Constitutive Communication and Recognition :

Honneth´s Notion of“Struggles for Recognition”*

Introduction

Scholars of organizations increasingly consider communication as constitutive of

organizations (Ashcraft, Kuhn & Cooren 2009; Putnam & Nicotera 2009; Cooren, Kuhn,
Cornelissen, & Clark2011). The central assumption of this approach coined as CCO (for
Communicative Constitution of Organizations) is to understand organizations as “ongoing
and precarious accomplishments realized, experienced, and identified primarily – if not
exclusively – in communication processes” (Cooren, Kuhn, Cornelissen, & Clark 2011, p.
1150; see also Kuhn 2012, pp. 548). Instead of treating them as containers or “objective,
reified entities” in which communication occurs (Putnam & Nicotera 2009, p. 7),
organizations are seen as “ongoing products of meaning-making practices” which are
generated out of the circumstances of situated interaction (Cooren, Kuhn, Cornelissen, &
Clark 2011, p. 1154). Accordingly, communication is seen as the “producer and carrier of
organizational reality” (Kuhn 2012, p. 548) or “the means by which organizations are
established, composed, designed, and sustained” (Cooren et al. 2011, p. 1154).
Following this perspective, this paper explores the role of the moral dimension of
communication in constituting organizations. Specifically, I seek to unfold the explanatory
contribution of Axel Honneth´s theory on “struggles for recognition” (Honneth 1996) to CCO
thinking. Being a representative of present socio-philosophical scholarship in Germany and
standing in the tradition of Frankfurt School, Honneth´s work plays a pivotal role in theorizing
on moral grounds of social interaction and society in the national as well as international
context (Fraser & Honneth 2003; Cooke 2006; van den Brink & Owen 2007). He elaborates
on the idea that persons can construct and maintain a practical self-relation and identity only
through the reciprocal relation with other subjects and with their help of affirmative reactions
or “recognition” respectively (see also Habermas 1992, pp. 43-57). Honneth defines
recognition as exercise of “moral attitudes we are mutually obliged to adopt in order to secure
jointly the conditions of our personal integrity” (1997, p. 28). Consequently, misrecognition
leads to feelings of personal harm and possibly encompasses struggles for recognition in order

*
Final version of this paper has been published in Blaschke, St. & Schoeneborn, D. (2017): Organization as
Communication – Perspectives in Dialogue. Routledge.

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to confirm identity claims of individuals and groups. By using Honneth´s approach, I focus on
the constitutive effects of “recognition” and “struggles for recognition” which I refer to as
moral dimension of communication. Thus, I understand (mis)recognition as evaluative
dimension of communication which expresses affirmation or denial, and thus moral
evaluations, of identity and relation-to-self of individuals and groups (see also Taylor 2011).
On the one hand, this understanding is quite in accordance with definitions of “moral
communication”, basically understood as particular form of communication that “transports”
respect or disrespect towards human beings (Bergmann & Luckmann, 1999, p. 22; Schultz,
2011, p. 55). On the other hand, and as I will show in the remainder of this paper, Honneth´s
basic theoretical premises force us to think of recognition as driver and basic dimension and
not particular form of communication. Thus, in a broad sense, every communication is
informed by recognition (see also Joas & Knöbl 2004, pp. 734), which, of course, is explicitly
addressed to more or less extent in the particular situation.
So far, the element of recognition has hardly been incorporated in approaches to the
communicative constitution of organizations. Thus, by focussing on the Montreal School´s
approach as one of the most extensive strains of CCO thinking (e.g. Taylor, Cooren, Giroux,
& Robichaud 1996; Taylor 1999, 2011; Cooren 2000, 2004; Taylor & Van Every 2000) my
aim is to delineate a notion of the constitutive effects of recognition and organizations as site
and emerging product of “struggles for recognition”, accordingly. In my view, this contributes
to CCO thinking in four particular ways: First,by introducing the notion of “struggles for
recognition”, instability and disorder are made visible as an important precondition for
ordering and organizing thus supporting recent arguments within the CCO field (Bisel 2008;
Kuhn 2012; Vasquez, Schoeneborn & Sergi 2012). Second, focusing on recognition as moral
dimension and driver of communication delivers a particular explanation for why actors
engage in the very communication processes that constitute organizations. Third, applying
Honneth´s theory highlights the notion of organizations as morally responsible actors in its
own right, which, inter alia and finally, bears the potential to criticize social reality promoting
a communication-based research on organizations with a critical edge (see also Schoeneborn
& Sandhu 2013, p. 307).
In the first section of this paper, I introduce main arguments of Honneth´s theory.
Furthermore, the Montreal Schools´ approach and its modelling of the constitutive role of
communication get acknowledged here. In the subsequent section, I look at differences and
basic commonalities between the two research approaches and detect main characteristics of
recognition as moral dimension of constitutive communication. In a next step, I consider basic

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analytical contributions from this conjunction of research fields and specify research
perspectives within the field of CCO respectively. In the final section, I critically summarize
main findings of the analysis.

Theoretical Fundaments
I start this section with a closer look at the fundaments of Honneth´s theoretical approach (cf.
Honneth 1994, 1996, 2003; Fraser &Honneth 2003). In a next step, I introduce the CCO
perspective in the particular variant of the Montreal School. Currently, the Montreal School,
being driven by scholars like James Taylor, Francois Cooren, and their colleagues, presents
one of the most elaborated constitutive models of organizational communication (e.g. Cooren
et al. 2011, p. 1155; Koschmann 2012; Kuhn 2013). Accordingly, I concentrate on the basic
arguments of this particular theoretical framing.

The “Struggle for Recognition”

Honneth’s theory of the “Struggle for Recognition” (1996) is enjoying a steadily growing
national and international reception and much discussion among social philosophers and
political and social scientists (cf. Fraser & Honneth 2003; Cooke 2006; Forst, Hartmann, Saar
& Jaeggi 2009; van den Brink & Owen 2007). While initially grounding his work in the
writings of Hegel and Mead, Honneth is continually expanding his own theory (e.g. Honneth
2003, 2005, 2010a). Honneth understands the urge toward “self-realization”as the insistence
of individuals and groups on their claims to identity, and the call for mutual recognition
necessarily associated with these claims as the general driver of ongoing social development.
He pursues the goal of drafting a “social theory with normative content”, whose intention is to
“explain the processes of social change by referring to the normative demands that are,
structurally speaking, internal to the relationships of mutual recognition” (Honneth 1996, p.
92).Social development thus takes place under the “imperative of mutual recognition, because
one can develop a practical relations-to-self only when one has learned to view oneself, from
the normative perspective of one´s partners in interaction, as their social addressee (ibid.).This
imperative forces individuals into a gradual blurring of the content of mutual recognition, and
therefore into struggles for recognition, because only in this way can they express their claims
to subjectivity socially and thus develop identity. Accordingly, Honneth defines the relation-
to-self as “the consciousness or feeling that a person has of him- or herself with regard to the
capabilities and rights this person enjoys.” (Honneth 1997, p. 25)
Against this backdrop, social change is rooted in the factual demand for recognition of facets

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of one’s own identity, that is, in “struggles for recognition” on the part of individuals and
social groups. With reference to social development, Honneth assigns particular significance
to social struggles, in which individual experiences of disrespect of identity are read as typical
for an entire group, and in such a way motivate collective demands for expanded relations of
recognition (Honneth 1996, p. 162).Examples include struggles for equality of the sexes and
against racial discrimination as well as labor battles. As these examples suggest, such
struggles can be very conflict-intensive processes in which all sorts of contentions are
conceivable. Granting recognition can take place in a variety of forms, but always mirrors the
primary intention of a certain affirmation of one’s opponent (cf. Honneth 2004, p. 56).When
based on identity claims, these conflicts are matters of perceived exclusion and disrespect, and
thus are morally motivated (Honneth 1996, pp. 131). Thus, for Honneth “a physical injury
becomes a moral injustice whenever the subject affected has no choice but to view it as an
action that intentionally disregards it in an essential aspect of its well-being; it is not solely the
bodily pain as such, but the accompanying consciousness of not being recognized in one’s
own self-understanding that constitutes the condition for moral injury here. (…) it is the
disrespect of personal integrity that transforms an action or utterance into a moral injury.”
(Honneth 1997, p. 23) This internal link between particular reciprocal rights and duties makes
it possible to speak of a “morality” of recognition (ibid., p. 31).
According to Honneth, struggles for recognition serve as process of individual emancipation
and social advancement. In this vein, he refers to recognition as (1) positive affirmation of the
characteristics of individuals or social groups; (2) an attitude that is realized in concrete
action; and (3) a distinct phenomenon, hence not a result or side-effect of an action aimed at
another goal (Honneth 2003, p. 319; Honneth 2004, p. 55; Honneth, 2010b, pp. 329). Finally,
and before entering the different forms of recognition, we may advert to the point that
acceptance of recognition is contingent on the normative state of existing recognition patterns
at a particular time and in a particular place. Previous, longstanding, and interactively
obtained experiences trigger the perceived credibility of offered recognition and its
progressive character, thus pointing to already established social patterns of recognition.
Honneth assumes that today’s Western capitalist society is characterized by a historic
differentiation into three patterns or forms of recognition (cf. Honneth 1996, pp. 92) – (1)
“love”, (2) “rights”, and (3) “solidarity”. Together, these forms constitute an institutionalized
order of recognition; that is, the social-moral order of modern society and its organizations
(cf. Fraser &Honneth 2003, p. 162 and p. 177).This means that the functional logic and
legitimation of today’s work organizations are also based significantly on these patterns of

4
interaction so that Honneth speaks of them as “sedimented patterns of recognition” (2010a, p.
117).
(1) Love is an affective form of recognition and expresses itself in emotional attention paid by
individuals to each other. As people grow up, the experience of love helps them acquire trust
in the value of their own bodily needs, and is the basis of personality formation (Honneth
1996, pp. 95; Fraser & Honneth 2003, p. 163). Following childhood and youth, love is a form
of interaction characterized by the principle of mutual care and affection. Corresponding
conflicts of recognition typically take the form that newly developed needs or those that have
not been considered to date are presented, while citing this mutually declared love, in order to
enforce a changed or extended kind of attention (Fraser & Honneth, 2003, p. 170).
(2) The form of recognition taken by right refers to a cognitive-rational respect between
legally equal partners in an interaction, such as the recognition of a citizen with all his or her
rights and duties (Honneth 1996, pp. 107). In contrast to love, this form of recognition is
universal; it is directed at general qualities and skills that pertain to all legal subjects without
regard to a person's status. Through legal recognition, subjects can regard themselves as
autonomous, morally responsible persons and thus feel as if they are full members of the
community. Recognition conflicts about rights are normally characterized by invoking the
principle of equality, highlighting the degree to which previously excluded groups deserve
legal recognition for well-founded reasons, or by emphasizing how previously disregarded
facts make a differentiation of legal principles appear to be sensible(Fraser & Honneth 2003,
pp. 170).
(3) The form of solidarity refers to an individual’s social esteem. It distinguishes itself from
rights in that it does not refer to recognition of the person as such, but to a gradual assessment
of concrete qualities and skills (Honneth 1996, pp. 121). According to Honneth, this form of
recognition is directed at the performance of the individual, which is perceived in our society
primarily through paid work. Solidarity is thus at once an integrating and differentiating mode
of recognition: it has an integrating effect like that of rights because the social recognition of
individual factors assumes a shared value horizon and/or common standards of judgment.
Thus, for example, people’s claims to social esteem on the basis of their work can only arise
when the individual subscribes to the social notion that work is even worthy of recognition.
Yet in contrast to rights, recognition of differing performance also has a differentiating effect,
because it seeks to make individual, biographically-related differences that affect performance
socially visible, and to judge them. For Honneth, “the experience of being socially esteemed
is accompanied by a felt confidence that one´s achievements or abilities will be recognized as

