Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a

particular person chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be

considered as committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who
travel from one place to another," and which single act of depredation could
be capable of "stunting the economic and social progress of the people" as to
be considered "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the
penal statutes of all countries," and would accordingly constitute an obstacle
"to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people,"
such that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or
brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This would be an
exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.

True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306
and 307 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting
its applicability to the offenses stated therein when committed on the
highways and without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed.
Furthermore, the decree does not require that there be at least four armed
persons forming a band of robbers; and the presumption in the Code that
said accused are brigands if they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains
under the decree. But, and this we broadly underline, the essence of
brigandage under the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful
acts are directed not only against specific, intended or pre conceived victims,
but against any and all prospective victims anywhere on the highway and
whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as the concept of brigandage
which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it
was under its aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for that matter,
under the old Brigandage Law.

Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact

that the crime of robbery committed by appellants should be covered by the
said amendatory decree just because it was committed on a highway. Aside
from what has already been stressed regarding the absence of the requisite
elements which thereby necessarily puts the offense charged outside the
purview and intendment of that presidential issuance, it would be absurd to
adopt a literal interpretation that any unlawful taking of property committed on
our highways would be covered thereby. It is an elementary rule of statutory
construction that the spirit of intent of the law should not be subordinated to
the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the
elementary caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument
goes but skin deep into its meaning, and the fundamental rule that criminal
justice inclines in favor of the milder form of liability in case of doubt.

If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would
be the determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it
would not be far-fetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the
corpus of our substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio
ad absurdum line of reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory
adopted by the trial court falls far short of the desideratum in the
interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor
vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at
gunpoint by the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the
location of the vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the
offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering
nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? And,
if the scenario is one where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is
large cattle which are incidentally being herded along and traversing the
same highway and are impulsively set upon by the accused, should we apply
Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely disregard the explicit
prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974?

We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the
robbery in the present case was committed inside a car which, in the natural
course of things, was casually operating on a highway, is not within the
 situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms.
Besides, that particular provision precisely define[s] "highway
robbery/brigandage" and, as we have amply demonstrated, the single act of
robbery conceived and committed by appellants in this case does not
constitute highway robbery or brigandage. (citations omitted).

In the instant case, there is not a shred of evidence that Laurente and his co-accused, or
their acts, fall within the purview of P.D. No. 532, as interpreted above. Thus, to repeat,
Laurente cannot be validly convicted for highway robbery with homicide under P.D. No. 532.

Assuming further, however, that Laurente and his co-accused may be convicted under P.D.
No. 532, the death penalty cannot be legally imposed on Laurente. While it is true that
Section 3 of the said decree prescribes the penalty of death for highway robbery with
homicide, the imposition of capital punishment was suspended  by Section 19(1), Article III of
7

the 1987 Constitution. 8

The reimposition of the death penalty by R.A. No. 7659  did not ipso jure lift the suspension
9

as far as P.D. No. 532 is concerned. An examination of the former reveals that while it
specifically imposed the death penalty or restored it for certain crimes,   it failed to do so for
10

the latter — in fact, R.A. No. 7659 does not mention P.D. No. 532 at all. Clearly, by failing to
squarely deal with P.D. No. 532, Congress is deemed not to have considered highway
robbery with homicide a "heinous crime"; or if it did, it found no "compelling reason" to
reimpose the death penalty therefor.

Nevertheless, the amended. information hereinafter quoted   indubitably shows, that except
11

for the emphasis of the place where the robbery was committed, i.e., a highway, the charge
is actually for robbery with homicide as defined and penalized under Article 294(1) of the
Revised Penal Code. This provision now reads, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 7659:

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. —

Penalties. — Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or
intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by

reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide
shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have
been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or
arson . . . .

Simply, the information remains a valid information for robbery with homicide under the
above provision. The investigating prosecutor's characterization that it was for highway
robbery with homicide is of no moment. On the matter of an accused's right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation,   it is elementary that what determines the offense
12

charged is not the characterization made by the prosecutor who prepared the information,
but the allegations in the indictment. 13

Accordingly, on the assumption that the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt
all the elements of robbery and of homicide committed on the occasion thereof, Laurente can
nevertheless be meted the penalty of death under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. No. 7659, since the crime was committed on 14 February 1994, or one
month and thirteen days after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659. But whether the prosecution in
fact discharged its burden is an entirely different matter which goes into the merits of this
appeal.

We shall the return our attention to the appeal proper.

In an information   dated 17 February 1994 and filed with the trial court on 21 February 1994,
14

Laurente was charged with the crime of Highway Robbery with Homicide. The information
was later amended to include his co-accused, Melvin Dagudog and Richard Disipulo. The
indictment in the amended information read as follows: