1) INTENTIONAL TORTS

a) Intent
i) Definition - Intent is formed if an action is
1. Purposeful
2. Knowing
a. Test: Substantial Certainty
b. Subjective test – actual knowledge
ii) Transferred Intent
b) Battery
i) Elements
1. D intentionally causes
2. un-consented contact
3. with P’s person that is
4. harmful or offensive
ii) Notes
1. offensive is objective – what society feels is acceptable
a. exception when D knows P is unusually sensitive
2. consent is presumed for ordinary contact of everyday life
3. P’s person includes anything connect to P (clothing, purse, can if in it)
4. Intent to do battery not required, only to make contact
5. egg shell P – D liable for all harm that results if only a minor battery was intended
a. you take the P as you find him
6. victim does not have to be aware of contact
a. unconscious
7. Respondeat Superior – employer responsible for employee’s action
c) Assault
i) Elements
1. D intentionally causes
2. Reasonable apprehension of
3. Imminent harmful or offensive contact
4. accidental creation of apprehension is not assault
a. fear not required
5. victim must be aware of assault
6. words alone cannot create apprehension, must be coupled with an overt act
d) False Imprisonment
i) Elements
1. unlawful or unconsented acts with intent to
2. confine or restrain P
3. in a bounded area (controlled by D)
4. P is aware of the confinement or is harmed by it
ii) Intent to Confine established by
1. Physical Barrier
2. Force or the immediate threat of force against P, P’s family or P’s property
a. implied threat sufficient
3. Withholding property
4. Omissions where there is a duty to act
5. Improper (unlawful) assertion of legal authority
iii) Insufficient forms of FI
1. future threats
2. moral pressure/attempt to clear one’s name
3. economic coercion
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 a. child discipline
e) Malicious prosecution
i) Elements
1. D institutes a criminal/civil proceeding against P
2. Termination of the proceeding in favor of P
a. Dropped charges/case does not count (Maniaci v. Marquette)
3. Absence of probable cause for the proceedings
4. For an improper purpose (malice)
a. Primary purpose is other than bringing P to justice
5. Damages
a. Usually assumed if first 4 are proven
ii) Public Policy Implications: How easy or hard this tort is defined determines how easy or hard it is to
use the court system to bring suit. Access to the courts/Right to Sue. Some courts looking for ways
to expand termination in favor to included certain kinds of dropped cases
f) Abuse of Process
i) Elements
1. intentional misuse
a. purpose for which it is not designed
2. of a legal process
a. criminal or civil
3. for an ulterior purpose
4. resulting in damage
ii) Differs from Malicious Prosecution
1. prior proceeding does not have to terminate in favor of P
2. no malice required
3. probable cause does not defeat P’s claim
g) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)
i) Elements
1. D commits extreme and outrageous conduct
a. Beyond all bounds of decency in a civilized society
b. Mere rudeness or callous offensiveness is insufficient
c. Special exceptions to need for outrageous
(i) Common Carriers (RS § 48)
1. A common carrier [or hotel] or other public utility is subject to liability to patrons
utilizing its facilities for gross insults that reasonably offend them, inflicted by the
utility’s servants while otherwise acting within the scope of their employment.
(ii) D knows that P is especially vulnerable
1. child, ill patient, hypersensitive (pot of gold/rocks)
2. D’s position of power can increase P’s vulnerability
(iii) Continuous action – keeps doing the same non-outrageous thing while knowing of
its annoyance (tapping on back everyday
2. with intent or recklessness to cause extreme mental distress
a. *Substantial risk of an incident occurring (Now covered by negligent infliction of emotional
distress)
3. P suffers extreme mental distress
a. Historically required physical manifestation of distress (heart attack to stomach ache)
b. Now don’t need physical manifestation – look to outrageousness of wrongdoer’s conduct to
recognize authenticity or severe distress
ii) Third Person IIED
1. Transferability to third parties:
a. Plaintiff is present
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 b. Defendant knows that plaintiff (third party) is present
c. Plaintiff is a close relative of victim (i.e. Immediate Family Member)
2. Minority rule adds:
a. Defendant must know that third party is a relative
(i) Stricter standard
3. Restatement provision more lenient:
a. Any other person present if physical harm
b. Close relatives may recover if only emotional harm
c. No requirement of knowledge on part of D
iii) 1st Amendment rights
1. public figures need to prove NY times malice – D must act with knowledge or reckless disregard
toward truth of falsity of assertion
h) Intentional interference with valid contractual relations (IICR) or economic/business expectancies
IIEE)
i) Elements
1. Valid contract or economic expectancy
2. D has knowledge of the valid contract or economic expectancy, and
a. knew or should of known – knowledge of the facts which form a contract, not necessarily
that those facts actually form a contract
3. The defendant intends to interfere
a. Intent = Purposeful interference and knowledge with substantial certainty that interference
will occur
b. Except CA: intent for interference means purposeful, not knowing, actions only
(i) applies to IIEE and probably IIK
4. The defendant causes interference, and
5. P suffers damage
ii) Justifications for interference with economic expectation or contractual relations:
1. Stating truthful information or honest advice within the scope of a request (1st Amend provision)
a. Truth as to external facts covered, intent of actor not always covered
2. Acting to protect the welfare of another when charged to protect that welfare
3. K/EE is illegal or against public policy
4. Protecting bona fide interests through good faith and means
i) Vicarious Liability – considerations for all torts
i) Liability for tort committed by another
ii) Respondeat Superior – employers liable for torts committed by employees within the scope of their
employment
1. Frolic -OR- detour
iii) Exception:
1. Indy contractor:
i. The principal will not be held vicariously liable for tortious acts of her agent if the agent
is an independent contractor. (Tip: Heavily Tested) Exceptions:
ii. if the independent contractor is engaged in inherently dangerous activities (e.g.
