PAGCOR vs Aumentado (General Rule)

FACTS

Rufino G. Aumentado, Jr. was employed by PAGCOR as a table supervisor. Subsequently, PAGCOR
dismissed respondent from the service. Feeling aggrieved, respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal.

The CSC ruled that respondent was illegally terminated from the service and ordered respondent’s
reinstatement and the payment of his backwages. PAGCOR filed a motion for reconsideration. The CSC
denied PAGCOR’s motion.

PAGCOR appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the CSC’s decision.

PAGCOR appealed to the Supreme Court but was denied due to failure to take the appeal within the
reglementary period of 15 days. The order was subsequently made final and executory.

Aumentado requested for his immediate reinstatement and the payment of his backwages. He also filed a
motion for execution before the CSC. In its Resolution, the CSC granted respondent’s motion.

However, sometime in April, PAGCOR and Aumentado entered into an amicable settlement and, for
monetary consideration, he executed a quitclaim for a consideration of ₱843,840.41 and the release of all
liabilities or demands of action of PAGCOR in connection with the CSC’s Resolution.

Later, PAGCOR filed with the CSC a “Manifestation of Quitclaim with Prayer to Declare Complainant in
Contempt.” PAGCOR sought the reconsideration of CSC’s Resolution on the basis of the quitclaim
executed by respondent. CSC denied PAGCOR’s motion, stating that since there are no more legal
impediments, Rufino G. Aumentado, Jr. should now be reinstated to his former position, or, if the same
be legally untenable, to any equivalent position.

PAGCOR filed a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied.

PAGCOR appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Ruling of the CA

The Court of Appeals denied PAGCOR’s appeal. It ruled that the appeal was not proper because Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court (the Rules) applies only to appeals from judgments or final orders of an administrative
body. PAGCOR’s appeal was not one from a judgment or final order of the CSC but was directed against a
resolution ordering respondent’s reinstatement in accordance with a decision which had already become
final and executory. An order of execution is not appealable.

PAGCOR filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUE

1.) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that its jurisdiction under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court is limited only to JUDGMENTS and FINAL ORDERS of the Civil Service
Commission?
2.) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that CSC’s Resolutions are merely orders for
execution thus not susceptible to appeal?

HELD

I.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for review under Rule 43 is not limited to
judgments and final orders of the CSC.

Sec. 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax
Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-
judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies is the Civil
Service Commission.

It is clear from the Rules that the Court of Appeals can entertain appeals from awards, judgments, final
orders or resolutions of the CSC.

II.

The general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable. There are, however, exceptions to
this rule, namely:

1. The writ of execution varies the judgment;

2. There has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust;

3. Execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;

4. It appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court;

5. The terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or

6. It appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance,
or issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the
writ issued without authority.

In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some
remedy available to the aggrieved party. The remedy may either be by appeal or by a special civil action of
certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.

PAGCOR and respondent executed the quitclaim after the entry of judgment. The execution of a
quitclaim after a decision has become final and executory is a supervening event which could
affect the execution of the decision. The quitclaim between PAGCOR and respondent brought about a
change in their situation because the validity of the quitclaim would determine whether respondent is
entitled to reinstatement. The validity of the quitclaim will also determine if the execution of CSC
Resolution ordering the reinstatement of Aumentado will be inequitable or unjust.

In this case, the CSC, without mentioning the quitclaim, issued a CSC Resolution and ordered
respondent’s reinstatement. The CSC only took notice of the quitclaim in another CSC Resolution and
declared it void. PAGCOR insists that the quitclaim is valid. The Court of Appeals subsequently denied
PAGCOR’s appeal without ruling on the validity of the quitclaim.

The issue on the validity of the quitclaim is a question of fact which should have been properly decided by
the Court of Appeals.

The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

FACTS

Petitioners, except Mark Brazil (Brazil) and Nestor Macapayag (Macapayag) are members of the Miarayon,
Lapok, Lirongan, Talaandig Tribal Association (MILALITTRA), or Talaandig tribe, who claimed to have
been living since birth on the land located in Bukidnon, Mindanao, which they inherited from their
forefathers.

On the other hand, respondents, represented by attorney-in-fact Ramon Aberasturi, claimed to be the
lawful owners and possessor of an unregistered parcel of agricultural land, with an area of 105 hectares,
which appears to be located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig tribe.

Aberasturi respondents filed a Petition for Accion Reivindicatoria, with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction with Damages against petitioners
before the Regional Trial Court of Bukidnon.

Unduran filed their Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. They
alleged that with the advent of Republic Act No. (RA) 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples'
Rights Act (IPRA), they, together with the rest of the tribe members, assisted the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) in the processing, validation, and delineation of their Ancestral Domain claim.

A Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) was issued by virtue of NCIP En Banc Resolution to the
Talaandig tribe over its ancestral domain in Talakag, Bukidnon, containing an area of 11,105 hectares.
Later, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo awarded the said CADT to the Talaandig tribe. As awardees of a
CADT, petitioners argued that NCIP has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the case, as the subject
matter concerns a dispute and controversy over an ancestral land/domain of Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICCs)/Indigenous Peoples (IPs).

The NCIP through Atty. Melanie Pimentel, filed a Motion to Refer the Case to the Regional Hearing Office-
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (RHO-NCIP), alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter.

Aberatsuri, et. al. filed a Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint from Accion Reivindicatoria to one
for "Injunction, Damages, and Other Relief," with the attached Amended and Supplemental Complaint.

Unduran, et. al. filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended and Supplemental Complaint, alleging that the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and to issue a writ of injunction therein.

The RTC issued an Order granting the Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint, and declared
Aberatsuri, et. al.’s Motion to Refer the Case to the RHO-NCIP and Motion to Dismiss moot and academic
as a consequence of the grant of the said motion to amend and supplement complaint.

Unduran, et. al. filed another Motion to Refer the Case to the RHO-NCIP and Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint.

RTC Ruling

The RTC ruled as follows:

a.) Unduran et. al.’s motion to refer the case to the RHO-NCIP was denied for being bereft of merit.
b.) The injunctive writ prayed for by Unduran is hereby GRANTED for being meritorious. They are to
maintain the status quo.

Unduran filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
CA Ruling

The CA affirmed the RTC.

The CA ruled that the RTC correctly granted the amendment of the complaint and properly refused to
refer the case to the RHO-NCIP. The subject matter of both complaints is well within the jurisdiction of
the RTC.

ISSUE

W/N the courts have jurisdiction over the complaint or injunction involving an ancestral domain of the
Taalandigs.

HELD

Yes, the courts have jurisdiction.

On the matter of NCIP's jurisdiction and of procedures for enforcement of rights, NCIP Administrative
Order No. 1, 1998, the pertinent provision of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (NCIP-IRR) of the
IPRA, Rule IX, Section 1 states:

Sec.1. xxxx

All conflicts related to the ancestral domain or lands where one of the parties is non-ICC/IP or
where the dispute could not be resolved through customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in
accordance with the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the NCIP to be adopted
hereafter.

In line with Section 69 of the IPRA on the NCIP's quasi-judicial power to promulgate rules and regulations
governing the hearing and disposition of cases filed before it, the NCIP issued Administrative Circular No.
1-03, known as the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure (NCIP Rules), which reiterates its
jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and enumerates the actions that may be
brought before it. Section 5, Rule III, of the NCIP Rules provides for the jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. − The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to
the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of the IPRA 8371, including but not limited
to the following:

(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer (RHO):

a. Cases involving disputes, controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;

xxxx

Anent the condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA,
Sections 13 and 14, Rule IV of the NCIP Rules pertinently provide:

Section 13. Certification to File Action. - Upon the request of the proper party, members of the
indigenous dispute settlement group or council of elders shall likewise issue a certification to file
action before the NCIP. In giving due regard to customary laws, the certification may be in any
form so long as it states in substance the failure of settlement notwithstanding the efforts made
under customary law or traditional practices.

