The Elections of 1936-37 in the Punjab and

Political Position of the Muslim League

Akhtar Hussain Sandhu

Only two nominees of the Muslim League succeeded in the

elections of 1937. MA Jinnah had been a non-entity in the
Punjab until the passage of the Pakistan Resolution in 1940. 1
Amarjit Singh concludes that the Punjab Muslim League
experienced the severest setback of its history in the elections
1937. He considers the aftermath as the era of struggle for
survival on the part of the League. 2 KC Yadav writes on the
Jinnah-Sikandar Pact that the British ordered Sir Sikandar Hayat
to conclude a pact with the Muslim League to revive its image
after the defeat in the elections 1937. 3 Important documents and
solid arguments are there to challenge such conclusions.
Through this article, I have tried to address such contentions.
Through my study, I have tried to prove that the League had
deep roots in the Punjab before the elections of 1937 as it was
perceived as the sole Muslim party at the national level. The
election results were no surprise to the League leadership
because of the prevailing circumstances. The League’s decision
to participate in the regional politics was a turning point in the
history of the Indian Muslims which enabled it to permeate
among the masses. It also made the British and their loyal groups
uneasy in the Punjab. The Unionists intended to capture the
League but became a victim of their own tricky politics.
The Muslim League is considered to be a weak party during
the 1930s but actually it had started successfully engaging the
regional elements in the Muslim politics during this time. No
doubt, the League’s position in the Punjab was not strong
because the only blue-eyed group of the British Governor was
the Unionist Party which was officially entitled to have
influential position in the bureaucracy and the politics. To line
up the Punjab behind the League was necessary because without
Pakistan Vision Vol. 10 No. 2 51

its backing the League had a weak voice in all-India issues

relating to the Muslim community. The League did not require
this backing earlier because every Muslim province was thought
to be with the League but the specific circumstances of the pre-
election situation convinced MA Jinnah to enter the regional
politics which was not the tradition of the parties working at all-
India level. The central political leadership preferred their
involvement in the issues relating to the central politics.
Before 1936, the League was confined to the national
politics had given a free hand to the regional parties taking for
granted their support. On the other hand, the Unionist Muslims
felt vulnerable by supporting the League as they could lose
political and social status in the province which they had been
enjoying for a few decades. The Shiromani Akali Dal 4 had got
recognition as a religious and political force among the Sikh
community. They opposed the feudal leadership of the Khalsa
National Party. 5 The Akal politics was mainly based on
antagonism and hatred towards the Muslims on religious and
historical grounds. They were opposed to the feudal leadership
within the Sikh community on economic and political reasons.
They projected themselves as the benefactors of the panth but
actually they were keen to secure economic and political gains in
the guise of religion. This two-faced politics of the major
stakeholders of the Punjab created crisis in the provincial
politics. The League permeated gradually among the regional
politics and secured sympathy of the masses.
The 1930s was a turbulent phase of the Punjab history. The
Muslim League became a leaderless party for the time being as
Jinnah was in England and the local Muslims were utilizing the
All-India Muslim Conference for their political activities. No
one valued the importance of the League and the sincere Muslim
leadership diverted its attention to the regional parties. Sir Agha
Khan joined hands with the Punjab Unionist Party and supported
it financially. 6 Sir Agha Khan had no voting base in the Punjab
and his separation from the League did not value as far as the
electoral politics was concerned. He was respected by the
community on his generous funding for the Muslim projects and
influence in the imperial circles, nevertheless, his severance from
the traditional Muslim representative party was not an
encouraging sign. Under such atmosphere, MA Jinnah came
52 The Elections of 1936-37 in the Punjab