excavating, blasting)
iii. If the duty is nondelegable bc of public policy concerns (e.g., duty to use due care in
building fence)
iv. land possessor vicariously liable if Independent Contractor hurts invitee (E.g., EE of
Independent
 contractor knocks over plant that hits you. You’re at mall. Mall vicariously liable)
j) Defenses to intentional Torts
i) Consent
1. Express
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 2. Implied
ii) Self- Defense
1. Use reasonable force
2. Believed necessary
3. To prevent immediate harm

2) NEGLIGENCE
a) Elements of Negligence:
1. Duty
a. a legally recognized relationship between the parties
(i) Duty is restricted to those within the foreseeable zone of danger
2. Breach of the Standard of Care
a. Standard of Care – the required level of expected conduct
(i) “Reasonable Man” standard
(ii) Under all the circumstances
b. Breach – failure to meet the standard of care
3. Cause-in-Fact
a. Harm must have the required nexus to the D’s breach
(i) Connection between action and effect
(ii) Must be shown to have actually caused injury
4. Legal or Proximate Cause
a. No policy reasons to relieve the D of liability
(i) Effect must be foreseeable, not so remote that the harm was unexpected
5. Damage
a. P suffers injury
b) Duty
i) Duty only extends to those that are reasonably foreseeable to be endangered (Zone of Danger)
1. Majority View (Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, p. 172)
2. Forseeablity not needed for intentional torts, or transferred intent
ii) Former View/ Andrews dissent
1. A negligent act is negligent not only to those foreseeable, but also to anyone who is injured
2. Duty owed to the world (Andrews dissent in Palsgraf)
a. Andrews dissent in Palsgraf: a negligent act is wrong to the public at large, not to those who
happen to be within the zone of danger. If negligence (breach of duty) towards one person
injures a third person, that person is foreseeable.
b. But, Negligence could be limited by proximate cause, but dissent in Palsgraf said that
foreseeablity should be viewed in hindsight!
c) Limits on Duty
i) No Duty Rule
1. There is no general duty to come to the aid of another or continue aiding another
ii) Duty to Aid Exception
1. Special Relationship between P and D (Duty to aid)
a. Business/Customer, Employer/Employee, Parent/Child, Captain/Passenger, Teacher/Student,
Doctor/Patient, Invitees, Licensees (probably)
(i) Not Fellow Travelers, Roommates
b. Therapist/Third Party – Duty to Warn
(i) Reasonable care to protect (Duty to warn) required when therapist knows or should know
based on professional standards that patient presents a serious danger of extreme violence
to another
1. Must be a specific victim (CA statutory limit)
2. Actual determination of threat (CA statutory limit)
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 3. The privilege of confidentiality ends where the public peril begins
4. Tarasoff v. UC Regents, p. 215 (Therapist’s patient murdered P)
c. Police/Potential Victims
(i) no general duty to aid absent a special relationship
(ii) A general duty would allow judges to second guess police
2. Instrument Under Control of the D (Duty to aid)
a. Split – Historic Rule: No duty when accident is not D’s fault
3. Commencing an act that puts P in worse position / Voluntary Acts that put P in Worse Position
(Duty to continue aid)
a. Change of Risk - Danger of Harm has been increased by partial performance
b. Detrimental Reliance - P has forgone other opportunities in reliance on the performance
(i) Detrimental reliance
1. Ayres v. Hicks, p. 204 (Hikers / Ski Patrol)
c. Obligation exists even when the accident is caused
(i) without any fault on part of the D
(ii) by the negligence of the P or a third party
d. Plaintiff is only entitled to recover for an aggravation of his injuries
(i) Damages restricted to damages that are the proximate result of the D’s actionable
negligence
4. Good Samaritan Statutes
a. Options to encourage aid:
(i) Limit to Medical Professionals
(ii) Limit to Bad Faith, Recklessness
(iii) Liability only for gross negligence
iii) Land Occupier Duty
1. Duty to those on land
a. Common Law (Status Based Approach)
(i) Trespassers
1. C/L = no duty to prevent accidental injury
a. Duty limited to willful conduct (traps)
2. Majority Modifications for Frequent/Known Trespassers
a. i.e. Foreseeable
b. Active Operations = obligation to exercise reasonable care
c. Artificial Conditions = duty to warn or make safe those known by the possessor
that could cause death or serious bodily injury
i. No duty to inspect, (i.e. no “should have known”)
ii. No duty for natural conditions
3. Child Trespassers (§ 339)
a. Elements
i. Knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass
ii. Knows or has reason to know that there is an unreasonable risk of death or
serious bodily harm
iii. Due to their youth, children do not discover danger or the risk of
intermeddling with it (Higher standard the younger the child)
iv. Utility of not eliminating danger is slight compared to risks involved
v. Possessor fail to exercise reasonable care to eliminate danger or protect
children
b. Traditionally required attractive conditions, now any artificial conditions
i. Attraction only indicates that trespass was foreseeable
(ii) Licensee (Social Guests, Others without a business purpose)
1. Duty limited to:
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 a. Willful and wanton conduct
b. Active Operations
c. Warn of all known conditions, artificial and natural, that could cause any injury to