Section 14. Exceptions. - The certification shall not be required in the following cases:
 b. Where one of the parties is non-IP/ICC or does not belong to the same IP/IC Community,
except when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the Council of Elders/Leaders;

The Court therefore finds that the CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of the amended complaint
based on allegations therein was within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

The NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they
arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP, as provided by Sec. 66 of the IPRA.

Therefore, pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same
ICC/IP. When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same
ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case
shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP. In this case,
while most of the petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP.
Thus, even if the real issue involves a dispute over land which appear to be located within the ancestral
domain of the Talaandig Tribe, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which shall have the power to hear, try
and decide this case.

Considering the general rule that the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA covers only
disputes and claims between and among members of the same ICCs/IPs involving their rights under the
IPRA, as well as the basic administrative law principle that an administrative rule or regulation
must conform, not contradict the provisions of the enabling law, the Court declares Rule IX, Section
1 of the IPRA-IRR, Rule III, Section 5 and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP Rules as null and void
insofar as they expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA to include such disputes
where the parties do not belong to the same ICC/IP.
DOH vs Philip Morris Mfg., Inc. (Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction)

FACTS

On November 19, 2008, PMPMI, through the advertising agency PCN Promopro, Inc. (PCN) applied for a
sales promotion permit before the BFAD, now the FDA, for its Gear Up Promotional Activity (Gear Up
Promo).

After 15 days of inaction from BFAD, PCN inquired about the status of their application. BFAD verbally
stated that there is an existing Memorandum prohibiting tobacco companies from conducting any tobacco
promotional activities in the country.

Another application was filed by PMPMI, through Arc Worldwide Philippines Co. for a promotional permit.
BFAD refused and advised AWPC to await its formal written notice. BFAD eventually denied the Gear Up
Promo application in accordance with the provisions of RA 9211 or the "Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003"
stating that "all promotions, advertisements and/or sponsorships of tobacco products are already
prohibited."

PMPMI filed an administrative appeal in DOH on the ground that promotion is not prohibited but merely
restricted. DOH denied the appeal on the bases of that the issuance of permits for sales promotional
activities was never a ministerial duty of the BFAD; rather, it was a discretionary power to be exercised
within the confines of the law. Moreover, previous approvals of sales promotional permit applications
made by the BFAD did not create a vested right on the part of the tobacco companies to have all
applications approved; and that it was the purpose of RA 9211 to ban tobacco advertisement, promotions,
and sponsorship.

PMPMI appealed to CA.

CA Ruling

The CA ruled in favor of PMPMI and held that the DOH does not have unbriddled authority to deny
PMPMI’s promotional permit applications, adding that "[w]hen the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation, only for application." Furthermore, it ruled
that the DOH is bereft of any authority to enforce the provisions of RA 9211 as it is bestowed to the Inter-
Agency Committee-Tobacco as provided by the said law.

DOH raised the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not the IAC-Tobacco has the exclusive authority to administer and implement the provisions
of RA 9211.

HELD

Yes.

After a meticulous examination of the pertinent provisions of RA 7394 and RA 9211, the Court found that
9211 impliedly repealed the relevant provisions of 7394 with respect to the authority of the DOH to
regulate tobacco sales promotions.

