Solid Homes v.

Payawal Admin Law

1
Docket No. G.R. No. 84811 August 29, 1989 J. Cruz Simon
Petitioners: Respondents:
SOLID HOMES, INC. TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF APPEALS

Recit Ready Summary

Payawal is a buyer of a subdivision lot sold by Solid Homes. The latter executed a deed of sale over the
land but failed to deliver the corresponding certificate of title despite Payawal’s repeated demands.
Payawal filed a case in the RTC but Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
court had no jurisdiction, it being vested in the NHA (presently HLURB)

Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction? – No. NHA has jurisdiction

The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344. The language of the decree leaves no
room for doubt that "exclusive jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner and the private
respondent is vested not in the Regional Trial Court but in the National Housing Authority. In case of
conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their
enactment. It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP 129 and PD 1344 the special law.

As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more
and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the
particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and
dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the
increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called
the fourth department of the government. Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies
must be liberally construed to enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the
legislative purpose.

Facts

1. Teresita Payawal filed a case against Solid Homes, Inc. before the RTC of Quezon City. Payawal
alleged that Solid Homes contracted to sell to her a subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9, 1975, for
the agreed price of P28,080.00, and that by September 10, 1981, she had already paid the
defendant the total amount of P 38,949.87 in monthly installments and interests.
2. Solid Homes subsequently executed a deed of sale over the land but failed to deliver the
corresponding certificate of title despite Payawal’s repeated demands since according to her, Solid
Homes had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company.
3. Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, this
being vested in the National Housing Authority under PD No. 957. The motion was denied.
4. The defendant repleaded, citing Section 3 of the said decree providing that "the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in
accordance with the provisions of this Decree."
5. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was ordered to deliver
to her the title to the land or, failing this, to refund to her the sum of P 38,949.87 plus interest from
1975 and until the full amount was paid. She was also awarded P 5,000.00 moral damages, P
5,000.00 exemplary damages, P 10,000.00 attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit.
6. Solid Homes appealed but the decision was affirmed by the respondent court.
Issues Ruling
Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction? 1. No
 Rationale
The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled "Empowering the National
Housing Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under Presidential
Decree No. 957." Section 1 of the latter decree provides as follows:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

The language of this section, especially the italicized portions, leaves no room for doubt that "exclusive
jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner and the private respondent is vested not in the
Regional Trial Court but in the National Housing Authority.

This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of conflict between a general law and a
special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Thus, it has been held that
the fact that one law is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special act is to be
considered as remaining an exception of the general act, one as a general law of the land and the other
as the law of the particular case.

The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change the
principle. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the
prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining
an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication. It is obvious that the
general law in this case is BP No. 129 and PD No. 1344 the special law.

On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is part of the exclusive power
conferred upon it by PD 1344 to hear and decide “claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman.”

As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more
and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the
particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and
dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the
increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called
the fourth department of the government.

Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable them
to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose. Following this policy in
Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority, the Court sustained the competence of the
respondent administrative body, in the exercise of the exclusive jurisdiction vested in it by PD No. 957
and PD No. 1344, to determine the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a subdivision lot.
[
Disposition
Decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
is SET ASIDE
Separate Opinions