P
i. No duty to repair/make safe
ii. in general, licensee takes property as it is found, thus no duty for obvious
defects
(iii) Invitees (Business visitors)
1. Activities, Conditions: Duty not limited
iv) Immunities
1. Parent-Child
a. Traditional immunity in US for:
(i) Intentional torts for battery and assault
(ii) Liability for personal injuries caused by negligence
(iii) Did not cover property or purely economic torts
b. Modifications:
(i) Partially Abolished (Majority)
1. Intentional torts, general negligence - immunity eliminated
2. Negligent parenting – immunity preserved
(ii) Completely Abolished (CA)
1. Parents must act like reasonable parents
2. Under this system defendants can implead parents
2. Governmental
a. Discretionary Acts (Policy Decisions)
(i) Immune
(ii) Prevents democracy from being usurped
1. Types of policy decisions usually held accountable for in an election
b. Ministerial Acts (Routine)
(i) Not immune
c. No general duty for failure to warn by police
d. Statutory Immunity
(i) Specific listed acts
d) Breach of the Standard of Conduct
i) Reasonable Person Standard
1. How a reasonably prudent person would have acted in similar circumstances
ii) Objective standard
1. Ordinary intelligence, knowledge and experience
2. B < PL If the burden of the precaution is less than the probability of loss times the magnitude of
the loss – Justice Hand formula
3. A minimum amount of care is required, but maximum care is not.
a. No requirement to be perfect
b. D must come up to level of RP, clumsiness is no defense
4. Jury asks, “What would a reasonable person have done?”
iii) Exceptions
1. Emergency Exception
a. Standard is what would a RP do when faced with that emergency,
(i) D not held to same standard of conduct which would be required of him if there was no
emergency.
(ii) Cordas v. Peerless Transport Co., p. 110
b. A person’s negligence in creating the emergency will not result in an exception
2. Disabilities
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 a. Compare to a reasonable person with same disability
(i) The reasonable blind person
3. An individual’s mental capacity or insanity is not taken into account.
a. All individuals are required to have the mental state of the reasonable man.
b. Objective Standard
4. Sudden and Unforeseen Incapacities
a. Majority Rule
(i) Sudden Physical Illness
1. Exception for sudden, but not chronic conditions
(ii) Sudden Mental Illness
1. No exception
b. Minority Rule (Wisconsin)
(i) Sudden Mental Illness included (again not for chronic)
1. Breunig v. American Family Insurance, Pg. 114
5. Child Standard of Care
a. A child is held to the standard of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence and experience
(i) Subjective standard
b. Exceptions where children held to adult RP standard
(i) Majority: Child engaging in adult activity
1. “An exception arises where the child engages in an activity normally undertaken only
by adults, and for which adult qualifications are required. As in the case if one
entering upon a professional activity which requires special skill…., he may be held
to the standard of adult skill, knowledge and competence, and no allowance may be
made for his immaturity.” RS 2d, 283A (c)
a. i.e. driving a car, flying a plane, but not hunting (which is traditionally engaged in
by children)
i. Neumann v. Shlansky, Pg. 120
(ii) Minority: Highly dangerous activity (not just solely adult activities)
6. Professional/Doctor’s Standard
a. Performance/Malpractice
(i) Professional standard is to the skill and knowledge of member of profession
1. Generalists held to community standard
2. Specialists held to national standard
(ii) Exception if obvious breach
1. Golf ball left in body
b. Informed Consent
(i) CA/Modern Rule
1. Jury decides if Doctor should have asked patient
(ii) Former/Other Rule
1. Medical community decides whether doctor should have asked
(iii) Cause-in-Fact Split (at issue when Doctor did not obtain informed consent and
now we are trying to find if Doctors failure to gain informed consent is the cause of
patient’s injury)
1. Objective Test (CA)
a. Would a reasonable person have consented to the surgery if they had information
2. Subjective Test
a. Would this particular patient have consented
3. Doctor could be held liable for Battery
iv) Res Ipsa Loquitur – The Thing Speaks for Itself (Evidentiary Doctrine)
1. A presumption of negligence will be created when an accident occurs:
a. More likely than not the result of negligence
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 (i) That which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence
b. The negligence can be attributed to the defendant
(i) Caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant,
and
c. Plaintiff is not at Fault
(i) Is not due to any voluntary action or contribution on part of the plaintiff
2. Common sense exception based on circumstantial evidence
a. Allows an inference of negligence on part of D when case would otherwise be dismissed for
lack of negligence
3. Application of RIL to groups of independent actors
a. Majority: RIL does not apply to groups of independent actors
(i) Would imply guilt onto a D who is probably innocent
1. Difference from Joint and Several Liability where all Ds are negligent
b. Minority Rule (CA) – RIL allowed in limited circumstances
(i) When an unconscious plaintiff receives unusual injuries in the course of medical
treatment, RIL may apply to any D who had any control over the P’s body or the
instrumentalities which might have caused the injuries.
1. Ybarra v. Spangard, p. 198
(ii) Exception cures problem when it would be impossible for P to gain evidence due to
unconsciousness
1. 5th grade class justice – hold innocent D’s guilty to prevent P from being unable to
recover
v) Negligence Per Se (Statutory Negligence)
1. When there is a criminal statute, administrative regulation or municipal ordinance, judge may
give to jury as the standard of conduct in place of RP standard
2. To establish, P must prove
a. P is in class of persons intended to be protected by the statute
b. P’s harm was one meant to be prevented by the statute
3. Does not apply when complying with the statute would be more dangerous or if violation was
beyond D’s control (impossible)
a. Majority – judge instructs jury to follow criminal standard in place of RP standard
b. Minority – jury considers statute in context of RP standard
4. Public Policy Question: Is this mixing standards of two different types of law? (Tort and
Criminal)
e) Cause-in-Fact
i) But For Test: Majority & used 99% if the time for cause
1. But for D’s negligent act, P would not have been hurt
a. If act is taken away, will accident not occur?
2. More than one cause allowed
3. Restatement and CA use “Substantial Factor,” which means “But For” unless there is Joint and
Several Liability
4. What if the accident might have happened anyway?
a. Where the negligence of the defendant greatly multiplies the chances of accident to the
plaintiff, and is of a character naturally leading to its occurrence, the mere possibility that it
might have happened without the negligence is not sufficient to break the chain of cause and
effect between the negligence and the injury.
(i) Reynolds v. Texas and Pacific Railroad, p. 149
ii) When “But For” test cannot be proven (i.e. not more likely than not, more than 50% chance)
1. Substantial factor test
a. Redundant (Independent) Actions and Redundant Causes

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 (i) Majority makes an exception to “but for” test for redundant, virtually (nearly)
simultaneous causes
(ii) Substantial (Material) Factor will result in causation
(iii) Anderson v. Minneapolis Railway, p. 154 (Two fires, each could have burned
house)
2. Joint and Several Liability (Joint Tortfeasors)
a. Definition: each defendant liable for P’s entire damages
b. Acting in concert (aid, encourage)
c. Vicarious liability (Respondeat Superior)
d. Redundant Actions but Single Cause (Independent acts causing a single indivisible injury)
(i) Elements
1. Small number of Ds
2. All Ds breach standard of conduct (no one is innocent)
3. P unable to prove which one was liable
(ii) The court can shift the burden of proof for cause-in-fact from the plaintiff to the
defendants.
(iii) Each D liable as joint tortfeasors under JSL
(iv)Majority test: when small number of Ds have engaged in substantially simultaneous
culpable conduct imposing similar risk on the victim
(v) Summers v. Tice, p. 155
e. Market Share
(i) Modification of the Summers rule to hold each actor liable for his proportional share of
the market (Sindell v. Abbott, p. 157), applied only in DES cases so far
1. Used in CA, NY, MI, FL, WI
(ii) Elements
1. D breach S of C by producing and marketing a dangerous drug
2. P sues a substantial majority of the market (80% or more)
3. Each D who is unable to prove their innocence must pay their market share of the
damages
f) Proximate Cause
i) Elements
1. Foreseeable type of harm
2. No superseding intervening force
ii) Foreseeable
1. Not the manner of harm, or the extant, just the type
a. Eggshell Plaintiff
b. Not what is likely, but what is potentially possible as viewed by a reasonable person.
c. Overseas Tankship v. Morts Dock: The S.S. Wagon Mound, p. 183
2. Old rule – Polemis / Direct Connection
a. A D who is negligent is responsible for all the consequences whether reasonably foreseeable
or not.
iii) Superceding, Intervening Force
1. There cannot be a superseding, intervening force
2. An intervening act will be superceding and break the causal nexus if it is:
(i) Extraordinarily Unexpected/Extraordinary under the circumstances
(ii) Not foreseeable in the normal course of events
(iii) Independent or far removed from the defendant’s conduct
3. An act of a third person that intervenes between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury
will normally not break the causal connection

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 4. If the foreseeable intervening force is the likelihood that a 3rd party may act in a particular
manner, that an act will not break the causal connection no matter if the act is innocent,
negligent, intentional or criminal.