The Court noted that both laws separately treat "promotion" as one of the activities related to tobacco: RA
7394 defines "sales promotion" under Article 4 (bm), while RA 9211 speaks of "promotion" or "tobacco
promotion" under Section 4 (l).
In fine, the Court agreed with the CA that it is the IAC-Tobacco and not the DOH which has the
primary jurisdiction to regulate sales promotion activities. As such, the DOH’s ruling, including its
construction of RA 9211 (i.e., that it completely banned tobacco advertisements, promotions, and
sponsorships, as promotion is inherent in both advertising and sponsorship), are declared null and void,
which, as a necessary consequence, precluded the Court from further delving on the same. As it stands,
the present applications filed by PMPMI was thus remanded to the IAC-Tobacco for its appropriate action.
Notably, in the proper exercise of its rule-making authority, nothing precludes the IAC- Tobacco from
designating any of its pilot agencies (which, for instance, may even be the DOH) to perform its
multifarious functions under RA 9211.
ESTRADA vs. CA (Reasons for the Doctrine)

FACTS

Alfredo Estrada, Renato T. Canilang and Manuel C. Lim, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a
complaint for Injunction and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order against Bacnotan Cement Corp. (BCC), Wawandue Fishing Port, Inc. (WFPI), Jeffrey Khong Hun as
President of WFPI, Manuel Molina as Mayor of Subic, Zambales, and Ricardo Serrano as Regional Director
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

The complaint alleges that: WFPI and the Municipality of Subic entered into an illegal lease contract,
which in turn became the basis of a sub-lease in favor of BCC; the sub-lease between WFPI and BCC is a
violation of the first lease because the cement plant, which BCC intended to operate in Wawandue, Subic,
Zambales, is not related to the fish port business of WFPI; and BCC’s cement plant is a nuisance because
it will cause pollution, endanger the health, life and limb of the residents and deprive them of the full use
and enjoyment of their properties. Estrada, et.al prayed that an order be issued: to restrain and prohibit
BCC from opening, commissioning, or otherwise operating its cement plant.

WFPI/Khong Hun and BCC filed separate motions to dismiss, both alleging that the complaint states no
cause of action. BCC, in its motion, added that: Estrada, et.al failed to exhaust administrative remedies
before going to court; that the complaint was premature; and that the RTC has no jurisdiction on the
matter. Serrano of the DENR also filed a motion to dismiss stating that there was no cause of action
insofar as he is concerned since there was nothing in the complaint that shows any dereliction of duty on
his part.

RTC Ruling

The RTC issued an order denying WFPI and BCC’s (respondents) motions to dismiss and granting the
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, holding that:

While it maybe true that petitioners might have first to seek relief thru the DENR’s Pollution Adjudication
Board a resort to the remedy provided under the Pollution Adjudication Board is rendered useless and
ineffective in the light of the urgency that the said pollution be restrained outright in lieu of the
impending risk described in the petition. It will be noted that the DENR did not have the power either in
Executive Order 192, Republic Act 3931 and Presidential Decree 984 to issue a writ of injunction.

The motions for reconsideration were likewise denied.

BCC then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking to reverse and set aside the orders of the RTC, as
well as to lift the writ of preliminary injunction.

CA Ruling

The CA granted BCC’s position. It reasoned that:

1.) The denial of said Motion to Dismiss by the RTC was a grave abuse of discretion because of the
doctrine of Administrative Remedy which requires that where an administrative remedy is
provided by statute, relief must be sought administratively first before the Court will take action.

Whenever, there is an available Administrative Remedy provided by law, no judicial recourse can
be made until such remedy has been availed of and exhausted for three (3) reasons that:
(1) Resort to court maybe unnecessary if administrative remedy is available;
(2) Administrative Agency may be given a chance to correct itself; and
 (3) The principle of Amity and Convenience requires that no court can act until
administrative processes are completed.
2.) When it comes to nuisance (Art. 694, NCC), the Court has general jurisdiction under the New
Civil Code. But when it comes to pollution which is specific, the administrative body like the
DENR has jurisdiction. Clearly, nuisance is general or broader in concept while pollution is
specific.
3.) BCC did not yet have the permit to operate (which should properly be made only after a factual
determination of the levels of pollution by the DENR). Hence, the injunction issued in this case is
premature and should not have been issued at all by public respondent.
4.) It is also a settled rule that the remedy of injunction is not proper where an administrative
remedy is available.

