India-US relations
Historical context of India-US Relations (Dr. S Jaishankar, Aug. 2018)
Historically, the US made an ambivalent approach to the growth of India's power.
• On the one hand, it valued Indian stability and promoted those aspects that served its larger
interests. That explains the US's generosity when it came to development programs at a time
when our political relations were not at their best. When there were serious challenges such as in
1962, American policy makers were actually anxious about our future.
• But on the other hand, they worked overtime to neutralize our regional dominance strove
particularly hard to ensure some parity with Pakistan.
This policy started changing during the Kargil conflict and has gathered momentum over successive
administrations. It has been driven by numerous factors, among them our growing economic and
technology relationship, new geo-politics arising from the rise of China, and some commonality of
interest on terrorism. The diaspora has been a big factor in this process.
Among the changes that reflect this new relationship are the India-US Civil Nuclear Deal and also the
closer defence cooperation. Clearly an India that has substantial economic relationship, serious military
ties, greater convergence in strategic interests and an influential diaspora connect, has to approach the
US very differently.
We cannot continue on autopilot. For good reason of History the old Indian mindset vis-a-vis the US is
defensive, even suspicious. But today, a stronger and more capable India is perfectly capable of a
strategy of leveraging the US (e.g. India-US nuclear deal example of India leveraging great power to get
ahead). Keeping a distance from another country cannot be a primary yardstick of policy independence
of a confidant power. On the contrary, we can make the pursuit of our own global goals and interests
much harder. A clear eyed view of our national interests encourages us to work with the US when
required and differ with it when necessary.
Newer normal in world politics - Economic Nationalism in the US has already made trade more central
to relationships than ever before. The recalibration in American global posture have repercussions that
are yet to be felt.
There could be differences as well on third party relationships (e.g. Iran), but at a time when we are still
harvesting the gains of improved India-US ties, it is important not to lose focus. The structural basis of
this relationship has never been stronger.
Certainly, there will be the give and take of International Politics, and now increasingly on International
Trade, but it is not that as if we don't have cards to play. The less rigid global architecture allows for
more freedom of manoeuvre (hinting at China, Russia ties for leveraging ties with the US). Abandoning
prejudices and making decisions on merits would itself be doing foreign policy very differently.
Shivshankar Menon in his Book "Choices: Inside the Making of India's Foreign Policy", writes that there
has been a conviction that a true India-US strategic partnership would serve our national interests in the
changed geopolitical situation. While both countries have always fought shy of saying that their
partnership is to balance China, it is clear that the rise of China was one of the major spurs.
There is a creative tension at the heart of India-U.S. relations. India clearly needs U.S. technology,
markets, and support to transform itself and create the stable and peaceful environment that the
country needs to grow. The US finds a stronger and more active India useful since there is a clear
strategic congruence between the two countries' goals in the Indo-Pacific. But India is also an awkward
partner since its strategic interests in West Asia diverge from those of the U.S., and India's present stage
of development, so different from that of the U.S., leads India to make economic demands that strain
U.S. preferences.
Today India and the United States are victims of the civil nuclear initiative's success. The emotional
impact of the Civil Nuclear Initiative raised the level of ambition in the relationship so high that
expectations on both sides have become hard to fulfill.
While India's ties with the United States are better than ever and continue to expand, in public discourse
the search continues for the next big thing, the next civil nuclear initiative. I have no doubt that having
surprised the world once in July 2005, India and the United States can certainly do so again in the future.
India US Defence Ties – Defence Framework Pact and DTTI
Defence cooperation has been the most visible aspect of this evolving relationship over the last one-
and-a half decade. The US has in fact emerged as the top arms supplier to India and currently India
conducts more military exercises with the US than with any other country.
• January 1995: Defence Policy Group (DPG) (apex institutional dialogue mechanism for Defence
Cooperation)
• June 2005: a New Defence Framework Agreement, focused on defence trade, joint exercises,
personnel exchanges, collaboration and cooperation in maritime security and counter piracy
operations, exchanges between each of the Services, etc.
o Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) (is not a Treaty or Law), 2012:
• To strengthen defence cooperation by facilitating the Indian companies to collaborate
with US partners in defense co-production, where the US provides technology and
guidance for building modern weapon systems.
• Co-development and co-production under DTTI may become the hallmark of the
Modi government’s ‘Make-in-India’ initiative.
• 2015: renewed this Defence Framework Agreement for the next 10 years.
o four key “pathfinder projects” for joint development and production under the DTTI
• Intelligence-gathering and reconnaissance modules for C-130J Super Hercules aircraft
• Mobile electric hybrid power sources
• Chemical, biological warfare protection gear for soldiers
• India is among eight countries where US defense exports are not restricted.
• June 2016: The recognition of India as a "Major Defence Partner".
• August 2018: Strategic Trade Authorisation - STA-1 status to India
Military Joint Exercises:
1. Naval exercise MALABAR with Japan,
o When the 2007 edition of this bilateral exercise, held off Okinawa, was enlarged to
accommodate Australia, Singapore and Japan, China issued a shrill demarche, conveying its
fear and displeasure. It took another eight years before Japan was formally admitted to
make Malabar a tri-lateral.
2. India’s participation in the Rim-of-the-Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise in Hawaii,
3. Red Flag Air Force Exercise in Alaska,
4. YUDH ABHYAS Army exercise.
Four 'Foundational pacts' that US wanted India to sign since 2002, are:
1. End User Verification Agreement (which the US and India had already signed).
2. Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), signed as India specific LEMOA.
3. Communications Interoperability & Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA).
o June 2018: Draft Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA)
changed from CISMOA to reflect its India-specific nature.
4. Basic Exchange & Cooperation Agreement on geo-spatial services (BECA).
What is LEMOA?
• Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), a modified version of Logistics Support
Agreement (LSA).
• Would enable mutual exchange of logistics support, supplies and services (LSSS) between the
defense forces of both countries.
• India did not had such agreements with any nation due to apprehensions that it would lead us
progressively towards a form of informal alliance (Which has political sensitivities). Earlier,
whenever any ship from any country visited our ports or airbases, it goes through a long process
of clearances through MEA, MoD and other agencies. This foundational agreement facilitates
cutting short of those agreements.
• Simplifies procedures for berthing, refuelling, repairing, supplying food stores etc., it's not a bad
deal.
• Why LEMOA and not LSA?
o For specific situations such as joint military exercises, interventions in disaster relief and any
other situation mutually agreed upon.
o No automaticity that it would apply in all situations and India would have discretionary
powers to grant such permissions.
o However, refusing their requests (hypothetically supposing in some war between US and
some other country, say Iran, which is friendly to us) on case-to-case basis might create a
political controversial thing.
• Agreement mentions specifically to allay concerns of being seen as a too close a US military ally ,
“The Agreement does not create any obligations on either Party to carry out any joint activity. It
does not provide for the establishment of any bases or basing arrangements.”
What is CISMOA?
• CISMOA stands for Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum Agreement.
• Would allow the interoperability of equipments, meaning that there would be access to
encrypted and secret technologies or communications.
• So far US has blocked sale of some of the advanced technologies and sensitive equipments
(generally installed on US procured systems only) to India on account of non-signing this
agreement.
• Could also be important for multinational operations related to rescue, disaster relief etc.
June 2018 - Draft Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA); Sushant Singh -
COMCASA: Why US, India can’t connect (June 2018)
• Provides a legal framework for the transfer of communication security equipment from the US to
India that would facilitate “interoperability” between Indian and US forces — and potentially with
other militaries that use US-origin systems for secure data links.
• To facilitate the use of high-end secured communication equipment to be installed on military
platforms being sold to India. India’s military, they argue, is currently dependent on commercially
available and less secure communication systems on high-end American platforms like C-130Js
and the P8I maritime surveillance aircraft.
• US says signing COMCASA becomes mandatory if India is to get the armed version of the Sea
Guardian drones from Washington.
India’s concerns:
i. Defence ministry officials fear American intrusive access to Indian military communication
systems
ii. Violation of Indian sovereignty due to visits by US inspectors to Indian bases to inspect the
COMCASA-safeguarded equipment.
iii. They also fear that a large quantity of Russian-origin and indigenous Indian military platforms may
not be compatible with COMCASA.
iv. It is also a politically sensitive issue in India. Moving into an election year, with India-US relations
on a somewhat less strong footing, the government may be hesitant to sign the agreement now.
What kind of assurances India demands? (Aug. 2018)
• India’s demand for a clause which explicitly states that Indian sovereign law takes precedence
over COMCASA. Indian officials argue that such a clause was part of the India-US nuclear deal
negotiated by the UPA government and there is no reason why Americans can’t make the same
concession now.
