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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1123             March 5, 1947

ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL., respondents.

Alejo Mabanag, Jose O. Vera, Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto Serrano, J.

Antonio Araneta, Antonio Barredo, and Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
Secretary of Justice Ozaeta, Solicitor General Tañada, and First Assistant
Solicitor General Reyes for respondents.
TUASON, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a
congressional resolution designated "Resolution of both houses
proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be
appended as an ordinance thereto." The members of the Commission on
Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General, and the
Director of the Bureau of Printing are made defendants, and the
petitioners are eight senators, seventeen representatives, and the
presidents of the Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the
Philippine Youth Party. The validity of the above-mentioned resolution is
attacked as contrary to the Constitution.
The case was heard on the pleadings and stipulation of facts. In our view
of the case it is unnecessary to go into the facts at length. We will
mention only the facts essential for the proper understanding of the
issues. For this purpose it suffices to say that three of the plaintiff
senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had been proclaimed by
a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected
senators and representatives in the elections held on April 23, 1946. The
three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of
the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of
alleged irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their
election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take
part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had
not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been
introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not
been acted upon definitely by the House when the present petition was
filed.
As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not
take part in the passage of the questioned resolution, nor was their
membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-
fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the
Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted, the
affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been
short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
At the threshold we are met with the question of the jurisdiction of this
Court. The respondents deny that this Court has jurisdiction, relying on
the conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution. There is
some merit in the petitioners' contention that this is confusing
jurisdiction, which is a matter of substantive law, with conclusiveness of
an enactment or resolution, which is a matter of evidence and practice.
This objection, however, is purely academic. Whatever distinction there is
in the juridical sense between the two concepts, in practice and in their
operation they boil down to the same thing. Basically the two notions are
synonymous in that both are founded on the regard which the judiciary
accords a co-equal coordinate, and independent departments of the
Government. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of
respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also
binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect.
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that
political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to
the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred
upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provision. (16
C.J.S., 431.) This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation
of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or
citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall
within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of
exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full
harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts
to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the
government.
But there is one case approaching this in its circumstances: Coleman vs.
Miller, a relatively recent decision of the United States Supreme Court
reported and annotated in 122 A.L.R., 695. The case, by a majority
decision delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, is authority for the
conclusion that the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a
proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question
and hence not justiciable. The Court further held that the decision by
Congress, in its control of the Secretary of State, of the questions of
whether an amendment has been adopted within a reasonable time from
the date of submission to the state legislature, is not subject to review by
the court.
If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which
leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two steps
complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single
objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as provided in
section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only)
two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There is no logic in attaching
political character to one and withholding that character from the other.
Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function
performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and
committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this
power is even independent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If
on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed
to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into
the validity of a proposal than into that of a ratification. As the Mississippi
Supreme Court has once said:

There is nothing in the nature of the submission which should cause

the free exercise of it to be obstructed, or that could render it
dangerous to the stability of the government; because the measure
derives all its vital force from the action of the people at the ballot
box, and there can never be danger in submitting in an established
form, to a free people, the proposition whether they will change their
fundamental law. The means provided for the exercise of their
sovereign right of changing their constitution should receive such a
construction as not to trammel the exercise of the right. Difficulties
and embarrassments in its exercise are in derogation of the right of
free government, which is inherent in the people; and the best security
against tumult and revolution is the free and unobstructed privilege to
the people of the State to change their constitution in the mode
prescribed by the instrument. (Green vs. Weller, 32 Miss., 650; note,
10 L.R.A., N.S., 150.)

Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion joined in by Justices Roberts,

Frankfurter and Douglas, in Miller vs. Coleman, supra, finds no basis for
discriminating between proposal and ratification. From his forceful
opinion we quote the following paragraphs:
The Constitution grant Congress exclusive power to control
submission of constitutional amendments. Final determination by
Congress that ratification by three-fourths of the States has taken
place "is conclusive upon the courts." In the exercise of that power,
Congress, of course, is governed by the Constitution. However,
whether submission, intervening procedure or Congressional
determination of ratification conforms to the commands of the
Constitution, call for decisions by a "political department" of
questions of a type which this Court has frequently designated
"political." And decision of a "political question" by the "political
department" to which the Constitution has committed it "conclusively
binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of
. . . government." Proclamation under authority of Congress that an
amendment has been ratified will carry with it a solemn assurance by
the Congress that ratification has taken place as the Constitution
commands. Upon this assurance a proclaimed amendment must be
accepted as a part of the Constitution, leaving to the judiciary its
traditional authority of interpretation. To the extent that the Court's
opinion in the present case even impliedly assumes a power to make
judicial interpretation of the exclusive constitutional authority of
Congress over submission and ratification of amendments, we are
unable to agree.

The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the

proper procedure is being followed between submission and final
adoption. However, it is apparent that judicial review of or
pronouncements upon a supposed limitation of a "reasonable time"
within which Congress may accept ratification; as to whether duly
authorized State officials have proceeded properly in ratifying or
voting for ratification; or whether a State may reverse its action once
taken upon a proposed amendment; and kindred questions, are all
consistent only with an intimate control over the amending process in
the courts. And this must inevitably embarrass the course of
amendment by subjecting to judicial interference matters that we
believe were intrusted by the Constitution solely to the political
branch of government.

The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in

some respects as subject to judicial construction, in others as subject
to the final authority of the Congress. There is no disapproval of the
conclusion arrived at in Dillon vs. Gloss, that the Constitution
impliedly requires that a properly submitted amendment must die
unless ratified within a "reasonable time." Nor does the Court now
disapprove its prior assumption of power to make such a
pronouncement. And it is not made clear that only Congress has
 constitutional power to determine if there is any such implication in
Article 5 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the Court's opinion
declares that Congress has the exclusive power to decide the
"political questions" of whether as State whose legislature has once
acted upon a proposed amendment may subsequently reverse its
position, and whether, in the circumstances of such a case as this, an
amendment is dead because an "unreasonable" time has elapsed. No
such division between the political and judicial branches of the
government is made by Article 5 which grants power over the
amending of the Constitution to Congress alone. Undivided control of
that process has been given by the Article exclusively and completely
to Congress. The process itself is "political" in its entirely, from
submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution,
and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any
point.

Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in another concurring opinion to which the other

three justices subscribed, arrives at the same conclusion. Though his
thesis was the petitioner's lack of standing in court — a point which not
having been raised by the parties herein we will not decide — his
reasoning inevitably extends to a consideration of the nature of the
legislative proceeding the legality of which the petitioners in that case
assailed. From a different angle he sees the matter as political, saying:

The right of the Kansas senators to be here is rested on recognition

by Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S., 130; 66 Law. ed., 505; 42 S. Ct., 217, of
a voter's right to protect his franchise. The historic source of this
doctrine and the reasons for it were explained in Nixon vs. Herndon,
273 U.S., 436, 540; 71 Law. ed., 759, 761; 47 S. Ct., 446. That was an
action for $5,000 damages against the Judges of Elections for
refusing to permit the plaintiff to vote at a primary election in Texas.
In disposing of the objection that the plaintiff had no cause of action
because the subject matter of the suit was political, Mr. Justice
Homes thus spoke for the Court: "Of course the petition concerns
political action, but it alleges and seeks to recover for private
damage. That private damage may be caused by such political action
and may be recovered for in a suit at law hardly has been doubted for
over two hundred years, since Ashby vs. White, 2 Ld. Raym., 938; 92
Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521; 3 Ld. Raym., 320; 92 Eng.
Reprint, 710, and has been recognized by this Court." "Private
damage" is the clue to the famous ruling in Ashby vs. White, supra,
and determines its scope as well as that of cases in this Court of
which it is the justification. The judgment of Lord Holt is permeated
with the conception that a voter's franchise is a personal right,
assessable in money damages, of which the exact amount "is
 peculiarly appropriate for the determination of a jury," see Wiley vs.
Sinkler, 179 U.S., 58, 65; 45 Law. ed., 84, 88; 21 S. Ct., 17, and for
which there is no remedy outside the law courts. "Although this
matter relates to the parliament," said Lord Holt, "yet it is an injury
precedaneous to the parliament, as my Lord Hale said in the case of
Bernardiston vs. Some, 2 Lev., 114, 116; 83 Eng. Reprint, 175. The
parliament cannot judge of this injury, nor give damage to the plaintiff
for it: they cannot make him a recompense." (2 Ld. Raym., 938, 958;
92 Eng. Reprint, 126; 1 Eng. Rul. Cas., 521.)

The reasoning of Ashby vs. White and the practice which has
followed it leave intra-parliamentary controversies to parliaments and
outside the scrutiny of law courts. The procedures for voting in
legislative assemblies — who are members, how and when they
should vote, what is the requisite number of votes for different
phases of legislative activity, what votes were cast and how they were
counted — surely are matters that not merely concern political action
but are of the very essence of political action, if "political" has any
connotation at all. Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark, 143 U.S., 649, 670, et
seq.; 36 Law. ed., 294, 302; 12 S. Ct., 495; Leser vs. Garnett, 258 U.S.,
130, 137; 66 Law. ed., 505, 511; 42 S. Ct., 217. In no sense are they
matters of "private damage." They pertain to legislators not as
individuals but as political representatives executing the legislative
process. To open the law courts to such controversies is to have
courts sit in judgment on the manifold disputes engendered by
procedures for voting in legislative assemblies. If the doctrine of
Ashby vs. White vindicating the private rights of a voting citizen has
not been doubted for over two hundred years, it is equally significant
that for over two hundred years Ashby vs. White has not been sought
to be put to purposes like the present. In seeking redress here these
Kansas senators have wholly misconceived the functions of this
Court. The writ of certiorari to the Kansas Supreme Court should
therefore be dismissed.

We share the foregoing views. In our judgment they accord with sound
principles of political jurisprudence and represent liberal and advanced
thought on the working of constitutional and popular government as
conceived in the fundamental law. Taken as persuasive authorities, they
offer enlightening understanding of the spirit of the United States
institutions after which ours are patterned.
But these concurring opinions have more than persuasive value. As will
be presently shown, they are the opinions which should operate to
adjudicate the questions raised by the pleadings. To make the point clear,
it is necessary, at the risk of unduly lengthening this decision, to make a
statement and an analysis of the Coleman vs. Miller case. Fortunately, the
annotation on that case in the American Law Reports, supra, comes to out
aid and lightens our labor in this phase of the controversy.
Coleman vs. Miller was an original proceeding in mandamus brought in
the Supreme Court of Kansas by twenty-one members of the Senate,
including twenty senators who had voted against a resolution ratifying the
Child Labor Amendment, and by three members of the House of
Representatives, to compel the Secretary of the Senate to erase in
indorsement on the resolution to the effect that it had been adopted by
the Senate and to indorse thereon the words "as not passed." They
sought to restrain the offices of the Senate and House of Representatives
from signing the resolution, and the Secretary of State of Kansas from
authenticating it and delivering it to the Governor.
The background of the petition appears to have been that the Child Labor
Amendment was proposed by Congress in June, 1924; that in January,
1925, the legislature of Kansad adopted a resolution rejecting it and a
copy of the resolution was sent to the Secretary of State of the United
States; that in January, 1927, a new resolution was introduced in the
Senate of Kansas ratifying the proposed amendment; that there were
forty senators, twenty of whom voted for and twenty against the
resolution; and that as a result of the tie, the Lieutenant Governor cast his
vote in favor of the resolution.
The power of the Lieutenant Governor to vote was challenged, and the
petition set forth prior rejection of the proposed amendment and alleged
that in the period from June 1924 to March 1927, the proposed
amendment had been rejected by both houses of the legislatures of
twenty-six states and had been ratified only in five states, and that by
reason of that rejection and the failure of ratification within a reasonable
time, the proposed amendment had lost its vitality.
The Supreme Court of Kansas entertained jurisdiction of all the issues but
dismissed the petition on the merits. When the case reached the Supreme
Court of the United States the questions were framed substantially in the
following manner:
First, whether the court had jurisdiction; that is, whether the petitioners
had standing to seek to have the judgment of the state court reversed;
second, whether the Lieutenant Governor had the right to vote in case of a
tie, as he did, it being the contention of the petitioners that "in the light of
the powers and duties of the Lieutenant Governor and his relation to the
Senate under the state Constitution, as construed by the Supreme Court
of the state, the Lieutenant Governor was not a part of the 'legislature' so
that under Article 5 of the Federal Constitution, he could be permitted to
have a deciding vote on the ratification of the proposed amendment,
when the Senate was equally divided"; and third, the effect of the previous
rejection of the amendment and of the lapse of time after its submission.
The first question was decided in the affirmative. The second question,
regarding the authority of the Lieutenant Governor to vote, the court
avoided, stating: "Whether this contention presents a justiciable
controversy, or a question which is political in its nature and hence not
justiciable, is a question upon which the Court is equally divided and
therefore the court expresses no opinion upon that point." On the third
question, the Court reached the conclusion before referred to, namely, (1)
that the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed
amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question, within the
ultimate power of Congress in the exercise of its control and of the
promulgation of the adoption of amendment, and (2) that the decision by
Congress, in its control of the action of the Secretary of State, of the
questions whether an amendment to the Federal Constitution has been
adopted within a reasonable time, is not subject to review by the court.
The net result was that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Kansas
was affirmed but in the grounds stated in the United States Supreme
Court's decision. The nine justices were aligned in three groups. Justices
Roberts, Black, Frankfurter and Douglas opined that the petitioners had no
personality to bring the petition and that all the questions raised are
political and non-justiciable Justices Butler and McReynolds opined that
all the questions were justiciable; that the Court had jurisdiction of all
such questions, and that the petition should have been granted and the
decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas reversed on the ground that the
proposal to amend had died of old age. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice
Stone and Mr. Justice Reed regarded some of the issues as political and
non-justiciable, passed by the question of the authority of the Lieutenant
Governor to case a deciding vote, on the ground that the Court was
equally divided, and took jurisdiction of the rest of the questions.
The sole common ground between Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice
McReynolds, on the one hand and the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stone
and Mr. Justice Reed, on the other, was on the question of jurisdiction; on
the result to be reached, these two groups were divided. The agreement
between Justices Roberts, Black, Frankfurter and Douglas, on the one
hand, and the Chief Justice and Justices Stone and Reed, on the other,
was on the result and on that part of the decision which declares certain
questions political and non-justiciable.
As the annotator in American Law Reports observes, therefore going four
opinions "show interestingly divergent but confusing positions of the
Justices on the issues discussed. "It cites an article in 48 Yale Law
Journal, 1455, amusingly entitled "Sawing a Justice in Half," which, in the
light of the divergencies in the opinions rendered, aptly queries" whether
the proper procedure for the Supreme Court would not have been to
reverse the judgment below and direct dismissal of the suit for want of
jurisdiction." It says that these divergencies and line-ups of the justices
"leave power to dictate the result and the grounds upon which the
decision should be rested with the four justices who concurred in Mr.
Justice Black's opinion." Referring to the failure of the Court to decide the
question of the right of the Lieutenant Governor to vote, the article points
out that from the opinions rendered the "equally divided" court would
seem under any circumstances to bean equal division of an odd number
of justices, and asks "What really did happen? Did a justice refuse to vote
on this issue? And if he did, was it because he could not make up his
mind, or is it possible to saw a justice vertically in half during the
conference and have him walk away whole?" But speaking in a more
serious vein, the commentator says that decision of the issue could not
be avoided on grounds of irrelevance, since if the court had jurisdiction of
the case, decision of the issue in favor of the petitioners would have
required reversal of the judgment below regardless of the disposal of the
other issues.
From this analysis the conclusion is that the concurring opinions should
be considered as laying down the rule of the case.
The respondent's other chief reliance is on the contention that a duly
authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on
the courts. This is the rule prevailing in England. In the United States, "In
point of numbers, the jurisdictions are divided almost equally pro and con
the general principle (of these, two or three have changed from their
original position), two or three adopted a special variety of view (as in
Illinois), three or four are not clear, and one or two have not yet made their
decisions." (IV Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Edition, 685, footnote.) It is
important to bear in mind, in this connection, that the United States
Supreme Court is on the side of those which favor the rule. (Harwood vs.
Wentworth, 40 Law. ed., 1069; Lyon vs. Wood, 38 Law. ed., 854; Field vs.
Clark, 36 Law. ed., 294.)
If for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our
law making body, we choose to follow the rule. Section 313 of the old
Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: "Official
documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the
Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided
for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those
bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions,
or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, or printed by their order;
Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive
proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."
But there is more than statutory sanction for conclusiveness.
This topic has been the subject of a great number of decisions and
commentaries written with evident vehemence. Arguments for and
against the rule have been extensive and exhaustive. It would be
presumptuous on our part to pretend to add more, even if we could, to
what has already been said. Which such vast mass of cases to guide our
judgment and discretion, our labor is reduced to an intelligent selection
and borrowing of materials and arguments under the criterion of
adaptability to a sound public policy.
The reasons adduced in support of enrollment as contrasted with those
which opposed it are, in our opinion, almost decisive. Some of these
reasons are summarized in 50 American Jurisprudence, section 150 as
follows:

SEC. 150. Reasons for Conclusiveness. — It has been declared that

the rule against going behind the enrolled bill is required by the
respect due to a coequal and independent department of the
government, and it would be an inquisition into the conduct of the
members of the legislature, a very delicate power, the frequent
exercise of which must lead to endless confusion in the
administration of the law. The rule is also one of convenience,
because courts could not rely on the published session laws, but
would be required to look beyond these to the journals of the
legislature and often to any printed bills and amendments which
might be found after the adjournment of the legislature. Otherwise,
after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills,
authenticated as exacted by the Constitution, for years, it might be
ascertained from the journals that an act theretofore enforced had
never become a law. In this respect, it has been declared that these is
quite enough uncertainty as to what the law is without saying that no
one may be certain that an act of the legislature has become such
until the issue has been determined by some court whose decision
might not be regarded as conclusive in an action between the parties.

From other decisions, selected and quoted in IV Wigmore on Evidence,

696, 697, we extract these passages:

I think the rule thus adopted accords with public policy. Indeed, in my
estimation, few things would be more mischievous than the
introduction of the opposite rule. . . . The rule contended for is that
the Court should look at the journals of the Legislature to ascertain
 whether the copy of the act attested and filed with the Secretary of
State conforms in its contents with the statements of such journals.
This proposition means, if it has any legal value whatever, that, in the
event of a material discrepancy between the journal and the enrolled
copy, the former is to be taken as the standard of veracity and the act
is to be rejected. This is the test which is to be applied not only to the
statutes now before the Court, but to all statutes; not only to laws
which have been recently passed, but to laws the most ancient. To
my mind, nothing can be more certain than that the acceptance of
this doctrine by the Court would unsettle the entire statute law of the
State. We have before us some evidence of the little reliability of
these legislative journals. . . . Can any one deny that if the laws of the
State are to be tested by a comparison with these journals, so
imperfect, so unauthenticated, the stability of all written law will be
shaken to its very foundations? . . . We are to remember the danger,
under the prevalence of such a doctrine, to be apprehended from the
intentional corruption of evidences of this character. It is scarcely too
much to say that the legal existence of almost every legislative act
would be at the mercy of all persons having access to these journals.
. . . ([1866], Beasley, C.J., in Pangborn vs. Young, 32 N.J.L., 29, 34.)

But it is argued that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the

Courts, then less than a quorum of each House may be the aid of
corrupt presiding officers imposed laws upon the State in defiance of
the inhibition of the Constitution. It must be admitted that the
consequence stated would be possible. Public authority and political
power must of necessity be confided to officers, who being human
may violate the trusts reposed in them. This perhaps cannot be
avoided absolutely. But it applies also to all human agencies. It is not
fit that the Judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond all others;
nor has it been able at all times with truth to say that its high places
have not been disgraced. The framers of our government have not
constituted it with faculties to supervise coordinate departments and
correct or prevent abuses of their authority. It cannot authenticate a
statute; that power does not belong to it; nor can it keep a legislative
journal. (1869, Frazer, J., in Evans vs. Brownem 30 Ind., 514, 524.)

Professor Wigmore in his work on Evidence — considered a classic, and

described by one who himself is a noted jurist, author, and scholar, as "a
permanent contribution to American law" and having "put the matured
nineteenth-century law in form to be used in a new era of growth" —
unequivocally identifies himself with those who believe in the soundness
of the rule. The distinguished professor, in answer to the argument of
Constitutional necessity, i.e., the impossibility of securing in any other
way the enforcement of constitutional restrictions on legislative action,
says:

(1) In the first place, note that it is impossible of consistent

application. If, as it is urged, the Judiciary are bound to enforce the
constitutional requirements of three readings, a two-thirds vote, and
the like, and if therefore an act must be declared no law which in fact
was not read three times or voted upon by two-thirds, this duty is a
duty to determine according to the actual facts of the readings and
the votes. Now the journals may not represent the actual facts. That
duty cannot allow us to stop with the journals, if it can be shown
beyond doubt that the facts were otherwise than therein represented.
The duty to uphold a law which in fact was constitutionally voted
upon is quite as strong as the duty to repudiate an act
unconstitutionally voted upon. The Court will be going as far wrong in
repudiating an act based on proper votes falsified in the journal as it
will be in upholding an act based on improper votes falsified in the
enrollment. This supposed duty, in short, is to see that the
constitutional facts did exist; and it cannot stop short with the
journals. Yet, singularly enough, it is unanimously conceded that an
examination into facts as provable by the testimony of members
present is not allowable. If to support that it be said that such an
inquiry would be too uncertain and impracticable, then it is answered
that this concedes the supposed constitutional duty not to be
inexorable, after all; for if the duty to get at the facts is a real and
inevitable one, it must be a duty to get at them at any cost; and if it is
merely a duty that is limited by policy and practical convenience, then
the argument changes into the second one above, namely, how far it
is feasible to push the inquiry with regard to policy and practical
convenience; and from this point of view there can be but one
answer.

(2) In the second place, the fact that the scruple of constitutional duty
is treated thus inconsistently and pushed only up to a certain point
suggests that it perhaps is based on some fallacious assumption
whose defect is exposed only by carrying it to its logical
consequences. Such indeed seems to be the case. It rests on the
fallacious motion that every constitutional provision is "per se"
capable of being enforced through the Judiciary and must be
safeguarded by the Judiciary because it can be in no other way. Yet
there is certainly a large field of constitutional provision which does
not come before the Judiciary for enforcement, and may remain
unenforced without any possibility or judicial remedy. It is not
necessary to invoke in illustration such provisions as a clause
requiring the Governor to appoint a certain officer, or the Legislature
to pass a law for a certain purpose; here the Constitution may remain
unexecuted by the failure of Governor or Legislature to act, and yet
the Judiciary cannot safeguard and enforce the constitutional duty. A
clearer illustration may be had by imagining the Constitution to
require the Executive to appoint an officer or to call out the militia
whenever to the best of his belief a certain state of facts exists;
suppose he appoints or calls out when in truth he has no such belief;
can the Judiciary attempt to enforce the Constitution by inquiring into
his belief? Or suppose the Constitution to enjoin on the Legislators to
pass a law upon a certain subject whenever in their belief certain
conditions exist; can the Judiciary declare the law void by inquiring
and ascertaining that the Legislature, or its majority, did not have
such a belief? Or suppose the Constitution commands the Judiciary
to decide a case only after consulting a soothsayer, and in a given
case the Judiciary do not consult one; what is to be done?

These instances illustrate a general situation in which the judicial

function of applying and enforcing the Constitution ceases to
operate. That situation exists where the Constitution enjoins duties
which affect the motives and judgment of a particular independent
department of government, — Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary.
Such duties are simply beyond enforcement by any other department
if the one charged fails to perform them. The Constitution may
provide that no legislator shall take a bribe, but an act would not be
treated as void because the majority had been bribed. So far as the
Constitution attempts to lay injunctions in matters leading up to and
motivating the action of a department, injunctions must be left to the
conscience of that department to obey or disobey. Now the act of the
Legislature as a whole is for this purpose of the same nature as the
vote of a single legislator. The Constitution may expressly enjoin each
legislator not to vote until he has carefully thought over the matter of
legislation; so, too, it may expressly enjoin the whole Legislature not
to act finally until it has three times heard the proposition read aloud.
It is for the Legislature alone, in the latter case as well as in the
former, to take notice of this injunction; and it is no more the function
of the Judiciary in the one case than in the other to try to keep the
Legislature to its duty:

xxx     xxx     xxx

The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous
desire to check at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have
set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost
made them a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the
wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an
inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the legislature. The
 sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking
the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with
the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful,
and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll
may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. (4
Wigmore on Evidence, 699-702.)