ISSUE

Whether or not the instant case falls under the exceptional cases where prior resort to administrative
agencies need not be made before going to court.

HELD

No, it does not.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with the
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the
same may be elevated to a court of justice for review. If a remedy within the administrative machinery is
still available, with a procedure pursuant to law for an administrative officer to decide the controversy, a
party should first exhaust such remedy before going to court. A premature invocation of a court’s
intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible on such ground.

The reason for this is that prior availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides
for a speedier disposition of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy
away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with.

The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded
an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error
committed in its forum. Hence, premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of
action of the petitioner.

While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is flexible and may be disregarded in certain
instances, the instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptional circumstances.

The matter of determining whether there is pollution of the environment that requires control, if not
prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 192, series
of 1987 has assumed the powers and functions of the defunct National Pollution Control Commission
created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB)
under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of the National
Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases.

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum.

The Court of Appeals correctly found that the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
going to court which renders their complaint dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.
NOTE (Printing this part is optional but encouraged):

Exceptional Circumstances as provided by the case:

(1) when there is a violation of due process,

(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,

(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,

(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,

(5) when there is irreparable injury,

(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears [sic]
the implied and assumed approval of the latter,

(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,

(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,

(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,

(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,

(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention,

(12) when no administrative review is provided by law,

(13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies, and

(14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.

Mukhang iba yung nasa syllabus pero eto yung provided ng jurisprudence so ito yung susundin ko as
exceptional cases.
CIPRIANO vs MARCELINO (When the claim involved is small)

FACTS

Leticia Cipriano served as record clerk in the office of municipal treasurer Gregorio P. Marcelino of
Calabanga, Camarines Sur, from January 1, 1963 to January 15, 1966, at a monthly salary of eighty
pesos (P80). On the latter date she resigned.

Because the respondent municipal treasurer, upon her severance from the service, refused to pay her
salary corresponding to the period from September 1, 1965 to January 15, 1966, inclusive (P349), as well
as the commutation equivalent of her accumulated vacation and sick leaves (P600), Cipriano filed with
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur an action for mandamus to compel the said municipal
treasurer to pay her the total amount of P949.

Marcelino moved to dismiss upon the ground that she had not "exhausted all administrative remedies
before filing the present action," arguing that exhaustion of all administrative remedies is a condition
precedent before an aggrieved party may have judicial recourse.

The CFI granted the motion and ordered the dismissal of the case. Cipriano's motion for reconsideration
was denied.

ISSUE

W/N the exhaustion of administrative remedies is proper.

HELD

The Court has held time and time again that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
without exception, nor is it a condition precedent to judicial relief. The principle may be disregarded
when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It may and should be relaxed when its
application may cause great and irreparable damage.

It is altogether too obvious that to require the petitioner Cipriano to go all the way to the President of the
Philippines on appeal in the matter of the collection of the small total of nine hundred forty-nine (P949)
pesos, would not only be oppressive but would be patently unreasonable. By the time her appeal shall
have been decided by the President, the amount of much more than P949, which is the total sum of her
claim, would in all likelihood have been spent.

All the documents required to support payment of Cipriano's salary and the cash commutation of her
unused vacation and sick leaves have been accomplished. Cipriano having thus earned the right to the
said payment, it has become the corresponding duty of the respondent treasurer to recognize such right
and effect payment.
LEPANTO vs WMC RESOURCES (Effect of non-compliance – Rule 16, Sec. 1, ROC)

FACTS

The Philippine Government and WMC Philippines executed a Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement, denominated as the Columbio FTAA, for the purpose of large scale exploration, development,
and commercial exploration of possible mineral resources in an initial contract area of ~99k hectares
located in the provinces of South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, and North Cotabato in
accordance with Executive Order No. 279 and Department Administrative Order No. 63, Series of 1991.

