Durkheim and Functionalism

It is simplistic to equate functionalist perspectives directly with political conservatism.[9]

The tendency to emphasize "cohesive systems", however,

leads functionalist theories to be contrasted with "conflict theories"
which instead emphasize conflicts over the allocation of resources
between different groups, classically social classes, in society

In the 1960s, functionalism was criticized for being unable to account for social change,
or for structural contradictions and conflict
(and thus was often called "consensus theory").[33]

Also, it ignores inequalities including race, gender, class, which cause tension and conflict.
The refutation of the second criticism of functionalism,
that it is static and has no concept of change, has already been articulated above,
concluding that while Parsons' theory allows for change,
it is an orderly process of change [Parsons, 1961:38], a moving equilibrium.

As the influence of functionalism in the 1960s began to wane,

the linguistic and cultural turns led to a myriad of new movements in the social sciences:

"According to Giddens, the orthodox consensus terminated in the late 1960s and 1970s
as the middle ground shared by otherwise competing perspectives gave way
and was replaced by a baffling variety of competing perspectives.
This third generation of social theory includes phenomenologically inspired approaches,
critical theory, ethnomethodology, symbolic interactionism,
structuralism, post-structuralism,
and theories written in the tradition of
hermeneutics and ordinary language philosophy."[32]

Auguste Comte believed that society constitutes a separate "level" of reality, distinct from both biological
and inorganic matter. Explanations of social phenomena had therefore to be constructed within this level,
individuals being merely transient occupants of comparatively stable social roles. In this view, Comte was
followed by Émile Durkheim.
 Tacott-Parsons

Structural functionalism reached the peak of its influence in the 1940s and 1950s, and by the 1960s was in
rapid decline.[28] By the 1980s, its place was taken in Europe by more conflict-oriented approaches,[29] and
more recently by structuralism.[30] While some of the critical approaches also gained popularity in the
United States, the mainstream of the discipline has instead shifted to a myriad of empirically-oriented
middle-range theories with no overarching theoretical orientation. To most sociologists, functionalism is now
"as dead as a dodo".[31]

Functionalism also has an anthropological basis in the work of theorists such as Marcel Mauss, Bronisław
Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown. It is in Radcliffe-Brown's specific usage that the prefix 'structural'
emerged.[7] Radcliffe-Brown proposed that most stateless, "primitive" societies, lacking strong centralized
institutions, are based on an association of corporate-descent groups.[8] Structural functionalism also took on
Malinowski's argument that the basic building block of society is the nuclear family,[8] and that the clan is
an outgrowth, not vice versa.

Counter Intuitive Terminology

A central concern for Durkheim was the question of how

certain societies maintain internal stability and survive over time.
He proposed that such societies tend to be segmented,
with equivalent parts held together by shared values, common symbols
or (as his nephew Marcel Mauss held), systems of exchanges.

The central concern of structural functionalism may be regarded as a continuation of the Durkheimian task of
explaining the apparent stability and internal cohesion needed by societies to endure over time. Societies are
seen as coherent, bounded and fundamentally relational constructs that function like organisms, with their
various (or social institutions) working together in an unconscious, quasi-automatic fashion toward achieving
an overall social equilibrium. All social and cultural phenomena are therefore seen as functional in the sense
of working together, and are effectively deemed to have "lives" of their own. They are primarily analyzed in
terms of this function.
 In sociology, "mechanical solidarity" and "organic solidarity"[1]
are the concepts of solidarity as developed by Émile Durkheim.
Durkheim introduced the terms "mechanical" and "organic solidarity"
as part of his theory of the development of societies
in The Division of Labour in Society (1893).

Solidarity types of norms in existence,

and the conscience collective.[2]

Collective consciousness, collective conscience,

or collective conscious (French: conscience collective)
is the set of shared beliefs, ideas, and moral attitudes
which operate as a unifying force within society.[1]

In general, it does not refer to the specifically moral conscience,

but to a shared understanding of social norms.[2]
The term was introduced by the French sociologist Émile Durkheim
in his The Division of Labour in Society in 1893.
The French word conscience generally means
"conscience", "consciousness", "awareness",[3] or "perception".[4]

Commentators and translators of Durkheim disagree on which is most appropriate,

or whether the translation should depend on the context.
Some prefer to treat the word 'conscience' as an untranslatable foreign word or technical term,
without its normal English meaning.[5]
As for "collective", Durkheim makes clear that he is not
reifying or hypostasizing this concept; for him,
it is "collective" simply in the sense that
it is common to many individuals;[6] cf. social fact.

Durkheim used the term in his books The Division of Labour in Society (1893), The Rules of the
Sociological Method (1895), Suicide (1897), and The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912). In The
Division of Labour, Durkheim argued that in traditional/primitive societies (those based around clan, family
or tribal relationships), totemic religion played an important role in uniting members through the creation of
a common consciousness (conscience collective in the original French). In societies of this type, the contents
of an individual's consciousness are largely shared in common with all other members of their society,
creating a mechanical solidarity through mutual likeness.

The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a society forms a determinate
system with a life of its own. It can be termed the collective or common consciousness.
— Emile Durkheim[13]

In Suicide, Durkheim developed the concept of anomie to refer to the social rather than individual causes of
suicide. This relates to the concept of collective consciousness, as if there is a lack of integration or solidarity
in society then suicide rates will be higher.[14]

Gramsci and collective consciousness

According to Michelle Filippini’s book Using Gramsci, on Antonio Gramsci, “A collective consciousness,
which is to say a living organism, is formed only after the unification of the multiplicity through friction on
the part of the individuals; nor can one say that ‘silence’ is not a multiplicity.”[15] Essentially, a form of
collective consciousness can be based on fact that Gramsci’s conception of hegemony vis-à-vis the
hegemony of the ruling class played a role in mobilizing the collective consciousness of those who are
oppressed by the ruling ideas of society, or the ruling hegemony. Collective consciousness in this sense can
refer to a multitude of different individual forms of consciousness coalescing into a greater whole. As to
whether this whole is unified, this is up for debate. In Gramsci’s view, a unified whole is composed of
solidarity among its different constituent parts, and therefore, this whole cannot be uniformly the same.
Rather, it can and should embrace different forms of consciousness (or individual experiences of social
reality), which coexist to reflect the different experiences of the marginalized peoples in a given society. This
is in accordance with Gramsci’s theory of Marxism and class struggle applied to cultural contexts. Cultural
Marxism (as distinguished from the right-wing use of the term) embodies the concept of collective
consciousness. It incorporates social movements that are based on some sort of collective identity; these
identities can include, for instance, gender, sexual orientation, race, and ability, and can be incorporated by
collective-based movements into a broader historical material analysis of class struggle.
Gramsci’s theory of collective consciousness thus departs from conventional stereotypes of Marxism as
being a purely deterministic, anti-humanist ‘ideology.’ Marxism is often attacked as being somewhat devoid
of the interpersonal experiences of the subaltern. Yet, as Gramsci points out, “Modern politics thus ‘abolishes
the state as a federation of classes – but certain forms of the internal life of the subaltern classes are reborn as
parties, trade unions, cultural associations.’6 “[16] Thus, the essential collective consciousness of the
subaltern manifests itself in the forms of free associations like the aforementioned as a unifying force of
diversity in the realm of society and the state. The state itself is an entity that is made up of civil society, in
which different groups compete for political power. Thus, a multiple collective consciousness can exist
within the body politic. This collective consciousness is often used to advocate for basic human rights at the
national and international level. Collective consciousness in these instances can lead to a greater social
consciousness among people and can act as a reinforcing framework for Marxist thought.
According to Filippini, “The nature and workings of collective organisms – not only parties, but also trade
unions, associations and intermediate bodies in general – represent a specific sphere of reflection in the
Prison Notebooks, particularly in regard to the new relationship between State and society that in Gramsci’s
view emerged during the age of mass politics.”[17] Collective organisms can express collective
consciousness. Whether this form of expression finds itself in the realm of the state or the realm of society is
up to the direction that the subjects take in expressing their collective consciousness. In Gramsci’s famous
Prison Notebooks, the ongoing conflict between civil society, the bureaucracy, and the state necessitates the
emergence of a collective consciousness that can often act as an intermediary between these different realms.
The public organizations of protest, such as labor unions and anti-war organizations, are vehicles that can
unite multiple types of collective consciousness. Although identity-based movements are necessary for the
progress of democracy and can generate collective consciousness, they cannot completely do so without a
unifying framework. This is why anti-war and labor movements provide an avenue that has united various
social movements under the banner of a multiple collective consciousness. This is also why future social
movements need to have an ethos of collective consciousness if they are to succeed in the long-term.
Cognitive knowledge and collective consciousness
According to Zukerfield, “The different disciplines that have studied knowledge share an understanding of it
as a product of human subjects – individual, collective, etc.”[18] Knowledge in a sociological sense is
derived from social conditions and social realities. Collective consciousness also reflects social realities, and
