PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS CASES

CANON 2-INTEGRITY

1. ROSQUETA vs. JUDGE ASUNCION CASE NO.: A.M. No.MTJ-13-1823 DATE OF PROMULGATION:
March19, 2014

Facts:

On July 2, 2008, complainant Police Sr. Insp. Teddy M. Rosqueta, then Deputy Chief of Police of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, filed
an affidavit- complaint charging respondent Presiding Judge Jonathan A. Asuncion of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 2, in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte with grave misconduct and violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
specifically Canon 2, Rule 2.01.

At about 4:30 pm of April 25, 2008, Chief Insp. Jericho Baldeo, the Chief of Police of Bacarra, received a report about persons
armed with firearms in the house of one Alex Asuncion. Chief Insp. Baldeo dispatched Sr. Insp. Rosqueta and other
members of the Bacarra Municipal Police Station to verify the report. Sr. Insp. Rosqueta and his team proceeded to the area,
where they found two shirtless males with guns tucked on their waists and immediately apprehended them for illegally
possessing firearms, magazines and ammunitions. The arrestees were identified as Fidel Refuerzo and Rex Dalere. The
firearm that became the subject of this administrative charge – identified as a DAEWOO 9mm pistol bearing serial number
BA 005280 – was seized from Refuerzo.

Based on Sr. Insp. Rosqueta’s investigation, Refuerzo, a resident of Barangay 15, Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, worked as an
associate/bodyguard of Judge Asuncion.Upon verification at the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office of the Office of the
Firearms and Explosives, Security Agencies and Guards Supervision (FESAGS), Refuerzo was found to be not listed as a
registered or licensed holder of any kind and caliber of firearm.

The investigation revealed that the firearm in question had been previously seized from the possession of one Joseph Canlas
during an illegal drugs buy-bust operation conducted on August 23, 2005 in Darayday, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte; and that Sr.
Insp. Rosqueta had led the buy-bust operation and had seen to the filing on August 24, 2005 of criminal cases charging
Canlas with illegal possession of dangerous drugs in violation of Republic Act No 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act), and with the illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended
by Republic Act No. 8294.

Issue:

WON judge asuncion violated the new code of judicial conduct & guilty of gross misconduct?

Ruling:

The admonition that judges must avoid not only impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety is more sternly applied
to lower court judges.
Indeed, judges are reminded that after having accepted their exalted position in the Judiciary, they owe to the public to
uphold the exacting standards of conduct demanded of them. The circumstances obtaining here seriously tainted the good
image and reputation of the Judiciary, even as it reflected badly on Judge Asuncion’s personal and official reputation.
Sec. 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct under the category of gross
misconduct. We have defined gross misconduct as a "transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer."

Judge Asuncion is found administratively liable for gross misconduct for violating Sections1 and 2ofCanon2, and Sec. 1of
Canon4, of the New Code of judicial Conduct; he is ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P21, 000.00 to be paid within 15
days from the finality hereof, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.

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2. BERNARDITA F. ANTIPORDA v. FRANCISCO A. ANTE +

FACTS:
Complainant alleged that in the morning of March 2, 2014, she was in the backyard of a house
located at Rizal St., Barangay III, Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, when respondent, who was in the adjacent
lot, suddenly confronted her by saying, “Why are you glaring/pouting at me?" Then, he slapped
her face several times, and whipped her with a dog chain. He also pointed a .45 caliber pistol at
complainant, as well as her boarders and workers, who witnessed the incident.
Although complainant admitted having glared at respondent at the time, she explained that it was
because she discovered that respondent had maliciously reported to the Office of the City
Engineer of Vigan that her house was being renovated without the necessary building permit in
spite of the fact that she secured one. The OCA referred the matter to Judge Balloguing of the RTC of Vigan City for
investigation, report, and recommendation.

In her Report, Judge Balloguing found that complainant had indeed sustained physical injuries
inflicted by respondent. However, she believed that it was complainant who held the steel chain,
which she used to defend herself when respondent approached her. Judge Balloguing also found
that respondent had a grudge against complainant because he reported the illegal renovation of
her house, opining that he could have instead advised her to secure the necessary building
permit. Judge Balloguing recommended that respondent be found guilty of acts unbecoming of a
judge and be sanctioned with either a fine or suspension.
The OCA, while concurring with Judge Balloguing's conclusions of fact, disagreed with respect to
the recommended penalty.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent should be held administratively liable.

RULING:
YES, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that "integrity is essential not only to the
proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges."
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court, and the Judiciary as a whole. In other
words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. Judges are required to always be temperate,
patient, and courteous, both in conduct and in language.
Apart from being a display of arrogance, respondent's demeanor and actuations, which resulted
in physical injuries to complainant, are in direct contravention of the virtues of patience, sobriety,
and self-restraint so espoused by the Court and highly expected of a member of the judiciary.
Regardless of the reason for the incident, respondent, being a magistrate, should have observed
judicial temperament which requires him to be always temperate, patient, and courteous, both in
conduct and in language.
Respondent's acts, therefore, constitute grave misconduct, which the Court defines as "a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer."
Since respondent has, however, retired on November 7, 2017 and hence, could not anymore be
dismissed from service, the Court, instead, found it proper to order the forfeiture of all of his
retirement benefits (except accrued leave credits), and further, disqualify him from reinstatement
or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

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3. ANONYMOUS VS. JUDGE BILL D. BUYUCAN, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, BAGABAG-DIADI, NUEVAVIZCAYA

FACTS

: On June 26, 1969, Proclamation No. 573 was signed, which set aside certain lands of the public domainas permanent forest
reserves. Included in the said reservation was a 193-hectare parcel of land located in SitioTapaya, Villaros, Bagabag, Nueva
Vizcaya, a portion of which was granted to the Department of Agriculture (DA)for research purposes (Subject Property).
Accordingly, the Subject Property was declared for taxation purposesby the DA as evidenced by T.D. ARP No. 2005-03017-
0117 and is now known as the Department of AgricultureCagayan Valley Hillyland Research Outreach Station (DA-
CVHILROS).

As there was a need to clear the Subject Property of informal settlers already residing therein, the DA filedseveral criminal
and civil cases before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bagabag-Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya(MCTC), which is presided over by
respondent Judge Buyucan. Among the cases filed before the MCTC were: (i) Civil Case No. 626 for Forcible Entry, entitled
"Province ofNueva Vizcaya v. Eling Valdez, et al.," and (ii) Criminal Cases No. 4691 and 5094 for Malicious Mischief,
entitled"People of the Philippines v. Eling Valdez" and "People of the Philippines v. Amado Valdez alias Eling,"respectively.
The said cases were eventually dismissed by respondent Judge Buyucan in separate Decisionsdated May 22, 2008 and June
16, 2008. A few months later, in August 2008, respondent Judge Buyucan acquired a parcel of and located within theSubject
Property for One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) from Eling Valdez, the same respondentin the previously
dismissed cases, together with Ernesto A. Bagos, Isaija Suarez, and a certain Casmin as co-vendors. The purported sale was
evidenced by a "Waiver of Rights and Improvements."Subsequently, complaints for Malicious Mischief were again filed
before the MCTC against the informal settlers,entitled "People of the Philippines v. Arsenio Apostol and John Doe" and
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 5597and 5598. A Motion for Voluntary Inhibition dated March 9, 2009 was then filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),seeking the inhibition of respondent Judge Buyucan as he was also residing within the
very same propertyinvolved in the said criminal cases. The OSG alleged that his continued presence in the Subject Property
had"emboldened" the other informal settlers to continue with their illegal occupation therein. Respondent JudgeBuyucan,
however, refused to recuse himself from hearing the said cases. As a result of the foregoing, in a Letter dated March 1, 2013,
the OMB informed the OCA of an anonymous textmessage received by the Ombudsman Lifestyle Check Hotline on February
20, 2013, as follows:

Gud day po, gusto ko lang iparating sa inyo itong problema namn dto sa brgy. Villaros, Bagabag NuevaVizcaya tungkol po sa
isang naturingan Judge dto po sa aming bayan kasip nagpatayo po cia ng bahayeh pagkaalam po naming dpo sa kanya yung
lupa at wala po kamng makita na building permit taposmaluwang pa ang kanyang sinakop na lupa para kanyang panabong
na maunkan imbes n asana kamiang makinabang san po paki imbistigahan po ito maraming salamat po!!!Gud am po, yung
tinutukoy po maimbistigahan ay si judge Bill Buyucan ng MTC Bagacg, N.V., tnx/.

In an Indorsement dated April 4, 2013, the OCA referred the Letter dated March 1, 2013 to Hon. Fernando F.Flor, Jr. (Judge
Flor), Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, forinvestigation and report. In his Report
dated May 16, 2013,Judge Flor gathered the following facts:1. Judge Buyucan is occupying an approximate area of one (1)
hectare where he keeps and maintainshis fighting cock farm. A year ago, he started constructing a two-storey house made
of strong materialswithout securing a building permit. This is confirmed by the Municipal Engineer of Bagabag in
itsCertification dated May 15, 2013.2. The land occupied by Judge Buyucan is part of the 193 hectares given to the
Department of Agriculture(DA) by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 573 dated June 26, 1969, intended for research purposes
and for planting of various plants and trees. The land is declared for taxation purposes in the name of the DAas evidenced
by Tax Declaration ARP No. 2005-03017-0117

ISSUES:

WoN Judge Buyucan is liable

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Ruling:

YES. The evidence on record is unequivocal.

At the outset, respondent Judge Buyucan's continued illegal settlement erodes the public'sconfidence in its agents of
justice considering that such act amounts to an arbitrary deprivation ofthe DA's ownership rights over the Subject Property.
Even worse, his continued refusal to vacateinstigated the continued illegal occupation of other informal settlers residing
therein.

Respondent Judge Buyucan's conduct incites intrigue and puts into question his impartiality indeciding the cases then
pending before him. Such conduct unquestionably gives rise to theimpression that he was motivated by extraneous factors
in ruling on the said cases.

Guided by the foregoing standards, the Court hereby finds respondent Judge Buyucan guilty ofgross misconduct for his
flagrant violation of the standard of conduct embodied in the New JudicialCode of Judicial Conduct.

The interests of justice require no less than a penalty commensurate to the violations committedby the person charged. In
this regard, the OCA's recommendation to penalize respondent JudgeBuyucan with a six (6)-month suspension without
benefits is far too light given the gravity andmultiplicity of infractions committed by respondent Judge Buyucan. Such acts
betray his utter lackof integrity and impartiality, both mandatory and continuing requirements, which renders him unfitto
continue his service as an esteemed member of the bench. Bearing the foregoing in mind, theCourt hereby imposes the
penalty of dismissal from the service and forfeiture of benefits followingRule 140.