• Assurance that the American side won’t use the access it gets to the military communications
system for spying on India.
• About the misuse of control equipment, as it is part of proprietary American network, which can
be used by US military against Indian forces.
• The US government should not switch the whole equipment off or shut the Indian military
network down as part of a policy decision.
US's new National Security Strategy (Dec. 2017)
Indo-Pacific:
• We welcome India’s emergence as a leading global power and stronger strategic and defense
partner. We will seek to increase quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India.
• We will expand our defense and security cooperation with India, a Major Defense Partner of the
United States, and support India’s growing relationships throughout the region.
South Asia: The United States continues to face threats from transnational terrorists and militants
operating from within Pakistan. The prospect for an Indo-Pakistani military conflict that could lead to a
nuclear exchange remains a key concern requiring consistent diplomatic attention.
U.S. interests in the region include countering terrorist threats that impact the security of the U.S.
homeland and our allies, preventing cross-border terrorism that raises the prospect of military and
nuclear tensions, and preventing nuclear weapons, technology, and materials from falling into the hands
of terrorists.
Political:
• We will deepen our strategic partnership with India and support its leadership role in Indian
Ocean security and throughout the broader region.
• We will press Pakistan to intensify its counterterrorism efforts, since no partnership can survive a
country’s support for militants and terrorists who target a partner’s own service members and
officials. The United States will also encourage Pakistan to continue demonstrating that it is a
responsible steward of its nuclear assets.
• We will help South Asian nations maintain their sovereignty as China increases its influence in the
region.
Economic:
• We will encourage India to increase its economic assistance in the region. In Pakistan, we will build
trade and investment ties as security improves and as Pakistan demonstrates that it will assist the
United States in our counterterrorism goals.
Military and Security:
• We will bolster the fighting strength of the Afghan security forces to convince the Taliban that
they cannot win on the battlefield and to set the conditions for diplomatic efforts to achieve
enduring peace. We will insist that Pakistan take decisive action against militant and terrorist
groups operating from its soil.
Trade and Commercial Sector
• High levels of bilateral trade and highest ever FDI inflows to India in 2016-17, especially from the
US. In 2017 calendar year, India-U.S. bilateral trade in goods and services reached $140 billion
• “Silicon Valley comes to India’ program which will have experts from USA coming to India to
interact with start-ups and provide the required momentum to Indian entrepreneurial eco-system.
• Travel and Tourism as a new work stream for future collaboration.
• Infrastructure and Smart Cities collaboration - to tap the opportunity of India’s infrastructure
projects through mechanisms like the “National Infrastructure and Investment Fund”
• Issues in areas of standards, Intellectual Property
• Co-hosted the 2017 Global Entrepreneurship Summit in India.
• April 2018 - The Office of the USTR would review the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)
eligibility of India, Indonesia, and Kazakhstan. The U.S. GSP programme was established by the
U.S. Trade Act of 1974, and promotes economic development by eliminating duties on thousands
of products when imported from one of the 129 designated beneficiary countries and territories.
Shyam Saran on US obstructing India's entry into the APEC:
• Our argument: If India becomes the member of APEC, US won't have a pressure to try and
negotiate on trade related issues, it would have comfort level because of this. It could then
conform over a period of time to the higher standards and would help India in becoming part and
parcel of what US says as a 'higher standards trading arrangements'.
• Even this argument is being opposed by US, wherein other countries support India for its
membership. Now this kind of approach US cannot continue to have and yet believe that US-India
can develop a strong political and security partnership.
One leg of the US-India cooperation in terms of security relationship is growing very well but the other
leg of economic and trade cooperation is highly infected and not sustainable in the long term for
overall growth of relations.
What is Indo – US’s WTO problem?
Agriculture
• AoA of Uruguay round negotiations is heavily tilted in favor of developed world.
• Current quest of India as part of G-33 is towards achieving permanent solution. This has impact on
our PDS system at administered prices.
Intellectual Property
• As part of Doha Development Agenda, developing countries managed to tweak ‘Agreement on
TRIPS in favor of developing countries by allowing compulsory licensing in certain circumstances.
o e.g. NATCO for ‘nexavar’ drug produced originally by German firm Bayer AG.
• US not only want this concept to be done away with, it also wants a liberal IPR regime which
allows evergreening of patents.
• Indian Patent Act allows protection of both product and process, but it allows patent only when
there is enhanced efficacy of the substance.
Visa problem
• India is the largest user of H1B visas (67.4% of the total H1B visas issued in FY14 went to Indians)
and is also among the largest users of L1 visas (Indians received 28.2% of the total L1 visas issued
in FY14). India is likely to pursue bilateral discussions over the issue, but as last resort it may head
to WTO if nothing comes out.
o What is H-1B visa: a non-immigrant visa that allows US companies to employ foreign
workers in specialty occupations that require theoretical or technical expertise in specialized
fields such as in architecture, engineering, mathematics, science, and medicine for up to six
years.
o Why do H-1B visa woes continue? The Hindu
Source Channel
• Shyam Saran: https://t.me/visionpt3652019
o Since issuance of visas is considered to be an immigration issue and not a trade issue, one
cannot take the suspension to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. What we can do is
to highlight the fact that this is a partnership in which both parties gain.
• Indian IT services contribute to enhancing the global competitiveness of U.S.
companies,
• Indian IT companies are providing significant employment in their operations to U.S.
citizens, and
• U.S. tech companies in India are some of the most profitable in the world.
o Furthermore, in negotiating with the U.S. on this issue, we should leverage the fact that
India is a growing market for U.S. products and services, in particular for defence hardware
and technology. There should be some element of trade-off.
o Indian IT companies should also adapt to the changed situation by diversifying markets away
from the heavy dependence on the U.S.
• A newly released World Bank report on global migration shows - In skilled migration worldwide,
busiest route is India to US. Nearly 12 lakh skilled migrants from India to the US in 2010,
compared to nearly 3 lakh from the Philippines to Canada. (July 2018)
C Raja Mohan on challenges in Trade relations under Trump Administration (May 2018):
• Amidst Trump’s growing challenges to India on trade and immigration issues, Delhi’s claims that it
is in ‘compliance with the WTO’ or its insistence on ‘free movement of labour’ into America
appear utterly innocent of the new dynamics shaping Trump’s demand for rewriting the trade
rules and opposition to open borders.
• At Wuhan, China has shown it is taking Trump seriously and finding ways to manage the multiple
uncertainties generated by him. India appears miles away from constructing a coherent strategic
response that will take advantage from some of Trump’s policies while limiting the damage from
others.
Trump administration - Impact on India-US relations:
C Raja Mohan: Smart money, in Delhi, should be on significant change rather than continuity in
Washington. There is probably only one guidance to understanding Trump’s America: the past is not a
good guide for the future.
PM Modi's June 2017 visit to USA.
Joint Statements: 2017, 2016
• Democratic Stalwarts in the Indo-Pacific Region - a close partnership between the US and India is
central to peace and stability in the region:
o Respecting freedom of navigation, overflight, and commerce throughout the region;
o To resolve territorial and maritime disputes peacefully and in accordance with international
law (read UNCLOS);
o Bolstering regional economic connectivity through the transparent development of
infrastructure and the use of responsible debt financing practices, while ensuring respect
for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the rule of law, and the environment; and call on
other nations (read China) in the region to adhere to these principles.
• Increase tangible collaboration with partners in the Middle East.
• A new para on DPRK - to work together to counter the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction
programs.
• Counter-Terrorism:
o Called on Pakistan to ensure that its territory is not used to launch terrorist attacks on other
countries, to expeditiously bring to justice the perpetrators of the 26/11 Mumbai,
Pathankot, and other cross-border terrorist attacks perpetrated by Pakistan-based groups.
o Expanding intelligence-sharing and operational-level counterterrorism cooperation.
o Support to UN CCIT, reinforce the message that no cause or grievance justifies terrorism.
• Defence: Proposed sale of Sea Guardian drones (non-weaponized, surveillance purposes) for
Indian Navy - the first non-NATO country to be offered these.
o But India, looking for possible weaponized systems is yet to commit to a purchase from
America. The $2 billion deal could go a long way in boosting jobs in the US and certainly ties
in with Trump's "America First" policy, but might be less attractive to India than it appears at
first glance.
• Nuclear: Both looked forward to conclusion of contractual agreements between Westinghouse
and the NPCIL for six nuclear reactors in India and also related project financing.
o April 2018: The two sides reaffirm their strong commitment to early and full
implementation of our civil nuclear partnership, including the Westinghouse civil nuclear
project at Kovvada.
• U.S. energy exports so that more natural gas, clean coal, and renewable resources and
technologies are available to fuel India’s economic growth and inclusive development. To expand
energy and innovation linkages, including on more efficient fossil fuel technologies, smart grids,
and energy storage. Both Financing of energy projects, including clean coal projects, by
Multilateral Development Banks to promote universal access to affordable and reliable energy.
o April 2018: India-US Strategy Energy Partnership Joint Statement
o Four primary pillars of cooperation: (1) Oil and Gas; (2) Power and Energy Efficiency; (3)
Renewable Energy and Sustainable Growth; and (4) Coal. Both parties may consider
establishing additional pillars of cooperation based on mutual agreement.
• India’s formal entry into the International Expedited Traveler Initiative (Global Entry program) in
order to facilitate closer business and educational ties between the citizens of India and the
United States. In 2016, there was a MoU for this.
Expert's/Scholar's views:
Shyam Saran (May 2017): The present government has invested heavily in building a stronger strategic
partnership with the US. This was based on the assumption that even with its geopolitical pre-
dominance diminished, the US remained a formidable military power and an unmatched source of
technological innovation and excellence. It shared India’s interest in preventing a China-dominated
Asia and the world. It would, therefore, be an indispensable partner in India’s trajectory towards great
power status.
Trump’s preoccupations at home mean that the US will be less engaged with regional and global issues
and this adds another layer of complexity in dealing with the China challenge and in navigating an even
more treacherous international landscape.
However, the strengths of the US are likely to be enduring and India should not dilute the relationship
because of immediate concerns such as the issue of visas to our IT professionals.
FS S Jaishankar (July 2017): "The United States is, generally speaking, reframing its terms of engagement
with the world. Let us be clear what is not happening: the US is not withdrawing from the world. On
the contrary, it is seeking to get what it hopes to be a better deal from the rest of the world.
It is important not to jump to conclusions. The continued presence of the United States in the Asia-
Pacific is an important factor in the calculations of all nations. Developing a nuanced understanding of
the unfolding situation is a must for policy makers, as well as analysts."
"Don't demonize Trump, Analyse Trump."
Pratap Mehta (Oct 2017) - The new Asian game - An authoritarian, assertive China is a challenge for
India. But it is premature to conclude that US will be its saviour.
C Raja Mohan (Oct 2017) - India should resist the temptation for an endless debate on whether America
can move away from China and Pakistan and be India’s reliable partner. Delhi should focus, instead, on
strengthening practical cooperation wherever possible with Trump’s Washington.
Delhi must seek to:
• stiffen America’s resolve to confront the Pakistan Army’s sponsorship of terror,
• encourage him to discard the residual bureaucratic hesitations in Washington about supporting
India’s rise, and
• delineate the pathways for constructing a stable balance of power system in the Indo-Pacific.
C Raja Mohan (Nov. 2017) - Xi, Trump, Asian disorder.
The new complexities driving Asian politics.
• These include America’s demands for “fair” rather than “free trade” with Asia and the problem of
accommodating China’s rise without abandoning its long-standing allies and friends in the region.
Xi insisted that Beijing and Washington need to “jointly” promote peace and stability in Asia. This is one
of Xi’s core demands on Trump — to share the leadership of Asia on Beijing’s terms. Trump, or any other
US president, will have a hard time ceding America’s long-standing primacy in Asia.
Three things stand out:
i. America and China will continue to jockey for political primacy in Asia;
ii. the tension between Washington’s traditional commitment to economic globalisation and
Trump’s “America First” policies is unlikely to be resolved any time soon; and
iii. most countries in the region are beginning to diversify their security partnerships.
The rise of China and the turbulence in American domestic politics have created great disorder under
the heavens. But they have also opened up much room for creative Indian diplomacy in Asia.
Alyssa Ayres: US policies toward India and Asia need strategic coherence (Nov. 2017)
• US should call explicitly for APEC to offer membership to India. Asia’s third largest economy
deserves to have a seat at the table, and it will help India to be more embedded in the premier
regime focused on free and open trade in Asia.