sociological knowledge can be gained through the adoption of a collective consciousness. Many different
disciplines such as philosophy and literature examine collective consciousness from different lenses. These
different disciplines reach a similar understanding of a collective consciousness despite their different
approaches to the subject. The inherent humanness in the idea of collective consciousness refers to a shared
way of thinking among human beings in the pursuit of knowledge. Individual knowledge can be
distinguished from collective knowledge by its emphasis on individual people as opposed to groups of
people. Collective consciousness is thus group-oriented rather than individualistic.
Collective consciousness, to some degree, can be distinguished from social consciousness. Indeed, according
to Zukerfeld, “the problem is the integration of the subject in the web of 'social relations'. These, particularly
those of production, are what determine ‘social consciousness.’ “[19] If social consciousness is determined
by social relations, then collective consciousness is determined by collective relations. There is a big
difference between the two. Social relations refer to material, historically determined relations, primarily of
production and exchange, between people. Collective relations, on the other hand, refers to the co-existence
of different groups of people or the 'collective'. Coexistence is what ultimately determines the level of
collective consciousness in any given society. Societies with a higher level of collective consciousness are
more likely to accept the principle of human cooperation versus the principle of human competition.
Collective consciousness can provide a new understanding of the relationship between self and society. As
Zukerfeld states, “Even though it impels us, as a first customary gesture, to analyse the subjective (such as
individual consciousness) or intersubjective bearers (such as the values of a given society), in other words
those which Marxism and sociology examine, now we can approach them in an entirely different light.” [20]
Unlike previous modes of thought, “cognitive materialism”[21] is presented in the work by Zukerfeld as a
sort of ‘third way’ between sociological knowledge and Marxism. Cognitive materialism is based on a kind
of collective consciousness of the mind. This consciousness in turn can be used, with cognitive materialism
as a guiding force, by human beings in order to critically analyze society and social conditions. Critical
analysis will then spur collective action to solve these social problems. Once the goals of solving these
problems have been achieved, the creation of a new, humane society will involve some degree of collective
consciousness. Collective consciousness, in this case, is a mechanism to analyze subjective societal factors
and integrate them into the overall framework of social analysis.
Collective consciousness in literary and oral tradition
In a work using a Serbian folk story as a case study on the collective experience of oral and literary
traditions, Wolfgang Ernst examines collective consciousness in terms of forms of media. "Current discourse
analysis drifts away from the 'culturalist turn' of the last two or three decades and its concern with individual
and collective memory as an extended target of historical research".[22] Despite this turn away from
questions of individual and collective knowledge, there is still a collective consciousness present in terms of
the shared appreciation of folk stories and oral traditions. Folk stories enable the subject and the audiences to
come together around a common experience and a shared heritage. In the case of the Serbian folk “gusle”,
[23] the Serbian people take pride in this musical instrument of epic poetry and oral tradition and play it at
social gatherings. Expressions of art and culture are, ultimately, expressions of a collective consciousness.
They can also be expressions of multiple social realities. Regardless, a permeating collective consciousness
exists in society and can be expressed through multiple modes of communication.
Collective consciousness has a relationship with collective memory. “Collective memory is thus no longer a
reference to a remembered past but a way of analyzing the present as a collection of big (meta-)data in real-
time for future prediction.”[24] In other words, the collective consciousness of the people, manifested
through forms of literary and cultural media, can be quantified by big data. Big data can be a representation
of collective consciousness insofar as it tries to quantify the experiences of the public on the Internet.
However, there is a limit to quantifying social experiences. Collective consciousness that is independent of
any sort of quantifiable data, namely through oral tradition, has always been a part of human culture and will
continue to remain so. In the future, collective consciousness will also remain as a huge part of human
society. However, the form it will take will be very different from the form it is taking now.
Finally, it is important to remember the realness involved in creating a collective consciousness. Reality is
socially defined, and is based on the social experiences of human beings. Indeed, as Ernst argues,
“Phonographic recordings of real voices irritate the historical consciousness of cultural memory.”[25] The
emphasis laid here on authenticity is also what makes up the lived experience of collective consciousness.
The authenticity of collective consciousness necessitates human participation in order to provide it with a
deeper meaning. If reality is not authentic and does not represent the social experiences of the collective,
collective consciousness will also cease to have any significant meaning. Rather, it will become submerged
in favor of an inauthentic, artificial sense of reality and society. Therefore, the final attribute of collective
consciousness is its fundamental essence of reality as opposed to unreality.

Pre-Mechanical Societies

In simpler societies (e.g., tribal),

solidarity is usually based on kinship ties of familial networks.

Mechanical Society

Durkheim used the term "mechanical solidarity"

to refer to these types of "social bonds,
based on common sentiments and shared moral values,
that are strong among members of pre-industrial societies".[1]

In modern, complex societies, members perform very different tasks, resulting in a strong interdependence.
Based on the metaphor above of an organism in which many parts function together to sustain the whole,
Durkheim argued that complex societies are held together by "solidarity", i.e. "social bonds, based on
specialization and interdependence, that are strong among members of industrial societies".[1

In a society exhibiting mechanical solidarity,

its cohesion and integration comes from the homogeneity of individuals—
people feel connected through similar
work, educational and religious training, and lifestyle.
Mechanical solidarity normally operates
in traditional and small-scale societies.[2]

The historian of the sixteenth century finds herself endlessly drawing family trees in order to understand the
family networks in which individuals are caught. This supposes that daughters were considered pawns, as it
were, to be used in the negotiation of alliances and networks of influence. This is still the case, it can be seen
with Bacon. This relationship is very much linked to a class function. Whilst there was a degree of social
mobility – figures such as Thomas Cromwell and Bacon came from families that were able to rise from
relatively obscure and modest backgrounds to occupy the highest offices of state – by the end of the
seventeenth century, these ties no longer quite have the function that they did a century before although are
still clearly at work in the aristocracy.
The reason for this would appear to be that there is greater fluidity – in what remains a remarkably rigid class
divided society – in class relations and that, as a result, there is more interpenetration of the landed and the
bourgeois, with the bourgeoisie buying into land and landed societies welcoming the injection of ready
specie into their fixed assets. The astute will have noticed that there is an underlying metaphorical transfer
from the economic to the reproductive and this metaphorical field is, evidently, one to which the eighteenth
century, in particular, was alert. Two different regimes – that of the family and that of class – overlap and are
described in terms of the different considerations appropriate to each.

Organic

Organic solidarity comes from the interdependence

that arises from specialization of work and the complementarities between people—
a development which occurs in modern and industrial societies.[2]
It is social cohesion based upon the
dependence individuals have on each other in more advanced societies.
Although individuals perform different tasks and often have different values and interests,
the order and very solidarity of society
depends on their reliance on each other to perform their specified tasks.
Thus, social solidarity is maintained in more complex societies
through the interdependence of its component parts
(e.g., farmers produce the food to feed the factory workers
who produce the tractors that allow the farmer to produce the food).

Mechanical vs. organic solidarity[3]

Feature Mechanical solidarity Organic solidarity
Morphological Based on resemblances (predominant in Based on division of labor
(structural) basis less advanced societies) (predominately in more advanced
Segmental type (first clan-based, later societies)
territorial) Organized type (fusion of markets and
Little interdependence (social bonds growth of cities)
relatively weak) Much interdependency (social bonds
Relatively low volume of population relatively strong)
Relatively low material and moral Relatively high volume of population
density Relatively high material and moral
density
Types of norms (typified Rules with repressive sanctions Rules with restitutive sanctions
by law) Prevalence of penal law Prevalence of cooperative law (civil,
commercial, procedural, administrative
and constitutional law)
Formal features of High volume Low volume
conscience collective High intensity Low intensity
High determinateness Low determinateness
Collective authority absolute More room for individual initiative and
reflection
Content of conscience Highly religious Increasingly secular
collective Transcendental (superior to human Human-orientated (concerned with
interests and beyond discussion) human interests and open to discussion)
Attaching supreme value to society and Attaching supreme value to individual
interests of society as a whole dignity, equality of opportunity, work
Concrete and specific ethic and social justice
Abstract and general

Furthermore, Durkheim favoured a radical form of guild socialism along with functionalist explanations.
Also, Marxism, while acknowledging social contradictions, still uses functionalist explanations. Parsons'
evolutionary theory describes the differentiation and reintegration systems and subsystems and thus at least
temporary conflict before reintegration (ibid). "The fact that functional analysis can be seen by some as
inherently conservative and by others as inherently radical suggests that it may be inherently neither one nor
the other."[34]
Stronger criticisms include the epistemological argument that functionalism is tautologous, that is it attempts
to account for the development of social institutions solely through recourse to the effects that are attributed
to them and thereby explains the two circularly. However, Parsons drew directly on many of Durkheim's
concepts in creating his theory. Certainly Durkheim was one of the first theorists to explain a phenomenon
with reference to the function it served for society. He said, "the determination of function is…necessary for
the complete explanation of the phenomena."[35] However Durkheim made a clear distinction between
historical and functional analysis, saying, "When ... the explanation of a social phenomenon is undertaken,
we must seek separately the efficient cause which produces it and the function it fulfills." [35] If Durkheim
made this distinction, then it is unlikely that Parsons did not. However Merton does explicitly state that
functional analysis does not seek to explain why the action happened in the first instance, but why it
continues or is reproduced. By this particular logic, it can be argued that functionalists do not necessarily
explain the original cause of a phenomenon with reference to its effect. Yet the logic stated in reverse, that
social phenomena are (re)produced because they serve ends, is unoriginal to functionalist thought. Thus
functionalism is either undefinable or it can be defined by the teleological arguments which functionalist
theorists normatively produced before Merton.
Another criticism describes the ontological argument that society cannot have "needs" as a human being
does, and even if society does have needs they need not be met. Anthony Giddens argues that functionalist
explanations may all be rewritten as historical accounts of individual human actions and consequences (see
Structuration).
A further criticism directed at functionalism is that it contains no sense of agency, that individuals are seen as
puppets, acting as their role requires. Yet Holmwood states that the most sophisticated forms of
functionalism are based on "a highly developed concept of action,"[23] and as was explained above, Parsons
took as his starting point the individual and their actions. His theory did not however articulate how these
actors exercise their agency in opposition to the socialization and inculcation of accepted norms. As has been
shown above, Merton addressed this limitation through his concept of deviance, and so it can be seen that
functionalism allows for agency. It cannot, however, explain why individuals choose to accept or reject the
accepted norms, why and in what circumstances they choose to exercise their agency, and this does remain a
considerable limitation of the theory.
Further criticisms have been levelled at functionalism by proponents of other social theories, particularly
conflict theorists, Marxists, feminists and postmodernists. Conflict theorists criticized functionalism's
concept of systems as giving far too much weight to integration and consensus, and neglecting independence
and conflict.[23] Lockwood, in line with conflict theory, suggested that Parsons' theory missed the concept of
system contradiction. He did not account for those parts of the system that might have tendencies to mal-
integration.[23] According to Lockwood, it was these tendencies that come to the surface as opposition and
conflict among actors. However Parsons thought that the issues of conflict and cooperation were very much
intertwined and sought to account for both in his model.[23] In this however he was limited by his analysis
of an ‘ideal type' of society which was characterized by consensus. Merton, through his critique of functional
unity, introduced into functionalism an explicit analysis of tension and conflict. Yet Merton's functionalist
explanations of social phenomena continued to rest on the idea that society is primarily co-operative rather
than conflicted, which differentiates Merton from conflict theorists.
Marxism, which was revived soon after the emergence of conflict theory, criticized professional sociology
(functionalism and conflict theory alike) for being partisan to advanced welfare capitalism. [23] Gouldner
thought that Parsons' theory specifically was an expression of the dominant interests of welfare capitalism,
that it justified institutions with reference to the function they fulfill for society.[23] It may be that Parsons'
work implied or articulated that certain institutions were necessary to fulfill the functional prerequisites of
society, but whether or not this is the case, Merton explicitly states that institutions are not indispensable and
that there are functional alternatives. That he does not identify any alternatives to the current institutions does
reflect a conservative bias, which as has been stated before is a product of the specific time that he was
writing in.
As functionalism's prominence was ending, feminism was on the rise, and it attempted a radical criticism of
functionalism. It believed that functionalism neglected the suppression of women within the family structure.
Holmwood[23] shows, however, that Parsons did in fact describe the situations where tensions and conflict
existed or were about to take place, even if he did not articulate those conflicts. Some feminists agree,
suggesting that Parsons provided accurate descriptions of these situations.[23] On the other hand, Parsons
recognized that he had oversimplified his functional analysis of women in relation to work and the family,
and focused on the positive functions of the family for society and not on its dysfunctions for women.
Merton, too, although addressing situations where function and dysfunction occurred simultaneously, lacked
a "feminist sensibility."[23]
Postmodernism, as a theory, is critical of claims of objectivity. Therefore, the idea of grand theory and grand
narrative that can explain society in all its forms is treated with skepticism. This critique focuses on exposing
the danger that grand theory can pose when not seen as a limited perspective, as one way of understanding
society.[citation needed]
Jeffrey Alexander (1985) sees functionalism as a broad school rather than a specific method or system, such
as Parsons, who is capable of taking equilibrium (stability) as a reference-point rather than assumption and
treats structural differentiation as a major form of social change. The name 'functionalism' implies a
difference of method or interpretation that does not exist.[36] This removes the determinism criticized above.
Cohen argues that rather than needs a society has dispositional facts: features of the social environment that
support the existence of particular social institutions but do not cause them.

Other Thinkers

Various forms of what might be termed "collective consciousness" in modern societies

have been identified by other sociologists,
 such as Mary Kelsey, going from solidarity attitudes and memes
to extreme behaviors like group-think, herd behavior,
or collectively shared experiences during collective rituals and dance parties.[7]
Mary Kelsey, sociology lecturer in the University of California, Berkeley,
used the term in the early 2000s to describe people within a social group,
such as mothers, becoming aware of their shared traits and circumstances,
and as a result acting as a community and achieving solidarity.

Rather than existing as separate individuals, people

come together as dynamic groups to share resources and knowledge.
It has also developed as a way of describing how an entire community comes together to share
similar values. This has also been termed "hive mind", "group mind", "mass mind", and "social mind".[8]

According to a theory the character of collective consciousness depends on the type of mnemonic encoding
used within a group (Tsoukalas, 2007). The specific type of encoding used has a predictable influence on the
groups behavior and collective ideology. Informal groups, that meet infrequently and spontaneously, have a
tendency to represent significant aspects of their community as episodic memories. This usually leads to
strong social cohesion and solidarity, an indulgent atmosphere, an exclusive ethos and a restriction of social
networks. Formal groups, that have scheduled and anonymous meetings, tend to represent significant aspects
of their community as semantic memories which usually leads to weak social cohesion and solidarity, a more
moderate atmosphere, an inclusive ethos and an expansion of social networks.[9]

Society is made up of various collective groups, such as the family, community, organizations, regions,
nations which as Burns and Egdahl state "can be considered to possess agential capabilities: to think, judge,
decide, act, reform; to conceptualize self and others as well as self's actions and interactions; and to
reflect."[10](italics in the original). Burns and Egdahl note that during the Second World War different
nations behaved differently towards their Jewish populations.[11] The Jewish populations of Bulgaria and
Denmark survived whereas the majority of the Jewish populations in Slovakia and Hungary did not survive
the Holocaust. It is suggested that these different national behaviors vary according to the different collective
consciousness between nations. This illustrates that differences in collective consciousness can have practical
significance.

Edmans, Garcia, and Norlia examined national sporting defeats and correlated them with decreases in the
value of stocks. They examined 1,162 football matches in thirty-nine countries and discovered that stock
markets of those countries dropped on average forty-nine points after being eliminated from the World Cup,
and thirty-one points after being eliminated in other tournaments.[12] Edmans, Garcia, and Norli found
similar but smaller effects with international cricket, rugby, ice hockey, and basketball games.