it be added, the clients"
follows: forbearance. The petitioner"s reverses should have cautioned him that
his lawyer was mishandling his case and moved him to seek the help of
Clearly, it was through the gross ineptitude of petitioner's other counsel, which he did in the end but rather tardily.
original counsel that he was precluded from presenting
his evidence in Civil Case No. 1552; that he lost his right Now petitioner wants us to nullify all of the antecedent proceedings and
to appeal; and that the Decision in the Id case became recognize his earlier claims to the disputed property on the justification
final, executory and executed. that his counsel was grossly inepet. Such a reason is hardly plausible as
the petitioner's new counsel should know. Otherwise, all a defeated party
xxx xxx xxx would have to do to salvage his case is claim neglect or mistake on the
part of his counsel as a ground for reversing the adverse judgment.
There is also no dispute that the Decision in Civil Case There would be no end to litigation if this were allowed as every
No. 1552 has already become final, executory and shortcoming of counsel could be the subject of challenge by his client
executed, and this, all because of the gross ineptitude of through another counsel who, if he is also found wanting, would likewise
counsel for the defendants (herein petitioner and his wife) be disowned by the same client through another counsel, and so on ad
who did not file the record on appeal within the extended infinitum. This would render court proceedings indefinite, tentative and
period of time granted by the Court and who later on subject to reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge of replacing
pursued a wrong remedy before the Honorable Court of counsel.
appeals in CA. G.R. No. SP-04698 and before the
Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. No. L- 43388 thereby On the effects of counsel's acts upon his client, this Court has
allowing the period for availing of the remedy of Relief categorically declared:
judgment judgment to lapse. 6
It has been repeatedly enunciated that "a client is bound
Counsel are supposed to represent their clients by virtue of a valid by the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and
authorization from the latter and act on their behalf with binding effect. cannot be heard to complain that the result might have
Persons are allowed to practice law only after they shall have passed the been different had he proceeded differently. A client is
bar petitions, which merely determine if they have the minimum bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds were
requirements to engage in the exercise of the legal profession. This is no to be admitted and reasons for reopening cases, there
guaranty, of course, that they will discharge their duties with full fidelity to would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel
their clients or with full mastery or at least appreciation of the law. The could be employed who could allege and show that prior
law, to be fair, is not really all that simple; there are parts that are rather counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced
complicated and may challenge the skills of many lawyers. By and large, or learned. ... Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency
however, the practice of the law should not present much difficulty unless of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of
by some unfortunate quirk of fate the lawyer has been allowed to enter certain evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of
the bar despite his lack of preparation, or, while familiar with the proof, ... failure to introduce certain evidence, to summon
intricacies of his , is nevertheless neglectful of his duties and does not witnesses and to argue the case are not paper grounds
pay proper attention to his work. for a new trial, unless the incompetency of counsel is so
great that his client is prejudiced and prevented from
In the instant case, the petitioner should have noticed the succession of properly presence his case." (Vol. 2, Moran, Comments
errors committed by his counsel and taken appropriate steps for his on the Rules of Court, pp. 218, 219-220, citing Rivero v.
Santos, et al., 98 Phil. 500. 503-504; Isaac v. Mendoza,
 89 Phil. 279; Montes v. Court, 48 Phil. 64; People v. cannot be employed to negate the effects of a valid decision of a court of
Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167; U.S. v. Dungca, 27 Phil. 274, justice determining the conflicting claims of ownership of the parties in an
U.S. v. Umali, 15 Phil. 33; see also People v. Ner 28 appropriate proceeding, as in Civil Case No. 1562. The decision in that
SCRA 1151, 1164). In the 1988 case of Palanca v. case was a valid resolution of the question of ownership over the
American Food, etc. (24 SCRA 819, 828), this principle disputed properties and cannot be reversed now through the remedy of
was reiterated. (Tesoro v. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA reconveyance.
296, 304).
For all its conceded merits, equity is available only in the absence of law
At that, it is not even exactly true, as the petitioner claims, that his and not as its replacement. Equity is described as justice outside legality,
evidence was not considered by the trial court in Civil Case No. 1552. which simply means that it cannot supplant although it may, as often
The record shows that when the defendants filed their second motion for happens, supplement the law. We said in an earlier case 12 and we
reconsideration and/or to allow them to present their evidence, which was repeat it now, that all abstract arguments based only on equity should
attached, it was examined by the court "in fairness to the defendants" but yield to positive rules, which pre-empt and prevail over such persuasions.
found to be "so vague and not appearing to be indubitable as to warrant Emotional appeals for justice, while they may wring the heart of the
reopening of the case." 9 This conclusion was reached by the late Judge Court, cannot justify disregard of the mandate of the law as long as it
Jaime R. Agloro after he had made a careful and lengthy analysis of such remains in force. The applicable maxim, which goes back to the ancient
evidence, dwelling on each of the disputed properties, their antecedent, days of the Roman jurists – and is now still reverently observed – is
description, and the basis of the defendants' claims therefor. A mere "aequetas nunquam contravenit legis.
reading of such discussion, which covered two single spaced typewritten
pages, will show that, although the judge could have simply denied the We find it unnecessary to rule on the other arguments raised by the
second motion for reconsideration, he nonetheless took the time and petitioner as they will not affect the decision we reach today. This
exerted painstaking efforts to study the proffered evidence. The decision must again be adverse to him although he may this time be
meticulous consideration of such evidence commends the trial judge's represented by able counsel.
thoroughness and sense of justice and clearly belies the petitioner's
complaint that he had been denied due process. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
It is so ordered.
Perhaps it is for this reason that the petitioner does not strongly attack
the decision, preferring to train his sights on his own former counsel. As Narvasa, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
he says in his petition, he "does not seek the nullity of the judgment
rendered in Civil Case No. 1552 which has already become final due to
Teehankee, C.J., took no part.
legal technicality." 10 What he does ask for is a reconveyance of the
subject properties which he says were udjustly taken from him as a result
of his lawyer's mistakes. Such blunders, he contends, are correctable in 6
an action for reconveyance which the Court should allow in the exercise
of its equity jurisdiction.

The law on reconveyance is clear, and jurisprudence thereon is well-

settled. This remedy is available in cases where, as a result of mistake or
fraud, property is registered in the name of a person not its owner. 11
Clerical error in designating the real owner is a valid ground for
reconveyance after the decree shall have become final following the
lapse of one year therefrom. Reconveyance may also be sought where it
is established that a person not entitled to the property succeeded in
registering it in his name to the prejudice of the real owner. However, it
 Republic of the Philippines Marikina, Rizal, has been approved by this Office. Lot No.
SUPREME COURT 26, Block No. (48) 2, together with the housing unit
Manila constructed thereon, has been allocated to you.

FIRST DIVISION You are, therefore, advised to occupy the said house
immediately.
G.R. No. L-30056 August 30, 1988
If you fail to occupy the same within three (3) days from
MARCELO AGCAOILI, plaintiff-appellee receipt of this notice, your application shall be considered
vs. automatically disapproved and the said house and lot will
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, defendant-appellant. be awarded to another applicant.

Artemio L. Agcaoili for plaintiff-appellee. Agcaoili lost no time in occupying the house. He could not stay in it,
however, and had to leave the very next day, because the house was
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for defendant-appellant. nothing more than a shell, in such a state of incompleteness that civilized
occupation was not possible: ceiling, stairs, double walling, lighting
facilities, water connection, bathroom, toilet kitchen, drainage, were
 
inexistent. Agcaoili did however ask a homeless friend, a certain
Villanueva, to stay in the premises as some sort of watchman, pending
NARVASA, J.: completion of the construction of the house. Agcaoili thereafter
complained to the GSIS, to no avail.
The appellant Government Service Insurance System, (GSIS, for short)
having approved the application of the appellee Agcaoili for the purchase The GSIS asked Agcaoili to pay the monthly amortizations and other
of a house and lot in the GSIS Housing Project at Nangka Marikina, fees. Agcaoili paid the first monthly installment and the incidental fees, 3
Rizal, subject to the condition that the latter should forthwith occupy the but refused to make further payments until and unless the GSIS
house, a condition that Agacoili tried to fulfill but could not for the reason completed the housing unit. What the GSIS did was to cancel the award
that the house was absolutely uninhabitable; Agcaoili, after paying the and require Agcaoili to vacate the premises. 4 Agcaoili reacted by
first installment and other fees, having thereafter refused to make further instituting suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila for specific
payment of other stipulated installments until GSIS had made the house performance and damages. 5 Pending the action, a written protest was
habitable; and appellant having refused to do so, opting instead to cancel lodged by other awardees of housing units in the same subdivision,
the award and demand the vacation by Agcaoili of the premises; and regarding the failure of the System to complete construction of their own
Agcaoili having sued the GSIS in the Court of First Instance of Manila for houses. 6 Judgment was in due course rendered , 7 on the basis of the
specific performance with damages and having obtained a favorable evidence adduced by Agcaoili only, the GSIS having opted to dispense
judgment, the case was appealled to this Court by the GSIS. Its appeal with presentation of its own proofs. The judgment was in Agcaoili's favor
must fail. and contained the following dispositions, 8 to wit:

The essential facts are not in dispute. Approval of Agcaoili's 1) Declaring the cancellation of the award (of a house and
aforementioned application for purchase 1 was contained in a letter 2 lot) in favor of plaintiff (Mariano Agcaoili) illegal and void;
addressed to Agcaoili and signed by GSIS Manager Archimedes
Villanueva in behalf of the Chairman-General Manager, reading as
2) Ordering the defendant (GSIS) to respect and enforce
follows:
the aforesaid award to the plaintiff relative to Lot No. 26,
Block No. (48) 2 of the Government Service Insurance
Please be informed that your application to purchase a
house and lot in our GSIS Housing Project at Nangka,
 System (GSIS) low cost housing project at Nangka unit constructed thereon, has been allocated to you." Neither the
Marikina, Rizal; application form nor the acceptance or approval form of the GSIS — nor
the notice to commence payment of a monthly amortizations, which again
3) Ordering the defendant to complete the house in refers to "the house and lot awarded" — contained any hint that the
question so as to make the same habitable and house was incomplete, and was being sold "as is," i.e., in whatever state
authorizing it (defendant) to collect the monthly of completion it might be at the time. On the other hand, the condition
amortization thereon only after said house shall have explicitly imposed on Agcaoili — "to occupy the said house immediately,"
been completed under the terms and conditions or in any case within three (3) days from notice, otherwise his "application
mentioned in Exhibit A ;and shall be considered automatically disapproved and the said house and lot
will be awarded to another applicant" — would imply that construction of
4) Ordering the defendant to pay P100.00 as damages the house was more or less complete, and it was by reasonable
and P300.00 as and for attorney's fees, and costs. standards, habitable, and that indeed, the awardee should stay and live
in it; it could not be interpreted as meaning that the awardee would
occupy it in the sense of a pioneer or settler in a rude wilderness, making
Appellant GSIS would have this Court reverse this judgment on the
do with whatever he found available in the envirornment.
argument that—
There was then a perfected contract of sale between the parties; there
1) Agcaoili had no right to suspend payment of amortizations on account
had been a meeting of the minds upon the purchase by Agcaoili of a
of the incompleteness of his housing unit, since said unit had been sold
determinate house and lot in the GSIS Housing Project at Nangka
"in the condition and state of completion then existing ... (and) he is
Marikina, Rizal at a definite price payable in amortizations at P31.56 per
deemed to have accepted the same in the condition he found it when he
month, and from that moment the parties acquired the right to reciprocally
accepted the award;" and assuming indefiniteness of the contract in this
demand performance. 13 It was, to be sure, the duty of the GSIS, as
regard, such circumstance precludes a judgment for specific
seller, to deliver the thing sold in a condition suitable for its enjoyment by
performance. 9
the buyer for the purpose contemplated , 14 in other words, to deliver the
house subject of the contract in a reasonably livable state. This it failed to
2) Perfection of the contract of sale between it and Agcaoili being do.
conditioned upon the latter's immediate occupancy of the house subject
thereof, and the latter having failed to comply with the condition, no
It sold a house to Agcaoili, and required him to immediately occupy it
contract ever came into existence between them ; 10
under pain of cancellation of the sale. Under the circumstances there can
hardly be any doubt that the house contemplated was one that could be
3) Agcaoili's act of placing his homeless friend, Villanueva, in possession, occupied for purposes of residence in reasonable comfort and
"without the prior or subsequent knowledge or consent of the defendant convenience. There would be no sense to require the awardee to
(GSIS)" operated as a repudiation by Agcaoili of the award and a immediately occupy and live in a shell of a house, a structure consisting
deprivation of the GSIS at the same time of the reasonable rental value only of four walls with openings, and a roof, and to theorize, as the GSIS
of the property. 11 does, that this was what was intended by the parties, since the contract
did not clearly impose upon it the obligation to deliver a habitable house,
Agcaoili's offer to buy from GSIS was contained in a printed form drawn is to advocate an absurdity, the creation of an unfair situation. By any
up by the latter, entitled "Application to Purchase a House and/or Lot." objective interpretation of its terms, the contract can only be understood
Agcaoili filled up the form, signed it, and submitted it. 12 The acceptance as imposing on the GSIS an obligation to deliver to Agcaoili a reasonably
of the application was also set out in a form (mimeographed) also habitable dwelling in return for his undertaking to pay the stipulated price.
prepared by the GSIS. As already mentioned, this form sent to Agcaoili, Since GSIS did not fulfill that obligation, and was not willing to put the
duly filled up, advised him of the approval of his "application to purchase house in habitable state, it cannot invoke Agcaoili's suspension of
a house and lot in our GSIS Housing Project at NANGKA, MARIKINA, payment of amortizations as cause to cancel the contract between them.
RIZAL," and that "Lot No. 26, Block No. (48) 2, together with the housing It is axiomatic that "(i)n reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay
if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner As we . . reaffirmed in Air Manila, Inc. vs. Court of
with what is incumbent upon him." 15 Industrial Relations (83 SCRA 579, 589 [1978]). "(E)quity
as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and
Nor may the GSIS succeed in justifying its cancellation of the award to do complete justice where courts of law, through the
Agcaoili by the claim that the latter had not complied with the condition of inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their
occupying the house within three (3) days. The record shows that judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are
Agcaoili did try to fulfill the condition; he did try to occupy the house but incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not
found it to be so uninhabitable that he had to leave it the following day. the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance
He did however leave a friend in the structure, who being homeless and rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed
hence willing to accept shelter even of the most rudimentary sort, agreed by different courts... " 16
to stay therein and look after it. Thus the argument that Agcaoili breached
the agreement by failing to occupy the house, and by allowing another In this case, the Court can not require specific performance of the
person to stay in it without the consent of the GSIS, must be rejected as contract in question according to its literal terms, as this would result in
devoid of merit. inequity. The prevailing rule is that in decreeing specific performance
equity requires 17 —
Finally, the GSIS should not be heard to say that the agreement between
it and Agcaoili is silent, or imprecise as to its exact prestation Blame for ... not only that the contract be just and equitable in its
the imprecision cannot be imputed to Agcaoili; it was after all the GSIS provisions, but that the consequences of specific
which caused the contract to come into being by its written acceptance of performance likewise be equitable and just. The general
Agcaoili's offer to purchase, that offer being contained in a printed form rule is that this equitable relief will not be granted if, under
supplied by the GSIS. Said appellant having caused the ambiguity of the circumstances of the case, the result of the specific
which it would now make capital, the question of interpretation arising enforcement of the contract would be harsh, inequitable,
therefrom, should be resolved against it. oppressive, or result in an unconscionable advantage to
the plaintiff . .
It will not do, however, to dispose of the controversy by simply declaring
that the contract between the parties had not been validly cancelled and In the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the Court may adjust the rights of
was therefore still in force, and that Agcaoili could not be compelled by parties in accordance with the circumstances obtaining at the time of
the GSIS to pay the stipulated price of the house and lot subject of the rendition of judgment, when these are significantly different from those
contract until and unless it had first completed construction of the house. existing at the time of generation of those rights.
This would leave the contract hanging or in suspended animation, as it
were, Agcaoili unwilling to pay unless the house were first completed, The Court is not restricted to an adjustment of the rights
and the GSIS averse to completing construction, which is precisely what of the parties as they existed when suit was brought, but
has been the state of affairs between the parties for more than twenty will give relief appropriate to events occuring ending the
(20) years now. On the other hand, assuming it to be feasible to still finish suit. 18
the construction of the house at this time, to compel the GSIS to do so so
that Agcaoili's prestation to pay the price might in turn be demanded, While equitable jurisdiction is generally to be determined
without modifying the price therefor, would not be quite fair. The cost to with reference to the situation existing at the time the suit
the GSIS of completion of construction at present prices would make the is filed, the relief to be accorded by the decree is
stipulated price disproportionate, unrealistic. governed by the conditions which are shown to exist at
the time of making thereof, and not by the circumstances
The situation calls for the exercise by this Court of its equity jurisdiction, attending the inception of the litigation. In making up the
to the end that it may render complete justice to both parties. final decree in an equity suit the judge may rightly
consider matters arising after suit was brought. Therefore,
 as a general rule, equity will administer such relief as the WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court a quo insofar as it invalidates
nature, rights, facts and exigencies of the case demand at and sets aside the cancellation by respondent GSIS of the award in favor
the close of the trial or at the time of the making of the of petitioner Agcaoili of Lot No. 26, Block No. (48) 2 of the GSIS low cost
decree. 19 housing project at Nangka, Marikina, Rizal, and orders the former to
respect the aforesaid award and to pay damages in the amounts
That adjustment is entirely consistent with the Civil Law principle that in specified, is AFFIRMED as being in accord with the facts and the law.
the exercise of rights a person must act with justice, give everyone his Said judgments is however modified by deleting the requirement for
due, and observe honesty and good faith. 20 Adjustment of rights has respondent GSIS "to complete the house in question so as to make the
been held to be particularly applicable when there has been a same habitable," and instead it is hereby ORDERED that the contract
depreciation of currency. between the parties relative to the property above described be modified
by adding to the cost of the land, as of the time of perfection of the
Depreciation of the currency or other medium of payment contract, the cost of the house in its unfinished state also as of the time of
contracted for has frequently been held to justify the court perfection of the contract, and correspondingly adjusting the
in withholding specific performance or at least amortizations to be paid by petitioner Agcaoili, the modification to be
conditioning it upon payment of the actual value of the effected after determination by the Court a quo of the value of said house
property contracted for. Thus, in an action for the specific on the basis of the agreement of the parties, or if this is not possible by
performance of a real estate contract, it has been held such commissioner or commissioners as the Court may appoint. No
that where the currency in which the plaintiff had pronouncement as to costs.
contracted to pay had greatly depreciated before
enforcement was sought, the relief would be denied SO ORDERED.
unless the complaint would undertake to pay the
equitable value of the land. (Willard & Tayloe [U.S.] 8 Wall Cruz, Gancayco, Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
557,19 L. Ed 501; Doughdrill v. Edwards, 59 Ala 424) 21
 