• To address the urgent need for infrastructure funding in the Asian region—to offer a real
alternative to the Belt and Road loans.
• In economic dialogues with India, the administration needs to keep its gaze on the strategic and
not get buried in the transactional. A narrow focus on the $24 billion trade deficit with India
(compared to more than $300 billion with China), should not distract from this larger goal. Of
course, we and India need to sort out market access problems and our difficulties with Indian IPR
polices, but these questions are not strategic in nature.
• A strong, stable, democratic India committed to a rules-based order will indeed be a “bookend”
for the region. Washington will have to alter its economic focus to get there.
Nisha Biswal - (Oct. 2017) - The geo-economics of the Indo-Pacific are as important as the region’s
geopolitics.
A fully realised US-India economic partnership is necessary to accomplish the shared goals and shape
the destiny of the Indo-Pacific region.
C Raja Mohan - How India can negotiate Trump’s world (Dec. 2017)
If President George W. Bush affirmed that Washington will support India’s rise, Trump is welcoming
India’s “emergence as a leading global power”. If presidents Bush and Obama stopped seeing India
through the constricting prism of South Asia, Trump is betting on a larger role for Delhi in stabilising the
Indo-Pacific.
Delhi has to look at one of the key propositions in Trump’s NSS: “Economic security is national
security”. Aligning India’s economic strategy with the changes unfolding in Trump’s America is the key to
an enduring and productive bilateral partnership. Central to that approach is the revitalization of India’s
high-technology partnership with America.
• India’s real opportunity with Trump’s America, therefore, lies in building on the expansive linkages
between Bengaluru and Silicon Valley and demonstrating that the two nations could
simultaneously prosper.
Harsh Pant: Responding to Donald Trump’s disruption (May 2018): The challenge for India is to use its
convergence with Russia and China on global issues to bring a semblance of balance to American
capriciousness on the global stage.
C Raja Mohan: India’s diplomacy, Trump effect (May 2018)
As Trump demands reciprocity in commercial relationships to redress America’s massive trade
imbalance with the rest of the world, most of America’s partners are eager to make bilateral deals with
Washington. As Trump questions the costs and benefits of alliances, America’s traditional partners in
Europe and Asia have been compelled to consider the logic of strategic autonomy from the U S. Neither
Trump’s allies nor his adversaries can now afford to take Washington for granted.
India’s positive political relations with the US have been complemented by the new challenges of
managing the problems on the trade and immigration fronts. If Sino-US tensions have opened up space
for India, those between Washington and Moscow shrink Delhi’s room for manoeuvre. Modi’s informal
summits in Wuhan with Xi and Sochi with Putin are part of the new nimble footed Indian diplomacy
towards major powers.
Delhi’s weak defence industrial base and tentative military diplomacy have prevented it from measuring
up to its own claim on being a “regional security provider”.
Suhasini Haider (June 2018)
• U.S. new law called Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) - India’s
plans to acquire the Russian S-400 missile system.
o July 2018 - US Congress exempts India, Vietnam, & Indonesia from sanctions under
CAATSA on Russian weaponry purchases.
• In the past year, more than 30 key administration officials have quit or have been sacked — they
have had to deal with three National Security Advisers, two Chiefs of Staff, as well as two
Secretaries of State as interlocutors.
• “2+2” dialogue (Foreign and Commerce ministers) - Postponed to Sept. 2018.
Pratap Bhanu Mehta - Trump's Disruptions (June 2018)
Trump’s disruptions signify three mutually reinforcing trends.
i. Signalled “end of the west” as a coherent ideological and geo-political entity by disrupting the G-7.
ii. Making it clear that America does not want to sustain Pax Americana. It is not willing to pay the
price for it in terms of troops or financial commitments.
iii. Putting America first, and in rhetoric, rolling back on post-Cold War globalisation.
o There is surprise that it is Trump not China that is disrupting the global trading order.
Growing inequality, wage stagnation and deindustrialisation is being blamed on
globalisation.
Alyssa Ayres (July 2018): (Context: Tariff retaliation, CAATSA sanctions Russian S-400, JCPOA Iran
sanctions impact on India's Oil trade and Chabahar, postponement of 2+2 dialogue for third time) Put
simply, the Trump foreign policy can zero in on an arbitrarily-chosen economic metric, fixate on it, and
no strategic concern or history of alliance strength can compensate.
