Class III (Bulk) Distribution Successes:

What Can Be Learned?

A Monograph
by
Major Bernard L. Moxley Jr.
United States Army

School of Advanced Military Studies

United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AY 04-05

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

 Form Approved
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No. 074-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining
the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for
reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of
Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
052605 Monograph
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS
Class III (Bulk) Distribution Successes: What Can Be
Learned?

6. AUTHOR(S)
MAJ Bernard Moxley

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER
U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College
School of Advanced Military Studies
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING / MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT T 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. A

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 Words)

T

Major combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were a great success;
however, the theater logistics system has come under an enormous amount of criticism from
both warfighters and logisticians. However, distribution of bulk petroleum served as one
supply commodity that was an exception to the criticism. Key CFLCC leaders were determined
that there would not be any fuel shortages on the OIF battlefield. That same emphasis and
priority was not consistent throughout the entire logistical spectrum resulting in
degraded performance. It is important to study the success of Class III (B) distribution
to determine if there are systematic attributes transferable to the distribution of other
commodities. This study reinforced that logistics is a system of systems and is complex by
nature. The success of Class III (B) during OIF is largely attributable to C2 and the
level of theater development. Class III (B) performed in an outstanding manner and the
other classes of supply performed consistent with the level of investment. This paper
recommends that that a four star Joint Logistics Command (JLC) must be activated.
Commanders and planners have to understand that there is a direct correlation between the
level of logistics infrastructure investment and expected logistics performance.

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES

53
Logistics, Distribution, Bulk Fuel Operations, Command and Control 16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT
U U U none
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18
298-102
 SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Bernard L. Moxley Jr.

Title of Monograph: Class III (Bulk) Successes: What Can Be Learned?

Approved by:

__________________________________ Monograph Director

Kevin C. M. Benson, COL, AR

___________________________________ Director,
Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR School of Advanced
Military Studies

___________________________________ Director,
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. Graduate Degree
Programs

ii
 ABSTRACT
CLASS III (BULK) DISTRIBUTION SUCCESSES: WHAT CAN BE LEARNED by MAJOR
Bernard L. Moxley Jr., United States Army, 53 pages.
Major combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were a great success;
however, the theater logistics system has come under an enormous amount of criticism from both
warfighters and logisticians. Leaders at all levels of command have criticized OIF distribution
management systems. However, distribution of bulk petroleum served as one supply commodity
that was an exception to the criticism. The performance of OIF bulk petroleum distribution was
in contrast to Operation Desert Storm (ODS) with its noted fuel shortages and reports of units
running out of fuel on the battlefield.
Key CFLCC leaders witnessed and in some cases personally experienced fuel shortages
during ODS and were determined that there would not be any fuel shortages on the OIF
battlefield. This determination was evident in the preparation and development of the OIF bulk
fuel distribution infrastructure. That same emphasis and priority was not consistent throughout
the entire logistical spectrum resulting in degraded performance. It is important to study the
success of Class III (B) distribution to determine if there are systematic attributes transferable to
the distribution of other commodities.
Distribution has been problematic throughout military history and with America’s
military logistics system, evolving from supply based to distribution based makes optimizing
distribution even more critical. The Army’s push to become highly expeditionary further stresses
the importance of effective distribution across the operational spectrum.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the distribution processes for bulk petroleum
(Class III Bulk) against the distribution processes for (Class I-MREs) at the operational and
tactical levels of war. The methodology involved a historical comparison of Class I (MREs) and
Class III (Bulk) using the criteria of command and control (C2) and theater development. Theater
development was defined as the amount of effort: expressed as priority of effort, construction and
resources allocated prior to the start of offensive operations.
This study reinforced that logistics is a system of systems and is complex by nature. The
success of Class III (B) during OIF is largely attributable to C2 and the level of theater
development. Senior leaders were determined not to repeat their experiences of ODS fuel
shortages. Unfortunately, the same emphasis was not placed on the other logistical commodities
resulting in degraded performance. Class III (B) performed in an outstanding manner and the
other classes of supply performed consistent with the level of investment. C2 was also critical to
Class III(B)’s success. The 49th QM GRP was the single bulk fuel operator and performed in an
outstanding manner.
This paper recommends that if the military wants to achieve both efficiency and
effectiveness then a four star Joint Logistics Command (JLC) must be activated. TRANSCOM
can transition to the JLC. Doctrine was found to be viable but was not followed in some cases.
The TSC Commander should be the single operational logistical operator which doctrine
currently dictates. Commanders and planners have to understand that there is a direct correlation
between the level of logistics infrastructure investment and expected logistics performance.

iii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 1
Background and Purpose ............................................................................................................. 2
Limitations................................................................................................................................... 4
Importance................................................................................................................................... 5
Organization ................................................................................................................................ 5
EFFECTIVENESS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) ........................................................ 6
Operation Desert Shield/Storm C2 .............................................................................................. 7
Observations ................................................................................................................................ 9
Operation Iraqi Freedom C2...................................................................................................... 11
EFFECTIVENESS OF THEATER DEVELOPMENT ................................................................ 16
Operation Desert Shield/Storm Theater Development .............................................................. 17
Operation Iraqi Freedom Theater Development........................................................................ 19
Observations .............................................................................................................................. 24
EFFECTIVENESS OF DOCTRINE ............................................................................................. 25
Operation Iraqi Freedom Doctrine ............................................................................................ 26
Current Class I and Class III(B) Distribution Doctrine ............................................................. 32
Class I Distribution:............................................................................................................... 32
Class III (Bulk) Distribution.................................................................................................. 35
Observations .............................................................................................................................. 36
RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................................. 36
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 41
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 44
Books......................................................................................................................................... 44
U.S. Government Publications .................................................................................................. 44
Articles ...................................................................................................................................... 47
Unpublished Interviews............................................................................................................. 48
Briefings .................................................................................................................................... 53

iv
 TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1: 377th Theater Support Command Organization Chart .................................................. 11
Figure 2: Simplified OIF Distribution Complexity Chart ............................................................. 15
Figure 3: OIF Distribution Inefficiency ........................................................................................ 28
Figure 4: OIF Class III (B) Distribution Efficiency ...................................................................... 29
Figure 5: 377th TSC Fusion of Movements and Sustainment....................................................... 30
Figure 6: 377th TSC OIF Theater Distribution Concept............................................................... 31
Figure 7: Class I Battlefield Distribution ...................................................................................... 33
Figure 8: Class III (Bulk) Battlefield Distribution ........................................................................ 34

v
 INTRODUCTION
Rather, most armies seem to have prepared their campaigns as best they could on an ad hoc
basis, making great, if uncoordinated, efforts to gather together the largest possible number of
tactical vehicles, trucks of all descriptions, railway troops, etc., while giving little, if any,
thought to the ‘ideal’ combination which, in theory, would have carried them the furthest.
Creveld, Supplying War 1

History has echoed Dr. Van Creveld’s statement that armies have logistically prepared

their campaigns on an ad hoc basis and the United States has not been immune. In every recent

major combat operation, the United States Army in reviewing its performance, normally

determines that logistics can be improved. During Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Iraqi

Freedom, while major combat operations was noted as a great success, logistics was singled out

as needing improvement. During Operation Iraqi Freedom the Third Army and Combined Forces

Land Component Command (CFLCC) Commanding General LTG David D. McKiernan, related

that out of all the operational functions, joint logistics required the most work. 2

In On Point, an Army publication on OIF, combat service support was one of five

shortfalls identified during OIF. Some of the criticisms included “the recent shift to “just in time”

logistics to the training and equipping of CSS soldiers and units. The current system emphasizes

efficiency over effectiveness- from parts to supply distribution- in combat, however, effectiveness

is the only real measure of success.” 3

The Army is currently transforming from an Army of Excellence and Force XXI

structure to modularity. The transformation is centered on restructuring the Army into modular

formations with inherent capabilities to meet current and future threats. General Peter J.

1
Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1977), 236.
2
LTC Kevin M. Woods, “LTG David D. McKiernan interview, Commanding General, CFLCC,”
OIF Study Group, 1 May 2003. LTC Woods states that the interview consists of notations and not
quotations.
3
U.S. Department fo the Army, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), xxviii.

1
Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff, stated “Logistics transformation is critical as the Army adapts

to the new realities.” 4

The Army’s combat, combat support and combat service support (CSS) force structure

was historically based on defending and if necessary defeating Soviet aggression. Resource

constraints affected combat service support organizational design and forced CSS centralization

at division, corps and theater levels in order to achieve efficiencies. 5

Operation Iraqi Freedom did provide a well noted logistical success and that was Class III

(Bulk) fuel. The CFLCC C-4, MG C.V. Christianson noted “The Class III bulk system was a key

element in this fight and should be studied for future fights.” 6

Background and Purpose

Major combat operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was a great success

however, the theater logistics system has come under an enormous amount of criticism from both

warfighters and logisticians. Leaders at all levels of command have criticized OIF distribution

management systems. However, distribution of bulk petroleum served as one supply commodity

that was an exception to the criticism.

BG Vincent Boles, CFLCC Deputy C-4 reflecting on the success of class III (Bulk)

stated, “that bulk fuel was readily available” during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 7 The performance

of OIF bulk petroleum distribution was in contrast to Operation Desert Storm (ODS).

The Operation Desert Storm Class III (Bulk) distribution system experienced fuel

shortages and reports of units running out of fuel on the battlefield. Key CFLCC leaders

witnessed and in some cases personally experienced fuel shortages during ODS and were

4
General Peter J. Schoomaker, White Paper: Joint and Expeditionary Logistics for a Campaign
Quality Army (Draft) (Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 1.
5
Ibid, 9.
6
Major Paul Williams, “MG C.V. Christianson interview, CFLCC C-4,” OIF Study Group, 23
May 2003.

2
determined that there would not be any fuel shortages on the OIF battlefield. In his book Moving

Mountains LTG William G. Pagonis disputes the claim that any units ran out of fuel during

ODS. 8

The CFLCC senior leadership was determined that there would be no fuel shortages

during OIF and this was evident in the preparation and development of the OIF bulk fuel

distribution infrastructure. Unfortunately, that same emphasis and priority was not projected

throughout the entire logistical spectrum resulting in degraded performance.

With the Army and Joint communities revolutionizing distribution it is imperative to

study the success of Class III (B) distribution to determine if there are systematic attributes that

can be transferred to the distribution of other commodities. Distribution has been problematic

throughout military history and continues today. America’s military logistics system evolving

from supply based to distribution based makes optimizing distribution is even more critical.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the distribution processes for bulk petroleum

(Class III Bulk) against the distribution processes for food (Class I) at the operational and tactical

levels of operations. Specifically, what were the reasons for the success of Class III (B)

distribution during OIF and what changed from the poor Class III (B) performance during

Operation Desert Storm? Was the success systemic or an aberration? Can these successes be

transferred to other commodities or is it internally restricted to bulk petroleum? Is there elements

7
LTC David Kolleda, “BG Vincent E. Boles interview, CFLCC Deputy C-4,” OIF Study Group,
18 May 2003.
8
LTG William G. Pagonis was the “Commander of Logistics” during Operations Desert
Shield/Storm. LTG Pagonis became the 22nd Support Command Commanding General (initially started as
an ad hoc organization) and was the highest theater level logistics operator during the first gulf war.
During ODS, the USMC, USN and USAF did not work for him. LTG Pagonis was criticized for paying
too much attention on strategic movement at the expense of tactical logistics. His critics emphasize that
this led to the “iron mountains” of supplies and the evolution to “just-in-time” logistics. After the war he
wrote the book Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War and after his
retirement he became the Vice President for Distribution for Sears Corporation. Several Operation Iraqi
Freedom Senior logistics leaders sought LTG(Retired) Pagonis’ advice as they prepared for the task of
preparing the theater logistics infrastructure.

3
of army and joint doctrine that facilitated or hindered distribution and should it be revised? The

answers to these questions will result in recommendations for improving distribution.

Limitations

The greatest limitation of the research is the lack of depth across the logistical spectrum

due to the length of this monograph and time available. I will only examine the distribution of

Classes I and III (Bulk Petroleum) at the operational and tactical level. The emphasis of this

paper is at the operational level. I will discuss the tactical and strategic levels as they affect the

subject being explored. There are many points that I will only topically discuss but deserve

attention through other studies. Logistics is a system of systems and is very complex.

I selected Class I and Class III (Bulk) because they serve my purpose for examining OIF

distribution. Class III distribution was independent from the other classes of supply and achieved

success. Class I was competing for resources with the other classes of supply and struggled

throughout OIF. I hope to gain insights and recommendations by comparing the distribution

performances of Classes I and III (B).

Logistics is complex and I will not look at the requisitioning process except to illuminate

any points effecting either Class I and Class III (B). I will also only look at Class I through the

lens of Meals Ready to Eat (MRE). This is to exclude the difficulties of fresh foods distribution.

More importantly, the thrust of this monograph is to explore distribution of a class of supply

(Class I) that competed with other classes of supply. An examination of refrigeration units would

not serve the purpose of this monograph.

The decision to use only unclassified and declassified sources may hinder the access to

certain information. I decided to keep to unclassified sources to facilitate the widest

dissemination of the monograph.

OIF is still ongoing and the sources that I use and the information provided may not truly

be reliable in the aspect of lessons learned. One could argue that it is too early to derive lessons

4
learned and I would agree with that position. Colonel (Ret) Joseph Walden told me following my

interview with him “It’s not a lesson learned until someone does something about it.” 9 My hope

is to continue the discussion of the future of logistics during this transformational time.

Importance

This monograph is important because as the Army restructures to modularity there are

inherent logistical capabilities and concepts that must be developed. Logistics functions are

interrelated and interdependent. There is only a finite amount of logistical assets on the

battlefield to sustain the force.

Since logistics is a system of systems, actions involving one system involve intended and

sometimes unintended effects. The Third Infantry Division clearly identified this in its AAR

when it stated “The shortfall in general transportation assets created shortages when carrying

capacity could not meet divisional requirements. A shortage in a given class of supply required a

disproportionate number of trucks to correct. This phenomenon came to be known as “resupply

by inundation” (RBI). This RBI cycle could not be broken until the operations tempo

(OPTEMPO) slowed sufficiently to reduce requirements.” 10

Joint Vision 2020’s principle of “focused logistics” is congruent with the Army’s ability

to distribute the right supplies, at the right place, and at the right time. 11

Organization

This monograph has five major sections. Section one introduces the subject by stating

the research question, provides the relevance and importance of the research and the inherent

limitations. Section one further defines the problem and provides a background discussion.

9
Personal Interview with Colonel(Retired) Joseph Walden, conducted 22 November 2004.
10
Third Infantry Division,“Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report- Operation
Iraqi Freedom,” 2003, 203.
11
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2020”, not dated, 24.

5
Section two provides a comparison of Class I and Class III (B) distribution during Operations

Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom to determine the impact of command and control on the

performance. Section three compares Class I and Class III (B) distribution using the criteria of

theater development and the impact on the performance during Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi

Freedom. Section four provides a doctrinal comparison and analysis of Class I and Class III (B)

during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Section four also addresses distribution doctrine and ascertains

if it sufficient. Section five provides recommendations and section six is the conclusion.

EFFECTIVENESS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2)

The Army stresses the importance of command and control in operational matters. A key

benefit derived from C2 is unity of effort and clear direction. Joint Publication 1-02 defines

command and control as “The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated

commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command

and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment,

communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing,

coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. 12

The concept of a single logistical commander is frequently recommended as the answer

for improved logistics performance. COL (now BG and 1st COSCOM Commander ) Yves

Fontaine emphasized, “we need to build a centralized and permanent command and control

system that includes a logistics commander and a logistics force composed of tailored logistics

modules. 13

Operation Desert Shield/Storm provides an example of a single logistical operator at the

theater level across all the logistical functions and contrasts with OIF where there was not a single

12
JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 7 October 2004.
13
Yves J. Fontaine, “Strategic Logistics for Intervention Forces,” in AY97 Compendium Army
After Next Project, ed Douglas V. Johnson II (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998), 90.

6
logistics operator at the theater level. OIF .does provide an example of a single logistics operator

at the theater functional level (Class III (B)).

Operation Desert Shield/Storm C2

The fellow who’d come up with the tents-and who was responsible for making sure the soldiers

had food, clothing, shelter, transportation, equipment, and bullets- was Major General Gus

Pagonis, the chief of logistics for the ground forces of Desert Shield….

Scharwzkopf, It Doesn’t Take A Hero 14

During Operations Desert Shield/Storm there was commonality in the C2 structure for

Classes I and III (B). The C2 focus point was the single theater logistics operator, LTG Pagonis.

Provided is a general history focused on the logistical effort followed by ODS C2 observations.

Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990 and took control of the country. To deter further

Iraqi aggression, the United States deployed personnel, equipment and supplies to Saudi

Arabia.Due to the perceived immediate Iraqi threat, CENTCOM deployed mobile combat troops

first, followed by logistics soldiers. 15

During ODS, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) was responsible for the

theater logistics management. This included transportation/distribution operations as well as

policy. The ARCENT (Army Central Command Component- Third Army) managed the seaport

and airport operations. ARCENT was also responsible for management of surface transportation

and common items such as clothing, food and fuel. 16

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, CENTCOM Commander, and LTG John J. Yeosock,

ARCENT Commander, concluded that there was a need for a theater logistics single point of

contact and they assigned LTG (then MG) William (Gus) Pagonis the responsibility as the

14
H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take A Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 341.
15
Yves J. Fontaine, “Strategic Logistics for Intervention Forces,” in AY97 Compendium Army
After Next Project, ed Douglas V. Johnson II (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998), 76.
16
Ibid.

7
Deputy Commanding General for Logistics. 17 MG Pagonis saw the monumental task in front of

him of building a theater logistics structure from the ground up and realized that he did not have

the personnel to accomplish the task. The realization came to light as MG Pagonis relayed,” The

complexity of the arrangements being made in my command, and the problems in its ad hoc

nature, prompted General Yeosock on August 16th to designate my logistics operation as a

command of ARCENT.” 18 This command would later be designated the 22d Support Command.

A key planning assumption and doctrinally supported was that the 377th Theater Army

Area Command (later to become the Theater Support Command based on lessons learned from

Operation Desert Storm) was to deploy after the theater received its second corps. The XVIII

Airborne Corps was on the ground and the VII Corps was arriving in theater. During the alert

process, LTG Pagonis argued against the activation of the 377th and GEN Schwarzkopf put a stop

to the 377th deployment. LTG Pagonis’ rationale was that the 22d SUPCOM, even though it was

ad hoc was now trained to do the mission and introducing a new logistical element would only

create additional work 19

LTG Pagonis’ logistical concept was to establish log bases that would move forward with

the maneuver forces. The log bases would contain Classes I, III and V. A key planning factor

was that the bases were positioned using LTG Pagonis’ “90–mile rule.” This rule dictated that

there would be more than 90 miles between log bases enabling a truck to make a round trip in one

day. 20

One of the legacies that endured from Operation Desert Storm and played a pivotal part

in the logistical conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom was Class III (Bulk) There was a problem

with units running out of fuel during Operation Desert Storm. MG Christianson reflecting on the

17
William G. Pagonis, Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War
(Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press,1992), 97.
18
Ibid., 98.
19
Ibid., 131.
20
Ibid, 146.

8
experience thirteen years after the first gulf war stated “During Desert Storm many of the

brigades, even though they moved 100 to 150 miles, some maybe up to 200 miles, several of

them ran out of fuel in those four days.” 21 LTG Pagonis for all of his Herculean efforts during

Operation Desert Storm left a blazing memory of armored vehicles unable to move due to a lack

of fuel on many leaders that would be the senior leaders during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

LTG Pagonis dismisses the criticism that several VII Corps units ran out of fuel during

Operation Desert Storm, as he stated,”this criticism seems off the mark. Brigadier General Guest

was only twenty-five miles away with 300 5,000 gallon fuel tanks, simply awaiting instructions

from the Logistics Operation Center to move to any critical position on the battlefield.” 22 This

subject and LTG Pagonis’ statement are extremely important because during OIF the senior

leadership was determined that no one would run out of fuel like Desert Storm.

Observations

In his book Moving Mountains, LTG Pagonis stated, “Control is centralized; execution is

decentralized.” 23 LTG Pagonis’ quotation is mentioned frequently throughout the Army and

supports the concept of a single logistical operator on the battlefield. LTG Pagonis’ Desert Storm

performance stands as the example of the logistical possibilities when one person has

responsibility for the entire logistics execution. One of the biggest criticisms of distribution

management today is that there is not one entity in charge.

The importance in “Getting the “right” command and control (C2) logistics headquarters

in theater early is the key to providing the combatant commander with responsive and focused

logistics at the decisive time and place.” 24 The “right” C2 headquarters that LTC Cussins is

21
Mr. Quentin W. Schillare, “MG C.V. Christianson interview, CFLCC C-4,” OIF Study Group, 4
November 2003.
22
Ibid.,147-148.
23
Ibid.,84.
24
Ronald N. Cussins, “The Case for the Theater Support Command,” Army Logistician (July-
August 2004), 29.

9
referring to is the TSC. The Desert Shield/Storm experience conceived the Theater Support and

the Marine Logistics Commands. 25

Operations Desert Shield/Storm also left a legacy on the distribution system that the

Army has not reconciled to date and that is bottled water. As Suzi Thurmond relates ”Soldiers

supporting major operations have been drinking bottled water since ODS. Soldiers and

commanders expect to drink bottled water when they deploy, even though bottles place an

enormous strain on scare distribution assets.” 26

Bottled water took roughly 50% of the transportation assets allocated to the Theater

Distribution Center (TDC). COL (Retired) Walden related that the TDC would ship out 100

trucks daily with Class I and bottled water. On each 40ft trailer, half was Class I and the other

half was bottled water. 27 28

25
Michael R. Lehnert and John E. Wissler, “Marine Logistics Command”, Marine Gazette (August
2003),30.
26
Suzi Thurmond, “Analyzing the Lessons of OIF Distribution,” Army Logistician (July-August
2004), 19.
27
Personal Interview with Colonel(Retired) Joseph Walden, conducted 22 November 2004.
28
Author’s Note: The Army logistics community is grappling with the concept of bottled water.
There is discussion about removing all the water teams or relegating them to the reserve component. This
is a very serious problem that the Army needs to reconcile. It has far reaching distribution and manpower
dimensions. The author recommends that the Army establish bottled water planning factors, allocates
appropriate transportation assets and containerization for handling the bottled water.

10
Operation Iraqi Freedom C2

Early in the planning for OIF, LTG McKiernan informed MG Kratzer, Commander, 377th TSC

that fuel would not inhibit maneuver during the operation. MG Kratzer relayed, “But fuel would

not be the reason the attack was limited and we made sure there was enough fuel for our tanks

and our Bradleys to move forward.

MG Dave Kratzer, 377th TSC CG 29

During Operation Iraqi Freedom the 377th Theater Support Command (TSC) handled the

theater logistics. The 377th TSC was an Army Reserve unit from New Orleans that habitually

supported the Third Army. Figure 1 depicts the 377th TSC organization structure.

Figure 1: 377th Theater Support Command Organization Chart

11
Source: 377th Theater Support Command Briefing dated 11 May 2004

During OIF, the 377th TSC, commanded by Major General Dave Kratzer, was comprised

of over 41,000 active component, National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers. The 377th TSC

consisted of eight General Officer and six O-6 (Colonel) subordinate level commands. The 377th

was responsible to provide theater level life support to include hospitals, personnel, finance,

medical, base operations, ports, airfields, transportation, movement control, supply and military

police. 30

Unlike ODS, OIF did not produce a single logistics operator at the theater level. There

was no LTG Pagonis during OIF and it showed. There were three major generals working on

theater logistics. These generals were MG Christianson (CFLCC C-4), MG Stratman (CFLCC

DCG-Support) and MG Kratzer (377th TSC Commander). Doctrinally the TSC Commander is

responsible for theater logistics but it turned out to be a confusing situation of who was in charge.

LTG McKiernan added to the confusion when he said that the CFLCC C-4 (MG Christianson)

was the “Commander of Logistics”. 31

Unlike LTG Pagonis, MG Christianson was a staff officer with no command authority

over any logistical units. Doctrinally, MG Kratzer should have been the single theater logistical

operator. If LTG McKiernan was going to deviate from doctrine and assure clarity he should

have taken the steps to make MG Christianson a commander. The command authority would

have assured unity of effort and focus. Following the Operation Desert Storm (LTG Pagonis)

model would have provided the disparate staffs unity and economy of effort.

Because there was not a single logistical operator, each of the generals had separate

meetings and briefings. This resulted in three generals’ supporting staffs having to prepare for

29
Mr. Quentin W. Schillare, “MG Dave Kratzer interview, Commander, 377th Theater Support
Command,” OIF Study Group, 4 November 2003.
30
Mr. Quentin W. Schillare, “MG Dave Kratzer interview, Commander, 377th Theater Support
Command,” OIF Study Group, 4 November 2003.
31
Personal Interview with Colonel Kevin Benson, (CFLCC C-5) conducted 29 November 2004.

12
their general’s daily briefing and also provide input to the other generals’ briefings. This lack of

cohesion translated to daily briefings from 1700-2300 for many staff members. Six hours of daily

meetings translates to many lost hours of productivity and supervision on behalf of many senior

staff and commanders. Also, the lack of a single logistical commander created an atmosphere of

indecision.

The analogy of the child who plays off his parents until he gets what he wants is

appropriate to illustrate the confusion on decision making in the theater logistics arena. Since no

one knew who was in charge, people would go from general to general to get a decision that they

needed to execute or plan. This situation also facilitated improper decision making because some

people would just keep asking a general until they got the answer that they wanted. 32 The OIF

C2 structure did not allow the effective employment of logistical processes because of no clear

delineation of responsibility. The dispersion of responsibility resulted in vacillation and ineptness

among the decision makers and their commands. Logistics is difficult without having to ask

who’s in charge and who is the right person to make a decision? Command relationships have to

be established early to optimize economy of effort. The inverse example during OIF was the 49th

Quartermaster Group (POL).

Even though it was subordinate to the 377th TSC, the 49th Quartermaster Group was the

single OIF petroleum operator. The CFLCC C-4, MG Christianson highlighted the importance

and benefit of a singular petroleum point of contact when he stated, “There was a single person

responsible for everything from getting the POL, to putting the distribution system in place, to

executing the mission.” 33

COL Frazier, the 49th QM Group (POL) Commander also recognized the importance of

being the single POL Theater Operator when he said, “We controlled the distribution from the

32
Personal Interview with Colonel (Retired) Joseph Walden, conducted 22 November 2004.
33
Major Paul Williams, “MG C.V. Christianson interview, CFLCC C-4,” OIF Study Group, 23
May 2003.

13
factory to the destination.” 34 COL Frazier stated that the fact the 49 QM Group (POL) was the

single operator was one of the two reasons that Class III was so successful during OIF. In his

opinion, the other reason for the bulk petroleum success was the decision to preposition seven

POL Distribution Companies prior to the start of OIF. That decision to preposition those

companies will be discussed further in the infrastructure section. 35

The 49th QM GRP had a tremendous advantage over the other disparate units in the 377th

TSC due to its ability to train and plan collectively. The 49th QM GRP participated in the

exercises prior to OIF. Also, due to the importance of petroleum and the priority placed on it by

senior leaders, the bulk petroleum distribution process was rehearsed extensively. 36

34
LTC David Kolleda, “COL Melvin Frazier interview, 49th QM GRP (POL) Commander, OIF
Study Group, 24 May 2003.
35
Ibid.
36
Suzi Thurmond, “Analyzing the Lessons of OIF Distribution,” Army Logistician (July-August
2004), 19.

14
 Figure 2: Simplified OIF Distribution Complexity Chart

Logistics is complex and difficult to synchronize. Figure 2 displays a simplified way of

looking at the complexity facing the 49th QM GRP (POL) and the 377th TSC. The 49th QM had

responsibility for bulk petroleum from the factory to the foxhole. As such, the 49th QM was

responsible for the operational to the tactical level distribution. Obviously, the 377th TSC had

many more classes of supply to distribute.

Figure 2 illustrates the various classes of supply that had to be distributed but the figure’s

visual simplicity hides the true complexity. What is hidden is the strategic, operational and

tactical levels of supply and the requisition process associated with each class of supply.

Probably the biggest factor excluded is the enemy who definitely has an effect on OIF

distribution. The intervention of distribution creates an unplanned loss to the supply system that

cascades throughout the system. “Just in time” logistics further exacerbates the complexity due

to the diminished stockage levels on hand to respond to crisis. Additionally, each attack on a

convoy normally reduces the lift capability temporarily and may cause a permanent effect if the

supply vehicle can not be replaced.

Each class of supply equates to a system within a system as described above. The ability

to synchronize and integrate systems of systems diminish as the number of systems increase.

Class I as depicted in figure 2 had to compete not only for distribution assets with the other eight

commodities but also had to endure the effects of systematic irregularities within systems of

systems.

The Army, as a learning organization, must stress “systems thinking”. Systems thinking

is a conceptual framework, a body of knowledge and tools that have been developed over the past

fifty years, to make patterns clearer, and help us to change them effectively.” 37 The 49th QM

GRP (POL) with its singular purpose handled the complexity of Class III (B) expertly.

37
Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline (New York: Doubleday, 1990), 7.

15
Complexity can be effectively managed through clear direction and having the resources

necessary to establish an infrastructure (framework). Understanding complexity is one facet of

the equation but the other is having the right equipment to develop and control the processes.

Operations Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom provide varying levels of success in the

effectiveness of theater development.

EFFECTIVENESS OF THEATER DEVELOPMENT

The guys back in Washington and the guys back in Central Command in Tampa are probably not

going to understand this-but the biggest concern we have is logistics. If we can’t sustain the force

on the battlefield, we’re wasting bringing the force over here. A tank without ammunition and

fuel is just a piece of metal. You guys have got to succeed. Without you we can’t succeed. You

know, CSS [Combat Service Support] will not win a war, but CSS will sure lose a war. 38

LTG McKiernan talking to BG Stultz (143 TRANSCOM Commander)

The effectiveness or build up of theater development can not be understated. The build

up of logistical infrastructure to include personnel, equipment and facilities equate to

performance success. Theater development is defined as the amount of effort, expressed as

priority of effort (support), physical construction and resources allocated to the logistic functions

prior to the commencement of offensive operations

One of the key conceptual tools available to planners in building flexible operational

support plans is the logistics preparation of the theater (LPT). The LPT is used to identify

resources available in the theater for use by friendly forces. The LPT coupled with an estimate of

requirements allow logisticians to advise commanders of effective methods to facilitate

responsive support to the operations. 39 .

38
SGT Frank N. Pellegrini, “Supporting Gulf War 2.0”, Army, September 2003,26.
39
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 4-0, Combat Service Support (Washington D.C., Government
Printing Office, 2003), 5-34.

16
 Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Iraqi Freedom are similar logistically in the amount

of infrastructure buildup prior to hostilities. On Point interestingly points out that the 12 years of

effort to build the infrastructure was one of the key enablers to the war effort. Conversely, On

Point asks the question of how the joint force would operate in a less mature theater. 40

Operation Desert Shield/Storm Theater Development

…one of the first things he did was read was read Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and

Logistics from the Gulf War, which was the theater support memoir of Lt. Gen. William G.

Pagonis, the commander of the first TSC- a man who knew what it was to build what Kratzer has

likened to a “city in the sand.

An interview by SGT Pellegrini with MG David Kratzer (377th TSC Commander)

As discussed earlier in the C2 section, during ODS the perceived immediate Iraqi threat

towards Saudi Arabia or other nations, CENTCOM deployed mobile combat troops first,

followed by logistics soldiers. In answering the threat with a preponderance of combat forces, the

United States military had to establish the logistics infrastructure after the arrival of combat

forces. LTG Pagonis had the challenge of not only building a logistical infrastructure in an

austere environment but also supporting the combat forces already in Saudi Arabia. 41

During ODS, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) was responsible for the

theater logistics management. This included transportation/distribution operations as well as

policy. The ARCENT (Army Central Command Component- 3rd Army) managed the seaport and

airport operations. ARCENT was also responsible for management of surface transportation and

common items such as clothing, food and fuel. 42

40
U.S. Department of the Army, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom
(Fort Leavenworth, KS, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003), xxvii.
41
Yves J. Fontaine, “Strategic Logistics for Intervention Forces,” in AY97 Compendium Army
After Next Project, ed Douglas V. Johnson II (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998), 76.
42
Ibid.

17
 CENTCOM’s decision to delay the arrival of logisticians to the theater had severe

detrimental effects. The initial support structure could not effectively sustain the early combat

troops that arrived. There was a significant shortage of transportation assets, material handling

equipment (MHE), heavy equipment transporters (HET) and tractor- trailers. The austere Army

logistical presence meant no support for the Air Force and the Marines operating in Saudi

Arabia. 43

Deployment was problematic due to the lack of automation in CENTCOM. Since

CENTCOM had not completed its war plan, the automated data system which provided visibility

of deployment data was not populated. This also meant that logisticians could not track

equipment and supplies arriving in the APOD/SPODs. Logisticians may have known the arrival

date of a ship but not its contents. This meant that containers had to be opened to verify the

contents and destination.

Also, due to changes in the deployment sequence, units would many times follow their

equipment. Due to a lack of visibility, logisticians would have equipment without knowing when

the unit would arrive. All of these factors overwhelmed the logisticians and the port. This was

the start of Desert Shield/Storm’s “Iron Mountain”. 44

Container management as described above was a significant logistical problem. No

viable tracking system existed in the Army. This coupled with a lack of MHE and improper

documentation processes meant a massive amount of “frustrated” cargo. The logistical personnel

that were needed to properly receive the items had not arrived in country. Units that had not

received their items reordered them further stressing the logistical system. 45

43
Ibid. 76-77.
44
Ibid. 77.
45
Ibid. 77-78.

18
Operation Iraqi Freedom Theater Development

On Point discusses the 12 years of theater buildup that facilitated the success of Iraqi

Freedom. Those preparations eluded the logistics arena until an attack was imminent. Then

outside assistance was brought in to determine what logistic prepatory tasks needed to be

accomplished. 46

MG Bill Mortenson, Commander, 21st TSC (USAREUR) was brought in to help

delineate and justify the tasks. DOD directed that the Army fund the effort at approximately 550

million dollars. 120 million dollars was in FY02 funds and 363 million was allocated from FY03

funds. The list included class IX, fuel pipeline assets, bridging assets, tents, and maintenance

facilities. 47 At the beginning of operations on 19 March 2003, the 49th QM GRP had over 220

miles of pipeline and were able to store eight million gallons or the equivalent of 15 days of

supply for the attack north. 48

In terms of distribution the CENTCOM prepatory tasks included only four distribution

related items. Out of the four tasks, only two were land based and these included pre-positioning

seven Medium Truck Companies (POL) and building a 2.4 million gallon bag farm in support of

the pipeline. The other two distribution based pre-tasks were waterborne. These included

building to support JLOTS at the Kuwait Naval Base and pre-positioning Army watercraft. 49

The United States asked the Kuwaiti government to put in fuel pipelines and roads from

the refineries to the Iraq border. The fuel oil pipeline cost initially 25 million dollars and the

Kuwait Oil Company funded the construction. The United States provided the pumps for the

46
U.S. Department of the Army, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004) xxviii.
47
Colonel (Retired) Greg Fontenot, “MG Stratman interview, CFLCC DCG (Support),” OIF
Study Group, 19 June 2003.
48
LTC David Kolleda, “COL Melvin Frazier interview, 49th QM GRP (POL) Commander, OIF
Study Group, 24 May 2003.
49
377th Theater Support Command Briefing, dated 11 May 2004.

19
pipeline at a cost of 4 million dollars. 50 The significance was both monetary and operational. If

the Kuwaiti’s had not funded the pipeline cost, the United States would have had to fund the 21

million and that may have resulted in the other necessary infrastructure tasks not being

completed. Operationally, the pipeline saved the United States military many miles that fuelers

did not have to travel hauling fuel from the refineries to the bag farm. Also, the bag farm may

have been positioned closer to the refineries in the south. The closer the bag farm was to Iraq

equated to responsiveness for attacking forces. Unfortunately, the other classes of supply

distribution facilities did not enjoy the luxury of improvement that Class III (B) did. The other

classes of supply’ performance reflected the degraded level of infrastructure development.

The other classes of supply came through the Central Receiving and Storage Point at

Camp Doha. The logistics facilities prepared were solely to accommodate the rotating brigade

during exercises and not an onslaught of troops. This facility was totally inadequate for a theater

distribution point and became severely backlogged as OIF supplies arrived. In addition, this

facility was contractor run and the manpower was insufficient for the OIF build-up.

The 377th TSC established a Theater Distribution Center (TDC) at Camp Doha. This was

the first TDC (an ad hoc organization) ever established and it was non-doctrinal. The TDC was

established to compensate for the lack of a planned GS supply activity that would doctrinally

perform the function. The TDC as an ad hoc organization was under- resourced and over

worked. 51 Borrowed military manpower was the primary work force and there was a new crew

everyday on the day shift. This hampered any efficiency and procedures. 52

COL (Retired) Walden, was assigned to take over the responsibility of the TDC in his

position as the Director of the Distribution Management Center. He stated that on his first vist to

50
Colonel (Retired) Greg Fontenot, “MG Stratman interview, CFLCC DCG (Support),” OIF
Study Group, 19 June 2003.
51
Suzi Thurmond, “Analyzing the Lessons of OIF Distribution,” Army Logistician (July-August
2004), 23.
52
Personal Interview with COL (Retired) Walden on 22 November 2004.

20
the TDC there were over 1,000 Air Force pallets and he said “The early days of the TDC was no

different from Cam Rahn Bay, (Vietnam) without the trees.” 53 .

The 693d Quartermaster Company was assigned to operate the TDC. It had no training

for a GS supply facility and had been originally sent to off load ships with the company’s 50

soldiers. The unit had no material handling equipment, automation,and had to provide security

which stretched the company. 54

CPT Erik Hansen, the 693d Commander, stated that when his company first arrived at the

TDC, there were 28 containers waiting to be unloaded and then five days later many more

containers arrived from the APOD and SPOD. 55

The problem with an ad hoc organization is training and standardization. A TDC

Operations Officer relayed that unit expeditors determined cargo shipment priority. AAFES

cargo was the only exception due to the morale impact and high pilferage of the items. The First

Lieutenant Operations Officer said”If there was not a unit expeditor, the practice was first in first

out.” 56

The need for TDC unit expeditors was despised by the units and rightly so. The

Lieutenant’s statement and units’ perception for the need of expeditors represent the break down

of the distribution system. The Army’s distribution system is based on an automated

requisitioning system where units order supplies with a priority code to designate the degree of

need. Also, the distribution system has a responsibility to follow that requisition from the unit’s

order to the source of supply where the supply is shipped to the unit. The system culminates

when the unit receives the supply designated on the original requisition .

53
Ibid. Author’s Note: COL (Retired) Walden stated that Cam Rahn Bay was historically noted as
a picture of supplies everywhere and no organization.
54
MAJ Paul Williams, “CPT Erik Hansen interview, Commander, 693d QM CO (GS), “ OIF
Study Group, 11 May 2003.
55
Ibid.
56
MAJ Paul Williams, “1LT Patterson interview, Operations Officer, 3079 Transportation
Detachment (Cargo Distribution),” OIF Study Group, 11 May 2003.

21
 Human intervention is only necessary for emergency situations and should not be become

systematic as the expeditors became. Priority for supplies coming out of the TDC should have

been directed by higher headquarters and not by the presence of expeditors. To insinuate that

having non doctrinal expeditors guarantees delivery of supplies and the absence of an expeditor

guarantees late delivery if not possible non receipt is completely wrong. The 3ID in its AAR

address the manpower drain that was incurred by establishing functional expeditors. 57 To have a

unit in contact with the enemy consciously degrade its ranks and provide expeditors in order to

manipulate the distribution system is an indictment of the logistics system. Adding to the

distribution problem was the lack of transportation assets.

The 3ID reported in its AAR that the lack of general transportation assets and the lack of

host nation assets to perform as anticipated negatively impacted on the support to the division.

The assets available were not sufficient to meet corps and divisional needs. The lack of

transportation assets also contributed to “resupply by inundation” (RBI). 58

“RBI” was created when a shortage in a class of supply required that a disproportionate

number of trucks had to move the shortage forward inundating the supported unit’s capability in

that supply item and created a shortage in another class of supply. The new shortage required

replenishment and the cycle would continue. 59

“RBI” not only caused havoc at the tactical level but also caused frustration at the

operational level. LTC Regina Grant, Commander, 53rd Transportation Battalion stated “We

were always doing emergency pushes of Class I supplies, and that affected our ability to create a

routine transportation program.” 60

57
Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) AAR, 211.
58
Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) AAR, 203. Author’s Note: RBI is discussed in the
importance section of this monograph.
59
Ibid.
60
LTC.David J. Kolleda, “LTC Regina Grant interview, Commander, 53rd Transportation
Battalion,” OIF Study Group, 7 June 2003.

22
 Class I was problematic throughout OIF for two reasons. One mistake was

underestimating the requirement for MREs. This situation was caused by the Marines arriving

with more than 40% more personnel than expected or planned for. People not eating from the

contracted food service due to operational and quality needs also contributed to an over

consumption of MREs. The second problem was strategic and rested with MRE manufacturers. 61

Early in the deployment, the theater stocks had dwindled to zero on hand. The theater

was able to obtain emergency MRE stocks from Europe. During the first 30 days of OIF, theater

stocks never exceeded more than three days of MREs on hand at theater level. As MG

Christianson said that number was “well below what anybody would feel comfortable with.” 62

The strategic pipeline was not very responsive as very few commercial vendors were

producing MREs. Manufacturers had great difficulty meeting the Army’s needs since the

demand was not programmed in advance. The Army’s MRE needs were met with a cold

industrial base further aggravating the shortage. 63

The key element and thread through the diminished infrastructure build up was the late

arrival of logisticians. This situation was very similar to Desert Shield/Storm and the

consequences were felt throughout the distribution system. When asked about the vulnerability of

logistics prior to and during offensive operations on 27 May 2003, MG J.D.Thurman, CFLCC C-

3, reflected and so aptly stated “We still had units arriving late. I’d say that we were right on the

edge on logistics.” 64

The prioritization of Class III(B) over Class I was evident as judged by the flow of

soldiers. Class III (B) received priority over the other classes of supply as measured by Class III

(B) soldiers pre-positioned during the infrastructure preparation and arrivals into the theater. LTG

61
MAJ Paul Williams, “MG C.V. Christianson, CFLCC C-4,” OIF Study Group, 23 May 2003.
62
Ibid.
63
Suzi Thurmond, “Analyzing the Lessons of OIF Distribution,” Army Logistician (July-August
2004), 20.
64
LTC Steven Holcomb, “MG J.D. Thurman, CFLCC C-3,” OIF Study Group, 27 May 2003.

23
Wallace, V Corps Commander, reinforces the Class III (B) priority as he states, “early in the flow

we were very concerned about fuel. There was a company’s worth of 5,000 gallon tankers sitting

in Kuwait, but the truck drivers weren’t due into the theater for weeks. Ultimately, we asked for

and received permission to fly in truck drivers from V Corps to fall in on that equipment, in order

to get our truck companies moving.” 65

COL Frazier, 49th QM GRP (POL) Commander, recognized that the arrival of the seven

POL Distribution Companies were critical to the CL III success. The rest of the 49th’s truck

companies flowed from January to March 2003. 66 The same success can not be said for the other

logistics soldiers.

MG Christianson clearly delineates the contrast between bulk petroleum and the other

classes of supply as he states “Where we failed in supply is that we didn’t understand how critical

it was to have the right guys here early enough to stand up these warehouses. We got them here,

…just about the time that the supplies arrived and they didn’t have time to work procedures.” He

went on to say, “That was a high emphasis with pre-positioning the POL truck companies.

Transportation and everything else we took risk on.” 67

Observations

The performance of logistics is in a large degree tied to the investment of infrastructure.

Infrastructure defined as people, equipment and facilities. The OIF Class III (B) exemplary

performance was directly attributable to the infrastructure investment. Class III (B) was the clear

priority and received the commensurate attention. Class III was what “right looks like.”

Class I representing all of the other commodities, also performed based on the amount of

infrastructure investment. The prime example is the TDC which was ad hoc in its inception and

65
Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Lessons of the Iraq War: Executive Summary, (Washington,2003)
available from http://www.csis.org/features/iraq_instantlessons.exec.pdf;accessed 13 November 2003.
66
LTC David Kolleda, “COL Melvin Frazier interview, 49th QM GRP (POL) Commander, OIF
Study Group, 24 May 2003.

24
continued to struggle throughout OIF. The TDC’s Operations Officer’s comment that expediters

determined the distribution priority is an indictment for all logisticians and leaders.

Once again, logistics proved itself as a system of systems. Class I shortage problems

validated the ability of the strategic pipeline to respond to the shortage, forcing the theater

logistics system to take inventory from other sources. Also, the effects of the unforecasted 40%

additional Marines showing up and then not consuming meals from the contracted food service

site. These two events severely degraded the MRE stocks.

OIF was very similar to Operation Desert Shield/Storm. These observations are arguably

nothing more than observations revisited.

The V Corps Commander, LTG Wallace reflecting on the success of Class III (B) during

OIF said that there was never a fuel problem during OIF. The OIF senior leadership had expected

a fuel problem and they took many measures to avert it. He also mentioned in hindsight that the

leadership should have expended more time and energy on the other classes of supply. 68 One

can only speculate on what may have been logistically possible if more focus had been directed at

the other commodities.

EFFECTIVENESS OF DOCTRINE
This section will illustrate current Class I and Class III(B) doctrine against the

performance during OIF. It will also look at the TSC doctrine against its performance during

OIF.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Army started to transition from a supply based to a

distribution based logistics system. 69 The transition continues today across all the United States

67
MAJ Paul Williams, “MG C.V. Christianson, CFLCC C-4,” OIF Study Group, 23 May 2003.
68
Dr. Charles E. Kirkpatrick, LTG William S. Wallace interview, Commander, V Corps, OIF
Study Group, 16 June 2003.
69
General Peter J. Schoomaker, White Paper: Joint and Expeditionary Logistics for a Campaign
Quality Army (Draft) (Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 4.

25
military forces. Joint Vision 2020 lists “Focused Logistics” as one of the four operational

concepts that will provide our forces with a new conceptual framework.

Joint Vision 2020 defines focused logistics “as the ability to provide the joint force the

right personnel, equipment and supplies in the right place, at the right time, and in the right

quantity, across the full range of military operations.” 70 The goal of focused logistics is for the

future logistics footprint to be a more precise balance between “just in case” and “just in time” to

achieve “just enough. 71 Distribution based logistics as described in this monograph complements

focused logistics and are essentially the same concept.

Operation Iraqi Freedom Doctrine

FM 4-93.4, Theater Support Command, outlines the responsibilities of the TSC. Similar

to other logistical units above division level, the TSC is a multifunctional support headquarters

without a standard structure. It is designed to be flexible and facilitates flexibility based on

mission requirements. The TSC is responsible for the operational level of supply. The operational

level of supply focuses on sustainment, supply unit deployment, and distributing and managing

classes of supply. Soldiers, contractors and civilians provide support from within as well as

outside the theater of operations. In the theater, soldiers, contractors and DOD civilians perform

specified supply support functions. Deploying and integrating forces in the theater are based on

the combat commander’s campaign plan. The operational level of supply entails the support

required to sustain campaigns and major operations. The operational level of supply enables

success at the tactical level of war. 72

70
U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2020 (Washington, no date), 24; available from
http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/aspc/pubs/jv2020.pdf; Internet; accessed 1 November 2004.
Dominant maneuver, precision engagement and full-dimensional protection comprise the other operational
concepts.
71
Ibid. 25.
72
U.S. Department of the Army, FM4-0, Combat Service Support (Washington D.C., 2003), 3-1.

26
 Doctrinally, all TSCs are supposed to have a Distribution Management Center (DMC).

The 377th TSC’s DMC is located on the left of the slide. The purpose of the DMC is to provide

staff supervision over the Material Management Center (MMC) and the Movement Control
73
Agency (MCA). COL Walden stated that the DMC was ineffective because there was not a

fusion of the MMC and MCA with the DMC. The problem was that the DMC is a staff entity

and the MCA contained commanders to include a general officer. The lack of control was

detrimental to fusing sustainment and movements. 74

FM 100-10-1 (Theater Distribution) further discusses the importance of the DMC in

accomplishing the distribution concept of centralizing management. The FM states that

centralizing management is essential to efficient and effective distribution system operations. It

involves the integrated end-to-end visibility and control of the distribution system capacity and

distribution pipeline flow. Designated distribution managers in distribution management centers

(DMCs)…at each…echelon manage distribution management operations and coordinate and

synchronize movements of supplies, personnel, and unit equipment. Material management and

movement control operations at each echelon are synchronized under the …DMC. 75

Also, the DMC would provide supervision over other subordinate organizations assigned

or attached to the TSC. These units may include a QM Petroleum Group, Ammunition Group, or

one or more Area Support Groups. 76 A Personnel Command was placed under a TSC during OIF.

The move was made due to problems in mail and casualty reporting during Operations Desert

Shield/Storm 77

The Combined Arms Support Command located at Fort Lee, Virginia was so concerned

with the performance of OIF distribution that it reexamined FM 100-10-1 (Theater Distribution)

73
FM 100-10-1, 3-4 to 3-5.
74
Personal Interview with COL (Retired) Walden on 22 November 2004.
75
FM 100-10-1, 3-4 to 3-5.
76
Ibid.
77
SGT Frank N. Pellegrini, “Supporting Gulf War 2.0”, Army, September 2003,25.

27
to see if the difficulties were rooted in doctrine. After contacting the field, the consensus was

with the exception of force protection, that FM 100-10-1 did not need revision. The FM was still

considered relevant requiring only minor changes. 78

Figure 3: OIF Distribution Inefficiency

Source: Information was derived during personal interview with COL (Retired) Joseph Walden

on 22 November 2004.

Figure 3 represents the reality and inefficiency of the OIF distribution system. Most

items were handled eleven times and shipped five times before a supported unit saw its

commodity. It would take a separate study to calculate the manpower and distribution assets

wasted on merely moving items from one area to another. Figure 3 violates every supply and

78
Suzi Thurmond, “Analyzing the Lessons of OIF Distribution,” Army Logistician (July-August
2004), 18.

28
distribution doctrinal concept. 79 Conversely, The Class III (B) Distribution in Figure 4 represents

effectiveness.

Figure 4: OIF Class III (B) Distribution Efficiency

Source: Information was derived during personal interview with COL (Retired) Joseph Walden

on 22 November 2004.

79
Editors Note: Reference Figure 3. The author asked COL Walden what he would do to correct
the distribution problem illustrated and he said that he would have moved the TDC to Arifjan. There are
Kuwaiti political sensitivities between KCIA and Camp Wolf that can’t be easily solved. To minimize the
impact COL Walden would position trucks at Camp Wolf in the evening in order to do a trailer to trailer
transfer in the morning when the flights arrive.

29
 Figure 5: 377th TSC Fusion of Movements and Sustainment

Source: 377th Theater Support Command Briefing dated 11 May 2004.

Unlike the specialized units that may be assigned to the TSC, Area Support

Groups(ASGs) are multifunctional and are task organized for a particular mission. ASGs provide

direct support to units in a specific are of operations. 80 .

Figure 5 also illustrates a non doctrinal technique that is gaining acceptance across the

Army. The 377th formed fusion cells consisting of operational sustainment and operational

movements. This is a move away from traditional functional lanes and reinforces

communications and facilitates planning. Planners see this in the conduct of Operations Planning

Groups (OPG).

80
FM 4-93.4, 3-4.

30
Figure 6: 377th TSC OIF Theater Distribution Concept

Source: 377th Theater Support Command Briefing dated 11 May 2004.

Figure 6 is a very good representation of the involvement of the DMCs throughout the

operational and tactical levels of distribution. The figure also depicts the involvement of the

Marine Logistics Command and the British Support Command. As referenced earlier in the

paper, the Marine Logistics Command and the Theater Support Command were born out of

Operations Desert Shield/Storm.

The figure further illustrates a conflict involving multiple Material Management Centers

(MMC). Doctrinally, there should only be one Theater MMC. The presence of both the 19th and

31
321st MMCs caused confusion for the supported units. The TSC realized this and reduced to one

MMC. 81 The next level of supply after the operational level is the tactical level.

The tactical level of supply “focuses on readiness and supports the tactical commander’s

ability to fight battles and engagements. Successful support is anticipatory and provides the right

supplies at the right time and place to supported units. Major emphasis is placed on fueling the

force and supporting soldiers and their systems. Mobile, responsive capabilities are essential for

accomplishing the supply mission.” 82

The tactical level of supply was spearheaded by the 3d Corps Support Command

(COSCOM). During Operation Iraqi Freedom, The 3d COSCOM provided its habitual support to

the Army’s V Corps. V Corps and 3d COSCOM deployed from Germany for OIF. The 3d

COSCOM deployed with the 7th Corps Support Group (CSG), the 16th CSG, the 19th Material

Management Center (MMC) and the 181st Transportation Battalion. The 3d COSCOM integrated

the 101st and 24th CSGs into its command structure. The 101st CSG normally supported the 101st

Airborne Division (Air Assault) and the 24th CSG habitually supported the 3d Infantry Division

(Mechanized).

Current Class I and Class III(B) Distribution Doctrine

Class I Distribution:

The doctrinal flow of Class I from the strategic to tactical level of supply is depicted in

Figure 7.

81
LTC David Kolleda, “COL Richard D. Knapp interview, G-3 Current Operations, 143
TRANSCOM, OIF Study Group, 1 June 2003.
82
Ibid

32
 Figure 7: Class I Battlefield Distribution

Source: U.S. Department of the Army CGSC Student Text 63-1, Brigade, Division and Corps

Combat Service Support dated 2004, figure 6-3

At the operational level of supply, the TSC “pushes” Class I supplies to the Corps GS and
83
has the capability to “throughput” to the division DS supply company, if ,necessary.

At the tactical level of supply, COSCOM GS supply companies “push” class I supplies

forward to divisional DS supply companies. The amount of supplies “pushed” forward is based

on personnel strength, unit locations, task organization and the type of operation. As the situation

matures and actual strength numbers are reported, current doctrine dictates that units may begin

to requisition rations from supply activities. Class I is normally shipped to the MSB S&S

Company and the FSB’s supply company in the BSA. 84 The MRE is best suited for intense

levels of combat when soldiers are in contact, transit or in a convoy. 85

83
Ibid, 6-5.
84
Ibid, 6-5.
85
Ibid, 8-9.

33
 As depicted in Figure 7, the tactical distribution is handled by the COSCOM and

Division Support Commands. FM 63-3, Corps Support Command, details the responsibilities and

capabilities normally inherent in a COSCOM. Like the TSC, the most important aspect of the

COSCOM is that it can be tailored to the mission. OIF reinforced this flexibility as the

supporting CSGs from the 3rd ID and 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) were subordinated to

the 3rd COSCOM. The 3d COSCOM supported V Corps during the initial stages of OIF. 86

The other players in the tactical logistics area are the Division Support Command

(DISCOM) structures as depicted in FM 63-2, Division Support Command. The type of division

(airborne, air assault, armor/mechanized infantry, light) dictates the exact structure of its organic

DISCOM.

Figure 8: Class III (Bulk) Battlefield Distribution

Source: U.S. Department of the Army CGSC Student Text 63-1, Brigade, Division and Corps

Combat Service Support dated 2004, figure 6-5.

86
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 63-3, Corps Support Command (Washington, 1993) 1-17.

34
Class III (Bulk) Distribution

Figure 8 illustrates the doctrinal Class III (B) distribution system. Bulk fuel requisition

system is based on forecasted requirements. The MMCs at division, corps and theater levels play

a pivotal part in this process. The MMCs consolidate the forecasts from their subordinate units

and forward the consolidated forecast to the higher MMC. At the operational level, forecasts are

sent to the TSC MMC or Joint Petroleum Office. In OIF, the 377th TSC MMC was the

consolidator for the theater’s bulk fuel forecasts. 87

At the operational level, the TSC petroleum group uses various or a combination of

methods to distribute fuel. Some of the methods are pipeline, railcar, truck, barge, or a

combination, of these methods. The TSC transports fuel from the theater level to corps Class III

(B) points operated by the COSCOM. 88

The CSG/CSB petroleum supply companies and nondivision DS supplies operate the

Class III (B) points within the Corps area. A corps supply company then delivers the fuel from

the corps GS petroleum company to the Main Support Battalion, Forward Support Battalions or

the Division Aviation Support Battalion in the divison or brigade areas. 89

In emergencies, the TSC or Corps Material Management Centers may divert fuel to

forward locations in need of resupply. The fuel is normally diverted to a forward based CSB and

divisional Class III (B) supply points. 90

87
U.S. Department of the Army, ST 63-1, Brigade, Division, and Corps Combat Service Support
(Ft. Leavenworth, 2004), 6-9.
88
Ibid, 6-10.
89
Ibid. 6-10.
90
Ibid.

35
Observations

Doctrinally, at the corps and division levels, the organizations performed as intended.

The COSCOM and DISCOMs fulfilled their responsibilities within their means.The same can not

be said about the TSC.

The TSC did not perform its missions as required by doctrine. The general lack of

transportation across the logistical spectrum is the responsibility of the TSC. Also, the failings of

the distribution system doctrinally fall on the TSC. Figure 3 (OIF Distribution Inefficiency)

clearly delineates a distribution system in chaos. Every supply and distribution concept is being

violated. As discussed in the infrastructure chapter, a large part of the fault lays in the failure to

deploy the TSC forces earlier in the process.

Non-compliance with doctrine was not restricted to logisticians. Some warfighters in

their quest for success adversely affected the logistical system. Early in the mission analysis and

planning process, and because of their DESERT STORM experience, leaders at every level

focused on the necessity to provide fuel to the force during the long march up-country. On Point

illustrates “While there are no recorded instances of units running out of fuel during offensive

operations, success was achieved by nondoctrinal petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) resupply

efforts. Some of these included combat arms commanders retaining control of POL tankers

rather than returning them to support units.” 91

RECOMMENDATIONS
Logistics is a system of systems and it is complex in its nature. To many people that may

be obvious, but I would submit at the highest levels there is not that understanding. One look at

the Army’s White Paper on Joint and Expeditionary Logistics for a Campaign Quality Army

reveals a misunderstanding of logistics complexity.

91
U.S. Department of the Army, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004) 408-409.

36
 When discussing logistics focus areas in regards to modernizing theater distribution the

White Paper states that “Effective theater sustainment rests solidly on the fundamental concepts

of distribution-based logistics. The Army needs a single focus on the simple 92 task of

guaranteeing delivery—on time, every time, from where the source of support is to the soldier at

the tip of the spear.” 93 If guaranteeing delivery on time, every time was simple, I doubt that

distribution would be discussed today. To solve the distribution problem, it is imperative to

recognize that the system is complex and trying to make it simple is counter productive and only

leads to inadequate analysis and unworkable solutions.

If the military wants to be both efficient and effective, then the answer is a joint logistics

command at the four star general level. TRANSCOM can transition to the Joint Logistics

Command (JLC). The JLC would have regionally focused subordinate TSCs. The establishment

of regionally focused TSCs facilitates the development of subject matter experts within the TSC

and relationship building between the TSC and the regional combatant command. The TSC

would be the theater single logistics operator as it is doctrinally today. Even though the

performance of the 377th TSC was less than outstanding, it does not diminish the fact that the

TSC concept is sound.

The important point for strategic and operational commanders is to remember the LTG

Pagonis improved model. 94 That model would incorporate all joint theater logistics under one

commander. That commander would be the TSC Commanding General/Admiral. Assigning one

commander to command all logistics functions within the theater is imperative for proper

command and control. The TSC provides that singular logistics commander. Within the TSC are

92
Emphasis added.
93
General Peter J. Schoomaker, White Paper: Joint and Expeditionary Logistics for a Campaign
Quality Army (Draft) (Washington D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 17.
94
The LTG Pagonis improved model provides a TSC Commanding General/Admiral to control all
theater logistics. As stated earlier in the paper, LTG Pagonis didn’t control USMC, USN and USAF
logistics during ODS. Even though he was responsible and held accountable by GEN Schwarzkopf, LTG
Pagonis did not have command authority over the other joint forces logistics.

37
the multi-functional and functional commands that habitually exist today. Functional commands

are imperative for expertise and control. The 49th QM GRP’s (POL) performance during OIF is

indicative of what a functional command can accomplish. The 49th QM GRP (POL) showed what

was possible logistically when resourced properly and allowed to establish its support

infrastructure. I would advocate that the 49th QM GRP is the ideal example advocating single

control of a commodity.

Commanders and planners have to understand that there is a direct correlation between

logistics infrastructure and expected logistics performance. Infrastructure defined as people,

equipment and facilities. A robust logistics infrastructure will optimize the possibility of

enhanced logistics performance. OIF was a perfect backdrop to illustrate the correlation between

logistics infrastructure and logistics performance. The commendable Class III (B) performance

was directly attributable to the infrastructure investment. Class III (B) was the clear priority and

received the commensurate attention. Class III was “right looks like.” The converse was Class I

which suffered like the other classes of supply from the lack of infrastructure investment.

Class I representing all of the other commodities, also performed based on the amount of

infrastructure investment. The TDC was the prime example of what “wrong looks like”. Ad hoc

in its inception and under resourced the TDC struggled throughout OIF. As expressed earlier in

the monograph, the TDC never had the opportunity to succeed. During a large part of OIF, the

day work force was never the same. This resulted in a lack of proper procedures to handle and

distribute various classes of supply.

Once again, logistics proved itself as a system of systems. Leaders and planners have to

grasp the complexity of logistics in order to try and manage it. An effect anywhere in the

strategic, operational and tactical pipeline reverberates across the entire spectrum. Class I

shortage problems validated the effect of the failure of the strategic pipeline to quickly respond to

the shortage, requiring the Army taking inventory from other theater operational stocks. Also, the

effects of the unforecasted 40% additional Marines showing up and then not consuming meals

38
from the contracted food service site. These two events severely degraded the MRE stocks.

Another example of the logistical system was the failure of distribution during OIF. There were a

number of causes for the failure. Many of the reasons were the same from Desert Storm. OIF

was very similar to Operation Desert Shield/Storm in this regard. The observations presented are

probably nothing more than observations revisited.

As stated early in the monograph, bottled water required 50% of the daily lift out of the

TDC. The Army must develop doctrine to recognize that bottled water will probably be used in

all future operations. Planning factors to include consumption, lift requirements and packaging

must be developed. Also, additional distribution assets must be programmed into the UA, UEx

and UEy force designs to compensate for the planned use of bottled water.

How does this study impact on an expeditionary Army? Frankly, this study illustrates to

commanders and planners to what potential the logistics system can perform as evidenced by

Class III (B) during OIF. But, OIF also reinforced the historical distribution problems. To an

insight to way this happened, the OIF V Corps Commander, LTG Wallace’s states after the war

“We focused on fuel because we knew that it was going to be an issue and we never once.. not

once 95 … had a fuel problem. Fuel was not a problem. In retrospect, we probably should have

focused on some of the other classes of supply more than we did. “ 96

The OIF senior leaders focused on fuel at the expense of all the other logistical functions.

Those leaders decided to take risk in all of the logistical areas other than fuel. I would point out

in light of the risk, OIF logistics performed as the senior leaders intended. As the Army

transitions to an expeditionary force, logistics will continue to be based on risk tolerance.

A review of the Army’s working revision White Paper Unit of Employment (UE)

Operations recognizes that risk is inherent to sustaining operations. In a discussion on extending

95
Emphasis in the original.
96
Emphasis added. Dr. Charles E. Kirkpatrick, LTG William S. Wallace interview, Commander,
V Corps, OIF Study Group, 16 June 2003.

39
operational reach the paper states “the UE commander can still extend the operational reach of

the force by understanding the demands for logistics and the limitations of the logistical

system.” 97 The key words are understanding and logistical system.

Commanders and I would add planners have to have an understanding of the logistical

system. An understanding of logistics is an understanding of complex interrelated systems. Only

with this understanding of logistics can a commander realistically recognize and accept the risk

that logistics will always place on them. There will always be finite resources, competing

interests and time working against each other. The commander must decide what risk they are

willing to accept in this environment.

Doctrine works. Many of the doctrinal references will be updated based on the OIF

experience which is good. There are instances where doctrine was not followed and that is fine if

someone made a conscious decision based on situational factors. Doctrine is a common

understanding and a point of departure- it should never be dogma. Even with the great success of

Class III (B) during OIF, non doctrinal approaches were present:

Early in the mission analysis and planning process, and as a result of their DESERT

STORM experience, leaders at every level focused on the necessity to provide fuel to the force

during the long march up-country. While there are no recorded instances of units running out of

fuel during offensive operations, success was achieved by nondoctrinal petroleum, oil and

lubricants (POL) resupply efforts. Some of these included combat arms commanders retaining

control of POL tankers rather than returning them to support units. 98

This quote illustrates two key points. The action of retaining control of the POL tankers

by combat arms commanders was wrong. Taking those assets out of the distribution cycle caused

unintended effects across the battlefield. Hopefully, the 49th QM GRP (POL) was able to adjust

97
U.S. Department fo the Army, White Paper: Unit of Employment (UE) Operations, Version 3.5
Working Revision (Washington, D.C.: Governemnt Printing Press. 2004) 49.

40
to the loss and most likely did. Another point and probably the most important to commanders

and logisticians alike is the lack of confidence that those commanders had in the distribution

system. Commanders and logisticians have the responsibility to create confidence in the logistics

system.

As this paper pointed out, the logistics infrastructure and the logistics command and

control are established by combat arms commanders and not logisticians. The commanders

decide to what degree the logistical infrastructure will be developed by infrastructure

improvements and troop and equipment arrival dates.

Doctrinally, for the most part organizations performed as intended. This is especially

true at the tactical level. The COSCOM and DISCOMs fulfilled their responsibilities within their

means. The same cannot be said about the TSC.

The TSC did not perform its missions as required by doctrine. The general lack of

transportation across the logistical spectrum is the responsibility of the TSC. Also, the failings of

the distribution system doctrinally fall on the TSC. As discussed in the infrastructure chapter, a

large part of the fault lays in the failure to deploy the TSC forces earlier in the process and in

establishing systems to enable success.

CONCLUSION
Before a commander can even start thinking of maneuvering or giving battle, of marching this

way and that, of penetrating, enveloping, encircling, of anniliating or wearing down, in short of

putting into practice the whole rigmarole of strategy, he has-or ought-to make sure of his ability

to supply his soldiers with those 3,000 calories a day without which they will very soon cease to

be of any use as soldiers; that roads to carry them to the right place at the right time are available,

98
U.S. Department of the Army, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004) 408-409.

41
and that movement along these roads will not be impeded by either a shortage or a

superabundance of transport.

Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War

The purpose of this monograph was to analyze the distribution processes for Class I

against the distribution process for bulk petroleum against the backdrop of Operations Desert

Shield/Storm and Iraqi Freedom. Specifically, what caused the drastic improvement in

performance of bulk petroleum from Operations Desert Shield/Storm to Iraqi Freedom.

Examining the processes using the criteria of command and control along with

infrastructure improvements indicated that a large part of the Class III (B) success during OIF

was attributable to the criteria. COL Frazier, the 49th QM Group (POL) Commander was solely

responsible for bulk petroleum. He attributed a large part of the success to that fact that “We

controlled the distribution from the factory to the destination.” 99

The biggest factor of bulk petroleum’s success during OIF was the priority that LTG

McKiernan and other senior leaders placed on it. Based on their experiences during Operation

Desert Storm where units ran out of fuel, they were determined not to repeat it. And they didn’t!

The prioritization of bulk fuel resulted in success throughout the theater and across the

operational and tactical battlespace. Unfortunately, the attention accorded to bulk fuel did not

apply across the logistical spectrum.

Logistics is a complex system of systems. Logistic functions are interrelated. An impact

in one function will resonate across other functions. The tendency is to make the complex-

simple. As admirable and necessary that may be it results in an ignorance of a process or a

system of systems. Logistics is one of those areas where the Army has simplified a system of

42
systems resulting in senior leaders and logisticians relegating logistics to a simple number crunch.

Vision 2020 has set high marks for joint logistics and it will take a joint and focused effort on

behalf of the joint community’s leadership to achieve the tenants of focused logistics.

The concept of an expeditionary Army also places expectations for increased logistics

efficiency. Expeditionary force commanders must understand logistics as a complex system of

systems in order to properly assess and accept risk that is inherent in any operation. The more

robust the logistics infrastructure the more likely that logistics will run as commanders expect.

There is a correlation between infrastructure and performance and OIF proved it. The military

also needs a Joint Logistics Command (JLC).

A JLC provides reasonable hope for efficiency and effectiveness. Instead of four service

centric supply systems there should be one joint system. Also, the JLC can flexibly respond with

logistics assets from the air, sea and land across any combatant commander’s area. Every

regional combatant commander has a supporting TSC for the region’s logistics requirements.

The TSC is building relationships with the region’s forces, planning and establishing logistical

infrastructure. However, the JLC can pull the assets from the TSC to include personnel and

commodities to fulfill worldwide needs.

In closing, most of the observations cited in this paper from OIF are the same as ODS and

I’d guess the same as Vietnam. That indicator is not positive and not indicative of a learning

organization. I will close with what COL (Retired) Walden told me as we concluded his

interview “It’s not a lesson learned until someone does something about it. CALL (Center for

Army Lessons Learned, headquartered at Fort Leavenworth, KS) is filled with many

observations.” 100 I’d ask that the Army turn my observations into lessons learned!

99
LTC.David J. Kolleda, “COL Melvin Frazier interview, Commander, 49th QM Group (POL),”
OIF Study Group, 24 May 2003.
100
Personal Interview with Colonel (Retired) Walden conducted on 22 November 2004.

43
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Clausewitz, Carl V. On War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993.

Creveld, Martin V. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1977.
Franks, Tommy. American Soldier. New York: HarperCollins Books, 2004.
Merriam Websters’ Collegiate Dictionary (Eleventh Edition). Springfield: Merriam Webster Inc.,
2003.
Pagonis, William G. Moving Mountains. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992.
Schwarzkopf, Norman H. It Doesn’t Take A Hero. New York: Bantam Books, 1992.
Senge, Peter M. The Fifth Discipline New York: Doubleday, 1990.
Turabian, Kate L. A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations. 6th ed.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

U.S. Government Publications

Rand-Arroyo Documented Briefing. Combat Service Support Transformation: Emerging

Strategies for Making the Power Projection Army a Reality. Report prepared by Eric
Peltz, John M. Halliday, Steven L. Hartman. Arlington, VA.: Rand Corporation, 2003.
Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. Strategic Logistics for Intervention
Forces. Prepared by Yves J. Fontaine. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: 2002.
Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. The Glide Path to Focused Logistics.
Prepared by Robert L.Gosciewski. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: 2004.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Research Project. Forward Support to the
Digitized Division of Force XXI. Prepared by Kathryn A. Burba. Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas: 1999.
U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph. Division XXI CSS: Value Added or
Just a Repeat of History?, Prepared by Michael J. Curry. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:
1998.
U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph. Moving an Expeditionary Force:
Three Case Studies in Afghanistan, Prepared by Martha F. Granger. Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas: 2003.
U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph. What Happens When the Supply
Chain Breaks? Implications for the Army Supply Chain Under Attack, Prepared by
Steven S. Debusk. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 2003.
U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph. Class IX Operations in Operation
Iraqi Freedom, Prepared by Ted R. Stuart. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 2004.
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, Operations, Washington, D.C.: 2001.

44
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 4-0, Combat Service Support, Washington, D.C.: 2003.
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-16, Multinational Operations, Washington, D.C.: 2003.
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-91, Division Operations, Washington, D.C.: 2002.
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 4-0, Combat Service Support, Washington, D.C.: 2003.
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 4-01.30, Movement Control, Washington, D.C.: 2002.
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 4-93.4,Theater Support Command, Washington, D.C.: 2003.
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 5-482, Military Petroleum Pipeline Systems, Washington,
D.C.: 1988.
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 10-18, Petroleum Terminal and Pipeline Operations,
Washington, D.C.: 1987.
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 10-67, Petroleum Supply in Theaters of Operations,
Washington, D.C.: 1985.
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 10-69, Petroleum Supply Point Equipment and Operations,
Washington, D.C.: 1986.
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 55-1, Transportation Operations, Washington, D.C.: 1995.
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 63-2, Division Support Command, Armored, Infantry and
Mechanized Infantry Divisions, Washington, D.C.: 1991.
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 63-3, Corps Support Command, Washington, D.C.: 1993.
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 63-20, Forward Support Battalion, Washington, D.C.: 1990.
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 63-21, Main Support Battalion, Washington, D.C.: 1990.
U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-10-1, Theater Distribution, Washington, D.C.: 1999.
U.S. Department of the Army, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom,
Fort Leavenworth, Combat Studies Institute Press: 2004.
U.S. Department of the Army, ST 63-1, Brigade, Division, and Corps CSS, Fort Leavenworth,
KS.: 2004.
U.S. Department of the Army, ST 63-2, Combat Service Support At Echelons Above Corps, Fort
Leavenworth, KS.: 2003.
U.S. Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-53, Operational Concept Combat Service
Support, Fort Monroe, Virginia: 1997.
U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Vision Statement, Washington, D.C.: U.S.Government
Printing Office, 2001.
U.S. Department of the Army, White Paper, Joint and Expeditionary Logistics for a Campaign
Quality Army (Draft), Washington, D.C.: U.S.Government Printing Office, 2004.
U.S. General Accounting Office. GAO-04-305R, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on
the Effectiveness of Logistics Activities During Operation Iraqi Freedom, William M.
Solis, 18 December 2003; available from http://frwebgate2.access.gpo.gov.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Focused Logistics, A Joint Logistics Roadmap, Joint Vision 2010.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Not dated.

45
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint
Operations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-01, Defense Transportation System. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-01.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for
Sealift Support to Joint Operations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1996.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for
Movement Control. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-01.4, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for
Joint Theater Distribution. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-01.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for
Joint Logistics Over the Shore. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1998.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-01.8, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for
Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 2000.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-03, Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-04, Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-07, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for
Common User Logistics During Joint Operations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 2001.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of
Multinational Operations. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-09, Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control,
Communications and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995.
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, Not dated.
U.S. Naval War College Research Project. CSS Transformation: Does the Emperor Have
Clothes? Report prepared by Kenneth G. Juergens. Newport, Rhode Island: 2002.

46
Articles

Bowes, Andrew W. and Daub, Kimberly J. “Corps Support Battalion’s Experience in Operation
Iraqi Freedom.” Army Logistician (Jul-Aug 2004): 28-37.
Chandler, John. “The Courage to Change.” Marine Corps Gazette (Aug 2004): 24-26.
Cordesman, Anthony H. “The Lessons of the Iraq War: Executive Summary, Eleventh Working
Draft; July 21, 2003. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003;
available from http://www.csis.org/features/iraq_instantlessons exec.pdf;Internet.
Cussins, Ronald N. “The Case for the Theater Support Command.” Army Logisitician (Jul-Aug
1998): 29-33.
Dunn, Jeffrey M. “Feeding the Beast.” Marine Corps Gazette (Aug 2004): 50-54.
Graves, Gregory H. “Obstacles to CSS Transformation.” Army Logistician (Jul-Aug 2002): 7-11.
Harman, Larry D. “Asymmetric Sustainment: The Army’s Future.” Army Logistician (Jul-Aug
2003): 38-41.
Kelly, Richard L. “Excellence in Logistics Supporting Excellence in Warfighting.” Marine Corps
Gazette (Aug 2003): 14-16.
Kelly, Richard L. and Clifton, David R. “Excellence in Warfighting Support.” Marine Corps
Gazette (Aug 2004): 29-33.
Kelly, Richard L. “Logistics Modernization: A Marine Corps Warfighting Imperative.” Marine
Corps Gazette (Aug 2004): 16-20.
Kern, Paul J. “Balancing Transformation with Combat Service Support – Army Materiel
Command and Movement to the Future Force.” Army. (Mar 2004): 25-29.
Lehnert, Michael R. and Wissler, John E. “Marine Logistics Command: Sustaining Tempo
on the 21st Century Battlefield.” Marine Corps Gazette (Aug 2003): 30-33.
Liermann, Christopher R. “Restructuring the Division Support Command.” Army Logistician
(May-Jun 2003).20-26.
Linkowitz, Nicholas “Future MAGTF Logistics and Support from the Sea (2010+).Marine Corps
Gazette (Aug 2003): 23-29.
Miseli, Jason A. “The View From My Windshield: Just-in-Time Logistics Just Isn’t Working.”
Armor (Sep-Oct 2003): 11-19.
Montemayor, Carlo A. and Stauffer, Richard V. “Excellence in Warfighting Through
Logistics Education.” Marine Corps Gazette (Aug 2003): 17-20.
Nails, John B. “A Company Commander’s Thoughts on Iraq.” Armor (Feb 2004): 13-16.
Neal, Richard I., Knutson, Bruce B., Ayres, Raymond P., McKissock, Gary S. “An Imperative
for Change: The Case for Logistics Modernization.” Marine Corps Gazette (Aug 2004):
21-24.
Parsons, Gary L.. “Operation Iraqi Freedom Bulk Petroleum Distribution- ‘Proud To Serve’
Style.” Quartermaster Professional Bulletin (Autumn 2003): 11-15.
Paulus, Robert D. “Building Blocks of Focused Logistics.” Army Logistician (Sep-Oct 2003): 29-
34.

47
Paulus, Robert D. “Delivering Logistics Readiness to the Warfighter.” Army Logistician (Jan-Feb
2004): 16-23.
Pellegrini, Frank N. “Supporting Gulf War 2.0.” Army (Sep 2003): 20-26.
Rineaman, Keith and Ruark, Robert. “The Logistics Architecture: Our Sandtable for Logistics
Modernization.” Marine Corps Gazette (Aug 2004): 27-28.
Ridenour, Dena M. “Fueling the Force: Engineering Contributions To a Quartermaster Mission.”
Quartermaster Professional Bulletin (Autumn 2003): 16-23.
Swift, Steven and Chandler, John W. “Logistics Transformation: Embedding Support.” Marine
Corps Gazette (Aug 2003): 20-23.
Thurmond, Suzi. “Analyzing the Lessons of OIF Distribution.” Army Logistician (Jul-Aug
2004): 18-25.
Usher, Edward G. “Brute Force Combat Service Support: 1st Force Service Support Group
in Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Marine Corps Gazette (Aug 2003): 34-39.
Walsh, Shawn P. “More Tooth for the Tail: The Right Stuff for CSS Operations.” Army
Logistician (Jan-Feb 2004): 23-29.

Unpublished Interviews

Barker, John. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 22 May 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Benson, Kevin Interview by Colonel (Retired) Gregory Fontenot, 20 November 2003. Operation
Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
__________. Interview by Major Christopher McPadden, 23 December 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
__________. Interview by Major Bernard L. Moxley Jr., 29 November 2004. School of
Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Blount, MG. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel Kirkman, 3 May 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom
Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Boles, Vincent. Interview by Unidentified Interviewer, 2 April 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom
Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
__________. Interview by Major Paul V.Williams, 8 May 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom
Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
__________and Lerums, James. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 18 May
2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research
Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Bullard, Richard and Debra Hubbard. Interview by Major Paul V. Williams, 12-14 May 2003.
Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

48
Burch, Todd. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 22 May 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Byrne, Sean. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander H. Von Plinsky, 27 May 2003.
Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Christianson, C.V.. Interview by Major Paul V. Williams, 23 May 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
__________.. Interview by Greg Fontenot, 14 June 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group
Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Cintron, David. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 6 April 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Craft, Chris. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 28 April 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
D’Aquila, Anthony. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda , 27 May 2003.
Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Daugherty, Darryl. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda , 23 May 2003. Operation
Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
Engel, Gary. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 24 May 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Fontanella, Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel Kozlowski. Interview by Unidentified Interviewer, 3
June 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research
Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Ford, Michael. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 7 June 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Fowler, Barry. Interview by COL (Retired) Gregory Fontenot, 27 May 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Frazier, Melvin. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda , 24 May 2003. Operation
Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
Grant, Regina. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda , 7 June 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Hamilton, Gordon. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 8 April and 8 May 2003.
Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

49
Hansen,Erik. Interview by Major Paul V. Williams, 11 May 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom
Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Helmick, Jeff. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 28 April 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Houmes, 1LT. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel Von Plinsky, 27 May 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas .
Kratzer, David. Interview by Major Paul V. Williams, 22 May 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom
Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
__________. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel Paul Pierett, 8 June 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
__________. Interview by Quentin W. Schillare, 4 November 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom
Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Kristolaitis, CPT. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 14 April 2003. Operation
Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
Lambusta, John. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 21 April 2003. Operation
Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
Leathers, Alan and Tes Barrien. Interview by Major Paul V. Williams, 15 May 2003. Operation
Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
Loden, John. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel Scott Gedling, 23 May 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Mason, William. Interview by Major Dimetrius Jackson, 8 May 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom
Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
McClanahan, Craig. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 2 June 2003. Operation
Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
McKernan, Timothy. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, Unspecified Date.
Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

McKiernan, David. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel Kevin W. Woods, 1 May 2003. Operation
Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
__________. Interview by Major W.S. Story, 30 June 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom Study
Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

50
__________. Interview by Colonel (Retired) Gregory Fontenot, 8 December 2003.
Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Merritt, Howard. Interview by Major Paul V. Williams, 23 May 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom
Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Merriweather, Anthony. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 22 May 2003.
Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Montano, Felipe and Steven Brown. Interview by Jackson , 5 March 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
O’Neal, King. Interview by CW3 Watson, 13 May 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group
Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Ooley, Cheryl. Interview by Major Daniel B. George, 23 May 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom
Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Osborn, Edgar. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 28 May 2003. Operation
Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
Parker, CW3. Interview by CW3 Watson, 11 May 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group
Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Patterson, Randy. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 14 April 2003. Operation
Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
Pinkston, Bobby Ray. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 17 April 2003.
Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Reilly, Thomas. Interview by Major Gregory A. Weisler, 15 May 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Rogers, Ken and Mike Wichterman. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 23 April
2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research
Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Rowan, Jeanne. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander H. Von Plinsky, 3 June 2003.
Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Scheid, Mark. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 24 May 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Shun, Ronald. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda , 7 June 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Smithers, Charlie. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel James A. Knowlton, 5 June 2003. Operation
Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.

51
Sobeirra, SGT. Interview by Major Paul. V. Williams, 24 May 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom
Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Staley, Richard. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander H. Von Plinsky, 23 June 2003.
Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Stratman, Major General. Interview by Colonel (Retired) Gregory Fontenot, 19 June 2003.
Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Stroker, Fred. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 12 April 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Strong, MAJ and CPT Ward. Interview by Major Paul V. Williams, 21 May 2003. Operation
Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
Stultz, Jack. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 28 April 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
__________. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel Paul Pierett, 5 June 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Swenson, SSG. Interview by Major Paul V. Williams, 13 May 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom
Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Tartala, John. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 13 May 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Thurman, James. Interview by Unknown Interviewer, 1 April 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom
Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
__________. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel Steven Holcomb, 27 May 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
__________. Interview by Quentin W. Schillare, 4 November 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom
Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Turner, Hughes. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel Charles Pierett, 29 May 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Valencia, Glen. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, 31 May 2003. Operation
Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
Visot, Luis. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, Date Unknown. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Walden, Joseph. Interview by Major Bernard L. Moxley Jr., 22 November 2004. School of
Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

52
Wallace, William. Interview by Dr Charles E. Kirkpatrick, 16 June 2003. Operation Iraqi
Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas.
West, Treva. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander H. Von Plinsky, 31 May 2003.
Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Wichterman, Michael. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander H. Von Plinsky, 17 June
2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research
Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Woodhurst, Melinda. Interview by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kolleda, Date Unknown.
Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Briefings

Author Unknown. OIF Study Group- 2nd BDE/3 ID Briefing to OIF Study Group. Date
Unknown. Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research
Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Author Unknown. US Army Contributions to The Iraqi Theater of Operations. Date Unknown.
Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined Arms Research Library,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Author Unknown. CFLCC- 1003V Prep Tasks- Setting Theater Support Conditions
(Declassified). 15 FEB 03. Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group Collection. Combined
Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

53