WMC Resources subsequently divested itself of its rights and interests in the Columbio FTAA, and
executed a Sale and Purchase Agreement (first Agreement) with petitioner Lepanto over its entire
shareholdings in WMC Philippines, subject to the exercise of the Tampakan Companies’ exercise of their
right of first refusal to purchase the subject shares. Lepanto sought the approval of the first Agreement
from the DENR Secretary.

In 2001, WMC Resources and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of Shares of
Stocks. After due consideration and evaluation of the financial and technical qualifications of Sagittarius
Mines, Inc., the DENR Secretary approved the transfer of the Columbio FTAA from WMC Philippines to
Sagittarius Mines, Inc.

Aggrieved by the transfer of the Columbio FTAA in favor of Sagittarius Mines, Inc., Lepanto filed a Petition
for Review of the Order of the DENR Secretary with the Office of the President. Lepanto assails the validity
of the 2001 Order on the ground that:

1) it violates the constitutional right of Lepanto to due process;

2) it preempts the resolution of very crucial legal issues pending with the regular courts; and

3) it blatantly violates Section 40 of the Mining Act.

OP Ruling

The OP dismissed the petition.

The Order of the DENR Secretary is not violative of the Mining Law. Since the subject Columbio FTAA was
granted in accordance with the pertinent provisions of Executive Order No. 279 and Department
Administrative Order No. 63, or prior to the effectivity of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, especially as it
highlights the non-impairment of existing mining and/or quarrying rights, under Section 14.1(b) thereof,
only the consent of DENR Secretary is required. To hold otherwise would be to unduly impose a
burden on transferor WMC and thereby restrict its freedom to dispose of or alienate this property right
without due process.

Moreover, there is no merit in Lepanto’s argument that the DENR Secretary and consequently, the Office,
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter in issue. The assailed Order of the DENR Secretary was
pursuant to his exercise of the well-entrenched doctrine of primary jurisdiction of administrative agencies.

CA Ruling

The Court of Appeals likewise dismissed the petition.

The issue hinges on the applicability of Section 40 of RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, which
took force on 14 April 1995, on the transfer of FTAA from WMC to the Tampakan Companies, particularly
the Sagittarius Mines, Inc.
The condition of RA No. 7942 requiring the further approval of the President, if made to apply
retroactively to the Columbio FTAA, would impair the obligation of contracts simply because it constitutes
a restriction on the right of the contractor to assign or transfer its interest in an FTAA. In other words, it
diminished the vested rights of the contractor to assign or transfer its interests on mere approval
of the DENR Secretary. The restriction is therefore substantive, and not merely procedural, contrary to
the contention of petitioner.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, particularly Section 40, requiring the approval of the
President of the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements should have a
retroactive application to the Columbio FTAA.

HELD

No.

This posture of Lepanto would clearly contradict the established legal doctrine that statutes are to be
construed as having only a prospective operation unless the contrary is expressly stated or necessarily
implied from the language used in the law.

There is an absence of either an express declaration or an implication in the Philippine Mining Act of
1995 that the provisions of said law shall be made to apply retroactively, therefore, any section of said law
must be made to apply only prospectively, in view of the rule that a statute ought not to receive a
construction making it act retroactively, unless the words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that
no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise
satisfied.

Section 40 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 requiring the approval of the President with respect to
assignment or transfer of FTAAs, if made applicable retroactively to the Columbio FTAA, would be
tantamount to an impairment of the obligations under said contract as it would effectively restrict the
right of the parties thereto to assign or transfer their interests in the said FTAA.

