[CIV] Art.

1162 – 06
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Cangco v. MRR • The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on
G.R. No. L-12191 | October 14, 1918| Fisher, J.: the platform where the plaintiff alighted is found in the
fact that it was the customary season for harvesting these
Petitioners: JOSE CANGCO melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for
Respondents: MANILA RAILROAD CO. the shipment to the market.
• They were contained in numerous sacks which has been
FACTS piled on the platform in a row one upon another.
Jose Cangco, was employed by Manila Railroad Company. • The testimony shows that this row of sacks was so placed
To go to work, he used a pass supplied by the company to of melons and the edge of platform; and it is clear that the
ride the trains free of charge. fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted
• At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped
litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the employment upon the platform.
of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with • His statement that he failed to see these objects in the
a monthly wage of P25. darkness is readily to be credited.
• He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of
Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant Cangco’s arm was amputated twice as the first operation
railroad company; was unsatisfactory.
• In coming daily by train to the company's office in the city • The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an
of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injuries
the company, which entitled him to ride upon the which he had received were very serious.
company's trains free of charge. • He was therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in
the city of Manila where an examination was made and
One day, as he was exiting the platform, Cangco’s feet his arm was amputated.
came in contact with a sack of watermelons causing him
• The result of this operation was unsatisfactory, and the
to fall violently. His body ended up under the moving car
plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a
and his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated.
second operation was performed and the member was
• Upon the occasion in question, January 20, 1915, the again amputated higher up near the shoulder.
plaintiff arose from his seat in the second class-car where
• It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum
he was riding and, making, his exit through the door, took
of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for
his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the
other expenses in connection with the process of his
upright guardrail with his right hand for support.
curation.
• On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San
Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins to Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in
rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the CFI of Manila to recover damages of the defendant
the company's office and extends along in front of said company, founding his action upon the negligence of the
office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of servants and employees of the defendant in placing the
several coaches. sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so
• As the train slowed down another passenger, named placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger
Emilio Zuñiga, also an employee of the railroad company, alighting from the company's trains.
got off the same car, alighting safely at the point where
the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. CFI found Cangco failed to use due caution in alighting
• When the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff thus MRR not liable. Cangco appealed.
Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet • the trial judge, found the facts substantially as above
came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result stated, and drew therefrom his conclusion to the effect
that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently that, although negligence was attributable to the
on the platform. defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons
• His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and
under the moving car, where his right arm was badly from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed
crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was
alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six therefore precluded form recovering.
meters before it came to a full stop. • Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the
• The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
night, and as the railroad station was lighted dimly by a
single light located some distance away, objects on the ISSUE(S)
platform where the accident occurred were difficult to 1. W/N the negligence of the employees is attributable to the
discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car. employer [YES]
2. W/N there was contributory negligence on the part of the
The presence of the watermelons was explained as being plaintiff [NO]
customary because it was harvesting season and they
were brought to the station for shipment to the market. RULING
However, Cangco’s claim that he failed to see the objects
in the darkness was readily credited.
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STEPHANIE PUA
1. It cannot be doubted that the employees of the provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil
railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct
these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; and immediate, and its non-performance could not be
• that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to
alighted from the train; and that they therefore defendant's servants.
constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries
In the decisions of November 20, 1896, it appeared that
sustained by the plaintiff.
plaintiff's action arose ex contractu, but that defendant
• It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable sought to avail himself of the provisions of article 1902 of
for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is the Civil Code as a defense. The Spanish Supreme Court
barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. rejected defendant's contention
• In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these • Saying: “These are not cases of injury caused, without any
conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility pre-existing obligation, by fault or negligence, such as those
of the defendant company and the contributory to which article 1902 of the Civil Code relates, but of damages
negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined. caused by the defendant's failure to carry out the
undertakings imposed by the contracts . . . .”
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal
liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and 2. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have
that the obligation to respond for the damage which suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not
plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of been for defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to
that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to provide a safe alighting place.
exercise due care in its performance. • It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train
• That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing had come to a full stop before alighting, the particular injury
essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive suffered by him could not have occurred.
responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed • Defendant contends, and cites many authorities in support of
by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by the contention, that it is negligence per se for a passenger to
alight from a moving train. We are not disposed to subscribe
proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and
to this doctrine in its absolute form.
supervision.
• We are of the opinion that this proposition is too badly stated
• Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to and is at variance with the experience of every-day life.
obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-
• In this particular instance, that the train was barely moving
contractual obligations — or to use the technical form when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that
of expression, that article relates only to culpa it came to stop within six meters from the place where he
aquiliana and not to culpa contractual. stepped from it.
• Thousands of persons alight from trains under these
• The position of a natural or juridical person who has conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where
undertaken by contract to render service to another, is the company has kept its platform free from dangerous
wholly different from that to which article 1903 relates. obstructions.
When the sources of the obligation upon which plaintiff's
cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the The test by which to determine whether the passenger has
burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a
— if he does not his action fails. moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care.
• But when the facts averred show a contractual • It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person,
undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have
it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances
the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in disclosed by the evidence.
his pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due • This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or
to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care
defendant, or of his servants or agents. which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar
• Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient circumstances, to avoid injury."
prima facie to warrant a recovery. • we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court
in Picart vs. Smith, we may say that the test is this; Was there
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff
breach of a contract to show that the breach was due to the at the time he alighted from the train which would have
negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, proof on admonished a person of average prudence that to get off
the part of defendant that the negligence or omission of his the train under the conditions then existing was
servants or agents caused the breach of the contract would dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from
not constitute a defense to the action. alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory
• If the negligence of servants or agents could be invoked as a negligence.
means of discharging the liability arising from contract, the
