Evidence Case Digests (2015-2016) Batch 4

UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS – LAW

1) Armed Forces of the Philippines vs. Republic of the Philippines titling of the subject lots, and the court a quo never held petitioner liable for any delay in
Digested by: JMT prosecuting the subject case.

Facts: Petitioner was "created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 361, as amended, and Third, a perusal of the records would demonstrate that the petitioner did not fail to comply
was designed to establish a separate fund to guarantee continuous financial support to the with the Rules or any order of the court a quo, as there is no ruling on the part of the latter
[Armed Forces of the Philippines] military retirement system as provided for in Republic Act to this effect.
No. 340.
Indeed, there was no basis for the court a quo’s ruling that the petitioner failed to
Petitioner filed an Application for Registration of Title over 3 parcels of land located in West prosecute the subject case, because none of the grounds provided in the Rules for
Bitucan, Taguig City. After due posting and publication of the requisite notices, and since dismissing a case due to failure to prosecute is present. That the RTC dismissed the
no oppositor registered any oppositions after the petitioner met the jurisdictional application for land registration of the petitioner for failure to prosecute after the petitioner
requirements, the court a quo issued an order of general default against the whole world, presented all its evidence and after said court has rendered a decision in its favor, is highly
and the petitioner was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. irregular.
Subsequently, Pet submitted its Final Offer of Evidence. In response, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for Reconsideration, wherein it argued that the Pet 2) Alvarez vs Ramirez, GR. No. 143439, Oct. 14 2005
failed to prove that it has personality to own property in its name and the petitioner failed Digested by: KAD
to show that the witness it presented was duly authorized to appear for and in its behalf.
Facts: Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case for
Issue: Whether the court a quo acted contrary to law and jurisprudence when it dismissed arson. The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G.
petitioner’s application for land registration on the ground that petitioner failed to prosecute Alvarez, sister of respondent.
the subject case.
On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as
Ruling: YES. The reason of the court a quo in dismissing petitioner’s application for land the first witness against petitioner, her husband. The purpose of offering the testimony of
registration on the ground of failure to prosecute was the lack of authority on the part of this witness is to prove that the accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of the
Ms. Aban to testify on behalf of the petitioner. crime being charged particularly that accused Maximo Alvarez pour on May 29, 1998
gasoline in the house located at Blk. 5, Lot 9, Phase 1-C, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas, Metro
However, Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides Manila, the house owned by his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez; that accused Maximo Alvarez
only three instances wherein the Court may dismiss a case for failure to prosecute: after pouring the gasoline on the door of the house of Susan Ramirez ignited and set it on
Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. –If, for no justifiable cause, the fire; that the accused at the time he successfully set the house on fire of Susan Ramirez
plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in knew that it was occupied by Susan Ramirez, the members of the family as well
chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length as Esperanza Alvarez, the estranged wife of the accused; that as a consequence of
of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the the accused in successfully setting the fire to the house of Susan Ramirez, the door of said
complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the house was burned and together with several articles of the house, including shoes, chairs
court’s own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to and others. 
prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal
shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise In the course of Esperanzas direct testimony against petitioner, the latter showed
declared by the court. uncontrolled emotions, prompting the trial judge to suspend the proceedings.

Clearly, the court a quo’s basis for pronouncing that the petitioner failed to prosecute its Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to
case is not among those grounds provided by the Rules. It had no reason to conclude that Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.Trial court granted the
the petitioner failed to prosecute its case. First, the petitioner did not fail to appear at the order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez and deleting her testimony in the records.
time of the trial. In fact, the Decision of the RTC dated April 21, 2008 ordering the
registration of petitioner’s title to the subject lots shows that the petitioner appeared before Issue: WON Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband.
the Court and was represented by counsel. Records would also reveal that the petitioner
was able to present its evidence, and as a result, the RTC rendered judgment in its favor. Ruling: Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the
Second, the petitioner did not fail to prosecute the subject case considering that it husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
appeared during trial, presented Ms. Aban, who gave competent testimony as regards the the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a

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criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latters direct leave a void in the unhappy home. ( People v. Castaeda , 271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no
descendants or ascendants. longer any reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule.
 
The reasons given for the rule are: It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense,
1.     There is identity of interests between husband and wife; the relationship between petitioner and his wife was already strained. In fact, they were
2.     If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts
danger of perjury; presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is
3.     The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private no longer an interest the State aims to protect.
life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent
domestic disunion and unhappiness; and 3) Guerrero vs. St. Clare’s Realty & Co. (1983)
4.     Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing Digested by: JRV
one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.
  Facts: During the lifetime of spouses Isidoro Guerrero and Panay Ramos, they were the
But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own absolute owners of the disputed property. They had 6 children. Panay predeceased Isidoro.
exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for Before the latter’s demise, he verbally willed and ordained that the questioned lot be
offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are assigned and adjudicated to Andres as his share in the inheritance, while the other children
backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the having been assigned to other lots.
general rule. For instance, where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that
there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be Andres entrusted the land to his sister, Cristina and allowed her to have the property
disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, cultivated and to retain the owner’s share in the harvests. The arrangement between them
identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on was that Cristina could continue in the cultivation of the land and enjoyment of the owner’s
that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences share in the produce for as long as she needed the property. Andres died survived by his
of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through widow and their children. Cristina continued as trustee of the deceased Andres.
their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
  However, it was found out that the disputed land was titled in the name of Manuel
In Cargil vs. State: The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the Guerrero who was able to have the lot titled in his name on the basis of a Deed of Sale of
person is too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting Land purportedly executed by Cristina. Then, Manuel executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The better rule is that, when favour of defendants Guerreros and after the deed of sale was registered, the defendants
an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes Guerreros cause to be notarized an “Article of Partnership” of St. Clare’s Realty Company,
within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except Ltd. constituting themselves as partners. Defendants Guerreros sold the disputed lot in a
in a criminal prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against the other. Deed of Absolute Sale to St. Clare’s by virtue of which Register of Deeds issued a TCT in
the name of the company.
Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal
relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for Heirs of Andres argued that the Deed of Sale in favour of Manuel was fraudulent, simulated
arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, and falsified for the reason that Cristina was not the owner of the land at the time she
confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and purportedly sold it.
flourishes.
Frisco Cervantes, grandson of Cristina testified as a witness of the plaintiffs that having had
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals: The act of private respondent in setting fire previous information that the disputed lot was borrowed from Andres and Cristina merely
to the house of his sister-in-law Susan Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was there, mortgaged it to Manuel. That he went to the house of Manuel to inquire about the
and in fact with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the mortgage and the latter stated that the land had been sold but it would be changed with
harmony and confidences of marital relation which the disqualification primarily seeks to another lot of the same area. As he was not satisfied with the answer of Manuel, he went
protect. The criminal act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the to the Office of Register of Deeds where he obtained a copy of a Deed of Sale in favour of
conjugal relation. It underscored the fact that the marital and domestic relations between Manuel.
her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony,
peace or tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in such a case, Laura Cervantes, daughter of Cristina testified that Cristina could ask money from Manuel
identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the security and confidences of private life because of the land that Andres had lent to her. She also testified that shortly after the
which the law aims to protect are nothing but ideals which through their absence, merely death of her mother, Manuel, accompanied by Felicisimo Guerrero went to their house, and

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summed up the loans he had extended to Cristina; and that Felicisimo asked Laura to sign latter promising to pay the loan within 90 days with interest at the rate of 10% per annum.
a piece of paper to attest to the fact that a certain amount of money had been borrowed The note was executed in the presence of Florencia Q. Abraham, the creditor's wife, who
from Manuel. affixed her signature at the bottom thereof as a witness thereto. Upon the maturity of the
note, a demand was made for its payment, but the debtor failed to pay. Alfonso Abraham,
Defendants Guerreros filed a written motion to disqualify Laura Cervantes as a witness on Sr. died. On the other hand, Juan C. Ysmael died intestate leaving the note still unpaid.
the basis of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the New Rules of Court. The trial court granted the
motion and declared that Luara Cervantes, Jose Cervantes as well as other witnesses In a Special Proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of Juan Ysmael, Florencia
similarly situated, are disqualified in the case. Q. Vda. de Abraham, together with her sons, Alfonso and Jesus, all surnamed Abraham,
filed a pleading entitled "Reclamation" demanding payment of the amount represented by
Issue: Whether or not witnesses Laura and Jose Cervantes were correctly disqualified from the note. Because no regular administrator of the estate had yet been appointed by the
testifying in the case and their testimonies excluded on the basis of Section 20(a), Rule 130 court, the "Reclamation" was not acted upon. However, as soon as Priscilla Recto-Kasten
of the Rules of Court. was appointed administratrix, the claimants reproduced their "Reclamation" before the
lower court and the same was finally set for hearing. As agreed upon by the parties, the
Ruling: Section 20 (a), Rule 130 provides: “"Section 20. Disqualification by reason of reception of evidence was delegated to a commissioner. During the hearing before the
interest or relationship. — The following persons cannot testify as to matters in which they commissioner, the counsel for the administratrix interposed a general and
are interested, directly or indirectly as herein enumerated: continuing objection to the testimony of Florencia Vda. de Abraham invoking the
provisions of Section 26(c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court.However, after the
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is claimant had testified, he lengthily cross-examined her on the very matters
prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a against which he interposed a general objection.
deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound The lower court allowed the claim against the intestate estate of Juan C. Ysmael.
mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such Priscilla Recto-Kasten, the administratrix, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate
deceased person or before such became of unsound mind." court concluding that "the lower court erred in finding that the claimants have established a
just and valid claim, and in allowing the claim — supposing it was a claim with
It is clear that mere witnesses who are neither parties plaintiff, nor their assignors, nor consideration — when the same had been barred by prescription, estoppel and laches,"
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, are not included in the prohibition. reversed the Order-Decree appealed from.