The petitioners contend that the enrolled bill rule has not found
acceptance in this jurisdiction, citing the case of United States vs. Pons
(34 Phil., 729). It is argued that this Court examined the journal in that
case to find out whether or not the contention of the appellant was right.
We think the petitioners are in error.
It will be seen upon examination of section 313 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, that, roughly, it provides two
methods of proving legislative proceedings: (1) by the journals, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or
secretary or printed by their order; and (2) in case of acts of the
Legislature, by a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries
thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts
and of the due enactment thereof.
The Court looked into the journals in United States vs. Pons because, in
all probability, those were the documents offered in evidence. It does not
appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or was
placed before the Court; and it has not been shown that if that had been
done, this Court would not have held the copyconclusive proof of the due
enactment of the law. It is to be remembered that the Court expressly
stated that it "passed over the question" of whether the enrolled bill was
conclusive as to its contents and the mode of its passage.
Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been
presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the
journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already
stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two
ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This Court
found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and
did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy
if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of
conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the
enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule
such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict
with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the
two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to
understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the
journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies
"shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof."
In view of the foregoing consideration, we deem it unnecessary to decide
the question of whether the senators and representatives who were
ignored in the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote were
members of Congress within the meaning of section 1 of Article XV of the
Philippine Constitution.
The petition is dismissed without costs.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, and Hontiveros, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
 

BENGZON, J., with whom concurs PADILLA, J., concurring:

Although I maintain that we have jurisdiction as petitioners contend, I

can't vote for them, because the enrolled copy of the resolution and the
legislative journals are conclusive upon us.
A. The overwhelming majority of the state courts are of the opinion that
the question whether an amendment to the existing constitution has been
duly proposed in the manner required by such constitution properly
belongs to the judiciary. That is the position taken by Alabama, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Washington and Wisconsin. (See 12 C. J., 880 and 16C.J.S., 437.)
(See also 11 Am. Jur., 639.) Only North Dakota and Oklahoma have
adopted a different view. (16 C.J.S., 437, notes 41 and 43.)

"The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a

constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to
the requirements of an existing constitution is a judicial question."
(McConaughy vs. Secretary of State, 106 Minn., 392, 409; 119 N.W.,
408.) (12 C.J., 880.)

"An examination of the decisions shows that the courts have almost
uniformly exercised the authority to determine the validity of the
proposal, submission, or ratification of constitutional amendments. It
has been judicially determined whether a proposed amendment
received the constitutional majority of votes. (Knight vs. Shelton, 134
Fed., 423; Rice vs. Palmer, 78 Ark., 432; 96 S. W. 396; Green vs. State
 Canvassers, 5 Ida., 130; 47 P., 259; 95 Am. S.R., 169; In re Denny, 156
Ind., 104; 59 N.E., 359; 51 L. R. A., 722; Dayton vs. St. Paul, 22 Minn.,
400; Tecumseh Nat. Bank vs. Saunders, 51 Nebr., 801; 71 N.W., 779;
Bott vs. Wurts, 63 N.J.L., 289; 43 A., 744, 881; 45 L.R.A., 251; State vs.
Foraker, 46 Oh. St., 677; 23 N.E., 491; 6 L.R.A., 422.)" (12 C.J., 880.)

As our constitutional system ("limitation" of powers) is more analogous

to state systems than to the Federal theory of "grant" of powers, it is
proper to assume that the members of our Constitutional convention,
composed mostly of lawyers, and even the members of the American
Congress that approved the Tydings-McDuffie enabling legislation,
contemplated the adoption of such constitutional practice in this portion
of the world. Hence, my conclusion that in Philippine polity, courts may
and should take cognizance of the subject of this controversy.
B. The petitioners' grievance is that, contrary to the provisions of the
Constitution (Article XV), the proposed amendment was not approved "by
a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House
of Representatives." They complain that certain Senators and some
members of the House of Representatives were not allowed to participate
and were not considered in determining the required three fourths vote.
The respondents, besides denying our power to revised the counting,
assert that the persons mentioned, for all practical purposed did not
belong to the Congress of the Philippines on the day the amendment was
debated and approved.
Central target of attack is Republic Act No. 73 "to submit to the Filipino
people, for approval or disapproval, the amendment to the Constitution of
the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance thereto, proposed by the
Congress of the Philippines in a Resolution of both Houses, etc."
Petitioners would have a declaration of invalidity of that piece of
legislation. Its first section provides that "the amendment to the
Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance thereto,
proposed by the Congress of the Philippines in a Resolution of both
Houses, adopted on September eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty-six,
shall be submitted to the people, for approval or disapproval, at a general
election which shall be held on March eleven, nineteen hundred and forty-
seven, in accordance with the provisions of this Act."
By this provision, the Legislative Department with the concurrence of the
Executive, declares in the most solemn manner that the resolution
proposing the amendment was duly carried. Therefore, it would be
pertinent to inquire whether those petitioners who are members of the
Congress that approved Republic Act No. 73 are not precluded from
questioning its validity or veracity, unless they assert and prove that in
Congress they opposed its enactment. In default of a contrary showing, it
is not reasonable to suppose that as members of Congress they
endorsed-- or at least are bound by — the declarations of Republic Act No.
73? And if a private party is estopped from challenging the constitutional
efficacy of a law whose enactment he has procured (see 16 C.J.S., 198
and 11 Am. Jur., 767) should not a member of Congress be estopped
from impugning a statute he helped (presumably) to pass?
Parenthetically it should be added that the remaining petitioners, as mere
citizens, would probably have no suable claim. (Cf. 16 C.J.S., 169.)
C. But perhaps these points should be left to future study and decision,
because the instant litigation may be solved by the application of other
well-established principles founded mainly on the traditional respect
which one department of the Government entertains for the actions of the
others.
On account of the separation of powers, which I firmly believe, I agree to
the applicability and binding effect of section 313 of Act No. 190, as
amended by Act No. 2210, which, in my opinion, has not been abrogated
by the Rules of Court. I likewise believe the soundness of the doctrine
expounded by the authoritative Wigmore on a question admittedly within
the domain of the law on evidence: conclusiveness of the enrolled bill of
resolution upon the judicial authorities.
D. Withal, should that principle of conclusiveness be denied, the
respondents could plausibly fall back on the time-honored rule that the
courts may not go behind the legislative journals to contradict their
veracity. (United States vs. Pons, 34 Phil., 729.)
According to the minutes of the joint session Exhibit 3, in the Senate
sixteenth (16) senators approved the resolution against five (5), with no
absences; whereas in the house sixty-eight (68) congressmen voted "yes",
eighteen(18) voted "no", one abstained from voting and one was absent.
Therefore, 16 being three-fourths of the total membership of twenty-one
of the Senate (16 plus 5), and 68 being more than three-fourths of the
total membership of eighty-eight (88) of the House of Representatives (68
plus 18 plus 1 plus 1), it is crystal clear that the measure was upheld by
the number of votes prescribed by the Constitution.
True, there are in the said exhibit statements by two Senators and one
congressman to the effect that the votes did not constitute the majority
required by the Constitution. However, in the fact of the incontestable
arithmetical computation above shown, those protests must be attributed
to their erroneous counting of votes; none of them having then asserted
that "there were absent Senators or Congressmen who had not been
taken into account. "Ford although we might have judicial notice of the
number of proclaimed members of Congress, still we are no better
qualified than the Legislature to determine the number of its actual
membership at any given moment, what with demises or demissions,
remotions or suspensions.

HILADO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result of the majority opinion as well as in the grounds
supporting the same in so far as they are not inconsistent with the
applicable reasons supporting my concurring opinion in Vera vs. Avelino
(77 Phil., 192). But I dissent from that part of the majority opinion (page 3,
ante) wherein it is stated that if the suspended members of the Senate
and House of Representatives had been counted "the affirmative votes in
favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths of vote in either branch of Congress."
The basic theories underlying my aforesaid concurring opinion in Vera vs.
Avelino, supra, are, first, that the questions therein raised were political in
nature within the exclusive province of the legislature, and, second, that
the judiciary does not possess jurisdiction over such questions. It is to me
evidence that the questions involved in the present proceeding are no
less political than those involved in that former Senate case. It is deemed
unnecessary to dwell at more length upon the grounds of my said
concurring opinion.
The ground for my dissent from the above-quoted statement of the
majority opinion in the instant proceeding is that the suspension of the
said members of the Senate and the House of Representatives being a
political question, the judiciary, being without jurisdiction to interfere with
the determination thereof by the proper political department of the
government, has perforce to abide by said determination if it were to go
any further in the consideration of the case. In other words, any further
discussion of the case in this Court will have to start from the premise
that said members have been suspended by the respective Houses of
Congress and that we, being powerless to interfere with the matter of said
suspension, must consider ourselves bound by the determination of said
political branches of the government. As said by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Philipps vs. Payne (2 Otto. [U.S.], 130; 23 Law. ed., 649),
"in cases involving the action of the political departments of the
government, the judiciary is bound by such action." (Williams vs.
Insurance Co., 13 Pet., 420; Garcia vs. Lee, 12 Pet., 511; Kennel vs.
Chambers, 14 How., 38; Foster vs. Neilson, 2 Pet., 209; Nabob of Carnatio
vs. East Ind. Co., Ves., Jr., 60; Lucer vs. Barbon, 7 How., 1; R.I. vs. Mass.,
12 Pet., 714.)
If, then, we are to proceed, as I think we should, upon the premise that
said members have been thus suspended, there will be to my mind,
absolutely no justification, ground nor reason for counting them in the
determination of whether or not the required three-fourths vote was
attained. Their case was entirely different from that of members who, not
having been suspended nor otherwise disqualified, had the right to vote
upon the resolution. In the case of the latter, they had, like all other
members similarly situated, three alternatives, namely, to vote in favor of
the resolution, to vote against it, or to abstain from voting. If they voted in
favor, of course, their votes had to be counted amount those supporting
the resolution. If they voted against, of course, their votes had to be
counted with those opposing. And if they abstained from voting, there
would be sound justification for counting them as not in favor of the
resolution, because by their very abstention they impliedly but necessarily
would signify that they did not favor the resolution, for it is obvious that if
they did, they would have voted in favor of it. On the other hand, those
suspended members who, by reason of the suspension, whose validity or
legality we are devoid of jurisdiction to inquire into, cannot be similarly
treated. In their case there would be no way of determining which way
their votes would have gone or whether or not they would have abstained
from voting. In this connection, in considering the hypothesis of their
voting in case they had not been suspended, I must go upon the
assumption that while those suspended members may belong to the
political party which, as a party, was opposed to the resolution, still they
would have voted independently and following their individual convictions.
In this connection, it might not be amiss to mention that there were quite
a number of minority members of the legislature who voted for the
resolution. Hence, we are not in a position to say that said suspended
members, if they had not been suspended, would have voted against the
resolution, nor in favor of it either, nor that they would have abstained
from voting. Why then should they bed counted with the members who
voted against the resolution or those who, having the right to vote,
abstained from doing so? Why should we count them as though we knew
that they would have voted against the resolution, or even that they would
have abstained from voting? Soundly construed, I submit that the
Constitution does not, and could not, include suspended members in the
determination of the required three-fourths vote.
I take it, that the drafters in providing in Article XV, section 1, of the
Constitution that "The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of
three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting (emphasis supplied) separately . . .", advisedly
used the vital and all-important word "voting" therein. I take it, that they
meant to refer to the members voting, undoubtedly expecting that all
members not suspended or otherwise disqualified, would cast their votes
one way or the other. But I am here even making a concession in favor of
the opponents when I say that those who, with the right to vote, abstain
from voting, may be counted among those not in favor of the measure.
But what I cannot bring myself to conceive is that the quoted provision
should have intended to count suspended or disqualified members as
opposed to the measure, or not being in favor of it, without it being
possible to know which way they would have voted or that they would
have abstained from voting — that they would never have voted in favor of
the measure. If I should ask why we should not count such suspended or
disqualified members among those in favor of the measure, I am sure
those who opine differently would answer, because we do not know that
they would have voted in favor of it. By the same token, if they should ask
me why we should not count them among those against the measure, I
would answer that we do not know that they would have voted against it
or that they would have abstained from voting. All this inevitably leads to
the conclusion — the only one possible — that such suspended or
disqualified members should not and cannot be counted due to that very
impossibility of knowing which way they would have voted or whether
they would have abstained from voting. I stand for a sound and rational
construction of the constitutional precept.

PARAS, J.:
I fully concur in the foregoing opinion of Mr. Justice Hilado.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

To surrender or not to surrender, that is the question.
The last bastion of democracy is in danger.
Those who are manning it are summoned to give up without the least
resistance, and the banner of the Constitution is silently and meekly
hauled down from its pole to be offered as a booty to the haughty
standard bearers of a new brand of Farcism. In t he words of Cicero,
"recedere de statu suae dignitatis."
Cardinal moral bearings have been lost in the psychological chaos
suffered by those, throwing overboard all ideals as burdensome and
dangerous ballast, in desperate efforts to attain at all costs individual
survival, even in ignominy, could not stand the impact of initial defeats at
the hands of invading fearsome military hordes.
The present is liable to confusion. Our minds are subjected to
determinate and indeterminate ideological pressures. Very often man
walks in the darkness of a blind alley obeying the pullings and pushings of
hidden and unhidden forces, or the arcane predeterminations of the
genes of human chromosomes. A rudderless ship floating in the middle
of an ocean without any visible shoreline, is bound to be wrecked at the
advent of the first typhoon. From early youth we begin to hear and learn
about the true ideals. Since then we set them as the guiding stars in our
actions and decisions, but in the long travel of life, many times the clouds
dim or completely darken those stars and then we have only to rely on our
faith in their existence and on habit, becoming unerring if long enough
followed, of adjusting our conduct to their guidance in calm and cloudless
nights. We are sitting in judgment to pass upon the conflicts, disputes
and disagreements of our fellowmen. Let us not forget that the day shall
come that we will be judged on how are are judging. Posterity shall
always have the final say. When the time solvent has dissolved the human
snag, then shall be rendered the final verdict as to whether we have faced
our task fearlessly or whether our hearts have shrunk upon the magnitude
of our duties and have chosen the most comfortable path of retreat. Then
it will be conclusively known whether did keep burning the tripod fire in
the temples of old. Some of us will just return into anonymity, covered by
the cold mist of historical oblivion; others will have their names as by
words repeatedly pronounced with popular hate or general contempt; and
still others will be remembered with universal gratefulness, love and
veneration, the guard on accorded to all those who remained faithful to
the fundamental tenets of justice. Winnowing time will sift the chaff from
the grain.
This is one of the cases upon which future generations will decide if this
tribunal has the sturdy courage to keep its responsibility in proper high
level. It will need the passing of decades and perhaps centuries before a
conclusive verdict is rendered, whether we should merit the scorn of our
fellow citizens and our decision shall be cursed as the Dred Scot decision
of Chief Justice Taney, the one that plunged the United States into civil
war, or whether in the heart of each future Filipino citizen there will be a
shrine in which our memory will be remembered with gratefulness,
because we have shown the far-reaching judicial statesmanship of Chief
Justice Marshall, the legal genius who fixed and held the rock bottom
foundations which made of the American Constitution the veritable
supreme law of the land and established the role of the tribunals as the
ultimate keepers of the Constitution. But for sure it will be rendered, and it
will be impartial and unbiased, exacting and pitiless, with unappealable
finality, and for the one condemned Dante wrote this lapidary line:
"lasciate ogni speranza."
Unless the vision of our mental eyes should be shut up by the opaque
cornea of stubborn refusal to see reality or should be impaired by the
polaroid visors of prejudice, there is no question that at the time when the
resolution in question, proposing an amendment to the Constitution, was
adopted, the members of the Senate were 24 and the members of the
House of Representatives were 96, and that the 16 members of the
Senate who voted in favor of the resolution, by undisputable
mathematical computation, do not constituted three-fourths of the 24
members thereof, and the 68 members of the House of Representatives
who voted for the resolution, by equally simple arithmetical operation, do
not constitute three-fourths of the 96 members of the said chamber. The
official certifications made by the presiding officers of the two houses of
Congress to the effect that three-fourths of all the members of the Senate
and three-fourths of all the members of the House of Representatives
voted for the resolution, being untrue, cannot change the facts. Nothing in
existence can. The certification, being a clear falsification of public
document punished by article 171 of the Revised Penal Code with prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000, cannot give reality to a fiction
based in a narration of facts that is in conflict with the absolute
metaphysical reality of the events.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitioners are citizens of the Philippines, taxpayers and electors, and

besides some of them are members of the Senate, others are members
of the House of Representatives, and still others are presidents of
political parties, duly registered, with considerable following in all parts of
the Philippines.
The first three respondents are chairman and members, respectively, of
the Commission on Elections and the remaining three are respectively the
Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General and the Director of the
Bureau of Printing.
Petitioners alleged that the Senate is actually composed of 24 Senators, 8
elected in 1941 and 16 in April 23, 1946, and that the House of
Representatives is composed of 98 members, elected on April 23, 1946,
minus 2d who resigned to assume other positions in the Government.
On September 18, 1946, there was presented for adoption by the
Congress of the Philippines a resolution proposing an amendment to the
Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto,
which reads as follows:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives, of the
Philippines in joint session assembled, by a vote of not less than
three-fourths of all the Members of each House voting separately. To
propose, as they do hereby propose, the following amendment to the
Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance
 thereto:

ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION

"Notwithstanding the provisions of section one, Article Thirteen, and

section eight, Article Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitution, during
the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the
President of the Philippines with the President of the United States on
the fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forty-six, pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered seven hundred and
thirty-three, but in no case to extend beyond the third of July, nineteen
hundred and seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation, development,
and utilization, of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, shall,
if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to
all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or
indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same manner as to,
and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the
Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled by
citizens of the Philippines."
This amendment shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at which it is
submitted to the people for the ratification pursuant to Article XV of
the Constitution.
Sixteen Senators voted in favor of the resolution and 5 against it, and 68
Representatives voted in favor and 18 against.
Thereafter, Congress passed Republic Act No. 73 calling a plebiscite to
be held on March 11, 1947, for the purpose of submitting to the people
the proposed amendment embodied in the resolution, and appropriating
P1,000,000 for said purpose.
Petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 73 as unconstitutional
because Congress may not, by said act, submit to the people for approval
or disapproval the proposed amendment to the Constitution embodied in
resolution Exhibit B inasmuch as, to comply with the express provisions
of Article XV of the Constitution, requiring the affirmative votes of three-
fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, three-fourths of the 24 members of the
Senate is constituted by at least 18 Senators, 2 more than those who
actually voted for the resolution in question, and three-fourths of the 98
members of the House of Representatives should at least be 72
Representatives, or 4 more than those who actually voted for the
resolution.
Respondents deny that the Senate is composed of 24 Senators, by
excluding from them petitioners Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E.
Romero and allege that the House of Representatives is not composed of
98 members but of only 90. They admit that at the joint session of
Congress to consider the resolution Exhibit B, in favor of the resolution 16
votes were cast in the Senate and in the House of Representatives 68 and
5 in the Senate and 18 in the House of Representatives had voted against.
They admit the approval of Republic Act No. 73 and that necessary steps
to hold the plebiscite therein provided are being taken, but deny that said
act is unconstitutional, and byway of defense, allege that the resolution
Exhibit B was adopted by three-fourths of all the qualified members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately and,
consequently, Republic Act No. 73, ordering its submission to the people
for approval or disapproval, fixing a date for a general election, and
appropriating public funds for said purpose, is valid and constitutional.
At the hearing of this case both parties submitted the following
stipulation:
The parties through their undersigned counsel hereby stipulate the
following facts:
1. That Messrs. Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero
were, by the majority vote of the Commission on Elections,
proclaimed elected senators in the election of April 23, 1946;
2. That when the Senate convened on May 25, 1946, the said
senators-elect took part in the election of the President of that body;
but that before the senators-elect were sworn in by the President of
the Senate, a resolution was presented, and subsequently approved,
to defer the administration of oath and the seating of Messrs. Jose O.
Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, pending the hearing and
decision of the protest lodged against their election;
3. That on the 25th of May, 1946, the said senators individually took
their alleged oath of office before notaries public, and not on the
floor, and filed said oaths with the Secretary of the Senate during the
noon recess of the said date;
4. That Messrs. Vera and Romero filed with the Auditor of the Senate
other oaths of office accomplished by them outside of the floor
before a notary public and the Secretary of the Senate, on September
5 and August 31, 1946, respectively; and that their corresponding
salaries from April 23, 1946, were paid on August 31, 1946;
5. That Mr. Diokno, having left for the United States, his son Jose W.
Diokno filed a copy of Mr. Diokno's alleged oath of office dated May
25, 1946, with the Auditor of the Senate on October 15,1946, and on
said date his salary was paid corresponding to the period from April
23 to October 15, 1946;
6. That all three have subsequently received their salaries every
fifteen days;
7. That since the approval of the resolution deferring their seating and
oaths up to the present time, the said Messrs. Vera, Diokno, and
Romero have not been allowed to sit and take part in the
deliberations of the Senate and to vote therein, not do their names
appear in the roll of the Senate;
8. That before May 25, 1946, the corresponding provincial boards of
canvassers certified as having been elected in the election held on
April 23, 1946, ninety-eight representatives, among them Messrs.
Alejo Santos and Jesus B. Lava for Bulacan, Jose Cando and
Constancio P. Padilla for Nueva Ecija, Amado M. Yuson and Luis
Taruc for Pampanga, Alejandro Simpauco for Tarlac, and Vicente F.
Gustilo for Negros Occidental;
9. That the aforesaid eight members-elect of the House of
Representatives took part in the election of the Speaker of the House
of Representatives held on May 25, 1946;
10. That before the members-elect of the House of Representatives
were sworn in by the Speaker, Mr. Topacio Nueno, representative for
Manila, submitted a resolution to defer the taking of oath and seating
of Luis Taruc and Amado Yuson for Pampanga, Constancio P. Padilla
and Jose Cando for Nueva Ecija, Alejandro Simpauco for Tarlac, Alejo
Santos and Jesus Lava for Bulacan, and Vicente F. Gustilo for Negros
Occidental "pending the hearing and decision on the protests lodged
against their election," copy of the resolution being attached to and
made part of this stipulation as Exhibit 1 thereof;
11. That the resolution Exhibit 1 was, upon motion of Representative
Escareal and approved by the House, referred for study to a
committee of seven, which up to the present has not reported, as
shown by the Congressional Record for the House of
Representatives;
12. That the eight representatives-elect included in the resolution
were not shown in on the floor and have not been so sworn in or
allowed to sit up to the present time, nor have they participated in any
of the proceedings of the House of Representatives except during the
debate of the Escareal motion referred to in paragraph 11 hereof, nor
cast any vote therein since May 25, 1946, and their names do not
appear in the roll of the members of the House except as shown by
the Congressional Record of the House of Representatives, nor in the
roll inserted in the official program for the inauguration of the
Republic of the Philippines hereto attached as Exhibit 2 hereof;
13. That the eight representatives-elect above mentioned took their
alleged oaths of office on the date set opposite their names, as
follows:
Jose Cando May 25, 1946
Vicente Gustilo May 25, 1946
Constancio Padilla May 22, 1946
Alejo Santos May 23, 1946
Luis M. Taruc May 25, 1946
Amado M. Yuson May 25, 1946
Jesus B. Lava May 25, 1946
Alejandro Simpauco May 25, 1946

all of which oaths were taken before notaries public, with the
exception of the first four who took their oaths before Mr. Narciso
Pimentel, Secretary of the House;
14. That said oaths were filed with the Auditor through the office of
the Secretary of the House of Representatives;
15. That the persons mentioned in paragraph 13 were paid salaries
for the term beginning April 23, 1946, up to the present, with the
exception of Messrs. Luis Taruc and Jesus Lava, to whom payment
was suspended since August 16;
16. That Messrs. Alejo Santos and Vicente F. Gustilo took their oaths
before the Speaker of the House of Representatives and were allowed
to sit on September 30, 1946, the last day of the Special Sessions;
17. That in addition to the eight persons above mentioned, two
members of the House, Representatives Jose C. Zulueta and Narciso
Ramos, had resigned before the resolution proposing an amendment
to the Constitution was discussed and passed on September
18,1946;
18. That the voting on the resolution proposing an amendment to the
Constitution was made by the Secretary calling the roll of each house
and the votes cast were as shown in the attached certificate of the
Secretary of the House of Representatives hereto attached, marked
Exhibit 3 and made a part hereof; and
19. That the Congressional Records for the Senate and House of
Representatives and the alleged oaths of office are made a part of
this Stipulation by reference thereto, respondents reserving the right
to question their materiality and admissibility.
 Manila, Philippines, November 25, 1946.
For the petitioners: For the respondents:

JOSE E. ROMERO ROMAN OZAETA

ANTONIO BARREDO Secretary of Justice

JOSE B.L. REYES

First Asst. Solicitor General

PETITIONER'S PERSONALITY

Whether petitioners have or have not the personality to file the petition in
this case is the first question we have to consider.
No party raised the question, but it having arisen in the course of the
Court's deliberation, we should not evade deciding it and giving what in
law and justice should be the answer.
To our mind there is no doubt that petitioners have the personality to
institute the present recourse of prohibition. If petitioners should lack that
personality, such legal defect would not certainly have failed to be noticed
by respondents themselves.
Respondents' failure to raise the question indicates their conviction that
petitioners have the necessary legal personality to file the petition, and we
do not see any reason why such personality should be put in doubt.
Petitioners are divided into three groups: the first is composed of
senators; the second, of representatives; and the third, of presidents of
four political parties.
All of the individuals composing the first two groups, with the exception
of Senators Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, are
members of either of the two houses of Congress and took part in the
consideration of Resolution Exhibit B and of Republic Act No. 73, while
the above three excepted senators were the ones who were excluded in
the consideration of said resolution and act and were not counted for
purposes of determining the three-fourths constitutional rule in the
adoption of the resolution.
In paragraph eight of the petition it is alleged that respondents have taken
all the necessary steps for the holding of the general election on March
11, 1947, and that the carrying out of said acts "constitute an attempt to
enforce the resolution and act aforementioned in open violation of the
Constitution," is without or in excess of respondents' jurisdiction and
powers, "violative of the rights of the petitioners who are members of the
Congress, and will cause the illegal expenditure and disbursement of
public funds and end in an irreparable injury to the taxpayers and the
citizens of the Philippines, among whom are the petitioners and those
represented by them in their capacities mentioned above."
There should not be any question that the petitioners who are either
senators or members of the House of Representatives have direct
interest in the legal issues involved in this case as members of the
Congress which adopted the resolution, in open violation of the
Constitution, and passed the act intended to make effective such
unconstitutional resolution. Being members of Congress, they are even
duty bound to see that the latter act within the bounds of the Constitution
which, as representatives of the people, they should uphold, unless they
are to commit a flagrant betrayal of public trust. They are representatives
of the sovereign people and it is their sacred duty to see to it that the
fundamental law embodying the will of the sovereign people is not
trampled upon.
The four political parties represented by the third group of petitioners,
represent large groups of our population, perhaps nearly one-half of the
latter, and the numerous persons they represent are directly interested
and will personally be affected by the question whether the Constitution
should be lightly taken and can easily be violated without any relief and
whether it can be amended by a process openly repugnant to the letter of
the Constitution itself.
As a matter of fact, the vital questions raised in this case affect directly
each and every one of the citizens and inhabitants of this country.
Whether our Constitution is, as it is supposed to be, a paramount law or
just a mere scrap of paper, only good to be thrown into a waste basket, is
a matter of far-reaching importance to the security, property, personal
freedom, life, honor, and interests of the citizens. That vital question will
necessarily affect the way of life of the whole people and of its most
unimportant unit. Each and every one of the individuals inhabiting this
land of ours shall have to make plans for the future depending on how the
question is finally decided. No one can remain indifferent; otherwise, it
will at his peril.
Our conclusion is that petitioners have full legal personality to institute
the present action; and much more, those who are members of Congress
have the legal duty to institute it, lest they should betray the trust reposed
in them by the electorate.

24 SENATORS

The first question raised by respondents' answer refers to the actual

number of the members of the Senate. According to petitioners there are
24 of them while according to respondents there are only 21, excluding
Senators Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, because,
according to them, "they are not duly qualified and sworn in members of
the Senate."
This allegation appears to be belied by the first seven paragraphs of the
stipulation of facts submitted by both parties.
No amount of sophism, of mental gymnastics or logo-daedaly may
change the meanings and effects of the words placed by respondents
themselves in said seven paragraphs. No amount of argument may
delude anyone into believing that Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero are
not senators notwithstanding their having been proclaimed as elected
senators, their having taken part in the election of the President of the
Senate, their having taken their oaths of office, and their receiving salaries
as senators.
Such a paradoxical proposition could have been driven into acceptance in
the undeveloped brains of the pithecanthropus or gigantopithecus of five
hundred millennia ago, but it would be unpardonably insulting o the
human mind of the twentieth century.
Our conclusion is that Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero should be
counted as members of the Senate, without taking into consideration
whatever legal effects the Pendatun resolution may have produced, a
question upon which we have already elaborated in our opinion in Vera vs.
Avelino (77 Phil., 192). Suspended or not suspended, they are senators
anyway, and there is no way of ignoring a fact so clear and simple as the
presence of the sun at day time. Therefore, counting said three Senators,
there are 24 Senators in all in the present Senate.

96 REPRESENTATIVES

The next question raised by respondents is their denial of petitioners'

allegations to the effect that the present House of Representatives is
composed of 98 members and their own allegation to the effect that at
present "only 90 members have qualified, have been fully sworn in, and
have taken their seats as such."
Again respondents' allegations are belied by paragraphs eight to
seventeen of the stipulation of facts.
The disagreement between the parties is as to whether or not
Representatives Cando, Gustilo, Padilla, Santos, Taruc, Yuson, Lava and
Simpauco, mentioned in paragraph 13 of the stipulation of facts, are
members of the House of Representatives.
The facts stipulated by the parties proved conclusively that said eight
persons are actual members of the House of Representatives. We may
even add that the conclusiveness about said eight representatives is even
greater than in the case of Senators Vera, Diokno, and Romero, because
no resolution of suspension has ever been adopted by the House of
Representatives against said eight members, who are being deprived of
the exercise of some of their official functions and privileges by the
unipersonal, groundless, dictatorial act of the Speaker.
That illegal deprivation, whose counterpart can only be found in countries
where the insolence of totalitarian rulers have replaced all constitutional
guarantees and all concepts of decent government, raises again a
constitutional question: whether it is permissible for the Speaker of the
House of Representatives to exercise the arbitrary power of depriving
representatives duly elected by the people of their constitutional
functions, privileges, and prerogatives. To allow the existence of such an
arbitrary power and to permit its exercise unchecked is to make of
democracy a mockery.
The exercise of such an arbitrary power constitutes a want on onslaught
against the sovereignty itself of the people, an onslaught which may
cause the people sooner or later to take justice in their own hands. No
system of representative government may subsist if those elected by the
people may so easily be silenced or obliterated from the exercise of their
constitutional functions.
From the stipulation of facts, there should not be any question that at the
last national election, 98 representatives were elected and at the time the
resolution Exhibit B was adopted on September 18, 1946, 96 of them were
actual members of the House, as two (Representatives Zulueta and
Ramos) has resigned.
Applying the three-fourth rule, if there were 24 senators at the time the
resolution was adopted; three-fourths of them should at least be 18 and
not the 16 who only voted in favor of the resolution, and if there were 96
representatives, three-fourths of them should certainly be more than the
68 who voted for the resolution. The necessary consequence is that,
since not three-fourths of the senators and representatives voting
separately have voted in favor of the resolution as required by Article XV
of the Constitution, there can be no question that the resolution has not
been validly adopted.
We cannot but regret that our brethren, those who have signed or are in
agreement with the majority opinion, have skipped the questions as to the
actual membership of the Senate and House of Representatives,
notwithstanding the fact that they are among the first important ones
squarely raised by the pleadings of both parties. If they had taken them
into consideration, it would seem clear that their sense of fairness will
bring them to the same conclusion we now arrived at, at least, with
respect to the actual membership of the House of Representatives.
Upon our conclusions as to the membership of the Senate and House of
Representatives, it appears evident that the remedy sought for in the
petition should be granted.

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

Without judging respondents' own estimate as to the strength of their

own position concerning the questions of the actual membership of the
Senate and House of Representatives, it seems that during the oral and in
the written arguments they have retreated to the theory of conclusiveness
of the certification of authenticity made by the presiding officers and
secretaries of both House of Congress as their last redoubt.
The resolution in question begins as follows: "Resolved by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the Philippines in joint session assembled,
by a vote of not less than three-fourths of all the members of each House
voting separately, . . .."
Just because the adoption of the resolution, with the above statement,
appears to be certified over the signatures of the President of the Senate
and the House of Representatives and the Secretaries of both Houses,
respondents want us to accept blindly as a fact what is not. They want us
to accept unconditionally as a dogma, as absolute as a creed of faith,
what, as we have shown, appears to be a brazen official falsehood.
Our reason revolts against such an unethical proposition.
An intimation or suggestion that we, in the sacred temple of justice,
throwing overboard all scruples, in the administration of justice, could
accept as true what we know is not and then perform our official
functions upon that voluntary self-delusion, is too shocking and absurb to
be entertained even for a moment. Anyone who keeps the minimum
sense of justice will not fail to feel aghast at the perversion or miscarriage
of justice which necessarily will result from the suggestion.
But the theory is advanced as a basis to attack the jurisdiction of this
Court to inquire behind the false certification made by the presiding
officers and the secretaries of the two Houses of Congress.
Respondents rely on the theory of, in the words of the majority opinion,
"the conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution."
To avoid repeating the arguments advanced by the parties, we have made
part of this opinion, as Appendices A, B, and C,1 the memoranda
presented by both petitioners and respondents, where their attorneys
appear to have amply and ably discussed the question. The perusal of the
memoranda will show petitioners' contentions to be standing on stronger
ground and, therefore, we generally agree with their arguments.
In what follows we will try to analyze the positions taken in the majority
opinion.

POLITICAL QUESTIONS

The majority enunciates the proposition that "political questions are not
within the province of the judiciary," except "by express constitutional or
statutory provision" to the contrary. Then argues that "a duly certified law
or resolution also binds the judges under the 'enrolled bill rule' out of
respect to the political departments."
The doctrine is predicated "on the principle of the separation of powers."
This question of separation of powers is the subject of discussion in the
case of Vera vs. Avelino, supra. We deem unnecessary to repeat what we
have already said in our opinion in said case, where we have elaborated
on the question.
Although the majority maintains that what they call the doctrine that
political questions are not within the province of the judiciary is "too well-
established to need citation of authorities," they recognize the difficulty
"in determining what matters fall under the meaning of political
questions."
This alleged doctrine should not be accepted at its face value. We do not
accept it even as a good doctrine. It is a general proposition made
without a full comprehension of its scope and consequences. No judicial
discernment lies behind it.
The confession that the "difficulty lies in determining what matters fall
within the meaning of political question" shows conclusively that the so-
called doctrine has recklessly been advanced.
This allegedly "well-established" doctrine is no doctrine at all in view of
the confessed difficulty in determining what matters fall within the
designation of political question. The majority itself admits that the term
"is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are
not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this
ground, on the courts to meddle with the acts of the political department
of the government."
Doctrine is that "what is taught; what is held; put forth as true, and
supported by a teacher, a school, or a sect; a principle or position, or the
body of principles, in any branch of knowledge; tenet; dogma; principle of
faith. "It is a synonym of principle, position, opinion, article, maxim, rule,
and axiom. in its general sense, doctrine applies to any speculative truth
or working principle, especially as taught to others or recommended to
their acceptance. Therefore, to be true, it should be expressed on simple
and self-evident terms. A doctrine in which one of the elemental or
nuclear terms is the subject of an endless debate is a misnomer and
paradox.
A doctrine is advanced and accepted as an established truth, as a starting
point for developing new propositions, as a guiding principle in the
solution of many problems. It is a groundwork for the building of an
intellectual system. It is the basis of a more or less complex legal
structure. If not the cornerstone, it should at least be one of the main
columns of an architectonic construction. If that groundwork, cornerstone
or column is supported by a thing whose existence still remains in
dispute, it is liable to fall.
We irrevocably refuse to accept and sanction such a pseudo-doctrine
which is based on the unsettled meaning of political question. The
general proposition that "political questions are not within the province of
the judiciary" is just one of the many numerous general pronouncements
made as an excuse for apathetic, indifferent, lazy or uncourageous
tribunals to refuse to decide hard or ticklish legal issues submitted to
them.
It belongs to the category of that much-vaunted principle of separation of
powers, the handful of sand with which judicial ostriches blind
themselves, as if self-inflicted blindness may solve a problem or may act
as a conjuration to drive away a danger or an evil.
We agree with the majority that the proposal to amend the Constitution
and the process to make it effective, as provided in Article XV of the
Constitution, are matters of political nature, but we cannot agree with
their conclusion that a litigation as to whether said article has been
complied with a violated is beyond the jurisdiction of the tribunals,
because to arrive at this conclusion we must accept as a major premise
the pseudo-doctrine which we have precisely exposed as erroneous and
false.
Is there anything more political in nature than the Constitution? Shall all
questions relating to it, therefore, betaken away from the courts? Then,
what about the constitutional provision conferring the Supreme Court
with the power to decide "all cases involving the constitutionality of a
treaty or a law?"

COLEMAN versus MILLER

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Coleman vs. Miller
(122 A. L. R., 625) is invoked as the mainstay of the majority position.
No less than eight pages of the majority opinion are occupied by the
exposition and analysis of the decision of the Supreme Court.
The case is invoked as authority for the conclusion that "the efficacy of
ratification by the State legislature of a proposed amendment to the
federal Constitution" and that "the decision by Congress, in its control of
the Secretary of State of the questions of whether an amendment has
been adopted within a reasonable time from the date of submission to
the State legislature," are political questions and not justiciable.
At the outset it must be noted that the two above mentioned questions
have no similarity or analogy with the constitutional questions herein
discussed. The questions as to the efficacy of the ratification by the
Senate of Kansas of the Child Labor amendment proposed by the United
States Congress in June, 1924, and upon the decision of said Congress,
"in its control of the Secretary of State," whether the amendment has been
adopted "within a reasonable time from the date of submission to the
State legislature," either one of them does not raise a controversy of
violation of specific provisions of the Constitution as the ones raised in
the present case.
No specific constitutional provision has been mentioned to have been
violated because in January, 1925, the Legislature of Kansas rejected the
amendment, a copy of the rejection having been sent to the Secretary of
State of the United States, and in January, 1927, a new resolution ratifying
the amendment was adopted by the Senate of Kansas on a 21-20
division, the Lieutenant Governor casting the deciding vote. Neither was
there such mention of constitutional violation as to the effect of the
previous rejection and of the lapse of time after submission of the
amendment to the State legislature.
No constitutional provision has been pointed out to have been violated
because the Lieutenant Governor had cast his vote or because by the
lapse of time from June, 1924 to March, 1927, the proposed amendment
had allegedly lost its vitality.
It is only natural that, in the absence of a constitutional provision upon the
efficacy of ratification by a State legislature of a proposed amendment, it
was within the ultimate power of the United States Congress to decide
the question, in its decision rendered in the exercise of its constitutional
power, to control the action of the Secretary of State, and the
promulgation of the adoption of amendment could not be controlled by
the courts.
Evidently, the invoked authority has no bearing at all with the matters in
controversy in the present case.
We note, as observed in the majority opinion, that the four opinions in
Coleman vs. Miller, according to the American Law Reports, show
"interestingly divergent but confusing positions of the justices," and are
the subject of an amusing article in 48 Yale Law Journal, 1455, entitled
"Sawing a Justice in Half," asking how it happened that the nine-member
United States Supreme Court could not reach a decision on the question
of the right of the Lieutenant Governor of Kansas to cast his vote,
because the odd number of justices was "equally divided."
How such a "confusing" and "amusing" four-opinion decision in Coleman
vs. Miller could be an authority is beyond our comprehension.

GREEN versus WELLER

One of the authorities upon which the majority relies is the decision of the
Mississippi Supreme Court in Green vs. Miller (32 Miss., 650), quoting one
paragraph thereof.
Here again we have a case of inapplicable authority, unless taken in its
reversed effect.
The Mississippi Supreme Court maintains that there is nothing in the
nature of the submission to the people of a proposal to amend the
Constitution which should cause the free exercise of it to be obstructed or
that could render it dangerous to the stability of the government, but in
making this pronouncement, it assumes that the submission is made "in a
established form," adding that the means provided for the exercise by the
people of their sovereign right of changing the fundamental law should
receive such a construction as not to trample upon the exercise of their
right, and that the best security against tumult and revolution is the free
and unobstructed privilege to the people of the state to change their
Constitution "in the mode prescribed by the instrument."
So the authority, if clearly interpreted, will lead us to the conclusion that
the majority position is wrong because the Mississippi Supreme Court, in
making the pronouncement, upon the assumption that the submission to
the people is made "in a established form" and "in the mode prescribed"
by the Constitution, namely, in accordance with the provisions of the
instrument, the pronouncements would be the opposite if, as in the
present case, the submission of the proposal of amendment to the
people is made through a process flagrantly violative of the Constitution,
aggravated by wanton falsification of public records and tyrannical
trampling of the constitutional prerogatives of duly elected
representatives of the people.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK

The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black, joined in by Mr. Justice

Roberts, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas, in the
"confusing" and "amusing" decision in Coleman vs. Miller, is also invoked
by the majority, but this other authority seems equally reluctant to offer its
helping hand to a helpless, desperate position.
The major premise of the concurring opinion is as follows: "The
Constitution granted Congress exclusive power to control submission of
constitutional amendments."
Everybody ought to know that no such an unlimited, unchecked,
omnipotent power is granted by our fundamental law to the Congress of
the Philippines. Our Congress may propose amendments or call a
convention to make the proposal, but that is all. Nowhere in the
Constitution can be found any word, any grammatical sign, not even the
faintest hint that in submitting the proposed amendments to the people,
Congress shall have "exclusive power to control the submission." That
submission must be provided by law, and no law may be enacted and
come into effect by the exclusive power of Congress. It needs the
concurring action of the President of the Philippines. And if the law
happens to violate the fundamental law, courts of justice may step in to
nullify its effectiveness. After the law is enacted, its execution devolves
upon the Executive Department. As a matter of fact, it is the Executive
Department which actually submits to the people the proposed
amendment. Congress fixes the date of submission, but the President of
the Philippines may refuse to submit it in the day fixed by law if war,
rebellion, or insurrection prevents a plebiscite from proceeding.
After showing that Mr. Justice Black started his argument from a major
premise not obtainable in the Philippines, his conclusions cannot help the
majority in anyway.

MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER

The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the "confusing" and

"amusing" case of Coleman vs. Miller is the next authority invoked by the
majority, but the opinion does not offered much help. The justice
maintains that the proceedings for voting in legislative assemblies "are
matters that concern not merely political actions but are also of the very
essence of political action," and then advances the following argument:
"To open the law-courts to such controversies is to have courts sit in
judgment on the manifold disputes engendered by procedures for voting
in legislative assemblies."
The argument has no weight at all. The argument merely displays an
attitude, one of simple distaste for the idea, but fails to give any sensible
reason for the attitude. Ina totalitarian regime, where decisions are
rendered not in answer to the promptings of a sense of justice, but as
expressions of moods, caprices and whims of arbitrary rulers, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's attitude could be taken as the law, but then it would be
necessary to elevate him first to the category of a fuehrer.
In our jurisdiction personal attitudes are not the law. Here, justice must be
founded on reason, but never on passing unreasoned moods, judicial or
otherwise.
We regret that we cannot agree with the majority's sharing Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's views, which in their judgment are in accord "with sound
principles of political jurisprudence and represent liberal and advanced
thought on the workings of constitutional and popular government. "Our
regret is not for ourselves alone but for those who happen to accept as
authority the unreasoned and unexplained mental attitude of a judicial
officer of a foreign country, praising it even with the much-abused label as
"liberal," notwithstanding the fact that it represents the whimsical rule of
personal attitudes and not the rule of well-matured reason.

THE ENROLLED BILL THEORY

This theory is amply discussed in the memoranda of the parties attached

hereto as Appendices A, B, and C. Although we consider it unnecessary to
enlarge the discussion, we deem it convenient to make a little analysis of
what is stated in the majority opinion. Respondents contend, with the full
approval of the majority, that a duly authenticated bill or resolution
imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts.
The present case is a conclusive evidence of the absurdity of the theory.
How can we accept the absolute verity of the presiding officers'
certification that the resolution in question has been adopted by three-
fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives, when as a matter of undisputable fact the certification is
false? How can we accept a theory which elevates a false-hood to the
category of truth?
The majority alleges that the rule is the one prevailing in England.
Because the English have committed the nonsense of accepting the
theory, is that reason for Filipinos to follow suit? Why, in the
administration of justice, should our tribunals not think independently?
Our temple of justice is not presided by simians trained in the art of
imitation but by human beings, and human beings must act according to
reason, never just to imitate what is wrong, although such mistakes may
happen to be consecrated as a judicial precedent. It would be
inconceivable for our courts to commit such a blunder.
Repeating what Wigmore has said (4 Wigmore on Evidence, 685,
footnote), the majority states that in the United States the jurisdictions
are divided almost equally pro and con on the theory, although in
petitioners' memorandum Appendix A there appears more up-to-date
evidence to the effect that there is a great majority for the rejection. But
to our mind, mere numbers as to pro and con seem to us immaterial in
the decision as to whether the theory is or is not correct. Numbers do not
make reason nor justice.
The majority contends that the theory conforms to the express policy of
our law-making body, invoking to said effect the now obsolete section
313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210.
Even if we should follow the anachronistic practice of deciding issues
upon the authority of laws which have been repealed or abolished, still the
evidence pointed out by the majority does not support their contention.
Section 313 alluded to enumerates the evidence that may prove the
procedures of the defunct Philippine Commission or of any legislative
body that may be provided for in the Philippines, with the proviso that the
existence of a copy of acts of said commission or the Philippine
Legislature, signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said
bodies, is a conclusive proof "of the provisions of such acts and of the
due enactment thereof."
This proviso has been repealed by its non-inclusion in the Rules of Court.
Sections 5 and 41 of Rule 123 show conclusively that this Supreme Court,
in making the rules effective since July 1, 1940, rejected the proviso as
unreasonable and unjust. Section 5 provides that we may take judicial
notice of the official acts of Congress and section 41 provides what
evidence can be used to prove said official acts, but nowhere in the rules
can a provision be found that would make conclusive a certification by
the presiding officers and secretaries of both House of Congress even if
we know by conclusive evidence that the certification is false.
The allegation that the theory in question conforms to the express policy
of our lawmaking body, upon the very evidence used in support thereof,
after a little analysis, has to banish as a mid-summer night's dream.

50 AMERICAN JURISDICTION, SECTION 150

In support of the theory of conclusiveness of the enrollment, the authority

of 50 American Jurisprudence, 150 is invoked as reasons for the theory.
We will analyze the reasons adduced:
1. Respect due to a coequal and independent department of the
government. This must be the strongest one, when it is first mentioned. It
is so flimsy to require much discussion. Shall we sacrifice truth and
justice for the sake of a social courtesy, the mutual respect that must be
shown between different departments of the government? Has our sense
of evaluation of spiritual values become so perverted that we can make
such a blunder in our choice? Since when have the social or official
amenities become of paramount value to the extent of overshadowing the
principles of truth and justice?
2. Because without the theory, courts would have to make "a n inquisition
into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate power."
This second reason is premised not on a democratic attitude, but rather
on a Fascistic one. It is premised on the false belief that the members of
the majority are a king of emperos of Japan, to be worshipped but never
to be discussed. The ideology depicted by the second reason should be
relegated to where it belongs: the archeological museum.
3. "The rule is also one of convenience." This reason again shows a
perverted evaluation of human values. Is justice to be sacrificed for the
sake of convenience?
4. "Otherwise after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills
authenticated as executed by the Constitution, for years, it might be
ascertained from the journals that an act heretofore enforced had never
become a law." This last reason personifies unreasonableness to the nth
degree. So we leave it as it is, as a perpetual evidence of the extent to
which legal stupidity may reach.

WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE

Now let us examine the arguments of the next authority invoked by the
majority, Wigmore on Evidence. We will also analyzed the arguments
relied upon.
1. That to go beyond the enrolled bill "would unsettle the entire statute
law of the State." This argument, as it appears quoted in the majority
decision, is premised on the unreliability of legislative journals, and it
seems to depict a mind poisoned by prejudice, as shown by the following:
"We are to remember the danger, under the prevalence of such a doctrine,
to be apprehended from the intentional corruption of evidences of this
character. It is scarcely too much to say that the legal existence of almost
every legislative action would be at the mercy of all persons having
access to these journals. . . ."
The argument should be taken into consideration in connection with
American experience, which seems not to be too flattering to our former
metropolis.
Our own personal experience of more than a decade in legislative
processes convinces us that Wigmore's assumption does not obtain in
the Philippines. It is true that in the pre-constitution legislative
enactments we have seen few instances in which there had been
disagreement between what has actually been passed, as shown by the
journal, and the authenticated enrolled bill. But the instances were so few
to justify entertaining here the same fears entertained by Wigmore in
America. Although those instances were few, we fought to correct the evil
in the Constitutional Convention, where we were able to introduce the
following revolutionary provision in the Constitution: "No bill shall be
passed by either House unless it shall be printed and copies thereof in
their final from furnished each member at least three calendar days prior
to its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the
necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no
amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its passage
shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in
the journal." (Section 21 [2], Article VI of the Constitution.)
This provision is an effective guarantee against the situation depicted by
Wigmore's fears.
2. To the argument that if the authenticated roll is conclusive upon the
courts, then less than a quorum of each House may by the aid of
presiding officers impose laws upon the State in defiance of the inhibition
of the Constitution, Wigmore answers: "This perhaps cannot be avoided
absolutely. But it applies also to all human agencies. It is not fit that the
judiciary should claim for itself a purity beyond all others; nor has it been
able at all times with truth to say that its high places have not been
disgraced."
The answer is unconvincing. Because there can be and there have been
blundering, disgraceful, or corrupt judicial officers is no reason why
arbitrary presiding officers and members of the legislature should be
allowed to have their way unchecked. Precisely the system of checks and
balances established by the Constitution presupposes the possibility of
error and corruption in any department of government and the system is
established to put a check on them.
When the question of an unconstitutional, arbitrary or corrupt action by
the legislature is placed at the bar of justice, the judiciary must not shrink
from its duty. If there is corruption in the judiciary, our laws provide the
proper remedy. Even we, the members of the highest tribunal, cannot with
impunity commit "culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
or other high crimes" without being liable to be removed from office on
impeachment, and we hope, if there is such a case, that the House of
Representatives and the Senate will do their duty in accordance with
Article IX of the Constitution, and not follow the uncourageous example
which is given under the intellectual tutelage of Wigmore.
 THE CONSTITUTIONAL NUMERICAL RULES

The three-fourth rule has been provided in Article XV of the Constitution

as a guarantee against the adoption of amendments to the fundamental
law by mere majorities.
The Constitution must be accorded more stability than ordinary laws and
if any change is to be introduced in it, it must be in answer to a pressing
public need so powerful as to sway the will of three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives. Said three-
fourth rule has been adopted by the Constitutional Convention, as all the
other numerical rules, with the purpose of avoiding any doubt that it must
be complied with mathematical precision, with the same certainty of all
numbers and fractions expressed or expressible in arithmetical figures.
Where the Constitution says three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, it means
an exact number, not susceptible of any more or less. All the members
means that no single member should be excluded in the counting. It
means not excluding three Senators and eight Representatives as
respondents want us to do in order not to cause any inconvenience to the
presiding officers and secretaries of both Houses of Congress who had
the boldness of certifying that the three-fourth rule had been complied
within the adoption of the resolution in question, when such a certification
is as false as any falsehood can be.
The three-fourth rule must not be left to the caprice of arbitrary majorities,
otherwise it would be the death knell of constitutionalism in our country.
If a constitutional provision can be so trifled with, as has happened in the
adoption of the resolution in question, it would mean breaking faith with
the vitality of a government of laws, to enthrone in its stead a whimsical
government of men.
The Constitution contains several numerical provisions. It requires that
the Senate shall be composed of 24 Senators (section 2, Article VI); that
Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the
return of every enumeration, and not otherwise (section 5, Article VI); that
each House may expel a member with the concurrence of two-third of all
the members (section 10 [3], Article VI); that electoral tribunals shall each
be composed of nine members, three Justices of the Supreme Court and
six legislature members (section 11, Article VI); that to overrun the veto of
the President, the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each
House is necessary (section 20 [1], Article VI), and in certain cases the
concurrence of three-fourths of all the members of each House is
necessary (section 20 [2], Article VI); that Congress shall, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House, have the
sole power to declare war (section 25, Article VI); that no treaty or law
may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds
of all the members of the Supreme Court (section 10, Article VIII); that the
House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment by a
vote of two-thirds of all its members (section 2, Article IX); and that the
Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments, but no person
shall be convicted without the concurrence of three-fourths of all the
members of the Senate (section 3, Article IX).
So it can be seen that the numerical rules inserted in the Constitution
affect matters not of momentary but of momentous importance. Each
and every one of them should be given effect with religious scruple, not
only because our loyalty to the sovereign people so requires, but also
because by inserting them the Constitutional Convention had abided by
the wise teachings of experience.
By denying the petition and allowing those responsible for the
unconstitutional adoption of the resolution in question to have their way
is to set up a precedent that eventually may lead to the supremacy of an
empire of lawlessness. It will be tantamount to opening Pandora's box of
evils and disasters.
The power to declare was can only be exercised by Congress with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House. From now
on, by the simple expediency of certification by the presiding officers and
secretaries of both Houses that two-thirds had voted where a bare
majority had voted in fact, said majority may plunge our people into a
maelstrome of war.
The Constitution provides that the power of impeachment needs the vote
of two-thirds of all the members of the House of Representatives. From
now on, a mere plurality of one will be enough to put impeachable high
officials, including the President, on the carpet.
To convict an impeached officer the fundamental law requires the
concurrence of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate. From now
on, that three-fourth rule may be dispensed with or circumvented by not
counting three actual Senators, as has been done in the resolution in
question, and thereby oust the President of the Philippines if he happens
not to be in the good graces of a senatorial majority.
Without entering into the merits of the proposed constitutional
amendment, to submit which to the people high-handed means have been
resorted to, there can be no question that it is of vital importance to the
people and it will affect future generations to unimaginable extent. The
Constitutional Convention had thought it wise that before such a
momentous proposal could be submitted to the people the three-fourth
rule should be adhered to by Congress.

QUOTATION FROM THE JALANDONI CASE

Months ago we stated: "It is high time to sound the clarion call that will
summon all the forces of liberalism to wage a crusade for human
freedom. They should put on the armor of righteousness and rally behind
the banner for the vindication of the principles and guarantees embodied
in the Constitution and the high purposes of the Chapter of the United
Nations." This, we said in our dissenting opinion in People vs. Jalandoni, L-
777. Concerning the judgment that the future may pass upon the
actuations of the Supreme Court, in that same opinion we ventured that
the historian army, under the heading of "Epoch of Great Reaction," write
as follows:

At no epoch of its history has the Supreme Court shown to be most

reactionary and retrogressive. When the victims of a constitutional
violation, perpetrated by a group of the highest officials of the
government, came to if for redress, it adopted a hands-off policy,
showing lack of the necessary vitality to grapple with the situation
and finding refuge in a comfortable retreat, completely disappointing
those who have pinned their faith and hope in it as the first pillar of
the Constitution and the inexpugnable bulwark of human
fundamental rights. The issue of human freedom was disposed of by
them most discouragingly by nullifying the right of an accused to be
free on bail on appeal, in flagrant violation of a constitutional
guarantee and of one of the fundamental purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations.

Upon touching the decision of this Court in the instant case, the same
historian may record that the highest tribunal of the new Republic of the
Philippines has struck the hardest blow to the Philippine constitutional
system, by refusing to do its duty in giving redress in a clear case of
violation of the fundamental law, to the great disappointment, despair and
apallment of millions of souls all over the world who are pinning their
hopes on constitutionalism for the survival of humanity.
The ideal of one world oftenly enunciated by progressive leaders in the
deliberations of the several organs of the United Nations is predicated in
the adoption of a single standard of laws, compulsory within all
jurisdictions of our planet. The ethology of all mankind must be shaped
under the pattern of that single legal standard. But the whole system is
liable to crash if it is not founded on the rock bed of the elemental
principle that the majesty of the law must always be held supreme.
To keep inviolate this primary principle it is necessary that some of the
existing social organs, moral attitudes and habits of thinking should
undergo reforms and overhauling, and many fixed traditional ideas should
be discarded to be replaced with more progressive ones and
inconsonance with truth and reason. Among these ideas are the wrong
ones which are used as premises for the majority opinion in this case.
The role of innovators and reformers is hard and often thankless, but
innovation and reform should continuously be undertaken if death by
stagnation is to be avoided. New truths must be discovered and new
ideas created. New formulas must be devised and invented, and those
outworn discarded. Good and useful traditions must be preserved, but
those hampering the progressive evolution of cultured should be stored in
the museum of memory. The past and the present are just stepping
stones for the fulfilment of the promises of the future.
Since the last decade of the nineteenth century, physical science had
progressed by leaps and bounds. Polonium and radium were discovered
by Madam Curie, Rontgen discovered the X-ray, and Rutherford the alpha,
beta and gamma particles. Atom ceased to be the smallest unit of matter
to become an under-microscopic planetarian system of neutrons,
protons, and electrons.
Ion exchangers are utilized to make of electrons veritable lamps of
Aladdin. Plants are grown in plain water, without any soil, but only with
anions and cations. Sawdust has ceased to be a waste matter, and from
it is produced wood sugar, weighing one-half of the sawdust processed.
Inter-stellar space vacuum, almost absolute, is being achieved to serve
ends that contribute to human welfare. Bacteria and other microbes are
harnessed to serve useful human purposes. The aspergillus niger is made
to manufacture the acetic to produce vinegar for the asking. The
penicillum notatum and the bacillus brevis are made to produce penicillin
and tyrothricin, two wonder drugs that are saving many lives from
formerly lethal infections. DDT decimates harmful insects, thus checking
effectively malaria, an illness that used to claim more than one million
victims a year in the world. The creation of synthetics had enriched the
material treasures offered to man by nature. Means of transportation are
developed to achieve supersonic speeds. Many scientific dreams are fast
becoming marvelous realities. Thus, science marches on. There is no
reason why the administration of justice should not progress onward,
synchronized with the rhythm of general human advancement towards a
better future.
The fact that the majorities of the two chambers of Congress have
without any qualm violated Article XV of the Constitution and the majority
of this Court, instead of granting the proper relief provided by law,
preferred to adopt the comfortable attitude of indifferent by-standers,
creates a situation that seems to be ogling for more violations of the
fundamental law. The final results no one is in a position to foresee.
Our vote is for the granting of the petition.

BRIONES, M., con quien esta conforme FERIA, M., disidente:

Por segunda vez en menos de un año nos Ilaman a decidiry arbitrar sobre
una violacion de la Constitucion — elcodigo fundamental de nuestro pais.
A media dos del año pasado se trataba del recurso interpuesto ante esta
misma Corte Suprema por tres Senadores1 que se quejaban dehaber sido
privados injusta y arbitrariamente de su derecho a sentarse en el Senado
de Filipinas y a particular y votar en sus deliberaciones, con grave
infraccion y detrimento de la Constitucion que ampara tal derecho. Ahora
esos mismos Senadores acuden de nuevo a esta Corte para quejarse de
otra violacion de la Constitucion, pero estavez no vienen solos: les
acompañan otros cinco miembros del Senado, diecisiete miembros de la
Camarra de Representantes y tres jefes de aagrupaciones o partidos
politicos — Democratic Alliance, Popular Front y Philippine Youth Party.
Jose O. Vera es recurrente en su doble capacidad de miembro del
Senado y Presidente del Partido Nacionalista. De modo que los
recurrentes suman veintiocho: 8Senadores, 17 Representantes y 3
particulares.2 Tienenun comun denominador, a saber: que son todos
ciudadanos de Filipinas, y, ademas, contribuyentes y electores.
Los recurridos son el Presidente y miembros de la Comision de
Elecciones, el Tesorero de Filipinas, el Auditor General y el Director del
Buro de Imprenta.3
El objeto del recurso es recabar de esta Corte un mandamiento de
prohibicion dirigigo a los recurridos para que estos, sus agentes,
empleados, subordinados y otras personas que actuen bajo su
superintendencia o en su nombre "se abstengan y desistan de dar los
pasos tendentes haciala celebracion de un plebiscito e eleccion general
el 11 de Marzo, 1947, y de imprimir la resolucion (sobre reformade los
articulos 13.º y 14.º de la Constitucion), las balotas y otros papeles
necesarios en relacion con dicho plebiscito,y de desembolsar o de
autorizar el expendio de fondos publicos para dicho proposito."
Para la mejor comprension del asunto estimo necesariopublicar integro a
continuacion el texto de la Resolucion conjunta que contiene la propuesta
reforma a la Constitucion, resolucion que constituye la materia u objeto
de la consulta popular en el referido plebiscito de 11 de Marzo, y es la
misma que en el lexico corriente de la prensa y del publico se conoce por
resolucion sobre paridad o igualdad de derecdhos constitucionales a
favor de los americanos, esdecir, que concede a estos iguales derechos
que a los filipinosen la propiedad y cultivo de terrenos publicos, en la
explotacion de nuestros recursos naturales como bosques,minas, pesca
y fuerza hidraulica, y en la propiedad y operacion de utilidades publicas.
He aqui su texto:

RESOLUTION OF BOTH HOUSES PROPOSING AN AMENDMENT

TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
TO BE APPENDED AS AN ORDINANCE THERETO.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

Philippines in joint session assembled, by a vote of not less than
three-fourths of all the Members of each House voting separately, to
propose, as they do hereby propose, the following amendment to the
Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an Ordinance
thereto;

ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION

Notwithstanding the provisions of section one, Article Thirteen, and

section eight, Article Fourteen, of the foregoing Constitution, during
the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into by the
President of the Philippines with the President of the United States on
the Fourth of July, nineteen hundred and forth-six, pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act Numbered Seven hundred and
thirty-three, but in no case to extend beyond the third of July, nineteen
hundred and seventy-four, the disposition, exploitation, development,
and utilization of all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces and sources of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, shall,
if open to any person, be open to citizens of the United States and to
all forms of business enterprise owned or controlled, directly or
indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same manner as to,
and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the
Philippines or corporation or associations owned or controlled by
citizens of the Philippines.

This amendment shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when

approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at which it is
submitted to the people for their ratification pursuant to Article XV of
the Constitution.

Adopted,
 (Sgd.) JOSE AVELINO
President of the Senate

(Sgd.) EUGENIO PEREZ

Speaker of the House of Representatives

We hereby certify that the foregoing Resolution was adopted by both

Houses in joint session assembled in the Hall of the House of
Representatives on September 18, 1946.

(Sgd.) ANTONIO ZACARIAS

Secretary of the Senate

(Sgd.) NARCISO PIMENTEL

Secretary of the House of Representatives

Para comprobar la voluntad popular sobre la reforma constitucional

propuesta el Congreso de Filipinas ha aprobadola Ley No. 73 de la
Republica que dispone y ordena la celebracion de un plebiscito para el 11
de Marzo de esteano, provee a la forma de celebrarlo y consigna el
presupuesto necesario para sufragar los gastos del mismo. Siuna
mayoria de los electores votare afirmativamente, la reformaquedara
ratificada y estara en vigor por un periodo de 28 años; en caso contrario,
quedara rechazada.
Los recurrentes alegan y sostiened que la resolucion conjuntade que se
trate es ilegal y nula por no haberse aprobadocon los votos de las tres
cuartas-partes (3/4) del Congreso, conforme a lo provisto en el Articulo
XV de la Constitucion, a saber:

SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of

three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this
Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments
shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority
of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are
submitted to the people for their ratification.

Se alega que cuando se considero y aprobo la citada Resolucion conjunta

el Senado se componia actualmente de 24 miembros, es decir, el numero
exacto fijado en la Constitucion, y la Camara de Representantes de 96
miembros, es decir, dos menos que el numero señalado en la
Constitucion, pues does dimitieron despues de las elecciones, uno para
aceptar un cargo en el ramo ejecutivo del gobierno y otro para aceptar un
nombramiento en el servicio diplomatico. Sin embargo, segun la
demanda de los recurrentes, en el Senado solo se permitio votar a 21
miembros, excluyen dose de las deliberaciones y votacionfina l de la
Resolucion a tres miembros, a saber; los Senadores Vera, Diokno y
Romero. De los referidos 21 miembros, votaron a favor de la Resolucion
16 y en contra 5; asi que — arguyen los recurrentes — la Resolucion no
quedo aprobada, por parte del Senado, con el numero constitucionalde
tres cuartas-partes (3/4) de los miembros, elcual debia ser 18.
En la Camara de Representantes, segun los recurrentes, solo se permitio
votar a 88 miembros, excluyen dose de las deliberaciones y votacion final
de la resolucion a 8 miembros, a saber: Representantes Alejo Santos y
Jesus B. Lava, de Bulacan; Reps. Jose Cando y Constancio P. Padilla, de
Nueva Ecija; Reps. Amado M. Yuson y Luis Taruc, de Pampanga; Rep.
Alejandro Simpauco, de Tarlac; y Rep. Vicente F. Gustilo, de Negros
Occidental. De los referidos 88 miembros votaron a favor de la
Resolucion solo 68; asi que — arguyen los recurrentas — la Resolucion
tampoco quedo aprobada, por parte de la Camara, con el numero
constitucional de tres cuartas-partes (3/4) partes de sus miembros, el
cual debia ser 72, por lo menos, y no 68, aun dando por descontados los
dos miembros que despues de las elecciones aceptaron cargos en otros
ramosdel gobierno.
Siendo inconstitucional y nula la Resolucion basica deque se trata,
consiguientemente los recurrentes tachantambien de inconstitucional e
invalida la referida Ley de la Republica No. 73 que convoca una eleccion
general o plebiscito para el 11 de Marzo de 1947 a fin de someter
alpueblo para su ratificacion o repudio la enmienda constitucional
propuesta, y que consigna la suma de P1,000,000 para los gastos en que
se hubiere de incurrir con motivo dela celebracion de dicho plebiscito,
entre habilitacion deprecintos electorales, pago de dietas de los
inspectores y costo de la a impresion, publicacion, fijacion y distribucion
gratuita de copias de la propuesta enmienda en ingles, español y otros
dialectos del pais.
Los recurridos, despues de admitir ciertas alegacioneses enciales de la
demanda y negar otras, plantean las siguientes defensas especiales:
Primera defensa especial: que una ley o resolucion impresa (enrolled Act
or Resolution) de ambas Camaras del Congreso, adverada o autenticada
con las firmas de los Presidentes de dichas Camaras, es prueba
concluyente deque la misma fue aprobada por el Congreso; que, en virtud
del respeto que se debe a un ramo igual y coordinado del gobierno, no es
permisible una investigacion judicial desi la misma a fue o no aprobada
debida y propiamente por el Congreso; y que, por tanto, esta Corte
Suprema carecede jurisdiccion para conocer y enjuiciar los puntos
suscitados por los recurrentes en relacion con la validez y
constitucionalidad de la resolucion en cuestion.
Empero si la primera defensa especial no fuese sostenida, los recurridos
alegan, por via de segunda defensa especial, que la resolucion
controvertida fue aprobada a conlos votos de tres cuartas-partes (3/4) de
todos los miembros cualificados del Senado y de la Camara de
Representantes votando separadamente, en consonancia con el Articulo
XV, apartado 1, de la Constitucion, y que consiguientementela ley de la
Republica No. 73 que ordena suplanteamiento ante el pueblo para su
ratificacion o desaprobacion, senala una fecha para la celebracion de
estaconsulta plebiscitaria y consigna fondos publicos para talfin, es
valida y constitucional.
Consta en autos una estipulacion de hechos concertadaentre las partes,
pero no se extracta aqui para no alargar innecesariamente esta
disidencia, pero se hara particular referencia a ella mas adelante a
medida que las exigenciasde la argumentacion lo demanden.
Es preciso hacer constar que los abogados de ambas parteshan hecho
cumplida justicia a la tremenda importancia del asunto haciendo
extensos estudios y pacientes investigaciones de la jurisprudencia
pertinente, en particular la americana, teniendo en cuenta la influencia
profunda y decisiva de aquel pais en nuestras ideas politicas y
constitucionales en virtud de la historica y estrecha convivenciade casi
medio siglo.
Es que la cosa no era para menos. Puede decirse, sinexageracion, que
excepto en cuatro momentos culminantes de su historia — el primer grito
de rebelion contra España en Agosto de 1896, la ruptura de hostilidades
contra Americaen Febrero de 1899, la aceptacion de la Ley de
Independencia en el plebiscito nacional de 1935, y la guerra contra el
Japon en 1941 — en ningun momento, en los ultimos 60 años, ha sido
Ilamado el pueblo filipino a rendiruna decision tan importante, de
trascendencia e implicacionestan graves, tan tremendas, como la que
tiene que hacer en el plebiscito de 11 de Marzo proximo con motivode la
Resolucion congresional discutida en el presente asunto.
Es una de esas decisiones que hacen historia; que parabien o para mal
sacuden los cimientos de un pais tal quesi fuese un fenomeno cosmico;
que determinan el curso desu existencia y deytinos nacionales; que
deciden, en una palabra, de la suerte de generaciones ya existentes y
degeneraciones que no han nacido todaviaa. Es una de esas decisiones
que para hacerla los pueblos deben hincarse humildemente de rodillas,
de cara al cielo, pidiendo al Dios de los pueblos y naciones la gracia de
una salvadora inspiracion de Su infinita sabiduria . . ..

II

Para los efector de una amplia perspectiva historica quepermita destacar

en toda su plenitud los contornos de losformidables "issues" o puntos
constitucionales debatidos en el presente asunto, parece conveniente
que repasemos, siquiera brevemente (en las notas marginales lo que no
cabeen el mismo texto de esta disidencia),4 los preceptos basicos de la
Constitucion que se trate de reformar conla Resolucion congresional de
que tantas veces se ha hechomerito. Helos aqui:

ARTICLE XIII. — CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL

RESOURCES.

SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public

domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall
not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be
the measure and the limit of the grant.

ARTICLE XIV. — GENERAL PROVISIONS

xxx     xxx     xxx

SEC. 8. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for

the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under
the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such franchise,
certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer
period than fifty years. No franchise or right shall be granted to any
individual, firm, or corporation, except under the condition that it shall
be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when
the public interest so requires.

Como queda dicho, la reofrma propuesta es en el sentidode que, no

obstante lo dispuesto en los preceptos arribatranscritos, "durante la
efectividad del Convencio Ejecutivo perfeccionado entre el Presidente de
Filipinas y el Presidente de los Estados Unidos el 4 de Julio de 1946, al
tenorde las disposiciones de la Ley del Commonwealth No. 733, pero que
en ningun case se extendera mas alla del 3 de Julio de 1974, la
disposicion, explotacion, desar rollo y utilizacionde todos los terrenos
agricolas, forestales y minerales de dominio publico, de aguas, minerales,
carbon, petroleo y otros minerales petroliferos, de todas las fuerzasy
fuentes de energia potencial, asi como de otros recursos de Filipinas, y la
operacion de utilidades publicas, si abiertos para cualguier persona,
quedan abiertos para los ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos y para todas
las formas de negocio y empresa de la propiedad o controladas, directao
indirectamente, por ciudad años de los Estados Unidos, de la misma
manera y bajo las mismas condiciones impuestasa los ciudadanos de
Filipinas o a las corporaciones o asociaciones de la propiedad o
controladas por ciudadanos de Filipinas (Resolucion conjunta del
Congreso filipino, supra).
Podemos tomar conocimiento judicial — pues, sobre ser historia
contemporanea, se trata de las labores y procesos deliberativos de la
misma Asamblea Constituyente — de quelos preceptos capitales arriba
transcritos constituyen la expresion acabada de toda la madurez de
juicio, de toda laprudencia y sabiduria de que eran capaces no solo los
autores de la Constitucion y los Delegados que la aprobaron, sino el
pueblo filipino que la ratifico en el correspondiente plebiscito nacional
convocado al efecto. En pocas resoluciones ha habido tanta firmeza y tan
fuerte unanimidadentre nuestros partidos politicos y sus caudillos como
enesa recia y constructiva afirmacion de nacionalismo. Nadamejor, creo
yo, que las siguientes palabras para definir elespiritu, la filosofia que
informa esas provisiones:

This provision of the Constitution has been criticized as establishing

the outworn Regalian doctrine which, it is suggested, may serve to
retard the economic development of the Philippines. The best
encomium on this provision is probably the very criticism launched
against it. It is inconceivable that the Filipinos would liberalize the
acquisition, disposition and exploitation of our natural resources to
the extent of permitting their alienation or of depriving the people of
this country of their heritage. The life of any nation depends upon its
patrimony and economic resources. Real freedom, if it is to be lasting,
must go hand in hand with economic security, if not economic
prosperity. We are at most usufructuaries of ourdomains and natural
resources and have no power to alienate them even if we should want
to do so. They belong to the generations yet unborn and it would be
the height of folly to even think of opening the door for their
untrammelled disposition, exploitation, development or utilization to
the detriment of the Filipinos people. With our natural resources in the
hands of foreigners what would be there left except the idealism of
 living in a country supposedly free, but where freedom is, after all, an
empty dream? We would be living in a sumptuous palace that it not
ours! We would be beggars in our own homes, strangers in our own
land!

Friendship and amity towards all nations are compatible with the
protection of the legitimate interests of the Filipino people. There is
no antagonism or hostility towards foreigners but sane nationalism
and self-protection which every country of the world is practising
today in the interest of self-preservation. (The Three Powers of
Government, by Laurel, pp. 117-118.)

Los criticos de la enmienda constitucional propuesta pueden discutir

libremente, como cumple a los ciudadanos de un pais democratico, los
meritos y demeritos de lamisma. Pueden combatirla con toda clase de
razones — morales, politicas, economicas, financieras, internacionales, y
hasta de decencia — y naturalmente defenderla tambiensus partidarios
desde todos los angulos. Podrian los opositoreshacer una minuciosa
diseccion de su fraseologia yacaso hallar en sus repliegues peligrosas
implicaciones, posibles riesgos, como en ese par de adverbios "directa o
indirectamente", a cuyo socaire podrian acogerse corporacioneso
asociaciones extranjeras controladas solo indirectamente por
ciudadanos americanos para concurrir en la explotacion de nuestros
terrenos publicos y recursos naturales, y en la operacion de utilidades
publicas. Todo estolo pueden hacer, y algo mas. Pero es obvio, elemental
quesemejante discusion no compete a esta Corte Suprema, sinoen todo
caso a otros poderes constituidos.
Nosotros no estamos para determinar y enjuiciar labondad o maldad de
la enmienda propuesta. Lo unico quenos incumbe hacer, ya que la
cuestion se halla propiamente planteada ante nosotros, es resolver si la
enmienda ha sido aprobada por el Congreso de acuerdo con el mandato
expreso de la Constitucion en materia de enmiendas; si losrequisitos que
la Constitucion señala para poder enmendarla — requisitos que son
mandatorios, categorica menteimperativos y obligatorios — se han
cumplido o se han violado. Como se dijo bien en el asunto de Gray vs.
Childs ([1934], 156 So., 274, 279), ". . . No podemos decir queel estricto
requerimiento relativo a las enmiendas se puede renunciar a favor de una
buena enmienda e invocar encontra de otra mala. . . . No compete a los
tribunales el determinar cuando una enmienda propuesta es sabia y
cuando no lo es. Los tribunales nada tienen que ver conla sabiduria de la
politica. Pero es deber de los tribunales, cuando se les pide que lo hagan,
el determinar si o no el procedimiento adoptado para la aprobacion de la
enmiendaes el señalado por los terminos de la ley organica.
Todo lo que se lha dicho hasta aqui para poner de relievela filosofia de
nuestra Constitucion en materia de recursos naturales y utilidades
publicas, se ha dicho no como expresion de un criterio propio, sino tan
solo para subrayar todala gravedad, toda la densidad del asunto, y
prevenir entodo caso los peligros de una rutinaria y
complacienteliviandad. Como tambien se dijo en el citado asunto deGray
vs. Childs, "la enmienda de la ley organica del Estado o nacion no es una
cosa para ser tomada ligeramente, ni para ser hecha de lance o al azar.
Es una cosa seria. Cuando la enmienda es aprobada, viene a ser parte de
laley fundamental del pais y puede significar el bienestar omaldicion de
las generaciones de la nacion donde se haceparte del codigo
fundamental."
Este pronunciamiento adquiere todo el valor y toda la resonancia de una
consigna en el presente caso en que lareforma propuesta afecta
vitalisimamente al patrimonionacional del pueblo filipino. ¿No son los
recursos naturalesy las utilidades publicas el tesoro de una nacion,
labase que sustenta su existencia, la espina dorsal de sueconomia? Por
tanto, jamas se podra exagerar el celo, la vigilancia que el pueblo y sus
organos naturales ejercenpara que las salvaguardias impuestas por la
misma Constitucionen relacion con el proceso y tramitacion de
todaenmienda constitucional se cumplan y observen con el maximo rigor.
Aqui no caben excusas ni subterfugios. Ni siquiera cabeescudarse tras la
doctrina de la separacion de poderes quela mayoria de esta Corte invoca
para justificar su inaccion, su pasividad, su politica de "manos fuera",
alegando que el presente asunto es coto vedado para nos otros, algo
quecae fuera de nuestra jurisdiccion, eso que en derecho politico y
constitucional se llama materia politica no-justiciable.

III

La mayoria rehusa asumir jurisdiccion sobre el presente caso porque dice

que versa sobre una cuestion politica, ylas cuestiones politicas caen
fuera de la competencia de los tribunales de justicia. Creo que esto es un
error, dicho seacon todos los respetos debidos a mis ilustres
compañeros que sostienen tal opinion. ¿Hay acaso algun documento
mas politico que la Constitucion? Si la opinion de lamayoria fuese valida y
acertada, practicamente ninguna violacion de la Constitucion podria ser
enjuiciada por los tribunales, pues cual mas, cual menos, casi todas las
transgresionesconstitucionales, sobre todo las que comete elpoder
legislativo o el poder ejecutivo, tienen caracter politico. Bajo esa opinion
la Constitucion seria una letramuerta, un simple pedazo de papel: los
poderes constituidos, los individuos que los componen, podrian
infringirim punemente la Constitucion sin que ningun arbitro
constitucional pudiera intervenir ordenadamente para restaurarla
suprema majestad de la ley fundamental violada. Esclaro que esto podria
conducir facilmente al caos, a la anarquia, a la revolucion, dependiendo
solo el resultado de lamayor o menor docilidad del pueblo, del grado de
elasticidad politica de las masas. Y es claro que ninguno puedequerer
este triste destino para nuestro pais.
Creo sinceramente que una mejor y mas correcta evaluacion de nuestro
sistema de gobierno que esta esencial mentecalcado en el americano, es
que bajo la teoria relativa de las eparacion de poderes, ningun poder es
superior al pueblo cuya voluntad esta encarnada en la Constitucion. Los
poderes no son mas que agentes, mandatarios, servidores: el pueblo es el
amo, el mandante, el soberano. Y el pueblo ordena y manda por medio de
la Constitucion — esta es suvoz el verbo hecho carne politica y social, el
soplo vital quetraduce y transmuts su espiritu en postulados esenciales
deregulacion y gobierno.
Todo eso esta bien, no puede haber seria objecion a ello,dicen los
sostenedores absolutistas de la teoria de la sedparacion de poderes.
Pero se pregunta: ¿quien señala lavoluntad del pueblo tal como esta
plasmada en la Constitucion? ?Quien es el profeta que desciende del
Sinai para revelar las tablas de la ley? ¿Quien ha de arbitrar en los
conflictos constitucionales, o quien ha de decidir los litigios propiamente
planteados en que se ventilan una infraccion de la Constitucion? ¿Hay un
peligroso vacio en nuestro mecanismo constitucional, o por el contrario,
los resorteestan todos bien situados, capaces de operar y funcionarade
cuada y eficientemente? Esto es precisamente el busilis, la cuestion
batallona.
No puede haber duda en la contestacion a tales preguntas. Bajo nuestro
sistema de gobierno el poder judiciales el llamado a señalar, a interpretar
la ley; y en los conflictoso transgresiones constitucionales esta Corte
Suprematiene la ultima palabra, le compete el arbitraje supremoy final.
Bajo nuestra mecanica constitucional, igual quebajo la americana, se da
la aparente paradoja de que la superior facultad, el supremo negocio de
interpretar la voluntad del pueblo tal como esta expresada mas o menos
permanentemente en la Constitucion, no corresponde propiamentea
ninguno d e los poderes electivos, los que se renuevanperiodicamente,
sino al poder que si bien es denombramiento en su origen, tiene, sin
embargo, sentido deperpetuidad, quiero decir, es vitalicio en la
complexion y funcion de los individuos que los componen — el poder
judicial. La sabiduria peculiar, la originalidad del sistemaconsiste
precisamente en eso: en haber alojado el supremo arbitraje con relacion a
los conflictos y transgresiones constitucionales en un poder del Estado al
cual deliberadamentese le ha dotado de un clima psicologico y moral el
maspropicio posible a la objetividad y desasimiento de lasdisputas
politicas y discordias civiles, situandosele por encimade los vaivenes de
la politica al uso y las veleida desde la suerte electora. "Esto es lo que va
implicto en la expresion supremacia judicial, que propiamente es la
facultad de revision judicial bajo la Constitucion" (Angara contra
Comision Electoral, 63 Jur. Fil., 171).

The very essence of the American conception of the separation of

powers is its insistence upon the inherent distinction between law-
making and law-interpreting, and its assignment of the latter to the
judiciary, a notion which, when brought to bear upon the Constitution,
yields judicial review." (Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court, p.
146.)

En el famoso asunto de Marbury vs. Madison, supra, el Tribunal Supremo

de los Estados Unidos, por boca de sugran Chief Justice John Marshall,
en terminos inequivocos definio y explico las facultades de la judicatura
para poneren vigor la Constitucion como la suprema ley del pais, y
declaro que es terminantemente de la competencia y deberdel
departamento judicial el decidir cual es la ley querige.

The reasoning of Webster and Kent is substantially the same.

Webster says: "The Constitution being the supreme law, it follows of
course, that every act of the Legislature contrary to the law must be
void. But who shall decide this question? Shall the legislature itself
decide it? If so, then the Constitution ceases to be legal and becomes
only a moral restraint for the legislature. If they, and they only, are to
judge whether their acts be conformable to the Constitution, then the
Constitution is advisory and accessory only, not legally binding;
because, if the construction of it rest wholly with them, their
discretion, in particular cases, may be in favor of very erroneous
constructions. Hence the courts of law, necessarily, when the case
arises, must decide upon the validity of particular acts." Webster,
Works, Vol. III, 30. (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United
States, Vol. 1, 2d edition, pp. 4, 5.)

En el citado asunto de Angara contra Comision Electoral dijimos tambien

lo siguiente:

. . . Y la judicatura, a su vez, con el Tribunal Supremo por artbitro final,

frena a con efectividad a los demas departament of en elejercicio de
su facultad de determinar la ley, y de aqui que pueda declarar nulos
los actos ejecutivos y legislativos que contravengan la Constitucion.

Esta doctrina reafirmo en el asunto de Planas contra Gil (67 Phil., 62),
a saaber:

. . . As far as the judiciary is concerned, which it holds' neither the

 sword nor the purse' it is by constitutional placement the organ called
upon to allocate constitutional boundaries, and to the Supreme Court
is entrusted expressly or by necessary implication the obligation of
determining in appropriate cases the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation. (Section 2 [1],
Art. VIII, Constitution of the Philippines.) In this sense and to this
extent, the judiciary restrains the other departments of the
government and this result is one of the necessary corollaries of the
"system of checks and balances" of the government established.

No es que con esto el poder judicial assume un complejode superioridad

sobre los otros poderes del Estado, no. Setrate simplemente de que,
dentro de las limitaciones de todacreacion humana, alguien tiene que
arbitrar y dirimir losconflictos y las transgresiones a gue puede dar lugar
la Constitucion, y se estima que el poder judicial, pro la razonde su ser y
de sus funciones, es el mas llamado a ser esearbitro. Se trate de una
propia y graciosa inhibicion delos otros poderes en virtud de una
necesidad impuesta porunas teorias y practicas de gobiernio que han
resistido la prueba del tiempo y el choque con la realidad y la experiencia.
En mi disidencia en el asunto de Vera contra Avelino (77 Phil., 192),
hablando sobre este particular dijelo siguiente y lo reitero ahora, a saber:

En parte, el argumento expuesto es correcto y acertado. No sepuede

discutir que los tres poderes del Estado son iguales e
independientesentre si; que ninguno de ellos es superior al otro,
mucho menos el poder judicial que entre los tres es el menos fuerte y
elmas precario en medios e implementos materiales. Tampoco se
puede discutir que bajo la Constitucion cada poder tiene una zona,
una esferade accion propia y privativa, y dentro de esa esfera un
cumulode facultades que le pertenecen exclusivamente; que dentro
de esaesfera y en el uso de esas facultades cada poder tiene
absoluta discreciony ningun otro poder puede controlar o revisar sus
actos so pretexto de que alguien los cuestiona o tacha de arbitrarios,
injustos, imprudentes o insensatos. Pero la insularidad, la separacion
llegasolo hasta aqui. Desde Montesquieu que lo proclamo
cientificamente hasta nuestros dias, el principio de la separacion de
poderes hasufrido tremendos modificaciones y limitaciones. El
consenso doctrinal hoy es que la teoria es solo relativa y que la
separacionde poderes queda condicionada por una mecanica
constitucional — lamecanica de los frenos y cortapisas. (Willoughby,
On the Constitution of the United States, tomo 3, pags. 1619, 1620,
2.ª edicion.) Como queda dicho, cada poder es absoluto dentro de la
esfera quele asigna la Constitucion; alli el juego de sus facultades y
funcionesno se puede coartar. Pero cuando se sale y extravasa de
esa esferainvadiendo otras esferas constitucionales, ejerciendo
 facultades queno le pertenecen, la teoria de la separacion ya no le
ampara, la Constitucion que es superior a el le sale al encuentro, le
restringe uy leachica dentro de sus fronteras, impidiendo sus
incursiones anti-constitucionales. La cuestion ahora a determinar es
si bajo nuestrosistema de gobierno hay un mecanismo que permite
restablecer eljuego normal de la Constitucion cuando surgen estos
desbarajustes, estos conflictos que podriamos llamar de fronteras
constitucionales; tambien es cuestion a determinar si cuando surgen
esos conflictos, un ciudadano sale perjudicado en sus derechos, el
mismo tiene algun remedio expedito y adecuado bajo la Constitucion
y las leyes, y quien puede concederle ese remedio. Y con esto
llegamos a la cuestion basica, cardinal en este asunto.

Nuestra opinion es que ese mecanismo y ese remedio existen — son

los tribunales de justicia.

La mayoria no define en su decision lo que llama cuestion politica no-

justiciable ni las maaterials o casos que caen dentro de su significado.
"The difficulty lies" — dice la ponencia — "in determining what matters fall
within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of
exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full
harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts
to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the
government." Pero razonando por analogia cita un precedente, una
autoridad — el caso de Coleman vs. Miller decidido no hace muchos años
por la Corte Suprema Federal de los Estados Unidos. La mayoria cree que
este es el caso mas semejante al que nos ocupa. Creo que la mayoria
padece error: el caso de Coleman contra Miller es precisamente un buen
argumento en favor del recurso.
Compendiado el caso es como sigue: En Junio, 1924, el Congreso de los
Estados Unidos propuso una reforma ala Constitucion, conocida por
"Child Labor Amendment" (enmienda sobre el trabajo infantil). En Enero,
1925, la Legislatura del Estado de Kansas adopto una resolucion
rechazandola enmienda y una copia certificada de la resolucionse envio
al Secretario de Estado de los Estados Unidos. En Enero, 1937, o sea 12
años despues, una resolucion conocida como "Resolucion Concurrente
del Senado No. 3" se presento en el Senado del Estado de Kansas
pararatificar la propuesta enmienda. Habia 40 Senadores. Alconsiderarse
la resolucion 20 Senadores votaron en favor y 20 Senadores en contra. El
Teniente Gobernador, que era entonces el Presidente del Senado en
virtud de la Constitucion estatal, emitio su voto en favor de la resolucion,
rompiendo asi el empate. La resolucion fue posteriormente adoptada por
la Camara de Representantes de Kandas mediante una mayoria de los
votos de sus miembros.
Fued entonces cuando se interpuso ante la Corte Suprema de Kansas un
recurso de mandamus por los 20 Senadores adversos a la resolucion y
por otros 3 miembros de la Camarade Representantes. El objeto del
recurso era (a) compeler al Secretario del Senado a borrar el endoso
favorable de la resolucion y poner en su lugar las palabras "no ha sido
aprobada"; (b) recabar la expedicion de un interdicto contra los oficiales
del Senado y Camara de Representantes prohibiendo les que firmaran la
resolucion y contra el Secretario de Estado de Kansad prohibiendole que
autentic aradicha resolucion y la entregara la Gobernador. La solicitud
cuestionaba el derecho del Teniente Gobernadora emitir su voto decisivo
en el Senado. Tambien se planteabaen la solicitud el hecho de que la
resolucion habiasido rechazada originariamente y se alegaba, ademas,
quedurante el periodo de tiempo comprendido entre Junio,1924, y Mayo,
1927, la enmienda habia sido rechazada porambas Camaras de las
Legislaturas de 26 Estados y solose habia ratificado en 5 Estados, y que
por razon de dicho rechazamiento y por no haberse ratificado dentro de
untiempo razonable la enmienda habia perdido su validez y vitalidad.
La Corte Suprema de Kansas hallo que no habia ninguna disputa sobre
los hechos, asumio competencia sobre el casoy sostuvo que el Teniente
Gobernador tenia derecho a emitirvoto decisivo, que la proyectada
enmienda conservabasu vitalidad original a pesar del tiempo transcurrido,
y quela resolucion, "habiendo sido aprobada por la Camara de
Representantes y por el Senado, el acto de ratificacion dela propuesta
enmienda por la Legislatura de Kansas erafinal y complete."
Consiguientemente el recurso de mandamus fue denegado.
Elevado el asunto en casacion para ante la Corte Suprema Federal, esta
asumio jurisdiccion sobre el caso, conla concurrencia y disidencia de
algunos Magistrados que opinaban que el recurso debia rechazarse de
plano, sin masceremonias, por la razon, segun los disidentes, de que los
recurrentes no tenian personalidad ni derecho de accion para pedir la
revision de la sentencia de la Corte Supremade Kansas, y porque ademas
se trataba de una cuestion puramente politica, por tanto no-justiciable.
Bajo la ponenciade su Presidente el Sr. Hughes, la Corte Suprema Federal
conocio del caso a fondo, discutiendo y resolviendo las cuestiones
planteadas. He aqui sus palabras: "Our authority to issue the writ of
certiorari is challenged upon the ground that the petitioners have no
standing to seek to have the judgment of the state court reviewed and
hence itis urged that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed.We are
unable to accept that view." Esto viene a ser comouna replica a las
siguientes palabras de los disidentes: "It is the view of Mr. Justice
Roberts, Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas and myself (Mr. Justice
Frankfurter) that the petitioners have no standing in the Court." Delo dicho
resulta evidente que la Corte Federal no adoptola actitud de "manos
fuera" (hands off), sino que actuo positivamente sobre el caso,
encarandolo.
La decision consta de tres partes. La primera parte, que es bastante
extensa, esta consagrada enteramente adiscutir la cuestion de la
jurisdiccion de la Corte. Ya hemosvisto que esta cuestion se ha resuelto
enteramente enfavor de la jurisdiction, en virtud de las razones luminosas
que alli se explanan y que no reproduzco por no ser necesario y para no
alargar indebidamente esta disidencia. La segunda parte es bien breve,
apenas consta de dos parrafos. Se refiere a la cuestion de si el voto del
Teniente Gobernador, que rompio el empate, era o no valido. La Corte
nolo resuelve, por que dice que sus miembros se dividieron porigual
sobre si era una cuestion politica y, por tanto, nojusticiable. La tercera
parte, tan extensa como la primera, esta dedicada a estudiar y discutir las
siguientes proposiciones :(a) Si habiendo sido rechazada
originariamentela enmienda, una ratificacion posterior podia validamente
dejar sin efecto dicho rechazamiento y tomarse como unaratificacion
legal al tenor de la Constitucion; (b) si ellargo tiempo transcurrido entre el
rechazamiento y la ratificacion — unos 13 años — no habia tenido el
efecto de darcaracter final a la repudiacion de la enmienda, causando
estado juridico definitivo.
El analisis que hace el ilustrado ponente de las cuestiones planteadas es
muy interesante y desde luego acabado. Se estudian y comentan luminos
amente los precedentes. Sobre la cuestion de si el rechazamiento de
unaenmienda propuesta impide que la misma sea ratificada
posteriormente, se puntualiza lo siguiente: que el articulo V de la
Constitucion Federal sobre enmienda esta fraseadoen terminos positivos,
es decir, habla de ratificacion y node rechazamiento, y que por tanto "el
poder para ratificarlo confiera al Estado la Constitucion, y que, como
poder ratificante, continua y persiste, a pesar de un previo rechazamiento.
"Luego la Corte dice, examinando los precedentes, que el Congreso, en el
ejercicio de su control sobrela promulgacion de las enmiendas a la
Constitucion, ha resuelto esta cuestion repetidas veces en el sentido
indicado, esto es, considerando inefectivo el previo rechazamientofrente
a una positiva ratificacion; y la Corte concluye que esta accion del
Congreso es valida, constitucional; por consiguiente, los tribunales no
estan autorizados para revisarla. Es en este sentido, creo yo, como la
Corte dice que se trate de una cuestion politica no-justiciable, es decir
una cuestion que cae dentro de la zona constitucional exclusion del
Congreso; por tanto, se trate deuna accion valida, constitucional. Pero no
hay nada enesa decision que diga, o permita inferir, que cuando el
Congreso viola un mandato expreso de la Constitucion, como en el caso
que nos ocupa, los tribunales no pueden intervenir, bajo el principio de la
supremacia judicial entratandose de interpretar la Constitucion, para
resolver el conflicto o enjuiciar la transgresion, y conceder el remedio
propiamente pedido. En otras palabras, en el caso de Coleman contra
Miller la Corte Suprema Federal hallo que el Congreso, al declarar valida
la ratificacion de la enmienda constitucional sobre trabajo infantil (Child
labor), no habia infringibo el articulo V de la Constitucion, sobre
enmiendas, y la Corte lo razona diciendo, con la vista delos precedentes,
que el referido articulo V habla de ratificacion y no de rechazamiento, y
que, por tanto, "el poderpara ratificar continua y persiste a pesar de un
previo rechazamiento." De suerte que, en realidad de verdad, no escierto
que la Corte Suprema Federal declaro injusticiablela materia, pues ¿que
mejor prueba de justiciabilidad que ese dictum categorico, positivo y
terminante?
Sobre la proposicion de si el largo tiempo transcurrido entre el
rechazamiento y la ratificacion — unos 136 años — no habia tenido el
efecto de dar caracter final a la repudiacion de la enmienda, causando
estado juridico definitivo, la Corte Suprema Federal fallo que no, es decir,
declarovalida la ratificacion no obstante dicho lapso de tiempo,
aduciendo razones muy atinadas, entre ellas la de que las condiciones de
caracter moral, medico, social y economico que aconsejaban la
prohibicion del trabajo infantil en las fabricas eran tan validas y
existentes, si no mas, cuandose sometio la enmienda por primera vez
para su ratificacion como 13 años despues. Y luego la Corte cita
autoridades y precedentes en apoyo de su conclusion, entre ellosel caso
tipico y decisivo de Dillon vs. Glass (256 U.S., 368; 65 Law.ed., 994; 41
Sup.Ct., 510). En este caso la Cortedeclaro que el Congreso, al proponer
una enmienda a la Constitucion, pueded fijar un tiempo razonable para su
ratificacion, y sostuvo la accion del Congreso al disponer enla proyectada
18.ª Enmienda que la misma seria ineficaza menos que se ratificase
dentro de siete años.
Ahora bien, en el caso de Coleman contra Miller ocurre todo lo contrario:
el Congreso no habia fijado ningun plazopara la ratificacion. En vista de
esto, los recurrentes pretendian que la Corte supliera la omision del
Congreso declarandolo que era tiempo razonable, teniendo en cuentalos
precedentes judiciales y el precedente congresional de 7 años ya
sostenido en el caso citado de Dillon contra Glass; y que desde luego el
periodo de 13 años era demasiado largo para ser razonable. La Corte
Suprema dijo que no, queno eran los tribunales los que debian fijar ese
tiempo razonable; que en esta cuestion entraban muchos factores
denaturaleza varia y compleja — politicos, economicos y sociales — que
solo el Congreso estaba en condiciones de determinar ya mediante la
correspondiente legislacion como enel caso de la 18.ª Enmienda, ya en
cada caso concreto deratificacion al ejercer su control sobre la
promulgacion de las enmiendas. Ahora bien, pregunto: ¿no es esto un
dictum judicial? ¿no es esto justiciar? ¿no esta aqui la Corte Suprema
Federal sentandose en estrados y emitiendo judicialmente su opinion
sobre una materia juridica y constitucional sometida a su consideracion?
En realidad, puede decirse que la unica cuestion que la Corte ha dejado
de resolver es la validez o nulidad del voto decisivo del Teniente
Gobernador, por la razon de que sobre este punto, segun se dice en la
misma decision, la opinion del Tribunal estaba igualmente dividida.
Todas las demas cuestiones han sido enjuiciadas, resueltes, y esta
accion dela mayoria, asumiendo plena jurisdiccion sobre el caso y las
materias en el discutidas, es lo que ha motivado la disidencia de 4
Magistrados los Sres. Black, Roberts, Frankfurter y Douglas. En efecto,
estos disidentes no disimulansu desagrado al ver que la Corte asume en
el caso, siquier implicitamente, el poder de interpretacion judicial, y
aunvan mas alla — expresan un notorio desencanto al ver que la Corte
"trata el proceso enmendatorio provisto por la Constitucion, como sujeto
a interpretacion judicial en algunos respectos, y en otros sujeto a la
autoridad final del Congreso", y al ver tambien que en la decision "no hay
desaprobacion de la conclusion establecida en el asunto de Dillon contra
Glass, de que la Constitucion requiere tacitamente que una enmienda
propiamente sometida debe darsepor muerta, a menos que se ratifique
dentro de un tiempo razonable." Es decir, los Magistrados disidentes
esperaban que la Corte revocase y abrogase lo hecho por ella en elcitado
asunto de Dillo contra Glass en donde la Corte, envez de abstenerse de
conocer del caso por tratarse en el, segun los disidentes, de materia
politica no-justiciable, ejercio plena jurisdiccion sobre el mismo
asumiendo supoder tradicional de interpretar la Constitucion y
declarando valida la lay del Congreso que fijaba un plazo de7 años para
la ratificacion de la 18.ª Enmienda. No puedo resistir a la tentacion de
reproducir las mismas palabrasde la disidencia: ellas, mejor que todo lo
que yo pueda decir, demuestran de modo inconcuso las irreconciliables
diferencias de criterio entre la mayoria, representada porel ilustre ponente
Sr. Hughes, y los disidentes, pues mientraspor un lado el ponente justicia
decididamente el caso considerando, discutiendo y resolviendo todas las
cuestionesplanteadas, menos la cuestion del voto del Teniente
Gobernador, citando profusamente autoridades y precedentes, los
disidentes, en su opinion, preconizan una actitudde absoluta abstencion,
de "manos fuera" (hands off), portratarse, segun ellos, de una materia
politica no-justiciable que cae exclusivamente bajo el control del
Congreso. He aqui las palabras de los disidentes:
. . . To the extent that the Court's opinion in the present case even
impliedly assumes a power to make judicial interpretation of the
exclusive constitutional authority of Congress over submission and
ratification of amendments, we are unable to agree.
 The State court below assumed jurisdiction to determine whether the
proper procedure is being followed between submission and final
adoption. However, it is apparent that judicial review of or
pronouncements upon a supposed limitation of a "reasonable time"
within which Congress may accept ratification; as to whether duly
authorized State officials have proceeded properly in ratifying or
voting for ratification; or whether a State may reverse its action once
taken upon a proposed amendment; and kindred questions, are all
consistent only with an ultimate control over the amending process in
the courts. And this must inevitably embarrass the course of
amendment by subjecting to judicial interference matters that we
believe were intrusted by the Constitution solely to the political
branch of government.
The Court here treats the amending process of the Constitution in
some respects as subject to judicial construction, in others as subject
to the final authority of the Congress. There is no disapproval of the
conclusion arrived at in Dillon vs. Glass, that the Constitution
impliedly requires that a property submitted amendment must die
unless ratified within a "reasonable time." Nor does the Court now
disapprove its prior assumption of power to make such a
pronouncement. And it is not made clear that only Congress has
constitutional power to determine if there is any such implication in
article 5 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the Court's opinion
declares that Congress has the exclusive power to decide the political
questions of whether a State whose legislature has once acted upon
a proposed amendment may subsequently reverse its position, and
whether in the circumstances of such a case as this, an amendment
is dead because an "unreasonable" time has elapsed. No such
division between the political and judicial branches of the government
is made by article 5 which grants power over the amending of the
Constitution to Congress alone. Undivided control of that process has
been given by the article exclusively and completely to Congress. The
process itself is "political" in its entirety, from submission until an
amendment becomes part of the Constitution and is not subject to
judicial guidance, control or interference at any point.
Since Congress has sole and complete control over the amending
process, subject to no judicial review, the views of any court upon this
process cannot be binding upon Congress, and in so far as Dillon vs.
Glass attempts judicially to imposed a limitation upon the right of
Congress to determine final adoption of an amendment, it should be
disapproved. . . . (Coleman vs. Miller, 122 A.L.R., 695, 708, 709.)
La distribucion de los votos con relacion a las cuestiones planteadas en
el referido asundo de Coleman vs. Miller esalgun tanto confusa, como
han podido notar los mismos comentaristas; asi que necesita de alguna
explicacion. Escierto que no suscriben la ponencia mas que 3
Magistrados, a saber: el ponente Sr. Hughes y los Sres. Stone y Reed,
pero en cuanto a la jurisdiccion plena que la Corte asumio sobre el caso y
la materia hay que añadir los votos de los Sres. McReynolds y Butler.
Estos dos ultimos no soloconcurrian implicitamente en la accion de la
Corte al enjuiciarel caso, sino que inclusive opinaban que debia
concederse el recurso, esto es, que debia anularse la ratificacion tardia
de la Enmienda sobre Trabajo Infantil (Child Labor) hecha por la
Legislatura de Kansas. De modo queen cuanto al "issue" de la
jurisdiccion, la justiciabilidad del caso, la votacion era de 5 contra 4 — por
la jurisdiccion,la justiciabilidad, el ponente Sr. Hughes, y los Magistrados
Sres. Stone, Reed, McReynolds y Butler; por la actitud de absoluta
abstencion, de "manos fuera" (hands off), los Magistrados Sres. Black,
Frankfurter, Roberts y Douglas.
Repito lo dicho mas arriba: el caso de Coleman vs. Miller, en vez de ser
una autoridad a favor de los recurridos, juntamente con el caso de Dillon
vs. Glass constituyen precedentes decisivos en la jurisprudencia federal
americana a favor de los recurrentes.

Pero si la jurisprudencia federal milita en favor de latesis de que tenemos

jurisdiccion para enjuiciar y decidirel presente caso, en el ejercicio de
nuestras supremas funciones como interprete de la Constitucion bajo el
principio firmemente establecido de la supremacia judicial en asuntos
propiamente planteados sobre conflictos y transgresiones
constitucionales, la jurisprudencia de los Estados estodavia mas
indubitable e inequivoca, mas terminante y decisiva. La importancia de
esto sube de punto si se tieneen cuenta que, mas que con el gobierno
federal, nuestra analogia, nuestros puntos de contacto en lo politico,
constitucional y juridico es mas bien con los diferentes Estados de la
Union americana. Nuestro sistema de gobierna es unitario. Aqui nuestras
provincias no son Estados autonomos y semi-independientes como lo
son los Estados americanos. Asi que la cedula, la unidad politica mas
semejante a la nuestra no es la federal, sino la estatal. Por eso si bienes
cierto que las constituciones de los Estados, como lanuestra, todas estan
fundamentalmente calcadas en el patron de la Constitucion federal, se
vera que en ciertosrasgos caracteristicos del sistema unitario nuestra
Constitucionse aproxima evidentemente mas a las de los Estados que a
la federal. Esa semejanza es sobre todo notabilisimaen la parte que se
refiere al proceso enmendatorio de la Constitucion. Es que, en realidad,
los Estados de la Union americana, para todos los efectos de la vida
interior, domestica, son practicamente naciones independientes; asi que
nuestra evolucion, nuestro transitode la condicion de Commonwealth a la
de Republicas oberana e independiente si bien nos distingue de ellos enel
derecho internacional, ninguna diferencia, sin embargo, ha operado en el
campo constitucional, ora en la parte dogmatica de la Constitucion, ora
en la parte organica. Y la mejor prueba de esto es que con la
independencia nohemos tenido necesidad de cambiar de Constitucion:
lamisma que nos servia cuando eramos simple Commonwealth, es decir,
cuando estabamos sujetos a la soberania americana, es la misma que
nos sirve hoy cuando ya somos Republic; y no cabe duda de que nos
serviria perfectamente bien si no la tuvieramos asendereada y malparada
en nuestras pecaadoras manos con repetidas violaciones, confrecuentes
asaltos contra su integridad . . ..
Ahora bien; sin petulancia se puede retar a cualquieraa que señale un
caso, un solo caso en la jurisprudencia de los Estados de la Union
americana en que los tribunales de justicia se hayan negado a conocer y
enjuiciaruna violacion constitucional semejante a la que nos ocupapor la
razon de que se trataba de una cuestion politica no-justiciable. No hay
absolutamente ninguno; por esoque los recurridos, a pesar de las
pacientes y laboriosas investigaciones que denota su habil y concienzudo
alegato, no han podido citar ni un solo caso.
En cambio, los tomos de jurisprudencia de various Estados dan cuenta de
casos indenticosd al que nos ocupa y entodos ellos se ha declarado
invariablemente que la violacion de la Constitucion en lo que se refiere al
precepto que regula el proceso de la enmiendas a la Ley organica esuna
cuestion judicial, y ninguna Corte Suprema de Estados e ha lavado jamas
las manos bajo la teoria de la separacion de poderes. Es mas: creo que in
siquiera seha planteado seriamente la objecion fundada en el
argumentod e la injusticiabilidad.
Para no alargar demasiado esta disidencia no voy a citarmas que algunos
casos los mas conocidos y representativos, tomados de la jurisprudencia
de algunos Estados, a saber: Florida, Minnesota, Georgia e Indiana. De la
Corte Suprema de Florida tenemos dos casos: el de Crawford vs .Gilchrist
y el de Gray vs. Childs.
En el asunto de Crawford vs. Gilchrist (64 Fla., 41; 59 So., 963l Ann. Cas.,
1914B, 916), se trataba de una accionde prohibicion interpuesta por el
Gobernador del Estado, Albert W. Gilchrist, contra el Secretario de Estado,
H. Clay Crawford, para impedir que cierta propuesta enmiendaa la
Constitucion se publicara y se sometiera al electorado en un plebiscito
para su ratificacion o rechazamiento. Esdecir, lo mismo de que se trate
en el case que tenemos antenosotros. La enmienda habia sido aprobada
por la Camarade Representantes de Florida con el voto necesario y
constitucional de tres quintas (3/5), y fue enviada al Senado para su
concurrencia. El Senado tambien la aprobo conel voto de tres quintos,
pero esta votacion fue reconsiderada posteriormente. Asi estaba el
asunto, pendiente de reconsideracion cuando se clausuro la Legislatura.
Despues, sin embargo, diose por aprobada la propuesta enmienday el
Secretario de Estado trato de dar los pasos parasu publicacion y
ratificacion plebiscitaria. De ahi la accionde interdicto prohibitorio,
fundada en la alegacion de quela enmienda no habia sido aprobada
debidamente por la Legislatura de acuerdo con los metodos prescritos en
la Constitucion de Florida. Igual que en el presente casetambien hubo alli
una batalla forense colosal, con untremendo despliegue de habilidad y
talento por cada lado. El ponente no se recata en alabar el esfuerzo de las
partesy dice: ". . . we think the parties to this litigationare to be
commended, both for taking the proceedings that have brought these
unsual questions before the court for determination and for the great
ability with which their counsel have presented them to this court."
¿Se lavo las manos la Corte Suprema de Florida declarandose
incompetente para conocer del asunto por la razonde que se trataba de
una cuestion politica y, por tanto, nojusticiable? De ninguna manera. La
Corte asumio resueltamente su responsabilidad y poder tradicional de
interpretarla Constitucion y fallo el asunto en su fondo, declarando que la
cuestion era propiamente judicial y que laenmienda constitucional
propuesta no se habia aprobada deconformidad con los requisitos
establecidos por la Constitucionpara el proceso y tramitacion de la
enmiendas. Por tanto, se denego la peticion de supersedeas
interpuestapor el recurrido para enervar el recurso; es decir, al
recurrentegano su inusitado e historico pleito. Y las esferas politicas de
Florida no se desorbitaron por esta decisivaderrota de la teoria de la
separacion de poderes. Vale la pena reproducir algunar de las doctrinas
sentadas en elasunto, a saber:
Constitutional Law — Power of Courts to Determine Validity of Action
by Legislature in Proposing Constitutional Amendment.
A determination of whether an amendment to the constitution has
been validly proposed and agreed to by the Legislature is to be had in
a judicial forum where the constitution provides no other means for
such determination.
Injunction — Subject of Relief — Act of Secretary of State in Certifying
Proposed Amendments.
The act of the secretary of state in publishing and certifying to the
country commissioners proposed amendments to the constitution is
in its nature ministerial, involving the exercise of no discretion, and if
the act is illegal it may be enjoined in appropriate proceedings by
proper parties, there being no other adequate remedy afforded by law.
 Injunction — Governor as Complainant, Secretary of State as
Defendant.
The governor of the state, suing as such, and also as a citizen,
taxpayer, and elector, is a proper complainant in proceedings brought
to enjoin the secretary of state from publishing at public expense and
certifying proposed amendments to the constitution upon the ground
that such proposed amendments are invalid because they have not
been duly "agreed to by three-fifths of all the members elected to
each house" of the legislature.
Amendments to Constitution — Effect of Ignoring Mandatory
Provisions of Constitution.
If essential mandatory provisions of the organic law are ignored in
amending the constitution, it violates the right of all the people of the
state to government regulated by law.
Duty of Court to Enforce Constitution.
It is the duty of the courts in authorized proceedings to give effect to
the existing constitution.
Mandatory Provisions of Constitutions as to Manner of Amending
Constitution.
The provision of the organic law requiring proposed amendments of
the constitution to "be agreed to by three-fifths of all the members
elected to each house" of the legislature is mandatory, and it clearly
contemplates that such amendments shall be agreed to by the
deliberate, final, affirmative vote of the requisite number of the
numbers of each house at a regular session.
Construction of Constitution to Give Intended Effect — Mandatory
Character of Provisions.

Every word of a state constitution should be given its intended

meaning and effect, and essential provisions of a constitution are to
be regarded as being mandatory. (Crawford vs. Gilchrist, Ann. Cas.,
1914 B, pp. 916, 917.)

El asunto de Crawford vs. Gilchrist se decidio en 1912. Enm 1934 otro

asunto constitucional importante, el de Gray contra Childs, se decidio en
virtud de la autoridad y sentencia dictada en dicho asunto de Crawford.
En el caso citado de Gray contra Childs (156 So. Rep., 274; Fla.), tambien
se trataba de una demanda de prohibicion para impedir la publicacion de
una propuesta enmienda constitucional que iba a ser sometida al
electorado de Florida para su ratificacion o rechazamiento en una
eleccion general o plebiscito fijado para Noviembre, 1934. La enmienda
habia sido aprobada por la Camara de Representantes con el voto de tres
quintos (3/5), pero en el Senado hubo cierta confusion acerca del texto
finalmente aprobado. La Legislatura, antes de clausurarse aprobo unafs
resolucion conjunta autotizando a ciertos oficiales de las Camaras para
que despues de la clausura hiciesen ciertas correciones enlas actas y en
el diario de sesiones a fin de formar la verdaderahistoria de los
procedimientos y compulsar el textode la enmienda tal como habia sido
aprobada. Se alegabaen la demanda que esto era ilegal y
anticonstitucional. Eltribunal de circuito estimo el recurso de prohibicion.
Elevado el asunto en apelacion para ante la Corte Suprema del Estado, la
misma confirmo la sentencia apelada concediendo el interdicto
prohibitorio. Hed aqui los pronunciamientos de la Corte que parecen
estereotipados para el caso que nos ocupa, a saber:

(4,5) Section 1 of article 17 of our Constitution provides the method

by which the Constitution may be amended. It requires that a
proposed amendment shall be entered upon the respective Journals
of the House of Representatives and of the Senate with the yeas and
nays showing a three-fifths vote in favor of such amendment by each
House. The proposed amendment here under consideration nowhere
appears upon the Journals of the Senate, and therefore it is
unnecessary for us to consider any other questions presented or any
authorities cited.

The amendment of the organic law of the state or nation is not a

thing to be lightly undertaken not to be accomplished in a haphazard
manner. It is a serious thing. When an amendment is adopted, it
becomes a part of the fundamental law of the land, and it may mean
the weal or woe of the future generations of the state wherein it
becomes a part of the fundamental law. We cannot say that the strict
requirements pertaining to amendments may be waived in favor of a
good amendment and invoked as against a bad amendment. If the
Constitution may be amended in one respect without the amendment
being spread upon the Journals of one of the respective House of the
Legislature, then it may be ameqnded in any other respect in the
same manner. It is not for the courts to determine what is a wise
proposed amendment or what is an unwise one. With the wisdom of
the policy the courts have nothing to do. But it is the duty of the
courts, when called upon so to do, to determine whether or not the
procedure attempted to be adopted is that which is required by the
terms of the organic law.

Finding that the organic law has not been complied with, as above
pointed out, the decree appealed from should be, and the same is
 hereby, affirmed on authority of the opinion and judgment in the case
of Crawford vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla., 41; 59 So., 953; Ann. Cas., 1914B,
9156. (Gray vs. Childs, 156 Southern Reporter, pp. 274, 279.)

Note se que la clausula sobre enmiendas en la Constitucion de Florida es

semejante a la nuestra, a saber: (1) la propuesta enmienda tiene que ser
aprobada por la Legislatura, en Florida con el voto de tres quintos (3/5)
de los miembros, en Filipinas con el voto de tres cuartos (3/4); (2) los
sies y los nos tienen que hacersesd constar en el diario de sesiones
(Articulo VI, seccion 10, inciso 4; seccion 20, inciso 1, Constitucion de
Filipinas); (3) despues de aprobada la enmienda por la Legislatura se
somete al electorado en una eleccion o plebiscito, para su ratificacion
orechazamiento.
El procedimiento sobre enmiendas prescrito en la Constitucion federal
americana es diferente, a saber: el Congreso puede proponer la enmienda
bien (1) mediante la aprobacion de dos tercios (2/3) de sus miembros;
bien (2) mediante una convencion que se convocara al efecto apeticion
de las Legislaturas de dos tercios (2/3) de los diferentes Estados. En
cualquiera de ambos casos la enmiendasera valida para todos los
efectos y fines comoparte de la Constitucion siempre que fuera ratificada
porlas Legislaturas de tres cuartos (3/4) de los Estados, o
porconvenciones de tres cuartas-partes de los mismos, segun que uno u
otro modo de ratificacion hubiera sido propuestopor el Congreso.
Esta diferencia de procedimientos es la que, segun digomas arriba, me
inclina a sostener que la jurisprudencia constitucional propiamente
aplicable a Filipinas es la jurisprudencia de los Estados, puesto que es
con estos con los cuales tenemos analogia o paridad constitucional en lo
que toca a la forma y manera como se puede reformar la Constitucion.
Seguire ahora citando mas casos.
Tenemos un caso de Minnesota, identico a los ya citados de Florida. En el
asunto de In re McConaughy (106 Minn., 392; 119 N.W., 408), tambin se
suscito la cuestion de si una propuesta enmienda constitucional habia
sido aprobada de acuerdo con los requisitos señalados en la
Constitucion de Minnesota. Alli como aqui tambien hubo disputa sobre si
esto era una cuestion judicial o una cuestion politica no justiciable. La
Corte Suprema deaquel Estado declaro sin ambajes que era una cuestion
judicial. He aqui sus palabras que no tienen desperdicio:

The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a

constitutional amendment has been properly adopted according to
the requirements of an existing constitution is a judicial question.
There can be little doubt that the consensus of judicial opinion is to
 the effect that it is the absolute duty of the judiciary to determine
whether the constitution has been amended in the manner required
by the constitution, unless a special tribunal has been created to
determine the question; and even then many of the courts hold that
the tribunal cannot be permitted to illegally amend the organic law.
There is some authority for the view that when the constitution itself
creates a special tribunal, and confides to it the exclusive power to
canvass votes and declare the results, and makes the amendment a
part of the constitution as a result of such declaration by
proclamation or otherwise, the action of such tribunal is final and
conclusive. It may be conceded that this is true when it clearly
appears that such was the intention of the people when they adopted
the constitution. The right to provide a special tribunal is not open to
question; but it is very certain that the people of Minnesota have not
done so, and this fact alone eliminates such cases as Worman vs.
Hagan, 78 Md., 152; 27 Atl., 616; 21 L. R. A., 716, and Miles vs.
Badford, 22 Md., 170; 85 Am. Dec., 643, as authorities against the
jurisdiction of the courts. (In re McConaughy, 106 Minn., 392; 119 N.
W., 408.)

Tambien tenemos un caso de Georgia. En el asunto de Hammond vs.

Clark (136 Ga., 313; 71 S.E., 479; 38 L.R.A.[N.S.], 77), se suscito
igualmente una disputa sobre siuna enmienda habia sido aprobada de
acuerdo con los requisitos de la Constitucion era una cuestion judicial o
no. La Corte Suprema de aquel Estado declaro afirmativamente. He aqui
su inequivoca pronunciamiento:

Counsel for plaintiff in error contended that the proclamation of the

governor declaring that the amendment was adopted was conclusive,
and that the courts could not inquire into the question. To this
contention we cannot assent. The constitution is the supreme state
law. It provides how it may be amended. It makes no provision for
exclusive determination by the governor as to whether an amendment
has been made in the constitutional method, and for the issuance by
him of a binding proclamation to that effect. Such a proclamation
may be both useful and proper, in order to inform the people whether
or not a change has been made in the fundamental law; but the
constitution did not make it conclusive on that subject. When the
constitution was submitted for ratification as a whole, a provision
was made for a proclamation of the result by the governor. Const. art.
13, section 2, par. 2 (Civ. Code 1910, section 6613). But in reference
to amendment there is no such provision. Const. article 13, section 1,
par. 1 (Civ. Code 1910, section 6610). In the absence of some other
exclusive method of determination provided by the constitution, the
weight of authority is to the effect that whether an amendment has
been properly adopted according to the requirements of the existing
 been properly adopted according to the requirements of the existing
constitution is a judicial question. (Hammond vs. Clark, 136 Ga., 313;
71 S.E., 479;38 L.R.A. [N.S.], 77.)

Tambien tenemos el siguiente case de Indiana:

(1) In the beginning we are confronted with the contention on the part
of appellees that this court has no jurisdiction to determine the
questions in issue here. In the case of Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind.,
336, 391; 99 N.E., 1, 21 (Ann. Cas. 1915C, 200), this court, after
reviewing many decisions as to the power of the courts to determine
similar questions, sums up the whole matter as follows:

"Whether legislative action is void for want of power in that body, or

because the constitutional forms of conditions have not been
followed or have been violated (emphasis supplied) may become a
judicial question, and upon the courts the inevasible duty to
determine it falls. And so the power resides in the courts, and they
have, with practical uniformity, exercised the authority to determine
the validity of the proposal, submission, or ratification of change in
the organic law. Such is the rule in this state" — citing more than 40
decisions of this and other states.

(2) Appellees further contend that appellant has not made out a case
entitling him to equitable relief. The trial court found that the officers
of the state, who were instructed with the execution of the law, were
about to expend more than $500,000 under the law, in carrying out its
provisions; indeed, it was suggested, in the course of the oral
argument, that the necessary expenditures would amount to more
than $2,000,000. This court, in the case of Ellingham vs. Dye, supra,
involving the submission to the people of the Constitution prepared
by the Legislature, answered this same question contrary to the
contention of appellees. See pages 413 and 414 of that opinion. (186
Ind., 533; Bennett vs. Jackson, North Eastern Reporter, Vol. 116, pp.
921, 922.)

Creo que la posicion de la jurisprudencia americana tanto federal como

de Estado sobre este punto, esto es, cuandoes judicial la cuestion y
cuando no lo es, se halla bien definida en el tomo 12 del Corpus Juris, en
la parte que llevael encabezamiento de "Constitutional Law" y bajo el
subepigrafe que dice: "Adoption of Constitution and Amendments" (12
Corpus Juris, 880, 881). Es un compendiocuidados amente elaborado en
que se da un extracto de la doctrina con las citas sobre autoridades al
pie. Reproducire el compendio, pero omitiendo las citas para no alargar
demasiado esta disidencia: el que desee comprobarlas no tienemas que
consultar el tomo. En realidad, leyendo este extracto se ve que parece un
resumen del extenso analisis que llevo hecho sobre la doctrina tanto
federal como estatal. Su meollo es, a saber: la cuestion de si o no una
nueva constitucion se ha adoptado la tienen que decidir los
departamentos politicos del gobierno; pero la cuestion de si una
enmienda a una constitucion existente ha sido debidamente propuesta,
adoptada y ratificada de acuerdo con los requisitos provistos por la
Constitucion, para que vengaa ser parte de la misma, es una cuestion que
los tribunales de justicia tienen que determinar y resolver, excepto
cuandola materia ha sido referida por la Constitucion a un tribunale
special con poder para llegar una conclusion final. He aqui el sinopsis:

SEC. 382. b. Adoption of Constitution and Amendments. — Whether or

not a new constitution has been adopted is a question to be decided
by the political departments of the government. But whether an
amendment to the existing constitution has been duly proposed,
adopted, and ratified in the manner required by the constitution, as as
to become part thereof, is a question for the courts to determine,
except where the matter has been committed by the constitution to a
special tribunal with power to make a conclusive determination, as
where the governor is vested with the sole right and duty of
ascertaining and declaring the result, in which case the courts have
no jurisdiction to revise his decision. But it must be made clearly to
appear that the constitution has been violated before the court is
warranted in interfering. In any event, whether an entire constitution is
involved, or merely an amendment, the federal courts will not attempt
to pass on the legality of such constitution or amendment where its
validity has been recognized by the political departments of the state
government, and acquiesced in by the state judiciary. (12 C.J., pp.
880, 881.)

VI

Otra razon que aduce la mayoria para desestimar el recusro es que la

copia impresa de la resolucion en cuestionaparece certificada por los
presidentes de ambas Camaras del Congreso; que en esa certificacion
consta que dicha resolucion fue debidamente aprobada por el Congreso
conlos votos de las tres quintas-partes (3/5) de sus miembros; que, por
tanto, la debida aprobacion de dicha resolucion nose puede cuestionar,
es una prueba concluyente para todoel mundo y para los tribunales de
justicia particularmente. Este argumento se funda en la doctrina inglesa
llamada "enrolled act doctrine," cuya traduccion mas aproximada al
español es "doctrina de la ley impresa." Esto, por unlado.
Por otro lado, la representacion de los recurrentes arguye que lo que rige
y prevaleced en esta jurisdiccion noes la doctrina inglesa o "enrolled act
doctrine," sino ladoctrina americana que se conoce con el nombre de
"journalentry doctrine," en virtud de la cual la prueba de siuna ley o una
resolucion ha sido debidamente aprobadapor el Congreso debe buscarse
en el diario de sesiones mismo del Congreso. Lo que diga el diario de
sesiones esconcluyente y final.
Los recurrentes tienen la razon de su parte. Este punto legal ya se
resolvio por esta Corte en la causa de los Estados Unidos contra Pons (34
Jur. Fil., 772), que ambaspartes discuten en sus respectivos informes.
Una de las defensas del acusado era que la Ley No. 2381 de la
Legislatura Filipina en virtud de la cual habia sido condenado era nula e
ilegal porque so aprobo despues ya del cierrede las sesiones especiales
que tuvo lugar el 28 de Febrero de 1914, a las 12 de la noche; es decir,
que, en realidad de verdad, la aprobacion se efectuo el 1.º de Marzo,
puesla sesion sine die del dia anterior se prolongo mediante una ficcion
haciendose parar las manecillas del reloj a las 12 en punto de la noche.
Esta Corte, sin necesidad deninguna otra prueba, examino el diario de
sesiones correspondientea la referida fecha 28 de Febrero, y habiendo
hallado que alli constaba inequivocamente haberse aprobadola
mencionada ley en tal fecha, fallo que esta pruebaera final y concluyente
para las partes, para los tribunales y para todo el mundo. La Corte
desatendio por completoel "enrolled act," la copia impresa de la ley, pues
dijo, asaber: "Pasando por alto la cuestion relativa as si la Ley Impresa
(Ley No. 2381), que fue aprobada por autorizacion legal, constituye
prueba concluyente sobre la fecha desu aprobacion, investigaremos si
los Tribunales pueden consultar otras fuestes de informacion, ademas de
los diarios de las sesiones legislativas, para determinar la fecha enque se
cerraron las sesiones de la Legislatura, cuando talesdiarios son claros y
explicitos." Y la Corte dijo que nohabia necesidad de consultar otras
fuestes, que el diario de sesiones era terminante, definitivo; y asi fallo la
causaen contra del apelante.
Y no era extraño que asi ocurriese: habia en la Corte una mayoria
americana, familiarizada y compenetrada naturalmente con la
jurisprudencia pertinente de su pais ¿Quede extrano habia, por tanto, que
aplicasen la doctrina americana, la doctrina del "journal entry," que es
mas democratica, mas republicana, en vez de la doctrina inglesa, el
"enrolled act doctrine," que despues de todo tiene ciertotinte monarquico,
producto del caracter peculiar e influencia tradicionalista de las
instituciones inglesas? (Vease Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., 371; Del.)
Firman, como se sabe, la decision el ponente Sr. Trent, y los Magistrados
Sres. Torres, Johnson, Moreland y Araullo, sin mingun disidente.Y notese
que cuando se promulgo esta sentencia todavia estaba en vigor el
articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil, tal como estaba
reformado por la Ley No. 2210. que entre otras cosas proveia lo
siguiente: ". . . Entendiendose, que en el caso de las Leyes de la
Comisionde Filipinas o de la Legislatura Filipina, cuando existeuna copia
firmada por los Presidentes y los secretarios de dichos cuerpos, sera
prueba concluyente de las dispociones de la ley en cuestion y de la
debida aprobacion delas mismas." ¿Que mejor prueba de la voluntad
expresa, categorica, de hacer prevalecer la doctrina americana sobrela
doctrina inglesa? Lo mas comodo para esta Cortehubiera sido aplicar el
citado articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil. No lo hizo, paso
por alto sobreel mismo, yendo directamente al diario de sesiones dela
Legislatura, tomando conocimiento judicial del mismo. Si aqui hay algun
respeto a la regla del stare decisis, estaes una magnifica ocasion para
demostrarlo. Una regla bien establecida no ha de abrogarse asi como asi;
sobretodo cuando de por medio anda la Constitucion como enel presente
caso en que se ha formulado ante nosotros la queja de que la ley
fundamental ha sido violada en unrespecto muy importante como es el
capitulo sobre enmiendas, y la queja no solo no es temeraria sino que se
hallaapoyada en buenas y solidas razones.
Mas todavia: cuando se establecio la doctrina en lacitada causa de los
Estados Unidos contra Pons (1916, Agosto 12) adoptando en esta
jurisdiccion la doctrina americana del "journal entry" en lugar de la inglesa
del "enrolled act," en nuestra Ley Organica que, por cierto, no era aun la
Ley Jones sino la Ley del Congreso de 1902, no habia ninguna
disposicion que proveyera mandatoriamente que en el diario de sesiones
de la Legislatura sehiciesen constar los sies y los nos en la votacion de
cualquier proyecto de ley o resolucion, consignando especifica mentelos
nombres de los miembros que hayan votado enpro y en contra, ni
tampoco habia ninguna disposicione statutoria a dicho efecto. De modo
que en aquella epoca el diario de sesiones de la Legislatura carecia aun
de las fuertes garantias de veracidad que ahora posee en virtud de esa
disposicion que hace obligatoria la constancia oconsignacion de los sies
y nos, disposicion incorporada enla Constitucion del Commonwealth,
ahora de la Republica. (Vease Constitucion de Filipinas, Articulo VI,
seccion 10, inciso 4; seccion 20, incico 1; seccion 21, inciso 2.)
Sobre la derogacion del articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil no
puede haber duda. Ese articulo, que equivale a una regla de prueba, no se
ha incorporado enel Reglamento de los Tribunales. No tratandose de una
regla fundada en un principio general y unanimemente establecido, sino
de algo peculiar aislado, acerca del cuallas autoridades estan divididas,
con una mayoria de los Estados de la Union americana decididamente en
contra, suno inclusion en el Reglamento de los Tribunales tiene
queconsiderarse necesariamente como una derogacion. Indudablemente
esta Corte, al no incluir dicho articulo en el Reglamento de los Tribunales,
ha querido derogarlo en vistade los resuelto en la citada causa de
Estados Unidos contraPons y de la novisima disposicion insertada en la
Constitucion del Commonwealth, ahora de la Republica, que exige la
consignacion en el diario de sesiones de los sies y nos en cada votacion
final de proyecto de ley o resolucion conjunta, con especificacion de los
nombres de los que hasvotado.
Resulta evidente de lo expuesto que ahora existen masrazones para
reafirmar en esta jurisdiccion la doctrina americana del "journal entry" o
"constancia en el diario desesiones" (1) porque el citado seccion 313 del
Codigo de Procedimiento Civil ya no rige con la vigencia del Reglamento
de los Tribunales; (2) porque esa disposicion denuestra Constitucion que
hace obligatoria la consignacion de los sies y nos en la votacion de cada
bill o resolucion, con especificacion de los nombres de los que hayan
votado enfavor y en contra, hace del diario de sesiones la mejor prueba
sobre autenticidad de los actos legislativos y es, porconsiguiente, la ley
sobre la materia en este pais, con entera exclusion de la doctrina inglesa
o "enrolled act doctrine."Las autoridades americanas son contestes en
que siempreque en un Estado de la Union Federal la Constitucioncontiene
una disposicion semejante a la nuestra sobre sies y nos la regla de
prueba no es la copia impresa de la leyo "enrolled act," sino el "journal
entry" o constancia enel diario de sesiones. (Vease Rash vs. Allen, supra.)
Aqui se podria dar por terminada toda discusion sobre este punto si no
fuera porque los abogados de los recurridos arguyen fuertemente en
favor de la doctrina de la copia impresa o "enrolled act doctrine," y la
mayoria de esta Corte acepta sus argumentos. Se cita, sobre todo, el
asunto federal de Field vs. Clark en apoyo de la doctrina.
He examinado la jurisprudencia americana sobre este particular con toda
la diligencia de que he sido capaz y he llegado a la conclusion de que
nuestros predecesores enesta Corte merecen todo encomio por su
indubitable aciertoal adoptar en esta jurisdiccion, en la causa de los
Estados Unidos contra Pons, supra, la doctrina americana del "journal
entry" o constancia en el diario de sesiones legislativas. No cabe duda de
que esta doctrina es mas democratica, mas liberal, y tambien mas
humana y mas concorde con la realidad. La doctrina inglesa del "enrolled
act" ocopia impresa de la ley esta basada en el derecho comun y se
adopto en Inglaterra donde, como se sabe, no hay constitucion escrita y
la forma de gobierno es monarquica,y se adopto en un tiempo en que el
poder del Parlamento que era tambien el mas alto tribunal de justicia, era
absoluto y transcendente y las restricciones sobre el mismo eran muy
ligeras. Por eso un tribunal americano ha dicho: "Because such a rule
obtains as to the Parliament of Great Britain, under a monarchial form of
government, that cannot be regarded as a very potent reason for its
application in this state, where the will of the sovereign power hasbeen
declared in the organic act." (Vease Rash vs. Allen, supra, pag. 379; cito
con frecuencia este asunto famoso de Delaware porque es en el mismo
donde he hallado una discusion mas acabada y comprensiva sobre
ambas doctrinas: la americana del "journal entry" y la inglesa del "enrolled
act.")
Es indudable que el sesgo de la jurisprudencia americana hoy en dia es a
favor de la doctrina del "journal entry." Lo resuelto en el asunto federal de
Field contra Clark, enque tanto enfasis ponen los recurridos, no ha hecho
mas que fortalecer ese giro, pues en dicho asunto va en vuelta
lainferencia de que cuando la Constitucion establece ciertos requisitos
para la aprobacion de una ley o resolucion, conla consignacion de los sies
y nos y los nombres de los que han votado afirmativa y negativamente, el
diario de sesioneses el que rige y prevalece como modo e instrumento de
autenticacion. Por eso que en el asunto tipico y representativode Union
Bank vs. Commissioners of Oxford (199 N.C., 214; 25 S.E., 966; 34 L.R.A.,
487), la Corte Supremade North Carolina ha declarado lo siguiente.

According to the law it is well settled in nearly 100 well-adjudicated

cases in the courts of last resort in 30 states, and also by the
Supreme Court of the United States, that when a state Constitution
prescribes such formalities in the enactment of laws as require a
record of the yeas and nays on the legislative journals, these journals
are conclusive as against not only a printed statute, published by
authority of law, but also against a duly enrolled act. The following is a
list of the authorities, in number 93, sustaining this view either directly
or by very close analogy. . . . It is believed that no federal or state
authority can be found in conflict with them.

Decisions can be found, as, for instance, Carr. vs. Coke (116 N.C.,
223; 22 S.E. 16; 28 L.R.A., 737; 47 Am. St. Rep., 801, supra, to the
effect that, where the Constitution contains no provision requiring
entries on the journal of particular matters — such, for example, as
calles of the yeas and nays on a measure in question — the enrolled
act cannot, in such case, be impeached by the journals. That,
however, is very different proposition from the one involved here, and
the distinction is adverted to in Field vs. Clark, 143 U.S., 671 (12 Sup.
Ct., 495; 36 Law. ed., 294. (Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., p. 377.)

Y en el asunto de Ottawa vs. Perkins la Corte Suprema de los Estados

Unidos ha dicho lo siguiente:

But the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of South
Ottawa vs. Perkins, 94 U.S., 260; 24 Law., ed., 154, on appeal from the
United States court for the Northern district of Illinois (Mr. Justice
 Bradley delivering the opinion), said: "When once it became the
settled construction of the Constitution of Illinois that no act can be
deemed a valid law, unless by the journals of the Legislature it
appears to have been regularly passed by both houses, it became the
duty of the courts to take judicial notice of the journal entries in that
regard. The courts of Illinois may decline to take that trouble, unless
parties bring the matter to their attention, but on general principles
the question as to the existence of a law is a judicial one and must be
so regarded by the courts of the United States." (Rash vs. Allen, 76
Atl. Rep., p. 387.)

Se dice que el interest publico exige que el "enrolled act" o copia impresa
de la ley firmada por los Presidentes deambas Camaras del Congreso de
declare concluyente y final, porque de otra manera habria caos,
confusion: cualquierase creeria con derecho a atacar la validez de una ley
o resolucion, impugnando la autenticidad de su aprobacion ode su texto.
Pero esto pone en orden las siguientes preguntas que se contestan por si
mismas: ?no es el diariode sesiones un documento constitucional,
exigido por la Constitucion que se lleve por las dos camaras del
Congreso, controlado y supervisado por dichas camaras y por los
oficiales de las mismas? ¿que mejor garantia de autenticidad, contra la
falsificacion, que ese requerimiento constitucional de consignar
obligatoriamente en el diario, en la votacionde todo bill o resolucion, los
sies y los nos, y haciendoconstar los nombres tanto afirmativos como
negativos? ¿se ha producido por ventura caos y confusion en los Estados
americanos que han adoptado esta regla y que, segun admiten los
mismos recurridos, forman una decisiva mayoria? ¿se acaso posible
concebir que el sentido americano, tan practico, tan utilitario, tan, realista,
optase poruna regla que fuese origen de caos y confusion?
Prescindiendo ya de la jurisprudencia que, ya hemos visto,
estadecididamente inclinada a favor de la doctrina americana del "journal
entry" ?que dicen los tratadistas mas autorizados, los de nombradia bien
establecida, y sobre todolos especialistas en derecho constitucional?
El Juez Cooley, en su celebrada obra sobre Constitutional Limitations, 7th
ed., 193, dice lo siguiente a favor del "journal entry rule":

Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed., 193),

says: "Each house keeps a journal of its proceedings which is a public
record, and of which the courts are at liberty to take judicial notice. If
it would appear from these journals that any act did not receive the
requisite majority, or that in respect to it the Legislature did not follow
any requirement of the Constitution or that in any other respect the
act was not constitutionally adopted, the courts may act upon this
evidence, and adjudge the statute void. But whenever it is acting in
 apparent performance of legal functions, every reasonable
presumption is to be made in favor of the action of a legislative body.
It will not be presumed in any case, from the mere silence of the
journals, that either house has exceeded its authority, or disregarded
a constitutional requirement in the passage of legislative acts, unless
when the Constitution has expressly required the journals to show the
action taken, as, for instance, where it requires the yeas and nays to
be entered."

Sutherland, en su tambien celebrada obra sobre Statutory Construction,

seccion 46 y siguientes, tambien sedeclara a favofr del "journal entry rule"
con el siguiente pronunciamiento:

The presumption is that an act properly authenticated was regularly

passed, unless there is evidence of which the courts take judicial
notice showing the contrary. The journals are records, and, in all
respects touching proceedings under the mandatory provisions of the
Constitution, will be effected to impeach and avoid the acts recorded
as laws and duly authenticated, if the journals affirmatively show that
these provisions have been disregarded. . . . The journals by being
required by the Constitution or laws, are record . . ..

When required, as is extensively the case in this country, by a

paramount law, for the obvious purpose of showing how the
mandatory provisions of that law have been followed in the methods
and forms of legislation, they are thus made records in dignity, and
are of great importance. The legislative acts regularly authenticated
are also records. The acts passed, duly authenticated, and such
journals are parallel records; but the latter are superior, when explicit
and conflicting with the other, for the acts authenticated speak
decisively only when the journals are silent, and not even then as to
particulars required to be entered therein. (Rash vs. Allen, 76 Atl. Rep.,
p. 378.)

Desde luego la opinion de Wigmore, en que se apoya la mayoria, merece

toda clase de respetos. Pero creo no seme tachara de parcial ni ligero si
digo que sobre el punto constitucional que estamos discutiendo, me
inclino mas y doy mayor peso a la opinion del Juez Cooley y de
Sutherland, por razones obvias. Wigmore nunca pretendio serespecialista
en derecho constitucional. Con mucho tino elponente en el tantas veces
citado asunto de Rash contra Allen dice lo siguiente de la opinion del
celebrado constitucionalista:

We have quoted Judge Cooley's language because of the great

respect that his opinions always command, and also because of the
 fact that it is upon the authority of his opinion that many of the
decisions in support of the American rule have been based. (Rash vs.
Allen, 76 Atl. Rep., p. 378.)

Un detenido y minucioso examen de la jurisprudencia y de los tratados

sobre el particular lleva a uno al convencimiento de que la tendencia
actual en America es a tomar la substancia, el fondo mismo de las cosas
en vez de la simpleforma, el caparazon, a prescindir del artificio, de la
ficcion legal, para ir a la realidad misma. Y no cabe duda deque el
"enrolled act" se presta a veces a tener mas apoyo en el artificio y ficcion
legal, mientras que el diario desesiones, con las fuertes garantias de
autenticidad como las que se proveen en nuestra Constitucion y en
Constituciones similares americanas, reproduce y refleja la realidad de
los hechos relativamente con mas exactitud y fidelidad. Tomemos como
ejemplo el presente caso. La copia impresade la resolucion cuestionada,
firmada por los Presidentes de ambas Camaras del Congreso, reza que la
misma fueaprobada debidamente con los votos de las tres cuartas-
partes (3/4) del Congreso, pero esto no es mas que unaopinion, una
conclusion legal de los presidentes, pues noconsta en dicha copia
impresa el numero concreto de votos emitidos, ni el numero concreto de
la totalidad de miembros actuales de cada camara. Tampoco constan en
dichacopia impresa, tal como manda la Constitucion, los sies y nos de la
votacion, con los nombres de los que votaron afirmativa y negativamente.
Asi que, con solo esa copiaimpresa a la vista, no podemos resolver la
importantisima cuestion constitucional que plantean los recurrentes, a
saber: que la votacion fue anticonstitucional; que arbitrariamente fueron
excluidos de la votacion 11 miembros debidamente cualificados del
Congreso — 3 Senadores y 8 Representantes; que, por virtud de la
exclusion ilegal y arbitraria de estos 11 miembros, el numero de votos
emitidosen cada camara a favor de la resolucion no llegani constituye las
tres cuartas-partes (3/4) que requiere la Constitucion; y que, por tanto, la
resolucion es ilegal, anti-constitucional y nula. Para resolver estas
cuestiones, todastremendas, todas transcedentales, no hay mas remedio
queir al fondo, a las entrañas de la realidad, y todo ello no sepuede hallar
en el "enrolled act," en la copia impresa dela ley, que es incolora, muda
sobre el particular, sino enel diario de sesiones donde con profusion se
dan tales detalles. ¿No es verdad que todo esto demuestra
graficamentela evidente, abrumadora superioridad del "journalentry"
sobre el "enrolled act," como medio de prueba?
Mi conclusion, pues, sobre este punto es que el giro dela legislacion
jurisprudencia en los diferentes Estados de la Union es decididamente en
favor de la doctrina americana del "journal entry"; que en Filipinas desde
1916 en que se promulgo la sentencia en la causa de Estados Unidos
contra Pons la regla es el "journal entry rule"; que esta regla se adopto por
este Supremo Tribunal enun tiempo en que estaba vigente el articulo 313
del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil y cuando el diario de sesiones de la
Legislatura no gozaba de los prestigios de que goza hoy, en virtud de las
rigidas y fuertes garantias sobre autenticidad de las votaciones
legislativas provistas en nuestra Constitucion; que ahora que el referido
articulo 313 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil ya ha sido derogado porel
Reglamento de los Tribunales y se hallan vigentes esasgarantias
constitucionales que son mandatorias, la reglaindiscutible y exclusiva
sobre la materia es el "journal entry rule"' que la regla americana es mas
liberal y mas democratica que la regla inglesa, la cual tiene un evidente
sabormonarquico; que el puebo filipino jamas tolerara un
sistemamonarquico o algo semejante; que el cambiar de regla ahora es
un paso muy desafortunado, un injustificado retroceso, un apoyo a la
reaccion y puede dar lugar a la impresionde que las instituciones de la
Republica filipina tienden a ser totalitarias; que la doctrina inglesa del
"enrolled act" es un instrumento harto inadecuado, ineficaz, para resolver
conflictos constitucionales que se iran planteando ante los tribunales, e
inclusive puede fomentargroseros asaltos contra la Constitucion; que, por
el contrario, la doctrina americana del "journal entry" es amplia, eficaz, y
permite que con toda libertad y desembarazose puedan resolver los
conflictos y transgresiones constitucionales, sin evasivas ni debilidades;
y, por ultimo, que nuestro deber, el deber de esta Corte, es optar por la
doctrina que mejor asegure y fomente los procesos ordenadosde la ley y
de la Constitucion y evitef situaciones en que el ciudadano se sienta
como desamparado de la ley y dela Constitucion y busque la justicia por
sus propias manos.

VII

La mayoria, habiendo adoptado en este asunto una posicion inhibitoria,

estima innecesario discutir la cuestion de si los 3 Senadores y 8
Representantes que fueron excluidos de la votacion son o no miembros
del Congreso. Es decir, lo que debiera ser cuestion fundamental — el
leitmotiff, la verdadera ratio decidendi en este caso — se relegaa termino
secundario, se deja sin discutir y sin resolver. No puedo seguir a la
mayoria en esta evasion: tengo que discutir este punto tan plenamente
como los otros puntos, si no mas, porque es precisamente lo principal —
el meollo del caso.
Comencemos por el Senado. Los 3 Senadores excluido seran miembros
actuales del Senado cuando se voto la resolucion cuestionada, por las
siguientes razones:
(a) Segun la estipulacion de hechos entre las partes y los ejemplares del
diario de sesiones que obran en autoscomo anexos, dichos Senadores
fueron proclamados por la Comision de Elecciones como electos
juntamente con sus 21 compañeros. Despues de la proclamacion
participaron en la organizacion del Senado, votando en la eleccion del
Presidente de dicho cuerpo. De hecho el Senador Vera recibio 8 votos
para Presidente contra el Senador Avelino que recibio 10. Tambien
participaron en algunos debates relativos a la organizacion.
(b) Tambien consta en la estipulacion de hechos y enel diario de sesiones
que prestaron su juramento de cargo ante Notarios particulares
debidamente autorizados y calificados para administrarlo, habiendose
depositado dicho juramento en la secretaria del Senado. Se dice, sin
embargo, que ese juramento no era valido porque no se presto
colectivamente, en union con los otros Senadores. Esto es unerror. La Ley
sobre la materia es el articulo 26 del Codigo Administrativo Revisado, a
saber:

By whom oath of office may be administered. — The oath of office

may be administered by any officer generally qualified to administer
oath; but the oath of office of the members and officers ofeither
house of the legislature may also be administered by persons
designated for such purpose by the respective houses.

Este articulo es demasiado claro para necesitar mas comentarios. Es

evidente que el Senador y Representante puede calificarse prestando el
juramento de su cargo antecualquier funcionario autorizado para
administrarlo; y la disposicion de que tambien pueden administrar ese
juramento personas designadas por cada camara es solo decaracter
permisivo, opcional. Y la mejor prueba de estoes que antes del
advenimiento de la Republica el Senadodhabia reconocido la validez del
juramento de cargo prestadoante un Notario Publico por otros Senadores
de la minoria los Sres. Mabanag, Garcia, Confesor y Cabili. Amenos que
estas cosas se tomen a broma, o la arbitrariedadse erija en ley — la ley de
la selva, del mas fuerte — no esconcebible que el juramento ante Notario
se declare validoen un caso y en otro se declared invalido, concurriendo
lasmismas circunstancias;
(c) Tambien consta, en virtud de la estipulacion de hechos y de los
ejemplares del diario de sesiones que obran en autos como anexos, que
los Senadores Vera, Diokno y Romero han estado cobrando todos sus
sueldos y emolumentos como tales Senadores desde la inauguracion del
Senado hasta ahora, incluso naturalmente el tiempo en quese aprobo la
resolucion cuestionada. Es violentar demasiadola argucia el sostener que
un miembro de una camara legislativa puede cobrar todos sus haberes y
emolumentos y, sin embargo, no ser legalmente miembro de la misma. El
vulgo, maestro en la ironia y en el sarcasmo, tiene unamanera cruda para
pintar esta situacion absurda: "Tiene, pero no hay". ¿Como es posible que
las camaras autoricen el desembolso de sus fondos a favor de unos
hombres que, segun se sostiene seriamente, no estan legalmente
cualificados para merecer y recibir tales fondos?
(d) Se arguye, sin embargo, que los Senadores Vera, Diokno y Romero no
son miembros del Senado porque, envirtud de la Resolucion Pendatun, se
les suspendio el juramento y el derecho a sus asientos. Respecto del
juramento, ya hemos visto que era valido, segun la ley. Respecto dela
suspension del derecho al asiento, he discutido extensamente este punto
en mi disidencia en el asunto de Vera contra Avelino, supra, calificando de
anticonstitucional ynula la suspension. Pero aun suponiendo que la
mismafuera valida, los recurrentes alegan y arguyen que no poreso han
dejado de ser miembros los suspendidos. La alegaciones acertada. La
suspension no abate ni anula lacalidad de miembro; solo la muerte,
dimision o expulsion produce ese efecto (vease Alejandrino contra
Quezon, 46 Jur. Fil., 100, 101; vease tambien United States vs.
Dietrich,126 Fed. Rep., 676). En el asunto de Alejandrino contra Quezon
hemos declarado lo siguiente:

Es cosa digna de observar que el Congreso de los Estados Unidos en

toda su larga historia no ha suspendido a ninguno de sus
miembros.Y la razon es obvia. El castigo mediante reprension o
multavindica la dignidad ofendida de la Camara sin privar a los
representados de su representante; la expulsion cuando es
permisiblevindica del mismo modo el honor del Cuerpo Legislativo
dando asi oportunidad a los representados de elegir a otro nuevo;
pero la suspension priva al distrito electoral de una representacion
sin quese le de a ese distrito un medio para llenar la vacante.
Mediante la suspension el cargo continua ocupado, pero al que lo
ocupa se le ha impuesto silencio. (Alejandrino contra Quezon, 46 Jur.
Fil.,100, 101.)

La posicion juridica y constitucional de los 8 Representantes excluidos de

la votacion es todavia mas firme.Consta igualmente, en virtud de la
estipulacion de hechos y de los ejemplares del diario de sesiones
obrantes en autos, que dichos 8 Representantes tambien se calificaron,
alinaugurarse el Congreso, prestando el juramento de sucargo ante
Notarios Publicos debidamente autorizados; quesu juramento se
deposito en la Secretaria de la Camara; que han estado cobrando desde
la inauguracion hasta ahoratodos sus sueldos y emolumentos, excepto
dos los Representantes Taruc y Lava que han dejado de cobrar desde
hacealgun tiempo; que tambien han participado en algunas
deliberaciones, las relativas al proyecto de resolucion parasuspenderlos.
Pero entre su caso y el de los Senadores existe estadiferencia
fundamental: mientras con respecto a estos ultimosla Resolucion
Pendatun sobre suspension llego aaprobarse adquiriendo estado
parlamentario, en la Camarade Representantes no ha habido tal cosa,
pues la resolucionde suspension se endoso a un comite especial para su
estudioe investigacion, y hasta ahora la Camara no ha tomadosobre ella
ninguna accion, no favorable ni adversa. Demodo que en el caso de los
Representantes hasta ahora nohay suspension, porque de tal no puede
calificarse la acciondel Speaker y del macero privandoles del derecho
detomar parte en las deliberaciones y votaciones. Para queuna
suspension produzca efectos legales y, sobre todo, constitucionales,
tiene que decret arla la Camara misma, pormedio de una resolucion
debidamente aprobada, de acuerdocon los requisitos provistos en la
Constitucion. Nada deesto se ha hecho en la Camara.
El Articulo XV de nuestra Constitucion, sobre enmiendas, dice que "El
Congreso, en sesion conjunta, por el voto detres cuartas partes de todos
los miembros del Senado y dela Camara de Representantes votando
separadamente, puede proponer enmiendas a esta Constitucion o
convocar unaconvencion para dicho efecto." Donde la ley no distingueno
debemos distinguir. La frase todos los miembros debeinterpretarse como
que incluye todos los miembros elegidos, no importa que esten ausentes
o esten suspendidos; mas naturalmente cuando no estan suspendidos
como en el casode los ya citados 8 Representantes. El Juez Cooley, ensu
ya citada obra Constitutional Limitations, hace sobreeste particular los
siguientes comentarios que son terminantes para la resolucion de este
punto constitucional, a saber:

For the votre required in the passage of any particular law the reader
is referred to the Constitution of his State. A simple majority of a
quorum is sufficient, unless the Constitution establishes some other
rule; and where, by the Constitution, a two-thirds of three-fourths vote
is made essential to the passage of any particular class of bills, two-
thids or three-fourths of a quorum will be understood, unless the
terms employed clearly indicate that this proportion of all the
members, or of all those elected, is intended. (A constitutional
requirement that the assent of two-thirds of the members elected to
each house of the legislature shall be requisite to every bill
appropriating the public money or property for localor private
purposes, is mandatory, and cannot be evaded by calling a bill a "joint
resolution".)

(Footnote: "Such a requirement is too clear and too valuable to be

thus frittered away." Allen vs. Board of State Auditors, 122 Mich., 324;
47 L.R.A., 117.)

(Footnote: "By most of the constitutions either all the laws, or laws on
some particular subjects, are required to be adopted by a majority
 voted, or some other proportion of "all the members elected," or of
"the whole representation." These and similar phrases require all the
members to be taken into account whether present or not. Where a
majority of all the members elected is required in the passage of a law,
an ineligible person is not on that account to be excluded in the count.
(Satterloo vs. San Francisco, 23 Cal.,314.)" (Cooley on Constitutional
Limitations, Vol. 1, p. 291.)

VIII

Los recurridos no cuestionan la personalidad o derecho de accion de los

recurrentes para plantear el presente litigio. Sin embargo, en nuestras
deliberaciones algunos Magistrados han expresado dudas sbore si los
recurrentestien en interes legal suficiente y adecuado para demandar y,
por tanto, para invocar nuestra jurisdiccion en el presentecaso. La duda
es si el interes que alegan los recurrentesno es mas bien el general y
abstracto que tiene cualquier otro ciudadano para defender la integridad
de la Constitucion, en cuyo caso seria insuficiente para demandarante los
tribunales, los cuales, segun el consenso de las autoridades, no estan
establecidos para considerar y resolver controversias academicas y
doctrinales, sino conflictos positivos, reales, en que hay algun dano y
perjuicioo amago de dano y perjuicio.
Creo que la personalidad o derecho de accion de losrecurrentes es
incuestionable. En primer lugar, 11 de ellosson miembros del Congreso, y
alegan que se les privo delderecho de votar al considerarse la resolucion
cuestionaday que si se les hubiese permitido votar dicha resolucion no
hubiese obtenido la sancion de las tres cuartas-partes (3/4) que requiere
la Constitucion. ¿Que mayor interes legalque este? Ellos dicen que sus
votos hubieran sido decisivos, que con su intervencion parlamentaria
hubies en salvado alpaid de lo que consideran amago de una tremenda
calamidad publica — la concesion de iguales derechos a los americanos
para explotar nuestros recursos naturales y utilidades publicas. ¿No es
este amago de dano, para ellos individualmente y para el pais
colectivamentem, adecuado y suficiente para crear un interes legal? En el
asunto de Coleman vs. Miller, supra, se suscito esta misma cuestion y se
resolvio a favor de los recurrentes. Como ya hemos visto, estos eran 20
Senadores del Estado de Kansas que alegaban que en la propuesta
ratificacion de la 18.ª Enmienda a la Constitucion Federal sus votos que
daron abatidos por elvoto decisivo del Teniente Gobernador. La Corte
Federal declaro que esto constituia interes legal suficiente y adecuado.
En segundo lugar, los recurrentes alegan ser ciudadanos, electores y
contribuyentes de Filipinas. Naturalmente, como tales tienen derecho a
participar en la explotacion de nuestros recursos naturales y operacion
de utilidades publicas, con exclusion de los americanos y otros
extranjeros. De ello se sigue logicamente que cualguier actolegislativo
que anule y abrogue esa exclusividad afectarapersonalmente a sus
derechos, amagandolos de un probable perjuicio. Esto, a mi juicio, crea
un interes legalade cuado u suficiente para litigar. Esto no es un
interesmeramente academico, abstracto. (Vease Hawke vs.Smith, 253
U.S., 221, 227; 64 Law. ed., 871, 875; 40 Sup.Ct., 495; 10 A. L. R., 1504;
veanse tambien Leser vs.Garnett, 258 Ud.S., 130, 137; 66 Law. ed., 505,
571; 42 Sup.Ct., 217; Coleman vs. Miller, 122 A. L. R., 698.)
En el asunto de Hawke vs. Smith, supra, el demandante alegaba ser
"ciudadano y elector del Estado de Ohio, y comoelector y contribuyente
del Condado de Hamilton, en sunombre y en el de otros similarmente
situados, presento una solicitud de prohibicion ante el tribunal del Estado
para que se prohibiera al Secretario de Estado a que gastara fondos
publicos en la preparacion e impresion de balotaspara la sumision al
electorado de la 18.ª Enmienda a la Constitucion Federal para su
ratificacion. La Corte Suprema Federal fallo que el demandante tenia
intereslegal y, por tanto, personalidad y derecho de accion para
demandar.
En el asunto de Leser vs. Garnett, supra, los demandantes alegaban ser
electores cualificados de Maryland y solicitaban la exclusion de ciertas
mujeres del censo electoralpor el fundamento de que la Constitucion de
Maryland limitaba el sufragio a los varones y la 19.ª Enmiendaa la
Constitucion Federal no habia sido validamente ratificadaa. Lo Corte
Suprema Federal fallo tambien que los demandantes tenian interes legal
suficiente y adecuado.

IX

Cuando se celebraron las audiencias en este asunto sele pregunto a uno

de los abogados de los recurridos, creo que el mismo Secretario de
Justicia, cual seria el remedio legal para los recurrentes, ya que se
sostiene que en elpresente caso se trate de una materia no judicial,
injusticiable, y, que, por tanto, los tribunales nada tienen que hacer. El
Secretario de Justicia contesto: ninguno. Lounico que los recurrentes
pueden hacer es esperar las elecciones y plantear el caso directamente
ante el pueblo, unico juez en las controversias de caracter politico. Esto
mismose dijo en el caso de Vera contra Aveino, supra, y reiterolo que alli
he dicho sobre este argumento, a saber:

Solo nos queda por considerar el argumento deprimente,

desalentadorde que el caso que nos ocupa no tiene remedio ni bajo
la Constitucion ni bajo las leyes ordinarias. A los recurrentes se
lesdice que no tienen mas que un recurso: esperar laas elecciones y
plantear directamente la cuestion ante el pueblo elector. Si los
 recurrentes tienen razon, el pueblo les reivindicara eligiendoles o
elevandoa su partido al poder, repudiando, en cambio, a los
recurridoso a su partido. Algunas cosas se podrian decir acerca de
este argumento. Se podria decir, por ejemplo, que el remedio no es
expeditoni adecuado porque la mayoria de los recurridos han sido
elegidos para un periodo de seis anos, asi que no se les podra exigir
ninguna responsabilidad por tan largo tiempo. Se podria decir
tambien que en una eleccion politica entran muchos factores, y es
posible quela cuestion que se discute hoy, con ser tan fervida y tan
palpitante, quede, cuando llegue el caso, obscurecida por otros
"issues" maspresionantes y decisivos. Tambien se podria decir que,
independientemente de la justicia de su cuasa, un partido minoritario
siemprelucha con desventaja contra el partido mayoritario.

Pero, a nuestro juicio, la mejor contestacion al argumento esque no

cabe concebir que los redactores de la Constitucion filipina hayan
dejado en medio de nuestro sistema de gobierno un peligros ovacio
en donde quedan paralizados los resortes de la Constituciony de la
ley, y el ciudadano queda inerme, impotente frente a lo que el
considera flagrante transgresion de sus derechos. Los redactoresde
la Constitucion conocian muy bien nuestro sistema de gobierno —
sistema presidencial. Sabian muy bien que este no tiene la
flexibilidaddel tipo ingles — el parlamentario. En Inglaterra y en
lospaises que siguen su sistema hay una magnifica valvula de
seguridad politica; cuando surge una grave crisis, de esas que
sacudenlos cimientos de la nacion, el parlamento se disuelve y se
convocanelleciones generales para que el pueblo decida los grandes
"issues" del dia. Asi se consuman verdaderas revoluciones, sin
sangre, sin violencia. El sistema presidential no tiene esa valvula. El
periodo que media de eleccion a eleccion es inflexible. Entre
nosotros, porejemplo, el periodo es de seis años para el Senado, y de
cuatro años para la Camara de Representantes y los gobiernos
provinciales y municipales. Solamente se celebran elecciones
especiales para cubrir vacantes que ocurran entre unas elecciones
generalesy otras. Se comprendera facilmente que bajo un sistema asi
esharto peligroso, es jugar con fuego el posibilitar situaciones
dondeel individuo y el pueblo no puedan buscar el amparo de la
Constitucion y de las leyes, bajo procesos ordenados y expeditos,
paraprotegar sus derechos. (Vera contra Avelino, pags. 363, 364.)

Fued Jefferson quien dijo que como medida de higiene politicaera

conveniente que el pueblo americano tuviera una revolucion cada veinte
años. Parece que el gran democratadijo esto no por el simple prurito de
jugar con laparadoja, con la frase, sino convencido de que la revoluciones
el mejor antidoto para la tirania o los amagos de tirania.
Grande como es el respeto que merecen las opiniones delinmortal autor
de la Decaraction de Independencia, creoque la revolucion es siempre
revolucion, la violencia es siempre violencia: caos, confusion,
desquiciamiento de los resortes politicos y sociales, derramamiento de
sangre, perdidade vidas y haciendas, etcetera, etcetera. Asi que
normalmente ninguno puede desear para su pais la violencia, aun en
nombre de la vitalidad, de la salud publica.
Estoy convencido de que el mejor ideal politico es la revolucionsin
sangre, esa que no pocas veces se ha consumado v. gr. en la historia
contemporanea de Inglaterra, yaun de America misma. Y ese ideal es
perfectamente realizable permitiendo el amplio juego de la Constitucion y
delas leyes, evitando pretextos a la violencia, y no posibilitando
situaciones de desamparo y desesperacion.
Por eso creo sinceramente que la mejor politica, la mejordoctrina judicial
es la que en todo tiempo encauza y fomentalos procesos ordenados de la
Constitucion y de la ley.

Footnotes

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

1 Omitted.

BRIONES, M., con quien esta conforme FERIA, M., dissidente:

1 Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno y Jose E. Romero.

2 Senadores: Alejo Mabanag, Carlos P. Garcia, Eulogio Rodriguez,

Tomas Confesor, Tomas Cabili, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, y Jose
E. Romero.

Representantes: Juvenal Almendras, Paulino Alonzo, Apolinario

Cabigon, Floro Crisologo, Gabriel Dunuan, Cosme B. Garcia, Agustin
Y. Kintanar, Vicente Logarta, Francisco A. Perfecto, Cipriano P.
Primicias, Nicolas Rafols, Jose V. Rodriguez, Juan de G. Rodriguez,
Felixberto M. Serrano, Conrado Singson, George K. Tait, y Leandro A.
Tojong.

Presidentes de Partido: Jose O. Vera, Jesus G. Barrera, Emilio Javier y

Sofronio Quimson, Nacionalista Party, Democratic Alliance, Popular
Front y Philippine Youth Party, respectivamente.
3 Comision de Elecciones: Jose Lopez Vito, Francisco Enage y
Vicente de Vera, respectivamente.

Marciano Guevara, Paciano Dizon y Pablo Lucas, Tesorero, Auditor y

Director de Imprenta, respectivamente.

4 La politica de nacionalizacion de la recursos naturales yutilidades

publicas incorporada en nuestra Constitucion no es unapolitica
nueva, sino que trae su origen de nuestro pasado remoto, dela
historia colonial misma de España en Filipinas. Los primeros
conflictos de los filipinos con los conquistado es tenian por causala
propiedad de la tierra; los filipinos se esforzaban por reivindicarel
dominio del suelo que creian detentado por los colonizadores. Estos
conflictos fueron agravandose con el tiempo condensan dose enla
formidable cuestion agraria que en las postrimerias del siglo
diecinueve fue enm gran parte la causa de la revolucion contra
España. Lass campanas de Rizal y de los laborantes, y el Katipunan
de Bonifacio tomaron gran parte de su fuerza, de su valor combativo,
delos agravios provocados por la cuestion agraria. La Liga Filipinade
Rizal estaba fundamentalmente basada en un ideario economico
nacionalista, de control y dominio sobre la riqueza y recursos delpais.

"Cuando America establecio aqui su soberania su mayor acierto

consistio en echar los cimientos de su politica fundamental de
'Filipinas para los filipinos.' Primero el Presidente McKinley, y
despues los Presidentes Taft y Wilson, consolidaron esta politica. El
congresoaprobo leyes tendentes a la conservacion de terrenos
publicos yrecursos naturales, entre ellas la Ley de 1.º de Julio de
1902 conocida por Ley Cooper. En estas leyes se limitaba y restringia
la adquisiciony uso de bienes de dominio publico por particulares.

"Una pruebaf palmaria del celo del Congreso americano por mantener
rigidamente la politica de conservacion del patrimonio delos filipinos
fue la investigacion congresional provocada por el Congresista
Martin, de Colorado, en relacion con la venta de terrenos delos frailes
en Mindoro, a una compañia americana en exceso de las 1,024
hectareas fijadas en las leyes de terrenos publicos. Esto diolugar a
uno de los episodios mas famosos en la carrera del Comisionado
Residente Quezon. Este relata su campaña en su autobiografia 'The
Good Fight,' a saber:

"'My next address to Congress took place when a congressional

investigation was being urged by Congressman Martin of Colorado to
determine how the Government of the Philippines was carrying out
the policy laid down by Congress, that limited to 1024 acres the
maximum area of government land that could be sold to corporations
or individuals. This law had been enacted soon after the United States
has taken the Philippines to prevent the exploitation of the Filipino
people by capitalists, whether foreigners or natives. American capital
interested in the sugar industry has acquired two very large tracts of
land which the Philippine Government had bought from the friars with
the funds bonds issued under the security of the Philippine
Government. The avowed purpose in buying these extensive
properties from the Spanish religious orders was to resell them in
small lots to Filipino farmers, and thus to do away with absentee
landlordism which had been the most serious cause of the Philippine
rebellion against Spain. The reason given for the sale of these lands
to American capital by the American official in charge of the
execution of the congressional policy were two-fold: First, that the act
of Congress referred only to lands of the public domain not to lands
acquired by the Government in some other way. And second, that the
sale of these lands was made in order to establish the sugar industry
in the Philippines on a truly grand scale under modern methods, as
had been done in Cuba. It was further alleged that such a method
would bring great prosperity to the Philippines.

"'I spoke in support of the proposed investigation, contending that the

establishment of the sugar industry under those conditions would
mean the debasement of the Filipinos into mere peons. 'Moreover,' I
argued, 'large investments of American capital in the Philippines will
inevitably result in the permanent retention of the Philippines by the
United States.' At the climax of ny speech I roared: If the preordained
fate of my country is either to be a subject people but rich, or free but
poor, I am unqualifiedly for the latter.'

"'The investigation was ordered by the House of Representatives, and

although the sales already made were not annulled, no further sales
were made in defiance of the Congressional Act. (The Good Fight, by
President Quezon, pp. 117-119.)'

"Para implementar la politica de nacionalizacion el gobierno filipino

bajo la Ley Jones y la Ley del Commonwealth fundo con una gruesa
capitalizacion las corporaciones economicas del Estado comoel
Philippine National Bank, National Development Company, National
Cement Company, National Power Corporation, y otras.

"Para reglamentar y supervisar las utilidades y servicios publicos se

creo la Comision de Servicios Publicos."
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation