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San Luis vs. San Luis
*
G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.

EDGAR SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,

respondent.
*
G.R. No. 134029. February 6, 2007.

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD

SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, respondent.

Venue; In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals (74 SCRA

189 [1976]), we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining residence
—as contradistinguished from domicile—of the decedent for purposes
of fixing the venue of settlement of his estate.—Under Section 1, Rule
73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of
the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of
the province “in which he resides at the time of his death.” In the case
of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 189 (1976), we laid down
the doctrinal rule for determining the residence—as
contradistinguished from domicile—of the decedent for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.

Same; For purpose of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or
actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

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San Luis vs. San Luis

legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity

and consistency.—It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that
“residence,” for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the
estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with “domicile.” The rulings in
Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because
they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction
between “residence” for purposes of election laws and “residence” for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, “residence”
and “domicile” are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of
Court, the “residence” of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
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therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a
person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

Family Code; Marriages; The Court stated that “the severance of

the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from
each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy
on the other.”—This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989), where the Court recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that
the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit
against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that “the severance of the
marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from
each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy
on the other.”

Same; Same; Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment

between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the marital bond while
the other remains bound to it.—When the object of a marriage is
defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties
and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some
way should be obtainable. Marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any
good to the society where one is considered released from the marital
bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs
where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the
Filipino spouse, as in this case.

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San Luis vs. San Luis

Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; In Garcia v. Recio, 366

SCRA 437 (2001), the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of
its authenticity and due execution must be presented.—Applying the
above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly
obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file
the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the
records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of
the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), the Court laid down the specific
guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce
judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must
be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.

Marriages; Co-ownership; Property; Any property acquired during

the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts.—Respondent would qualify as an interested person who

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has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If
she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to
remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as
a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs
the property relations between parties who live together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a
coownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through
their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through

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San Luis vs. San Luis

their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall
be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.

PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Manuel O. Chan, Jr. for petitioner Edgar San Luis.
     Ariel Vista for petitioner Rodolfo San Luis.
          Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for
respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated1

petitions for review assailing the
February 4, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No.
2
52647, which reversed
3
and set aside the September 12,
1995 and January 31, 1996 Resolutions of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch4 134 in SP. Proc. No. M3708; and
its May 15, 1998 Resolution denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was
with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born
six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and
Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

_______________

1 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 45-66. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon

D. Luna and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and

Roberto A. Barrios.
2 Records, pp. 335-338. Penned by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

3 Id., at pp. 391-393.

4 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 68. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D.

Luna and concurred in by Associate Justices Demetrio G. Demetria and

Roberto A. Barrios.

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San Luis vs. San Luis

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee

Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October
15, 1971,5
Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce6
and Awarding Child
Custody on December 14, 1973.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad
San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William
Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian 7
at Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children
with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time
of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s
estate. On December
8
17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch
146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that,
at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San
Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila;
that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal
spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his
second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both
conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less;
that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent
prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and
that letters of administration be issued to her.

_______________

5 Records, p. 125.
6 Id., at p. 137.
7 Id., at p. 116.

8 Id., at pp. 1-5.

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San Luis vs. San Luis

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the

children9 of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state
a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of
Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to
his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress
of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still
legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds 10
and
joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal of the
petition.
11
On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions 12
to dismiss, respondent
filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition thereto. She submitted
documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised
the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went
home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she
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presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family

Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the
marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been
dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo 13had the legal
capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of
the Family Code
14
and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.

_______________

9 Id., at pp. 10-24.

10 Id., at pp. 30-35.
11 Id., at p. 38.

12 Id., at pp. 39-138.

13 When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien

spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
14 G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.

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San Luis vs. San Luis

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San

Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration
15
from the
Order denying their motions to dismiss. They asserted that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage
with Felicisimo because16 this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from
his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding
Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case. 17
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order
denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that
respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal
standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid.
Meanwhile, the 18
motion for disqualification was deemed moot
and academic because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos
was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the
resolution of said motion. 19
Mila filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan on
November 16, 1994.20
On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law
on which it was based. 21
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order
granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to
Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

_______________

See Records, pp. 155-158, 160-170 and 181-192.

15

This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
16

impair vested rights or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.
17 Records, p. 259.

18 Id., at p. 260.

19 Id., at pp. 262-267.

20 Id., at pp. 270-272.

21 Id., at p. 288.

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San Luis vs. San Luis
22
On April 24, 1995, the trial court required the parties to
submit their respective position papers on the twin issues of
venue and legal capacity of respondent
23
to file the petition. On
May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested that he is adopting the
arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent
24
and 25Rodolfo
filed their position papers on June 14, and June 20, 1995,
respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the
petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a
resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should
have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It
also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the
petition for letters of administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the
decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to
Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights
of Felicisimo’s legitimate children. 26
Respondent 27 moved for reconsideration and for the
disqualification
28
of Judge Arcangel but said motions were
denied.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed
and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed
Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of
which states:

_______________

22 Id., at p. 301.
23 Id., at pp. 302-303.
24 Id., at pp. 306-311.
25 Id., at pp. 318-320.
26 Id., at pp. 339-349.
27 Id., at pp. 350-354.
28 Id., at pp. 391-393.