In determining the precise relief to give, the Court will "balance the
equities" or the respective interests of the parties, and take account of the 7
relative hardship that one relief or another may occasion to them .22

The completion of the unfinished house so that it may be put into

habitable condition, as one form of relief to the plaintiff Agcaoili, no longer
appears to be a feasible option in view of the not inconsiderable time that
has already elapsed. That would require an adjustment of the price of the
subject of the sale to conform to present prices of construction materials
and labor. It is more in keeping with the realities of the situation, and with
equitable norms, to simply require payment for the land on which the
house stands, and for the house itself, in its unfinished state, as of the
time of the contract. In fact, this is an alternative relief proposed by
Agcaoili himself, i.e., "that judgment issue . . (o)rdering the defendant
(GSIS) to execute a deed of sale that would embody and provide for a
reasonable amortization of payment on the basis of the present actual
unfinished and uncompleted condition, worth and value of the said
house. 23
 Republic of the Philippines 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808,
SUPREME COURT 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
Manila
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108,
EN BANC 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187,
188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985 224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-
269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT 303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358,
OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440,
NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576,
vs. 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641,
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881,
the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA
CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 &
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of 65.
Printing, respondents.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196,
  1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-
1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600,
ESCOLIN, J.: 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-
1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-
1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797,
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a
1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-
right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine
1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-
Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868,
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952,
effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044,
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders. e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454,
457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-
532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is
568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-
sought:
677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103,
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-
171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312,
27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122,
324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404,
123.
406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504,
521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661,
718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360-
1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted
that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a
directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings
presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the
requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental.
are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, authority supports the proposition that the relator is a
corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the proper party to proceedings of this character when a
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or America were otherwise, we think that it would not be
unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is
of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule,
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby because, if under the particular circumstances the reason
may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at
some other specified time, to do the act required to be No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the
done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent.
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the The circumstances which surround this case are different
wrongful acts of the defendant. from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator
is not a proper party to these proceedings no other
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of
petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the the law officer of the Government to appear and represent
performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for the people in cases of this character.
their petition to be given due course.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present
of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a
rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If
only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed
subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same,
which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally
exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the respondents in this case.
question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not
real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that
the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such
since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis
to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
Article 2 of the Civil Code: whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time
unless it is otherwise provided, ... when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore
enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan
construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative
ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated,
which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents
itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines
equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su
the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion potestad. 5
is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There
date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used
as follows: therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty
must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law
[1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette.
nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
executive and administrative orders and proclamations, whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions publication.
or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees
documents or classes of documents as may be required that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue
classes of documents as the President of the Philippines measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
shall determine from time to time to have general apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
so to be published. ... assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7: courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the
requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9
that the Official Gazette as the official government sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right
repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by
decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may this Court.
know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may
application, which have not been published, shall have no force and have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot
effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published justified."
only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to
whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears
been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in
too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030,
pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published.
vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit: 10
Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished
Act of Congress, having been found to be PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled
conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of
affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized
Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment
however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal
such a determination, is an operative fact and may have laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights force and effect.
claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon SO ORDERED.
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both
of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most
 7 2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and
laws which are not?
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT 3. What is meant by "publication"?
Manila
4. Where is the publication to be made?
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
5. When is the publication to be made?
LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be
AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners, no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are
vs. not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2
the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first
ETC., ET AL., respondents. that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should
therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is
RESOLUTION otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the
publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication,
  when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that
in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices
CRUZ, J.: and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these
arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening
of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he
published as required by law. The government argued that while submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise government agency or for particular persons did not have to be
provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in the
become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration
case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of this
publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion Court. 5
as follows:
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in follows:
the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which
are of general application, and unless so published, they shall ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
have no binding force and effect. completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for such publication.
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1 Specifically, they ask the
following questions: After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties,
both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"? the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise
provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an
not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect
upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application
extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did
not apply because it was "otherwise provided. " Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
dispensed with altogether. The reason. is that such omission would directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules and regulations
offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
a law e effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack
of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-
because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in
non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be the performance of their duties.
communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to
operate. Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding
that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be
knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a
published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or
less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be
"the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the
this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
legislative enactments of the government.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on
albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office
law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely rule but by the Local Government Code.
cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it
unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since
such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly
politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even
pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the
presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This
Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is
manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and
1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and deserves no further comment.
interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The evident
purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law. The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This
is once again an open society, with all the acts of the government subject
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to
categorically for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in
that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were the people and all government authority emanating from them.
sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another merely
acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating where it Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the
should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership authority to review the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it
of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their
a binding decision supported by the necessary vote. right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are
concealed.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be
made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of
readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
perform the function of communicating, the laws to the people as such pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless
amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor the naked blade is drawn.
General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it
exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been published.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall
immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after
or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the
That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political
departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed
SO ORDERED.
procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that
under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in
the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay,
effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.
period provided by the legislature.
8
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as
soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2.
There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties
 Republic of the Philippines the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial
SUPREME COURT Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen,
Manila rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and
awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the
THIRD DIVISION trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision
promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988 petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of
the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September
vs.
30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL,
24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely,
GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR.,
respondents. This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse
of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file
a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied their
RESOLUTION
motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in
Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5,
  1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing
a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution
CORTES, J.: denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986
(142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two
(2) resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule
case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a
CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal
denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate
reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in said Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound
1987 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having been filed discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
out of time.
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643],
being verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the modes and
However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this defect, this periods of appeal.
Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny
it. Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15,
1986,144 SCRA 161],stressed the prospective application of said rule,
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:
building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop
occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to In other words, there is a one-month grace period from
private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's
respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to
of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On
 June 30, 1986, within which the rule barring extensions of petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of
time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is
yet, not strictly enforceable. inapplicable to this case.

Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the
February 27, 1986, it is still within the grace period, which instant petition for lack of merit.
expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate
Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was
filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the
grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage
of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of
the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of
Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the
ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a
motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case

should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-
publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the
time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.
Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of
Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden
duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of
decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been
clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of
Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the
Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave
abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner
liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the
proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of
necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private

9
respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they
heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore,
 Republic of the Philippines On June 10, 1988, the decision, together with the entire records of the
SUPREME COURT case, were transmitted to, and received by, the Commissioner of
Manila Customs (Annex H, Petition, p. 277, Rollo).

EN BANC On June 14, 1988, without modifying his decision, the District Collector of
Customs ordered the warehouse, wherein the bags of sugar were stored,
G.R. No. 84111 December 22, 1989 to be sealed.

JIMMY O. YAOKASIN, petitioner, On June 19, 1988, the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Board
vs. (EIIB) filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Annex I, Petition, p. 278, Rollo),
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, SALVADOR M. MISON and the for "further hearing on the merits" (p. 279, Rollo), based on evidence that
DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF TACLOBAN, VICENTE D. the seized sugar was of foreign origin. Petitioner opposed the motion for
YUTANGCO, respondents. being merely pro forma and/or that the same was, in effect, a motion for
new trial.
 
Hearing Officer Paula Alcazaren set the Motion for reconsideration for
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.: hearing on July 13, 1988.

This petition questions the power of automatic review of the But before that, or on July 4, 1988, the Commissioner of Customs by
Commissioner of Customs over the decision of the Collector of Customs "2nd Indorsement" returned to the District Collector of Customs the:
in protest and seizure cases.
... folder of Tacloban S.I. No. 06-01 (R.P. vs. 9000
On May 27, 1988, the Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 bags/ sacks of bags/sacks of refined sugar, MR. JIMMY YAOKASIN,
refined sugar, which were being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and consignee/claimant), together with the proposed decision,
turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs. for hearing and/or resolution of the government is motion
for reconsideration ... . (p. 437, Rollo, Emphasis Ours.)
The petitioner presented a sales invoice from the Jordan Trading of Iloilo
(Annex A, Petition) to prove that the sugar was purchased locally. The On the same date, July 4, 1988, petitioner applied for and secured a writ
District Collector of Customs, however, proceeded with the seizure of the of replevin from the Regional Trial Court of Leyte (CC 7627, Branch VII),
bags of sugar. through a Petition/Complaint for certiorari Prohibition with Replevin and
Damages with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order (Annex L,
Petition, p. 288, Rollo).
On June 3 and 6, 1988, show-cause hearings were conducted. On June
7, 1988, the District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the
sugar as follows: On July 12, 1988, respondent District Collector of Customs filed an
Answer assailing the court's jurisdiction. On the same day, the District
Collector and the Commissioner of Customs filed in the Court of Appeals
WHEREFORE, premises considered subject Nine
a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Application for a Writ of
Thousand (9,000) sacks/bags of refined sugar are hereby
Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order to annul the July 4, 1988
ordered released to Mr. Jimmy O. Yaokasin,
— "Order Granting Replevin with Temporary Restraining Order" (CA-G.R.
consignee/claimant and the immediate withdrawal of
SP NO. 15090; p. 396, Rollo).
Customs Guard within its bodega's premises. (p. 276,
Rollo.)
On July 15, 1988, the Collector of Customs reconsidered his June 7,
1988 decision, as follows:
 WHEREFORE, the undersigned hereby reconsiders his Effective immediately, you are hereby directed to
Decision, finds that the 9,000 bags/sacks of refined sugar implement strictly the following —
in question are of foreign origin, smuggled into the
country, and declares them forfeited in favor of the Decisions of the Collector of Customs in
government. seizure and protest cases are subject to
review by the Commissioner upon appeal
Considering the provision in the quoted Customs as provided under existing laws; provided,
Memorandum Order, especially the latter part thereof however, that where a decision of the
prohibiting the release of the articles in question to the Collector of Customs in such seizure and
claimant, and considering also that the said sacks of protest cases is adverse to the
sugar are presently stored in the bodega of claimant, and government it shall automatically be
considering further that there are no facilities for storage reviewed by the Commissioner of
in Tacloban City, for security reasons, the Honorable Customs. (PD. No. 1, Annex C.)
Commissioner of Customs is respectfully and earnestly
urged to order the immediate transfer of the sugar from In view thereof, no releases in any seizure or like cases
the said bodega to any Customs Warehouse, preferably may be effected unless and until the decision of the
in Manila and to this end to order the setting aside of Collector has been confirmed in writing by the
such sum of money in order to effectively accomplish this Commissioner of Customs.
purpose." (p. 11, Rollo.)
For immediate and strict compliance.
Also, on the same day, the Court of Appeals: (a) gave due course to
respondent's petition; and (b) restrained Judge Pedro S. Espina, (p. 436, Rollo; Emphasis Ours)
Regional Trial Court, Leyte, from further proceeding in Civil Case No.
7627, and from enforcing his Order of July 4, 1988.
The memorandum order implements Section 12 (Art. IV, Part. IV, Vol. I)
of the Integrated Reorganization Plan (hereafter, "PLAN") which provides:
It is petitioner's contention that the June 7, 1988 decision of the District
Collector of Customs became final and executory, in view of the absence
12. The Collector of Customs at each principal port of
of an appeal therefrom by the "aggrieved party" (himself) within the 15-
entry shall be the official head of the customs service in
day period provided for in Sec. 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
his port and district responsible to the Commissioner. He
Hence, the release of the 9,000 bags of sugar must be upheld.
shall have the authority to take final action on the
enforcement of tariff and customs laws within his
On the other hand, the District Collector and the Commissioner of collection district and on administrative matters in
Customs argue that since the June 7, 1988 decision is adverse to the accordance with Chapter III, Part II of this Plan. Decisions
government, the case should go to the Commissioner of Customs on of the Collector of Customs in seizure and protest cases
automatic review, pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 20-87, dated May are subject to review by the Commissioner upon appeal
18, 1987, of former Acting Commissioner of Customs Alexander Padilla, as provided under existing laws; provided, however, that
which provides: where a decision of a Collector of Customs in such
seizure and protest cases is adverse to the government,
CUSTOMS MEMORANDUM ORDER it shall automatically be reviewed by the Commissioner of
Customs which, if affirmed, shall automatically be
NO. 20-87 elevated for final review by the Secretary of Finance;
provided, further that if within thirty days from receipt of
TO: All Collectors of Customs and Others Concerned the records of the case by the Commissioner of Customs
 or the Secretary of Finance, no decision is rendered by Section 12 of the Plan and Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code
the Commissioner of Customs or the Secretary of do not conflict with each other. They may co-exist. Section 2313 of the
Finance, the decision under review shall become final Code provides for the procedure for the review of the decision of a
and executory. (Emphasis supplied) collector in seizure and protest cases upon appeal by the aggrieved
party, i.e., the importer or owner of the goods. On the other hand, Section
In Presidential Decree No. 1, dated September 24, 1972, former 12 of the Plan refers to the general procedure in appeals in seizure and
President Marcos decreed and ordered that the Plan be (4 adopted, protest cases with a special proviso on automatic review when the
approved, and made as part of the law of the land." Under the 1987 collector's decision is adverse to the government. Section 2313 and the
Constitution, "[a]ll existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proviso in Section 12, although they both relate to the review of seizure
proclamations, letters of instruction, and other executive issuances not and protest cases, refer to two different situations — when the collector's
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, decision is adverse to the importer or owner of the goods, and when the
repealed, or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII). While some provisions of the decision is adverse to the government.
Plan have ceased to be operative because of subsequent
reorganizations, other provisions, such as Section 12 have not been The decision of the Court in the case of Sy Man vs. Jacinto (93 Phil. 1093
repealed by subsequent legislation. [19531]), which the petitioner invokes as precedent, is riot in point. In the
present case the Acting Commissioner, in issuing the memorandum
Section 12 of the Plan applies to petitioner's shipment of 9,000 bags of circular, was directing strict compliance with an existing provision of law,
sugar. Taxes being the lifeblood of the Government, Section 12, which which mandates automatic review of decisions of collectors in seizure
the Commissioner of Customs in his Customs Memorandum Order No. and protest cases which are adverse to the government. On the other
20-87, enjoined all collectors to follow strictly, is intended to protect the hand, in Sy Man, the memorandum order of the Insular Collector of
interest of the Government in the collection of taxes and customs duties Customs directed the elevation of records in seizure and forfeiture cases
in those seizure and protest cases which, without the automatic review for automatic review even if he had not been expressly granted such
provided therein, neither the Commissioner of Customs nor the Secretary power under the then existing law.
of Finance would probably ever know about. Without the automatic
review by the Commissioner of Customs and the Secretary of Finance, a The objection to the enforcement of Section 12 of the Plan and CMO No.
collector in any of our country's far-flung ports, would have absolute and 20-87 on the ground that they had not been published in the Official
unbridled discretion to determine whether goods seized by him are locally Gazette, is not well taken. The Plan, as part of P.D. No. 1, was "adopted,
produced, hence, not dutiable or of foreign origin, and therefore subject approved and made as part of the law of the land" and published in
to payment of customs duties and taxes. His decision, unless appealed Volume 68, No. 40, p. 7797 of the Official Gazette issue of October 2,
by the aggrieved party (the owner of the goods), would become final with 1972.
'the no one the wiser except himself and the owner of the goods. The
owner of the goods cannot be expected to appeal the collector's decision Article 2 of the Civil Code, which requires laws to be published in the
when it is favorable to him. A decision that is favorable to the taxpayer Official Gazette, does not apply to CMO No. 20-87 which is only an
would correspondingly be unfavorable to the Government, but who will administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs addressed to his
appeal the collector's decision in that case certainly not the collector. subordinates. the customs collectors.

Evidently, it was to cure this anomalous situation (which may have Commonwealth Act No. 638 (an Act to Provide for the Uniform
already defrauded our government of huge amounts of uncollected Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette) enumerates what
taxes), that the provision for automatic review by the Commissioner of shall be published in the Official Gazette besides legislative acts and
Customs and the Secretary of Finance of unappealed seizure and protest resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines.
cases was conceived to protect the government against corrupt and Executive and administrative orders and proclamations, shall also be
conniving customs collectors. published in the Official Gazette, except such as have no general
applicability." CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to comply
strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance which is addressed
only to particular persons or a class of persons (the customs collectors).
"It need not be published, on the assumption that it has been circularized
to all concerned" (Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27).

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is denied for lack of merit. The
temporary restraining order which we issued in this case is hereby made
permanent. Cost against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,

Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Padilla, Jr., took no part.