back and re-organised the League in early 1935. He planned to

gather the prominent Muslim leaders under the League flag and
invited Sir Fazl-i-Husain to preside over the League session. He
not only turned down his request to join the League session but
also decided to resist the League leader to have any influence in
the Punjab affairs because it could end the communal harmony
of the province. 7 The main argument for the refusal was that the
Hindu and Sikh communities would never accept the League’s
position. It is surprising that nobody questioned the
communalistic character of Sir Fazl-i-Husain who had
incessantly been criticized by Hindus and Sikhs on his pro-
Muslim policies which confirmed him a Muslim rather than a
cross-communal leader. The non-Muslim groups at protests
against him included the moderate faction of the Sikhs as well. 8
The principal issue was the office of the Premiership. Fazl-i-
Husain feared that by joining the League, the Muslims of the
Punjab could be deprived of the Premier’s office. The
machinations within the party were at peak and none was happy
on his return from the centre to the Punjab politics. 9 Under this
specific situation, he was unable to render support to the League.
His pro-League posture could be an invitation to new
problems. 10
Fazl’s refusal to accept Jinnah’s invitation to preside over
the League session has been hailed by many writers and
attributed to the political prudence of Fazl-i-Husain and as an
utter defeat of Jinnah. To Khalid Bin Sayeed, “Jinnah did not
make any headway in the Punjab” 11 but the factual position is
that he never confined himself to the central politics and
activated the party to capture the Punjab as soon as possible. The
writers projected Fazl’s refusal prominently because rejection of
the invitation of a leader like Jinnah was not possible for a leader
of a regional character. He was projected as a challenger to
Jinnah and his status was raised among the anti-League circles.
However, such writers ignored the coming political
developments in the Punjab in which Jinnah became assertive
soon after his entry in the regional politics.
The decision to participate in the regional politics became
imperative to strengthen the League in all-India politics. Before
the refusal of Fazl-i-Husain, it was a general perception that all
the Unionist Muslims were with the League but the rejection of
Pakistan Vision Vol. 10 No. 2 53

the Jinnah’s invitation convinced the League leadership to come

down to the regional level to save the party from the
blackmailing by the local leadership. Muslims were lucky that
League decided to challenge the regional parties well in time as
the first general elections under the 1935 Act were approaching
which could provide an opportunity to deal with the regional
parties and place the League agenda directly before the Muslim
masses. It pleased the Muslims of the Punjab that they were
expecting a better alternate to the Unionists who practically did
nothing for the common people. Their utmost endeavour was to
facilitate the landed aristocracy and the well to do families who
were inter-linked to each other by inert-marriages 12 neglecting
the prevailing caste system.
Before the elections of 1937, Sardar Buta Singh, the Deputy
President of the Council, contested election for the seat of
President of the Punjab Council against Ch. Chhotu Ram. The
Sikhs were hopeful of the victory as the urban Hindu members
opposed Chhotu Ram. This made Sardar Buta Singh a very
strong candidate. 13 But Chhotu Ram won the seat with 56 votes
while Sardar Buta Singh bagged only 28 votes. The defeat
enraged the Sikh parties who protested and left the Chamber. 14
This shows the environment of the communal relations within
the Punjab legislature. The non-Muslims had been with the
Unionist leadership but with reservations. They never gave a free
hand to the leadership in communal and other political issues
which had made this coalition strong as well as vulnerable. They
being far away from the communal tangles had been running the
governmental affairs successfully but on the other hand, ignoring
the real and core issues such as communalism was erroneous
which ultimately proved harmful. Even then, every community
was pursuing the communal agenda remaining within the
coalition government. In 1937, the non-Muslim members of the
Punjab Legislative Assembly intrigued against Sir Sikandar and
made a united effort to force the Premier to leave the office
through a no-confidence motion. They collected 16 lakh rupees
under Sardar Baldev Singh but not a single Muslim favoured this
anti-Sikandar conspiracy. 15
54 The Elections of 1936-37 in the Punjab

Provincial Elections of 1937

The Indian Act of 1935 brought major changes in the
constitutional status of the Punjab. The provincial Council was
renamed as the Punjab Legislative Assembly with increased
number of its members (175). All the members were to be
elected by the increased number of voters. The voting
qualification was the education, 16 being widow or mother of the
officer or military men martyred in war, being tax payee, being
tenant or land-owner of specific quantity of land or public
servant. The Sikhs were given 18 per cent, Hindus 24 per cent
and Muslims 48 per cent share in the Assembly seats. 17 The
division on the communal basis to Kripal C. Yadav was a
continuity of the divide and rule policy of the British who
intended to damage the national cause of India 18 but as a matter
of fact no community objected to it; they only protested on the
allocation of number of seats in the assembly. According to the
contradictory demands, the Sikhs had demanded 30 per cent
seats or the partition of the Punjab at the Round Table
Conference during 1930-32 19 which made the communal issue in
the Punjab very complicated and sensitive as well. Before the
general elections of 1937, the situation was undemocratic in the
province and the political tycoons were hardly opposed in their
constituencies. In the elections of 1930, Dr. Gokal Chand Narang
(EU), Ch. Chhotu Ram, Ujjal Singh (EU), S. Sampuran Singh
(EU), Raja Narender Nath (EU), S. Joginder Singh (EU),
Mukand Lal Puri (EU) from the non-Muslims and Jamal Khan
Leghari (EU), Ahmad Yar Daultana, Mubarak Ali Shah, Raza
Shah Gilani (EU), Mohammad Hayat Qureshi (EU), Feroz Khan
Noon (EU), Ch. M. Zafarullah Khan (EU), Ch. Shahab-ud-din
(EU), Pir Akbar Ali (EU), Abdul Ghani (EU) and others from
the Muslims were the prominent figures who returned to the
provincial legislature 20 as unopposed (EU). It shows the
environment of elections where influential families were playing
the role of a pressure group or Qabza group. Maulana Mazhar
Ali Azhar and Zaman Mehdi Khan won bye-election in 1934 and
entered the Assembly. 21
Pakistan Vision Vol. 10 No. 2 55

The elections of 1937 started with submitting the nomination

papers in November 1936 and polling was planned from
December 1936 to January 1937. 22 The Unionist Party having no
threat from any other political party launched its candidates and
in many cases it was decided beforehand that the winning
candidate would be an existing Unionist member. Being
confident so the Unionist Party did not contest elections as a
democratic party. According to Ian Talbot it did not arrange any
public gathering to convince the voters about the manifesto.
They believed that the government officials were there to do this
job. 23 They did not need to approach the masses because some
specific groups had a right to cast the vote but the common
Punjabis were deprived of this basic right. Furthermore, the
Unionist Party was existing as a ruling class having no ideology
to follow therefore, they were least interested in securing public
sympathy.
Interestingly, the elections were the first electoral event
which attracted a huge number of contesters and all the parties
participated with full democratic zeal and only a few returned as
unopposed to the Assembly while before 1937 most of the
candidates had faced no difficulty in re-capturing their seats.
The Sikhs and the Hindus joined hands against the Unionist
government which was being perceived as a Muslim domination
over the minorities. The Shiromani Akali Dal contested elections
on the basis to save Indian freedom, anti-Communal Award
pledge, Sikh rights, anti-Shahidganj struggle, Kirpan issue, etc. 24
The Akali Sikhs and the Congress made adjustment in numerous
constituencies during the elections 25 which encouraged them to
make more joint efforts in the political sphere. The Sikhs
expressed grave concern over the Muslim domination in the
Punjab and vociferated against the Unionist Muslims. The
League came down to the regional politics which disturbed the
makeshift arrangements in the provincial political arena. Jinnah
who was said to be a non-entity in the Punjab was there in the
Punjab when the Gurdwara Movement was launched by the
Sikhs in 1920s. He seemed favouring the Akalis when they were
tortured by the authorities. 26 He was the leader who resigned
from the assembly when the Rowlatt Act was enforced. He was
there in the Punjab when the Shahidganj issue was dragging
whole of the Punjab to a dreadful chaos. KL Guaba and Allama
56 The Elections of 1936-37 in the Punjab

Mashriqi requested Jinnah to interfere while the Governor and

the Unionist leaders were waiting to end the Muslim-Sikh
clashes. 27 It is interesting that the cross-communal party (the
Unionists) had been waiting for Jinnah (a communalist to the
Unionists) to cool down the communal frenzy in the province
over the Shahidganj issue.
The Congress got majority in 8 provinces out of 11 while the
League won only two seats in the Punjab. Beside 16 independent
candidates, the party position was as under:

Results in Punjab

Party Seats
Ahrar 02
Muslim League 02 28
Shiromani Akali Dal 11
Khalsa National Party 13
Hindu Mahasabha 12
Punjab Unionist Party 98
Ittehad-i-Millat 02
Indian National Congress 18
Congress Nationalist Party 01
Source: KC Yadav, Elections, 133-34.

The results reflect the trend of the Sikh voters towards the
Akalis who performed well and got recognition as the sole
representative of the Sikh panth. The main objective of the
League to contest the elections was to announce its entry into the
regional politics to challenge the Unionists who had refused to
accommodate the League leadership. It was a mere appearance
and first show on the part of the League and the real work were
yet to be done in the future.
The Unionist Party maintained its hegemony in the
Assembly but it secured 70 per cent votes in the rural and only
25 per cent votes in the urban constituencies. Apart from this, it
did not send any candidate in the eight urban constituencies
reserved for Hindus. 29 The sweeping election results put the anti-
League parties into power but this defeat did not discourage the
League because the results were not out of expectation. The
Pakistan Vision Vol. 10 No. 2 57

League leadership being realist could not expect a miracle

regarding the results after facing an extreme difficulty in finding
candidates for the constituencies. Jinnah was sure that it was a
starting point for the League and with its first direct entry in the
regional politics it could make the local leadership realize that
they had a short time to survive. Amarjit Singh writes that the
League sent 44 candidates in the constituencies 30 which is not a
correct figure. Only 10 candidates in the Punjab contested
elections from the League platform which shows that the League
leadership had no high expectations. With 102 seats in whole of
India retained the League which came up as a sole representative
party of the Muslims. The Congress launched 57 Muslim
candidates in the Punjab but only 26 reached the Assembly. The
party secured less than 50 per cent of the total votes in India.
Therefore, it was satisfying for the League that the Congress too
had not performed well in the Punjab. To Uma Kaura, “The only
redeeming feature for the League was that the performance of
Congress in the Muslim majority areas was also not
impressive.” 31 The League was the only party which voiced for
the rights of Muslims. Although the Punjab Unionist Party got
majority in the Punjab Assembly yet it had no representation in
other provinces of India.