anomalous result would be that person acting through the No contributory negligence because Cangco had the right to
medium of agents or servants in the performance of their presume that there would be no obstruction in the platform
contracts, would be in a better position than those acting in he got off from everyday.
person. • As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from
• The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that plaintiff
it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to
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was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil
the car without being able to discern clearly the condition of Code] are applicable are understood to be those not
the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one
• In considering the situation thus presented, it should not be another. But where relations already formed give rise to
overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-contract,
fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of then breaches of those duties are subject to article 1101,
melons piled on the platform existed; and as the defendant 1103, and 1104 of the same code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf
was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at 365.)”
to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the
plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of some This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which,
circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform under the Spanish law, is, in certain cases imposed upon
was clear. employers with respect to damages occasioned by the
• The place, as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly negligence of their employees to persons to whom they are not
lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of the bound by contract, is not based, as in the English Common Law,
defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the upon the principle of respondeat superior — if it were, the
plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility concede that it had master would be liable in every case and unconditionally — but
right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, upon the principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code,
the placing of them adequately so that their presence would which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or negligence,
be revealed. do injury to another, the obligation of making good the damage
• The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher caused.
than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The • One who places a powerful automobile in the hands of a
distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the servant whom he knows to be ignorant of the method of
alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty of an act of
thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to negligence which makes him liable for all the consequences
stepping off. of his imprudence.
• The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement • The obligation to make good the damage arises at the very
material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even instant that the unskillful servant, while acting within the
surface on which to alight. scope of his employment causes the injury.
• Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and • The liability of the master is personal and direct.
agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for • But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence
him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act whatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is
would have been in an aged or feeble person. not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the
• Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the
the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between
train at this station. the master and the person injured.
• There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with
regard either to the length of the step which he was required It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in
to take or the character of the platform where he was the selection and control of the servant relieves the master
alighting. from liability for the latter's acts —
• Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in • on the contrary, that proof shows that the responsibility has
undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under never existed.
way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore • As Manresa says the liability arising from extra-contractual
he was not guilty of contributory negligence. culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which,
without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention,
has caused damage to another.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION • A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of
The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is his servant, taking into consideration the qualifications they
hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his
the costs of both instances. So ordered. purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal
diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to
whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no
***NOTES*** liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his
servants, even within the scope of their employment, such
On the distinction on culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana: third person suffer damage.
• In commenting upon article 1093 Manresa clearly points • True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil Code the law
out the difference between "culpa, substantive and creates a presumption that he has been negligent in the
independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an selection or direction of his servant, but the presumption
is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care and diligence
obligation between persons not formerly connected by
in this respect.
any legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident in the
performance of an obligation already existing . . . ." The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical
• In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was provisions, as found in the Porto Rico Code, has held that these
made to rest squarely upon the proposition that article articles are applicable to cases of extra-contractual culpa
1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of exclusively. This distinction was again made patent by this Court
negligence which constitute the breach of a contract. “The in its decision in the case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, which
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was an action brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual • The fundamental distinction between obligations of this
liability of the defendant to respond for the damage caused by character and those which arise from contract, rests
the carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation
his employment. it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which
creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual
The Court, after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of relations the vinculum exists independently of the
the Civil Code, said: breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties
• From this article two things are apparent: when entering into the contractual relation.
(1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a ====
presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the master or employer either in selection of A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the
the servant or employee, or in supervision over him liability of employers for damage done by the negligent acts of
after the selection, or both; and their servants will show that in no case has the court ever
(2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris decided that the negligence of the defendant's servants has been
et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. held to constitute a defense to an action for damages for breach
of contract.
It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he The field of non- contractual obligation is much more broader
has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a than that of contractual obligations, comprising, as it does, the
family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields,
liability. figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that
• This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him
on his own negligence and not on that of his servant. from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a
• This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract
negligence. It is, of course, in striking contrast to the under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the
American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed
negligence of the servant in conclusively the negligence of the between the parties.
master.
.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in
case of extra-contractual culpa based upon negligence, it is
necessary that there shall have been some fault attributable to
the defendant personally, and that the last paragraph of article
1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in
complete accord with the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who
says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability created by article 1903 is
imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the
special relations of authority or superiority existing between the
person called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his
act or omission, was the cause of it.
• On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for
the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents,
when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount
to the breach of a contact, is not based upon a mere
presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or
control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and
care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability
for the breach of his contract.

Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-

contractual or contractual.
• Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or
omission of those mutual duties which civilized society
imposes upon it members, or which arise from these
relations, other than contractual, of certain members of
society to others, generally embraced in the concept of
status.
• The legal rights of each member of society constitute the
measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative
in character, which the existence of those rights imposes
upon all other members of society.
• The breach of these general duties whether due to willful
intent or to mere inattention, if productive of injury, give rise
to an obligation to indemnify the injured party.