10
 Republic of the Philippines That we were passengers of Thames with Plate No. 52-
SUPREME COURT 222 PUJ Phil. 73 and victims after the said Thames met
Manila an accident at Barrio Payocpoc Norte, Bauang, La Union
while passing through the National Highway No. 3;
THIRD DIVISION
That after a thorough investigation the said Thames met
G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991 the accident due to mechanical defect and went off the
road and turned turtle to the east canal of the road into a
REYNALDA GATCHALIAN, petitioner, creek causing physical injuries to us;
vs.
ARSENIO DELIM and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. xxx xxx xxx

Pedro G. Peralta for petitioner. That we are no longer interested to file a complaint,
criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the
Florentino G. Libatique for private respondent. said Thames, because it was an accident and the said
driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the
extent of helping us to be treated upon our injuries.
 
xxx xxx xxx 2
FELICIANO, J.:p
(Emphasis supplied)
At noon time on 11 July 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded,
as a paying passenger, respondent's "Thames" mini bus at a point in San
Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, bound for Bauang, of the same province. On Notwithstanding this document, petitioner Gathalian filed with the then
the way, while the bus was running along the highway in Barrio Court of First Instance of La Union an action extra contractu to recover
Payocpoc, Bauang, Union, "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at compensatory and moral damages. She alleged in the complaint that her
one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement injuries sustained from the vehicular mishap had left her with a
flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the forehead,
into a ditch. Several passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian, were generating mental suffering and an inferiority complex on her part; and
injured. They were promptly taken to Bethany Hospital at San Fernando, that as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and stay away from her
La Union, for medical treatment. Upon medical examination, petitioner friends. She also alleged that the scar diminished her facial beauty and
was found to have sustained physical injuries on the leg, arm and deprived her of opportunities for employment. She prayed for an award
forehead, specifically described as follows: lacerated wound, forehead; of: P10,000.00 for loss of employment and other opportunities;
abrasion, elbow, left; abrasion, knee, left; abrasion, lateral surface, leg, P10,000.00 for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her
left. 1 forehead; P30,000.00 for moral damages; and P1,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
On 14 July 1973, while injured. passengers were confined in the hospital,
Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited them and later paid for their In defense, respondent averred that the vehicular mishap was due to
hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave petitioner P12.00 force majeure, and that petitioner had already been paid and moreover
with which to pay her transportation expense in going home from the had waived any right to institute any action against him (private
hospital. However, before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured respondent) and his driver, when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint
passengers, including petitioner, sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit Affidavit on 14 July 1973.
which stated, among other things:
After trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint upon the ground that to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly
when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit, she relinquished evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.
any right of action (whether criminal or civil) that she may have had
against respondent and the driver of the mini-bus. The degree of explicitness which this Court has required in purported
waivers is illustrated in Yepes and Susaya v. Samar Express Transit
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's (supra), where the Court in reading and rejecting a purported waiver said:
conclusion that there had been a valid waiver, but affirmed the dismissal
of the case by denying petitioner's claim for damages: . . . It appears that before their transfer to the Leyte
Provincial Hospital, appellees were asked to sign as, in
We are not in accord, therefore, of (sic) the ground of the fact, they signed the document Exhibit I wherein they
trial court's dismissal of the complaint, although we stated that "in consideration of the expenses which said
conform to the trial court's disposition of the case — its operator has incurred in properly giving us the proper
dismissal. medical treatment, we hereby manifest our desire to
waive any and all claims against the operator of the
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING considerations, there Samar Express Transit."
being no error committed by the lower court in dismissing
the plaintiff-appellant's complaint, the judgment of xxx xxx xxx
dismissal is hereby affirmed.
Even a cursory examination of the document mentioned
Without special pronouncement as to costs. above will readily show that appellees did not actually
waive their right to claim damages from appellant for the
SO ORDERED. 3 latter's failure to comply with their contract of carriage. All
that said document proves is that they expressed a
In the present Petition for Review filed in forma pauperis, petitioner "desire" to make the waiver — which obviously is not the
assails the decision of the Court of Appeals and ask this Court to award same as making an actual waiver of their right. A waiver
her actual or compensatory damages as well as moral damages. of the kind invoked by appellant must be clear and
unequivocal (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
July 8, 1887) — which is not the case of the one relied
We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid
upon in this appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
waiver of her cause of action had been made by petitioner. The relevant
language of the Joint Affidavit may be quoted again:
If we apply the standard used in Yepes and Susaya, we would
have to conclude that the terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant
That we are no longer interested to file a complaint,
case cannot be regarded as a waiver cast in "clear and
criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the
unequivocal" terms. Moreover, the circumstances under which
said Thames, because it was an accident and the said
the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian need to be
driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the
considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the
extent of helping us to be treated upon our injuries.
effects of the vehicular accident, having been in the hospital for
(Emphasis supplied)
only three days, when the purported waiver in the form of the
Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while reading
A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other
couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document,
to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its
legally pertains to him. 4 A waiver may not casually be attributed entirety. Considering these circumstances there appears
 substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of diligence to prevent the mishap involving his mini-bus. The records
the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent had
respondent) she signed and whether she actually intended exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. Curiously,
thereby to waive any right of action against private respondent. respondent did not even attempt, during the trial before the court a quo,
to prove that he had indeed exercised the requisite extraordinary
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier diligence. Respondent did try to exculpate himself from liability by
for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a alleging that the mishap was the result of force majeure. But allegation is
common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe not proof and here again, respondent utterly failed to substantiate his
any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. For defense of force majeure. To exempt a common carrier from liability for
a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, death or physical injuries to passengers upon the ground of force
public policy or good majeure, the carrier must clearly show not only that the efficient cause of
customs. 5 To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages the casualty was entirely independent of the human will, but also that it
by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this was impossible to avoid. Any participation by the common carrier in the
case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary occurrence of the injury will defeat the defense of force majeure. In
diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render Servando v. Philippine Steam Navigation Company, 12 the Court
that standard unenforceable. 6 We believe such a purported waiver is summed up the essential characteristics of force majeure by quoting with
offensive to public policy. approval from the Enciclopedia Juridica Española:

Petitioner Gatchalian also argues that the Court of Appeals, having by Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is the
majority vote held that there was no enforceable waiver of her right of immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is
action, should have awarded her actual or compensatory and moral exempt from liability non-performance. The Partidas, the
damages as a matter of course. antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code, defines
"caso fortuito" as 'an event that takes place by accident
We have already noted that a duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in and could not have been foreseen. Examples of this are
protecting the safety of its passengers is imposed upon a common destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck,
carrier. 7 In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory violence of robber.
presumption arises that the common carrier was at fault or had acted
negligently "unless it proves that it [had] observed extraordinary diligence In its dissertation on the phrase "caso fortuito" the
as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." 8 In fact, because of this Enciclopedia Juridica Española says: 'In legal sense and,
statutory presumption, it has been held that a court need not even make consequently, also in relation to contracts, a "caso
an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common fortuito" presents the following essential characteristics:
carrier in order to hold it liable. 9 To overcome this presumption, the (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
common carrier must slow to the court that it had exercised extraordinary occurence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with
diligence to prevent the injuries. 10 The standard of extraordinary his obligation, must be independent of the human will; (2)
diligence imposed upon common carriers is considerably more it must be impossible to foresee the event which
demanding than the standard of ordinary diligence, i.e., the diligence of a constitutes the "caso fortuito", or if it can be foreseen, it
good paterfamilias established in respect of the ordinary relations must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be
between members of society. A common carrier is bound to carry its such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
passengers safely" as far as human care and foresight can provide, using obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be
the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard to all the free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
circumstances". 11 resulting to the creditor.

Thus, the question which must be addressed is whether or not private Upon the other hand, the record yields affirmative evidence of fault or
respondent has successfully proved that he had exercised extraordinary negligence on the part of respondent common carrier. In her direct
examination, petitioner Gatchalian narrated that shortly before the vehicle possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar,
went off the road and into a ditch, a "snapping sound" was suddenly especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of
heard at one part of the bus. One of the passengers, an old woman, cried injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a
out, "What happened?" ("Apay addan samet nadadaelen?"). The driver legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante. If the scar is relatively
replied, nonchalantly, "That is only normal" ("Ugali ti makina dayta"). The small and does not grievously disfigure the victim, the cost of surgery
driver did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus. may be expected to be correspondingly modest. In Araneta, et al. vs.
Moreover, the driver's reply necessarily indicated that the same Areglado, et al., 15 this Court awarded actual or compensatory damages
"snapping sound" had been heard in the bus on previous occasions. This for, among other things, the surgical removal of the scar on the face of a
could only mean that the bus had not been checked physically or young boy who had been injured in a vehicular collision. The Court there
mechanically to determine what was causing the "snapping sound" which held:
had occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten accustomed to it.
Such a sound is obviously alien to a motor vehicle in good operating We agree with the appellants that the damages awarded
condition, and even a modicum of concern for life and limb of passengers by the lower court for the injuries suffered by Benjamin
dictated that the bus be checked and repaired. The obvious continued Araneta are inadequate. In allowing not more than
failure of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the P1,000.00 as compensation for the "permanent deformity
bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after and — something like an inferiority complex" as well as
he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from for the "pathological condition on the left side of the jaw"
one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical caused to said plaintiff, the court below overlooked the
safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of clear evidence on record that to arrest the degenerative
respondent and his driver. process taking place in the mandible and restore the
injured boy to a nearly normal condition, surgical
We turn to petitioner's claim for damages. The first item in that claim intervention was needed, for which the doctor's charges
relates to revenue which petitioner said she failed to realize because of would amount to P3,000.00, exclusive of hospitalization
the effects of the vehicular mishap. Petitioner maintains that on the day fees, expenses and medicines. Furthermore, the
that the mini-bus went off the road, she was supposed to confer with the operation, according to Dr. Diño, would probably have to
district supervisor of public schools for a substitute teacher's job, a job be repeated in order to effectuate a complete cure, while
which she had held off and on as a "casual employee." The Court of removal of the scar on the face obviously demanded
Appeals, however, found that at the time of the accident, she was no plastic surgery.
longer employed in a public school since, being a casual employee and
not a Civil Service eligible, she had been laid off. Her employment as a xxx xxx xxx
substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the
availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. In view of her The father's failure to submit his son to a plastic operation
employment status as such, the Court of Appeals held that she could not as soon as possible does not prove that such treatment is
be said to have in fact lost any employment after and by reason of the not called for. The damage to the jaw and the existence
accident. 13 Such was the factual finding of the Court of Appeals, a of the scar in Benjamin Araneta's face are physical facts
finding entitled to due respect from this Court. Petitioner Gatchalian has that can not be reasoned out of existence. That the injury
not submitted any basis for overturning this finding of fact, and she may should be treated in order to restore him as far as
not be awarded damages on the basis of speculation or conjecture. 14 possible to his original condition is undeniable. The
father's delay, or even his negligence, should not be
Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on allowed to prejudice the son who has no control over the
her forehead, is another matter. A person is entitled to the physical parent's action nor impair his right to a full indemnity.
integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual
injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and . . . Still, taking into account the necessity and cost of
assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as corrective measures to fully repair the damage; the pain
 suffered by the injured party; his feelings of inferiority due SO ORDERED.
to consciousness of his present deformity, as well as the
voluntary character of the injury inflicted; and further Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
considering that a repair, however, skillfully conducted, is
never equivalent to the original state, we are of the 11Gatchalian bs. Delim (oct 21 1991)
opinion that the indemnity granted by the trial court should
be increased to a total of P18,000.00. (Emphasis
supplied)

Petitioner estimated that the cost of having her scar surgically removed
was somewhere between P10,000.00 to P15,000.00. 16 Upon the other
hand, Dr. Fe Tayao Lasam, a witness presented as an expert by
petitioner, testified that the cost would probably be between P5,000.00 to
P10,000.00. 17 In view of this testimony, and the fact that a considerable
amount of time has lapsed since the mishap in 1973 which may be
expected to increase not only the cost but also very probably the difficulty
of removing the scar, we consider that the amount of P15,000.00 to cover
the cost of such plastic surgery is not unreasonable.

Turning to petitioner's claim for moral damages, the long-established rule

is that moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the
part of the common carrier is shown. 18 Since we have earlier concluded
that respondent common carrier and his driver had been grossly
negligent in connection with the bus mishap which had injured petitioner
and other passengers, and recalling the aggressive manuevers of
respondent, through his wife, to get the victims to waive their right to
recover damages even as they were still hospitalized for their injuries,
petitioner must be held entitled to such moral damages. Considering the
extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have suffered as a result
of her physical injuries including the permanent scar on her forehead, we
believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award.
Petitioner's claim for P1,000.00 as atttorney's fees is in fact even more
modest. 19

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 24 October

1980, as well as the decision of the then Court of First Instance of La
Union dated 4 December 1975 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.Respondent is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioner Reynalda
Gatchalian the following sums: 1) P15,000.00 as actual or compensatory
damages to cover the cost of plastic surgery for the removal of the scar
on petitioner's forehead; 2) P30,000.00 as moral damages; and 3)
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, the aggregate amount to bear interest at
the legal rate of 6% per annum counting from the promulgation of this
decision until full payment thereof. Costs against private respondent.
 Republic of the Philippines That we were passengers of Thames with Plate No. 52-
SUPREME COURT 222 PUJ Phil. 73 and victims after the said Thames met
Manila an accident at Barrio Payocpoc Norte, Bauang, La Union
while passing through the National Highway No. 3;
THIRD DIVISION
That after a thorough investigation the said Thames met
G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991 the accident due to mechanical defect and went off the
road and turned turtle to the east canal of the road into a
REYNALDA GATCHALIAN, petitioner, creek causing physical injuries to us;
vs.
ARSENIO DELIM and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. xxx xxx xxx

Pedro G. Peralta for petitioner. That we are no longer interested to file a complaint,
criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the
Florentino G. Libatique for private respondent. said Thames, because it was an accident and the said
driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the
extent of helping us to be treated upon our injuries.
 
xxx xxx xxx 2
FELICIANO, J.:p
(Emphasis supplied)
At noon time on 11 July 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded,
as a paying passenger, respondent's "Thames" mini bus at a point in San
Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, bound for Bauang, of the same province. On Notwithstanding this document, petitioner Gathalian filed with the then
the way, while the bus was running along the highway in Barrio Court of First Instance of La Union an action extra contractu to recover
Payocpoc, Bauang, Union, "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at compensatory and moral damages. She alleged in the complaint that her
one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement injuries sustained from the vehicular mishap had left her with a
flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the forehead,
into a ditch. Several passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian, were generating mental suffering and an inferiority complex on her part; and
injured. They were promptly taken to Bethany Hospital at San Fernando, that as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and stay away from her
La Union, for medical treatment. Upon medical examination, petitioner friends. She also alleged that the scar diminished her facial beauty and
was found to have sustained physical injuries on the leg, arm and deprived her of opportunities for employment. She prayed for an award
forehead, specifically described as follows: lacerated wound, forehead; of: P10,000.00 for loss of employment and other opportunities;
abrasion, elbow, left; abrasion, knee, left; abrasion, lateral surface, leg, P10,000.00 for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her
left. 1 forehead; P30,000.00 for moral damages; and P1,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
On 14 July 1973, while injured. passengers were confined in the hospital,
Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited them and later paid for their In defense, respondent averred that the vehicular mishap was due to
hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave petitioner P12.00 force majeure, and that petitioner had already been paid and moreover
with which to pay her transportation expense in going home from the had waived any right to institute any action against him (private
hospital. However, before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured respondent) and his driver, when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint
passengers, including petitioner, sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit Affidavit on 14 July 1973.
which stated, among other things:
After trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint upon the ground that to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly
when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit, she relinquished evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.
any right of action (whether criminal or civil) that she may have had
against respondent and the driver of the mini-bus. The degree of explicitness which this Court has required in purported
waivers is illustrated in Yepes and Susaya v. Samar Express Transit
On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's (supra), where the Court in reading and rejecting a purported waiver said:
conclusion that there had been a valid waiver, but affirmed the dismissal
of the case by denying petitioner's claim for damages: . . . It appears that before their transfer to the Leyte
Provincial Hospital, appellees were asked to sign as, in
We are not in accord, therefore, of (sic) the ground of the fact, they signed the document Exhibit I wherein they
trial court's dismissal of the complaint, although we stated that "in consideration of the expenses which said
conform to the trial court's disposition of the case — its operator has incurred in properly giving us the proper
dismissal. medical treatment, we hereby manifest our desire to
waive any and all claims against the operator of the
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING considerations, there Samar Express Transit."
being no error committed by the lower court in dismissing
the plaintiff-appellant's complaint, the judgment of xxx xxx xxx
dismissal is hereby affirmed.
Even a cursory examination of the document mentioned
Without special pronouncement as to costs. above will readily show that appellees did not actually
waive their right to claim damages from appellant for the
SO ORDERED. 3 latter's failure to comply with their contract of carriage. All
that said document proves is that they expressed a
In the present Petition for Review filed in forma pauperis, petitioner "desire" to make the waiver — which obviously is not the
assails the decision of the Court of Appeals and ask this Court to award same as making an actual waiver of their right. A waiver
her actual or compensatory damages as well as moral damages. of the kind invoked by appellant must be clear and
unequivocal (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
July 8, 1887) — which is not the case of the one relied
We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid
upon in this appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
waiver of her cause of action had been made by petitioner. The relevant
language of the Joint Affidavit may be quoted again:
If we apply the standard used in Yepes and Susaya, we would
have to conclude that the terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant
That we are no longer interested to file a complaint,
case cannot be regarded as a waiver cast in "clear and
criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the
unequivocal" terms. Moreover, the circumstances under which
said Thames, because it was an accident and the said
the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian need to be
driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the
considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the
extent of helping us to be treated upon our injuries.
effects of the vehicular accident, having been in the hospital for
(Emphasis supplied)
only three days, when the purported waiver in the form of the
Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while reading
A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other
couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document,
to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its
legally pertains to him. 4 A waiver may not casually be attributed entirety. Considering these circumstances there appears
 substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of diligence to prevent the mishap involving his mini-bus. The records
the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private before the Court are bereft of any evidence showing that respondent had
respondent) she signed and whether she actually intended exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law. Curiously,
thereby to waive any right of action against private respondent. respondent did not even attempt, during the trial before the court a quo,
to prove that he had indeed exercised the requisite extraordinary
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier diligence. Respondent did try to exculpate himself from liability by
for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a alleging that the mishap was the result of force majeure. But allegation is
common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe not proof and here again, respondent utterly failed to substantiate his
any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. For defense of force majeure. To exempt a common carrier from liability for
a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, death or physical injuries to passengers upon the ground of force
public policy or good majeure, the carrier must clearly show not only that the efficient cause of
customs. 5 To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages the casualty was entirely independent of the human will, but also that it
by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this was impossible to avoid. Any participation by the common carrier in the
case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary occurrence of the injury will defeat the defense of force majeure. In
diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render Servando v. Philippine Steam Navigation Company, 12 the Court
that standard unenforceable. 6 We believe such a purported waiver is summed up the essential characteristics of force majeure by quoting with
offensive to public policy. approval from the Enciclopedia Juridica Española:

Petitioner Gatchalian also argues that the Court of Appeals, having by Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is the
majority vote held that there was no enforceable waiver of her right of immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is
action, should have awarded her actual or compensatory and moral exempt from liability non-performance. The Partidas, the
damages as a matter of course. antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code, defines
"caso fortuito" as 'an event that takes place by accident
We have already noted that a duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in and could not have been foreseen. Examples of this are
protecting the safety of its passengers is imposed upon a common destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck,
carrier. 7 In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory violence of robber.
presumption arises that the common carrier was at fault or had acted
negligently "unless it proves that it [had] observed extraordinary diligence In its dissertation on the phrase "caso fortuito" the
as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." 8 In fact, because of this Enciclopedia Juridica Española says: 'In legal sense and,
statutory presumption, it has been held that a court need not even make consequently, also in relation to contracts, a "caso
an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common fortuito" presents the following essential characteristics:
carrier in order to hold it liable. 9 To overcome this presumption, the (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
common carrier must slow to the court that it had exercised extraordinary occurence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with
diligence to prevent the injuries. 10 The standard of extraordinary his obligation, must be independent of the human will; (2)
diligence imposed upon common carriers is considerably more it must be impossible to foresee the event which
demanding than the standard of ordinary diligence, i.e., the diligence of a constitutes the "caso fortuito", or if it can be foreseen, it
good paterfamilias established in respect of the ordinary relations must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be
between members of society. A common carrier is bound to carry its such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
passengers safely" as far as human care and foresight can provide, using obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be
the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard to all the free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
circumstances". 11 resulting to the creditor.

Thus, the question which must be addressed is whether or not private Upon the other hand, the record yields affirmative evidence of fault or
respondent has successfully proved that he had exercised extraordinary negligence on the part of respondent common carrier. In her direct
examination, petitioner Gatchalian narrated that shortly before the vehicle possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar,
went off the road and into a ditch, a "snapping sound" was suddenly especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of
heard at one part of the bus. One of the passengers, an old woman, cried injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a
out, "What happened?" ("Apay addan samet nadadaelen?"). The driver legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante. If the scar is relatively
replied, nonchalantly, "That is only normal" ("Ugali ti makina dayta"). The small and does not grievously disfigure the victim, the cost of surgery
driver did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus. may be expected to be correspondingly modest. In Araneta, et al. vs.
Moreover, the driver's reply necessarily indicated that the same Areglado, et al., 15 this Court awarded actual or compensatory damages
"snapping sound" had been heard in the bus on previous occasions. This for, among other things, the surgical removal of the scar on the face of a
could only mean that the bus had not been checked physically or young boy who had been injured in a vehicular collision. The Court there
mechanically to determine what was causing the "snapping sound" which held:
had occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten accustomed to it.
Such a sound is obviously alien to a motor vehicle in good operating We agree with the appellants that the damages awarded
condition, and even a modicum of concern for life and limb of passengers by the lower court for the injuries suffered by Benjamin
dictated that the bus be checked and repaired. The obvious continued Araneta are inadequate. In allowing not more than
failure of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and safety of the P1,000.00 as compensation for the "permanent deformity
bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after and — something like an inferiority complex" as well as
he had heard once again the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from for the "pathological condition on the left side of the jaw"
one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the physical caused to said plaintiff, the court below overlooked the
safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of clear evidence on record that to arrest the degenerative
respondent and his driver. process taking place in the mandible and restore the
injured boy to a nearly normal condition, surgical
We turn to petitioner's claim for damages. The first item in that claim intervention was needed, for which the doctor's charges
relates to revenue which petitioner said she failed to realize because of would amount to P3,000.00, exclusive of hospitalization
the effects of the vehicular mishap. Petitioner maintains that on the day fees, expenses and medicines. Furthermore, the
that the mini-bus went off the road, she was supposed to confer with the operation, according to Dr. Diño, would probably have to
district supervisor of public schools for a substitute teacher's job, a job be repeated in order to effectuate a complete cure, while
which she had held off and on as a "casual employee." The Court of removal of the scar on the face obviously demanded
Appeals, however, found that at the time of the accident, she was no plastic surgery.
longer employed in a public school since, being a casual employee and
not a Civil Service eligible, she had been laid off. Her employment as a xxx xxx xxx
substitute teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the
availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. In view of her The father's failure to submit his son to a plastic operation
employment status as such, the Court of Appeals held that she could not as soon as possible does not prove that such treatment is
be said to have in fact lost any employment after and by reason of the not called for. The damage to the jaw and the existence
accident. 13 Such was the factual finding of the Court of Appeals, a of the scar in Benjamin Araneta's face are physical facts
finding entitled to due respect from this Court. Petitioner Gatchalian has that can not be reasoned out of existence. That the injury
not submitted any basis for overturning this finding of fact, and she may should be treated in order to restore him as far as
not be awarded damages on the basis of speculation or conjecture. 14 possible to his original condition is undeniable. The
father's delay, or even his negligence, should not be
Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on allowed to prejudice the son who has no control over the
her forehead, is another matter. A person is entitled to the physical parent's action nor impair his right to a full indemnity.
integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual
injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and . . . Still, taking into account the necessity and cost of
assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as corrective measures to fully repair the damage; the pain
 suffered by the injured party; his feelings of inferiority due SO ORDERED.
to consciousness of his present deformity, as well as the
voluntary character of the injury inflicted; and further Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
considering that a repair, however, skillfully conducted, is
never equivalent to the original state, we are of the  
opinion that the indemnity granted by the trial court should
be increased to a total of P18,000.00. (Emphasis
12. Tenchavez vs escano (nov. 29 1965)
supplied)

Petitioner estimated that the cost of having her scar surgically removed
was somewhere between P10,000.00 to P15,000.00. 16 Upon the other
hand, Dr. Fe Tayao Lasam, a witness presented as an expert by
petitioner, testified that the cost would probably be between P5,000.00 to
P10,000.00. 17 In view of this testimony, and the fact that a considerable
amount of time has lapsed since the mishap in 1973 which may be
expected to increase not only the cost but also very probably the difficulty
of removing the scar, we consider that the amount of P15,000.00 to cover
the cost of such plastic surgery is not unreasonable.

Turning to petitioner's claim for moral damages, the long-established rule

is that moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the
part of the common carrier is shown. 18 Since we have earlier concluded
that respondent common carrier and his driver had been grossly
negligent in connection with the bus mishap which had injured petitioner
and other passengers, and recalling the aggressive manuevers of
respondent, through his wife, to get the victims to waive their right to
recover damages even as they were still hospitalized for their injuries,
petitioner must be held entitled to such moral damages. Considering the
extent of pain and anxiety which petitioner must have suffered as a result
of her physical injuries including the permanent scar on her forehead, we
believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award.
Petitioner's claim for P1,000.00 as atttorney's fees is in fact even more
modest. 19

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 24 October

1980, as well as the decision of the then Court of First Instance of La
Union dated 4 December 1975 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.Respondent is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioner Reynalda
Gatchalian the following sums: 1) P15,000.00 as actual or compensatory
damages to cover the cost of plastic surgery for the removal of the scar
on petitioner's forehead; 2) P30,000.00 as moral damages; and 3)
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, the aggregate amount to bear interest at
the legal rate of 6% per annum counting from the promulgation of this
decision until full payment thereof. Costs against private respondent.
 Republic of the Philippines engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for
SUPREME COURT Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This
Manila time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the
elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of
EN BANC Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.

G.R. No. L-19671           November 29, 1965 Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement
did not, however, materialize because when Vicente went back to her
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended
vs. nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees. home where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto
and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the
hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father
Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an
REYES, J.B.L., J.: invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of
authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place,
Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid,
claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly
and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous
the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena, 1 all surnamed relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta
"Escaño," respectively.2 translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new
marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following: Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while
Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh.
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing
of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second year as her previous letters when their love was aflame.
student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-
to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and
"sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She
32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished was not prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh.
stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, "1-Escaño"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As
Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño").
marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the
registered with the local civil register. scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for
her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was
that the couple were deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the
their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital hearing (Exh. "B-4").
future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they
started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a
marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the passport, indicating in her application that she was single, that her
purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she 2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the
intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for damages;.
she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified
complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial 3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the
District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on damages to the defendant parents on their counterclaims; and.
the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21
October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in 4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by
open court by the said tribunal. the plaintiff.

In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and
Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each
September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the
(Exh. "D"-2). record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and
otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence
Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly
begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958. authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.

But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May priest and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil
1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena law, not only because of the separation of Church and State but also
Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage
Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and law in force at the time) expressly provided that —
against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan
Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid the legal capacity of the contracting parties and consent.
divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present (Emphasis supplied)
husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in
any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal
damages.
requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil
effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the provided the following:
plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion
of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No
Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against
marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one
the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted
or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was
directly to this Court.
performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that
the person who solemnized the marriage was actually
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following: empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.

1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of
Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages and in dismissing the their marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved
complaint;. (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442,
448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a
authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a
Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view
Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the
annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that following:
her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage those which have for their object public order, policy and good
she was under the undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in
argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's a foreign country.
consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not
render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign
remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous
done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those
Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution. members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn
abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor
Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez
under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that should have appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the
the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil
Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court
decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary
expressly provided: consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and
second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely
Philippines, even though living abroad. duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband
constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither
divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging
term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim,
to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell
adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband"
divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant
IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of
prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
subpar. 1).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after
an invalid divorce are in accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of
this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr.
recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the
effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her
absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor
prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be
1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own
these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta,"
interest. Said this Court in that case: Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to
the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness"
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and
results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and
celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not
and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand,
and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the
significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event,
estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be
inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon
natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no
excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to
Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born of defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to
adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied) proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or
induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an
from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent
involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition her money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they
that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not
an action for legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of the concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so
declaring, the trial court committed error. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives,
aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she
status of a person (whether divorced or not) would depend on the was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be
territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with
the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives,
Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667: which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the
contrary is proved.
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands
are well known to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law
the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest himself in
if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a
laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72) stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction
between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in
 regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr.
alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the court below, we opine that
as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have
her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same
justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise
acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in
marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in
marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of
interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court,
welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining
of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or Summing up, the Court rules:
misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet
or unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable (1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed
for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled
faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage
and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to
away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been
applied in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a
equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son.
person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal
separation conformably to Philippine law;
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial
or social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one
to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and
consort entitles the other to recover damages;
anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have
been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in
the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not (4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one
established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen. consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy
motives on their part.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor
Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in
damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of
was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is
evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the (2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-
marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys'
public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry fees;
under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of
the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather (3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto
than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000
opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
damages and attorney's fees.
Neither party to recover costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal,

Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

13. Koh vs. ca (70 scra 298)

 Republic of the Philippines B of Amended Petition) On May 8, 1974, petitioner filed a
SUPREME COURT Manifestation before the lower court apprising it that the
Manila copy of the Motion To Dismiss sent to private respondent
(counsel for private respondent did not specify any
FIRST DIVISION address in the Complaint other than his alleged address
in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte) was returned unserved by
G.R. No. L-40428 December 17, 1975 the Bureau of Post for the reason that he was unknown in
the said address. (San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte) Annexes "C"
and "D" of Amended Petition.
FRANCISCO T. KOH, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., District On May 28, 1974, petitioner's counsel received a Notice
Judge, Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Branch I, and JOSE P. from the lower court setting the hearing of the Motion To
COLOMA, respondents. Dismiss for June 4, 1974. In response to this notice,
petitioner on May 31, 1974 filed a Manifestation informing
the lower court that he, was submitting the motion without
Koh Law Offices for petitioner.
further arguments. Three (3) days before the scheduled
hearing of the Motion to Dismiss, specifically on June 11,
Ferdinand A. Valentin for respondents. 1974, counsel for petitioner received a copy of private
respondents' opposition to his Motion To Dismiss. Finding
  that the private respondents pleading required comment,
on June 18, 1974, petitioner herein filed a Reply thereto
ESGUERRA, J.: (Annex G of Amended Petition).

Petition for certiorari with writ of preliminary injunction to review and On July 9, 1974, petitioner, thru counsel, received a copy
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals (Eighth Division) in CA-G.R. of the Order of the lower court denying the Motion To
No. SP-03322, entitled "Francisco T. Koh, petitioner vs. Jose P. Coloma Dismiss (Annex A of Amended Petition. However from the
and Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, Jr., Judge of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, registry return card of the corresponding pleadings, it was
Branch I, respondents". The appellate Court found "no grave abuse of apparent that the Order denying our Motion To Dismiss
discretion on the part of the respondent judge in not dismissing the dated June 25, 1974 of the lower court aforementioned
complaint on the ground of improper venue"; dismissed the petition for did not consider the facts and exhibits reflected in
injunction and lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it previously issued petitioner's Reply To Opposition To Motion To Dismiss
against the respondents. inasmuch as the same was received by the lower court on
June 27, 1974 (2 days later) after the Order had been
The undisputed facts contained in petitioner's brief as adopted in issued (the petitionees pleadings in the said case were all
respondents' brief are: filed with the court thru registered mail special delivery
due to the distance involved). For this reason, and within
On February 21, 1974, private respondent (Jose Coloma) the period authorized by law, on July 11, 1974 petitioner
filed a Complaint for damages against the herein filed a Motion For Reconsideration of the said Order
petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, reiterating therein the matter stated in his Reply to
Branch I, the same being docketed as Civil Case No. Opposition which was not considered by the lower court
5011-1 (Annex A of Amended Petition). On April 8, 1974, (Annex I of Amended Petition). This Motion for
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the said Complaint on Reconsideration was opposed by private respondent.
the grounds that the same fails to state a sufficient cause
of action and that venue has been improperly laid. (Annex
 In an Order dated July 19, 1974, the lower court issued Respondent Appellate Court predicted its decision on the finding that
an Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by despite the petitioner's receipt of a copy of the opposition to the
the petitioner. petitioner's motion to dismiss filed by private respondent Coloma in the
trial court, petitioner failed to appear during the healing of his notion to
From the Orders of the lower court dated June 25, 1974 dismiss the complaint on June 14, 1974; that "the parties were given the
and July 19, 1974, the petitioner herein instituted opportunity to adduce proofs and advance arguments to support their
certiorari proceedings with preliminary injunction before respective sides and on the basis of whatever were adduced during the
the Court of Appeal the same being docketed as CA-G.R. hearing, it rendered a ruling in the exercise of its jurisdiction; "that" the
No. L-03322. For failure of the petitioner to attach thereto lower court in its ruling cited the evidence it relied upon and doctrines
certified true copies of the Orders appealed from by which supported and justified its findings and conclusions;" that
reason of their unavailability, the Court of Appeals "considering that there is no showing of whimsical and capricious
dismissed the said petition. However, on September 5, exercise of discretion, it could be said that if ever there was an error
1974, petitioner herein filed a Motion for Reconsideration committed by the respondent judge, it was an error of judgment in the
of the resolution of the Court of Appeals and on exercise of his discretion which is correctable by appeal;" and that it
September 24, 1974, the said Motion was favorably acted concurred with the lower court's order denying the motion to dismiss
upon and the petition was given due course. On October which is anchored on the argument that the question of residence of a
9, 1974, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary person is one of intent. In the instant case, the trial Court concluded that
injunction in the said case enjoining the Court of First San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, is the residencia of plaintiff as contemplated in
Instance of Ilocos Norte from further proceeding thereon. paragraph (b) Section 2 of Rule 4.

After the issues on the peticion were joined by the filing of Under ordinary circumstances the foregoing reasoning and findings of the
the ANSWER for the respondents dated October 15, trial court and the respondent Appellate Court could be considered highly
1974, the case was set for oral arguments after which the tenable and justifiably defensible, but We simply cannot ignore
parties were required to submit, simultaneously, their petitioner's allegation in his motion to dismiss filed in the trial court that
respective memoranda. Only petitioner herein filed his "this clearly is a nuisance action brought before the Honorable Court to
Memorandum in support of his petition. Private require the defendant (petitioner) to travel and appear in Laoag, Ilocos
respondents did not submit their memorandum. Norte" as well as the background of the present case and compels Us to
delve deeper into the possible motives of private respondent in choosing
In a resolution dated March 19, 1975, the Court of as situs for his claim for damages against petitioner the rather relatively
Appeals dismiss the petition for certiorari and dissolved far Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.
the writ of preliminary injunction.
It is clear that Civil Case No. 5011 (for Damages) (Annex "A" to this
Hence this petition for review and reversal of said resolution of March 19, Petition) filed by private respondent Coloma in the Court of First Instance
1975. of Ilocos Norte, wherein Coloma is asking for damages to the tune of
P173,000.00 from petitioner for alleged "malicious, baseless, and
unfounded criminal complaint" filed by petitioner against Coloma, arose
The only issue raised before Us is whether or not respondent Appellate
from the following alleged incidents, to wit:
Court erred and thus committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner before it; in holding that private
respondent Jose P. Coloma is a resident of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, That sometime on May 21, 1970, the defendant
and thereby holding that venue of the action before the Court of First (petitioner) Francisco T. Koh filed before the Municipal
Instance of Ilocos Norte was proper, and in finding that the complaint of Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal, a complaint of Forcible
private respondent Coloma in the trial court recites a sufficient cause of Entry and Detainer against the plaintiff (private
action. respondent Coloma) for the possession of a house and lot
located at 480, Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong, Rizal, on Private respondent Coloma convinced the trial court, although he
which plaintiff (Coloma) and his family were all residing, admitted that he is presently residing at No. 57 K-6th Street, Kamias,
Quezon City, that he could be considered a legal resident domiciled at
That to avert the ejectment of plaintiff (Coloma) and his San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, because he was born and he grew up there;
family from the aforecited house, plaintiff (Coloma) and that his parents and his brothers and sisters still live there; that their
defendant (petitioner) entered into a compromise ancestral home and lands are situated there; that he studied in Ilocos
settlement in court whereby plaintiff (Coloma) will pay to Norte up to his graduation in the Ilocos Norte High School; that if ever he
defendant (petitioner) the total amount of P3,125.00, came to Manila, it was for the purpose of pursuing a college carrer; that
he goes home time and again to oversee their properties' harvests as he
That to insure the payment of the aforecited obligation is the oldest; that if he is staying in Quezon City now, it is because his
plaintiff (Coloma) issued to defendant (petitioner) a Manila wife is a government employee as staff nurse in the Philippine General
Banking Corporation check No. 17010812 post-dated Hospital; and after her retirement, he and his family intends to return to
February 27, 1971; his hometown of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and establish his permanent
home there.
That in post-dating the aforecited check, plaintiff (Coloma)
explicitly explained to defendant (petitioner) that there is On the other hand, petitioner contends that on May 8, 1974, he filed a
not sufficient funds at the time in the Bank to cover the Manifestation before the lower court apprising it that the copy of the
amount the necessity to post- date it with the expectation motion to dismiss was sent to private respondent Coloma (counsel for
that Plaintiff (Coloma) will deposit the necessary amount Coloma did not specify any address in the complaint) in his alleged
on or before the due date; address of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, but the same was returned
unserved by the Bureau of Posts for the reason that he (Coloma) was
unknown in the said address of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Annex "C" and
That for certain beyond the control of plaintiff (Coloma),
"D" of Amended Petition); that in pleadings under oath filed in several
he failed to deposit the required amount on the date due,
judicial proceedings involving petitioner and private respondent, the latter
so that defendant (petitioner) Francisco T. Koh forcibly
asserted his actual and present residence as either 486 Barangka Drive,
the plaintiff and his family from their aforecited residence
Mandaluyong, Rizal or No. 57, K-6th Kamias, Quezon City, Rizal, to wit:
the following day, February 28, 1971;
1. Jose P. Coloma vs. Francisco T. Koh, Administrative
That defendant (petitioner), still not contented in having
Case No. 1060, Supreme Court;
successfully evicted plaintiff (Coloma) mo his family from
their residence, defendant (petitioner) filed a criminal
complaint against the plaintiff (Coloma) before the Fiscal's 2. Jose P. Coloma vs. Francisco T. Koh, Civil Case No.
Office at Pasig, Rizal, over the Manila Banking 14067, C.F.I. Rizal, Branch XI;
Corporation check in question, which complaint was later
filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal; 3. Jose P. Coloma, et al. vs. Francisco T. Koh, Civil Case
No. 15450, C.F.I. Rizal, Branch VI;
That defendant personally applied and actively
participated in the criminal case as a private prosecutor in 4. Jose P. Coloma, et al. vs. Hon. Cesar C. Cruz, et al.,
collaboration with the prosecuting fiscal; C.F.I. Rizal, Civil Case No. 14687;

That the Court of First Instance of Rizal, upon motion of 5. Jose P. Coloma, et al., vs. Hon. Presiding Justice
plaintiff (Coloma) dismissed said criminal complaint in its Salvador V. Esguerra, et al., Supreme Court, G.R. No. L-
order dated Sept. 26, 1972. 35945;
 6. Jose P. Coloma vs. Hon. Cesar C. Cruz, et al., C.F.I. There is a difference between domicile and residence.
Rizal, Civil Case No. 14140; Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; domicile, denotes a fixed
7. Jose P. Coloma, et al. vs Hon. V.M. Ruiz, et al., C.A.- permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
G.R. No. SP-00329; in ten petition of returning. A man may have a residence
in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
8. Francisco T. Koh vs. Hon. Guardson Lood, et al., C.A.- domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
G.R. No. intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
00785-R; but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any
time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His
place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is
9. Jose P. Coloma vs. Hon. Juan Enriquez, et al., G.R.
not by any means, necessarily so since no length of
No. L-36425;
residence without intention of remaining will constitute
domicile. (Emphasis supplied)
that both private respondent Coloma and his wife Crisanta A. Coloma are
registered voters in the Greater Manila Area, it appearing in Jose P.
We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of
Coloma's Voter's I.D. No. A- 4941010 and Mrs. Coloma's Voter's I.D. No.
Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words
A-4941009 that they are residents of No. 486 Barangka Drive,
"resides or may be found," and not "is domiciled," thus:
Mandaluyong, Rizal; that the complaint filed against petitioner for
damages in the C. F. 1. of Ilocos Norte, was prepared in Manila, signed
by a Manila lawyer, verified in Manila by private respondent who showed Sec. 2(b) Personal actions — All other actions may be
his Residence Certificate issued in Manila (R.C.A-324643, issued on commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the
March 8, 1973, in Manila); that the filing of the complaint for damages defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff
before the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte was "purely for the purpose of or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
harrassment and that venue of the action was improperly laid". plaintiff. (Emphasis supplied)

It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully
Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions convinced that private respondent Coloma's protestations of domicile in
are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to the San Nicolas, Ilocos, Norte, based on his manifested intention to return
parties litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to there after the retirement of his wife from government service to justify his
them of the courts of justice. It is likewise undeniable that the term bringing of an action for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos
domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term Norte, is entirely of no moment since what is of paramount importance is
residence, for it is a established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile where he actually resided or where he may be found at the time he
refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while brought the action, to comply substantially with the requirements of Sec.
residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact 2 (b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on venue of personal actions. The
this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the admission of private respondent Coloma that when he brought the action
Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, he was
cases involving stateless persons. "residing at No. 57 K-6th Street, Kamias, Quezon City" is to Our mind
absolutely fatal to all his contentions of good faith in bringing that action
in a distant place and at the same time quite revealing of his motive for
This Court held in the case of Uytengsu vs. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781,
doing so, when We take into consideration the basis of the action for
October, 1954, reversing its previous stand in Larena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil.
damages against petitioner which is the criminal prosecution for estafa
36 and Nuval v. Guray 52 Phil. 645, that —
against private respondent Coloma arising from a bank check he used to
pay petitioner and was dishonored for lack of funds; respondent Coloma's
proven acts in having the civil complaint for damages prepared in Manila
by a Manila lawyer, verified in Manila and filed in Ilocos Norte C.F.I. and of refunding the amount written in the dishonored check to the petitioner.
the numerous cases between petitioner and respondent Coloma in this The logical conclusion that could be derived from all the foregoing is that
Court, the Court of Appeals and the Rizal Courts of First Instance the criminal complaint filed against respondent Coloma for Estafa by the
wherein respondent Coloma swore under oath that he is a resident of Fiscal of Rizal is by no means "malicious", "baseless", and "unfounded"
486 Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong, Rizal and No. 57, K-6th Kamuning, and, therefore, the action for damages is without any basis and that
Quezon City. respondent Coloma's civil complaint for damages filed in the C.F.I. of
Ilocos Norte was without sufficient cause of action.
An examination of the cause of action contained in the civil complaint for
damages filed by respondent Coloma against petitioner in Civil Case No. We observe in the examination of the record of this case, that private
5011 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte raises lingering doubts respondent Coloma can go to the extent of resorting to other means
in Our mind as to the existence of a valid and justified cause of action, for while this case pending in the respondent Court of Appeals to find a
it prays for P173,000.00 worth of alleged damages (actual, moral solution to another aspect of the raging controversy between petitioner
exemplary and attorney's fees) based on an alleged "malicious, baseless, and private respondent. As a result of respondent Coloma's filing of a
and unfounded complaint" filed by petitioner against respondent Coloma, complaint for damages (Civil Case No. 5011) against petitioner in the
when it could be seen from the civil complaint itself that the basis of the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, wherein respondent Coloma alleged that "he is a
action for damages is the criminal prosecution of respondent Coloma for resident of the Municipality of San Nicolas, Province of Ilocos Norte,"
the crime of estafa in the C.F.I. of Rizal because of the complaint of Petitioner filed in the Fiscal's Office of Manila a case of perjury against
petitioner arising from the post-dated check admittedly issued by respondent Coloma and the Investigating Fiscal in his resolution believed
respondent Coloma which was dishonored for lack of funds. It can readily in the existence of a prima facie case against him. Respondent Coloma
be seen from the record that it was the Fiscal of Rizal who filed the was able to get a directive from the Secretary of Justice, dated Sept. 3,
criminal complaint for estafa against respondent Coloma after preliminary 1974, reversing the findings of the Investigating Fiscal and instructing the
investigation when the fiscal was convinced of the existence of a prima City Fiscal of Manila to have the case "dismissed, immediately upon
facie case against Coloma. While it is true that petitioner was the receipt hereof". At any rate, We are convinced that the misunderstanding
offended party because the dishonored check was issued in his favor and between petitioner and private respondent Coloma has gone to such an
that he acted as private prosecutor when the case was filed in the C.F.I. extent that it would not be surprising for respondent Coloma to be
of Rizal because there was no separate civil action filed against Coloma motivated by vengeance when he filed his action for damages against the
arising from the same cause of alleged estafa, it certainly cannot be said petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte in order to get even with and
that as offended party in the criminal case and by initiating the same impose all kinds of inconveniences on the petitioner. Otherwise,' it would
criminal case against respondent Coloma he (petitioner) was the one have been easier and very much more convenient for both parties if the
who filed the "malicious, baseless and unfounded complaint" against civil action for damages against petitioner had been filed either in the
private respondent Coloma. To establish the filing of the criminal case C.F.I. of Quezon City or Pasig, Rizal, because both petitioner and private
against Coloma by the Fiscal of Rizal as "malicious" is highly respondent are admittedly residing within the greater Manila area.
problematical because the Fiscal of Rizal conducted a preliminary
investigation on the same and if he in the exercise of his quasi-judicial WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Appellate Court is hereby
duty believed there was a prima facie case against respondent Coloma reversed; the Orders dated June 25, 1974, and July 19, 1974, in Civil
that made him file the case, his act cannot be called "malicious". We note Case No. 5011-1 of the Court of the First Instance of Ilocos Norte are set
here that the petitioner was not the one who filed the criminal case aside; the complaint in the aforementioned case is hereby dismissed for
against the respondent Coloma, the former being merely the offended improper venue and lack of sufficient cause of action, and the respondent
party. The criminal complaint against respondent Coloma could hardly be judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte or his successor in
termed "baseless and unfounded" because he himself admitted that he office is restrained from further proceeding with the hearing of said case.
issued a post-dated check that was dishonored. If the criminal complaint
against him was dismiss by the C.F.I. of Rizal upon his own motion and With costs against private respondent Coloma.
perchance by some reason of technicality or by reason of reasonable
doubt, respondent Coloma is by no means absolved from the civil liability
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines 7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
SUPREME COURT CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen
Manila years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was
baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has
EN BANC she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all
information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao,
G.R. No. L-16749             January 31, 1963 Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be
deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
xxx     xxx     xxx
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant. 12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved
daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs.
Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger
LABRADOR, J.:
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income
from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate,
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and
Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death
said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever,
accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy during her lifetime: ....
Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen
Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in
the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case
his final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only
of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs.
P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the
Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will
estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila
on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen
Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R.
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the
Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now
E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the
residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b)
California, U.S.A.
that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to
Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was
descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased
CHRISTENSEN DANEY. Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the
entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the
xxx     xxx     xxx forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California,
Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile IV
of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged
that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE
natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS
from the time of her birth. CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the V
United States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the
successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO
has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable
(In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the
Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on
United States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But
Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed
there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in
various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this
the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor
appeal.
himself in appellee's brief:
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of
record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born
I on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first
arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN
THE INHERITANCE. In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United
States and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913,
II during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in
Sacramento, California.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR
FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the
ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW. for the United States and came back here the following year,
1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his
III own country, and came back to the Philippines the following year,
1939.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES. 1äwphï1.ñët
 Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with
Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II. two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides
Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which
returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might
Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be
"AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his
and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.) settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand,
not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise
California shortly after the making of his last will and testament of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply
(now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while
in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3) intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a
term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not
Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich,
migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he p. 29)
came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and
only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is
appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as
state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the follows:
Philippines and make home in the State of California.
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning the law of the country where it is situated.
from mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode.
Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29) respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento, California from whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter nature of the property and regardless of the country where said
was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the property may be found.
deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California
by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination
was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to of the meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion
is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary
his Conflict of Laws. provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own
private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted
mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law.
as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the been criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi
disposition of personal property? The decision of the court below, would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus
sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no
Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form compelling logical reason why the original reference should be
and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true
Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those
Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows: who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis
circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule
and is governed by the law of his domicile. of reference.

The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the
not denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of
there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the
decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in
correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the
Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If
thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above,
Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have
which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the
that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the be for the woman. The same result would happen, though the
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if
the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines. both courts accepted the renvoi.

The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances:
thus: where the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a
decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in
Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further
decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to
foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court;
Conflict of Laws rules?" and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be
valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court
chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France,
rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England, and
once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the France. The question arises as to how this property is to be
rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should distributed among X's next of kin.
not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have
resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court.
There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to
movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has
domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am.
natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to Jur. 296)
French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in
French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons
examination of French law, however, would show that if a French for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in
court were called upon to determine how this property should be the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent
distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the parts of the article are quoted herein below:
deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of
distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the
has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the
French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules
French court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of
on the assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it a country' means the whole of its law.
accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter
course, thus applying its own law.
xxx     xxx     xxx
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of
conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the
International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the
conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again
following theses:
to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The
German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'"
(Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.) (1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the
application of foreign laws.
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be
resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question (2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the
may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in court shall respect:
such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which,
while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, (a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the
has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal
essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be
designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law
"Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an of the place where the act in question occurred.
affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of
the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result (b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law,
in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily
law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.) competent, which agree in attributing the determination of
a question to the same system of law.
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been
advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of xxx     xxx     xxx
the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into
account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the
as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in
question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first
 inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws
property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled
he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the
accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and
he must accept this reference back to his own law. enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we
must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of
rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above
law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-
enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State,
but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the
California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the
law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the
domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should
person of the owner. govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various
authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e.,
states, and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to
property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California,
of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent
will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in
questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the
domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back
validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. and forth between the two states, between the country of which the
Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine
borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the
recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the
property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for
intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
The New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of
that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the parent recognizing them.
the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It
had its origin in that international comity which was one of the first The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs.
fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock
and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government,
boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly
more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in
pp. 442-443.) each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States
but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar
pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a Issue:
citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his
will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be                 Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the
Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..  

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the Held:
case returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be
made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed,
                The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights
with costs against appellees.
to Helen Christensen Garcia said in effect that there be two rules in
California on the matter.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
1.       The conflict rule which should apply to Californian’s outside
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
the California, and
DIGEST OF # 14
2.       The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles
in califronia.
Facts:
The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California
                Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to Civil code States that “if there is no law to the contrary in the place where
California where he resided and consequently was considered a personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the decree of its
California Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913. He came to the owner and is governed by the law of the domicile.”
Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death.
However, during the entire period of his residence in this country, he had Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of his
always considered himself as a citizen of California. domicile, the Philippines is ought to be followed.

                In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir remanded to the lower court with instructions that partition be
but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia made as that of the Philippine law provides.
who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared as
an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims that
under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the
matter is returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine law is 15. Board of commissioner vs. dela rosa (197 scra 858)
ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased in view
of successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On
the other hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear
under Art, 16 (2) of the  Mew Civil Code, the national of the deceased
must apply, our courts must apply internal law of California on the matter.
Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a
testator should dispose any property possessed by him in absolute
dominion.

 
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila BIDIN, J.:

EN BANC This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Solicitor General
seeking 1) to set aside the Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order
G.R. Nos. 95122-23             May 31, 1991 dated September 7, 1990, issued by respondent Judge de la Rosa in
Civil Case No. 90-54214 which denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION restrained petitioners from commencing or continuing with any of the
AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, proceedings which would lead to the deportation of respondent William
COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE Gatchalian, docketed as D.C. No. 90-523, as well as the Order of
COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE respondent Judge Capulong dated September 6, 1990 in Civil Case No.
COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD 3431-V-90 which likewise enjoined petitioners from proceeding with the
OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and deportation charges against respondent Gatchalian, and 2) to prohibit
BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners, respondent judges from further acting in the aforesaid civil cases.
vs.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Branch On October 23, 1990, respondent Gatchalian filed his Comment with
29, WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, respondents. Counter-Petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 96512-13, alleging lack of
jurisdiction on the part of respondent Board of Commissioners, et al.,
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION over his person with prayer that he be declared a Filipino citizen, or in the
AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, alternative, to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE
COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE On December 13, 1990, petitioners filed their comment to respondent
COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD Gatchalian's counter-petition. The Court considers the comment filed by
OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and respondent Gatchalian as answer to the petition and petitioners'
BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners, comment as answer to the counter-petition and gives due course to the
vs. petitions.
HON. TERESITA DIZON CAPULONG, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch
172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DEE HUA T. GATCHALIAN, There is no dispute as to the following facts:
SHERWING T. GATCHALIAN, KENNETH T. GATCHALIAN, REXLON
T. GATCHALIAN, and WESLIE T. GATCHALIAN, respondents. On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William
Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native
G.R. Nos. 95612-13             May 31, 1991 born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural mother,
Marciana Gatchalian (Annex "1", counter-petition). Before the Citizenship
WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner, Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has five (5)
vs. children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose Gatchalian, Gloria
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian and Benjamin
AND DEPORTATION), et al., respondents. Gatchalian (Annex "2", counter-petition).

The Solicitor General for petitioners. On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor,
edesma, Saludo & Associates for respondent William Gatchalian. arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco, and
Cervo and Tanay Law Office for respondent T.D. Capulong, D.H.T. Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. They had with them Certificates of
Gatchalian, et al. Registration and Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong
based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the then Secretary of decision of the then Board of Commissioners and the recall of the
Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino warrants of arrest issued therein (Annex "5", counter-petition).
citizens. Gloria and Francisco are the daughter and son, respectively, of
Santiago Gatchalian; while William and Johnson are the sons of On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order
Francisco. reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board of Special Inquiry
thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled
After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision the warrant of arrest issued against him (Annex "6", counter-petition).
dated July 6, 1961, admitting William Gatchalian and his companions as
Filipino citizens (Annex "C", petition). As a consequence thereof, William On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of
Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificate No. 16135 by the Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice recommending that
immigration authorities on August 16, 1961 (Annex "D", petition). respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by the
warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation of Sec.
On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum 37 (a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45 (c), and (d) and (e) of
No. 9 setting aside all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, also known as the
Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of Immigration Act of 1940 (Annex "G", petition).
decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The same memorandum
directed the Board of Commissioners to review all cases where entry was On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the
allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner of Immigration for
those cases was that of William and others. investigation and immediate action (Annex "20", counter-petition).

On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the
proprio of the proceedings had in the Board of Special Inquiry, reversed Commission of Immigration and Deportation * issued a mission order
the decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of, among others, commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian (Annex "18",
respondent Gatchalian (Annex "E", petition). A warrant of exclusion also counter-petition). The latter appeared before Commissioner Domingo on
dated July 6, 1962 was issued alleging that "the decision of the Board of August 20, 1990 and was released on the same day upon posting
Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now become final and P200,000.00 cash bond.
executory (Annex "F", petition).
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and
The actual date of rendition of said decision by the Board of prohibition with injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br.
Commissioners (whether on July 6, 1962 or July 20, 1962) became the 29, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa, docketed as Civil Case No.
subject of controversy in the 1967 case of Arocha vs. Vivo (21 SCRA 90-54214.
532) wherein this Court sustained the validity of the decision of the new
Board of Commissioners having been promulgated on July 6, 1962, or On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case
within the reglementary period for review. No. 90-54214 alleging that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the
Board of Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry.
Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered Nonetheless, respondent judge dela Rosa issued the assailed order
by the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with dated September 7, 1990, denying the motion to dismiss.
the Board of Special Inquiry where the deportion case against them was
assigned. Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, respondent Gatchalian's wife and
minor children filed before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry recommended to the Manila, Br. 172, presided by respondent judge Capulong Civil Case No.
then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda the reversal of the July 6, 1962 3431-V-90 for injunction with writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint
alleged, among others, that petitioners acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in the institution of deportation proceedings against William. issue "writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
On the same day, respondent Capulong issued the questioned temporary corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their
restraining order restraining petitioners from continuing with the respective regions, . . ." Thus, the RTCs are vested with the power to
deportation proceedings against William Gatchalian. determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
The petition is anchored on the following propositions: 1) respondent
judges have no jurisdiction over petitioners (Board of Commissioners, et It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of
al.,) and the subject matter of the case, appellate jurisdiction being Appeals is vested with —
vested by BP 129 with the Court of Appeals; 2) assuming respondent
judges have jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of discretion in (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
preempting petitioners in the exercise of the authority and jurisdiction to decisions, resolutions, order, or awards of Regional Trial Courts
hear and determine the deportation case against respondent Gatchalian, and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, board or
and in the process determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent judge commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction
dela Rosa gravely abused his discretion in ruling that the issues raised in of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
the deportation proceedings are beyond the competence and jurisdiction provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third
of petitioners, thereby disregarding the cases of Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
vs. Arca (supra), which put finality to the July 6, 1962 decision of the Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Board of Commissioners that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen;
and 4) respondent judge Capulong should have dismissed Civil Case No. It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of
3431-V-90 for forum-shopping. the Court of Appeals extends to all quasi-judicial agencies. The quasi-
judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the Court of
In his counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges among others that: 1) Appeals are those which under the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their
assuming that the evidence on record is not sufficient to declare him a enabling acts, are specifically appealable to the Court of Appeals
Filipino citizen, petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of Appeals, 171
deportation case until the courts shall have finally resolved the question SCRA 348 [1989]; Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848
of his citizenship; 2) petitioners can no longer judiciously and fairly [1988]). Thus, under Republic Act No. 5434, it is specifically provided that
resolve the question of respondent's citizenship in the deportation case the decisions of the Land Registration Commission (LRC), the Social
because of their bias, pre-judgment and prejudice against him; and 3) the Security Commission (SSC), Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Patent
ground for which he is sought to be deported has already prescribed. Office and the Agricultural Invention Board are appealable to the Court of
Appeals.
For purposes of uniformity, the parties herein will be referred to in the
order the petitions were filed. In the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (supra), this Court
clarified the matter when We ruled:
Petitioners argue that under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is the Court of
Appeals which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983:
judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies, boards or commissions,
such as the Board of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry. . . . The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now
Court of Appeals) from quasi-judicial bodies shall
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioners are not quasi- continue to be governed by the provisions of Republic Act
judicial agencies and are not in equal rank with Regional Trial Courts. No. 5434 insofar as the same is not inconsistent with the
provisions of B.P. Blg. 129.
Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts
have concurrent jurisdiction with this Court and the Court of Appeals to The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows:
 Sec. 1. Appeals from specified agencies.— Any provision There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the National Labor Relations
of existing law or Rules of Court to the contrary Commissions, whose decisions are directly appealable to this Court. It is
notwithstanding, parties aggrieved by a final ruling, only when a specific law, as Republic Act No. 5434, provides appeal from
award, order, or decision, or judgment of the Court of certain bodies or commissions to the Court of Appeals as the Land
Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of Labor under Section Registration Commission (LRC), Securities and Exchange Commission
7 of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred and two, also (SEC) and others, that the said commissions or boards may be
known as the "Minimum Wage Law"; the Department of considered co-equal with the RTCs in terms of rank, stature and are
Labor under Section 23 of Republic Act Numbered Eight logically beyond the control of the latter.
hundred seventy-five, also known as the "Industrial Peace
Act"; the Land Registration Commission; the Social However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among those quasi-
Security Commission; the Civil Aeronautics Board; the judicial agencies specified by law whose decisions, orders, and
Patent Office and the Agricultural Inventions Board, may resolutions are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. In fact, its
appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals, within the decisions are subject to judicial review in accordance with Sec. 25,
period and in the manner herein provided, whether the Chapter 4, Book VII of the 1987 Administrative Code, which provides as
appeal involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact follows:
and law, or questions of law, or all three kinds of
questions. From final judgments or decisions of the Court Sec. 25. Judicial Review.—(1) Agency decisions shall be subject
of Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to judicial review in accordance with this chapter and applicable
to the Supreme Court as provided under Rule 45 of the laws.
Rules of Court.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of
various special courts, jurisdiction over quasi-judicial bodies has
(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified in
to be, consequently, determined by the corresponding
the statute or, in the absence thereof, in any court of competent
amendatory statutes. Under the Labor Code, decisions and
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the
awards of the National Labor Relations Commission are final and
Rules of Court.
executory, but, nevertheless, reviewable by this Court through a
petition for certiorari and not by way of appeal.
Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is subsequent to B.P.
Blg. 129 and which thus modifies the latter, provides that the decision of
Under the Property Registration Decree, decision of the
an agency like the Bureau of Immigration should be subject to review by
Commission of Land Registration, en consulta, are appealable to
the court specified by the statute or in the absence thereof, it is subject to
the Court of Appeals.
review by any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the
provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.
The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are
likewise appealable to the Appellate Court, and so are decisions
B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same
of the Social Security Commission.
level or rank of the RTC except those specifically provided for under the
law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as
As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions the RTC, its decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed
of certain administrative bodies to the Court of Appeals, it means through a special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC (Sec. 21, (1) BP
that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in 129).
terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the
latter. (Emphasis supplied)
True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive
authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien,
and in the process, determine also their citizenship (Lao Gi vs. Court of records that respondent's claim of citizenship is substantial, as We shall
Appeals, 180 SCRA 756 [1989]). And a mere claim of citizenship cannot show later, judicial intervention should be allowed.
operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in
deportation proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531 In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take
[1954]). cognizance of the proceedings instituted by respondent Gatchalian would
nonetheless be the Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals in
However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits of an exception, view of Sec. 21 (1), BP 129, which confers upon the former jurisdiction
at least insofar as deportation proceedings are concerned. Thus, what if over actions for prohibition concurrently with the Court of Appeals and the
the claim to citizenship of the alleged deportee is satisfactory? Should the Supreme Court and in line with the pronouncements of this Court in Chua
deportation proceedings be allowed to continue or should the question of Hiong and Co cases.
citizenship be ventilated in a judicial proceeding? In Chua Hiong vs.
Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665 [1955]), this Court answered the Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial Court.
question in the affirmative, and We quote: But not in the case at bar.1âwphi1 Considering the voluminous pleadings
submitted by the parties and the evidence presented, We deem it proper
When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of to decide the controversy right at this instance. And this course of action
his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be is not without precedent for "it is a cherished rule of procedure for this
recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.
molestation from any official or authority, and if he is disturbed by No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial court
a deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable right to only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and from
resort to the courts for his protection, either by a writ of habeas there to this Court" (Marquez vs. Marquez, 73 Phil. 74; Keramic
corpus or of prohibition, on the legal ground that the Board lacks Industries, Inc. vs. Guerrero, 61 SCRA 265 [1974]) Alger Electric, Inc. vs.
jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and evidence thereof is satisfactory, Court of Appeals (135 SCRA 37 [1985]), citing Gayos vs. Gayos (67
there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation SCRA 146 [1975]).
proceedings to continue, granting him the remedy only after the
Board has finished its investigation of his undesirability. In Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 357
[1988]), We also stated:
. . . And if the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at all, it
must also be protected on time, to prevent undue harassment at Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of
the hands of ill-meaning or misinformed administrative officials. evidence is not necessary where the court is in a position to
Of what use is this much boasted right to peace and liberty if it resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many
can be availed of only after the Deportation Board has unjustly occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious
trampled upon it, besmirching the citizen's name before the bar of administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits
public opinion? (Emphasis supplied) instead of remanding them to the trial court for further
proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of Commissioners subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest
over deportation proceedings is, therefore, not without exception demands an early disposition of the case or where the trial court
(Calacday vs. Vivo, 33 SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA had already received all the evidence of the parties (Quisumbing
155 [1967]). Judicial intervention, however, should be granted only in vs. CA, 112 SCRA 703; Francisco, et al., vs. The City of Davao,
cases where the "claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are et al., supra; Republic vs. Security Credit & Acceptance Corp., et
reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In other words, al., 19 SCRA 58; Samal vs. CA, supra; Republic vs. Central
the remedy should be allowed only on sound discretion of a competent Surety & Insurance Co., 25 SCRA 641).
court in a proper proceeding (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra;
Co. vs. Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]). It appearing from the
Likewise in Tejones vs. Gironella (159 SCRA 100 [1988]), We said: Neither can it be argued that the Board of Commissioners' decision
(dated July 6, 1962) finding respondent's claim to Philippine citizenship
Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids not satisfactorily proved, constitute res judicata. For one thing, said
waste of time, effort and expense, both to the parties and the decision did not make any categorical statement that respondent
government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case (cf. Gatchalian is a Chinese. Secondly, the doctrine of res judicata does not
Fernandez vs. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 297). A marked characterstic apply to questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Commission on Elections
of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so (supra); citing Soria vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee
demand . . . the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 42 SCRA 561 [1971]; Sia Reyes vs.
(Li Siu Liat vs. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal vs. Deportation Board, 122 SCRA 478 [1983]).
CA, 99 Phil. 230 and US vs. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74.) (Beautifont,
Inc. vs. Court of appeals, et al., Jan. 29, 1988; See also Labo vs. In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971])
Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA 1 [1989]). and in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration (supra), this Court declared
that:
Respondent Gatchalian has adduced evidence not only before the
Regional Trial Court but also before Us in the form of public documents (e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or
attached to his pleadings. On the other hand, Special Prosecutor Renato indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
Mabolo in his Manifestation (dated September 6, 1990; Rollo, p. 298, corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as
counter-petition) before the Bureau of Immigration already stated that to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata,
there is no longer a need to adduce evidence in support of the hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion
deportation charges against respondent. In addition, petitioners invoke may demand.
that this Court's decision in Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra),
has already settled respondent's alienage. Hence, the need for a judicial An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs.
determination of respondent's citizenship specially so where the latter is Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz:
not seeking admission, but is already in the Philippines (for the past thirty
[30] years) and is being expelled (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a
supra). party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or by an
administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy,
According to petitioners, respondent's alienage has been conclusively after a full-blown hearing with the active participation of the
settled by this Court in the Arocha and Vivo cases, We disagree. It must Solicitor General or his authorized representative, and this finding
be noted that in said cases, the sole issue resolved therein was the or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the
actual date of rendition of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then board of decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such
Commissioners, i.e., whether the decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 party's citizenship in any other case or proceeding. But it is made
or on July 20, 1962 it appearing that the figure (date) "20" was erased clear that in no instance will a decision on the question of
and over it was superimposed the figure "6" thereby making the decision citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in
fall within the one-year reglementary period from July 6, 1961 within any other case or proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with
which the decision may be reviewed. This Court did not squarely pass the procedure herein stated.
upon any question of citizenship, much less that of respondent's who was
not a party in the aforesaid cases. The said cases originated from a Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of
petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on July 21, 1965 by Macario citizenship, the following must be present: 1) a person's citizenship must
Arocha in behalf of Pedro Gatchalian. Well settled is the rule that a be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a
person not party to a case cannot be bound by a decision rendered party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active
therein. part in the resolution thereof, and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed
by this Court.
Gauged by the foregoing, We find the pre-conditions set forth in Burca issuance of the warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of
inexistent in the Arocha and Vivo cases relied upon by petitioners. probable cause, surely, it cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only
Indeed, respondent William Gatchalian was not even a party in said judges can issue the same (Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution).
cases.
A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest (dated August 15, 1990;
Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the arrest of respondent Rollo, p. 183, counter-petition) issued by the Commissioner of
follows as a matter of consequence based on the warrant of exclusion Immigration, clearly indicates that the same was issued only for purposes
issued on July 6, 1962, coupled with the Arocha and Vivo cases (Rollo, of investigation of the suspects, William Gatchalian included. Paragraphs
pp. 33), the Court finds the same devoid of merit. 1 and 3 of the mission order directs the Intelligence Agents/Officers to:

Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise x x x           x x x          x x x

known as the Immigration Act of 1940, reads:
1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal
Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the Procedure, Rule 113, Sec. 5, for violation of the Immigration Act,
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer Sec. 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative Code;
designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant
of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the x x x           x x x          x x x
Board of Commissioner of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien. (Emphasis supplied) 3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately
conduct custodial interrogation, after warning the suspect that he
From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of has a right to remain silent and a right to counsel; . . .
implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are
concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of respondent was based,
arrest only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the ostensibly, on the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion has obviously no leg
existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. In to stand on. The mission order/warrant of arrest made no mention that
other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of the same was issued pursuant to a final order of deportation or warrant of
Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final exclusion.
order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is
But there is one more thing that militates against petitioners' cause. As
null and void for being unconstitutional (Ang Ngo Chiong vs. Galang, 67
records indicate, which petitioners conveniently omitted to state either in
SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo, 62 SCRA 363 [1975]; Vivo
their petition or comment to the counter-petition of respondent,
vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155; Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562; Qua Chee
respondent Gatchalian, along with others previously covered by the 1962
Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua To vs. Galang,
warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing before the Board of
10 SCRA 411; see also Santos vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 74
Special Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973.
SCRA 96 [1976]).
On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry, after giving due course
As We held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (supra), "(t)he
to the motion for re-hearing, submitted a memorandum to the then Acting
constitution does not distinguish warrants between a criminal case and
Commissioner Victor Nituda (Annex "5", counter-petition) recommending
administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having committed a
1 the reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of
crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by
Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961 decision of the then
a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative
Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and 2 the lifting of the warrants of arrest
nature deserve less guarantee?" It is not indispensable that the alleged
issued against applicants. The memorandum inferred that the "very basis
alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the
of the Board of Commissioners in reversing the decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry was due to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of illegitimate child of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian, the latter
Foreign Affairs, . . ., which was dispatched to the Philippine Consulate in being a Filipino; that he was born in Manila on July 25, 1905; and that he
Hong Kong authorizing the registration of applicants as P.I. citizens." The was issued Philippine Passport No. 28160 (PA-No. A91196) on
Board of Special Inquiry concluded that "(i)f at all, the cablegram only led November 18, 1960 by the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila. In his
to the issuance of their Certificate(s) of Identity which took the place of a affidavit of January 23, 1961 (Annex "5", counter-petition), Santiago
passport for their authorized travel to the Philippines. It being so, even if reiterated his claim of Philippine citizenship as a consequence of his
the applicants could have entered illegally, the mere fact that they are petition for cancellation of his alien registry which was granted on
citizens of the Philippines entitles them to remain in the country." February 18, 1960 in C.E.B. No. 3660-L; and that on July 20, 1960, he
was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino and was
On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Order issued Certificate No. 1-2123.
(Annex "6", counter-petition) which affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry
No. 1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting respondent Gatchalian and The dissenting opinions of my esteemed brethrens, Messrs. Justices F.P.
others as Filipino citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest and Feliciano and H.G. Davide, Jr., proposing to re-open the question of
revalidated their Identification Certificates. citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian at this stage of the case, where it is
not even put in issue, is quite much to late. As stated above, the records
The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last of the Bureau of Immigration show that as of July 20, 1960, Santiago
official act of the government on the basis of which respondent William Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino citizen. It is a final decision
Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the that forecloses a re-opening of the same 30 years later. Petitioners do
present. Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of not even question Santiago Gatchalian's Philippine citizenship. It is the
respondent William Gatchalian. citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian that is in issue and
addressed for determination of the Court in this case.
There should be no question that Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of
William Gatchalian, is a Filipino citizen. As a matter of fact, in the very Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the fact that
order of the BOC of July 6, 1962, which reversed the July 6, 1961 BSI respondent's arrest came twenty-eight (28) years after the alleged cause
order, it is an accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino. The of deportation arose. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that
opening paragraph of said order states: deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation
The claim to Filipino citizenship of abovenamed applicants is arises." In Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065 [1953]), We laid down
based on the citizenship of one Santiago Gatchalian whose the consequences of such inaction, thus:
Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration in an Order dated July 12, 1960. (Annex "37", There is however an important circumstance which places this
Comment with Counter-Petition). case beyond the reach of the resultant consequence of the
fraudulent act committed by the mother of the minor when she
Nonetheless, in said order it was found that the applicants therein have admitted that she gained entrance into the Philippines by making
not satisfactorily proven that they are the children and/or grandchildren of use of the name of a Chinese resident merchant other than that
Santiago Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian as a Filipino was of her lawful husband, and that is, that the mother can no longer
reiterated in Arocha and Arca (supra) where advertence is made to the be the subject of deportation proceedings for the simple reason
"applicants being the descendants of one Santiago Gatchalian, a that more than 5 years had elapsed from the date of her
Filipino." (at p. 539). admission. Note that the above irregularity was divulged by the
mother herself, who in a gesture of sincerity, made an
spontaneous admission before the immigration officials in the
In the sworn statement of Santiago Gatchalian before the Philippine
investigation conducted in connection with the landing of the
Consul in Hongkong in 1961 (Annex "1" to the Comment of petitioners to
minor on September 24, 1947, and not through any effort on the
Counter-Petition), he reiterated his status as a Philippine citizen being the
part of the immigration authorities. And considering this frank
 admission, plus the fact that the mother was found to be married than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and that no period of limitation is
to another Chinese resident merchant, now deceased, who applicable in deportations under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12.
owned a restaurant in the Philippines valued at P15,000 and
which gives a net profit of P500 a month, the immigration officials The Court disagrees. Under Sec. 39 of the Immigration Act, it is
then must have considered the irregularity not serious enough reiterated that such deportation proceedings should be instituted within
when, inspire of that finding, they decided to land said minor "as a five (5) years. Section 45 of the same Act provides penal sanctions for
properly documented preference quota immigrant" (Exhibit D). violations of the offenses therein enumerated with a fine of "not more
We cannot therefore but wonder why two years later the than P1,000.00 and imprisonment for not more than two (2) years and
immigration officials would reverse their attitude and would take deportation if he is an alien." Thus:
steps to institute deportation proceedings against the minor.
Penal Provisions
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we believe that
much as the attitude of the mother would be condemned for Sec. 45. Any individual who—
having made use of an improper means to gain entrance into the
Philippines and acquire permanent residence there, it is now too
(a) When applying for an immigration document personates
late, not to say unchristian, to deport the minor after having
another individual, or falsely appears in the name of deceased
allowed the mother to remain even illegally to the extent of
individual, or evades the immigration laws by appearing under an
validating her residence by inaction, thus allowing the period of
assumed name; fictitious name; or
prescription to set in and to elapse in her favor. To permit his
deportation at this late hour would be to condemn him to live
separately from his mother through no fault of his thereby leaving (b) Issues or otherwise disposes of an immigration document, to
him to a life of insecurity resulting from lack of support and any person not authorized by law to receive such document; or
protection of his family. This inaction or oversight on the part of
immigration officials has created an anomalous situation which, (c) Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration document, knowing
for reasons of equity, should be resolved in favor of the minor it to be false; or
herein involved. (Emphasis supplied)
(d) Being an alien, enters the Philippines without inspection and
In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation admission by the immigration officials, or obtains entry into the
against herein respondent arose in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest Philippines by wilful, false, or misleading representation or wilful
of respondent was issued by Commissioner Domingo only on August 15, concealment of a material fact; or
1990 — 28 long years after. It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has
already prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly enforced (e) Being an alien shall for any fraudulent purpose represent
by petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the himself to be a Philippine citizen in order to evade any
warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the requirement of the immigration laws; or
Identification certificate of respondent, among others, was revalidated on
March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner Nituda. (f) In any immigration matter shall knowingly make under oath
any false statement or representations; or
It is also proposed in the dissenting opinions of Messrs. Justices
Feliciano and Davide, Jr., that the BOC decision dated July 6, 1962 and (g) Being an alien, shall depart from the Philippines without first
the warrant of exclusion which was found to be valid in Arocha should be securing an immigration clearance certificates required by section
applicable to respondent William Gatchalian even if the latter was not a twenty-two of this Act; or
party to said case. They also opined that under Sec. 37 (b) of the
Immigration Act, the five (5) years limitation is applicable only where the
deportation is sought to be effected under clauses of Sec. 37 (b) other
 (h) Attempts or conspires with another to commit any of the the Civil Code, an action based on judgment must be brought within 10
foregoing acts, shall be guilty of an offense, and upon conviction years from the time the right of action accrues.
thereof, shall be fined not more than one thousand pesos, and
imprisoned for not more than two years, and deported if he is an In relation to Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the rule, therefore, is:
alien. (Emphasis supplied)
1. Deportation or exclusion proceedings should be initiated within five (5)
Such offenses punishable by correctional penalty prescribe in 10 years years after the cause of deportation or exclusion arises when effected
(Art. 90, Revised Penal Code); correctional penalties also prescribe in 10 under any other clauses other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and of
years (Art. 92, Revised Penal Code). paragraph (a) of Sec. 37 of the Immigration Act; and

It must be noted, however, that under Sec. 1, Act No. 3326 [1926], as 2. When deportation or exclusion is effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11
amended, (Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and and 12 of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37, the prescriptive period of the
Municipal Ordinances) "violations penalized by special acts shall, unless deportation or exclusion proceedings is eight (8) years.
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the
following rules: . . .c) after eight years for those punished by In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision
imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; . . ." was rendered on July 6, 1962 before they commenced deportation or
exclusion proceedings against respondent William Gatchalian in 1990.
Consequently, no prosecution and consequent deportation for violation of Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed. Neither
the offenses enumerated in the Immigration Act can be initiated beyond may an action to revive and/or enforce the decision dated July 6, 1962 be
the eight-year prescriptive period, the Immigration Act being a special instituted after ten (10) years (Art. 1144 [3], Civil Code).
legislation.
Since his admission as a Filipino citizen in 1961, respondent William
The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting deportation of an Gatchalian has continuously resided in the Philippines. He married Ting
alien after entry or a warrant of exclusion based on a final order of the Dee Hua on July 1, 1973 (Annex "8", counter-petition) with whom he has
BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of four (4) minor children. The marriage contract shows that said
prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of respondent is a Filipino (Annex "8"). He holds passports and earlier
the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a certain time, while passports as a Filipino (Annexes "9", "10" & "11", counter-petition). He is
prescription of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the government of a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided
the right to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a certain time and exercised his right of suffrage (Annex 12, counter-petition). He
(Padilla, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 1974, at p. 855). engaged in business in the Philippines since 1973 and is the
director/officer of the International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman
"Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a International Corp. as a Filipino (Annexes, "13" & "14", counter-petition).
criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary He is a taxpayer. Respondent claims that the companies he runs and in
administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, which he has a controlling investment provides livelihood to 4,000
the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be employees and approximately 25,000 dependents. He continuously
denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship and discharged his responsibility
particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation as such until petitioners initiated the deportation proceedings against him.
proceedings." (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Under Sec. 6, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court, a final judgment may not be executed after the "The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or
lapse of five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against
becomes final and executory. Thereafter, it may be enforced only by a undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious
separate action subject to the statute of limitations. Under Art. 1144 (3) of to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people" (Lao Gi vs.
Court of Appeals, supra). How could one who has helped the economy of
the country by providing employment to some 4,000 people be Special Inquiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian
considered undesirable and be summarily deported when the and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and immigration
government, in its concerted drive to attract foreign investors, grants authorities regarding their marriages, birth and relationship to each other
Special Resident Visa to any alien who invest at least US$50,000.00 in are not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as statements or
the country? Even assuming arguendo that respondent is an alien, his declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree
deportation under the circumstances is unjust and unfair, if not downright (Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furtheremore, this salutary rule of evidence finds
illegal. The action taken by petitioners in the case at bar is diametrically support in substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of the Civil Code provides:
opposed to settled government policy.
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document,
Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent is an alien. In final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be
support of their position, petitioners point out that Santiago Gatchalian's proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the marriage of Francisco special laws. (See also Art. 172 of the Family Code)
(father of William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China, were
not supported by any evidence other than their own self-serving Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago Gatchalian and
testimony nor was there any showing what the laws of China were. It is Francisco Gatchalian aforementioned are not self-serving but are
the postulate advanced by petitioners that for the said marriages to be competent proof of filiation (Art. 172 [2], Family Code).
valid in this country, it should have been shown that they were valid by
the laws of China wherein the same were contracted. There being none, Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that
petitioners conclude that the aforesaid marriages cannot be considered a marriage formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring
valid. Hence, Santiago's children, including Francisco, followed the to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of
citizenship of their mother, having been born outside of a valid marriage. the Family Code) provides that "(a)ll marriages performed outside of the
Similarly, the validity of the Francisco's marriage not having been Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the citizenship of their were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
mother, a Chinese national. country . . ." And any doubt as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and
the extent as to how far the validity of such marriage may be extended to
After a careful consideration of petitioner's argument, We find that it the consequences of the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil
cannot be sustained. Code in this manner: "In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the
solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans
In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim vs. Collector of toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds,
Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the
[1915]), this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any
foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as member of the family in case of unlawful aggression." (Emphasis
those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there being no proof of supplied). Bearing in mind the "processual presumption" enunciated in
Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that it is Miciano and other cases, he who asserts that the marriage is not valid
the same as that of Philippine law. under our law bears the burden of proof to present the foreign law.

The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William
Santiago Gatchalian much more on respondent William Gatchalian who Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a
was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate, legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino being
Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a
the laws of China relating to marriage, having been content with the Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the
testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.
during the Japanese occupation of China. Neither was Francisco
Gatchalian's testimony subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino
citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of the Constitution, which
provides:

Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution. . . .

This forecloses any further question about the Philippine citizenship of

respondent William Gatchalian.

The Court is not unaware of Woong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo (13 SCRA 552
[1965]) relied upon by petitioners. The ruling arrived thereat, however,
cannot apply in the case at bar for the simple reason that the parties
therein testified to have been married in China by a village leader, which
undoubtedly is not among those authorized to solemnize marriage as
provided in Art. 56 of the Civil Code (now Art. 7, Family Code).

Premises considered, the Court deems it unnecessary to resolve the

other issues raised by the parties.

WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R.

Nos. 95612-13 is hereby GRANTED and respondent William Gatchalian
is declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby permanently enjoined
from continuing with the deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90-
523 for lack of jurisdiction over respondent Gatchalian, he being a Filipino
citizen; Civil Cases No. 90-54214 and 3431-V-90 pending before
respondent judges are likewise DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Gancayco, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,

concur.
Fernan, C.J., and Narvasa, J., concur in the result.

16. Bellis vs. bellis. (20 scra 358)

 Republic of the Philippines trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife,
SUPREME COURT Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos
Manila Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each
and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder
EN BANC shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives,
namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna
G.R. No. L-23678             June 6, 1967 Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in
equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor. Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors- Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of
appellants, First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees. The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all
the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants. shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
et al. various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al. respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company. to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman. motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances
on account of their respective legacies.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the
executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order
Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the
of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving
satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of
the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089
shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos
therein.1äwphï1.ñët
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of
P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the
The facts of the case are as follows: executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and
Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and
the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, second marriages.
he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-
deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed
Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that
had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and,
Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April
which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of 27, 1964 by the executor.1
administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the
administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is property may be found.
Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the nation of the decedent.
lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this
Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the
Philippine law. Civil Code, stating that —

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen those which have for their object public order, public policy and
Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both agreed upon in a foreign country.
a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. 2 So
that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted.
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article"
refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new
situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second
where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must
here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a
proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate
different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress
doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to
their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to
Article 16 of the Civil Code.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may
be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights,
with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; general ones.
and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate —
the law of the country where it is situated. arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine
estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to
the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his
national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10
— now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no
forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be
applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with
costs against appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar,

Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

 
17. Kasilag vs. rodriguez (69 phil 217)
G.R. No. 46623, Kasilag v. Rodriguez et al., 69 Phil. 217 The respondents, children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio,
commenced the aforesaid civil case to the end that they recover from the
Republic of the Philippines petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements granted by
SUPREME COURT way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio under patent No. 16074 issued
Manila on January 11, 1931, with certificate of title No. 325 issued by the
registrar of deeds of Bataan on June 27, 1931 in her favor, under section
EN BANC 122 of Act No. 496, which land was surveyed and identified in the
cadastre of the municipality of Limay, Province of Bataan, as lot No. 285;
that the petitioner pay to them the sum of P650 being the approximate
December 7, 1939
value of the fruits which he received from the land; that the petitioner sign
all the necessary documents to transfer the land and its possession to
G.R. No. 46623 the respondents; that he petitioner be restrained, during the pendency of
MARCIAL KASILAG, petitioner, the case, from conveying or encumbering the land and its improvements;
vs. that the registrar of deeds of Bataan cancel certificate of title No. 325 and
RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and issue in lieu thereof another in favor of the respondents, and that the
IGNACIO DEL ROSARIO, respondents. petitioner pay the costs of suit.

Luis M. Kasilag for petitioner. The petitioner denied in his answer all the material allegations of the
Fortunato de Leon for respondents. complaint and by way of special defense alleged that he was in
possession of the land and that he was receiving the fruits thereof by
IMPERIAL, J.: virtue of a mortgage contract, entered into between him and the
deceased Emiliana Ambrosio on May 16, 1932, which was duly ratified
This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner from the decision of by a notary public; and in counterclaim asked that the respondents pay
the Court of Appeals which modified that rendered by the court of First him the sum of P1,000 with 12 per cent interest per annum which the
Instance of Bataan in civil case No. 1504 of said court and held: that the deceased owed him and that, should the respondents be declared to
contract Exhibit "1" is entirely null and void and without effect; that the have a better right to the possession of the land, that they be sentenced
plaintiffs-respondents, then appellants, are the owners of the disputed to pay him the sum of P5,000 as value of all the improvements which he
land, with its improvements, in common ownership with their brother introduced upon the land.
Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are entitled to the possession thereof;
that the defendant-petitioner should yield possession of the land in their On May 16, 1932 Emiliana Ambrosio, in life, and the petitioner executed
favor, with all the improvements thereon and free from any lien; that the the following public deed:
plaintiffs-respondents jointly and severally pay to the defendant-petitioner
the sum of P1,000 with interest at 6 percent per annum from the date of "This agreement, made and entered into this 16th day of May, 1932, by
the decision; and absolved the plaintiffs-respondents from the cross- and between Emiliana Ambrosio, Filipino, of legal age, widow and
complaint relative to the value of the improvements claimed by the resident of Limay, Bataan, P.L., hereinafter called the party of the first
defendant-petitioner. The appealed decision also ordered the registrar of part, and Marcial Kasilag, Filipino, of legal age, married to Asuncion
deeds of Bataan to cancel certificate of title No. 325, in the name of the Roces, and resident at 312 Perdigon Street, Manila, P.L., hereinafter
deceased Emiliana Ambrosio and to issue in lieu thereof another called party of the second part.
certificate of title in favor of the plaintiffs-respondents and their brother
Gavino Rodriguez, as undivided owners in equal parts, free of all liens
WITNESSETH: That the parties hereto hereby covenant and agree to
and incumbrances except those expressly provided by law, without
and with each other as follows:
special pronouncement as to the costs.
ARTICLE I. That the party of the first part is the absolute registered November, 1936, or four and one-half (4½) years after date of the
owner of a parcel of land in the barrio of Alngan, municipality of Limay, execution of this instrument, the aforesaid sum of one thousand pesos
Province of Bataan, her title thereto being evidenced by homestead (P1,000) with interest at 12 per cent per annum, then said mortgage shall
certificate of title No. 325 issued by the Bureau of Lands on June 11, be and become null and void; otherwise the same shall be and shall
1931, said land being lot No. 285 of the Limay Cadastre, General Land remain in full force and effect, and subject to foreclosure in the manner
Registration Office Cadastral Record No. 1054, bounded and described and form provided by law for the amount due thereunder, with costs and
as follows: also attorney's fees in the event of such foreclosure.