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“WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January

31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated
February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records
29
of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.”

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the

Rules of Court, the term “place of residence” of the decedent,
for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate,
refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from
legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo
discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters
of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

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The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal

capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article
26 of
30
the Family Code and the rulings
31
in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. It found that the marriage
between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by
virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family
Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under
paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract
a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus—

“With the well-known rule—express mandate of paragraph 2, Article

26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn,
Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O.
No. 227,—there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view
—sweeping statement—of Judge Arc[h]angel, that “Article 26, par. 2
of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against
divorce in any form whatsoever.” Indeed, courts cannot deny what the
law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to
the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been
obtained by the Foreigner on December 14,

_______________

29 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 66.

30 Supra note 14.
31 G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.

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San Luis vs. San Luis
32
1992, the Filipino divorcee, “shall x x x have capacity to remarry
under Philippine laws.” For this reason, the marriage between the
deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as “a bigamous
marriage.”
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as
the surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the
33
settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x”

Edgar, Linda, 34 and Rodolfo filed separate motions for

reconsideration which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to 35this Court via the instant
petition for review on certiorari. Rodolfo later filed a
manifestation
36
and motion to adopt the said petition which was
granted.
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo
insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. 37They
contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval38 v. Guray and
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, “residence” is
synonymous with “domicile” which denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They
claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given
time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the peti-

_______________

32 Parenthetically, it appears that the Court of Appeals proceeded from a

mistaken finding of fact because the records clearly show that the divorce was
obtained on December 14, 1973 (not December 14, 1992) and that the marriage
of Gov. San Luis with respondent was celebrated on June 20, 1974. These
events both occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988.

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33 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 65.
34 See CA Rollo, pp. 309-322, 335-340, and 362-369.
35 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 8-42.
36 Id., at p. 75.
37 52 Phil. 645 (1928).
38 G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 408.

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San Luis vs. San Luis

tion for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta.

Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to
Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee.
They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively
applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the
void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be
considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no
legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly
laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks 39
merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition
for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should
be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province “in which he
resides at the time 40of his death.” In the case of Garcia Fule v.
Court of Appeals, we laid down the doctrinal rule for
determining the residence—as contradistinguished from
domicile—of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate:

“[T]he term “resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as

distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” This term “resides,”
like the terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and

_______________

39 SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons be settled.—If the decedent

is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or
an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides
at the time of his death, x x x. (Underscoring supplied)
40 G.R. Nos. L-40502 & L-42670, November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 189.

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rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such

nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word “domicile” still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
make a distinction between the terms “residence” and “domicile” but
as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous,
and convey the same meaning as the term “inhabitant.” In other
words, “resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
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person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the
term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence
in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
41
residence must be more than temporary.” (Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that “residence,” for

purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo, is synonymous with “domicile.” The rulings in
Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case
because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a
distinction between “residence” for purposes of election laws
and “residence” for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In
election cases, “residence” and “domicile” are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to 42
which when absent, one has the intention of returning.
However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court,
the “residence” of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile

_______________

41 Id., at pp. 199-200.

42 Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, supra note 38 at p. 415.

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San Luis vs. San Luis
43
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in
one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that
Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent
44
submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased 45
the
aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements from
the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for
the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of
Felicisimo at “100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa.”
Respondent also presented proof of membership46
of the deceased
in the Ayala47
Alabang Village48
Association and Ayala Country
Club, Inc., letter-envelopes from 1988 to 1990 sent by the
deceased’s children to him
49
at his Alabang address, and the
deceased’s calling cards stating that his home/city address is
at “100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa” while
his office/provincial address is in “Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.”
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of
Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for
letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional

_______________

43 See Boleyley v. Villanueva, 373 Phil. 141, 146; 314 SCRA 364, 368 (1999);

Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-22795, January 31,
1977, 75 SCRA 124, 128-129.
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44 Records, pp. 76-78.
45 Id., at pp. 60-75.
46 Id., at p. 79.
47 Id., at p. 80.
48 Id., at pp. 81-83.
49 Id., at p. 84.

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50
Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17,
1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and
the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over
Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati51
City as per Supreme
Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition
was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to
file the petition for letters of administration, we must first
resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his
alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was
solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.

_______________

50 The Regional Trial Court and not the Municipal Trial Court had
jurisdiction over this case because the value of Gov. San Luis’ estate exceeded
P200,000.00 as provided for under B.P. Blg 129, Section 19(4).
51 SC Administrative Order No. 3 dated January 19, 1983 states in part:

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, and Section 4 of the Executive
Order issued by the President of the Philippines on January 17, 1983, declaring the
reorganization of the Judiciary, the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts
in the National Capital Judicial Region are hereby defined as follows:

xxxx
5. Branches CXXXII to CL, inclusive, with seats at Makati—over the municipalities of Las
Piñas, Makati, Muntinlupa and Parañaque. x x x

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308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

San Luis vs. San Luis
52
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. involved a marriage
between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was
subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by
the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under
Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the
properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected.
The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and
held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
“In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from
the marriage from the standards of American law, under which
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divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme
Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,
799:

“The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie,
when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a
wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry
again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of
the former marriage.”

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer

the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
53
alleged conjugal property.”

_______________

52 Supra note 14.

53 Id., at pp. 139, 143-144.

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San Luis vs. San Luis

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court

ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the
alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform
her marital duties and obligations. It held:

“To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our

laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife’s obligations under
Article 109, et seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
54
country if the ends of justice are to be served.” (Emphasis
added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. IbaySomera

55
where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained
abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not
a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino
wife. The Court stated that “the severance of the marital bond
had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other,
hence the actuations
56
of one would not affect or cast obloquy on
the other.” 57
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated
that where a Filipino is divorced by his 58
naturalized foreign
spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. Although decided on
December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in
1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of
limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be

_______________

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54 Id., at p. 144.
55 Supra note 31.
56 Id., at p. 664.
57 G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998, 300 SCRA 406.
58 Id., at p. 414; See also Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October
5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 121.

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310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

San Luis vs. San Luis

denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing

marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that “if the foreigner obtains
a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino59spouse shall have capacity
60
to remarry under Philippine law.” In Garcia v. Recio, the
Court likewise
61
cited the aforementioned case in relation to
Article 26. 62
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, the historical
background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law

Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the “Family Code,”
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family
Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law,
amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.

_______________

59 Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code

of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 263.

60 G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437.
61 Id., at p. 447.
62 Supra note 58.

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San Luis vs. San Luis

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)
xxxx

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Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed

that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to
the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry
63
under Philippine law. (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a

situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and
paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law
already established through judicial precedent.
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good 64
to the community, relief in some
way should be obtainable. Marriage, being a mutual and
shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered
released from the marital bond while the other remains bound
to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse

_______________

63 Id., at pp. 119-121.

64 Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254-255 (1916).

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312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

San Luis vs. San Luis

obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in

this case. 65 66
Petitioners cite Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code in
stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as
Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s
rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should
not be discriminated against
67
in his own country if the ends of
justice68are to be served. In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, the Court stated:

“But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should
be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as
to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good
motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must
keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally
valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of
its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound,
because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same,
in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a

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balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even
as the law is obeyed.

_______________

65 ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,

condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
66 ART. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,
and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or
by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
67 Supra note 14 at p. 144.
68 G.R. No. L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 259.

313

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San Luis vs. San Luis

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly

apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal
command without regard to its cause and consequence. “Courts are
apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law,” so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, “where these words import a policy
that goes beyond them.”
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice “as the
constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due.” That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the
law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we
interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it
was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
69
dispensed with justice.”

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce

decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad
with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that
there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce
obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent 70
and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,
the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and
proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested
by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Phil-

_______________

69 Id., at pp. 264-265, 268.

70 Supra note 60.

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314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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San Luis vs. San Luis

ippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which

the record
71
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted72photocopies of
the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family
Law Act of California which purportedly show that their
marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial 73
notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for
further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by
Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has
the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the coowner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their74 joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters
of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the
decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in
part:

_______________

71 Id., at pp. 448-449.

72 Records, pp. 118-124.
73 Supra note 60 at p. 451.
74 SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.—If x x x a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband
or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve; x x x.

315

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San Luis vs. San Luis

“SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration.—A petition

for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person
and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.”

An “interested person” has been defined as one who would be

benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must 75
be
material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an
interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of
Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of
which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity
of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to
prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under
the laws of the U.S.A., then
76
she may be considered as a co-
owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage,
or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that
the property acquired by either or both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed

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by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not

necessary that the property be acquired through their joint
labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to

_______________

75 Saguinsin v. Lindayag, 116 Phil. 1193, 1195; 6 SCRA 874, 876-877 (1962).
76 Article 144 of the Civil Code reads in full: When a man and a woman live
together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is
void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.

316

316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

San Luis vs. San Luis

the co-owners
77
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven.
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both
the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be
Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in
Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the
property relations of couples living together
78
as husband and
wife but79are incapacitated to marry. In Saguid v. Court of
Appeals, we held that even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of property occurred
80
before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs. The Court described the property
regime under this provision as follows:

“The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of

parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the
extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which
involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the
parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party
who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts
an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own

_______________

77 Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1297; 260 SCRA 221,

228 (1996).
78 Francisco v. Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation, G.R. No.
151967, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 494, 506.
79 G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.
80 Id., at p. 686.

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San Luis vs. San Luis

81
evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x”

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal

capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or
as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article
148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28,
1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied
petitioners’ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order
which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is
AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

          Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,

concur.

Petition denied, case remanded to trial court for further

proceedings.

Notes.—Under the property regime of co-ownership,

properties acquired by both parties during their union in the
absence of proof to the contrary are presumed to have been
obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be
owned by them in equal shares. (Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 478
SCRA 327 [2005])
Under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired
during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal.
(Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 427 SCRA 439 [2004])

——o0o——

_______________

81 Id., at pp. 679, 686-687.

318

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