(i) A foreseeable intervening force that is caused be a 3rd party’s negligence will not break
the causal connection
5. Exception: Eggshell Plaintiff Rule
a. For personal injury you take the plaintiff as you find them
(i) Type of injury suffered by victim need not be foreseeable
g) Duty Regarding Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress – 3rd Party Actions
i) Generally no duty not to negligently inflict emotional distress on another
ii) Bystander Victims
1. Majority (NY)
a. P must be in the Zone of Danger (Target Zone)
(i) Based on historic need for contact in order to allow for emotional injury (pain and
suffering)
(ii) Bystander recovery is incidental to primary recovery
b. Physical manifestations required
(i) Minority of majority allows pure emotional distress
2. Minority – 20 states - Dillon Rule (originally CA)
a. Duty extends to those that would be foreseeably distressed
b. Elements of foreseeability:
(i) Plaintiff located near the scene of accident
1. can’t see on TV
(ii) Direct, contemporaneous sensory perception of the accident
1. Majority of minority: DSP of accident itself
2. Minority of minority (MA): DSP of accident or aftermath
(iii) Closely related
1. Minority of minority (NJ) allows recovery by coinhabitants
c. Physical manifestation
(i) Majority of minority: need physical manifestation
(ii) Minority of minority: no need for physical manifestation
3. CA rule (Revised Minority rule- Thing v. Chusa, p.263)
a. P is closely related to victim
b. P is Present at the scene and aware of injury producing event
(i) Strict Dillon rule
c. Emotional distress beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested victim
(i) Physical manifestations not required
iii) Direct Victim
1. Majority
a. P must be in zone of danger
b. P must have physical manifestation of harm
2. Minority (CA)
a. Recovery to all direct victims for reasonable, foreseeable mental distress
b. Physical manifestation not needed
3. Special Cases - Always direct victim: corpse handling and wrongful notice of death (these are
limited to parent/child, husband/wife)
4. Co-patient factor
a. Where 3rd party also has a relationship to D
b. Husband and Wife patients of hospital, husband can recover for improper diagnosis of with
with VD (Molien, CA)
c. Mother recovered for NEID when mutual therapist molested child (court held direct victim)
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 (i) Father couldn’t recover b/c not a patient, even though he chose and paid for treatment
iv) Future NIED - “toxic torts” - (possible test question)
1. Recovery for fear of future physical harm
a. More Likely Than Not Test (CA)
(i) Recovery allowed only when it is probable (i.e. >50%) that future harm will result
1. Potter v. Firestone (Class Example): fear of cancer resulting from pollution
b. Reasonable Person Test (Other Jdxs)
(i) Recovery if RP would have emotional distress
(ii) allowed when fear is reasonable and causally related to D’s actions
c. Physical manifestations
(i) majority requires
(ii) minority (CA) doesn’t
h) Wrongful Death
i) Common Law did not allow recovery for wrongful death
1. Immoral and indignant for courts to be assigning values to human lives
2. Killing the P was better than merely injuring him
ii) Majority Law: Modified by statute to enforce liability
1. Creates disincentive
2. Lack of social net for families
iii) Who may recover
1. Listed by statute
a. Family, but not cohabitants or mistresses
b. CA includes dependant parents
iv) Type of Damages
1. Majority
a. Pecuniary losses only allowed in most jrdxs
(i) Lost wages, hospital, funeral, damaged property
(ii) Results in very low amounts for children
2. Minority (CA & NEB)) adds
a. Loss of Companionship/Loss of Society
(i) Trend is to include this
(ii) CA allows
3. Minority Minority (FL) adds
a. Pain and Suffering (Grief)
(i) Knapp v. Compania Dominicana de Aviancion, p. 282
4. Punitive Damages
a. Majority: not allowed
(i) CA allows only for WD by felony
b. Minority allows
i) Survivorship Actions
i) At C/L, no survivorship action allowed for other injuries caused to P if he dies of accident
1. Tort dies with the person
ii) Modern Law - Survivorship Statutes allow suits to be inherited if P dies prior to end of suit.