Beginning at point marked 1 on plan E-57394, N. 84º 32' W. 614.82 m. ARTICLE VI. That the party of the first part shall pay all taxes and
from B.B.M. No. 3, thence N. 66º 35' E. 307.15 m. to point "2"; S. 5º 07' assessments which are or may become due on the above described land
W. to point "5"; S.6º 10' E. 104.26 m. to point "4"; S. 82º 17' W. to point and improvements during the term of this agreement.
"5"; S. 28º 53' W. 72.26 m. to point "6"; N. 71º 09' W. to point "7"; N. 1º
42' E. 173.72 m. to point 1, point of beginning, "Containing an area of ARTICLE VII. That within thirty (30) days after date of execution of this
6.7540 hectares. "Points 1,2,6 and 7, B.L.; points 3,4 and 5, stakes; agreement, the party of the first part shall file a motion before the Court of
points 4, 5 and 6 on bank of Alangan River. "Bounded on the North, by First Instance at Balanga, Bataan, P. I., requesting cancellation of
property claimed by Maria Ambrosio; on the East, by Road; on the South, Homestead Certificate of Title No. 325 referred to in Article I hereof and
by Alangan River and property claimed by Maxima de la Cruz; and on the the issuance, in lieu thereof, of a certificate of title under the provisions of
West, by property claimed by Jose del Rosario. "Bearing true. Declination Land Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act 3901.
0º 51' E. "Surveyed under authority of sections 12-22, Act No. 2874 and
in accordance with existing regulations of the Bureau of Lands, by ARTICLE III. It if further agreed that if upon the expiration of the period of
Mamerto Jacinto, public land surveyor, on July 8, 1927 and approved on time (4½) years stipulated in this mortgage, the mortgagor should fail to
February 25, 1931. redeem this mortgage, she would execute a deed of absolute sale of the
property herein described for the same amount as this mortgage,
ARTICLE II. That the improvements on the above described land consist including all unpaid interests at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, in
of the following: favor of the mortgagee.

Four (4) mango trees, fruit bearing: one hundred ten (110) hills of ARTICLE IX. That in the event the contemplated motion under Article VII
bamboo trees; one (1) tamarind and six (6) boñga trees. hereof is not approved by the Court, the foregoing contract of sale shall
automatically become null and void, and the mortgage stipulated under
ARTICLE III. That the assessed value of the land is P940 and the Article IV and V shall remain in full force and effect.
assessed value of the improvements is P860, as evidenced by tax
declaration No. 3531 of the municipality of Limay, Bataan. In testimony whereof, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands
the day and year first herein before written.
ARTICLE IV. That for and in consideration of the sum of one thousand
pesos (P1,000) Philippine currency, paid by the party of second part to (Sgd.) MARCIAL KASILAG
the party of the first part, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the
party of the first part hereby encumbers and hypothecates, by way of (Sgd.) EMILIANA AMBROSIO
mortgage, only the improvements described in Articles II and III hereof, of
which improvements the party of the first part is the absolute owner.
Signed in the presence of:
ARTICLE V. That the condition of said mortgage is such that if the party
(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLE
of the first part shall well and truly pay, or cause to paid to the party of the
second part, his heirs, assigns, or executors, on or before the 16th day of
(Sgd.) GAVINO RODRIGUEZ.
 PHILIPPINE ISLANDS } ss. After an analysis of the conditions of Exhibit "1" the Court of Appeals
BALANGA, BATAAN } ss. came to the conclusion and so held that the contract entered into by and
between the parties, set out in the said public deed, was one of absolute
Before me this day personally appeared Emiliana Ambrosio purchase and sale of the land and its improvements. And upon this ruling
without cedula by reason of her sex, to me known and known to it held null and void and without legal effect the entire Exhibit 1 as well as
me to be the person who signed the foregoing instrument, and the subsequent verbal contract entered into between the parties,
acknowledged to me that she executed the same as her free and ordering, however, the respondents to pay to the petitioner, jointly and
voluntary act and deed. severally, the loan of P1,000 with legal interest at 6 per cent per annum
from the date of the decision. In this first assignment of error the
I hereby certify that this instrument consists of three (3) pages petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals violated the law in holding
including this page of the acknowledgment and that each page that Exhibit 1 is an absolute deed of sale of the land and its
thereof is signed by the parties to the instrument and the improvements and that it is void and without any legal effect.
witnesses in their presence and in the presence of each other,
and that the land treated in this instrument consists of only one The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to the effect that the
parcel. intention of the contracting parties should always prevail because their
will has the force of law between them. Article 1281 of the Civil Code
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my consecrates this rule and provides, that if the terms of a contract are
notarial seal, this 16th day of May, 1932. clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the
literal sense of its stipulations shall be followed; and if the words appear
to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the
(Sgd.) NICOLAS NAVARRO
intention shall prevail. The contract set out in Exhibit 1 should be
Notary Public
interpreted in accordance with these rules. As the terms thereof are clear
and leave no room for doubt, it should be interpreted according to the
My commission expires December 31, 1933. literal meaning of its clauses. The words used by the contracting parties
in Exhibit 1 clearly show that they intended to enter into the principal
Doc. No. 178 contract of loan in the amount of P1,000, with interest at 12 per cent per
Page 36 of my register annum, and into the accessory contract of mortgage of the improvements
Book No. IV on the land acquired as homestead, the parties having moreover, agreed
upon the pacts and conditions stated in the deed. In other words, the
One year after the execution of the aforequoted deed, that is, in 1933, it parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the
came to pass that Emiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay the stipulated land acquired as homestead, to secure the payment of the indebtedness
interests as well as the tax on the land and its improvements. For this for P1,000 and the stipulated interest thereon. In clause V the parties
reason, she and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract stipulated that Emiliana Ambrosio was to pay, within four and a half
whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on years, or until November 16, 1936, the debt with interest thereon, in
condition that the latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would which event the mortgage would not have any effect; in clause VI the
attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of the parties agreed that the tax on the land and its improvements, during the
land, and would introduce improvements thereon. By virtue of this verbal existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the owner of the land; in
contract, the petitioner entered upon the possession of the land, gathered clause VII it was covenanted that within thirty days from the date of the
the products thereof, did not collect the interest on the loan, introduced contract, the owner of the land would file a motion in the Court of First
improvements upon the land valued at P5,000, according to him and on Instance of Bataan asking that certificate of title No. 325 be cancelled
May 22, 1934 the tax declaration was transferred in his name and on and that in lieu thereof another be issued under the provisions of the
March 6, 1936 the assessed value of the land was increased from Land Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3901; in clause
P1,020 to P2,180. VIII the parties agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the
mortgage within the stipulated period of four years and a half, she would
execute an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee, Law. ed., 448; Borland v. Prindle, 144 Fed 713; Western Union Tel. Co.
the petitioner, for the same amount of the loan of P1,000 including unpaid v. Kansas Pac. R. Co., 4 Fed., 284; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. U.S., 15 Ct.
interest; and in clause IX it was stipulated that in case the motion to be Cl., 428.)
presented under clause VII should be disapproved by the Court of First
Instance of Bataan, the contract of sale would automatically become void Addressing ourselves now to the contract entered into by the parties, set
and the mortgage would subsist in all its force. out in Exhibit 1, we stated that the principal contract is that of loan and
the accessory that of mortgage of the improvements upon the land
Another fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts, not less acquired as a homestead. There is no question that the first of these
important than those indicated, is to the effect that the terms, clauses and contract is valid as it is not against the law. The second, or the mortgage
conditions contrary to law, morals and public order should be separated of the improvements, is expressly authorized by section 116 of Act No.
from the valid and legal contract and when such separation can be made 2874, as amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517, reading:
because they are independent of the valid contract which expresses the
will of the contracting parties. Manresa, commenting on article 1255 of SEC. 116. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units
the Civil Code and stating the rule of separation just mentioned, gives his or institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired
views as follows: under the free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to
encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the
On the supposition that the various pacts, clauses or conditions are valid, application and for a term of five years from and after the date of
no difficulty is presented; but should they be void, the question is as to issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the
what extent they may produce the nullity of the principal obligation. Under satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period;
the view that such features of the obligation are added to it and do not go but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged
to its essence, a criterion based upon the stability of juridical relations to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
should tend to consider the nullity as confined to the clause or pact
suffering therefrom, except in case where the latter, by an established It will be recalled that by clause VIII of Exhibit 1 the parties agreed that
connection or by manifest intention of the parties, is inseparable from the should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the mortgage within the
principal obligation, and is a condition, juridically speaking, of that the stipulated period of four and a half years, by paying the loan together with
nullity of which it would also occasion. (Manresa, Commentaries on the interest, she would execute in favor of the petitioner an absolute deed of
Civil Code, Volume 8, p. 575.) sale of the land for P1,000, including the interest stipulated and owing.
The stipulation was verbally modified by the same parties after the
The same view prevails in the Anglo-American law, as condensed in the expiration of one year, in the sense that the petitioner would take
following words: possession of the land and would benefit by the fruits thereof on
condition that he would condone the payment of interest upon the loan
Where an agreement founded on a legal consideration contains several and he would attend to the payment of the land tax. These pacts made
promises, or a promise to do several things, and a part only of the things by the parties independently were calculated to alter the mortgage a
to be done are illegal, the promises which can be separated, or the contract clearly entered into, converting the latter into a contract of
promise, so far as it can be separated, from the illegality, may be valid. antichresis. (Article 1881 of the Civil Code.) The contract of antichresis,
The rule is that a lawful promise made for a lawful consideration is not being a real encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and void because
invalid merely because an unlawful promise was made at the same time it is legal and valid.
and for the same consideration, and this rule applies, although the
invalidity is due to violation of a statutory provision, unless the statute The foregoing considerations bring us to the conclusion that the first
expressly or by necessary implication declares the entire contract void. . . assignment of error is well-founded and that error was committed in
. (13 C. J., par. 470, p. 512; New York Cent. etc. R. Co. v. Gray, 239 holding that the contract entered into between the parties was one of
U.S., 583; 60 Law ed., 451; U.S. v. Mora, 97 U.S., 413, 24 Law. ed., absolute sale of the land and its improvements and that Exhibit 1 is null
1017; U.S. v. Hodson, 10 Wall, 395; 19 Law ed. 937; Gelpcke v. and void. In the second assignment of error the petitioner contends that
Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 Law ed., 520; U.S. v. Bradly, 10 Pet. 343, 9 the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he is guilty of violating the
Public Land Act because he entered into the contract, Exhibit 1. The Borrowing the language of Article 433, the question to be answered is
assigned error is vague and not specific. If it attempts to show that the whether the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in good faith
said document is valid in its entirety, it is not well-founded because we because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its
have already said that certain pacts thereof are illegal because they are acquisition by which it is invalidated. It will be noted that ignorance of the
prohibited by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended. flaw is the keynote of the rule. From the facts found established by the
Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner
In the third assignment of error the petitioner insists that his testimony, as was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside
to the verbal agreement entered into between him and Emiliana from the prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, the
Ambrosio, should have been accepted by the Court of Appeals; and in question is whether good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the
the fourth and last assignment of error the same petitioner contends that laws. Manresa, commenting on article 434 in connection with the
the Court of Appeals erred in holding that he acted in bad faith in taking preceding article, sustains the affirmative. He says:
possession of the land and in taking advantage of the fruits thereof,
resulting in the denial of his right to be reimbursed for the value of the "We do not believe that in real life there are not many cases of good faith
improvements introduced by him. founded upon an error of law. When the acquisition appears in a public
document, the capacity of the parties has already been passed upon by
We have seen that subsequent to the execution of the contract, Exhibit 1, competent authority, and even established by appeals taken from final
the parties entered into another verbal contract whereby the petitioner judgments and administrative remedies against the qualification of
was authorized to take possession of the land, to receive the fruits registrars, and the possibility of error is remote under such
thereof and to introduce improvements thereon, provided that he would circumstances; but, unfortunately, private documents and even verbal
renounce the payment of stipulated interest and he would assume agreements far exceed public documents in number, and while no one
payment of the land tax. The possession by the petitioner and his receipt should be ignorant of the law, the truth is that even we who are called
of the fruits of the land, considered as integral elements of the contract of upon to know and apply it fall into error not infrequently. However, a
antichresis, are illegal and void agreements because, as already stated, clear, manifest, and truly unexcusable ignorance is one thing, to which
the contract of antichresis is a lien and such is expressly prohibited by undoubtedly refers article 2, and another and different thing is possible
section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended. The Court of Appeals held that and excusable error arising from complex legal principles and from the
the petitioner acted in bad faith in taking possession of the land because interpretation of conflicting doctrines.
he knew that the contract he made with Emiliana Ambrosio was an
absolute deed of sale and, further, that the latter could not sell the land But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error of fact, or
because it is prohibited by section 116. The Civil Code does not better still, ignorance of a fact is possible as to the capacity to transmit
expressly define what is meant by bad faith, but section 433 provides that and as to the intervention of certain persons, compliance with certain
"Every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title, or in the manner of formalities and appreciation of certain acts, and an error of law is
its acquisition, by which it is invalidated, shall be deemed a possessor in possible in the interpretation of doubtful doctrines. (Manresa,
good faith"; and provides further, that "Possessors aware of such flaw are Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code. Volume IV, pp. 100, 101 and
deemed possessors in bad faith". Article 1950 of the same Code, 102.)
covered by Chapter II relative to prescription of ownership and other real
rights, provides, in turn, that "Good faith on the part of the possessor According to this author, gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not
consists in his belief that the person from whom he received the thing be the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be
was the owner of the same, and could transmit the title thereto." We do such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws
not have before us a case of prescription of ownership, hence, the last because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the
article is not squarely in point. In resume, it may be stated that a person improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not
is deemed a possessor in bad faith when he knows that there is a flaw in violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking
his title or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated. possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not
know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of
the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as
a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These considerations again bring that, under the verbal agreement, from the value of the fruits had to be
us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the taken a certain amount to pay the annual land tax. We mention these
provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of data here to show that the petitioner is also not bound to render an
his good faith. We do not give much importance to the change of the tax accounting of the value of the fruits of the mortgaged improvements for
declaration, which consisted in making the petitioner appear as the owner the reason stated that said value hardly covers the interest earned by the
of the land, because such an act may only be considered as a sequel to secured indebtednes.
the change of possession and enjoyment of the fruits by the petitioner, to
about which we have stated that the petitioner's ignorance of the law is For all the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision is reversed,
possible and excusable. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner acted in and we hereby adjudge: (1) that the contract of mortgage of the
good faith in taking possession of the land and enjoying its fruits. improvements, set out in Exhibit 1, is valid and binding; (2) that the
contract of antichresis agreed upon verbally by the parties is a real
The petitioner being a possessor in good faith within the meaning of incumbrance which burdens the land and, as such, is a null and without
article 433 of the Civil Code and having introduced the improvements effect; (3) that the petitioner is a possessor in good faith; (4) that the
upon the land as such, the provisions of article 361 of the same Code are respondents may elect to have the improvements introduced by the
applicable; wherefore, the respondents are entitled to have the petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the
improvements and plants upon indemnifying the petitioner the value petitioner to buy and have the land where the improvements or plants are
thereof which we fix at P3,000, as appraised by the trial court; or the found, by paying them its market value to be filed by the court of origin,
respondents may elect to compel the petitioner to have the land by upon hearing the parties; (5) that the respondents have a right to the
paying its market value to be fixed by the court of origin. possession of the land and to enjoy the mortgaged improvements; and
(6) that the respondents may redeem the mortgage of the improvements
The respondents also prayed in their complaint that the petitioner be by paying to the petitioner within three months the amount of P1,000,
compelled to pay them the sum of P650, being the approximate value of without interest, as that stipulated is set off by the value of the fruits of the
the fruits obtained by the petitioner from the land. The Court of Appeals mortgaged improvements which petitioner received, and in default
affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying the claim or indemnity for thereof the petitioner may ask for the public sale of said improvements for
damages, being of the same opinion as the trial court that the the purpose of applying the proceeds thereof to the payment of his said
respondents may elect to compel the petitioner to have the land. The credit. Without special pronouncement as to the costs in all instances. So
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court that the ordered.
respondents have not established such damages. Under the verbal
contract between the petitioner and the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, Diaz, J., concur.
during the latter's lifetime, the former would take possession of the land
and would receive the fruits of the mortgaged improvements on condition
that he would no longer collect the stipulated interest and that he would
attend to the payment of the land tax. This agreement, at bottom, is
tantamount to the stipulation that the petitioner should apply the value of
the fruits of the land to the payment of stipulated interest on the loan of
P1,000 which is, in turn, another of the elements characterizing the
contract of antichresis under article 1881 of the Civil Code. It was not
possible for the parties to stipulate further that the value of the fruits be
also applied to the payment of the capital, because the truth was that
nothing remained after paying the interest at 12% per annum. This
interest, at the rate fixed, amounted to P120 per annum, whereas the
market value of the fruits obtainable from the land hardly reached said
amount in view of the fact that the assessed value of said improvements
was, according to the decision, P860. To this should be added the fact