It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that order of the US court passed

in favour of Raman regarding the custody of his daughter is enforceable in India.

The petitioner without the consent of the respondent has removed the younger
daughter i.e. Prabha from her natural environment and also removed from the
surrounding of her father and her elder daughter, who in turn has been affected by
this and has been depressed ever since departure of her younger sibling. The
petitioner has taken a pernicious step and that has been the cause of hurt to the
father and foremost the elder daughter, Riya. For the welfare of the children it is
contested that the younger daughter must return to her natural environment, i.e.
New York and to her elder sister. In the case of Dr. V. Ravichandran vs UOI 1 it was
held that “ Merely because the child has been brought to India, the custody issue
concerning the minor child does not deserve to be gone into by the courts in India
and it would be in accord with the principle of comity as well as on the facts, to
return the child back to USA from where he has been removed, and enable the
parties to establish their case before the courts in the native state of child i.e. USA,
for modification of existing custody orders by the court”. In the case Harben v.
Harben 2 it was said that “ It has always been the practice of this Court to ensure
that a parent should not gain advantage by the use of fraud or force in relation to
the kidnapping of children from the care of the other spouse ...”. In the case, H.
(infants), In re case 3 it was said that “… The sudden and unauthorised removal of
children from one country to another is far too frequent nowadays, and, as it seems
to me, it is the duty of all courts in all countries to do all they can to ensure that
the wrongdoer does not gain an advantage by his wrongdoing”, Willmer, L.J. went
on to hold “The Judge took the view and I think it was the right view that in a case
such as the present, that he ought to send these boys back to their own country to
be dealt with by the court of their own country, provided that he was satisfied that
they would come to no harm if the father took them back to the United States; and
that this was so, even though it might subsequently turn out, after all the merits of
the case had been thoroughly thrashed out in the court in New York, that it would
perhaps be better after all for the boys to reside in England and see little or nothing
of their father… The courts in all countries ought, as I see it, to be careful not to
do anything to encourage this tendency. [This] substitution of self-help for due
process of law in this field can only harm the interests of wards generally, and a
Judge should, as I see it, pay regard to the orders of the proper foreign court unless
he is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that to do so would inflict serious harm on
the child.”
The Supreme court of India in Surinder Kaur Sandhu  v. Harbax Singh Sandhu, Y.V.
Chandrachud, C.J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court held thus “… The
modern theory of conflict of laws recognises and, in any event, prefers the
jurisdiction of the State which has the most intimate contact with the issues arising
in the case. Jurisdiction is not attracted by the operation or creation of fortuitous
circumstances such as the circumstance as to where the child, whose custody is in
issue, is brought or for the time being lodged. To allow the assumption of
jurisdiction by another State in such circumstances will only result in encouraging
forum shopping. Ordinarily, jurisdiction must follow upon functional lines. That is
to say, for example, that in matters relating to matrimony and custody, the law of
that place must govern which has the closest concern with the well-being of the
spouses and the welfare of the offspring’s of the marriage. The spouses in this
case had made England their home where this boy was born to them. The father
cannot deprive the English court of its jurisdiction to decide upon his custody by
removing him to India, not in the normal movement of the matrimonial home but,
1
(2010) 1 SCC 174
2
(1957) 1 WLR 261
3
(1966) 1 WLR 381 (Ch & CA)
by an act which was gravely detrimental to the peace of that home. The fact that
the matrimonial home of the spouses was in England, establishes sufficient contacts
or ties with that State in order to make it reasonable and just for the courts of that
State to assume jurisdiction to enforce obligations which were incurred therein by
the spouses. (See  International Shoe Co.  v. State of Washington 4 which was not a
matrimonial case but which is regarded as the fountainhead of the subsequent
developments of jurisdictional issues like the one involved in the instant case.) It
is our duty and function to protect the wife against the burden of litigating in an
inconvenient forum which she and her husband had left voluntarily in order to
make their living in England, where they gave birth to this unfortunate boy.” 5 In V.
Ravi Chandran (2) v. Union of India, (2010) it was held that “While dealing with a
case of custody of a child removed by a parent from one country to another in
contravention of the orders of the court where the parties had set up their
matrimonial home, the court in the country to which the child has been removed
must first consider the question whether the court could conduct an elaborate
enquiry on the question of custody or by dealing with the matter summarily
order a parent to return custody of the child to the country from which the child
was removed and all aspects relating to the child's welfare be investigated in a
court in his own country. Should the court take a view that an elaborate enquiry
is necessary, obviously the court is bound to consider the welfare and happiness
of the child as the paramount consideration and go into all relevant aspects of
welfare of the child including stability and security, loving and understanding
care and guidance and full development of the child's character, personality and
talents…. In a case where the court decides to exercise its jurisdiction summarily
to return the child to his own country, keeping in view the jurisdiction of the
court in the native country which has the closest concern and the most intimate
contact with the issues arising in the case, the court may leave the aspects
relating to the welfare of the child to be investigated by the court in his own
native country as that would be in the best interests of the child. The indication
given in McKee v. McKee6 that there may be cases in which it is proper for a court
in one jurisdiction to make an order directing that a child be returned to a
foreign jurisdiction without investigating the merits of the dispute relating to the
care of the child on the ground that such an order is in the best interests of the
child has been explained in the case of Dhanwanti Joshi (Dhanwanti
Joshi v. Madhav Unde7)”. Buckley, L.J. held as follows in the case of L (Minors),
In re case 8   “… The action of one party in kidnapping the child is doubtless one of
the circumstances to be taken into account any may be a circumstance of great
weight; the weight to be attributed to it must depend on the circumstances of the
particular case. The court may conclude that notwithstanding the conduct of the
‘kidnapper’…. may conclude that the child should be returned to his or her native
country or the jurisdiction from which he or she has been removed. Where a court

4
90 L Ed 95 : 326 US 310 (1945)
5
 (1984) 3 SCC 698
6
1951 AC 352 : (1951) 1 All ER 942 (PC)
7
(1998) 1 SCC 112
8
(1974) 1 WLR 250 : (1974) 1 All ER 913 (CA)] 
makes a summary order for the return of a child to a foreign country without
investigating the merits, the same principles, in my judgment, apply, but the
decision must be justified on somewhat different grounds.… The Judge may well be
persuaded that it would be better for the child that those merits should be
investigated in a court in his native country than that he should spend in this
country the period which must necessarily elapse before all the evidence can be
assembled for adjudication here. Anyone who has had experience of the exercise of
this delicate jurisdiction knows what complications can result from a child
developing roots in new soil, and what conflicts this can occasion in the child's
own life. Such roots can grow rapidly. An order that the child should be returned
forthwith to the country from which he has been removed in the expectation that
any dispute about his custody will be satisfactorily resolved in the courts of that
country may well be regarded as being in the best interests of the child.” 9
Thus order passed by the New York court must be honoured and interim order must
be passed by the Hon’ble court that the child in the present case must be returned
to the native country where they belong and are citizen of, and more especially so
having regard to the fact that they have been kept in flagrant contempt of New
York Court’s order. Keeping in mind the well-established principle of welfare of
child in the matter of custody of child and the principle of the most intimate
contact it can be concluded that returning the custody of child to the father is the
most appropriate step to be taken in the present matter.

9
Supra note 8.