F.C.

FISHER, plaintiff
vs.
YANGCO STEAMSHIP COMPANY, J.S. STANLEY, as Acting Collector of Customs of the
Philippine Islands, IGNACIO VILLAMOR, as Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands
and W.H. BISHOP, as prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila, respondents.

G.R. No. L-8095             March 31, 1915

DOCTRINE: The giving of unreasonable or unnecessary preference or advantage to any

FACTS:

F.C. Fisher is a stockholder in the Yangco Steamship Company, which owns a large number of
steam vessels, engaged in coastwise trade. In 1912, the directors of the company adopted a
resolution “expressly declaring and providing that the classes of merchandise to be carried by
the company in its business as a common carrier do not include dynamite, powder or other
explosives, and expressly prohibiting the officers to carry”.

J.S. Stanley demanded and required the company the acceptance and carriage of such
explosives, the refusal and suspension of the issuance of the necessary clearance documents
of the vessels of the company unless and until the company consents to accept such explosives
for carriage and that should the company decline to accept, Attorney-General Ignacio Villamor
and the prosecuting attorney W.H. Bishop intend to institute proceedings under the penal
provisions of section 4, 5, and 6 of Act No. 98 of the Philippine Commission against the
company to enforce the requirements.

Yangco contends that they cannot subject themselves to the “ruinous consequences which
would inevitably result” from failure on their part to obey the demands and requirements, that
the Acting Collector of Customs erroneously construes the provisions of Act No. 98, and that if
the Act does in fact require the company to carry such explosives it is to that extent
unconstitutional and void.

ISSUE: Whether a common carrier in the Philippine Islands may decline to accept for carriage
any shipment of merchandise of a class which it expressly or impliedly declines to accept from
all shippers alike, because “the duty of a common carrier to carry for all who offer arises from
the public profession he has made, and limited by it”.

HELD:

Yes. The provision of the Act which prescribes that, "No common carrier ... shall, under any
pretense whatsoever, fail or refuse to receive for carriage ... to carry any person or property
offering for carriage," is not to be construed in its literal sense and without regard to the context,
so as to impose an imperative duty on all common carriers to accept for carriage, and to carry
all and any kind of freight which may be offered for carriage without regard to the facilities which
they may have at their disposal. The legislator could not have intended and did not intend to
prescribe that a common carrier running passenger automobiles for hire must transport coal in
his machines; nor that the owner of a tank steamer, expressly constructed in small watertight
compartments for the carriage of crude oil must accept common carrier must accept and carry
contraband articles, such as opium, morphine, cocaine, or the like, the mere possession of
which is declared to be a criminal offense; nor that common carriers must accept eggs offered
for transportation in paper parcels or any merchandise whatever do defectively packed as to
entail upon the company unreasonable and unnecessary care or risks.

Read in connection with its context this, as well as all the other mandatory and prohibitory
provisions of the statute, was clearly intended merely to forbid failures or refusals to receive
persons or property for carriage involving any "unnecessary or unreasonable preference or
advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular kind
of traffic in any respect whatsoever," or which would "subject any particular person, company,
firm, corporation or locality, or any particular kind of traffic to any undue or unreasonable
prejudice or discrimination whatsoever.”

GAUDIOSO EREZO, ET AL., plaintiff-appellee,

G.R. No. L-9605             September 30, 1957

DOCTRINE: All motor vehicles and trailer of any type used or operated on or upon any highway
of the Philippines must be registered.

FACTS:

Aguedo Jepte is the registered owner of a six by six truck bearing plate No. TC-1253.
While the same was being driven by Rodolfo Espino y Garcia, it collided with a taxicab at the
intersection of San Andres and Dakota Streets, Manila. As the truck went off the street, it hit
Ernesto Erezo and another, and the former suffered injuries, as a result of which he died. The
driver was prosecuted for homicide through reckless negligence. Garcia pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay the heirs of Ernesto Erezo the sum of P3,000. As
the amount of the judgment could not be enforced against him, Erezo brought this action
against the registered owner of the truck, Aguedo Jepte.

Jepte does not deny at the time of the fatal accident the cargo truck driven by Rodolfo Espino y
Garcia was registered in his name. He, however, claims that the vehicle belonged to the Port
Brokerage, of which he was the broker at the time of the accident. He explained, and his
explanation was corroborated by Policarpio Franco, the manager of the corporation, that the
trucks of the corporation were registered in his name as a convenient arrangement so as to
enable the corporation to pay the registration fee with his backpay as a pre-war government
employee. Franco, however, admitted that the arrangement was not known to the Motor Vehicle
Office.
ISSUE: Whether Jepte should be liable to Erezo for the injuries occasioned to the latter because
of the negligence of the driver even if he was no longer the owner of the vehicle at the time of
the dame (because he had previously sold it to another).

HELD:

Yes. The Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992, as amended) provides that no vehicle may
be used or operated upon any public highway unless the same is properly registered. It has
been stated that the system of licensing and the requirement that each machine must carry a
registration number, conspicuously displayed, is one of the precautions taken to reduce the
danger of injury to pedestrians and other travelers from the careless management of
automobiles, and to furnish a means of ascertaining the identity of persons violating the laws
and ordinances, regulating the speed and operation of machines upon the highways (2 R. C. L.
1176). Not only are vehicles to be registered and that no motor vehicles are to be used or
operated without being properly registered for the current year, but that dealers in motor
vehicles shall furnish the Motor Vehicles Office a report showing the name and address of each
purchaser of motor vehicle during the previous month and the manufacturer's serial number and
motor number. (Section 5 [c], Act. No. 3992, as amended.).

Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by which ownership in
vehicles is transferred, as in land registration cases, because the administrative proceeding of
registration does not bear any essential relation to the contract of sale between the parties but
to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public highway (section 5 [a], Act No.
3992, as amended).The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if
any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicles on the public
highways, responsibility therefore can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.

In synthesis, we hold that the registered owner, the defendant-appellant herein, is primarily
responsible for the damage caused to the vehicle of the plaintiff-appellee, but he (defendant-
appellant) has a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that he may
be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff-appellant.

NOSTRADAMUS VILLANUEVA, Petitioner
v. 
PRISCILLA R. DOMINGO and LEANDRO LUIS R. DOMINGO, Respondents

G.R. NO. 144274 : September 20, 2004

DOCTRINE: The registered owner of any vehicle is directly and primarily responsible to the
public and third persons while it is being operated.

FACTS:
Priscilla R. Domingo is the registered owner of a silver Mitsubishi Lancer Car model 1980
bearing plate No. NDW 781 '91 with Leandro Luis R. Domingo as authorized driver.
Nostradamus Villanueva was then the registered "owner" of a green Mitsubishi Lancer bearing
Plate No. PHK 201 '91.

Following a green traffic light, Priscilla Domingo's silver Lancer car with Plate No. NDW 781 '91
then driven by Leandro Luis R. Domingo was cruising along the middle lane of South
Superhighway at moderate speed from north to south. Suddenly, a green Mitsubishi Lancer with
plate No. PHK 201 '91 driven by Renato Dela Cruz Ocfemia darted from Vito Cruz Street
towards the South Superhighway directly into the path of NDW 781 '91 thereby hitting and
bumping its left front portion. As a result of the impact, NDW 781 '91 hit two (2) parked vehicles
at the roadside, the second hitting another parked car in front of it.

ISSUE: Whether the registered owner of a motor vehicle be held liable for damages arising from
a vehicular accident involving his motor vehicle while being operated by the employee of its
buyer without the latter’s consent and knowledge.

HELD:

Yes. The principle upon which this doctrine is based is that in dealing with vehicles registered
under the Public Service Law, the public has the right to assume or presume that the registered
owner is the actual owner thereof, for it would be difficult for the public to enforce the actions
that they may have for injuries caused to them by the vehicles being negligently operated if the
public should be required to prove who the actual owner is.

This Court has consistently ruled that regardless of who the actual owner is of a motor vehicle
might be, the registered owner is the operator of the same with respect to the public and third
persons, and as such, directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation.
In contemplation of law, the owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual
operator and employer being considered merely as his agent.

Whether the driver is authorized or not by the actual owner is irrelevant to determining the
liability of the registered owner who the law holds primarily and directly responsible for any
accident, injury or death caused by the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways. To
require the driver of the vehicle to be authorized by the actual owner before the registered
owner can be held accountable is to defeat the very purpose why motor vehicle legislations are
enacted in the first place.

In synthesis, we hold that the registered owner, the defendant-appellant herein, is primarily
responsible for the damage caused to the vehicle of the plaintiff-appellee, but he (defendant-
appellant) has a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that he may
be required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff-appellant.

FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICES, Petitioner,

DOCTRINE: Damage is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible for.

FACTS:

Jose A. Espinas was driving his car along Leon Guinto Street in Manila. Upon reaching the
intersection of Leon Guinto and President Quirino Streets, Espinas stopped his car. When the
signal light turned green, he proceeded to cross the intersection. He was already in the middle
of the intersection when another car, traversing President Quirino Street and going to Roxas
Boulevard, suddenly hit and bumped his car. As a result of the impact, Espinas’ car turned
clockwise. The other car escaped from the scene of the incident, but Espinas was able to get its
plate number. After verifying with the Land Transportation Office, Espinas learned that the
owner of the other car, with plate number UCF-545, is Filcar.

Filcar argued that while it is the registered owner of the car that hit and bumped Espinas’ car,
the car was assigned to its Corporate Secretary Atty. Candido Flor, the husband of Carmen
Flor. Filcar further stated that when the incident happened, the car was being driven by Atty.
Flor’s personal driver, Timoteo Floresca.

ISSUE: Whether Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle which figured in an accident,
may be held liable for the damages caused to Espinas.

HELD:

Yes. Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver, Floresca, and is thus
vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Thus, whether
there is an employer-employee relationship between the registered owner and the driver is
irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered owner who the law holds primarily and
directly responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the operation of the vehicle in
the streets and highways.

Filcar should not be permitted to evade its liability for damages by conveniently passing on the
blame to another party; in this case, its Corporate Secretary, Atty. Flor and his alleged driver,
Floresca. Following our reasoning in Equitable, the agreement between Filcar and Atty. Flor to
assign the motor vehicle to the latter does not bind Espinas who was not a party to and has no
knowledge of the agreement, and whose only recourse is to the motor vehicle registration.

Neither can Filcar use the defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code - that the
employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage - because the motor vehicle registration law, to a
certain extent, modified Article 2180 of the Civil Code by making these defenses unavailable to
the registered owner of the motor vehicle.  Thus, for as long as Filcar is the registered owner of
1awp++i1

the car involved in the vehicular accident, it could not escape primary liability for the damages
caused to Espinas.
This does not mean, however, that Filcar is left without any recourse against the actual
employer of the driver and the driver himself. Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment,
the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the actual employer of
the driver of the amount that he may be required to pay as damages for the injury caused to
another.

GILBERTO M. DUAVIT, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Acting through the Third Division, as Public
Respondent, and ANTONIO SARMIENTO, SR. & VIRGILIO CATUAR respondents.

DOCTRINE: An owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident involving the said
vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed
by him.

FACTS:

Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. and Virgilio Catuar were aboard a jeep owned by Ruperto Catuar, who was also
driving the said jeep on Ortigas Avenue, San Juan, Rizal; that Catuar’s, at the time, was running
moderately at 20 to 35 kilometers per hour and while approaching Roosevelt Avenue, Virgilio Catuar
slowed down. Suddenly, another jeep driven by Oscar Sabiniano hit and bumped Catuar’s jeep on the
portion near the left rear wheel, and as a result of the impact Catuar’s jeep fell on its right and skidded by
about 30 yards. The jeep was damaged, particularly the windshield, the differential, the part near the left
rear wheel and the top cover of the jeep. Virgilio Catuar was thrown to the middle of the road, his wrist
was broken and he sustained contusions on the head. Likewise, Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. was trapped inside
the fallen jeep, and one of his legs was fractured. Sarmiento and Catuar have filed this case both against
Oscar Sabiniano as driver, and against Gualberto Duavit as owner of the jeep.

Gualberto Duavit, while admitting ownership of the other jeep, denied that Oscar Sabiniano was his
employee. Duavit claimed that he has not been an employer of Oscar Sabiniano at any time up to the
present.

Sabiniano admitted that he took the jeep from the garage of defendant Duavit without the consent or
authority of the latter. He testified further, that Duavit even filed charges against him for theft of the jeep,
but which Duavit did not push through as his (Sabiniano's) parents apologized to Duavit on his behalf.

ISSUE: Whether the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an accident can be held liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code when the said vehicle was neither driven by an employee of
the owner nor taken with the consent of the latter.

HELD:
No. As early as in 1939, we have ruled that an owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an
accident involving the said vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or knowledge and
by a person not employed by him. 

Herein petitioner does not deny ownership of the vehicle involved in tire mishap but completely
denies having employed the driver Sabiniano or even having authorized the latter to drive his
jeep. The jeep was virtually stolen from the petitioner's garage. To hold, therefore, the petitioner
liable for the accident caused by the negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his driver nor
employee would be absurd as it would be like holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an
accident caused by the person who stole such vehicle. In this regard, we cannot ignore the
many cases of vehicles forcibly taken from their owners at gunpoint or stolen from garages and
parking areas and the instances of service station attendants or mechanics of auto repair shops
using, without the owner's consent, vehicles entrusted to them for servicing or repair.

We cannot blindly apply absolute rules based on precedents whose facts do not jibe four square with
pending cases. Every case must be determined on its own peculiar factual circumstances. Where, as in
this case, the records of the petition fail to indicate the slightest indicia of an employer-employee
relationship between the owner and the erring driver or any consent given by the owner for the vehicle's
use, we cannot hold the owner liable.