Laura Cervantes and Jose Cervantes are not parties in the present case, and neither are Issue: Whether or not petitioners have established a just and valid claim. And if the
they assignors of the parties nor "persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." They are answer is in the affirmative, whether the same is already barred by prescription and laches.
mere witnesses by whose testimonies the plaintiffs aimed to establish that it was not
Cristina, but Andres, who owned the disputed land at the time of its alleged sale to Manuel; Ruling:The record shows that petitioners have established the due execution and
that Cristina did not really sell but merely mortgaged the property to Manuel. genuineness of the promissory note and that respondents failed to present any evidence to
destroy the same.
The law uses the word ‘against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person.’ It should be noted that after the mention of an executor or administrator It is true that Section 26(c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides:
the words or other representative follows, which means that the word ‘representative’ (c) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is
includes only those who, like the executor or administrator, are sued in their representative, prosecuted, against an executor administrator or other representative of a deceased
not personal, capacity. And that is emphasized by the law by using the words ‘against the person, or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact
estate of such deceased persons’, which convey the idea of an estate actually owned by the occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of
deceased at the time the case was brought and that, therefore, it is only his rights that are unsound mind;
to be asserted and defendant in the litigation by the person representing him, not the
personal rights of such representative." However, there was a waiver of the prohibition when the counsel for the
administratrix extensively cross-examined the witness on the very matters
4) Florencia Abraham vs. Recto-Kasten (1962) subject of the prohibition. It was for this reason that the trial judge eventually overruled
Digested by: CMU the counsel's previous general and continuing objection and admitted the testimony of the
witness. Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that the counsel's lengthy cross-examination
Facts: Juan C. Ysmael, obtained a loan from Alfonso Abraham, Sr. in the amount of on the prohibited matter was merely for the purpose of establishing the "motive, prejudices
P12,500.00 in Japanese currency notes, and executed a promissory note in favor of the and predilection" of the witness.

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who testified on the alleged verbal lease agreement. TC judgment in favor of Vicente, CA
The reason for the rule apparently is that a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate as to affirmed TC decision.
what his examination of a witness may bring forth. Having made his selection of one of two
courses which he may pursue, he has no right, after he discovers that the course selected Issue: WON Gaspar Vicente may testify on matters of fact occurring before the death of
is not to his advantage, and after he has put the opposite party to the expense, and has Villanueva which constitutes a claim or demand upon his estate in violation of Rule 130 Sec.
consumed the time of the courts in a trial of the case in accordance with the course 20(a) of RoC
selected, to change his position and make another and different selection. Such course
would be unfair both to the opposite party and to the court and should not be Ruling: Yes. Under ordinary circumstances, Vicente would be disqualified by reason of
countenanced in any court of justice. interest from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of Villanueva,
such disqualification being anchored on Section 20(a) of Rule 130, commonly known as the
5) Goñi vs CA 144 SCRA 222 (1986) Survivorship Disqualification Rule or Dead Man Statute.
Digested by: TS
Section 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship.-The following
Facts:Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas (TABACLERA) owned 3 haciendas known persons cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested, directly or
as San Sebastian, Sarria and Dulce Nombre de Maria in Bais, Negros Occidental. Villanueva indirectly, as herein enumerated:
negotiated for the purchase of the haciendas but did not have sufficient funds to pay the (a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is
price so, with the consent of TABACLERA, he offered the haciendas to Santiago prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
Villegas, later substituted by Joaquin Villegas. Gaspar Vicente stood as the guarantor in a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or
document “Escritura de Taspaso de Cuenta” since TABLACLERA did not agree to the demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of
transaction without a guaranty. unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the
death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound
The amount realized from the transaction between Villegas and Villanueva was mind.
not enough so Villanueva contracted or promised to sell fields no. 3, 4, 13 of Hacienda
Dulce Nombre for P13,807 to Vicente. The amount of P12,460.24 was the amount debited The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false
from Vicente since it was the amount needed to complete the purchase price. Villanueva testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party and
was able to raise funders by selling a property in Ayungon Negros Occidental so he went to further to put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity
Vicente to rescind the contract/promise to sell but since the amount was already debited, of giving testimony. It is designed to close the lips of the party plaintiff when death has
this was not possible. They agreed that lots 4 and 13 would merely be leased to Vincent for closed the lips of the party defendant, in order to remove from the surviving party the
5 years starting 1950-1951 at annual rental of 15% of the gross income, rent to be temptation to falsehood and the possibility of fictitious claims against the deceased.
deducted from money advanced by Vicente.
This case remains within the ambit of the protection because the defendants-heirs are
In 1949, TABACLERA executed formal deed of sale of the 3 haciendas in favor of properly the "representatives" of the deceased, not only because they succeeded to the
Villanueva, including fields 3,4,and 13 which were registered in the latter’s name. These decedent's right by descent or operation of law, but more importantly because they are so
fields were mortgaged to the Rehabilitation and Finance Corporation later transferred to placed in litigation that they are called on to defend which they have obtained from the
PNB for total indebtedness of P334,400. Meanwhile, fields 3 and 13 were deceased and make the defense which the deceased might have made if living, or to
delivered to Vicente. Villanueva additionally executed a “Documento de la Venta establish a claim which deceased might have been interested to establish, if living.
Definitive” in favor of Villegas covering Lot 314 of Hacienda Sarria. Such protection, however, was effectively waived when counsel for petitioners cross-
In 1951, Villanueva died. Included in the inventory for intestate proceedings examined Vicente. "A waiver occurs when plaintiff's deposition is taken by the
were fields nos. 3, 4 and 13. Vicente instituted an action for recovery of property and representative of the estate or when counsel for the representative cross-examined the
damages against Goni in his capacity as administrator of the estate. Vicente sought to plaintiff as to matters occurring during deceased's lifetime. Also, the heirs presented a
recover field no. 3 by virtue of the contract/promise to sell. Goni filed an answer with counterclaim against Vicente. When Vicente thus took the witness stand, it was in a dual
counterclaim for accounting of the produce capacity as plaintiff in the action for recovery of property and as defendant in the
counterclaim for accounting and surrender of fields nos. 4 and 13. Evidently, as defendant
of fields 4 and 13 and surrender thereof at the end of the 5 th crop year in1955 plus moral in the counterclaim, he was not disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring
damages, atty. fees. There were two witnesses for Vicente: Vicente himself who testified before the death of Villanueva, said action not having been brought against, but by the
on the facts occurring before the death of Villanueva and Epifanio Equio a clerk of estate or representatives of the estate/deceased person. Likewise, under a great majority
TABACLERA Agency I Bais Sugar Central. Defendants on the other hand presented Goni of statutes, the adverse party is competent to testify to transactions or communications
with the deceased or incompetent person which were made with an agent of such person

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in cases in which the agent is still alive and competent to testify . But the testimony of the part of the surviving party, equally important is the rule that the law was designed to aid in
adverse party must be confined to those transactions or communications which were had arriving at the truth and was not designed to suppress the truth. 
with the agent.
The law twice makes use of the word "against." The actions were not brought "against" the
The contract/promise to sell under consideration was signed by petitioner Goñi as attorney- administratrix of the estate, nor were they brought upon claims "against" the estate. In the
in- fact of Villanueva. He was privy to the circumstances surrounding the execution of such first case, the action is one by the administratrix to enforce demand “by” the estate. In the
contract and therefore could either confirm or deny any allegations made by Vicente with second, the same analogy holds true for the claim was presented in cadastral proceedings
respect to said contract. The inequality or injustice sought to be avoided by Section 20(a) where in one sense there is no plaintiff and there is no defendant. Moreover, a waiver was
of Rule 130, where one of the parties no longer has the opportunity to either confirm or accomplished when the adverse party undertook to cross-examine the interested person
rebut the testimony of the other because death has permanently sealed the former's lips, with respect to the prohibited matters.
does not actually exist in the case at bar, for the reason that Goñi could and did not negate 7)Testate estate of RICHARD THOMAS FITZSIMMONS, deceased. MARCIAL P.
the binding effect of the contract/promise to sell. Thus, while admitting the existence of the LICHAUCO vs. ATLANTIC, GULF & PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA
said contract/promise to sell, Goñi testified that the same was subsequently novated into a Digested by: LAR
verbal contract of lease over fields nos. 4 and 13 of the Hacienda Dulce Nombre de Maria.
Facts:The appellant Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company of Manila is a foreign corporation duly
6) Tongco v. Vianzon, 50. PHIL. 698 (1927) registered and licensed to do business in the Philippines, with its office and principal place
Digested by: LT of business in the City of Manila. Richard T. Fitzsimmons was the president and one of the
largest stockholders of said company when the Pacific war broke out in 1941. As such
Facts: Marcelino Tongco and Anastacia Vianzon contracted marriage on July 5, 1894. president he was receiving a salary of P3,000 a month. He held 1,000 shares of stock, of
Marcelinodied on July 8, 1925, leaving Anastacia. The niece of the deceased, Josefa which 545 shares had not been fully paid for, but for which he had executed promissory
Tongco, wasnamed administratrix. Shortly before his death, Marcelino had presented claims notes in favor of the company aggregating P245,250, at the rate of P450 a share. In 1941
in acadastral case asking for titles to certain properties in the name of his conjugal the sum of P64,500 had been credited in his favor on account of the purchase price of the
partnership,and that corresponding decrees for these lots were issued not long after his said 545 shares ofstock out of bonuses and dividends to which he was entitled from the
death.In the cadastral case, the widow began action on April 28, 1926, presenting a motion company. Under his agreements with the company, should he die without having fully paid
forrevision of certain decrees within the one-year period prescribed. Issue was joined by for the said 545 shares of stock, the company, at its option, may either reacquire the said
theadministratrix of the estate. The Court of First Instance ordered new decrees and 545 shares of stock by returning to his estate the amount applied thereon, or issue in favor
certificatesof title be issued to the widow. A motion for a new trial was denied.On July 19, of his estate the corresponding number of the company's shares of stock equivalent to the
1926, the administratrix of the estate began action against the widow forrecovery of amount paid thereon at P450 a share.
specified property and for damages. The issue was practically the same as in thecadastral
case. CFI absolved the widow. The motion for a new trial was denied by His Honor,the Soon after the Japanese army occupied Manila in January, 1942, it seized and took
trial judge. The administratrix appealed possession of the office and all the properties and assets of the appellant corporation and
interned all its officials, they being American citizens.
Issue: Whether the widow was competent to testify?
Richard T. Fitzsimmons died on June 27, 1944, in the Santo Tomas internment camp, and
Ruling: Yes. The result, therefore, is to adhere to the findings and rulings of the trial special proceeding No. 70139 was subsequently instituted in the Court of First Instance of
judge. All the property of the spouses is presumed partnership property in the absence of Manila for the settlement of his estate.
proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. But even proceeding on this
assumption, the widow has proved in a decisive and conclusive manner exclusive ownership The Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Company of Manila resumed business operations in March,
of the property. 1945. In due course the said company filed a claim against the estate of Richard T.
Fitzsimmons and offered to reacquire the 545 shares sold to the deceased Fitzsimmons
Counsel relies on that portion of section 383 of the Code of Civil Procedure as provides that upon return to his estate of the amount of P64,500 paid thereon, and asked the court to
“Parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an authorize the setoff of the amount of its claim of P63,868.67 from the amount of P64,500
action or proceeding is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other returnable to the estate.
representative of a deceased person, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such
deceased person…, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death In his answer to the amended claim the administrator denied the alleged indebtedness of
of such deceased person...” While it is correct to say that the object and purpose is to the deceased to the claimant, expressed his conformity to the refund of P64,500 by the
guard against the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction on the claimant to the estate and the retransfer by the latter to the former of the 545 shares of
stock, and set up a counterclaim of P90,000 for salaries allegedly due the deceased from

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the claimant corresponding to the years 1942, 1943, and the first half of 1944, at P36,000 Vicente Chuidian filed a case against Enrique to recover the 1,500 shares and the accrued
per annum. benefits attached thereto. The stock certificate was in possession of Enrique until it was
deposited to Philippine Bank of Commerce. Enrique as a defendant testified of the oral
The evidence for the claimant consisted of the testimony of Santiago Inacay and Modesto agreement between him and Jose. In that oral agreement contained the understanding that
Flores, chief accountant and assistant accountant, respectively, of the Atlantic, Gulf & the owner of 1,500 shares is Enrique and it was really Enrique that paid for the price of the
Pacific Company of Manila. (It is admitted that all the prewar books and records of the shares. Jose was given the option to pay the price of the shares to Enrique but according
company were completely destroyed or lost during the war.) to the latter Jose never availed of the said option. Vicente did not object to such testimony
of Enrique. RTC decided in favor of Enrique and Jose appealed to IAC. IAC excluded the
Aside from Santiago Inacay and Modesto Flores, the claimant also called as witnesses Mr. testimony of Enrique on the ground of Dead man statute.
Henry J. Belden and Mr. Samuel Garmezy, vice-president-treasurer and president,
respectively, of the claimant company, to testify on the status of the personal account of Issue: WON it was proper for the IAC to exclude the testimony of Enrique on the ground
the deceased Fitzsimmons with the company as of December, 1941; but upon objection of of dead man statute
the administrator the trial court refused to admit their testimony on that point on the
ground that said witnesses were incompetent under section 26(c) of Rule 123, they being Ruling: No, this case is not one where dead man statute can be properly availed of. There
not only large stockholders and members of the board of directors but also vice-president- was no case against the estate of Jose Chuidian. In fact it was the administrator of Jose’s
treasurer and president, respectively, of the claimant company. estate that filed a case against Enrique. In such a set up the dead man statute is irrelevant.
The reason is, deadman statute is applicable as a ground for objection when there is a case
Issue: Whether or not the officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are disqualified AGAINST the administrator or executor of an ESTATE and not the other way around. The
from testifying for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or Supreme Court in this case further explains that assuming for argument purposes that the
demand against the estate. deadman statute is applicable, the same is deemed waived when Vicente failed to object
when Enrique was testifying as to his oral agreement with Jose.
Ruling:NO. Inasmuch as section 26(c) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court disqualifies only
parties or assignors of parties, the officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not 9) Mendezona vs. Viuda De Goitia, GR NO. L-31739, MARCH 11, 1930
disqualified from testifying for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon Digested by: KN
a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person. Facts:Plaintiffs Leonor Mendezona and Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal filed separate claims
against the intestate estate of Benigno Goitia y Lazaga, the first for the amount of P5,940
A self-serving declaration is a statement favorable to the interest of the declarant. It is not and the second P2,376. The claimants presented their evidence, which the committee
admissible in evidence as proof of the facts asserted. "The vital objection to the admission deemed insufficient and disapproved their claims. Both claimants appealed from the report
of this kind of evidence is its hearsay character. Furthermore such declarations are of the committee and filed a new complaint which was later amended with the approval of
untrustworthy; to permit their introduction in evidence would open the door to frauds and the court.
perjuries." (20 Am. Jur., Evidence, sec. 558, pages 470, 471.) On the other hand, a
declaration against the interest of the person making it is admissible in evidence, The defendant answered, pleading in special defense, that not having knowledge of the
notwithstanding its hearsay character, if the declaration is relevant and the declarant has supposed management of their rights in the "Tren de Aguadas," and, not having seen nor
died, become insane, or for some other reason is not available as a witness. "The true test received any money of the plaintiff's from said business, she (wife of deceased) is not in a
in reference to the reliability of the declaration is not whether it was made ante litem position to render an account of any sort to the plaintiffs, either in her own personal
motam, as is the case with reference to some classes of hearsay evidence, but whether the capacity or as judicial administratrix of Benigno Goitia's intestate estate.
declaration was uttered under circumstances justifying the conclusion that there was no
probable motive to falsify." (Id., section 556, pp. 467, 468.) By agreement of the parties, both cases were tried together, and the trial court rendered
one decision upon them on October 31, 1928, to wit:
8) Enrique Razon vs IAC 207 SCRA 234 (1992)
Digested by: JS  “that defendant Encarnacion C. Vda, de Goitia has been duly appointed judicial
administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband Benigno Goitia;
Facts: Enrique gave 1,500 shares of E. Razon Inc. to late Jose T. Chuidian with an  that Benigno Goitia was the representative and attorney-in-fact of the plaintiffs in
agreement that the latter will recognize the former’s ownership over the shares. Enrique the joint-account partnership known as the "Tren de Aguadas" of which the
had to give the shares to Jose because the original incorporators withdrew. Enrique by plaintiff Leonor Mendezona owns 180 shares worth P18,000, and the plaintiff
reason of intimate relationship with Jose did not require the latter to make an indorsement Valentina Izaguirre y Nazabal owns 72 shares worth P7,200;  
of the 1,500 shares to his favor. Jose died and the administrator of his estate, his son

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 that prior to 1915, Benigno was the manager of the co-partnership, and collected
the dividends for the plaintiffs, which he remitted to them every year – P540 for a) Did Mr. Benigno Goitia render you an account of your partnership in the “Tren de
Mendezona and P216 for Izaguirre y Nazabal; Aguadas”? –Yes, until the year 1914.
 that from 1915 until his death, Benigno failed to remit to the dividends upon their b) From the year 1915, did Mr. Benigno send you any report or money on account of
shares; and profits upon your shares? –He sent me nothing, nor did he answer my letters.
 that some time before his death, Benigno, who was no longer the manager of the c) Did you ever ask him to send you a statement of your account? –Yes, several
said business, receive as attorney-in-fact of both plaintiff, the amount of P90 as times by letter but I never received an answer.
dividend upon plaintiff Mendezona's shares, and P36 upon Izaguirre y Nazabal's
stock.” The first of these questions tends to show the relationship between the principals and their
attorney-in-fact Benigno Goitia up to 1914. Supposing it was error to permit such a
The trial court then ordered the defendant as judicial administratrix to render an account of question, it would not be reversible error, for that very relationship is proved by the
the amounts collected by her husband as attorney-in-fact and representative of the in the exhibits. As to the other 2 questions, the SC held that the claimants' denial that a certain
co-partnership from 1915 to July, 1926, within 30 days from notice of the decision; and fact occurred before the death of their attorney-in-fact Benigno Agoitia does not come
that the defendant may see, examine, and make a copy of the books and documents within the legal prohibitions (section 383, No. 7, Code of Civil Procedure).
relative to the business of the aforementioned co-partnership.
The law prohibits a witness directly interested in a claim against the estate of a decedent
On February 6, 1929, the defendant, reiterating her exception to the court's decision from testifying upon a matter of fact which took place before the death of the deceased.
enjoining her to render accounts, manifested that after a painstaking examination of the The underlying principle of this prohibition is to protect the intestate estate from fictitious
books and several attempts to obtain data from the manager and administrator thereof, claims. But this protection should not be treated as an absolute bar or prohibition from the
she has found no more evidence of any amount received by her late husband. The court filing of just claims against the decedent's estate.
however took account on the testimonies of the manager of the co-partnership (Santos)
and a shareholder (Salinas), after duly computing the amounts of shares, that Goitia In the case of Maxilom vs. Tabotabo (9 Phil., 390), the circumstances differ from those in
thereby received P13,140 in behalf of Mendezona, and P5,256 in behalf of Izaguirre. The the case at bar. In that case, the plaintiff Maxilom liquidated his accounts with the
trial court ordered defendant to pay the plaintiffs these amounts. Hence, defendant deceased Tabotabo during his lifetime, with the result that there was a balance in
appealed this judgment to the SC through the proper bill of exceptions. Maxilom’s favor against. The liquidation was signed by both Maxilom and Tabotabo. In spite
of this, some years later, Maxilom filed a claim against the estate of Tabotabo which shows
Issues: an increase in the amount in the previous liquidation (P312.37 to P1,062.37). It is evident
1. WON the court has jurisdiction to admit the amended complaints whereby the plaintiffs that in view of the prohibition of section 383, paragraph 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure,
claim P13,680 and P5,470 respectively, whereas the claims presented to the committee of Maxilom could not testify in his own behalf against Tabotabo's estate, so as to alter the
claims and appraisal were only for P5,940 and P2,376, respectively. balance of the liquidation made by and between himself and the decedent.
2. WON the Dead Man’s Statute/Survivorship Disqualification applies.
But in the case before us there has been no such liquidation between the plaintiffs and the
Rulings: deceased Goitia. They testify, denying any such liquidation. To apply to them the rule that
1. The fact that the claims filed with the committee were upon the basis of annual "if death has sealed the lips of one of the parties, the law seals those of the other," would
dividends, while those filed with the court below were on ordinary and extraordinary be to exclude all possibility of a claim against the testamentary estate. We do not believe
dividends, is of no importance, for after all they refer to the same amounts received by the that this was the legislator's intention.
deceased Benigno in the name and for the benefit of the plaintiffs. Just as in ordinary
actions in which the pleadings may be amended, so in the instant case, the original The plaintiffs-appellees did not testify to a fact which took place before their
complaint for the same amounts claimed before the committee was altered, increasing the representative's death, but on the contrary denied that it had taken place at all, i.e. they
amounts, and the amended complaint was approved by the court and not objected to by denied that a liquidation had been made or any money remitted on account of their shares.
the adverse party. To deny them the right to amend their complaint in accordance with
section 776, when they had secured more definite information as to the amounts due them, Finally, as to the interest imposed in the judgment appealed from, it is sufficient to cite
would be an injustice, especially when it is taken into consideration that this action arises article 1724 of the Civil Code, which provides that an agent shall be liable for interest upon
from trust relations between the plaintiffs and the late Benigno Goitia as their attorney-in- any sums he may have applied to his own use, from the day on which he did so, and upon
fact. those which he still owes, after the expiration of the agency, from the time of his default.

2. When these depositions were read in court, the defendant objected to their admission, 10)  Garcia vs. Dominga Robles, G.R. No. 180843, April 17, 2013
mainly objecting to these questions: Digested by: IMP

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In her Answer, herein respondent Dominga claimed that when her father-in-law Eugenio
Facts: Flora Makapugay (Makapugay) is the owner of a 2.5-hectare farm in Barangay died, only her husband Pedro succeeded and cultivated the land, and that petitioners never
Lugam, Malolos, Bulacan (the land), being tilled by Eugenio Caparas (Eugenio) as assisted him in farming the land; that Pedro is the sole agricultural lessee of the land; that
agricultural lessee under a leasehold agreement. Makapugay passed away and was Amanda’s July 10, 1996 Affidavit and "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" of even date
succeeded by her nephews and niece, namely Amanda dela Paz-Perlas (Amanda), Justo between her and the petitioners are self-serving and violate the existing 1979 Agricultural
dela Paz (Justo) and Augusto dela Paz (Augusto). On the other hand, Eugenio’s children – Leasehold Contract; that under Section 38 of Republic Act No. 3844 (RA 3844), petitioners’
Modesta Garcia (Garcia), Cristina Salamat (Salamat) and Pedro – succeeded him. cause of action has prescribed. Dominga further claimed that Pedro has been in possession
of the land even while Eugenio lived; that petitioners have never cultivated nor possessed
Before she passed away, Makapugay appointed Amanda as her attorney-in-fact. After the land even for a single cropping; that Pedro has been the one paying the lease rentals
Eugenio died, or in 1974, Amanda and Pedro entered into an agreement entitled as evidenced by receipts; that when Pedro died in 1984, she succeeded in his rights as
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan", followed by an April 19, 1979 Agricultural Leasehold lessee by operation of law, and that she had been remitting lease rentals to the landowners
Contract, covering the land. In said agreements, Pedro was installed and recognized as the since 1985; and that petitioners had no right to institute themselves as her co-lessees. She
lone agricultural lessee and cultivator of the land. prayed that the Complaint be dismissed; that the July 10, 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng
Lupa" be nullified; that the execution of a new leasehold agreement between her and the
Pedro passed away in 1984, and his wife, herein respondent Dominga Robles Vda. de landowners be ordered; and by way of counterclaim, that moral damages and litigation
Caparas (Dominga), took over as agricultural lessee. costs be awarded her.

On July 10, 1996, the landowners Amanda, Justo and Augusto, on the one hand, and PARAD: Rendered judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs. The
Pedro’s sisters Garcia and Salamat on the other, entered into a "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng PARAD held that Amanda’s act of executing the July 10, 1996 Affidavit and "Kasunduan sa
Lupa" whereby Garcia and Salamat were acknowledged as Pedro’s co-lessees. Buwisan ng Lupa" amounted to dispossession of Pedro’s landholding and rights without
cause; that Amanda’s 1996 disclaimer, after having installed Pedro as tenant in 1979, was
On October 24, 1996, herein petitioners Garcia and Salamat filed a Complaint for belated and unjustified; that petitioners have not shown by evidence that they actually
nullification of leasehold and restoration of rights as agricultural lessees against Pedro’s cultivated the land, or that they paid rentals to the landowners; that petitioners’ cause of
heirs, represented by his surviving spouse and herein respondent Dominga. Before the action has prescribed in accordance with Section 38 of RA 3844; that for failure to timely
office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Bulacan, the case was question Pedro’s leasehold, his rights were transferred, by operation of law, to Dominga
docketed as Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Case No. R-03- upon his death. Finally, the PARAD held that petitioners’ July 10, 1996 "Kasunduan sa
02-3520-96. Buwisan ng Lupa" is null and void for being issued against Pedro’s existing 1979
Agricultural Leasehold Contract, which has not been cancelled by competent authority.
In their Complaint, Garcia and Salamat claimed that when their father Eugenio died, they
entered into an agreement with their brother Pedro that they would alternately farm the DARAB: In upholding the PARAD Decision, the DARAB held that contrary to petitioners’
land on a "per-season basis"; that the landowner Makapugay knew of this agreement; that claim, there was no alternate farming agreement between the parties, and thus petitioners
when Makapugay passed away, Pedro reneged on their agreement and cultivated the land may not claim that they were co-lessees; that Pedro merely shared his harvest with
all by himself, deliberately excluding them and misrepresenting to Amanda that he is petitioners as an act of generosity, and Dominga’s act of stopping this practice after
Eugenio’s sole heir; that as a result, Amanda was deceived into installing him as sole succeeding Pedro prompted petitioners to file DARAB Case No. R-03-02-3520-96 and claim
agricultural lessee in their 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract; that when Amanda learned the status of co-lessees; that Amanda’s Affidavit and the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng
of Pedro’s misrepresentations, she executed on July 10, 1996 an Affidavit stating among Lupa" between the landowners and petitioners cannot defeat Pedro’s 1979 Agricultural
others that Pedro assured her that he would not deprive Garcia and Salamat of their Leasehold Contract and his rights as the sole tenant over the land; that for sleeping on
"cultivatory rights"; that in order to correct matters, Amanda, Justo and Augusto executed their rights, petitioners are now barred by laches from claiming that they are co-lessees;
in their favor the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa", recognizing them as Pedro’s co- and that petitioners’ 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" is null and void for being
lessees; that when Pedro passed away, Dominga took over the land and, despite demands, contrary to law, morals, public policy, and Pedro’s 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract,
continued to deprive them of their rights as co-lessees; that efforts to settle their which was subsisting and which has not been cancelled by competent authority.
controversy proved futile, prompting the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee to issue the
proper certification authorizing the filing of a case; and that they suffered damages as a Court of Appeals: Denied petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari and affirmed the DARAB
consequence. Petitioners prayed that the 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract between Decision. The CA held that even granting that the issues are resolved on the merits, the
Pedro and Amanda be nullified; that they be recognized as co-lessees and allowed to petition would fail; the cancellation of the survey returns and plans covering TCT RT-65932
cultivate the land on an alternate basis as originally agreed; and that they be awarded reverts the property to its original classification as agricultural land which thus vindicates
attorney’s fees and costs of litigation. the leasehold agreements of the parties. And speaking of leasehold agreements, the CA
held that petitioners may not be considered as Pedro’s co-lessees, for lack of proof that

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they actually tilled the land and with petitioners’ own admission in their pleadings that they
merely received a share from Pedro’s harvests; that the original 1974 and 1979 leasehold 11) People vs Carlos47 PHIL. 626 (1925)
agreements between Makapugay, Amanda and Pedro categorically show that Pedro is the Digested by: AD
sole designated agricultural lessee; and that without proper legal termination of Pedro’s
lease in accordance with RA 3844, the landowners cannot designate other tenants to the This is an appeal from a decision of the CFI manila finding the defendant Fausto Carlos
same land in violation of the existing lessee’s rights. guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment.

Issue: Whether or not Amanda’s declaration in her Affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged Facts: The crime stemmed out from doctor-patient relationship. Carlos and his wife were
admission and recognition of the alternate farming scheme is admissible. regular patients of Dr. Pablo Sityar in Escolta where his wife is being treated for
appendicitis and him, for lung ailment. Dr.S in one of his consultations for his wife sent him
Ruling:The Petition is denied. out to buy some medicine and while defendant was absent on this errand, the doctor
outraged the wife. Defendant was informed by his wife shortly after leaving the clinic.
DARAB Case No. R-03-02-3520-96, which was filed in 1996 or long after Pedro’s death in Nevertheless, he went again to consult about some of his lung trouble.
1984, has no leg to stand on other than Amanda’s declaration in her July 10, 1996 Affidavit
that Pedro falsely represented to Makapugay and to her that he is the actual cultivator of Confined in PGH, he received a letter from Dr. Sityar asking for the immediate settlement of
the land, and that when she confronted him about this and the alleged alternate farming the account for his Prof services rendered for his wife. One afternoon in the office, by
scheme between him and petitioners, Pedro allegedly told her that "he and his two sisters evidence of the prosecution, the defendant then without preliminary quarrel between the
had an understanding about it and he did not have the intention of depriving them of their two attacked the doctor with a fan knife and stabbed him twice. Defendant then escaped
cultivatory rights." Petitioners have no other evidence, other than such verbal declaration, but later surrendered to the Phil constabulary at Malolos Bulacan. Carlos admitted but
which proves the existence of such arrangement. No written memorandum of such maintains tgat he did so in self-defense.
agreement exists, nor have they shown that they actually cultivated the land even if only
for one cropping. No receipt evidencing payment to the landowners of the latter’s share, or TC failed to establish case of self-defense so question now is he guilty of murder or of
any other documentary evidence, has been put forward. simple homicide. Court finds that it was committed with premeditation and hence, murder.
They took consideration on the letter written to the defendant by his wife and seized by the
What the PARAD, DARAB and CA failed to consider and realize is thatAmanda’s police in searching his effects on the day of arrest. The tenor of the letter shows that his
declaration in her Affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged admission and recognition wife feared that the defendant contemplated resorting to physical violence in dealing with
of the alternate farming scheme is inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead the doctor[writer-wife]. Counsel of defendant argues vigorously that the letter was a
Man’s Statute,which provides that "[i]f one party to the alleged transaction is privileged communication and therefore, not admissible in evidence
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the
other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own Issue: WON the letter constitutes a right for the defendant and his wife coming under
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction." Thus, since Pedro is privileged communication. /react-text
deceased, and Amanda’s declaration which pertains to the leasehold agreement affects the
1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" which she as assignor entered into with petitioners, Ruling: The numerical weight of authority is to the effect that where a privileged
and which is now the subject matter of the present case and claim against Pedro’s surviving commination from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party, whether
spouse and lawful successor-in-interest Dominga, such declaration cannot be admitted and legally or not , without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the
used against the latter, who is placed in an unfair situation by reason of her being unable spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication if otherwise
to contradict or disprove such declaration as a result of her husband-declarant Pedro’s prior competent, becomes admissible. /react-text
death.
For documents of communication coming into the possession of a third person, a distinction
If petitioners earnestly believed that they had a right, under their supposed mutual should obtain, if they were obtained from the addressee by voluntary delivery, they should
agreement with Pedro, to cultivate the land under an alternate farming scheme, then they still be privileged but if they were obtained surreptitiously or otherwise without the
should have confronted Pedro or sought an audience with Amanda to discuss the possibility addressee's consent, the privilege should cease.
of their institution as co-lessees of the land; and they should have done so soon after the
passing away of their father Eugenio. However, it was only in 1996, or 17 years after Pedro The letter in question was obtained through a search for which no warrant appears to have
was installed as tenant in 1979 and long after his death in 1984, that they came forward to been issued and documents obtained by illegal searches of the defendant's effects are not
question Pedro’s succession to the leasehold. As correctly held by the PARAD, petitioners admissible in a criminal case.
slept on their rights, and are thus precluded from questioning Pedro’s 1979 agricultural
leasehold contract. 12) Uy Chico vs. Union Life, 29 PHIL. 163 (1915)

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Digested by: RP
13) Regala vs Sandiganbayan (1996)
Facts: Uy Chico seeks to recover the face value of two insurance policies upon a stock of Digested by: MC
dry goods destroyed by fire. It appears that the father of Uy Chico died in 1897, at which
time he was conducting a business under his own name, Uy Layco. Uy Chico and his 14) Barton vs. Leyte Asphalt and Mineral Oil Co. (1924)
brother took over the business and continued it under the same name, "Uy Layco." Digested by: CT
Sometime before the date of the fire, Uy Chico purchased his brother's interest in the
business and continued to carry on the business under the father's name. At the time of 15) Orient Insurance Company vs. E.P Revilla,G.R. No. 34098, Sept. 17, 1930
the fire "Uy Layco" was heavily indebted and subsequent thereto the creditors of the estate Digested by: DJT
of Uy Chico's father. During the course of these proceedings, Uy Chico's attorney
surrendered the policies of insurance to the administrator of the estate, who Facts: Theobject of Orient Insurance Co.’s (Orient) petition for writs of certiorari and
compromised with the insurance company for one-half their face value, or mandamus is to require respondent judge to permit Orient’s counsel to examine a letter,
P6,000. This money was paid into court and is now being held by the sheriff. Uy Chico part of which has already been read into the record in the course of the examination of one
now brings this action, maintaining that the policies and goods insured belonged to of the witnesses testifying for private respondent Teal Motor Co., Inc. (TMC).
him and not to the estate of his deceased father and alleges that he is not bound
by the compromise effected by the administrator of his father's estate. TMC, as plaintiff, filed a civil action against Orient for the purpose of recovering upon 2 fire
insurance policies issued by the latter over TMC’s stock merchandise. The policy contained
The defendant insurance company sought to show that Uy Chico had agreed to a clause stipulating to the effect that all benefits would be forfeited if, in case of loss, the
compromise settlement of the policies, and for that purpose introduced evidence claim should be rejected by the insurer and action is not commenced within 3 months after
showing that Uy Chico's attorney had surrendered the policies to the such rejection. Orient’s defense alleges that the claim was rejected on April 15, 1929, and
administrator with the understanding that such a compromise was to be that notice of such rejection was given to plaintiff by letter on the same day. However, suit
effected. Uy Chico was asked, while on the witness stand, if he had any objection to his was not instituted by TMC until August 3, more than 3 months after rejection of the claim.
attorney's testifying concerning the surrender of the policies, to which he replied in the
negative. The attorney was then called for that purpose. Whereupon, counsel for Uy Chico According to TMC, on the day they were notified of the rejection, Orient representative E.
formally withdrew the waiver previously given by Uy Chico and objected to the testimony of E. Elser expressly requested TMC to defer judicial action until after July 31 for possibilities
the attorney on the ground that it was privileged. Counsel, on this appeal, base their of compromise between the parties. TMC relied on the request and delayed institution of
argument of the proposition that a waiver of the client's privilege may be withdrawn at any action. However, during the trial of the civil case, witness TMC president E. M. Bachrach
time before acted upon, and cite in support thereof Ross vs. Great Northern Ry. Co.. The made an oral statement as to the substance of part of a letter received by TMC from its
case of Natlee Draft Horse Co. vs. Cripe and Co. also appears to sustain their contention. attorneys, saying that he waited for about a week longer and not having heard anything
about it, he received a letter on July 13 from our attorneys urging me to file these cases .
Issue: Was the testimony in question privileged? When asked by the counsel for Orient to produce the letter, Bachrach only offered in
evidence part of the letter supporting his testimony (relating to the urging of the filing of
Ruling: NO. Our practice Act provides: "A lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the complaints) but refused to reveal the other part as it contained private matter privileged in
confidence and preserve the secrets of his client. He shall not be permitted in any court, nature between the attorneys and TMC (relating to contract of fees, retaining of counsel’s
without the consent of his client, given in open court, to testify to any facts imparted to him services in connection with the cases, alleged to be matters entirely distinct from the
by his client in professional consultation, or for the purpose of obtaining advice upon legal issue).
matters." (Sec. 31, Act No. 190.) A similar provision is inserted in section 383, No. 4, of the
same Act. It will be noted that the evidence in question concerned the dealings Orient demanded for the production of “the best evidence,” it being well-known a rule of
of Uy Chico's attorney with a third person. Of the very essence of the veil of secrecy law that a witness cannot be permitted to give oral testimony as to the contents of a paper
which surrounds communications made between attorney and client, is that such writing which can be produced in court. In response, only a portion of the letter referred to
communications are not intended for the information of third persons or to be by the witness was read into the record. Orient now insists that inasmuch as all the letters
acted upon by them, put of the purpose of advising the client as to his rights. It refers to the case then in court, the entire document should be exhibited pursuant to the
is evident that a communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of rule that when part of a document is offered in evidence, the entire document must be
its being communicated to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential presented.
relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions be delivering the
communication to the third person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it Issue: Does presentation of part of the letter constitute waiver to present the whole
cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal sense as a privileged document? Yes. Is a contract for fees and other terms of employment between attorney
communication between the attorney and his client. and client privileged in nature? No.

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another case was filed for falsification of judicial records. It was then that respondent
Ruling: The excerpt in question must be considered as proof submitted by TMC, and there Sansaet offered to testify as a state witness against his client Paredes, claiming that the
can be no question that, part of the letter having been introduced in behalf of the plaintiff, latter contrived and induced him to have the graft case dismissed on the ground of double
the whole of the letter could properly be examined by Orient, in accordance with the jeopardy by having him and co-respondent prepare and falsify the subject documents.
express provision of section 283, Code of Civil Procedure.
But the Sandiganbayan denied the motion on the ground of attorney-client privilege since
As to the alleged privileged nature of the terms of employment between attorney and client the lawyer could not testify against his own client. In view of such relationship, confidential
as contained in other portions of the letter, the court found it difficult to consider a contract matters must have been disclosed by Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer,
for fees as privileged. However irrelevant under the circumstances, it cannot be privileged in his professional capacity, and therefore privileged.
in nature. Contracts between attorneys and clients are inherently personal and considered
as private matters, but they are a constant subject of litigation, and contracts relating to Issue: Whether or not the testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is
fees are essentially not of privileged nature. barred by attorney-client privilege.

Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the letter contained privileged matters, such was Ruling: No. There is no privileged communication rule to talk about. The privilege applies
waived by the introduction in evidence of part of the letter. Section 238 of the Code of Civil only if the information was relayed by the client to the lawyer respecting a past crime. The
Procedure, making the whole of a declaration, conversation, or writing admissible when reckoning point is when the communication was given, not when the lawyer was made to
part has been given in evidence by one party, makes no exception as to privileged matter; testify.
and neither do jurisprudence on the subject recognize any exception. Hence, Orient was
entitled to examine the whole of the letter, with a view to the introduction in evidence of The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases as the facts thereof and the
such parts thereof as may be relevant to the case on trial, and the respondent judge was in actuations of both respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule.
error in refusing to permit the inspection by Orient.
It may be correctly assumed that there was a confidential communication made by Paredes
16) People of the Philippines vs. Honorable Sandiganbayan, to Sansaet in connection with the criminal cases since the latter served as his counsel
G.R. Nos. 115439-41, July 16, 1997 therein. The privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications made by the
Digested by: DPS client to his attorney but extends as well to information communicated by other means.
IOW, including physical acts. The acts and words of the parties, therefore, during the
Facts: The case involves a prominent politician in Mindanao, respondent Ceferino Paredes, period when the documents were being falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes
Jr., who was formerly the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor, and would not have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the same except
Congressman. During his stint, Paredes applied for and was granted a free patent over a under conditions of secrecy and confidence.
vast tract of land. However, it was cancelled because apparently, it has already been
designated and reserved as a school site. The court found that Paredes had obtained title However, the announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the
thereto through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application, and somebody came confidences which his attorney is bound to respect. It is true that by now, insofar as the
forward and filed a case of perjury against him. However, the same was dismissed on the falsifications are concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But for
ground of prescription. Then again, another case was filed against him for violation of RA the privilege to apply, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for using his former position as Provincial communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime
Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act on his committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future.
application for patent. In all these cases, Paredes was represented by respondent Atty. IOW, if the client seeks his lawyer’s advice with respect to a crime which he has already
Sansaet, a practicing attorney. committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the privilege
declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the client’s consent. The same privileged
Paredes, as defense, contends that he has already been charged under the same set of confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a crime a client intends to commit
facts and the same evidence where such complaint (perjury case where he was already thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer’s advice.
arraigned) has already been dismissed. Hence, double jeopardy has already attached. In
support hereof, Paredes presented court records and transcripts as proof of his arraignment Here, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the
in the perjury case. communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at
the time he and Honrada were about to falsify the documents. Clearly, therefore, the
However, the documents were found to be falsified, in conspiracy with Paredes’ counsel confidential communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in
and the clerk of court where the perjury case was filed. One Teofilo Gelacio claims that no reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by
notice of arraignment was ever received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. Hence, Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later

