HIRABASHI VS.

US, 320 US 99

Facts of the case

In the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt acted to
prevent incidents of subversion and espionage from individuals of Japanese descent
living in the United States. He issued two executive orders which were quickly
enacted into law. One gave the Secretary of War the power to designate certain
parts of the country "military areas" and exclude certain persons from them. The
second established the War Relocation Authority which had the power to remove,
maintain, and supervise persons who were excluded from the military areas. Gordon
Kiyoshi Hirabayashi, a student at the University of Washington, was convicted of
violating a curfew and relocation order.

Question

Did the President's executive orders and the power delegated to the military
authorities discriminate against Americans and resident aliens of Japanese descent in
violation of the Fifth Amendment?

Conclusion

The Court found the President's orders and the implementation of the curfew to be
constitutional. Chief Justice Stone, writing for the unanimous Court, took into
account the great importance of military installations and weapons production that
occurred on the West Coast and the "solidarity" that individuals of Japanese descent
felt with their motherland. He reasoned that restrictions on Japanese actions served
an important national interest. The Court ducked the thorny relocation issue and
focused solely on the curfew, which the Court viewed as a necessary "protective
measure." Stone argued that racial discrimination was justified since "in time of war
residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater source
of danger than those of a different ancestry."
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE,
BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL
INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.

FACTS:
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander
of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the
petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the
carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained
and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed
the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

ISSUE:

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling:

The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO

626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except
under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of
the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province
than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent
their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it
easier to kill them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which
was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant
case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander,
were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and
given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced
upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due
process.
PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL, 15 SCRA 569
Facts:
The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating
thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as
Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action,
for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain
him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said
municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said
Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960
and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3
of Republic Act No. 2370, reads: “Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor
their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.”
Issues:
Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power.
 
Discussions:
Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in
the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such
officers. This power is denied  by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local
governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to
wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers
thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President
cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the
scope of their authority.
Rulings:
Yes. It did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers. The alleged power of the
President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of
an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments,
bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate. Instead of giving the President less
power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive departments,
bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon
him more  power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive
departments, bureaus or offices.
De La Llana v. Alba
March 12, 1982 |G.R. No. L-57883

FACTS:
Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled, “An act reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes” was passed, providing for the
separation of Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to
municipal circuit courts (except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court
of Tax appeals). The honorable petitioner sought to prohibit the respondents from
implementing BP 129, alleging that the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution has been ignored and disregarded. Furthermore, they assert that the
reorganization was done in lack of good faith. However, the Solicitor General denies
his claim and maintains that the allegation of lack of good faith is unwarranted and
devoid of any support in law, and that BP 129 was a legitimate exercise of the power
vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary.

ISSUE:
Was there lack of good faith in reorganizing the judiciary?

HELD:
No. The Court held that there was good faith in reorganizing the judiciary. Citing the
separate opinion of Justice Laurel in the case of Zandueta v. De La Costa, the Court
similarly maintains that the passage of BP 129 was in good faith seeing as its
purpose was for the fulfillment of what was considered a great public need by the
legislative department, not intended to adversely affect the tenure of judges or any
particular judge. While it is possible that the legislature could deliberately abuse the
power to reorganize the judiciary, thus lacking good faith, the Court is unconvinced
that such was the case in this situation. Thus, where the Court holds that the
reorganization of the judiciary by virtue of BP 129 was done in good faith, the
“separation” of the petitioner due to the abolition of his office is valid and
constitutional.
DE LA LLANA vs.  ALBAFERNANDO

 
Facts:
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129entitled
"An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefore and for other
Purposes," the same being contrary to the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution as it separates from the judiciary Justices and judges of inferior courts
from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts
established by such Act. They likewise impute lack of good faith in its enactment and
characterize as undue delegation of legislative power to the President his authority
to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter
appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be
deemed completed. The Solicitor General maintains that there is no valid justification
for the attack on the constitutionality of the statute, it being a legitimate exercise of
the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the
allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack on the independence of the
judiciary being unwarranted and devoid of any support in law.

Issue:
W/O Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 should be declared unconstitutional for
colliding with the security of tenure enjoyed by justices and judges.

Held:
 
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, the unconstitutionality of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown. It held that the enactment there of was
in answer to a pressing and urgent need for a major reorganization of the judiciary.
It is a fundamental proposition that the legislative power to create courts ordinarily
includes the power to organize and to reorganize them, and that the power to
abolish courts is generally co-extensive with the power to create them. The power to
abolish was not intended to be qualified by the permanence of tenure. The right of
Judges to hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of 70 years, or
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, does not deprive
Congress of its power to abolish, organize or reorganize inferior courts.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS POEA
G.R. No. 76633         166 SCRA 533       October 18, 1988

Facts:
The petitioner challenge the decision of Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration POEA on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over
the case of Vitaliano Saco as he was not an overseas worker.
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an
accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under
Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The
petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by
the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the
State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after
considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant.
The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the
employees of the Philippine Air Lines who, although working abroad in its
international flights, are not considered overseas workers.
Moreover, the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself
as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that
no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even
with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion
which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
 
Issues:
Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 2 has violated the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power.
 
Discussions:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation
of legislative power:

1. Completeness test – the law must be complete in all its terms and

conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate
the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test – there must be adequate guidelines or stations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.
Rulings:
No. There was no principles violated. The authority to issue the said
regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. … “The
governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).”
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot
be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law
may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject
is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or
surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it
more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of
subordinate legislation.”
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down
in a statute by “filling in’ the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what
are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by
the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force
and effect of law.