By imposing a new condition apart from those already contained in the agreement, before the parties to
the Columbio FTAA may assign or transfer its rights and interest in the said agreement, Section 40 of the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, if made to apply to the Columbio FTAA, will effectively modify the terms of
the original contract and thus impair the obligations of the parties thereto and restrict the exercise of
their vested rights under the original agreement. Such modification to the Columbio FTAA, particularly in
the conditions imposed for its valid transfer is equivalent to an impairment of said contract violative of the
Constitution.
ADMU vs CA

FACTS

A waitress in the cafeteria of Cervini Hall inside the university campus charged Juan Ramon Guanzon,
son of private respondents Romeo Guanzon and Teresita Regalado, and a boarder and first year student
of the university with unbecoming conduct committed in the evening at the Cervini Hall’s cafeteria where
Juan slapped the said waitress after an altercation regarding his order of siopao. (Digester’s Note:
Hahahahaha! Expelled dahil sa siopao.)

The university conducted an investigation of the slapping incident. On the basis of the investigation
results, Juan Ramon was dismissed from the university.

The dismissal of Juan Ramon triggered off the filing of a complaint for damages by his parents against the
university in the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.

The CFI ruled in favor of the Guanzons.

CA Ruling

Upon appeal to the CA, the CFI’s ruling was initially reversed. Upon motion for reconsideration however,
the appellate court reversed its decision and set aside through a special division of five.

In reversing its own decision, the appellate court relied heavily on the findings of the Director of Private
Schools affirmed by the Minister of Education and the findings of the lower Court to the effect that due
process of law was not observed by the petitioner when it dismissed the private respondents' son Juan
Ramon.

ISSUE

1.) W/N the Guanzons were not afforded due process in the discipline case of Juan
2.) W/N the Guanzons violated the rule on the finality of administration action or exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

HELD

I.

The Guanzons were afforded due process.

The original decision of the Court of Appeals shows that the procedures in the expulsion were fair, open,
exhaustive, and adequate.

First, after the slapping incident, a preliminary inquiry was conducted by interviewing the companions
and friends of Juan who were also at the cafeteria. They confirmed the incident in question.

Second, finding that there was probable cause against Mr. Guanzon, prepared a memorandum to the
members of the Board of Discipline which was delivered to other members of the Board.

Third, Mr. Guanzon was fully informed of the accusation against him by reading the offense charged.

Fourth, separate letters were sent to the other members of the Board for guidance on the handling of the
case.

Fifth, notice of the meeting of the Board of Discipline set and was posted on the common grounds of the
school. The Secretary of the Dean of Discipline personally notified Mr. Guanzon of the meeting.
Sixth, despite notice, Mr. Guanzon did not care to inform his parents or guardian. He spoke for himself
and admitted to have slapped Carmelita Mateo. He then asked that he be excused as he wanted to catch
the boat for Bacolod City for the Christmas vacation.

Seventh, the decision of the Board of Discipline was unanimous in dropping from the rolls of students Mr.
Guanzon which was elevated to the office of the Dean of Arts and Sciences, who after a review of the case
found no ground to reverse the decision of the Board of Discipline. The case was finally elevated to the
President of the Ateneo University who sustained the decision of the Board of Discipline. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the President of the Student Council in behalf of Mr. Guanzon but the same
was denied by the President of the University.

Eighth, when the decision of the Board of Discipline was about to be carried out, Mr. Guanzon voluntarily
applied for honorable dismissal. He went around to the officials of the university to obtain his clearance
and this was approved on January 8, 1968.

Ninth, Mr. Romeo Guanzon, father of Juan Ramon Guanzon arranged for full and complete refund of his
tuition fee for the entire second semester of the school year. Juan Ramon was never out of school. He was
admitted at the De la Salle College of Bacolod City and later transferred to another Jesuit School.

The Court found that he was given the full opportunity to be heard to be fully informed of the charge
against him and to be confronted of the witnesses face to face. And since he chose to remain silent and
did not bother to inform his parents or guardian about the disciplinary action taken against him by the
defendant university, neither he nor his parents should find reason to complain.

II.

The petitioner raises the issue of "exhaustion of administrative remedies" in view of its pending appeal
from the decision of the Ministry of Education to the President of the Philippines. It argues that the
private respondents' complaint for recovery of damages filed in the lower court was premature.