Overall Results of the Elections of 1937

Province Actual Cong. Won Percentage
Seats
Bengal 250 35 32
NWFP 50 19 38
Punjab 175 18 10
Sindh 60 8 13
UP 228 133 58
Source: Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism, 108-9.

The results of the Punjab repudiated the Congress’s claim

that it was representative of all the Indian communities. In UP,
the Congressite Muslims were strong but “no Muslim was
returned on the Congress ticket.” 32 The Akalis had an
understanding with the Congress because it mainly wanted to
knock down the other Sikh parties. The SGPC 33 provided
58 The Elections of 1936-37 in the Punjab

workers, finances and support on the religious basis to the Akalis

who floated huge sums of money to win the elections against the
rival Sikh parties. This abuse of Gurdwara funds by the Akalis
was mentioned in Governor’s letter. 34 The Punjab Governor
Emerson concluded that the “Akali successes would have been
fewer had they not used religious funds for the purpose of
bribing the electorates.” 35 The real show of power in the regional
politics started after the elections. The elections produced
stunning implications which carved profound impact not only on
the politics of the Punjab but also at all-India level. The notable
incident of the elections 1937 was the Congress betrayal of the
League in the UP Assembly which according to Bimal Prasad
upset the Hindu-Muslim understanding 36 not only in the UP but
also throughout the Subcontinent.
The Congress leadership opposed the Unionists’ which was
not a sane strategy because the Unionists and the British had
similar agenda for the united India but the Congress could not
benefit from this enthusiasm. The anti-Muslim policies of the
Congress ministries confirmed the Two-Nation theory and
forced them to follow the League regarding their political rights.
The anti-Muslim drive of the Congress’ governments created
favourbale atmosphere for the League leadership who had
already been complaining of the cruel mentality of the Hindu
majority towards the Muslims. The debate in the British
Parliament on the anti-Muslim activities of the Congress
ministries was discouraged for the reason that such debate might
result in communal clashes in India. 37 The avoidance of the
subject by British Parliament ramified that there was something
wrong on the part of the Congress ministries which could
produce tension between Muslims and non-Muslims. Jinnah
passed a remark on the abuse of power by the Congress
ministries that “the Congress was like a poor man who had won
a great deal of money in a lottery; that it was intoxicated with
power.” 38 He also reiterated that ignoring the League by the
Congress was not a reasonable policy. The Congress leadership
would commit a greatest blunder if they thought that the
constitutional problem would be solved without the consent of
the League. He further warned that the Congress should “respect
the other parties” if it sought some agreed solution 39 to the on-
going constitutional deadlock.
Pakistan Vision Vol. 10 No. 2 59

The Muslims faced several problems under the Hindu

majority on the social issues and Congress rule on the political
rights. Even the Hindus tried to get their number increased
through false evidences. In January 1939, Hasan Nizami in an
editorial wrote that the Congress considered the League as an
impractical party and the Hindu-British patch-up against the
League was evident. He suggested that Jinnah should focus on
census of the Muslims. He explained that census was going to
start shortly and the League could work against the irregularities
expected in the census. The non-Muslim machinery was the real
cause of such irregularities because the non-Muslim officials
deliberately registered the ‘Hindi language’ as the mother tongue
of the Muslims which resulted in decrease of the Muslim voters.
Nizami Quoted his own example and expressed that he should
have been registered as voter according the eligibility criteria but
his name was not there in the voters’ list. He further requested
Jinnah to take the census issue into consideration because nine
crore Muslims were associated with the League therefore it was
necessary to collect the real figures of the Muslim population. 40

Popularity of the League

The League secured two seats in the Punjab and displayed

weak performance in the other Muslim majority provinces in the
elections which provided the anti-League parties an opportunity
to project it as an end of the political career of Jinnah and the
party. But as matter of fact, this failure did not rebut the League
and its leadership because many had foretold that the League
would win only a few of the Muslim seats in the coming
elections. 41 The stature of Jinnah remained as important and
effective as ever before. He was the only Muslim leader who
could face the Congress leadership on equal terms. 42 The results
did not pull him down in the eyes of the Muslims. His friendly
relations with the prominent Muslim families throughout the
country maintained his political position effective. 43 Ahmad Yar
Daultana, the Muslim Unionist, had a great respect for Jinnah. 44
Sometimes family members of the prominent leaders shared their
interests with him. Ahmad Yar Daultana wrote to Jinnah, “I have
60 The Elections of 1936-37 in the Punjab

considered you my leader during the last 25 years and have

always been loyal to you.” 45 He had a contribution in creating
congenial environment for Sir Sikandar Hayat and Jinnah who
later came to a pact at Lucknow in October 1937. 46
Jinnah was confident of the League’s success in the future
politics therefore he removed the shortcomings of the party and
“assured…that within a short time the League would become a
strong party capable of fighting any other party in the country.” 47
His prophecy came true and the Muslims of the Punjab
converged in the fold of League. Even the Punjab Premier under
the peculiar circumstances had to line up under the leadership of
Jinnah. The Pioneer appreciated the League’s success and wrote
that Jinnah had got a firm footing in the Punjab “within about a
year of his launching the programme.” 48
According to the Jinnah-Sikandar Pact in October 1937 at
Lucknow, the Unionist leader promised Jinnah to bring the
Unionist Muslim members to the League fold in the provincial
Assembly. This issue has generated an interesting debate among
the scholars as to why Sir Sikandar Hayat went to Lucknow after
winning the Premier’s office. The factors might include the
Hindu-Sikh unity, popularity of Jinnah, grouping within the
Unionist Party and Congress’ Mass Contact campaign in the
Punjab.
The first reason might be the Muslim Mass Contact
Movement of the Congress that moved Sikandar to approach
Jinnah because the Sikhs and Hindus intended to topple Sir
Sikandar’s government. They launched a campaign to root out
the League and Unionist influence from the Muslim majority
region. The Akalis were with the Congress as Master Tara Singh
supported Nehru and stated that the Punjab “Premier was a
stooge for the British, and that he was consolidating the Muslim
position in the Punjab.” 49 The other cause could be the grouping
within the Unionist Party which was divided into factions and
the League was causing further rifts among the party members.
The Punjab Muslim League though had negligible strength in the
Assembly, yet it enjoyed the support of highly respected figures
like Dr. Muhammad Iqbal. Sir Sikandar tried to capture the
League so that no rival could challenge his position in the
province. The other reason might be the sympathy of the Muslim
members with the League within the Unionist Party as Raja
Pakistan Vision Vol. 10 No. 2 61

Ghazanfar Ali Khan disclosed later that Jinnah himself deployed

him to create a pro-League atmosphere among the ruling
Muslims. 50
Sir Sikandar was well aware of the sensitive situation of the
party and that grouping within the party could weaken his
political grasp in the near future, therefore he decided to join
hands with Jinnah. Furthermore, he was clear that only the
League leadership could voice for the Muslim rights at the
national level 51 whose support was necessary to strengthen his
position. KC Yadav is of the opinion that Sir Sikandar joined
hands with Jinnah under the British motivation. 52 The writer
took it as a supposition rather than referring to any document.
Perhaps, his non-consultation of the Punjab Governor’s
Fortnightly Reports convinced him to misinterpret the situation.
The correspondence between the Punjab Governor and the
Viceroy clarifies that the Jinnah-Sikandar Pact was a personal
decision of Sir Sikander and it was astonishing for the British as
well. 53 Actually, Sir Sikandar came to the conclusion that only
Jinnah’s support could save him from the formidable Congress
and Akali Sikhs who had already been united in the Assembly an
year before. 54 Sangat Singh concluded that “the Unionists
committed the same blunder which the Akalis had committed
earlier by making Akali legislators to accept Congress
discipline.” 55
The Congress-Akali unity in the Assembly alarmed Sir
Sikandar who sought the League support. According to Qalb-i-
Abid, Sir Sikander because of the World War II could not afford
the desertion towards League because this tilt and popularity of
the League could upset the Sikhs. 56 Though, the threat from the
Congress and Akali Dal seems to be potent however, no simple
factor pushed Sir Sikandar to have a pact with the League
instead all major and minor neuroses convinced him to come to
terms with the League.
The Jinnah-Sikandar Pact strengthened both the Unionist
Party and the League but at the same time, it also resulted in the
bitterness between Muslims and Sikhs in the Punjab. 57 Sir
Sikandar could not visualise what side-effects the pact would
have on the future politics. 58 The Sikh apprehensions increased
because the pact declared the Unionist Muslims as the League
members while the League was perceived as the enemy of the
62 The Elections of 1936-37 in the Punjab

Sikh interests in the Punjab although they had no evidence to

prove the League as an anti-Sikhs party. The political
interdependence had bound them into coalition which the Sikhs
had absorbed as a necessary evil. The other attraction was the
official and social benefits which were possible in the unity
under which the cross-communal phenomenon was being
projected. The Jinnah-Sikandar Pact shattered confidence of
Sikhs, nevertheless they became satisfied on the clause of the
Pact which maintained the existing arrangements in the
Assembly.
This clause saved the non-Muslim and Muslim Unionist
coalition by sidelining the League. Sir Emerson was pleased on
the position of Sir Sikandar and wrote to Linlithgow on 12
November 1937 that the popularity of Sir Sikandar among Sikhs
and Hindus had saved the Punjab coalition government. The
Premier enjoyed cordial relations with Raja Narendra Nath who
forced Dr. Gokal Chand Narang to cancel the united Hindu
conference in Lahore which was being held against the Unionist
Muslims. 59 The Sikhs disapproved the Jinnah-Sikander Pact and
projected it as a conspiracy against the nationalists and
communal harmony. A meeting at Rawalpindi was arranged in
November 1938 under Sardar Baldev Singh. The Akali and
Congress flags were waved together and it passed anti-Unionist
remarks. The speakers also advised the Sikh audiences to join
the Congress. 60 Sajjad Zaheer, a Communist ideologue,
commented that the Jinnah-Sikandar pact was “a short-sighted
policy on the part of the League.” 61 But the actual position was
that, the League lost less and gained more from this pact. It
brought a revolutionary shift in the power of the Muslim politics.
The government officials and common Muslims perceived the
League as the real power of the near future. Jinnah was
perceived as leader of the Premier so the public started
complaining to Jinnah against the provincial and central
government. For example, in August 1938, the people appealed
to Jinnah to help the job-hunting Muslims. The impression
emerged that Sir Sikandar could not dare to overlook Jinnah’s
orders. 62
The popularity of the League was a sign of the downfall of
the Unionist government. The Unionists’ performance went so
low that ultimately it resulted in its political decline. In
Pakistan Vision Vol. 10 No. 2 63

December 1937, the Governor had to report that the Unionist

Ministers were not arranging public meetings while the
Communist and the Congress leaders had been working actively
in contacting the masses. To him, the Premier kept him busy in
the trivial administrative issues in the province. 63 All such
changes proved fatal for the Unionist Party while the decay of
the Unionists was a sign of League’s dominance.
Gradually, the League started making its position stronge in
the Punjab but the unjust policies of the Congress ministries did
more than other factors in popularizing the League among the
Indian Muslims. 64 Even before the passage of the Lahore
Resolution of 1940, the Muslims were mentally prepared to give
full support to the League. In January 1939, about 25,000
Muslims gathered in Patna to attend the League meeting. The
press presented the League as the sole representative party of the
Indian Muslims. Hasan Nizami expressed that the British and the
Hindus should witness this recognition of the League and honour
the reality otherwise it could be dangerous for them. He further
reiterated that hatred was growing against them day by day. He
also appreciated Jinnah for his sagacious dealing with the rival
parties on the communal matters. 65 The Congress leadership
took no prudent action in dealing with the communal issue at the
crucial stage instead they tried to let down the League and its
leadership. The Sikhs also remained adamantly with the
Congress which narrowed their role in the politics.
In the sum, the elections of 1937 were a starting point for the
League’s participation in the regional politics and after the
elections it prospered day by day as far as the massive support
was concerned. It did not loose its base, ideology, working
tempo and confidence though it got two seats in the first contest.
The culmination point of its effort was the passing of the Lahore
Resolution in 1940, just over 2 years, when it declared a political
war against the philosophy of united India which all the
outstanding factions such as the British, Hindus, Sikhs, and
nationalist Muslims believed in. A defeated party could not be as
assertive in the political domain as the League did. Moreover, if
the League was following the British dictation, then it was not
supposed to go against the will and ideology of the British
masters. The League’s agenda dictated by the British should
have been observed by the Unionists as well. If the League was
64 The Elections of 1936-37 in the Punjab

backed by the British, then the Unionists and British should not
have opposed the Lahore Resolution and the League leadership.
Considering the League as a sister party, (if the Premier had
revived the League under the British dictation) the Sikhs, Hindus
and Unionist Muslims should have strengthened the position of
MA Jinnah. But to the contrary, all of them, along with the
British made joint efforts to deny the true status of the League
which ratifies that the League was not depending on the British
support but it was truly a representative party of the Indian
Muslims which never compromised on question of the Muslim
rights.
The League leadership proved its sagacity in the political
affairs and caused cracks in the anti-League and pro-British fort
in the Punjab. Therefore, the elections of 1937 did not damage
their image but popularized them among the masses of the
Punjab. The Muslim massive response made the League so
assertive and confident in the political domain that it adopted the
character of a mass party within a short span of time.