Further, the Court adopts the finding and recommendation of the OCA to order respondent JudgeBuyucan to immediately
vacate the Subject Propert

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 A.M. No. RTJ-14-2399
4. BANDOY V JUDGE JACINTO November 19, 2004
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
GASPAR BANDOY JUDGE JOSE JACINTO
Administrative case filed by Bandoy against Judge Jacinto for alleged Grave Abuse of Authority
FACTS
1) Bandoy was charged with serious illegal detention initiated by DE JESUS which was raffled to Judge Jacinto’s sala.
2) Bandoy argues that the charge was filed by DE JESUS merely to get back against the former for being instrumental in the filing
of a charge against DE JESUS for violating ARTICLE XXII, SECTION 261, Paragraph 7, number 14 of the OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE
(Ballot switching). Bandoy, who was the poll watcher of Mayor Joel Panaligan, was said to have caught DE JESUS in the act of
ballot switching. DE JESUS is a public elementary school teacher who was the chair of the Board of Election Inspectors of a
particular precinct in Occidental Mindoro. He was alleged to be having close ties with the rival of Mayor Joel Panaligan, Voltaire
Villarosa. He was caught by a member of the media and has already been the object of a warrant of arrest. The case was also
raffled in the same sala- that of Judge Jacinto
3) Bandoy argues that Judge Jacinto has been manifestly partial towards DE JESUS, allowing the latter to postpone his
arraignment 7 times, before finally pleading not guilty before Judge Jacinto, inside his chambers on July 6, 2011. He also submits
that the Judge Jacinto failed to dismiss the serious illegal detention case against him despite the fact that DE JESUS has also
failed to appear whenever he was subpoenaed.
4) Meanwhile, Bandoy had his case reviewed under the DOJ. Secretary de Lima granted his motion and ordered the prosecutor to
withdraw the case. Judge Jacinto also denied the motion for withdrawal. The theory of the petitioner is that the manifest
partiality by Judge Jacinto against him is because Voltaire Villarosa, the candidate which DE JESUS had close ties to, was the
principal sponsor in Judge Jacinto’s wedding.
ISSUE/S
I. Whether the arraignment proceeding was improper and whether the Judge must be held administratively liable?- YES.
HE IS GUILTY OF GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW.
RATIO
In this case, Judge Jacinto, Jr. was directly confronted with an allegation that he arraigned De Jesus, Jr. inside his chambers.  He was
given the opportunity to answer, but he chose not to delve into it.  Ultimately, Judge Jacinto, Jr. did not squarely face the issues being
imputed against him, which was quite irregular since it was his name and his capacity as a member of the bench, that was being
challenged.  As aptly observed by the OCA, “the natural instinct of man impels him to resist an unfounded claim or imputation and defend
himself.  It is against human nature to just remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false accusations.” [38]  His silence introduces
doubt in the minds of the public, which is not acceptable.

The procedural steps laid down in Section 1(a) of Rule 116 are not empty rituals that a judge can take nonchalantly.  Each step constitutes
an integral part of that crucial stage in criminal litigation “where the issues are joined x x x and without which the proceedings cannot
advance further.”[39]

Thus, anything less than is required by Section 1(a) of Rule 116 constitutes gross ignorance of the law. [40]  There is gross ignorance of the
law when the error committed by the judge was “gross or patent, deliberate or malicious.” [41] It may also be committed when a judge
ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. [42]  Gross
ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith. [43]

The Court has impressed upon judges that they owe it to the public and the legal profession to know the very law that they are supposed
to apply in a given controversy.[44]  They are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules, to be conversant with the basic law, and to maintain the desired professional competence. [45]  When a judge displays an utter lack
of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts.  A judge owes the public and the Court the duty to be
proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be
the mainspring of injustice.[46]

Here, the Court cannot fathom why the arraignment of De Jesus, Jr. was postponed from 2007 to 2011 without appropriate action coming
from the court.  Judge Jacinto, Jr. should have availed of known legal remedies to compel De Jesus, Jr. to personally appear for his
arraignment, but he did not.  The appearance of leniency seemingly exhibited in favor of De Jesus, Jr. gives an impression of bias and
partiality that should be addressed and corrected.

Notes:

CANON 3-IMPARTIALITY

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5. COURT VS. RTC

EN BANC A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219, August 01, 2017 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS. RETIRED
JUDGE PABLO R. CHAVEZ, FORMER PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 87, ROSARIO, BATANGAS, ATTY.
TEOFILO A. DIMACULANGAN, JR., CLERK OF COURT VI, MR. ARMANDO ERMELITO M. MARQUEZ, COURT INTERPRETER III,
MS. EDITHA E. BAGSIC, COURT INTERPRETER III, AND MR. DAVID CAGUIMBAL, PROCESS SERVER, ALL OF REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 87, ROSARIO, BATANGAS, RESPONDENTS.

[A.M. No. 12-7-130-RTC]

RE: UNDATED ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST THE PRESIDING JUDGE, CLERK OF COURT AND COURT
STENOGRAPHER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 87, ROSARIO, BATANGAS.

PER CURIAM:

For resolution is the motion for reconsideration[1] filed by respondent retired Judge Pablo R. Chavez (Judge Chavez) of our
Decision[2] dated March 7, 2017.

We adjudged Judge Chavez guilty of gross neglect of duty and undue delay in rendering decisions and imposed on him the
penalty of forfeiture of all his retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, in lieu of dismissal from service which can
no longer be imposed due to Judge Chavez's retirement.

In his motion, Judge Chavez explains that the acts of omission attributed to him, far from being committed willfully and
intentionally, betray his good faith and that his failure to meet the exacting standards of performance required of a
Presiding Judge in the supervision of his personnel and management of his case load was borne merely of his misplaced
trust on his Clerk of Court, Atty. Teofilo Dimaculangan (Atty. Dimaculangan), and other court staff. He laments that he
himself was a victim of Atty. Dimaculangan's betrayal and regrets his inability to pursue disciplinary actions on his court staff
for their failure and refusal to observe and follow his instructions.

In any event, Judge Chavez begs the magnanimity and compassion of this Court and implores that we extend him leniency
by mitigating the penalty imposed and reducing it to a fine. Judge Chavez requests that the following mitigating
circumstances be considered in his favor: (1) his almost 31 years of continuous government service; (2) unblemished record
as he is a first time offender; and (3) his good faith and extreme remorse for his infraction.

Also, Judge Chavez appeals that he is already 77 years old and experiencing various illnesses. He pleads that his retirement
benefits would be used to support his daily needs and medication.

We hold that Judge Chavez's claims of acting in good faith and being a victim of the betrayal of Atty. Dimaculangan and his
court staff do not excuse him from liability.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Sumilang,[3] respondent judge was administratively charged in relation to an
anomalous transaction involving misappropriation of funds committed by his court staff. In rejecting respondent judge's
defense of lack of knowledge of the irregularities committed by his own staff and finding him guilty of gross negligence, we
held:
A judge must always remember that as the administrator of his court, he is responsible for the conduct and management
thereof. He has the duty to supervise his court personnel to ensure prompt and efficient dispatch of business in his court.
The ignorance of respondent Judge as to the irregularities occurring in his own backyard constitutes serious breach of
judicial ethics.

Judge Sumilang's excuse, that upon learning of the irregularities being committed by his court personnel, he immediately
acted with haste and instructed Malla to turn over the money, is specious and unconvincing. His admission that he had no
knowledge regarding the anomalies going on in his court underscores his inefficiency and incompetence. It clearly
demonstrates a lack of control expected of a judge exercising proper office management.[4] (Citations omitted.)
We emphasize that judges must not only be fully cognizant of the state of their dockets, likewise, they must keep a watchful
eye on the level of performance and conduct of the court personnel under their immediate supervision who are primarily
employed to aid in the administration of justice. The leniency of a judge in the administrative supervision of his employees is
an undesirable trait.[5]

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Here, Judge Chavez's failure to meet the exacting standards of his position, as evidenced by the number and different
irregularities discovered to have been occurring in his court, as well as his failure to eliminate these irregularities, establish
that he was grossly negligent in the performance of his duties.

II

Be that as it may, the presence of mitigating circumstances which should be appreciated in favor of Judge Chavez warrants
the reduction of the penalty to be imposed on him.

Section 48, Rule X of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) provides that in the
determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances attendant to the commission of
the offense shall be considered. The following are to be considered:

Other analogous circumstances.

In previous cases, we have also imposed lesser penalties in the presence of these mitigating circumstances. This is
consistent with precedent where we refrained from imposing the actual administrative penalties prescribed by law or
regulation in the presence of mitigating factors.[6] Indeed, while we are duty-bound to sternly wield a corrective hand to
discipline our errant employees and to weed out those who are undesirable, we also have the discretion to temper the
harshness of its judgment with mercy.[7]

In Committee on Security and Safety, Court of Appeals v. Dianco, we identified the instances where we imposed lesser
penalties in the presence of mitigating factors:
In Judge Isidra A. Arganosa-Maniego v. Rogelio T. Salinas, we suspended the respondent who was guilty of grave
misconduct and dishonesty for a period of one (1) year without pay, taking into account the mitigating circumstances of:
first offense, ten (10) years in government service, acknowledgment of infractions and feeling of remorse, and restitution of
the amount involved.

In Alibsar Adoma v. Romeo Gatcheco and Eugenio Taguba, we suspended one of the respondents for one (1) year without
pay, after finding him guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service.
The respondent was a first-time offender.

And, in Horacio B. Apuyan, Jr. and Alexander O. Eugenio v. Alfredo G. Sta. Isabel, we imposed the same penalty of one (1)
year suspension without pay to the respondent who was a first-time offender of the offenses of grave misconduct,
dishonesty, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interests of the service.[9] (Italics in the original, citations omitted.)
As regards judges, in Office of the Court Administrator v. Aguilar,[10] we imposed the penalty of six months suspension
instead of dismissal from service after taking into consideration the mitigating circumstances of dismissal of related criminal
cases for lack of probable cause, good faith, respondent judge's strong credentials for appointment as judge, length of
government service, first time offense, and remorse and promise to be more accurate and circumspect in future
submissions before us.

In In Re: Petition for the Dismissal from Service and/or Disbarment of Judge Baltazar R. Dizon,[11] we reconsidered our
earlier Decision dismissing from service the respondent judge and lowered the penalty to suspension from February 23, 1988
until the date of promulgation of the Resolution on May 31, 1989 after considering the mitigating circumstances of length of
government service, lack of corrupt motives, environmental difficulties such as overloaded docket, unceasing strain caused
by hearings on complex cases and lack of libraries, decent courtrooms, office equipment, supplies and other facilities, and
humble repentance.

In Rubin v. Corpus-Cabochan,[12] we considered the mitigating circumstances of first offense in respondent judge's almost
23 years of government service, frail health, case load and candid admission of infraction in determining that the
appropriate penalty to be imposed on respondent judge who was found guilty of gross inefficiency was admonition.

In Fernandez v. Vasquez,[13] we appreciated the mitigating circumstances of unblemished judicial service and first offense in
imposing the penalty of fine of P50,000 against respondent judge who was held guilty of dishonesty, an offense punishable
with dismissal even on the first commission. The fine was imposed in lieu of suspension from office which can no longer be
imposed due to respondent judge's retirement.

In Perez v. Abiera,[14] we imposed the penalty of fine equivalent to three-month salary of respondent judge, deductible
from his retirement benefits, after appreciating the mitigating circumstances of length of service and poor health.

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Thus, we exercise the discretion granted by the RRACCS and prevailing jurisprudence in the imposition of penalty and
reconsider the dismissal and forfeiture of Judge Chavez's retirement benefits in view of mitigating circumstances that were
overlooked and not properly appreciated.

We apply to Judge Chavez the mitigating circumstances of: (1) remorse in committing the infractions; (2) length of
government service; (3) first offense; and (4) health and age. These humanitarian considerations will mitigate Judge
Chavez's penalty and remove him from the severe consequences of the penalty of dismissal and forfeiture of his retirement
benefits. Taking into account these mitigating circumstances, together with the aggravating circumstance of being guilty of
the lesser offense of undue delay in rendering decisions, we impose the penalty of fine equivalent to three months of Judge
Chavez's last salary.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent retired Judge Pablo R. Chavez. The
Decision dated March 7, 2017 is MODIFIED. Respondent retired Judge Pablo R. Chavez is ordered to pay a FINE equivalent to
THREE MONTHS of his last salary, deductible from his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, Martires,
Tijam, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., J., Please see separate concurring opinion.
Leonen, J., I join Justice Velasco's separate opinion.
Caguioa, J., on leave.

(Court vs. Rtc A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219 August 01, 2017)

CANON 4-PROPRIETY

6. MA. LIZA M. JORDA vs. JUDGE CRISOLOGO S. BITAS

PROSECUTOR LEO C. TABAO vs. JUDGE CRISOLOGO S. BITAS
2014-03-05 | A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376 and A.M. No. RTJ-14-2377

Peralta, J.:
FACTS:

• Two administrative cases were filed against Judge Bitas, a Regional Trial Court Judge of Tacloban City.
• The first case came about when one Danilo Miralles was charged with Qualified Trafficking and the same filed with
the sala of Judge Bitas, in which the respondent judge issued an order finding probable cause to indict Danilo, but allowing
him to post bail in the three cases. Judge Bitas was allegedly showed bias in favor of the accused Miralles
o When he did not issue a warrant of arrest even when the Information have been filed charging Miralles with non-
bailable cases
o When he reduced bail even without a motion to fix bail without giving the opposition an opportunity to file its
objections
• The second charge was filed by Prosecutor Jorda involves the hearing on the Petition for Involuntary Commitment
of minor victim Margie Baldoza to the DSWD, wherein the judge allegedly propounded a series of questions tending to
mitigate Danilo’s role in the case, which according to the prosecution went beyond judicial authority and discretion.
• A motion for inhibition was filed against the judge. During the hearing, the judge allegedly publicly humiliated Pros.
Jorda and berated her for filing of the motion. He then told her he does not want to see her in his court, and prevented her
from conducting cross-examination.

Judge Bitas’ Defense:

• On the first charge: it was wrong to arrest Danilo because he was still in the process of determining probable cause
and when he did found probable cause, he found the evidence of the prosecution not strong hence he allowed Danilo to
post bail. There was no more need to file a petition for bail as he already found the evidence against Miralles weak during
the hearing on the determination of probable cause.
• On the second charge: it was complainant who lacked knowledge of the law and was lawyering for politicians.
Indeed he stopped her from conducting cross examination because it was the DSWD lawyers who should actively prosecute
the case.

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Office of the Court Administrator’s Recommendation:
• Found respondent judge GUILTY of grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law, and recommended
that Judge Bitas be fined P20,000.00 for each case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Bitas be liable for grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the performance of official duties,
bias and
partiality?

RULING:

On the first charge:

• In the instant case, Miralles was charged with Qualified Trafficking, which under Section 10 (C) of R.A. No. 9208 is
punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five
Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00). Thus, by reason of the penalty prescribed by law, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion
which can be exercised only by respondent judge after the evidence is submitted in a hearing. The hearing of the
application for bail in capital offenses is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the
prosecution’s evidence is weak or strong.
• As correctly found by the Investigating Justice, with life imprisonment as one of the penalties prescribed for the
offense charged against Miralles, he cannot be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, in accordance with Section
7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
• Here, Judge Bitas granted bail to Miralles without neither conducting a hearing nor a motion for application for bail.
Respondent judge's justification that he granted bail, because he found the evidence of the prosecution weak, cannot be
sustained because the records show that no such hearing for that purpose transpired. What the records show is a hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause, not a hearing for a petition for bail. The hearing for bail is different from the
determination of the existence of probable cause. It is only after this proceeding that the court can entertain a petition for
bail where a subsequent hearing is conducted to determine if the evidence of guilt is weak or not. Hence, in granting bail
and fixing it at P20,000.00 motu proprio, without allowing the prosecution to present its evidence, respondent judge denied
the prosecution of due process.
• Clearly, in the instant case, respondent judge's act of fixing the accused's bail and reducing the same motu proprio
is not mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on the part of respondent judge, but a patent disregard of well-
known rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for
gross ignorance of the law.

On the second charge:

• Judge’s actuations in the court premises during the hearing of the petition for commitment to the DSWD constitute
abuse of authority and manifest partiality to the accused. The Judge’s utterance of “I don’t want to see your face!”; “You
better transfer to another court!; You are being influenced by politicians” was improper and does not speak well his stature
as an officer of Court.
• The use of intemperate language is included in the proscription provided by Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct which stresses that as a dispenser of justice, respondent should exercise judicial temperament at all times,
avoiding vulgar and insulting language. He must maintain composure and equanimity.

• This Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed with a heavy burden and responsibility of
keeping the faith of the public. Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of official
functions must be avoided. This Court shall not countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in
the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the faith of the people in
the Judiciary.
• Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or
procedure is classified as a serious charge which constitutes sanctions.
• The actuations of respondent judge towards the complainants, as shown by his use of abusive and insulting words
against complainants in open court, and his correspondence with the Court, are evident of his PARTIALITY to the accused.

WHEEFORE, JUDGE CRISOLOGO BITAS was SUSPENDED from the service for three months and one day without pay instead
of a fine of P20,000 for each case, as recommended by Investigating Justice. He was WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar offense will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.

9|Page
7. ANTONIO M. LORENZANA v. JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA +

FACTS:
In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that in the course of SP. Proc. No. 06-7993,
the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave
Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as shown by the following instances:

1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over SCP's objections and
despite serious conflict of interest in being the duly appointed rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the
same time, the external legal counsel of most of SCP's creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he
engaged as legal adviser.

2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative meetings" in her
Order[2] dated May 11, 2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction (i.e., a first class golf club, a hotel and
sports club facilities in Metro Manila) and where she arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and features
of the rehabilitation plan she wanted to approve for SCP. She also announced in the meetings that she would
prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP.

3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the respondent dictated to
him. Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of her authority and effectively usurped and pre-empted the
rehabilitation receiver's exercise of functions.

4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-record so that there would be
no record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).

5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the case without the
knowledge and presence of SCP and its creditors.

6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza's financial adviser and, at the same
time, as her financial adviser to guide her in the formulation and development of the rehabilitation plan, for
a fee of P3.5M at SCP's expense. Anonas is also the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionza's
law firm.

7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP, leading to EPCIB's filing of
a motion to create a management committee.

8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that SCP could confront
EPCIB's witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a need for the creation of a management
committee), the respondent denied SCP's requests and delayed the issuance of the order until the last
minute.

9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP's counsel, Atty. Ferdinand Topacio;
blocked his every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his appearances in court; and made condescending
and snide remarks.

10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180 days given to her in
the Rules, without asking for permission to extend the period from the Supreme Court ( SC).

11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules (the court's power to
approve the rehabilitation plan) to include the power to amend, modify and alter it.

10 | P a g e
 12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in EPCIB's favor and made
comments and rulings in the proceedings that raised concerns regarding her impartiality.

13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest and personal involvement
in the case.

Issue:
WON Judge Austria be held liable for Judicial decorum.

Ruling:

Judges; bias and partiality must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Court held that the truth about
Judge Austria’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by simply relying on the verified complaint. Bias and
prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a judge’s  sacred  obligation  under  his  oath  of  office  to 
administer  justice without respect to the person, and to give equal right to the poor and rich. There should be
clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. In this case, aside
from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the complainant were grounded on
mere opinion and surmises. The complainant also failed to adduce proof indicating the judge’s predisposition to
decide the case in favor of one party.

8. ABE VS. ROGELIO

SECOND DIVISION A.M. No. MTJ-13-1837 [formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2463-MTJ], September 24, 2014 CONRADO ABE LOPEZ,
REPRESENTED BY ATTY. ROMUALDO JUBAY, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE ROGELIO S. LUCMAYON, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH 1, MANDAUE CITY, CEBU, RESPONDENT.

Facts:

In a verified complaint-affidavit dated December 12, 2011, the complainant, through his counsel Arty. Romualdo M. Jubay,
alleged that when he was eight years old, he inherited from his adoptive father Restituto Lopez one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 1718
with an area of 355 square meters located in Balamban, Cebu, evidenced by a document entitled "Katapusan Panugon"
(Testamente). He claimed that while the document mentioned Lot No. 1718, he ended up receiving a portion of Lot No. 1696
with a total land area of 49,817 square meters, that became the object of an extrajudicial settlement involving him, his
adoptive mother Honorata Lopez, and the relatives of the respondent in December 1978. Half of Lot No. 1696 was cultivated
by his adoptive mother until the latter's death in 1982. He took over the cultivation of the land after he retired as a seafarer
in 1988.

The complainant alleged that sometime in October 2004, he and the respondent met in a waiting shed located in front of
the house of the latter's grandmother in Buanoy, Balamban, Cebu. At that meeting, the respondent allegedly deceived him
into signing a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to process the sale of Lot No. 1696 to the prospective buyer, Aboitiz Group of
Company. Unknown to the complainant, the said SPA contained at the bottom portion, a so-called "Waiver of Rights" that
the respondent had deceptively inserted in order to strip him of his ownership of Lot No. 1696. After signing the document
(notarized by a certain Atty. Arturo C. Mata (Atty. Mata) without the complainant's presence), the respondent allegedly told
the complainant that he no longer had any right over the property. In March 2005, the father of the respondent, Pedro
Lucmayon (Pedro), ordered him to cease cultivating the land because of the Waiver of Rights in the SPA he signed.

The complainant also asserted that the respondent had caused Pedro and his siblings to execute a document entitled
"Supplemental Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Moises Legaspino and Victoria Lopez" to the damage and prejudice
of the complainant and his adoptive mother. He alleged that in the extrajudicial settlement, his name and the name of his
adoptive mother were excluded. They claimed that as legal heirs of the late Restituto Lopez (Restituto) who, in turn, had
inherited the property from his late mother Victoria Lopez (the co-owner of the property), their exclusion from the
extrajudicial settlement was an act of dishonesty to which the respondent should be held administratively liable.

In his comment[2] dated March 8, 2012, the respondent vehemently denied that he convinced the complainant to sell his
shares in the property; he claimed that it was the complainant who was interested in selling his shares after he got tired of

11 | P a g e
cultivating the land. He also denied that he deceived the complainant into signing the Waiver of Rights. He contended that
the filing of the administrative case against him was intended to embarrass and harass him.

The respondent further stated that the signing of the Waiver of Rights was done after he discovered that the complainant
was not legally adopted. He added that since there had been no legal adoption, the complainant could not be considered as
a legal heir and was not entitled to any portion of the land. He stated, too, that his participation in the sale transaction was
limited to informing his parents and relatives that the complainant is not a legal heir of Resitituto.

ISSUE:

WON the respondent is liable for violation of Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct ("Code") and Impropriety.

RULING:
As a general rule, a judge is prohibited from serving as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary. The
intent of the rule is to limit a judge's involvement in the affairs and interests of private individuals to minimize the risk of
conflict with his judicial duties and to allow him to devote his undivided attention to the performance of his official
functions. When a member of the bench serves as administrator of the properties of private individuals, he runs the risk of
losing his neutrality and impartiality, especially when the interests of his principal conflicts with those of the litigant who
comes before his court.

9. BIADO v. HON. BRAWNER-CUALING

DOMINADOR BIADO, MAMERTO BIADO, CARLITO DELA CRUZ, NORMA DELA CRUZ, DANILO DELA CRUZ, ROMULO
MARANO SR., FRANCISCO PADILLA, LOLITA ABLIR AND SONNY TONGCALO, Complainants vs. HON. MARIETTA S.
BRAWNER-CUALING, PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT [MCTC], TUBA-SABLAN, BENGUET,
Respondents
A.M. No. MTJ-17-1891 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 15-2792-MTJ]
February 15, 2017

FACTS:

On December 9, 2011, respondent judge issued a Decision in favor of the Heirs of Cariño Sioco. In her decision, respondent
judge found that all the elements of unlawful detainer were present in the case.9 She directed the complainants to vacate
the disputed lot and to "turn over the possession to the plaintiffs." She also ordered them to pay monthly rental fees to the
heirs until they vacated the premises.

Complainants appealed before the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet.However, their appeal was dismissed due to
their "failure to appear and participate in it." Since there was no further appeal made, respondent judge's decision became
final and executory.

On December 14, 2012, through motion of the prevailing party, respondent Judge issued an Order granting the Heirs of
Cariño Sioco's Motion for Execution. Similarly, she issued a Writ for Execution ordering the sheriff to cause the immediate
implementation of the Decision.

Complainants opposed the assailed decision and Writ of Execution, and claimed that respondent judge had no jurisdiction
over the case.They insisted that the disputed property was not within the jurisdiction of Tuba-Sablan, Benguet but within
Pangasinan. Moreover, there was an "existing boundary dispute between Pangasinan and Benguet."They asserted that they
had already brought this matter to respondent judge's attention and "sought deferment on the case pending the resolution
of the boundary issue." To bolster their claim, they even allegedly presented the Municipal Index Map of San Manuel,
Pangasinan and the Land Clarification of Benguet and Pangasinan. However, these were ignored by the respondent judge.

Complainants averred that respondent judge should have at least "inquired by herself" on the exact location of the disputed
property to determine if she had jurisdiction over the case. Respondent judge showed her gross ignorance of the law and
her manifest partiality against them for her failure to know the exact location of the disputed property. For this reason, they
were prompted to file this administrative case against her.

In her Comment dated November 23, 2015, respondent judge denied the accusations relative to her alleged manifest
partiality and gross ignorance of the law. She claimed that this administrative complaint was a "mere ploy to divert the

12 | P a g e
implementation of the decision in Civil Case No. 302," which already attained finality as of September 17, 2012, per Entry of
Judgment dated January 23, 2013. A Writ of Execution had already been issued, which complainants ignored.A Writ of
Demolition has likewise been issued after complainants failed to willingly remove their constructions. Instead of obeying the
writ, complainants filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No.
131838. Their petition, however, was dismissed33 on October 4,2013.

Due to complainants' "obstinate refusal" to comply with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court's order, the Heirs of Cariño Sioco
filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt against them docketed as Special Civil Action Case No. 03, which has been pending
resolution.

Respondent judge maintained that she had jurisdiction to rule over the case.She relied on the plaintiff's complaint and the
respondent's answer, which "categorically stated that both parties were residents and/or occupants of the parcels of land
located at Barangay Ansangan, Tuba, Benguet," Several other documents submitted by the complainants, showed that they
acknowledged the fact that the disputed property was in Benguet and not in San Manuel, Pangasinan.

Contrary to complainants' assertion that they immediately raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction as soon as they learned
about it, "it was only in their position paper, by way of a motion to dismiss, that complainants for the first time, questioned
the court's lack of jurisdiction." Also, respondent judge maintained that she did not ignore this issue and even ruled on the
matter in her assailed decision.
The Office of the Court Administrator, through a Report dated June 28, 2016, recommended the dismissal of this case for
being judicial in nature and for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Office of the Court Administrator is correct in its recommendation of the dismissal of the case for being
judicial in nature and lack of merit?

RULING:

We affirm the recommendation.

This administrative complaint is due to respondent judge's cognizance of Civil Case No. 302 and her consequent issuance of
the assailed Decision dated December 9, 2011 as well as the Writ of Execution. Complainants assert that these decisions
were tainted with manifest partiality and that respondent judge's conduct constitutes gross ignorance of the law since she
ruled on the case even though she had no jurisdiction over it.

An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a Judge deemed aberrant or irregular where a
judicial remedy exists and is available. It must be underscored that "the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject
to disciplinary action." He cannot be civilly, criminally, or administratively liable for his official acts, "no matter how
erroneous," provided he acts in good faith.

In this case, it is apparent that the assailed orders relate to respondent judge's acts in her judicial capacity. These alleged
errors, therefore, cannot be the proper subject of an administrative proceeding, but is only correctible through judicial
remedies. Hence, what complainants should have done was to appeal the assailed orders to the higher court .for review and
not to file an administrative complaint against responden t judge. "Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions do not
complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary.
The complainants' imputation of gross ignorance of the law must also fail. "Gross ignorance transcends a simple error in the
application of legal provisions. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous."

To be liable for gross ignorance of the law, the assailed orders of a judge, who acts in his official capacity, should not only be
erroneous; it must be established that his actuation was attended by "bad faith, dishonesty, hatred" or other similar motive.

Complainants oppose the assailed decision and Writ of Execution and claim that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over
the case. The disputed property is allegedly not within the jurisdiction of Tuba-Sablan, Benguet but in Pangasinan.
Complainants assert that while they have already brought the matter to respondent judge's attention, they were
nevertheless ignored.

13 | P a g e
Similarly, complainants' assertion of respondent judge's manifest partiality against them cannot prosper. Manifest partiality
pertains to "a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side rather than the other."63Thus, a mere
imputation of bias and partiality against a judge is insufficient because "bias and partiality can never be presumed."

Since "bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment is adverse to a party,"it is incumbent upon the
complainants to prove that respondent judge was manifestly partial against them. Their failure to prove this is fatal to their
cause. Apart from their bare allegations, complainants offered no other independent proof to validate this allegation.

Complainants' failure to substantiate their claims in an administrative proceeding can cause the dismissal of the case for lack
of merit.67"In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that a judge has regularly performed his duties will
prevail."

WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against Judge Marietta S. Brawner-Cualing is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

10.N/A

11.

CRISOLOGO vs. JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPG.R. No. 196894

March 3, 2014

FACTS:

On October 19, 1998, RTC-Br. 8, Davao City rendered its decision in favor of one SySen Ben, the plaintiff in a
collection case, against defendants Robert Limso, So Keng Koc, et al.The defendants were directed to transfer the
subject properties in favor of Sy Sen Ben. Thelatter subsequently sold the subject properties to one Nilda Lam who,
in turn, sold the same toJEWM on June 1, 2000. TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676 were then eventually issued in the
nameof JEWM, both of which still bearing the same annotations as well as the notice of lis pendens inconnection
with the other pending cases filed against So Keng Kok. A year thereafter, SpousesJesus G. Crisologo and Nannette B.
Crisologo prevailed in the separate collection case filedbefore RTC-Br. 15, Davao City against the same defendants.
Thus, on July 1, 1999, the saiddefendants were ordered to solidarily pay the Spouses Crisologo. After the issuance of
writ ofexecution, the Branch Sheriff issued a notice of sale scheduling an auction the propertiescovered by
TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676, now, in the name of JEWM. To protect its interest,JEWM filed a separate action
before RTC-Br. 14 for cancellation of lien with prayer for theissuance of a preliminary injunction, cancellation
of all the annotations on the back of thepertinent TCTs; and the issuance of a permanent injunction order
after trial on the merits. Thecounsel then of spouses Crisologo questioned the authority of the said court to restrain
theexecution proceedings in RTC-Br. 15. But JEWM opposed it on the ground that SpousesCrisologo
were not parties in the case. No motion to intervene was, however, filed as theSpouses Crisologo
believed that it was unnecessary since they were already the John and JaneDoes named in the complaint of JEWM.

ISSUE: Whether or not Spouses Crisologo are considered as indispensable parties in the casefor cancellation of lien.

RULING: In an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at the back of a certificateof title, the
persons considered as indispensable include those whose liens appear asannotations pursuant to
Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529. In Southwestern University v.Laurente, the Court held that the cancellation
of the annotation of an encumbrance cannot beordered without giving notice to the parties annotated in the
certificate of title itself. It would,thus, be an error for a judge to contend that no notice is required to be given to all
the personswhose liens were annotated at the back of a certificate of title. Here, undisputed is the fact thatSpouses
Crisologo’s liens were indeed annotated at the back of TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676.Thus, as persons with their liens
annotated, they stand to be benefited or injured by any orderrelative to the cancellation of annotations in the
14 | P a g e
pertinent TCTs. In other words, they are asindispensable as JEWM itself in the final disposition of the case for
cancellation, being one ofthe many lien holders. As indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should have been joined
asdefendants in the case pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The reason behindthis compulsory
joinder of indispensable parties is the complete determination of all possibleissues, not only between the parties
themselves but also as regards other persons who may beaffected by the judgment. In this case, RTC-Br. 14,
despite repeated pleas by SpousesCrisologo to be recognized as indispensable parties, failed to implement the
mandatory importof the aforecited rule

12.

Spouses Ricardo S. Marcelo and Evelyn Beato-Marcelo ([Sps. Marcelo]) v. Spouses Vilma Magopoy and Florentino
Magopoy ([Sps. Magopoy]).

The Facts

Complainants Sps. Marcelo were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2004-286 for unlawful detainer before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 78 (MeTC).On August 3, 2007, Sps. Marcelo moved[7] to cite Sps.
Magopoy in contempt for disobedience/resistance to lawful court processes. While finding the act of re-entry by Sps.
Magopoy as a clear defiance of a lawful writ, (i.e., the April 14, 2006 writ of execution) which is a form of indirect
contempt punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, the MeTC, in an Order[8] dated February 25, 2009, did not
cite them in contempt but, instead, ordered them to surrender the subject property to Sps. Marcelo within ten (10)
days from receipt of the order.[9]

On June 5, 2009, Sps. Marcelo filed an Ex-Parte Constancia in view of the continued refusal of Sps. Magopoy to
surrender the subject property.[10] This prompted Judge Pichay to issue an Order[11] dated August 7, 2009, giving
Sheriff Epres[12] three (3) days within which to effect Sps. Magopoy's eviction from the subject property.
Consequently, Sps. Magopoy filed a motion for reconsideration[13] on August 26, 2009, which was opposed[14] by
Sps. Marcelo on September 8, 2009.[15]

The hearing on the aforesaid motion was conducted on September 11, 2009, wherein Sps. Magopoy were directed
to file their reply. In compliance, Sps. Magopoy filed their Supplemental Motion and Reply on September 24, 2009
(supplemental motion),[16] alleging that the miscellaneous sales application of Sps. Marcelo over the subject
property had been denied by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.[17] The following day, Sps.
Marcelo filed a motion submitting all incidents for resolution.[18]

The Issue:

whether or not Judge Pichay should be held administratively liable for undue delay in the resolution of the pending
incidents in Civil Case No. 2004-286.

Ruling:
15 | P a g e
The Court concurs with the OCA's recommendations, subject to the modification of the recommended penalty to be
imposed against Judge Pichay.

The Constitution requires our courts to conscientiously observe the time periods in deciding cases and resolving
matters brought to their adjudication, which, for lower courts, is three (3) months from the date they are deemed
submitted for decision or resolution. Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (1987 Constitution)
states this rule, viz.:

Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court,
twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts.

13.

[ AM No. RTJ-15-2408, Mar 02, 2016 ]

FLORANTE A. MIANO v. MA. ELLEN M. AGUILAR

The Facts

Complainant alleged that he filed motions for inhibition in several cases raffled to the sala of respondent, specifically
Civil Case No. 173-B,[2] entitled "Florante A. Miano and Bernadette Atienza v. Romeo Migano" (Migano case), and
Criminal Case No. B-685,[3] entitled "People of the Philippines v. Nelson Mores y Madarang" (Madarang case), which
respondent granted.[4] In the Migano case, complainant alleged[5] as grounds for respondent's inhibition his being a
"personal friend" of the latter, as in fact complainant - whom respondent called "Florams," a nickname only used by
close and intimate friends - would often have dinners and/or lunches together with a common friend at respondent's
house in Quezon City. Moreover, prior to respondent's appointment to the judiciary, one of her colleagues at the
City Legal Office of Olongapo City, a certain Leonardo M. Miano, is a first cousin of complainant.[6] The OCA was
furnished a copy of the Order of Inhibition dated September 11, 2007.[7]

Subsequently, however, respondent issued an Order[8] dated October 11, 2007 (October 11, 2007 Order) in the
Migano case directing that the proceedings therein be held in abeyance "until such time that a new Presiding Judge
will be appointed by the Court Administrator to hear and decide this case."[9] Complainant asserted that this
constitutes ignorance of the rules on inhibition on the part of respondent because according to Administrative
Matter (A.M.) No. 03-8-02-SC,[10] where the judge in a single-branch RTC, such as RTC-Burgos where respondent
presides, is disqualified or voluntarily inhibits from hearing a case, the Order of Inhibition shall be transmitted to the
pairing judge who shall then hear and decide the case.[11] Likewise, complainant contended that due to the issuance
of the October 11, 2007 Order, the proceedings in the Migano case did not move from the time respondent inhibited
therefrom in 2007 up to the filing of the present administrative complaint.[12]

Issue

whether or not grounds exist to dismiss respondent from service, as recommended by the OCA.

Ruling

16 | P a g e
The Court concurs with the OCA in finding respondent guilty of Undue Delay in Issuing Orders in Several Cases and
Undue Delay in Transmitting the Records of a Case, but differs from its finding that respondent should likewise be
held guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law/Procedure.

To be able to render substantial justice and maintain public confidence in the legal system, judges should be
embodiments of competence, integrity and independence. Judges are also expected to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules and to apply them properly in all good faith. They are
likewise expected to demonstrate mastery of the principles of law, keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence, and
discharge their duties in accordance therewith.

14.

SPOUSES REYNALDO AND HILLY G. SOMBILON vs. GARAY AND PNBG.R. No. 179914June 16, 2014

FACTS: Spouses Reynaldo and Hilly Sombilon were the owners of a property which theymortgaged to the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) as security for their loan, was foreclosed and soldat public auction on July 15, 1998, where PNB
emerged as the winning bidder. A Certificate of Salewas issued in PNB’s name, which was duly registered with the
Registry of Deeds. The one-yearredemption period lapsed but spouses Sombilon failed to redeem the property. On
February 15,2005, a Final Deed of Conveyance was issued in favor of PNB. On April 14, 2005, TransferCertificate of
Title (TCT) No. 94384 was issued in the name of PNB. On the same date, PNBdecided to approve the purchase offer
of Atty. Garay since spouses Sombilon failed to make therequired down payment. On May 9, 2005, PNB filed an Ex-
Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ ofPossession before the RTC. Respondent Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order
granting the Petitionand issued a Writ of Possession in favor of PNB. On July 10, 2005, spouses Sombilon moved for
areconsideration of the issuance of the Writ of Possession arguing that Atty. Garay, who was theformer counsel of
Hilly, was barred from purchasing the property pursuant to paragraph 5, Article1491 of the Civil Code. Respondent
Judge hereby held in abeyance the Writ of Possession.

ISSUE:

Whether Judge Venadas, Sr. committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyancethe implementation of the
Writ of Possession

RULING:

Yes. The issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial upon the court. A debtor has oneyear from the date the
Certificate of Sale is registered with the Register of Deeds within which toredeem his property. During the one-year
redemption period, the purchaser may possess theproperty by filing a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession before the court, upon theposting of a bond. But after the one-year period, the purchaser has a right to
consolidate the titleand to possess the property, without need of a bond. And once title is consolidated under the
nameof the purchaser, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of thecourt; thus, no
discretion is left to the court. Questions regarding the regularity and validity of themortgage or the foreclosure sale
may not be raised as a ground to oppose or hold in abeyancethe issuance of the writ of possession as these must be
raised in a separate action forthe annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale. The pendency of such action is
also nota ground to stay the issuance of a writ ofpossession. In this case, the redemption period hadlong lapsed
when PNB applied for the issuance of the Writ of Possession. In fact, the title over thesubject property had already
been consolidated in PNB’s name. Thus, it was ministerial uponJudge Venadas, Sr. to issue the Writ of Possession in
favor of PNB, the registered owner of thesubject property

17 | P a g e
15.

Marietta Duque v. Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido

Petitioner’s claims:

Complainant is the alleged common-law wife of the murdered victim in the aforementionedCriminal Case No. 2000-
10-580. She claimed that the respondent Judge violated Section 15,Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for rendering
a decision beyond the 90 dayreglementary period without requesting an extension of time from this Court. She
allegedthat the prosecution filed its Memorandum submitting the case for resolution on August 10,2005, but the
respondent issued a Decision on December 12, 2005 which was promulgatedon January 27, 2006. Complainant
further alleged that neither the offended party nor thehandling prosecutor was notified of the promulgation.

Respondent’s claims:

Respondent judge denied the accusation that the decision in Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580was rendered beyond
the 90-day period as prescribed by the 1987 Constitution.He explained that while the last pleading - the
Memorandum for the Prosecution -was filed on August 10, 2005, the Order declaring the case submitted for
resolution wasissued on September 13, 2005. Respondent further explained that the Decision datedDecember 12,
2005 was promulgated only on January 27, 2006 because he was on officialleave from December 15, 2005 to January
15, 2006 as he left for the United States.Respondent maintained that there was no impropriety or procedural
infirmity inthe promulgation of the decision even though the complainant and the handling prosecutor,Robert M.
Visbal, were not present at that time. He reasoned that the complainant is notentitled to be notified of the
promulgation as she is neither the private complainant nor awitness, while the prosecution was duly represented
during the promulgation byProsecutor Edgar A. Sabarre who was also assigned in the RTC. Respondent pointed
outthat the court had already set the schedule of the promulgation. Hence, when ProsecutorVisbal opted not to
attend, it was for a reason only known to him.

Issue :

WON Respondent Judge Garrido violated both the Constitution and the Code of JudicialConduct when he failed to
decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 within the 90-day periodto decide cases prescribed for the lower courts.

Ruling:

Failure of a judge, such as respondent herein, to decide a case within the prescribed periodis inexcusable and
constitutes gross inefficiency warranting a disciplinary sanction.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido is hereby found GUILTY ofGROSS INEFFICIENCY for delay in
the disposition of a case and for which he is FINED TenThousand Pesos (P10,000.00). He is likewise found GUILTY of
violation of PresidentialDecree No. 26 for which he is ADMONISHED. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition ofthe
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of thedecision be attached to his
personal record.

16.

17.

18.

Re: Anonymous Complaint Against Judge Edmundo T. Acuna, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 123
18 | P a g e
FACTS:

Concerned citizens of the lower court filed an anonymous letter to the Office of the Court Administrator reporting
the alleged malpractices of Judge Edmundo Acuna. Among these are his regular use of expletives and insulting
terms such as “putang ina” and “putris,” and his constant berating and embarrassment of people in front of others.
It was also reported that he conducted trials and filed decisions for five criminal cases while he was on official leave
from the 15th of August to the 15th of September 2001.

The respondent contended that these allegations were exaggerated and the only purpose of which is to harass him,
and that part of his odd behaviours that may seem unacceptable to his colleagues were brought about by his
mourning due to the loss of his son which was amplified by the poor performance ratings of his staff. Although he
did admit to using such offensive terms, respondent averred that these were not directed to anyone in particular.
He also stated in his defense that while he was issued an Authority to Travel dated 14th of August 2011 to travel to
Canada, he still presented evidence on his entries in the daily time records that he was not yet on leave from the
15th to the 21st of August 2011. He thus had the right and duty to come to court as the case may be.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent’s behaviour and issuance of decisions while on official leave are subject to
disciplinary actions.

HELD:

Yes. The Court held that the use of such expletives is improper for the lauded office of a magistrate of the law. As
the public expects more from such a high and respectable office, the same level of expectation is also placed upon
the person who holds it to uphold its respectability and be conscious of his acts in order to maintain its
honourability. A judge is expected to be temperate, patient and courteous in order to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiability of the judiciary. As held in Ignacio and Valenzuela, a judge should avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all activities, to which herein respondent is guilty of.

Furthermore, the Court agrees with the Investigating Judge that overzealousness to work is not a shield from
administrative liability for the dire consequences that may effect from the result of his decisions and orders issued
while he was supposed to be on official leave.

As Judge Acuna was found guilty of impropriety, he is reprimanded and is sternly warned that repetition of the same
will be dealt with more severely.

19.

20.

MONTELIBANO ET AL vs.BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING CO., INC.

FACTS: Montelibano et al. are sugar planters adhered to the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc’s sugar central mill
under identical milling contracts originally executed in 1919. In 1936, it was proposed to execute amended milling
contracts, increasing the planters’ share of the manufactured sugar, besides other concessions. To this effect, a
printed Amended Milling Contract form was drawn up.

19 | P a g e
The Board of Directors of Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. adopted a resolution granting further concessions to the
planters over and above those contained in the printed Amended Milling Contract on August 10, 1936.

The printed Amended Milling Contract was signed by the Appellants on September 10, 1936, but a copy of the
resolution was not attached to the printed contract until April 17, 1937.

In 1953, the appellants initiated an action, contending that 3 Negros sugar centrals had already granted increased
participation to their planters, and that under paragraph 9 of the resolution of August 20, 1936, the appellee had
become obligated to grant similar concessions to the appellants herein.

The Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., inc., resisted the claim, urging that the resolution in question was null and void ab
initio, being in effect a donation that was ultra vires and beyond the powers of the corporate directors to adopt.

ISSUE: Was the act of the BOD ultra vires?

HELD: NO (The Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. is ordered to pay appellants the increase of participation in the
milled sugar in accordance with paragraph 9 of the Resolution of August 20, 1936.)

As the resolution in question was passed in good faith by the board of directors, it is valid and binding, and whether
or not it will cause losses or decrease the profits of the central, the court has no authority to review them.

Xx It is a well-known rule of law that questions of policy or of management are left solely to the honest decision of
officers and directors of a corporation, and the court is without authority to substitute its judgment of the board of
directors; the board is the business manager of the corporation, and so long as it acts in good faith its orders are not
reviewable by the courts.

21

DOROTHY FE MAH-AREVALO, Complainant, -versus – JUDGE CELSO L. MANTUA,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PALOMPON, LEYTE, BRANCH 17, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2360, FIRST DIVISION, November 19, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Immorality has been defined "to include not only sexual matters but also ‘conduct
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference
to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude
toward good order and public welfare.
In the case at bar, it was adequately proven that respondent engaged in an
extramarital affair with his mistress. The respective testimonies of complainant and
Nuñez clearly demonstrated how respondent paraded his mistress in full view of his
colleagues, court personnel, and even the general public by bringing her to fiestas and
other public places, without any regard to consequences that may arise as a result
thereof. Worse, respondent even had the audacity to use his chambers as a haven for
their morally depraved acts. In doing so, respondent failed to adhere to the exacting
standards of morality and decency which every member of the judiciary is expected to
observe.

FACTS

A complaint was filed against respondent judge accusing the latter of improper use
of his sala, using the court process server as his driver, delegating his work to the
legal researcher because he could no longer perform his duties due to his vices,

20 | P a g e
committed gross ignorance of law, asked for monetary benefits from the government, and failure to timely decide a
case. In his comment, respondent judge
denied the allegations mentioned in the complaint.

ISSUE

Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for Immorality and

violation of SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 in relation to A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC.
(YES)

RULING

SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 explicitly states that the Halls of Justice may
only be used for functions related to the administration of justice and for no other
purpose. Similar thereto, Section 3, Part I of A.M. No. 01-9-09-SC also provides for
similar restrictions regarding the use of the Halls of Justice.

In this case, complainant’s evidence had sufficiently established that respondent

used his chambers in the Hall of Justice as his residential and dwelling place. As
correctly pointed out by both the Investigating Justice and the OCA, respondent’s
defense that he rented a house did not negate the possibility that he used the Hall of
Justice as his residence, since it is possible that a person could be renting one place
while actually and physically residing in another.

Further, the Investigating Justice and the OCA correctly found respondent guilty of
Immorality. Immorality has been defined "to include not only sexual matters but
also ‘conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency,
depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing
moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.

In the case at bar, it was adequately proven that respondent engaged in an

extramarital affair with his mistress. The respective testimonies of complainant and
Nuñez clearly demonstrated how respondent paraded his mistress in full view of his
colleagues, court personnel, and even the general public by bringing her to fiestas
and other public places, without any regard to consequences that may arise as a
result thereof. Worse, respondent even had the audacity to use his chambers as a
haven for their morally depraved acts. In doing so, respondent failed to adhere to

the exacting standards of morality and decency which every member of the judiciary
is expected to observe. There is no doubt that engaging in an extra marital affair is
not only a violation of the moral standards expected of the members and employees
of the judiciary but is also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage
which the Court abhors and is, thus, punishable

22.
AMRTJ-15-2405: Ascano vs Jacinto

Facts: Petitioners accused respondent Judge of having acted with bias and partiality in favor of Mayor Villarosa for
having disallowed 500 witness from the courtroom and for having ordered the lifting of a TRO in favor of the mayor.

Petitioners claimed that during the hearings, respondent “argued, berated, accused, scolded, confused and
admonished petitioners without basis or justification.” They further claimed that respondent judge asked

21 | P a g e
complainants “confusing and misleading questions all geared and intended to elicit answers damaging to the cause
of petitioners and favorable to the cause of their adversary.”

Complainants alleged that it is common knowledge to the entire community of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, that
respondent is beholden to Mayor Villarosa and is identified with the causes, friends, and allies of the latter. Thus,
complainants filed the instant complaint charging respondent with serious violations of the canons of the Codes of
Judicial Conduct and Judicial Ethics and for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.

Issues: (1) Whether or not acts of the respondent judge constituted violations of RA 3019; (2) Whether or not
respondent judge violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct

Ruling: (1) Petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that respondent acted with bias and partiality. Mere
suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. Clear and convincing evidence is necessary to prove a charge of bias
and partiality. The circumstances detailed by petitioners failed to prove that respondent exhibited “manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence” in the discharge of his judicial functions, as required by
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, when he issued the Order lifting the TRO.

This Court cannot accept the contention that respondent’s bias and partiality can be gleaned from the mere fact that
he did not allow the “more than 500 members” who accompanied petitioners during the hearing to enter the
courtroom. As indicated in the report, due to the standard sizes of our courtrooms, it is highly improbable that this
huge group could have been accommodated inside.

(2) As stated in the report, respondent raised his voice and uttered abrasive and unnecessary remarks to petitioners’
witness. Respondent failed to conduct himself in accordance with the mandate of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, which reads:

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified
and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their
influence, direction or control.

A Judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court, viz:

It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of patience, prudence
and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language. He must choose his words, written or
spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing
speech increases his persuasiveness.

This Court likewise finds that respondent violated Section 1 of Canon 2 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

23.
JILL M. TORMIS, Complainants, -versus – JUDGE MEINRADO P. PAREDES,

FACTS: In her Affidavit/Complaint, dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes
with grave misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review
during the first semester of school year 2010-2011 at the Southwestern University,
Cebu City. She averred that sometime in August 2010, in his class discussions, Judge
Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis), then Presiding
Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as one of the
judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in
his class that Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and
ignorant of the law.
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only once
but several times. In one session, Judge Paredes was even said to have included in
22 | P a g e
his discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of Judge Tormis, stating
that he was a "court-noted addict."
In his Comment, dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the accusations of
Jill. He stated that Judge Tormis had several administrative cases, some of which he
had investigated; that as a result of the investigations, he recommended sanctions
against Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to get back at him;
that he discussed in his class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge Tormis'
involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of the investigation
conducted by the Court; that he never personally attacked Judge Tormis' dignity and
credibility; that the marriage scams in Cebu City constituted a negative experience
for all the judges and should be discussed so that other judges, court employees and
aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds; that the marriage scams were
also discussed during meetings of RTC judges and in schools where remedial law
and legal ethics were taught; that he talked about past and resolved cases, but not
the negative tendencies of Judge Tormis; that there was nothing wrong in discussing
the administrative cases involving Judge Tormis because these cases were known to
the legal community and some were even published in the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) and other legal publications; and that when he was the executive
judge tasked to investigate Judge Tormis, he told her to mend her ways, but she
resented his advice.

ISSUE
Whether Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge. (YES)

RULING
Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis
in 2010, the investigation relative to the said case had not yet been concluded. In
fact, the decision on the case was promulgated by the Court only on April 2, 2013. In
2010, he still could not make comments on the administrative case to prevent any
undue influence in its resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge
Tormis was one of the judges involved, was in contravention of the subjudice rule.
Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated Section 4,
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge Paredes
for discussing the marriage scams in his classes seemed noble, his objectives were
carried out insensitively and in bad taste. The pendency of the administrative case
of Judge Tormis and the publicity of the marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes
unrestrained license to criticize Judge Tormis in his class discussions. The publicity
given to the investigation of the said scams and the fact that it was widely discussed
in legal circles let people expressed critical opinions on the issue. There was no need
for Judge Paredes to "rub salt to the wound," as Justice Diy put it.

24.
VIRGILIO J. MAPALAD, SR. vs. ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ

FACTS
Complainant alleged that in an action for Recovery of Possession and Damages with
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, complainant was one of the plaintiffs
while respondent was the defendants' counsel therein. As the said case was decided
in favor of the plaintiffs, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal in which he indicated
his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance No. II-0014038
without indicating the date of issue thereof. On appeal, respondent filed the
appellants' brief, again only indicating his MCLE Compliance Number.
In another case, respondent, for the same clients, filed a Petition for Injunction
wherein he once again only indicated his MCLE Compliance Number. Respondent
23 | P a g e
also filed a Motion for Leave of Court in the said action, indicating his MCLE
Compliance Number without the date of issue.
Upon inquiry with the MCLE Office, complainant discovered that respondent had no
MCLE compliance yet. The MCLE Office then issued a Certification stating that
respondent had not yet complied with his MCLE requirements for the First
Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 to April 14, 2004) and Second Compliance Period
(April 15, 2004 to April 14, 2007).
Complainant argues that respondent's act of deliberately and unlawfully misleading
the courts, parties, and counsels concerned into believing that he had complied with
the MCLE requirements when in truth he had not, is a serious malpractice and grave
misconduct. The complainant, thus, prayed for the IBP to recommend respondent's
disbarment to this Court.
In a resolution, the Supreme Court required the respondent to file a comment on the
complaint. Despite receipt however, respondent failed to comply with the said
resolution. The Court, thus, issued another resolution requiring the respondent to
show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for
such failure and, again, to file a comment to the complaint. However, the respondent
again failed to comply.

ISSUE
Should Atty. Echanez be administratively disciplined based on the allegations in the
complaint and evidence on record?

RULING
Respondent's acts of misconduct are clearly manifest, thus, warranting the exercise
by this Court of its disciplinary power.
No less than the MCLE Office had issued a certification stating that respondent had
not complied with the first and second compliance period of the MCLE. Despite such
non-compliance, respondent repeatedly indicated a false MCLE compliance number
in his pleadings before the trial courts. In indicating patently false information in
pleadings filed before the courts of law, not only once but four times, as per records,
the respondent acted in manifest bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit. In so doing, he
indeed misled the courts, litigants – his own clients included – professional
colleagues, and all others who may have relied on such pleadings containing false information.

25.

26.
27
28.
Marie Roxanne G. Recto v. Hon. Henry J. Trocino
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2508

FACTS:
This case involves an administrative complaint against Judge Henry J. Trocino for biasand partiality, ignorance of the
law, grave oppression, and violation of the Code of JudicialConduct for issuing an ex parte Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) in relation to a case for ChildCustody pursuant to the Family Code.The latter case, entitled “Magdaleno
M Pena, for himself and in behalf of his minor son, Julian Henri "Harry" R. Pena v. Marie Roxanne G.
Recto” resulted in Judge Trocino issuing a TPO andgranting the temporary custody 15-month-old child, Julian Henri
"Harry" R. Pena, to Recto’s former live-in partner, Magdaleno Pena.In protest, Recto filed this administrative
complaint against Judge Trocino, alleging that he:1.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty

24 | P a g e
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCAthat Judge Trocino acted with
gross ignorance of the law when he issued, ex parte, the TPO pursuant to A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC in relation to R.A.
No. 9262. He deliberately ignored the provisions of the Family Code, A.M. No. 03-04-04- SC otherwise known as the
Rule on Custodyof Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in relation to Custody of Minors and A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC or
the Rule on Violence against Women and their Children.Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of the basic rules
and settled jurisprudence. A judgeowes it to his office to simply apply the law when the law or a rule is basic and the
facts are evident. Not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

29.
MAURA JUDAYA AND ANA AREVALO v. RAMIRO F. BALBONA
A.M. No. P-06-2279 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 06-2452-P), June 06, 2017
Preliminarily, it is worthy to emphasize that the precipitate resignation of a government
employee charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from service does not render
moot the administrative case against him.
Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative
sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any
administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable.
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between
the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits of the case. The
instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioner's separation from
government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions – that of
separation from service – may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other
penalties which may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative
offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold any government
office and the forfeiture of benefits.
Moreover, this Court views with suspicion the precipitate act of a government employee in
effecting his or her separation from service, soon after an administrative case has been
initiated against him or her. An employee's act of tendering his or her resignation immediately
after the discovery of the anomalous transaction is indicative of his or her guilt as flight in
criminal cases.
In order to sustain a finding of administrative culpability for such offense, only substantial
evidence is required, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
As a final note, "[i]t must be emphasized that those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of
justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of
the Judiciary and the people's confidence in it. The Institution demands the best possible
individuals in the service and it had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct
which would violate the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish,
the faith of the people in the justice system. As such, the Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks
of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards an effective and efficient administration of
justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public.

30.
Judge O. Baguio v Jocelyn P. Lacuna,
June 19, 2017, A.M. No. P-17-3709

FACTS:1. Judge Celso O. Baguio charged Jocelyn P. Lacuna, a Stenographer III with grossincompetence.2. Judge
Baguio alleged that he RTC had to reset a scheduled initial trial because of thefailure of LAcuna to transcribe and
submit the stenographic notes of the pre-trialproceedings. As a result, she was directed to immediately transcribe
the same and wasordered to submit a written explanation why she should not be held administrativelyliable for her
failure to perform her job in accordance with the rules. Although Lacunaapologized, she nonetheless claimed that
the resetting of the case was not solely due toher failure to perform her task but also in view of the absence of the
witness for theprosecution.3. Judge Baguio further claimed that despite having been previously suspended for
asimilar offense, Lacuna did not improve, and that her proficiency as stenographer wasdoubtful given that she relied
25 | P a g e
solely on tape recordings for the past 15 years.4. It was also pointed out that the incident complained of was just
one of the many similarincidents, which resulted in the cancellation of hearings and caused embarrassment tothe
court; however, Judge Baguio remarked that Lacuna has an almost perfectattendance and that she behaved well in
court.

ISSUE:1, Whether or not Lacuna should be held administratively liable for simple neglect of duty.

RATIO DECIDENDI:1.The duties of a Stenographer are clearly embodied under Section 17, Rule 136 of theRules of
Court, which states:SEC. 17.
Stenographer.
- It shall be the duty of the stenographer who hasattended a session of a court either in the morning or in the
afternoon, to deliverto the clerk of court, immediately at the close of such morning or afternoonsession, all the notes
he has taken, to be attached to the record of the case; andit shall likewise be the duty of the clerk to demand that
the stenographer complywith said duty. The clerk of court shall stamp the date on which such notes arereceived by
him. When such notes are transcribed the transcript shall bedelivered to the clerk, duly initialed on each page
thereof, to be attached to therecord of the case.2. All stenographers are required to transcribe all stenographic
notes and to attach thetranscripts to the record of the case not later than twenty (20) days from the time thenotes
are taken.3.In this case, it is undisputed that Lacuna failed to comply with the 20-day period in thetranscription of
the stenographic notes for the Pre-Trial. Heavy workload is not anadequate excuse for her to be remiss in the
performance of her duties. To allowotherwise would permit every government employee charged with negligence
anddereliction of duty to resort to the same convenient excuse to evade punishment. 4.
WHEREFORE,
the Court finds respondent Jocelyn P. Lacuna
GUILTY
of simple neglectof duty. She is hereby
SUSPENDED
for a period of three (3) months without pay and
STERNLY WARNED
to be more circumspect in the performance of her duties, as arepetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely. Let a copy ofthis Decision be entered in the 201 file of respondent Jocelyn P. Lacuna.

31.
PROSECUTOR LEO T. CAHANAP versus- JUDGE LEONOR S. QUIÑONES, RTC,
Branch 6, Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2470, EN BANC, January 10, 2018, CAGUIOA, J.
FACTS:
Complainant filed the instant administrative complaint charging respondent with Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Gross Misconduct and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for the
following alleged acts of respondent Judge:
First, Complainant alleged that in his last two (2) years as a prosecutor, he suffered unbearable
and intolerable oppression in the hands of respondent Judge.
In the case of People v. Inot, respondent got angry and objected to the leading questions asked
during complainant's re-direct examination, notwithstanding the fact that no objections were
raised by the defense counsel.
In the case of People v. Badelles, respondent issued an order blaming complainant for the failure
of the forensic chemist to bring the chemistry reports because complainant did not sufficiently
specify the chemistry reports due to the court. In the same case, respondent gave complainant a
lecture on the proper demeanor and conduct in court while he was making a formal offer of a
testimony.

Complainant asserted that the prosecutors, who previously appeared before respondent, opted to
be assigned to other courts as they too experienced humiliation and harsh treatment from her.
Further, respondent Judge's staff themselves were subjected to respondent Judge's insolent
behavior.
Second, Complainant further accused respondent of habitual tardiness.
26 | P a g e
Third, in the proceedings for the case of People v. Heck (Heck Case), respondent, in open court and
heard by the public, asked private complainant, Hanna Mamad, to go to her house because she
was interested in buying jewelry items from her.
Fourth, in the case of People v. Macapato, respondent issued an Order directing the release of
accused Dimaampao's vehicle despite the prosecution's written opposition on the ground that the
vehicle has yet to be presented as evidence in court and has yet to be formally offered before the
court could acquire jurisdiction.
Respondent Judge immediately set accused's subject motion for the release of accused
Dimaampao's vehicle for hearing a day after it was filed, in violation of the three-day notice rule.
Fifth, in the case of People v. Tingcang, respondent dismissed the case provisionally without
prejudice to its refiling upon the availability of the prosecution's witnesses on the ground of
speedy trial.
Sixth, in the case of People v. Casido, respondent dismissed a complaint for Attempted Murder due
to the absence of a fatal wound on the victim, which the prosecution believed to be misplaced in
an information for Attempted Murder.
Seventh and lastly, complainant averred that respondent Judge also mistreated her court staff.
Respondent allegedly shouted at a court stenographer and called her "bogo" which meant dumb.
Respondent Judge berated another stenographer and shouted at the latter "punyeta
ka" and "buwisit ka."

ISSUE:
Whether respondent should be held administratively liable. (YES)

RULING:
The Court has time and again reminded the members of the bench to faithfully observe the
prescribed official hours to inspire public respect for the justice system. It has issued Supervisory
Circular No. 14, Circular No. 13, and Administrative Circular No. 3-99 to reiterate the trial judges'
mandate to exercise punctuality in the performance of their duties. Administrative Circular No. 3-
99 entitled, "Strict Observance of Session Hours of Trial Courts and Effective Management of Cases
to Ensure Their Speedy Disposition," reiterates the mandate for trial judges to exercise punctuality
in the performance of their duties.

32.
In the matter of the charges of plagiarism, etc., against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo. [A.M. No. 10-7-17-
SC]

FACTS:

On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dismissed a petition filed by the Malaya Lolas
Organization in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel for Vinuya et al, questioned
the said decision. He raised, among others, that the ponente in said case, Justice Mariano del Castillo, plagiarized
three books when the honorable Justice “twisted the true intents” of these books to support the assailed decision.
These books were: a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of
International Law (2009); b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law (2006); and c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams,
Cambridge University Press (2005).

As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least inexcusable negligence. Interestingly,
even the three foreign authors mentioned above, stated that their works were used inappropriately by Justice Del
Castillo and that the assailed decision is different from what their works advocated.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar.

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HELD: No. There is no plagiarism. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court in its ruling on the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in 2011), the rule on plagiarism cannot be applied to judicial bodies.

No Plagiarism

At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another persons language, thoughts, or ideas. To plagiarize, as it is
commonly understood according to Webster, is to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from (another) and pass them off as
ones own.The passing off of the work of another as ones own is thus an indispensable element of plagiarism.

According to Black’s Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the “deliberate and knowing presentation of another person’s
original ideas or creative expressions as one’s own.”

This cannot be the case here because as proved by evidence, in the original drafts of the assailed decision, there was
attribution to the three authors but due to errors made by Justice del Castillo’s researcher, the attributions were
inadvertently deleted. There is therefore no intent by Justice del Castillo to take these foreign works as his own.

33.
34.

Samahan ng mga Babae sa Hudikatura (SAMABAHU) v. Untalan

A.M. No. RTJ-13-2363 | 25 February 2015

Ponente: J. Villarama, Jr.

Doctrine: Work-related sexual harassment is committed by an official or employee in the Judiciary who, having
authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work environment, demands, requests or otherwise
requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is
accepted by the latter.

Facts:

 SAMABAHU, a group of female court employees, wrote an unsigned letter to the Office of the Chief Justice
charging respondent Judge Untalan with sexual harassment.
 The alleged victim-complainants, who were female employees of Makati City RTC, namely Ripdos and
Herradura, stated in their Complaint-Affidavits that Judge Untalan committed acts of sexual harassment
against them.
 They likewise claimed that after their respective incidents where Judge Untalan harassed them, respondent
threatened them with a low performance rating on several occasions, among others.
 In his Comment, respondent judge denied all the allegations of improper conduct and sexual harassment
imputed to him. He argued that the standard of substantial evidence was not met considering that the alleged
date mentioned by Ripdos in her affidavit was an official holiday. Further, there was no evidence on record
evidencing corruption except for the bare allegation in the anonymous letter.
 The Investigating Judge, in his Final Report and Recommendation, found respondent guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of sexual harassment as he exercised moral ascendancy over the complaining female court
employees.