1. No statutory list of beneficiaries, use Ps heirs (from will)
iii) Compensation for:
1. Property Damages
a. Almost all jrdxs
2. Personal Injuries to the Decedent
a. Most jrdxs allow Lost Wages, Medical, Pain and Suffering
b. CA allows only for lost wages and medical expenses, not p+s
3. Mental Distress
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 a. Some Jdxs
4. Punitive Damages
a. Allowed for personal injury in some states
b. CA allows only for Lost Wages and Property damages not P+S
5. Significance in CA
a. No punitive damages from wrongful death
b. Add personal injury (wages/property) to wrongful death claim to get Punitive Damages
6. Instantaneous Death = no personal injury, so no big $$ for P+S or Punitive Damages in CA
j) Loss of Consortium - for period of injury (and prior to a wrongful death)
i) Loss of companionship, sex, household services after injury
ii) Majority (CA)
1. Allowed only for spouses, not children (i.e. Loss of Parental Consortium)
a. Traditionally only husband could recover
iii) Minority
1. allows children to recover for parents and vice versa
k) Wrongful Conception (Pregnancy) / Birth / Life
i) Wrongful Conception/Pregnancy (Majority)
a. Negligent caused birth of a healthy child
(i) Conception, not injury, is blamed on defendant
b. Damages – most allow only for cost of the pregnancy (CA)
ii) Wrongful Birth (Majority)
a. Negligently caused birth of an unhealthy child
b. Parents must prove they would not have had a child otherwise
(i) Turpin v. Sortini – parents with 100% genetic chance of having deaf child
c. Damages – additional expenses of rearing disabled child (only until child is 18)
iii) Wrongful Life (Minority/CA + 2 others)
a. Child’s claim for negligently caused birth of as an unhealthy child
b. Damages – extra costs associated w/ disability (not pain and suffering)
(i) General Damages traditionally avoided because of difficulty and awkwardness of
calculating damages
c. Statutory exemption for child v. parent (also governs impleading of parents)
l) Defenses to Negligence
i) Contributory Negligence (4 states still use – VA)
1. Conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard of conduct to which he should
reasonable conform for his own protection and which is a legally contributing cause cooperating
with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm
a. Also: P’s negligent conduct contributes as a proximate cause
b. Objective standard (RP)
2. Complete Bar to recovery if P’s conduct is a C-I-F and PC
3. Exceptions
a. Last Clear Chance Doctrine
(i) P’s contributory negligence ignored if it occurs before D’s negligence
(ii) Who had opportunity to avoid accident
1. Davies v. Mann
2. Often ignored when jdxs switches to comparative negligence
b. Intentional torts
c. Extreme and reckless conduct
(i) D’s negligence was so extreme it is treated as if it were intentional
d. Plaintiffs Unable to Exercise Self Protection
(i) Contributory Negligence ignored when D violates statute designed to protect a class of
person (child labor laws, serving alcohol to intoxicated persons)
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 ii) Comparative Negligence (Majority)
1. Pure Comparative Negligence
a. Liability based proportionally on fault, determined by jury
b. Adopted by 12 States (CA)
2. Modified Comparative Negligence
a. P barred from recovery if >50% at fault
(i) 50-50 split still allows recovery
(ii) 21 State Approach
b. P barred from recovery if = or >50% at fault
(i) 12 State Approach
3. Slight Comparative Negligence (SD)
(i) P’s negligence is a complete bar unless slight, then comparative negligence used
iii) Assumption of Risk
1. Definition: P must
a. know a particular risk and
b. voluntarily
c. assumes it (expose oneself to it)
2. Knowledge
a. subjective
(i) must actually know of the risk, along with its magnitude and implications
(ii) unanticipated risks are not assumed
3. Voluntarily
a. What is involuntary ranges from coercion to unreasonably difficult to avoid
4. Assume
a. analogous to consent
5. Types:
a. Express
(i) K or release form
1. Narrowly construed meaning
a. CA rule of construction – waivers written by defendant must explicitly reference
liability
(ii) May be invalid if
1. against public policy (i.e. malpractice or recklessness), or gross disparity in
bargaining power, duress
b. Implied
(i) By P’s conduct
6. Treatment of Implied Assumption of Risk under Comparative Negligence
a. Approach 1 (Minority) – Assumption remains a complete defense
(i) consensual
b. Approach 2 (Minority) - Questioning the reasonableness of the Assumed Risk
(i) Reasonable assumed risks = complete bar
(ii) Unreasonable assumed risks = partial bar under comparative negligence
1. Because unreasonableness is similar to contributory negligence
c. Approach 3 (CA/Majority) – Absorption of Assumption of Risk into comparative negligence
(i) All implied assumption of risks is comparative
1. In Knight v. Jewett, CA created a limited duty in active sports that held liability to
intentional or reckless conduct outside ordinary activity
7. The firefighter’s rule
m) Joint and Several Liability
i) Joint Tortfeasors
(1) Acting in concert (aid, encourage)
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 (2) Independent acts causing a single indivisible injury
(3) Vicarious liability (Respondeat Superior)
(4) Joint and Several Liability
ii) Special Problems after Comparative Fault
(1) Allocations of liability among joint tortfeasors
(a) Pro rata used traditionally
(b) Comparative
(i) If a jdx retains JSL, P can still recover full award against any D (CA)
(ii) If no JSL, P can only recover a D’s share, not full amount
(2) Settlement: Impact on percentage shares
(a) Majority
(i) If P settles with D1, D1’s final share is deducted from P’s total award, regardless of
amount of P’s settlement with D1
1. P accepts the risk of settling for too little
2. Discourages settlements
(b) Minority (CA)
(i) Settlement is deducted from total award, remaining D’s responsible for full amount under
JSL
1. Encourages settlements (1st D to settle has advantage)
2. Puts burden on remaining Ds, especially Ds with low share of liability
(3) Contribution and indemnification
(a) JSL Liability
(4) Policy debate and reform statutes
(a) CA Ballot measure – JSL retained for economic damages only, not P+S
3) Strict Liability
a) Liability without fault
i) Eliminates breach of the standard to exercise due care
(1) Used when hazards cannot be avoided by being careful
(2) Rationale
(a) to discourage dangerous activities, or at least shift them away to a less dangerous place
(b) used where disaster is likely to destroy all evidence
b) Strict Liability is for abnormally dangerous activities
i) Elements
(1) Abnormally dangerous activity (used to be called ultra-hazardous)
(2) Danger unavoidable even with the exercise of due care
(3) Activity under defendant’s control
(4) Harm must be of the type which makes the activity dangerous
ii) §519
(a) “One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the
person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity although he has exercised the
utmost care to prevent such harm”
(b) “Such strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the risk of which makes the activity
abnormally dangerous”
c) Factors of abnormally dangerous activities (§520)
i) high degree of risk
ii) likelihood of extreme harm
iii) inability to eliminate risk by exercising reasonable care
iv) activity is uncommon
v) inappropriateness of place where activity is carried out
vi) value of activity to community
(1) Some jdxs (Alaska) do not use last 2 factors
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 d) Activity generally must be highly dangerous, unusual, somewhat inappropriate
(1) includes keeping odd wild animals – strict liability if your tiger escapes
e) Application of the Doctrine
(1) Blasting activity
(2) dangerous storage
(3) dangerous release or application
(4) dangerous transportation
(a) transportation of material itself inherently dangerous
(b) Common Carrier exemption in some jurisdictions
(i) Liability only if transporter is negligent
(5) dangerous transmission
(6) additional activities
f) Strict Liability for injuries caused by animals
g) Defenses
i) Traditionally
(1) Contributory Negligence - not a defense
(2) Assumption of risk – yes defense
ii) Trend & CA
(1) Comparative Negligence and Assumption of Risk are defenses
4) Products Liability
a) Types
i) Negligence
ii) Breach of Warranty
iii) Misrepresentation
iv) Strict Liability
b) Negligence
i) Types
(1) Negligent design
(2) Negligent manufacture
(a) manufacturer not negligent for following specifications of 3rd party unless specs are so
obviously dangerous no reasonable person would follow them
ii) Distributors/Retailers
(1) can sue distributor only if negligent in distribution
(2) can sue retailer only if retailer knew of defect
iii) Superceding forces can end manufacturer’s liability
iv) Strategic purpose where strict liability also exists - Allows P to introduce negative evidence about
D’s breach of the standard of care that wouldn’t be allowed just under strict liability
c) Breach of Warranty (Contract Law)
i) Types
(1) Express
(a) Direct promise (advertising, face-to-face, contract)
(b) Liability w/out negligence if product fails to live up to promise
(2) Implied
(a) Not stated (i.e. chair has implied warranty to work as a chair should)
(b) Can be disclaimed
ii) Requirement of Privity
(1) can only sue D who sold item (i.e. retailer, not manufacturer)
(2) Later holdings found Manufacturer owes a duty to public for whom the product is intended, as
well as distributor/retailer
(a) Overcomes requirement of privity of contract
iii) Requirement of Timely Notice
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 iv) Benefits – can recover pure economic losses in some circumstances
d) Misrepresentation
e) Strict Products Liability
i) Elements
(1) Product is defective
(2) for a foreseeable purpose and is
(3) proximate cause of injury
(a) type of harm suffered must be that which makes the product dangerous
ii) What is Defective?
(1) Majority / Restatement (§402a)
(a) Defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
(i) Consumer expectations test - Product is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer
would expect
1. Weakness: diminished expectations could relieve manufacturer of liability
2. Unclear and circular reasoning
(2) Risk /Utility test
(a) Test: product is reasonably safe if
(i) its utility outweighs its risk, and
(ii) the risk has been reduced to the greatest extant possible consistent with its utility
1. Beshada v. Johns Manville
(b) Similar to negligence – asks if the product was reasonably safe for its foreseeable purposes
(3) Hybrid “Barker v. Lull Engineering” test (CA)
(a) Manufacturing Defect
(i) Definition – product differs from a ostensibly similar unit (i.e. broken)
(b) Design Defect, use either
(i) Consumer Expectations (modified):
1. Test
a. Product fails to perform
b. as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect
c. when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner
i. Drops “unreasonably dangerous” requirement
2. Advantage: P does not have to allege exact defect, only failure of the product to
perform
3. Limited now by overly high expectations people have for products, especially high
tech
(ii) Risk v. Benefits (Risk/Utility)
1. Test
a. P proves product is a proximate cause and
b. D fails to prove that benefits of D’s design outweigh the risk of danger
i. In CA, burden is on D to prove risk v. benefit
2. Product performs as expected but still exposes P to excessive preventable danger
3. Risk v. benefit factors
a. Gravity of danger
b. Likelihood of danger
c. Feasibility of safer alternative
d. Increased costs of safer design
e. Decreased utility of safer designs
(4) Evaluation of Risk v. Benefits
(a) At time of manufacture, or
(i) Without hindsight, then standard is very similar to negligence
(b) Hindsight – use technology/knowledge at time of trial
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 (i) Defendant’s knowledge is irrelevant
(ii) Benefits P because if advances in technology, it can be clear that risks outweigh the
benefits or are unreasonably dangerous
iii) Warning Defect (Subset of Design Defects)
(1) Duty to Warn when manufacturer knew or should of known of danger
(a) Making a warning is usually always possible w/out diminishing utility or increasing cost
(2) Adequate warnings generally insulate from liability
(3) Warning does not shield D from liability if D could have cured defect for minor amount of $
relative to the risk involved – D should have cured it, not warned about it
iv) Defenses to Strict Product Liabilities
(1) State of the Art Defense (design/warning cases, possibly extensible to all cases)
(a) Subtract any later knowledge that was not discoverable at time of manufacture
(i) Defect was not scientifically knowable at time of manufacture
(ii) Overrides hindsight argument
v) Restatement 3
(1) Defective = Risk v. Benefit test + state of the art defense
(a) No product shall be defective unless there is a safe alternative
5) Defamation
a) Defamation
i) ∆ must publish (make public)
ii) material that sufficiently identifies the π
iii) injures π’s reputation
iv) false statements purportedly of fact or of opinion implying the existence of facts
v) unprivileged
b) QUESTION: Does the statement involve a matter of public concern/statement about public figure?
i) If yes- π’s p/f case
(1) ∆ must make a defamatory statement: allegation of fact that reflects negatively on π character,
adversely affect one’s reputation
ii) If no- π need not prove malice
(1) If π is private person w/ matter of public concern
(a) Π must prove ∆ was negligent as to the statement’s truth or falsity
(b) Damages, only for proved actual injury but if π proves malice damages available
(2) If π is a private person w/ matter of private concern
(a) No requirement π prove fault
(b) Presumed damages for defamation
c) Privilege
i) Protect publishers and broadcasters concerning defamatory statements about public officials and
“public figures” so long as those statements are not made knowingly or recklessly
ii) NYT- one who defamed public official in performance of his official duty would be liable only if the
publication was made with “actual malice”
d) Defenses
i) Consent
ii) Truth
iii) Privilege
(1) Absolute- judicial proceedings, legislators
(2) Qualified, letters of reference, credit reporting, etc
6) Privacy
a) General Rule
i) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting harm to the
interests of the other
ii) The right of privacy is invaded by
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 (1) Intrusion upon seclusion
(2) Appropriation of name or likeness
(3) Publicity given to private life
(4) Publicity placing person in false light
b) Appropriation of name or likeness
i) Elements – liability for
(1) One who appropriates for his own use or benefit
(a) i.e. commercial use (endorsement)
(2) The name or likeness (picture) of another
ii) Exception for coverage of newsworthy events (journalism, scholarship), satire
c) Publicity Given to Private Life
i) Elements – liability for
(1) Publicity of
(2) Private facts
(3) Highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(4) Not of legitimate concern to the public
(a) Exception for newsworthy items
d) Publicity Placing Person in False Light
i) Elements – liability for
(1) Publicizing
(2) False Facts
(3) Offensive to a reasonable person
(4) Knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard to the truth
(a) i.e NY Times Malice, mere negligence not enough
(i) reckless = D knew they didn’t know whether true or not
7) Injurious Falsehood
a) A fallacious statement that causes intentional damage to an individual's commercial or economic
relations.
b) Any type of defamatory remark, either written or spoken, that causes pecuniary loss to an individual
through disparagement of a particular business dealing.
c) For example, the early cases on injurious falsehood involved oral aspersions cast upon an individual's
ownership of land, which prevented the individual from leasing or selling it. This TORT has also been
called disparagement of property, slander of goods, and trade libel.
8) Nuisance:
Private v Public Nuisance
A) Private Nuisance
1) Definition: A substantial + unreasonable + interference w/another private individual’s + use or
enjoyment of property + that he actually possesses + or to which he has a right of immediate
possession
2) Substantial interference: must be offensive, inconvenient or annoying to average person. Not
substantial if results merely from P’s hypersensitivity/specialized use of own property
3) Unreasonable: severity of inflicted injury must outweigh utility of D’s conduct. (Cts consider
neighborhood, land values, existence of alternative courses of conduct open to D).
4) Unlike trespass of land: where landowners’ exclusive possession interfered w/by physical
invasion
B) Public Nuisance:
1) Definition: An act that unreasonably interferes with + the health, safety or property rights of
the community (e.g., using a building for drugs).
2) Recovery for private person for public nuisance only if suffered unique damages not suffered
by public at large

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