The issue raised in court was whether or not the private respondents can recover damages as a result of
the dismissal of their son from the petitioner university. This is a purely legal question and nothing of an
administrative nature is to or can be done.

The case was brought pursuant to the law on damages provided in the Civil Code. The jurisdiction to try
the case belongs to the civil courts.

There was no need to await action from Malacañang.

FACTS

Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for education, increased
emoluments for health workers, and wider coverage for full value-added tax benefits … these are the
reasons why Republic Act No. 9337 (R.A. No. 9337) was enacted. Reasons, the wisdom of which, the
Court even with its extensive constitutional power of review, cannot probe. The petitioners in these cases,
however, question not only the wisdom of the law, but also perceived constitutional infirmities in its
passage.

Every law enjoys in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Their arguments notwithstanding,
petitioners failed to justify their call for the invalidity of the law. Hence, R.A. No. 9337 is not
unconstitutional.

Legislative History

RA 9337 or the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely,
House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950.

July 1, 2005 is the effectivity date of R.A. No. 9337. When said date came, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining respondents from
enforcing and implementing the law.

ABAKADA GURO Partylist questioned the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,
amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), which
contained a uniform proviso:

“That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1,
2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has
been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous
year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or

(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-
half percent (1 ½%).”

This was dubbed the “stand-by authority” of the President.

Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its
exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.

ISSUE

1. Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108 of the NIRC,
violate the following provisions of the Constitution:

a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and

b. Article VI, Section 28(2)

2. Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of the NIRC; and Section
12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the NIRC, violate the following provisions of the
Constitution:
a. Article VI, Section 28(1), and

b. Article III, Section 1

HELD

Petitioners allege that the grant of the stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is a
virtual abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not within the
purview of Section 28 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.

Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., further contend that delegating to the President the
legislative power to tax is contrary to republicanism. They insist that accountability, responsibility and
transparency should dictate the actions of Congress and they should not pass to the President the
decision to impose taxes. They also argue that the law also effectively nullified the President’s power of
control, which includes the authority to set aside and nullify the acts of her subordinates like the
Secretary of Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation
of the Secretary of Finance.

On the other hand, petitioners Escudero, et al. find bizarre and revolting the situation that the imposition
of the 12% rate would be subject to the whim of the Secretary of Finance, an unelected bureaucrat,
contrary to the principle of no taxation without representation. They submit that the Secretary of Finance
is not mandated to give a favorable recommendation and he may not even give his recommendation.
Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are provided in the law on what basis and as to how he
will make his recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance can easily be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter,
such that, ultimately, it is the President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.

xxxx

On the Principle of Non-Delegation of Powers

The general rule barring delegation of legislative powers is subject to the following recognized limitations
or exceptions: (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.

In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid.

It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative command is to be effected. Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
While the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and
administration of an exercise of such power may be left to them, including the power to determine the
existence of facts on which its operation depends.

The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is
contingent.

No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that
the word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word “shall” connotes a mandatory order.
Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. Where
the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no
choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed. Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President, a duty
which cannot be evaded.

In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the
Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. In such
instance, he is not subject to the power of control and direction of the President. He is acting as the agent
of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take
effect.

There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a
law. This is constitutionally permissible.

Digester’s Note:

This is based on the pattern of the book (and my (mediocre) understanding) mentioning the “Doctrine of
Qualified Political Agency” as we may be able to assume that prior to the approval of the 12% increase of
the VAT, a concerned party may assail the findings of the Secretary of Finance by appealing the same to the
Office of the President before using other remedies (Judicial intervention).

But since as mentioned in the case that the Secretary of Finance is essentially acting as an agent of the
Legislative Department, I’m not sure what Atty. Chavez wants to point out here.

PLEASE DELETE THIS PART:

Para ngang walang relation yung “Appeal to the OP” na topic ni sir sa overall content ng case eh. Pero that
remains to be seen.

Pasensya na, mejo mababa quality nito.