Issue: Whether respondent Judge Untalan is guilty of sexual harassment – NO

Held:

 Under Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC (Re: Rule on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment
Cases and Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary), work-related sexual harassment is
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 committed by an official or employee in the Judiciary who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy
over another in a work environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other,
regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the latter.
 It is committed when “the sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-
employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable
compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in
limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee.”
 Further, in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in the
complaint with substantial evidence.
 In this case, while respondent exercised moral ascendancy over the alleged victims, the alleged sexual
advances were not proven with moral certainty. The Court finds that the totality of evidence failed to convince
that respondent committed sexual harassment and that Ripdos and Herradura failed to substantiate their
charges against respondent by the required quantum of proof.
 While it is true that their affidavits were replete with details describing the alleged sexual advances, such
detailed narration, by itself, will not suffice and will not automatically result in a guilty verdict. The testimonies
of respondent’s witnesses which were given in a candid, spontaneous and straightforward manner, put
serious doubts on the veracity of the allegations of Ripdos and Herradura.
 Considering that the complainants failed to present substantial evidence to prove the alleged sexual advances
committed against them by the respondent, elementary justice dictates that he be exonerated from the said
charge.

35.

36.
Bengzon v. Blue Ribbon
FACTS:
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Governance
(PCGG), filed a complaint with Sandiganbayan against the petitioners of this case. PCGG allege, among others, that:
defendants (petitioners therein) Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and Juliette. Gomez Romualdez, alleged cronies of
former President Marcos and First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos, engaged in schemes and stratagems to unjustly
enrich themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. Among these stratagems are (1) obtained control of some
big business enterprises such as
MERALCO, Pilipinas Shell, and PCI Bank, (2) manipulated the formation of Erectors Holding Inc, to appear viable and
borrow more capital, reaching a total of more that P2 billion, (3) collaborated with lawyers (petitioners therein) of
the Bengzon Law Offices in concealing funds and properties, in maneuvering the purported sale of interests in
certain corporations, in misusing the Meralco Pension Fund worth P25 million, and in cleverly hiding behind the veil
of corporate entity. On 13 September 1988, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the
alleged take-over of SolOil Incorporated by Ricardo Lopa (who died during the pendency of this case) and called
upon the senate to look into possible violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act or RA 3019. The Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or Blue Ribbon Committee (SBRC) started its investigation through a
hearing on 23 May 1989, but Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify. The SBRC rejected petitioner Bengzon s plea and
voted to pursue its investigation. Petitioner claims that the SBRC, in requiring their attendance and testimony, acted
in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:
1. WON the court has jurisdiction over this case.
2. WON the SBRC s inquiry has a valid legislative purpose.
3. WON the sale or disposition of the Romualdez corporations is a purely private transaction which is beyond the
power of the SBRC to inquire into.
4. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process.

HELD:
1. YES. As the court held in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the departments of the government, and it is the
judiciary that was vested of the powers to determine the scope, nature and extent of such powers.

29 | P a g e
2. NO. The speech of Sen. Enrile contained no suggestion on contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the
Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA 3019. The purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by
respondent SBRC was to find out WON the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Ricardo Lopa, had violated the
law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36/39 corporations of Kokoy Romualdez to the Lopa Group. There
appears, therefore, no intended legislation involved. The inquiry also is not conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution
No. 2123 (SR 2123), as the committee alleges. The inquiry under SR 2123 is to look into the charges against PCGG
filed by stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26 Article XVIII of the
Constitution.

3. YES. Mr. Lopa and the petitioners are not connected with the government and did their acts as private citizens,
hence such a case of alleged graft and corruption is within the jurisdiction, not of the SBRC, but of the courts.
Sandiganbayan already took jurisdiction of this issue before the SBRC did. The inquiry of the respondent committee
into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment of into the
exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction.

4. NO. The Constitution provides the right of an accused of a crime to remain silent; this extends also to respondents
in administrative investigation but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding. This is not so in this
case. BUT since the court already held that the inquiry is not in aid of legislation, the petitioners therein cannot be
compelled to testify.

37.
38.
Re: Letter of Lucena Ofenido Reyes alleging illicit activities of a certain Atty. Cajayon involving cases in the Court of
Appeals, Cagayan De Oro City/Re: Letter-complaint of Sylvia Adante Charging Hon. Jane Aurora C. Lantion, Associate
Justice, Court of Appeals, Cagayan De Oro City, and Atty. Dorothy Cajayon with "Systematic Practices of Corruption"
A.M. No. 16-12-03-CA/IPI No. 17-248-CA-J
June 6, 2017

Facts:
On October 1 7, 2016, Adante filed before the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) a letter, alleging that it was
"intimated to [her]" that Atty. Cajayon, whom she met only once, was in cahoots with Justice Lantion in engaging in
the shameful business of "selling" decisions involving cases from the CA-CDO to the highest bidder. Subsequently, or
on October 25, 2017, Ofendoreyes filed before the same agency a letter, requesting the latter to investigate and stop
the purported partnership of Atty. Cajayon and Justice Lantion from the business of selling decisions in exchange for
money. Both letter-complaints were respectively referred by the Ombudsman to this Court on November 22, 20164
and November 23, 2016, which were, consequently, docketed as IPI No. 17-248-CA-J and A.M. No. 16-12-03-CA. In a
Resolution dated January 10, 2017, the Court referred the administrative matters to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) to study the possible consolidation of the same.

The OCA's Report and Recommendation

In a Memorandum dated February 14, 2017, the OCA recommended that the matters be consolidated, considering
that both letter-complaints involve the same respondents, i.e., Atty. Cajayon and Justice Lantion, and issue, i.e., the
sale of favorable decisions involving cases in the CA-CDO to the highest bidder. The OCA, however, observed that the
letter-complaints were insufficient in form and substance in that they: (1) were not verified; and (2) lacked affidavits
of persons who may have personal knowledge of the facts to prove or substantiate the letter-complaints' allegations
against respondents, as well as supporting documents. Moreover, it echoed the rule that in administrative
proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant,
and that in the absence of evidence against a court employee or magistrate to discipline for a grave offense, the
presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Cajayon and Justice Lantion should be held administratively liable.

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Ruling:

Under the Rules of Court, administrative complaints both against lawyers and judges of regular and special courts as
well as Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan must be verified and supported by affidavits of
persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said
allegations. For lawyers, these requirements are stated in Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 1. How Instituted. - Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by
the Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any
person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of
persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said
facts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Meanwhile, for judges and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan, the requirements are found in Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

39.
40.
41.
OCA v YU
Office of Court Administrator v. Eliza B. Yu
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813/ A.M. N0.12-1-09-MeTC/ A.M. NO. MTJ-13-1836 (Formerly A.M. No. 11-11-115- MeTC)/ A.M.
NO. MTJ-12-1815 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-2401- MTJ) / OCA IPI NO. 11-2398-MTJ / OCA IPI NO. 11-2399-MTJ/ OCA
IPI NO. 11-2378-MTJ/ OCA IPI NO. 12-2456-MTJ/ A.M. NO. MTJ-13-1821
March 14, 2017

FACTS

The Court finds and pronounces respondent Judge Elizabeth Yu guilty of gross insubordination; gross ignorance of
the law; gross misconduct; grave abuse of authority; oppression; and conduct unbecoming of a judicial official; and,
dismisses her from the service effective immediately, with forfeiture of all her benefits S, except accrued leave
credits, and further disqualifies her from reinstatement or appointment to any public office or employment.

RULING:
Accordingly, gross misconduct, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and willful disobedience of any lawful order by the
Court constitute grounds to disbar an attorney. In the respondent's case, she was herein found to have committed all
of these grounds for disbarment, warranting her immediate disbarment as a consequence. The Court deem it
worthwhile to remind that the penalty of disbarment being hereby imposed does not equate to stripping the
respondent of the source of livelihood her disbannent is intended to protect the administration of justice by
ensuring that those taking part in it as attorneys should be competent, honorable and reliable to enable the courts
and the clients they serve to rightly repose their confidence in them.

42.
43.
OCA v. JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO, AM No. MTJ-07-1691, 2013-04-02
Facts:
This is an administrative case that stemmed from the 6 July 2007 Memorandum of the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA).[2] The judicial audit team created by the OCA reported alleged
irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several branches... of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City.[3] Certain package fees were offered to
interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for instant marriages.
On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, proceeded to Cebu City and headed
the audit team created by OCA in investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the MTCC in Cebu City.[5] A
female and male lawyer of the audit team went... undercover as a couple looking to get married. They
went to the Palace of Justice and were directed by the guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a
31 | P a g e
certain "Meloy". The male lawyer feared that he would be recognized by other court personnel,
specifically the Clerk of Court... of Branch 4 who was a former law school classmate. The two lawyers
then agreed that only the female lawyer would go inside and inquire about the marriage application
process. Inside Branch 4, a woman named Helen approached and assisted the female lawyer. When
the female lawyer... asked if the marriage process could be rushed, Helen assured the lawyer that the
marriage could be solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate would only be dated the day
the marriage license becomes available. Helen also guaranteed the regularity of the process for a...
fee of three thousand pesos (P3,000) only.
In its 10 July 2007 Resolution, this Court treated the Memorandum dated 6 July 2007 of the judicial
audit team as a formal administrative complaint and directed Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Judge Gil
R. Acosta, Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, and Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales to submit... their respective
comments.[7] The Court also suspended the judges pending resolution of the cases against them.
On 24 August 2007, the OCA through Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño
submitted its Memorandum dated 29 August 2007[9] and Supplemental Report.[10] Six hundred forty-
three (643) marriage certificates were examined by... the judicial audit team.[11] The team reported
that out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages were solemnized under Article
34[12] of the Family Code.[13] The logbooks of the MTCC Branches... indicate a higher number of
solemnized marriages than the number of marriage certificates in the courts' custody.[14] There is also
an unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili
and Liloan,... Cebu.[15] There were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses
obtained on the same day.[16] The town of Barili, Cebu is more than sixty (60) kilometers away from
Cebu City and entails a travel time of almost two (2)... hours.[17] Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is
more than ten (10) kilometers away from Cebu City.
On 27 November 2007, the Court En Banc issued a resolution: a) requiring Judges Anatalio S.
Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales of the MTCC, Branches 2,
3, 4, and 8, respectively, of Cebu City, to comment on the findings of the 14
August 2007 Supplemental Report of the OCA, within fifteen (15) days from notice; b) directing the
Process Servicing Unit to furnish the judges with a copy of the Supplemental Report; c) requiring the
court personnel listed below to show cause within fifteen (15) days from... notice why no disciplinary
action should be taken against them for their alleged grave misconduct and dishonesty and impleading
them in this administrative matter
Issues:
The issue now before this Court is whether the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in Cebu
City are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross
misconduct, and in turn, warrant the most severe penalty of dismissal from... service
Ruling:
The OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of swift marriages. The
respondent judges and court personnel disregarded laws and procedure to the prejudice of the parties
and the proper administration of justice.
The OCA found that Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and
Edgemelo C. Rosales are all guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty when they solemnized
marriages without following the proper procedure laid down by law, particularly the Family
Code of the Philippines and existing jurisprudence. The OCA listed down aspects of the solemnization
process which were disregarded by the judges. The Court will now discuss the individual liabilities of
the respondent judges and court personnel vis-à-vis the evidence presented... by the OCA against
them.

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