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committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are

outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege. But even if it appeared that the communication in question were otherwise privileged (i. e.,
that the communication was considered confidential despite the presence of a stranger),
It is well settled that communication between a lawyer and his client, to be privileged, must the testimony was nonetheless admissible. The conversations in question dealt with plans
be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful to commit perjury so as to hide the criminal activity of appellant and others. It is beyond
purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. In fact, the prosecution of the honorable dispute that the attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications regarding an
relation of attorney and client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every intended crime.
communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or
attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under The policy underlying the attorney-client privilege is to promote the administration of
certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice. justice. It would be a perversion of the privilege to extend it so as to protect
communications designed to frustrate justice by committing other crimes to conceal past
To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later misdeeds.
committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his conspiring 18) U.S vs McPartlin (1979)
client, would be one of the worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the Digested by: JQ
noble profession of law.
19) Lim vs Court of Appeals 214 SCRA 273 (1992)
17) United States of Americav. Ana Luisa GORDON-NIKKAR Digest by: KRH
Digested by: KRH
Facts:Petitioner Nerry Lim and Private Respondent Juan Sim were married. Juan filed
Facts:Appellant, Ana Gordon-Nikkar, was convicted after a trial by jury on all three counts petition for annulment of such marriage on the ground that Nerry has been allegedly
of an indictment charging her with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia. Among the witnesses presented by the
approximately four kilograms of cocaine, and the substantive charges of possession with counsel of Juan was Dr. Lydia Acampado, Chief of the Female Services of the National
intent to distribute and distribution of the cocaine. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Mental Hospital, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Dr. Acampado
happened to examine Nerry one time. Nerry’s counsel objected to the presentation of Dr.
On appeal, appellant contends her conviction should be reversed because the district court Acampado arguing that having seen and examined Nerry in a professional capacity, Dr.
permitted a Government witness, Brenda Marchand, to give testimony regarding allegedly Acampado is barred from testifying under the rule on the confidentiality of a physician-
privileged conversations between appellant's attorney and his clients. patient relationship. Counsel of Juan contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be
presented as an expert witness and would not testify on any information acquired while
Marchand had two meetings in the office of appellant's attorney, Mr. Estrumsa. 1 On each of attending to the petitioner in a professional capacity.
these occasions, several of the co-defendants were present. Marchand, however, was not a
client of Estrumsa, and it is unclear whether all the other persons in these meetings were Issue:Whether or not Dr. Acampado, presented as an expert witness, is barred from
Estrumsa's clients. Of the two conversations related by Marchand, the second was the testifying in court on the ground of privileged communication between a physician and the
subject of thorough cross-examination by Estrumsa. The second conversation involved patient
Estrumsa's alleged recommendation that Marchand leave the country and go to Venezuela.
Ruling:No. Our careful evaluation of the submitted pleadings leads Us to no other course
On redirect, the Government inquired, over defense objection, into the substance of the of action but to agree with the respondent Court’s observation that the petitioner failed to
conversation during the first meeting. Marchand testified that at this meeting the discharge that burden. In the first place, Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an
participants, at Mr. Estrumsa's suggestion, agreed to give perjured cover-up testimony at expert witness. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, she did not disclose anything
trial to the effect that none of them had possessed the cocaine, but instead merely obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of the petition er;
happened to be at a party where the cocaine was discovered. moreover, the facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and
had no bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to
Issue:Whether the statements in attorney Estrumsa's office were protected by the the patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado’s answers to the questions
attorney-client privilege propounded to her relating to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the information
obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever
Ruling:No. A communication divulged to "strangers" or outsiders can scarcely be information or knowledge she had about the petitioner which was acquired by reason of the
considered a confidential communication between attorney and client. Therefore, this physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an expert witness, her testimony
communication is not protected by the attorney-client privilege. (Take note that when the before the trial court cannot then be excluded.
meeting took place in the office of the Atty. there were several persons present)

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There is authority to the effect that information elicited during consultation with a physician  contends that "the rules are very explicit: the prohibition applies only to a
in the presence of third parties removes such information from the mantle of the privilege. physician. The legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the case at bar
where the person sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged
Digester’s note:(Nerry Lim was accompanied by her dad Dr. Lim when they consulted Dr. communication is the husband and not the physician of the petitioner.
Acampado thus the court said that it is no longer privileged communication because the  the Rules sanction his testimony considering that a husband may testify against
element of confidentiality is wanting. That’s how I understand it.) his wife in a civil case filed by one against the other.
 privileged communication may be waived by the person entitled
20) MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN vs. CA and EDGAR KROHN, JR., (1994) thereto, and this petitioner expressly did when she gave her
Digested by: KS unconditional consent to the use of the psychiatric evaluation report
when it was presented to the Tribunal Metropolitanum
Principle: Physician-Patient Privilege Communication can only be invoked against a person Matrimoniale which took it into account among others in deciding the case and
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. declaring their marriage null and void.
 argues that petitioner also gave her implied consent when she failed to specifically
Facts: object to the admissibility of the report in her Answer where she merely described
 On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr. and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married in the evaluation report as "either unfounded or irrelevant."
church. They had three children. However, their union became stormy. In 1971,
underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain. Issue: WON there was a violation of Physician-Patient Privilege Communication?
But it proved futile so in 1973, they were already separated in fact.
 In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ruling:The requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully invoked: (a) the
Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. He privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is
obtained a decree from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired
Manila nullifying his church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; (d) the
"incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia  due to lack of due discretion existent at information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information
the time of the wedding and thereafter." It became final and definite in 1979. was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the
 In 1982, an order granting the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership patient.
was issued.
 On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one
marriage with Ma. Paz before the trial court. At the hearing on 8 May 1991, duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the
Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners.
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition.

Petitioner’s Contention: 21)  Blue Cross Health v. Olivares, G.R. No. 169737, 12 February 2008
 Argues that since Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court  prohibits a Digested by: CMU
*repeated case from Batch 2*
physician from testifying on matters which he may have acquired in attending to a
patient in a professional capacity, "WITH MORE REASON should be third person Facts: Respondent Neomi T. Olivares applied for a health care program with petitioner
(like respondent-husband in this particular instance) be PROHIBITED from Blue Cross Health Care, Inc., a health maintenance firm. For the period October 16, 2002 to
testifying on privileged matters between a physician and patient or October 15, 2003, she paid the amount of P11,117. For the same period, she also availed
from submitting any medical report, findings or evaluation prepared by of the additional service of limitless consultations for an additional amount of P1,000. She
a physician which the latter has acquired as a result of his confidential paid these amounts in full on October 17, 2002. The application was approved on October
and privileged relation with a patient."  22, 2002. In the health care agreement, ailments due to "pre-existing conditions" were
 Argues that to allow her husband to testify on the contents of the psychiatric excluded from the coverage.On November 30, 2002, or barely 38 days from the effectivity
evaluation report "will set a very bad and dangerous precedent because it abets of her health insurance, respondent Neomi suffered a stroke and was admitted at the
circumvention of the rule's intent in preserving the sanctity, security and Medical City which was one of the hospitals accredited by petitioner. During her
confidence to the relation of physician and his patient." 14 Her thesis is that what confinement, she underwent several laboratory tests. On December 2, 2002, her attending
cannot be done directly should not be allowed to be done indirectly. physician, Dr. Edmundo Saniel, informed her that she could be discharged from the
hospital. She incurred hospital expenses amounting to P34,217.20. Consequently, she
Respondent’s Contention: requested from the representative of petitioner at Medical City a letter of authorization in
order to settle her medical bills. But petitioner refused to issue the letter and suspended

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payment pending the submission of a certification from her attending physician that the 2. Whether it was liable for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. - YES
stroke she suffered was not caused by a pre-existing condition.She was discharged from
the hospital on December 3, 2002. On December 5, 2002, she demanded that petitioner Ruling: We agree with respondents.In Philamcare Health Systems, Inc. v. CA, we ruled
pay her medical bill. When petitioner still refused, she and her husband, respondent Danilo that a health care agreement is in the nature of a non-life insurance. It is an established
Olivares, were constrained to settle the bill.They thereafter filed a complaint for collection rule in insurance contracts that when their terms contain limitations on liability, they should
of sum of money against petitioner in the MeTC. In its answer, petitioner maintained that be construed strictly against the insurer. These are contracts of adhesion the terms of
it had not yet denied respondents' claim as it was still awaiting Dr. Saniel's report.In a letter which must be interpreted and enforced stringently against the insurer which prepared the
to petitioner, Dr. Saniel stated that: [Respondent] Neomi T. Olivares called by phone. She contract. This doctrine is equally applicable to health care agreements. Petitioner never
stated that she is invoking patient-physician confidentiality. That she no longer has any presented any evidence to prove that respondent Neomi's stroke was due to a
relationship with [petitioner]. And that I should not release any medical information pre-existing condition. It merely speculated that Dr. Saniel's report would be
concerning her neurologic status to anyone without her approval. adverse to Neomi, based on her invocation of the doctor-patient privilege. This
was a disputable presumption at best.
MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. It held: the best person to
determine whether or not the stroke she suffered was not caused by "pre-existing Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states:
conditions" is her attending physician Dr. Saniel who treated her and conducted the test Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are
during her confinement. But since the evidence on record reveals that it was no less than satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other
[respondent Neomi] herself who prevented her attending physician from issuing the evidence: (e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
required certification, petitioner cannot be faulted from suspending payment of her claim,
for until and unless it can be shown from the findings made by her attending physician that Suffice it to say that this presumption does not apply if:
the stroke she suffered was not due to pre-existing conditions could she demand a. the evidence is at the disposal of both parties;
entitlement to the benefits of her policy. b. the suppression was not willful;
c. it is merely corroborative or cumulative and
RTC reversed the ruling of the MeTC and ordered petitioner to pay. RTC held that it was d. the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
the burden of petitioner to prove that the stroke of respondent Neomi was excluded from
the coverage of the health care program for being caused by a pre-existing condition. It Here, respondents' refusal to present or allow the presentation of Dr. Saniel's
was not able to discharge that burden. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. report was justified. It was privileged communication between physician and
patient. Furthermore, as already stated, limitations of liability on the part of the insurer or
The health care agreement defined a "pre-existing condition" as a disability which existed health care provider must be construed in such a way as to preclude it from evading its
before the commencement date of membership whose natural history can be clinically obligations. Accordingly, they should be scrutinized by the courts with "extreme jealousy"
determined, whether or not the Member was aware of such illness or condition. Such and "care" and with a "jaundiced eye." Since petitioner had the burden of proving
conditions also include disabilities existing prior to reinstatement date in the case of lapse exception to liability, it should have made its own assessment of whether
of an Agreement. The agreement provided an enumeration of the disabilities considered as respondent Neomi had a pre-existing condition when it failed to obtain the
pre-existing condition. Under the agreement, disabilities which existed before the attending physician's report. It could not just passively wait for Dr. Saniel's
commencement of the agreement are excluded from its coverage if they become manifest report to bail it out. The mere reliance on a disputable presumption does not
within one year from its effectivity. Stated otherwise, petitioner is not liable for pre-existing meet the strict standard required under our jurisprudence.
conditions if they occur within one year from the time the agreement takes effect.
Next, petitioner argues that it should not be held liable for moral and exemplary damages,
Petitioner argues that respondents prevented Dr. Saniel from submitting his report and attorney's fees since it did not act in bad faith in denying respondent Neomi's claim. It
regarding the medical condition of Neomi. Hence, it contends that the presumption that insists that it waited in good faith for Dr. Saniel's report and that, based on general medical
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced should apply in its favor. findings, it had reasonable ground to believe that her stroke was due to a pre-existing
Respondents counter that the burden was on petitioner to prove that Neomi's stroke was condition, considering it occurred only 38 days after the coverage took effect.
excluded from the coverage of their agreement because it was due to a pre-existing
condition. It failed to prove this. We disagree. The RTC and CA found that there was a factual basis for the damages
adjudged against petitioner. They found that it was guilty of bad faith in denying a claim
Issues: based merely on its own perception that there was a pre-existing condition.
1. Whether petitioner was able to prove that respondent Neomi's stroke was caused
by a pre-existing condition and therefore was excluded from the coverage of the Respondents have sufficiently shown that they were forced to engage in a dispute with
health care agreement and - NO petitioner over a legitimate claim while respondent Neomi was still experiencing the effects

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of a stroke and forced to pay for her medical bills during and after her hospitalization
despite being covered by [petitioner's] health care program, thereby suffering in the Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the
process extreme mental anguish, shock, serious anxiety and great stress. They have shown issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that
that because of the refusal of petitioner to issue a letter of authorization and to pay these are covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication.
respondent Neomi's hospital bills, [they had] to engage the services of counsel for a fee of
P20,000.00. Ruling:Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence which reads:

Finally, the refusal of petitioner to pay respondent Neomi's bills smacks of bad
SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The
faith, as its refusal was merely based on its own perception that a stroke is a pre-existing
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
condition.
following cases:
22) Josielene Chan vs. Johnny Chan (2013)
(c)  A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a
Digested by: CD
civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or
treatment given by him or any information which he may have acquired in
Facts: On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed a petition for
attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was
the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children
reputation of the patient.
to her. Josielene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a
psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive
The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who
use of prohibited drugs.  Indeed, she had convinced him to undergo hospital confinement
gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined
for detoxification and rehabilitation.
without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation.
This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the
Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her wifely duties. To
history of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a
save their marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but when he and Josielene got to
correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a
the hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave him an injection.
physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had
The marriage relations got worse when the police temporarily detained Josielene for an
transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting
unrelated crime and released her only after the case against her ended. By then, their
his own health at great risk
marriage relationship could no longer be repaired.
The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the admission of
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form1 that
evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are offered. The offer
Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation
could be made part of the physician’s testimony or as independent evidence that he had
unit of a hospital. The form carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered
made entries in those records that concern the patient’s health problems.
from “methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.” Following up on this point, Josielene filed a
request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces
Johnny’s medical records when he was there confined. The request was accompanied by a
tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the
motion to “be allowed to submit in evidence” the records sought by subpoena duces tecum.
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum  covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those
records are produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to
their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-
Rules of Evidence quoted above is about non-disclosure of privileged matters.
patient privilege.
Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged
On September 17, 2007 the CA denied Josielene’s petition. It ruled that, if courts were to
since it is the “testimonial” evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged.
allow the production of medical records, then patients would be left with no assurance that
Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician “cannot in a civil case, without the
whatever relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept
consent of the patient, be examined” regarding their professional conversation. The
confidential. The prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates,
privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of
and pertinent hospital records. The CA added that, although Johnny can waive the
the physician at the trial.
privilege, he did not do so in this case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for
the limited purpose of showing his alleged forcible confinement.
To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the

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results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the
advice or treatment he gave him— would be to allow access to evidence that is
inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in
the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician
to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s
prior consent.

23) Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability (2008)

Digested by: DC

24) Lee v. CA G.R. No. 177861

Digested by: KB

Facts: Spouses (Lee) and Keh (woman) entered the Philippines in the 1930sas immigrants
from China. They had 11children. In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman (Tiu),
as housemaid. Respondent in this case the children of the spouses believed that Tiu left the
household and had a relation with him. Shortly after Keh died, the children of Tiu (Lee’s
“other children”) claimed that they were too children of Keh. Based on the NBI
investigation, the mother of the 8 children is a much younger woman, most probably TIU
possibly to conform with the grand design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate
children, consequently elevating the status of the second family and secure their future.
Hospital records showed the eighth child of Lee’s other children (recorded as 12 th child of
Lee and Keh) was born of a 17 yr old mother and Keh was 38 yrs old at that time. Same
goes with “other children”, the declared age of “Keh” on the hospital records does not
coincide with the actual age of real Keh. Lee-Keh children filed 2 petitions: one is Spec Pro
for deletion of the name of Keh on birth cert and replace with the name of Tiu; second is
ex parte for issuance of subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu to testify in the case.
Subpoena was quashed by RTC as it was oppressive and violated Sec 25, Rule 130 of the
RoC, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee’s “stepmother”.

Issue: WON court may compel Tiu to testify in the correction of birth certificate of Emma
Lee.

Ruling: Under Sec 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, Parental and Filial Privelege.--
“No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants,
children or other descendants is an adaptation of Art. 315 of CC that applies only in criminal
cases. But those who revised the CC chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions,
whether civil, criminal or administrative filed against parents and other direct ascendants or
descendants.

But here Tiu, who invoke the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of Emma Lee.
Privilege cannot apply to them because the rule only applies to direct ascendants and
descendants, a family tie connected by common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common
ancestry by her stepmother. Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against
petitioner Emma Lee.

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