Notes and References

1 Raghuvendra Tanwar, Politics of Sharing Power, The

Punjab Unionist Party 1923-1947 (New Delhi:
Manohar Publishers, 1999), 7.

2 Amarjit Singh, Punjab Divided, Politics of the Muslim

League and Partition 1935-1947 (New Delhi:
Kanishka Publishers, 2001), 57.

3 KC Yadav, “The Partition of India: A Study of the

Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 1849-1947,” The
Punjab Past and Present vol. XVII-I, no. 33 (April
1983): 130.

4 Akali Dal was founded on 14 December 1920 as

Gurdwara Sewak Dal, renamed as Akali Dal on 23
January 1921 and on 29 March 1922, it got recognition
with the name of Shiromani Akali Dal. Dr. Harjinder
Pakistan Vision Vol. 10 No. 2 65

Singh Dilgeer, http://www.dilgeer.com/sadal.htm, 31-

12-2003.

5 Chief Khalsa Diwan was changed into the Khalsa

National Party under Sir Sunder Singh Majithia after
the elections of 1936.

6 The Civil and Military Gazette (Lahore) 1 March

1936.

7 Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase

(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1978), 177.

8 Bakhshish Singh Nijjar, Punjab under the British

Rule, 1802-1932, vol. II (Patiala: n.p., n.d.), 57-58.

9 CMG,, 28 May 1936.

10 Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 1921-47

(Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1992), 187.

11 Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase,

177.

12 Khattars, Syeds, Qizalbash, Qureshi, Daultanas etc.

inter-married and strengthened their hold in the Punjab
politics. Even they negated the so-called caste system
which was an outstanding feature of the Punjabi
culture.

13 CMG, 20 October 1936.

14 Ibid., 21 October 1936.

15 “Meem Sheen ki kuchh yaden kuchh baten,” Nawa-i-

Waqt (Lahore) 11 September 1992.

16 Minimum education was primary.

66 The Elections of 1936-37 in the Punjab

17 Kripal C. Yadav, Elections in Punjab, 1920-1947

(Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 1981),
15-19.

18 Ibid.

19 Sikh Memorandum presented by Sardar Ujjal Singh at

Indian Round Table Conference (Second session) 12
November 1931, file no. 15, Quaid-i-Azam Papers.

20 Election Returns 1930 in Kripal C. Yadav, Elections in

Punjab, 67-71.

21 Ibid., 72-73.

22 Ibid., 84.

23 CMG, 14 October 1936 in Ian Talbot, Punjab and the

Raj (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1988), 130.

24 Akali Party’s Elections Manifesto, The Tribune of 20

June 1936.

25 R. N. Vohra, “The Akali Dal and the National

Movement,” Punjab History Conference, 20th Session
(Patiala: Punjab Historical Studies, Punjabi University,
1987): 339-40.

26 Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs, vol. II

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 210n.

27 Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 183-84.

28 Malik Barkat Ali won the seat by only 90 votes against

his rival candidate, Hamidullah Beg while Raja
Ghazanfar Ali took lead of 740 votes from Mohd.
Afzal Khan. Kripal C. Yadav, Elections in Punjab, 87
and 91.
Pakistan Vision Vol. 10 No. 2 67

29 Tanwar, Politics of Sharing Power, 100.

30 Amarjit Singh, Punjab Divided, 44.

31 Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism: The

Emergence of the Demand for India’s Partition, 1928-
40 (Lahore: Book Traders, n.d.), 109.

32 P. Hardy, The Muslims of British India (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 1972), 224.

33 Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee was a

parent organisation of the Akali Dal with religious
status among the Sikhs.

34 Letter from Emerson to Linlithgow, Linlithgow Papers

in PN Chopra ed., Towards Freedom, 1937-47, vol. 1
(New Delhi: Indian Council of Historical research,
1985), 166.

35 Letter from Emerson to Viceroy on 8 May 1937,

Linlithgow Papers, Ibid., 489.

36 Bimal Prasad, “Jawaharlal Nehru and Partition,” in

Amrik Singh, The Partition in Retrospect (Delhi:
National Institute of Punjab Studies, 2000), 30.

37 Weekly Munadi (Urdu) Delhi, 8 February 1940.

38 Qalb-i-Abid and Massarrat Abid, “The British

Response to the Demand for Pakistan: Prelude to the
Lahore Resolution and the British Reaction,” Journal
of Research vol., 19 (2002): 78.

39 Ibid.

40 Khwaja Hasan Nizami, “Muslim League k liey kam,”

Weekly Munadi (Delhi) 8 January 1939.
68 The Elections of 1936-37 in the Punjab

41 Mushirul Hasan ed., India’s Partition: Process,

Strategy and Mobilization (Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 1994), 235.

42 Sikandar Hayat, “Charisma, Crisis and the Emergence

of Quaid-i-Azam,” Journal of the Pakistan Historical
Society, vol. L, no. 1&2 (January-June 2002): 31-46.

43 Relations with the Punjab leaders can be observed

through the correspondence between Jinnah and the
Punjabi leaders, see S. Qaim Hussain Jafri, ed., Quaid-
i-Azam’s Correspondence with Punjab Muslim
Leaders (Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1977); se also,
Wakeel Anjum, Daultana Dastan (Lahore: Jang
publishers, 1996), 42 and passim.

44 Ahmad Yar Daultana, “Leaves from Unionist’s

Diary,” The Civil and Military Gazette, 21 October
1936.

45 Letter from AY Daultana to MA Jinnah on 28 March

1940, in Rizwan Ahmad, The Quaid-E- Azam Papers
1940 (Karachi and Lahore: East & West Publishing
Company, 1976), 96-97.

46 BS Nijjar, Punjab under the British, vol. III, 160-161.

47 Chopra, Towards Freedom, 558.

48 BS Nijjar, Punjab under the British, vol. III, 161.

49 S. Qalb-i-Abid, Muslim Politics in the Punjab, 192-

193.

50 Javed Haider Syed, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan-A

Political Biography (M.Phil. Thesis) (Department of
History, QAU, Islamabad, 1985), 141.
Pakistan Vision Vol. 10 No. 2 69

51 P. Moon, Divide and Quit (London: Chatto &

Windus, 1961), 17.

52 KC Yadav, “The Partition of India,” The Punjab Past

and Present, 130.

53 Fortnightly Report, (Punjab Governor to the Viceroy),

L/PJ/5/238.

54 The Akali-Congress relationship presented a confused

picture. Congress never valued the Sikhs but they
remained submissive to the Congress. To counter the
Akali influence, the Congress formed the Congress
Sikh Party under Sarmukh Singh Jhabal in August
1936 but after few political skirmishes, the Shiromani
Akali Dal joined hands partly with the Congress in the
elections 1937. In several constituencies, they put joint
candidates but in other constituencies, they contested
elections as rival parties.

55 The Shiromani Akali Dal agreed that the Akali

candidates, returned to the provincial legislature,
would be a part of the Congress Legislative Party
under the Congress discipline. Sangat Singh, The Sikhs
in History, 2nd ed. (New Delhi: Uncommon Books,
1996), 208; see also KL Tuteja, “Sikhs and the
Congress: 1930-40,” in Verinder Grover, ed., The
Story of Punjab, Yesterday and Today (Delhi: Deep
and Deep Publications, 1995), 455.

56 S. Qalb-i-Abid, “Muslim-Sikh Relationship (1921-47)

A Brief Survey,” Journal of the Pakistan Historical
Society XXXIX, Part III (July 1991): 271-272.

57 Secretary of State on the Indian Political Situation,

Cabinet Papers, no. 24/273 in Chopra, Towards
Freedom, 1196.
70 The Elections of 1936-37 in the Punjab

58 S. Qalb-i-Abid and Massarrat Abid, “Unionist-Muslim

League Relations and the Punjab Administration,”
Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan vol. 45,
no. 2 (July-December 2008): 91.

59 Letter from Emerson to Linlithgow on 12 November

1037 in Lionel Carter ed., Punjab Politics, 1936-1939:
Start of Provincial Autonomy (Delhi: Manohar
Publishers, 2004):, 147-150.

60 KC Gulati, The Akalis Past and Present (New (Delhi:

Ashajanak Publications, 1974), 77.

61 Bhagwan Josh, Communist Movement in Punjab,

1926-47 (Lahore: Book Traders, n.d.), 174.

62 Letters from Mohammad Aziz Mirza to MA Jinnah on

10 August 1938 and MA Majid, Secretary, Muslim
Employees Welfare Association, Rawalpindi on 15
August 1938, file. No. 1095, Quaid-i-Azam Papers,
NAP.

63 FR, L/PJ/5/238.

64 It was a fact that the Congress ministry did not exist in

the Punjab but the Muslims of the Punjab felt jubilant
on the resignation of the Congress ministries in 1939.

65 “Khawja Hasan Nizami ke Note,” (Muslim League ka

Jalsa) Munadi, Delhi (Urdu weekly) 1 January 1939.