Ashley Tellis (July 2018): In U.S.' zeal to mount frontal assault on Iran, India has become an inadvertent
casualty.
On PM Modi's informal summits with China and Russia:
• A tactical adjustment, partly in the context of India’s own electoral calendar (cannot afford new
crises on his frontiers). Furthermore, India has a traditional relationship with Russia that it cannot
jettison in a hurry. Nor can it afford to have a deeply confrontational relationship with China
either.
• I don’t think India has made any fundamental strategic shift against the United States. Polygamous
strategic partnerships have been the norm since the Cold War and will be the norm going forward.
Samir Saran - India-US relationship: Is the top-down structure sustainable? (July 2018)
It is time to enquire if the US can continue to unilaterally set the priorities for this relationship — and
strong-arm India into accommodating its preferred posture on key issues such as Pakistan and Iran.
• The fact is that India’s economic growth will see its GDP surpass the US before the middle of this
century on real terms and well before in PPP terms.
• This reality implies that New Delhi will increasingly set its own priorities and will retain
independent beneficial relationships with countries like Iran and chart its own course with its
neighbours.
How will the US establishment come to terms with the fact that for the better part of the 21st century,
India will be the larger economic partner? More importantly, has Delhi realised the potential and
consequences of this shift?
C Raja Mohan: India and Trump’s world (July 2018)
Context: Trump's outburst against EU, NATO, G7, accusing Germany of being “totally controlled by
Russia”, undermining the so-called special relationship between America and Britain, determined to
enhance the engagement with Putin’s Russia
• India will need a more transactional — a pejorative word in India’s diplomatic lexicon — approach
to deal with the Trump effect. Claiming that it is “WTO compliant” is a poor strategy when the big
boys are changing the trading rules. Delhi needs a flexible negotiating strategy founded in a more
ambitious internal reform agenda.
• In Trump’s world, the contradictions within the West are becoming sharper than ever before.
Obsession with “strategic autonomy” makes little sense when the post-War geopolitical categories
are breaking down. As in the economic domain, so in the political, India’s diplomatic emphasis
must be transactional.
• Delhi must avoid conflict with the powers with which it has serious disputes. It also needs to lift
self-imposed limits on security cooperation with the powers that are ready to boost India’s
material power. In these troubled times, transactional diplomacy, and not political posturing,
holds the key to achieving India’s ambitious national goals.
Richard Verma and N Menon Rao report on US-India relations - Joshua White summarizes the contents
of the report (Jan. 2018):
(a) “Strategic Advantage Initiative” focused on bolstering India’s defense capabilities in the Indo-Pacific.
(b) Creating a U.S.-India Indo-Pacific HADR cell to “plan and jointly train for coordinated response to
natural disasters in the Indian Ocean region.”
(c) Encourages India to improve its defense procurement process, and its sometimes myopic rubric for
evaluating overall cost. (U.S. defense companies highlight that U.S. systems often provide the best the
value over the lifetime of a system.)
(d) Finally, the report recommends a “joint defense implementation agreement.” An umbrella
arrangement that bundles a number of specific and often technical cooperative agreements.
Russia question in India-US relations (Context: India negotiating for Russian S-400 missile system
and US CAATSA)
The Russia question continues to vex the foreign policy establishment in both countries.
• While India’s dependence on Russia for defence products reduces, the fact is that it will remain a
key security partner for many years to come. At the same time, Moscow will increasingly become
an important actor for India’s political, connectivity and energy projects in Eurasia. To sustain a
long-term India-US partnership, it is now time for both countries to adopt a mutually
accommodative position on Russia.
• The US, for its part, must be flexible and account for the important role Russia plays in India’s
security objectives. New Delhi, on the other hand, must invest diplomatic energy in convincing
Washington to shed its cold war mentality towards Moscow and embrace an ‘entente cordiale’
with this superpower, especially as both countries begin to recalibrate their approach to China.
Neither India nor the US would benefit from Russia being in the Chinese corner.
Jeff Smith (June 2018)
• India should be encouraged to continue weaning itself off Russian hardware. But no credible
expert thinks it’s reasonable to demand that India halt defense trade with Russia immediately and
indefinitely. None believes India could do so without seriously undermining its national security.
• At a time Delhi and Moscow have grown increasingly estranged, Russia would like nothing more
than to drive a wedge between the two democracies.
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