5
‘valuable’ by other members of society.”(1996, p. 128). In everyday parlance, we could use
the expression “feeling of self-worth” to describe this phenomenon (ibid, p. 129). In this
sphere of recognition, the struggle for recognition generally takes the form that individuals
and social groups cite the principle of achievement in highlighting activities and skills that
have been neglected or undervalued to date in order to enforce the higher social esteem of
those activities and with it, a redistribution of (material) resources.(Fraser & Honneth 2003, p.
171).
Thus, according to Honneth, modern society is informed by institutionalized and contested
order of recognition with the three forms of love, rights, and solidarity. When making a link to
the level of organizations, one may argue that functional logic and legitimation of today’s
work organizations are also significantly based on this order of recognition. For example,
these forms of recognition are represented in mentoring and support practices (love), legal
arrangements, like working contracts (rights) as well as in wage, bonus, or career systems
(solidarity). While supposedly having a different relevance and shape in organizations, all
three forms of recognition possibly constitute moral grounds of organizational practices thus
informing and steering interactions and offering options for identity of participants
accordingly (Faßauer & Hartz 2014). Love, rights and solidarity thus constitute underlying
moral logics of interaction, while they are differently embellished, highlighted and perceived
in organizations.

The Montreal School´s Approach

Having presented the main assumptions of Honneth´s work on recognition, I turn to the CCO
perspective, in a next step. Scholars of the Montreal School suggest defining communication
as process of co-orientation, which occurs when people align their actions in order to
coordinate and control activities with respect to a shared object (e.g. see Taylor 2009). Based
on a number of different explanations of the communication phenomenon, co-oriented
communication basically is understood as an intersection of two dimensions of
communication – conversation and text. Conversation is thought of as “interaction through
talk and gesture” and represents the most elementary manifestation of communication (Taylor
1999, p. 24). Framed within a material social environment, conversation is the site where
organizations emerge (ibid, p. 54), “where organization is experienced and accomplished”
(Koschmann 2012, p. 65). Text, in turn, describes a form of communication that “may be
extended in time and space beyond the bounds of a single time/space setting”, a characteristic
that is referred to as “transcendence”of text (Taylor 1999, p. 29; Taylor 2009, p. 157). The

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transcendence of text points to its capacity to lead an existence independent of the author´s
intention and the particular event where it was conversationally produced adverting to the
particular role of non-human actors like software programs, manuals or mission statements in
constituting social reality (Cooren, 2004).This way, texts deliver the symbolic surface or
language environment “upon and through which conversations take shape” (Kuhn 2013, p.
551). Operating dialectically, conversation and text form a self-organizing loop: text is the
product of conversation, but it is also its raw material and preoccupation (Taylor & Van Every
2000, pp. 210; Taylor 2011, p. 1284). In turn, the transcendence of text and its dialectical
relation with conversation make sure that events and actions are linked together through space
and time including human and non-human actors (see also Cooren & Fairhurst 2009).That is,
outcomes of co-orientation or texts become “distanced” from the situation of their production
getting available for framing conversations in different contexts. Through this “distanciation”
of communication (Ricoeur 1981) localized conversations are possibly scaled up to distinct
organizational forms by producing no longer “a loose connection of conversations”, but
instead an organizational abstraction taken to represent all the conversations this abstraction
refers to (Koschmann 2012, p. 66; see also: Kuhn 2013, p. 552; Taylor 1999,p. 54).
When constituting large-scale organizations, a multiplicity of actors takes part in this process.
Taylor views organizations as configurations of many different spheres of work, each
characterized by its own culture and modes of sensemaking. Because of this, co-orientation
implies more than coordinating the individual member´s respective actions and intentions:“It
implies what we usually think of as management: integrating many areas of specialization into
some kind of coherent pattern” (Taylor 2009, p. 166).The emergence of organizations is thus
necessarily bound to co-orientation taking place between individuals but also between groups
of people representing the different domains of organizational work. Co-orientation results
into the emergence of organizations due to the enforcement of roles and responsibilities and
by bridging inter-related communities of practice respectively(see Taylor 2009, 2011, pp.
1278).This way, different organizational practices become “imbricated“ (Taylor 2009, p. 161;
Taylor 2011, p. 1285) that is they become linked or tiled on top of one another, representing
levels of organizational structure (Kuhn 2013, p. 552).
By sorting out their respective domains of authority and responsibilities, co-orientation
inevitably involves the ascription and/or negotiation of the individual´s but also that of the
collective´s identity involving a notion of respective members as “we“ as collectivity (Taylor
2011). Represented by actors that have the capacity to speak for the whole, communities of
practice thus are not only constituent domains of an organization legitimated and empowered

7
by their role as organizational agents but “equally as themselves, collectively, organizational
entities in their own right” (ibid, p. 1278). In turn, organizations acquire the status of an actor
in its own right - hence assuming an identity - when entering again into conversations with
other actors be they individuals or collectives. Organizations are results of this kind of
“enlargement of communication” exhibiting a conversation of conversations or “meta-
conversation” (ibid, p. 1279). In this way, co-orientation results into the emergence of
organizations by condensing “a myriad of conversations into an abstract representation of
collective identity and intention to coordinate and control situated action” conceivable as an
“authoritative text” (Kuhn 2008) that portrays “relations of authority and criteria of
appropriateness that become present in ongoing practice”(Kuhn 2012, pp. 552; see also
Koschmann 2013, pp.67). The notion of organizations as authoritative texts again makes
clear, that texts are not only neutral descriptions of reality, but rather “authorize the activities
and projects of some people and communities, while downgrading those of others” involving
patterns of dominance and legitimacy (Taylor 2011, p. 1283; see also Taylor 1999, pp. 54).In
turn, actors seek to author respective texts in order to serve their interests, making power or
the establishment of “precedence” a major component for understanding and analyzing
organizations in the Montreal School´s approach (Kuhn 2012, p. 553).

Bridging research fields

Apparently, Honneth´s work and approaches to CCO represent rather separate research fields.
Whereas the first introduces a socio-philosophical theory dealing with basic questions about
human beings, social interaction, and the advancement of societal structures due to struggles
for recognition, the latter elaborates on the communication based explanation of the
constitution of organizations. While Honneth´s work particularly centers around the
presuppositions, characteristics, and role of reciprocal recognition in contemporary Western
society, CCO scholarship investigates communicational processes as constitutive
phenomenon of organizing and organizations asking for the respective role of human and non-
human actors, dynamics of interaction or power relations, and their emergence in
communication. Honneth even neither operates with the term “organization” nor elaborates
deeper into the meaning of “communication”, while CCO approaches put the focus on both of
them as key objects of analysis. In order to finally discuss possible contributions of Honneth´s
perspective to CCO-thinking, I first summarize very basic, but common foci and
assumptions– in sense of a common ontology of the social – of the two approaches in the first
part of this section. In a second step, I delineate some general characteristics of the moral

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dimension of communication from a recognition-based perspective that is in alignment with
CCO-thinking.

Basic foci and assumptions of analysis

Referring to their basic interest and understanding on the emergence of social structures, three
commonalities of Honneth´s approach on the one hand and CCO on the other, especially in
the Montreal School variant stand out. First, both start their explanations from the micro-level
of individual interaction, second, both basically incorporate the notion of recursivity, and
third, both apply an idea of processuality and temporality.
First, we need to consider that Honneth as well as scholars of the Montreal School start their
explanations on the emergence of social structures on the micro-level by focusing on
interaction processes as central unit of analysis. While Honneth concentrates on interaction as
site and medium of recognition and of establishing human identity, scholars of the Montreal
Schoolwork with the logics of co-orientation that unfold in communicative interactions
(Taylor & van Every 2000). In both cases, respective characteristics of interaction are used as
key variables to explain the constitution of organizations (Montreal School)or society as a
whole (Honneth). While Honneth is interested in the very basic logic of mutual recognition
and struggles that result in individual emancipation and in the advancement of social
structures accordingly, the Montreal School specifically argues for a “scaling-up” process in
which the enlargement of co-oriented communication finally constitutes large organizations
(Cooren & Fairhurst 2009).
Second, both approaches operate with the notion of recursivity. Following James R. Taylor,
“to be recursive simply means that the structure of the whole emerges in the same way as the
structure of the parts” (2009, p. 175). Models on the communicative constitution of
organizations basically start with the idea on the recursive character of human language by
referring to its “ability to function both as the matter and framework of communication”
(ibid). When referring to the communicative constitution of organizations, this ability unfolds
in processes of co-orientation at all organizational layers including individual actors,
communities of practice, and organizations (process of “imbrications”; Taylor 2011). In every
case, the individual´s and collective actors identity emerges out of people´s interaction and
sensemaking activities that are permanently influenced by previous, distanced, or
“materialized” constructions of those identities at the same time. Communication with its
dimensions of conversation and text actually facilitates this recursivity. In order to describe
the interrelated development of personal identity, relation-to-self, and social structures,

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Honneth also employs the idea of recursivity. Here, the struggle for recognition is necessarily
directed towards the change of recognitional patterns portrayed in the shape of social relations
and institutions people are confronted with at a particular time and space. In order to build
relation-to-self and personal identity people necessarily refer to existing social structures and
inherent patterns of recognition. At the same time, identity claims of individuals and groups
are main drivers of social development and change of those patterns accordingly. Struggles
for recognition as events of communication are medium and site of this interrelated, recursive
development.
Third, in both approaches, organizations or institutions are understood as social constructs
that are grown over time in a certain space incorporating an institutional and historic
perspective on organizations. For example, organizations are not neutral against people´s
interests incorporating historically grown patterns of power, due patterns of recognition and
legitimacy (Ashcraft et al. 2009). Organizations and social institutions are recursively
embedded in social context and inter alia results of the precedence of some actors over others.
Scholars of the Montreal School refer to this by understanding organizations as “authoritative
texts”. Authoritative texts define relations of authority, standards of appropriateness of
behavior and action, and thus due patterns of recognition too (Kuhn 2008). Actors seek to
author these texts in order to serve their interests. Honneth particularly considers the claims
for recognition and identity of actors as driving force to participate on this “authoring” of
social institutions. Here, social institutions are seen as materialized results of struggles for
recognition(Honneth 2010a, p. 117). By describing organizations as manifested but always
embattled patterns of recognition, he specially aims to reveal the moral fundaments of actual
social life.

Recognition as moral dimension of constitutive communication In this section, I consider

basic characteristics of recognition as moral dimension of communication. In doing so, I look
for characteristics that follow Honneth´s understanding of recognition and are in alignment
with CCO thinking. When introducing a notion of the moral dimension of communication
from perspective Honneth´s theory, we, first of all, need to consider that Honneth understands
“recognition” as premise, driver, and basic dimension of communication. Standing in the
socio-philosophical tradition of the Frankfurt School, he broadly introduces his social theory
as a communication theory (Honneth 2000, p. 102) but - and in this regard, in critical distance
to Habermas´s theory on communicative action (1968; 1999) - with particular focus on
recognition which, according to Honneth, informs every sphere of human life. By basically

10
referring to communication as symbolic interaction, Honneth defines basal recognition
between interaction partners as general premise of continued communication. Further, the
human desire for recognition in order to build a positive relation-to-self and identity,
generally drives engagement in communication with significant others. Applying the notion
of recursivity, institutionalized social conditions always represent patterns of recognition too,
and are denoted as “communicative situation” prevalent at a particular space and time
(Honneth 1996, p. 170). Thus, according to Honneth, every interaction, even “rational”
economic exchange, is informed by the moral dimension of (mis)recognition between
interaction partners. This way, the three forms of recognition (love, rights, solidarity),
represent the institutionalized moral fundaments and raw material of communication even
when the desire for recognition drives particular processes of communication to different
degree and recognition is more or less explicitly addressed respectively. This way,
(mis)recognition does not represent a particular form of moral communication that is
separable from other, non-moral forms of communication, but rather a dimension of
communication that might be differently pronounced in a specific situation but nevertheless is
always inherent. This dimension of communication is “moral” in that it – again more or less
explicit –describes an evaluative (re)action to other person´s characteristics, behavior, and
actions; thus not own intentions but the attributes of the other direct recognition (Honneth
2003, p. 333). Quite in accordance with premises of CCO, the idea of morality is thus applied
to the reciprocity of social interaction and ascription of identity respectively (Taylor 2011).
Consequently, struggles for recognition are events of communication that obviously feature
(e.g. in form of “text” referred to) and negotiate (in form of “conversation”)the moral
dimension of communication, in that they represent debates about the evaluative
characteristics of the involved individuals and groups due to felt misrecognition. Thus, similar
with approaches on the constitutive character of communication, Honneth argues that patterns
of recognition– here read a moral dimension of communication –extent over time and space.
The moral fundaments of Western society in form of specific patterns of recognition (love,
rights, and solidarity) are defined as results of a historic process of social disputes recursively
inscribed into practices of organizing and the shape of organizations as well. Quite similar
with Taylor´s arguments (2011, p. 1277), prevailing patterns of recognition can thus be
understood as (more or less) scrutinized obligations and rights faced by any individual and
collective actor when entering respective interactions. Taylor refers to this by the distinction
of interaction and “transaction” and explains: “The distinction is this. When you get married
you have taken on a transaction-based set of mutual obligations, legitimated by society and

11
enforceable in law. The more informal reception that follows is a scene of interactions,
although even here the latter are framed by transactional understandings, such as the
obligation of the groom´s parents to host a reception for the guests. Buy a product and there is
a ground-level assumption of fair value of the dollar. Hiring onto a firm is an example of a
transaction, and again it establishes a calendar of rights and obligations. The interactions that
follow must now be weighed against the background established by the initial transaction, and
the web of relationships they have become thereby enfolded within” (Taylor, 2011, p. 1277,
emphasis in original).This seems quite close to Honneth´s notion of interaction which he
defines as basically informed by recognition and its institutionalized patterns, accordingly.
Thus, from standpoint of both approaches, one could argue that every interaction is already
informed by institutionalized notions of moral standards in form of more or less formalized
mutual expectations towards legitimate behavior and action. Thus, misrecognition of an
interaction partner’s legal status (e.g. that is already materialized in code of law as “text”)
would violate such expectations and drive subsequent behaviors and actions (e.g. struggles as
“conversations”). This way, Taylor´s argument fortifies the approach on recognition as moral
dimension of communication and the idea of its possible extension in time and space.
Finally, the extension of recognition patterns and thus the moral dimension of communication
across time and space is particularly facilitated by its assignment to “materiality” or non-
human actors, the latter of which is a key tenet of the Montreal Schools and CCO thinking
more generally (Ashcraft et al., 2009). Honneth in fact never uses the term of non-human
actors, but ascribes a moral dimension (recognition) not only to personal attitudes adopted
against each other, but also to the distribution of income or working conditions (machines,
working materials) individuals are confronted with for example (Fraser & Honneth 2003).
Thus, materialized social arrangements get enacted in their moral dimension through their
communicational invocation participating again in the constitution of reality. For example,
this is vividly demonstrated in labor disputes where material conditions, contents of work, and
their corresponding appraisal are interpreted to express (dis)respect triggering conflicts and
struggles between bargaining partners. Non-human actors are thus actively taking part in
morally informed communication that constitutes organizations. Again, this fits with the CCO
premise to be as inclusive as possible regarding what or who is taking part in the constitution
of organizational processes and organizations (Cooren et al. 2011, p. 1152).

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Recognition as moral dimension of communication:
Contributions to CCO and directions of research

While the two previous sections attempt to basically entangle Honneth´s and the Montreal´s
Schools approach, in this section I elaborate on main contributions resulting from such
entanglement. Specifically, I acknowledge four main aspects and refer them to possible
directions of communication research on organizations. First, the somewhat paradoxical
principle of constituting organizations through destabilization is introduced. Second, I focus
on recognition as driver of communication by discussing its emotional element in particular.
Third, I introduce the notion of organizations as morally responsible actors, before, finally,
the normative implications of a recognition-based perspective on the communicative
constitution of organizations are acknowledged.

Destabilization as constitutive principle

Elaborating on Honneth´s potential contribution to the CCO perspective implies to generally
support the idea of the communicative construction of morality but particularly point out its
disordering potential, as well. Traditionally, struggle and disorder not often have been
addressed within the CCO-perspective (for exceptions, see, e.g. Bisel 2008; Kuhn 2012;
Vasquez, Schoeneborn, & Sergi 2012). This may be due to the fact that proponents of the
CCO perspective apparently have primarily been concerned with the idea “that
communication organizes”, thus creating “order out of potential disorder” (Cooren, Kuhn,
Cornelissen & Clark 2011, p. 1160, original emphasis; see also Kuhn 2012, p. 549 on this
matter). This primary notion of communication would be fundamentally challenged by
Honneth´s writings on recognition.
Honneth´s approach of the struggle for recognition introduces a conflict-oriented conception
of the communicative constitution of organizations (Honneth 1996; 1997; Fraser & Honneth
2003).This is done in favor of a conception of the permanent and contested advancement of
moral standards as human presupposition of individual emancipation and social advancement.
Organizations are important sites and actors of defining and explicating moral standards
mirroring organizational values, normative standards of the particular social environment, and
the whole society (e.g. Ortmann 2010).When referring to Honneth´s writings from CCO

13
perspective, patterns of recognition are “translated” in organizational settings and materialized
in working contracts and employment rights as well as hierarchical structures and appraisal
systems for example. Respective “texts” represent the moral fundaments and raw material for
“conversation” and well as respective struggles in constituting organizations. Thus, struggles
for recognition describe a communicational situation of scrutinizing and destructing applied
moral standards designating forms of conflict, resistance, and demands for change -
phenomena which are traditionally associated with social instability. According to Honneth,
this destabilizing effect of struggles for recognition in fact appears as a main principle of
organizing reminding us that the stability of social arrangements in the long term inevitably
depends on their change and adaptation (Cooper 1986; Ortmann2002).Communication with
its moral dimension of recognition is thus trigger as well as means of settlement of respective
disputes pointing to its destabilizing but, at the same time, also constitutive role for organizing
and organizations. Incidentally, these arguments on the (dis)ordering potential of
communication seem quite close with the Luhmannian variant of CCO thinking (Schoeneborn
2011) as well as with other recent work within the research field (Bisel 2008; Kuhn 2012;
Vasquez et al. 2012; Porter 2013).Thus, proponents of CCO increasingly acknowledge
communication as “uncertain, ambiguous, paradoxical, fragmented, and dilemmatic” process
that makes every order momentary and contingent (Kuhn 2012, p. 549). For example, this is
demonstrated by Porter´s (2013) study on the emergence of organization and technology at a
shelter during Hurricane Katrina as well as by the study on ordering efforts in project-based
organizations by Vasquez, Schoeneborn and Sergi (2012). In both studies, the situational and
enduring negotiation of (in)determinate meaning, that is communication, is demonstrated as
permanent source of order as well as disorder. This way, when turning back to Honneth
arguments, one could argue, that the indeterminate character of communication processes is
prerequisite (e.g. to assert one´s claims for recognition with regard to the plurality of possible
orders) and driver (e.g. negotiating the meaning of due recognition) of struggles for
recognition.
In my view, understanding struggles for recognition as (dis)ordering communication in
particular, reveals several directions of communication research on organizations. For
example, the communicative premises of entering into struggles, particular communicative
events and respective courses of struggle, as well as applied communication strategies in
order to enforce one´s claims for recognition are worthwhile for deeper investigation.
Especially on the background of Honneth´s normative framing of struggles for recognition,
the factual communicational premises for entering into struggles are of particular relevance.

14
Thus, when looking at the factual struggles for recognition taking place in and through
organizations, we of course have to acknowledge, that not every identity claim of individuals
and collective actors triggers struggles for recognition in order to advance respective social
arrangements. In fact, respective claims for identity and self-realization are violated in
different forms and to different degrees in and trough organizing and organizations every
dayall around the world(e.g. Cederstrom & Fleming 2012). Considering this, important
questions seem to focus on the working mechanism of such communicative “consensus”
maintaining the “peaceableness” of the parties involved (Hartz & Habscheid 2006; Karasek &
Hartz 2007). Thus, besides somewhat rational explanations like that of the establishment of
“zones of indifference” between individual and organization (Barnard 1938) or political
approaches of relations of power and dominance, this sheds light on the communicative
strategies organizations and actors employ to incorporate claims for identity and respective
forms of resistance, and to “reconcile” conflicts accordingly (e.g. Boltanski & Chiapello
2005). Questions would thus refer to the premises of the instrumental or ideological use of
recognition as moral communication, for example (e.g. Alvesson & Willmott 2002 on
“identity regulation”) and its stabilizing or destabilizing effects in the short as well as in the
long run. Referring back to Honneth´s work, it would be of particular interest whether and
how his ideas on non-ideological recognition (positive, attitude, distinct) and his premises on
the acceptance of offered recognition (credibility and progressive) could become subject for
further discussion and differentiation.

Emotions and “irrationality” as driver, dimension, and object of communication

Honneth´s theory of the “struggles for recognition” can fruitfully add to CCO thinking by
providing an explanatory mechanism of why the communicative interactions occur that
constitute the organization. Incorporating recognition and self-realization as human desire,
thus can make a potential contribution to CCO thinking by highlighting the desire for
recognition as driving force of communication. Especially, its emotional source and the
emotional imprint of struggles for recognition as communicative events offer research
avenues that barely have been pursued in the CCO field.
Thus, in an organizational or - as it is supposed to be - functional and rational context, the
destabilizing effect of struggles for recognition, seem all the more difficult to foresee and to
manage, as they are matters of felt disrespect, claims for identity and personal integrity
bringing emotional and thus putative “irrational” issues on the managerial agenda (Ashforth
& Humphrey, 1995; Fleming & Spicer 2008, p. 307). Respective conflicts are morally

15
motivated and hard to handle by operating with the pure logics of simply optimizing the
economic benefits of the participants or efficacy of outcomes accordingly. Thus, from the
perspective introduced here, we are sensitized to acknowledge, that labor disputes, for
example indeed address the distribution of income or improvement of working conditions, but
refer to moral and thus emotional issues of recognizing one’s work, social inclusion, and
ascription of identity, at the same time. The differentiation between emotional and non-
emotional or rational and irrational issues thus becomes somewhat blurred opening an
analytical way to critically examine their respective invocation in and trough organizations.
Against this background, one can argue that the putative or -often rather favored - absence of
emotions and “irrational behavior” in an organizational context might crucially influence the
situated communication of actors. For example, moral injuries as violations of personal
integrity and respective responses, which are often subtle and less visible in day-to-day
interaction, might more or less purposefully overlooked and “overheard” in an organizational
context possibly contributing to an escalation of conflict in the long run (Prasad & Prasad
2000; Fleming & Spicer 2003). One suggestions for research on the communicative
constitution of organizations is thus to focus more on the particular conversational
characteristics of recognition as moral dimension of communication which is often seen as
extrinsic to direct questions of organizing and coordination. A further example might be the
purposeful suppression and cancellation of the moral dimension of communication by
blaming it as simply emotional and therefore irrational and unreasonable. The discursive
debasement of indignations in social media directed towards organizations or of “resistant”
behavior in processes of organizational change (e.g. Ford, Ford, & d´Amelio 2010; Faßauer
2011) might be examples. As emotions are putatively excluded from “functional” processes of
organizing the accusation of being and behaving emotional is often means to repel respective
claims of opponents on both sides. Conversely and somehow paradoxical, this discursive
strategy is also possible to be turned upside down in other conflicts or during the dynamics of
disputes. For example, one might think of situations where individuals or collective actors are
accused for being only interested in their economic benefits neglecting the moral and
affectionate bonds with others are they individuals or organizations. However, depending on
the situation and the participants of dispute, the moral dimension of communication in terms
of its emotional and “irrational” element is thus differently employed but always part of
constituting organizations. Further research on recognition as moral dimension of
communication and respective struggles, could pick on this flexible und discrepant labeling of
“rational” and “irrational” communication in order to critically deconstruct respective

16
discursive strategies (Putnam, Grant, Michelson, & Cutcher 2005; Fleming & Spicer 2008).
Finally, when referring to irrationality as driver and dimension of communication, a particular
issue for communication research on struggles for recognition might be the morally motivated
“breakup of communication”. In line with Honneth´s writings, such a breakup of particular
struggles, manifested in the refusal of any kind of cooperation with the other, would describe
the loss of one´s opponent status of even being a recognizable other for the respective other.
Thus, getting recognized by this particular opponent becomes obsolete or even kind of
injuries for building a positive relation-to-self (Faßauer & Hartz 2014). Referring to context
and situation such a breakup might involve more or less costs and risks for the resistant
allowing to think about “Real acts” of resistance (Contu 2008, pp.374; see also Deetz 2008).
In the light of these considerations, the research on struggles for recognition once again means
highlighting the emotional dimension of communication in constituting organizations. Thus,
the “fears and tears of struggle” (Fleming & Spicer 2008, p. 307; see also McBridge, Stirling
& Winter 2013) and their role in the formation of conflicts carried out in and through
organizations might thus are of greater importance than acknowledged, thus far.

Organizations as moral actors and normative implications

Finally, we tackle the analytical way for defining organizations as morally responsible actors
(Ortmann 2010; Paine 1994) as well as for acknowledging the normative implications of
Honneth´s approach. So far, both topics have been barely addressed in research on CCO and
could provide a substantial contribution to the field.
The entanglement of Honneth´s approach with the CCO perspective helps to foster a notion of
organization as cooperative actor in its own right notwithstanding incorporated into
permanent processes of keeping and/or struggling for recognition as kind of “meta-
conversation” (Taylor 2011, pp. 1281). Thus, struggles for recognition can take place between
particular individuals (e.g. leader-member relations), communities of practice as well as
between whole organizations. Together with the Montreal School´s concept of the
enlargement of communication as main mechanism of constituting organizations (e.g., Cooren
& Fairhurst 2009), we thus can define organizations as arenas as well as active participants of
struggles for recognition. Referring to the latter, organizations are perceived as interaction
partner with “whom”organizational members and other actors are confronted with and may be
generally seen - in the extension of this logic - as “somebody” who struggles for recognition
too. For example, the later gets visible in the establishment of organizational ethics
programmes and respective symbolic representation of organizations towards internal and

17
external audiences accordingly. In this vein, Ortmann (2010, p. 62) as well as Paine (1994)
highlight that organizations through shape of organizational arrangements have the ability to
foster as well undermine the moral capacity of its members indicating a particular
organizational capacity or incapacity. This way, organizations themselves of course do not
“feel”personal harm due to misrecognition (Ortmann 2010, p. 71), but can nevertheless build
up a moral capability or collective style of handling moral issues characterizing them as
cooperative actor with more or less integrity. This way, a “moral personality” is attributed to
organizations, or as Paine further argues: “Employees, customers, investors, citizens - in these
various roles we routinely decide whether companies we deal with are fair or unfair,
responsible or irresponsible, honest or dishonest, trustworthy or untrustworthy”(cited by
Bernhut 2003, p. 1).
Against this backdrop, respective research could focus onthe historic course of an
organization´s handling of struggles for recognition carving out a new perspective to explain
emerging organizational identity in its moral dimension (e.g. Langley et al. 2012; Koschmann
2013).This way, the focus is also put on the social embeddedness and societal recursivity of
organizations in terms of their normative and factual fundament of organizing (e.g. Hartz &
Faßauer 2013). Such a focus, again, questions the traditional differentiating between rational
and irrational issues of organizing allocating morality kind of external to “pure”
organizational questions (Ortmann 2010; Schröder 2013).One particular direction for research
on CCO, would thus to elaborate deeper on the joint communicative construction of an
organization´s identity as cooperative and morally responsible actor (e.g. Scherer & Palazzo
2007). From the perspective introduced here, it would be of particular relevance how involved
actors refer to their own identity and moral integrity, ascribe those to others and incorporate
or advance respective identities in course of struggles. Again, an important question refers to
the criteria of credibility and trustworthiness of offered recognition and their influence on the
course of struggle. This issue finally points to a kind of paradox organizations and
corporations in particular are confronted with. On the one hand, they are perceived as morally
accountable actors being in charge of the adherence to moral standards. On the other hand,
their communication on moral issues, like mutual respect, respective rights and duties, is
nearly naturally biased for being instrumental and therefore sanctimonious or ideological.
Respective research might concentrate on the communicative efforts especially undertaken in
order to deal with the topic of sanctimony thus advocating the closer connection of
scholarship on public relations and organizational communication, for example (Wehmeier &
Winkler 2013). Issues of sanctimonious communication of organizations as morally

18
responsible actors might play a different role in different contexts and respective conflicts can
result in different consequences too. In some cases, the apparent instrumental use of moral
arguments might get accepted in a manner of morally superiority by opponents thus settling a
dispute. In other cases, the same communication might crucially contribute to an escalation of
conflict. Hence, we need to advance our understanding of the boundary conditions under
which the escalation or the de-escalation through corporate communication is more likely.
This leads over to normative implications that follow from Honneth´s approach. Generally,
Honneth´s theory bears the potential to criticize social reality promoting a communication-
based research on organizations with a critical edge (see also Schoeneborn & Sandhu 2013, p.
307). This potential basically refers to the idea of the normative demands inherent to
relationships of mutual recognition as moral dimension of communication. Honneth´s theory
highlights the moral capacity and poverty of every human being and, in this way, allocates the
chance of morally motivated struggles as well as the capacity to encourage the moral
dimension of communication to all participants of organizational interaction. Thus, felt
misrecognition, claims for identity and self-realization are considered as a main source and
driver of communication providing the premises for the advancement of organizational
arrangements in particular. With this, and in light of the notion of organizations as morally
responsible actors, issues like respect and (non-)ideological communication in and through
organizations are put in a new way on the agenda of scholars and practitioners. This may
imply respective investigations on the conversational and textual characteristics on the moral
dimension of communication but also on approaches and consequences of the instrumental
use of moral arguments (Schultz 2011). Research topics like “sanctimonious” communication
or on the strategic invocation of putative rational or irrational motives of conflict in order to
repel identity claims of opponents are of interest here as well as communicative mechanisms
to settle respective disputes and to reach consensus. Thus, elaborating deeper into the
mechanism of struggles for recognition as moral communication can particularly help foster
the critical perspective of communicative research on organizations (see also Ashcraft et al.
2009).

Concluding remarks
Defining and explicating recognition and “struggles for recognition” (Honneth 1996) as moral
dimension of communication allows for introducing a new theoretical perspective on the
communicative constitution of organizations. Basically, the entanglement of both research
fields provides an approach for elaborating deeper on the evaluative dimension of

19
communication in constituting organizations. Here, morality is anchored in the reciprocity of
social interaction and mutual recognition as dimension of communication enabling the
development of relation-to-self, identity, and feelings of personal integrity. Thus, people are
recognized as morally accountable person by having enforceable rights or enjoying a
particular social esteem due to the appraisal of their occupational performance for example.
Denying recognition involves moral injuries and feelings of disregard that possibly
encompass struggles for recognition. Negotiated patterns of recognition are inscribed into
social institutions or “texts” framing “conversations” in terms of converting claims for
recognition already manifested or of advancing respective texts.
Thus, the main contribution of this chapter are to acknowledge the human desire for
recognition as an important and emotional driver of communication and to particular reveal
the (dis)ordering potential of this moral dimension of communication. The paper furthermore
points out that processes of organizing as well as organizations are crucial arenas of struggles
for recognition and organizations as morally responsible actors moreover are participants of
such struggles. Describing organizations as communicatively manifested and always
contested sites and products of struggles for recognition allows for revealing moral
fundaments of interaction at a particular time and space and, in this way, for providing
normative grounds to criticize social reality of organizations.
This paper presents a first attempt to entangle Honneth´s social theory on recognition with
research on the communicative constitution of organizations. Such an analytical endeavor is
always afflicted with constraints and vagueness. For now, this paper delivers a very basic and
broad understanding of recognition as constitutive communication. It is constricted to define
recognition as inherent dimension of every communication that extents over time and space,
and is assigned to “materiality” or non-human actors. According to Honneth´s theory,
(mis)recognition as dimension of communication informs every sphere of human life, while
the desire for recognition drives particular communication processes to different degree, and
recognition is more or less explicitly addressed accordingly. This way, Honneth´s (strong)
premise on recognition as exclusive medium of interaction and of building relation-to-self and
identity, on the one hand, paths a way for analyzing every communication, even “rational”
economic exchange and respective conflicts in particular, with regard to moral expectations of
interaction partners. On the other hand, the very same point risks inflating “recognition” as
explanatory and analytical category (see also on this critique, e.g. Fraser & Honneth 2003, pp.
230). A research focus that frames recognition as one particular dimension of communication
that can differently govern particular interactions might thus specifically help to foster a more

20
nuanced and empirically underpinned notion of recognition without dismissing Honneth´s
basic premises. Thus, the crucial challenge remains to delineate a communication model that
more clearly specifies particular characteristics of this dimension of communication. In any
case, “struggles for recognition” are communicative events where the moral dimension of
communication obviously is at work. Thus, one particular way to elaborate deeper on the
characteristics and effects of recognition as moral dimension of communication would be to
look at conflicts, their communicative dynamics and settlement in and around organizations.

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