The Super Tank Battle of Kursk: Was It Really the Stuff of Legends?

Click here to read the full article. Key Point: Kursk was not the turning point of
the war. The title of Martin Caidin's 1974 history of the Battle of Kursk is still
evocative, with its imagery of Nazi Germany's vaunted Tiger tanks in flames. Tigers
burning brightly are just one legend of the epic July 1943 battle between Germany
and Russia. There are many more: The Greatest Tank Battle in History, the Turning
Point of World War II, The Death Ride of the Panzers, Russian tanks ramming German
tanks in a mechanized orgy of destruction.... All very colorful, and all mostly or
partly untrue. Kursk is the Santa Claus and Easter Bunny of World War II battles,
whose popular history was constructed from German and Soviet propaganda, and based
on early accounts lacking vital information buried in Russian archives until after
the fall of the Soviet Union. Kursk was indeed an epic battle, that pitted 3
million German and Soviet soldiers and 8,000 tanks, all crammed into a small
portion of southern Russia. After the disaster at Stalingrad in February 1943, the
Red Army pushed the Germans back all the way across southern Russia, until a Panzer
counteroffensive in March halted the Russian advance. As spring mud and mutual
exhaustion brought operations to a close, the front lines solidified with a 120-
mile-wide Russian salient bulging into German lines near the city of Kursk. Germany
had a choice: wait to be hammered by another offensive from the Russian
steamroller, or take the initiative by launching its own offensive. Meanwhile, the
clock was ticking after the November 1942 Western Allied landings in North Africa
signaled that Germany would soon be forced to split its armies between Eastern and
Western Europe. In 1941, Germany had been strong enough to attack on a thousand-
mile-front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Now the Germans could only muster
enough troops to concentrate on a narrow sector.  An obvious target was the Kursk
salient, so obvious in fact that any Russian general with a map could guess the
German target (in addition, Moscow was tipped off by the "Lucy"). In effect, Kursk
was the first Battle of the Bulge, but on a much larger scale than the Americans
faced in December 1944. Story continues Top commanders such as Erich Von Manstein
wanted to attack in May, before the Soviets had time to dig in and reinforce the
salient. But a nervous and indecisive Hitler decided to postpone Operation Citadel
until July, to allow time to deploy his vaunted new Panther, Tiger and Elefant
tanks. While the big cats lumbered off the railroad cars near the front lines, the
Germans managed to amass nearly 800,000 men, 3,000 tanks, 10,000 guns and mortars,
and 2,000 aircraft. It would be the last time the Germans could concentrate such an
attack force (by comparison, at the Battle of the Bulge, the Germans had 400,000
men and 600 tanks). Yet as usual, the Germans were outnumbered. They faced 1.9
million Soviet soldiers, 5,000 tanks, 25,000 guns and mortars and more than 3,000
aircraft. Citadel was a prophetic name for the German offensive. The Soviets used
the extra time to build an incredibly dense defense system of multiple layers of
fortifications, including trenches, bunkers, tank traps and machine gun nests 25
miles deep, as well as minefields that averaged more than 3,000 mines per
kilometer. Kursk was not an imaginative battle. The Germans attacked an obvious
target, the Soviets fortified the obvious target, and the German offensive on July
4, 1943 was a traditional pincer move against the north and south base of the
salient to cut off the defenders inside. Despite support by 89 Elefants (a Porsche
version of the Tiger that the German army rejected), the northern pincer quickly
bogged down after advancing just a few miles. But the southern pincer, led by the
II SS Panzer Corps, managed to advance 20 miles to the town of Prokhorovka, until
its advance was checked by the Soviet Fifth Guards Tank Army. On July 10, Anglo-
American troops landed on the beaches of Sicily. Two days later Hitler informed his
generals that he was canceling the offensive and transferring the SS Panzer
divisions to Italy, to repel any Allied landings on the Italian peninsula. The
German offensive was over. But the Soviets had only just begun. Stavka, the Soviet
high command, used essentially the same trick that had worked at Stalingrad. It
waited until the Germans had concentrated their forces at Kursk, and exhausted
themselves against the Russian defenses. Then the Red Army launched a
counteroffensive that punctured the weakly held German lines at Orel, north of
Kursk, and Belgorod to the south. Thus the Germans found their pincer operation
squeezed on either side by a Soviet pincers, in yet another masterful example of
the Soviet gift for timing multiple offensives to keep the Germans off balance. As
they would do for the next 22 months, the Germans retreated. The Battle of Kursk
was over. The battle over the history of Kursk was not. So let's explode some of
the hype about Kursk: 1. The Tigers didn't burn. Soviet tanks did: There were lots
of flaming tanks at Kursk. They were mostly Russian. Loss estimates for Kursk are
fuzzy, but historians David Glantz and Jonathan House estimate the Germans lost 323
tanks destroyed, or about 10 percent of the tanks committed to the offensive (and a
fraction of the 12,000  tanks and self-propelled guns the Third Reich built in
1943). Many German tanks damaged by mines or Soviet weapons, or that broke down,
were subsequently recovered. The Soviets lost at least 1,600 tanks, a 5:1 ratio in
Germany's favor. The Germans probably lost 45 tanks at Prokhovoka, most of which
were subsequently recovered and repaired. The Soviets may have lost 300 tanks
destroyed and another 300 damaged, a 15:1 ratio in Germany's favor. As for Tigers
at Kursk, the Germans deployed 146. Only 6 were destroyed. Given that the German
offensive ran into perhaps the most extensive fortified zone in history, and then
fought against the numerically superior Soviet tank force, Panzer losses were
remarkably light. It was the German infantry, which as in most armies took the most
casualties and received the least glory, that was roughly handled at Kursk. 2.
Kursk was not a turning point of the war: The Germans could blame their defeats at
Moscow and Stalingrad on the Russian winter, overstretched supply lines and
incompetent Rumanian and Italian allies. Kursk demonstrated that the Red Army could
hold its own against fully rested and equipped German troops fighting in good
weather. More important, Kursk showed that the momentum on the Eastern Front had
changed. From June 1941 until July 1943, the tempo of the Russo-German war was
mostly determined by German offensives and Soviet responses.  After Kursk, the
Germans remained on the defensive, their elite Panzer divisions constantly moving
up and down the Eastern Front to plug Soviet breakthroughs and rescue encircled
German troops. Yet the momentum on the Eastern Front had already shifted six months
earlier at Stalingrad, where an entire German army, and several hundred thousand
German and satellite troops, were erased from the Axis order of battle. Kursk was
bloody: the German offensive alone cost 54,000 Germans and 178,000 Soviet
casualties -- yet there were no major encirclements or surrenders. Kursk was a
battle of attrition rather than decisive maneuver. Both armies were damaged yet
both remained intact. The Red Army had become too competent to let the German
Panzers slice and dice them as in 1941. And unless Germany could win the sort of
victories it achieved in 1941, and filled the POW cages with a million Soviet
prisoners, it is hard to see how Kursk could have been decisive. If the Germans had
destroyed a few Soviet divisions and eliminated the Kursk salient, the Soviets
would merely have rebuilt their strength and attacked somewhere else. By 1943,
there were simply not enough German troops to conquer the Soviet Union or to
solidly defend a thousand-mile front. 3. Prokhorovka was not the Greatest Tank
Battle in History: The meeting engagement between the II SS Panzer Corps and the
5th Guards Tank Army at Prokhorovka has been lauded as history's greatest tank
battle, probably because it involved SS Panzer divisions and a handful of Tigers.
The actual battle only pitted about 300 German tanks against roughly 800 Soviet
vehicles. The biggest tank battle in history may be Dubna, in June 1941, where 750
German tanks defeated 3,500 Soviet vehicles. 4. The Red Army was still not as good
as the German Army: The Red Army in 1943 had come a long way since its pitiful
performance in 1941-42. But despite the postwar propaganda, Kursk showed the
Soviets still had a long way to go. As Russian Kursk expert Valeriy Zamulin
demonstrates in "Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, Kursk, July
1943," Soviet tactical performance was clumsy and troop morale was brittle. Though
the Red Air Force was able to provide some support, its performance was also
lacking: for example, a surprise strike on German airfields on July 5 quickly
turned into a turkey shoot for the Luftwaffe fighter aces. Military theory holds
that the attacker should outnumber the defender three-to-one, and that fighting
through dense fortifications will render an attack ever more costly. The fact was
that the Germans were outnumbered at Kursk, and fought through multiple trench
lines and minefields, yet inflict three times as many casualties and destroy three
times as tanks and aircraft as the Germans themselves lost. 5. It was the Soviet
counteroffensive that bled the Germans: Accounts of Kursk tend to focus on the
dramatic German attack and desperate Soviet defense. Yet as was the case throughout
the war, German losses were relatively light as long as they remained on the
offensive, where they could use their talents for battlefield
flexibility and improvisation to the maximum. It was when the Germans were on the
defense, where they had less room to maneuver and were vulnerable to massive
artillery barrages, that they tended to take heavy casualties. The Germans lost
about 50,000 men during their attempted breakthrough. They may have suffered
another 150,000 casualties during the dual Soviet offensives -- Operations Kutuzov
and Rumyantsev -- in mid-July through August. German tank losses were not excessive
during their offensive, but once the long retreat to the Reich began, equipment
frequently had to be abandoned or blown up. 6. Soviet tanks didn't ram German tanks
at Kursk: The story is probably apocryphal. Even considering the Red Army's bravery
and discipline, trying to ram another tank before it blows you to smithereens would
be an act of battlefield Darwinism. 7. Kursk was an Anglo-American victory as well
as a Soviet one: Just as the SS Panzers were about to achieve a decisive
breakthrough -- or so Von Manstein claimed -- an Anglo-American amphibious force
landed on Sicily. Hitler called off Operation Citadel and transferred the SS Panzer
divisions to Italy. The timing was coincidental. The Anglo-Americans didn't land on
Sicily to support the Soviets at Kursk, nor could they have mounted a large
amphibious invasion on such short notice. But the practical effect was to draw
German troops from the Eastern Front at a critical time. Pointing this out takes
nothing away from the bravery and skill of the Red Army, any more that it
disparages the Western Allies to point out that the Soviets fought and destroyed
the bulk of the German army. But today, as America and Russia confront one another,
it is worth remembering there was a time when both nations cooperated to save the
world from a new Dark Ages. Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National
Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook. This first appeared in August
2016. Image: Panzer IIIs and IVs on the southern side of the Kursk salient at the
start of Operation Citadel. Summer 1943. German Federal Archives. Click here to
read the full article.

How Hitler's Last Ditch Effort to Fight the Russians in 1945 Flopped

Click here to read the full article. Here's What You Need To Remember: “Time,
pressure, poor weather, extremely difficult terrain conditions, [and] Hitler’s
impatience joined forces with the well-prepared enemy defense to form a combined
front.”  More From The National Interest:  Where World War III Could Start This
Year How the F-35 Stealth Fighter Almost Never Happened  Russia Has Missing Nuclear
Weapons Sitting on the Ocean Floor  How China Could Sink a U.S. Navy Aircraft
Carrier Even in the dark days of March 1945, when the Third Reich was on the brink
of collapse, its troops managed to exhibit that grim humor that enables frontline
soldiers to endure the horrors of battle. As the panzer crews of mighty Tiger II
tanks rumbled forward in the last German offensive of World War II in eastern
Hungary, they joked about the difficulties they were having coming to grips with
the enemy. A few of the 68-ton King Tigers sank up to their turrets in the mud
produced by an early spring thaw. Making light of the situation, tank commanders
quipped that they were steering tanks, not U-boats. The Soviet forces gathering on
the Oder River in early 1945 seemed not to bother Adolf Hitler. The German leader
became fixed on the need to protect the Hungarian oilfields from Red Army tank and
rifle units that had encircled Budapest in late December 1944. Hitler had sent the
IV SS Panzer Corps against the forces threatening Budapest in three consecutive
counterattacks in January 1945 that were known collectively as the Konrad
Offensives. But the tenacious Soviet forces had repulsed each assault. On February
13, the city fell to the soldiers of Marshal Rodion Malinovsky’s 2nd Ukrainian
Front. The Hungarian oilfields at Nagykaniscza constituted the last major petroleum
resources available to Germany. By early 1945, the Austrian and Hungarian oilfields
furnished 80 percent of the oil for the German armed forces. Despite the setbacks
of January, Hitler devised a new offensive called Operation Fruhlingserwachen
(Spring Awakening) that had both economic and military objectives. Hitler wanted to
stem the Soviet tide in Hungary. He envisioned a larger offensive that would roll
back the gains of Marshal Fyodor Tolbukhin’s 3rd Ukrainian Front in Hungary. If all
went according to plan, the Germans would inflict severe distress on the Russian
marshal and his forces in the upcoming campaign. Hitler hoped that his panzer
forces would be able to establish bridgeheads over the Danube River and perhaps
even retake Budapest. In so doing, the Germans would secure the oil resources
needed to feed their war machine. Story continues Although Operation Spring
Awakening officially began on March 6, 1945, the planning began as early as
January. The Supreme High Command of the German Army issued orders on January 16 to
SS-Oberfruppenfuhrer Sepp Dietrich to bring his Sixth Panzer Army back to Germany
from the Ardennes region to rest and refit for a new operation. Although Dietrich’s
command is commonly referred to as the Sixth SS Panzer Army, it was not officially
known as such until it was transferred to the Waffen SS on April 2, 1945.
Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army comprised Generalleutnant Hermann Preiss’s I SS Panzer
Corps and Generalleutnant Willi Bittrich’s II SS Panzer Corps. Preiss’s corps was
composed of the 1st SS and 12th SS Panzer Divisions, and Bittrich’s corps was
composed of the 2nd SS and 9th SS Panzer Divisions. To bring these battered units
up to standard strength for an SS panzer division, the commanders filled the
depleted ranks with raw recruits and support personnel from the Luftwaffe and
Kriegsmarine. Unfortunately, time and fuel were in short supply, so the replacement
personnel received no combat training. Nevertheless, the four panzer divisions did
receive nearly all of the arms and vehicle production they needed to build up their
tank, assault gun, and tank destroyer requirements. In the end, the Germans amassed
240,000 troops, 500 tanks, 173 assault guns, and 900 combat aircraft for the
offensive. Hitler and his advisers planned to make the main attack for Operation
Spring Awakening with General Otto Wohler’s Army Group South. Wohler would have
plenty of hitting power. His command would consist of General Hermann Balck’s Sixth
Army, Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army, and the Hungarian 8th Corps. Wohler had a total
of 10 panzer and five infantry divisions to hurl against the 3rd Ukrainian Front.
While Army Group South advanced south toward the Soviet forces between Lake Balaton
and Lake Velencze to the east, other German armies would strike east against
Tolbukhin’s left flank. Wohler’s attack would be supported by a secondary attack by
Generaloberst Alexander Loehr’s Army Group E in Yugoslavia, as well as another
minor attack by General Maximilian de Angelis’s Second Panzer Army. By the start of
Operation Spring Awakening, nearly 40 percent of the German Army’s heavy combat
fighting vehicles in use on the Eastern Front were in Hungary. Under the strictest
security measures, additional units made their way there. Col. Gen. Heinz Guderian,
the German Army’s Inspector General of Armored Troops, disapproved of Hitler’s
decision to send the Sixth Panzer Army into Hungary. Guderian believed its strength
would be better employed behind the Oder River to slow the Red Army’s drive on
Berlin. Hitler overruled Guderian, and the Hungarian offensive went forward as
planned. Hitler approved the final plan for Operation Spring Awakening on February
23. As part of the final preparations, he reinforced Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army
with the I Cavalry Corps, comprising the 3rd and 4th Cavalry Divisions, and
Generalleutnant Joseph von Radowitz’s 23rd Panzer Division. Radowitz’s troops would
serve as a ready reserve to be committed at the most opportune time. Dietrich
assigned Preiss’s I SS Panzer Corps the center position, which stretched from Lake
Balaton to a point west of Seregelyes. Bittrich’s II SS Panzer Corps took up a
position on its left, and the I Cavalry Corps deployed on its right. Flank
protection would be provided by the 44th Grenadier and 25th Hungarian Infantry
Divisions. Dietrich’s first objective was to secure a crossing over the Sio Canal
and capture the city of Dunafoldvar. General Hermann Breith’s III Panzer Corps of
Balck’s Sixth Army was to attack north of the Sixth Panzer Army from Seregelyes to
Lake Valence. Its objective was to capture the area between Lake Valence and the
Danube River. Two heavy tank battalions with King Tigers provided extra firepower
for the III Panzer Corps and the Sixth Panzer Army. Generalleutnant Rudolf Freiherr
von Waldenfels’ 6th Panzer Division would follow behind. Guarding the left flank of
the III Panzer Corps were the 3rd and 5th SS Panzer Divisions of SS-
Obergruppenführer Herbert Otto Gille’s IV SS Panzer Corps. The IV SS Panzer Corps
was badly depleted from the Konrad Offensives, but it would be sent into action
anyway. To the south, the Second Panzer Army held the front line south of Lake
Balafon. By the time of the offensive, though, it could hardly be described as a
panzer army. It consisted of four divisions equipped not with tanks, but with
assault guns. Its best division was the 16th SS Panzergrenadier Division. The
Second Panzer Army’s objective was to capture Kaposvar. Army Group E was deployed
south of the Second Panzer Army along the Drava River. Its objective was to
establish a large bridgehead across the Drava near Donati Miholjac with its three
divisions. Although the Germans had employed strict security measures to disguise
the transfer to Hungary, the Red Army knew a German offensive was brewing. As early
as February 12, the Western Allies passed along intercepted communications
regarding troop movements. Any doubt the Red Army commanders might have had was
eliminated near the end of February when the last successful Waffen SS operation,
known as Operation Southwind, went forward against the Soviet forces in Slovakia.
In that offensive, the I SS Panzer Corps eliminated a Red Army bridgehead over the
Gran River. Tolbukhin’s 3rd Ukrainian Front would receive the brunt of the German
attack. Created in October 1943, the units that constituted the front had
participated in various Soviet offensives that had liberated Ukraine and Moldova
from German occupation by August 1944. In the following months, the 3rd Ukrainian
Front had invaded Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Tolbukhin’s Red Army troops
liberated Belgrade in October. Afterward, Stavka, the Soviet high command, shifted
the front north to Hungary where it assisted Malinovsky’s 2nd Ukrainian Front in
besieging Budapest and helped repulse German attempts to relieve the city. While
the Germans were clearing the Gran bridgehead, Stavka issued directives to
Tolbukhin and Malinovsky to prepare for fresh offensives to capture Vienna and
Bratislava, respectively. Soviet Premier Josef Stalin set March 15 as the start
date for these offensives. Thus, Tolbukhin not only had to prepare for the upcoming
offensive, but also establish a defensive plan for the forthcoming German attack.
Tolbukhin created a multilayered defense that stressed antitank obstacles and
killing zones. Each layer had multiple fortified belts. The first two layers
typically had two or more lines of trenches. Altogether, Tolbukhin had a defense in
depth that stretched for 30 kilometers. But since the defenses were created in a
short time, the soldiers only strung barbed wire in a few places and had not had
time to construct concrete pillboxes. The 3rd Ukrainian Front had approximately
406,000 soldiers and 407 tanks, assault guns, and tank destroyers. In addition, the
Soviet 17th Air Army had 965 aircraft available to support the ground troops. The
4th Guards Army held the 3rd Ukrainian Front’s right flank. The army comprised
three rifle corps, each of which had three rifle divisions.
The 4th Guards’ main task was to defend Szekesfehvar. Deployed on its right flank
was the XXIII Tank Corps, which functioned as a mobile reserve. To the left of the
4th Guards was Lt. Gen. Nikolai Gagan’s 26th Army, deployed directly in the path of
the advancing Sixth Panzer Army. Gagan’s army was responsible for the area from
Seregelyes to Lake Balaton. Because of the likelihood that it would be hit hard,
the XXX Rifle Corps had half of the 3rd Ukrainian Front’s artillery and ample anti-
tank guns. The XVIII Tank Corps, another of Tolbuknin’s mobile reserves, was
stationed in the Sarosd area where it could either assist the 4th Guards or the
26th Army as the situation developed. The I Guards Mechanized Corps also was
deployed directly behind the 26th Army. The 57th Army was deployed to the south of
Gagan’s 26th Army. Comprising two rifle corps, its task was to guard a section of
the front that stretched from the shores of Lake Balaton south to the Drava River.
Although it had only six infantry divisions, each division had slightly more men
than those in the other Soviet armies. It was deployed in the path of the Second
Panzer Army. The V Guards Cavalry Corps was situated in the northeast area of the
57th Army in such a way that it might assist either the 57th Army or the 26th Army.
Stationed along the northern banks of the Drava River south of the 57th Army were
the six infantry divisions that constituted the First Bulgarian Army. Although the
Bulgarian divisions had a strength that was twice that of a Soviet division in
numbers, its men had less combat experience. Stavka believed that a major enemy
advance in the sector held by the Bulgarians was unlikely because of the difficulty
the Germans would have striking across the Drava. Still, Tolbukhin was prepared to
send elements of the 57th Army south to assist the Bulgarians if the need should
arise. To the Bulgarians’ left was the XII Army Corps from the Third Yugoslavian
Army, which was not part of Tolbuknin’s front. Tolbukhin entrusted the 27th Army
with his second line of defense. The 27th Army consisted of three Guards infantry
corps, yet all of its divisions were significantly weaker in men and equipment than
the 26th Army. The 27th Army held a section of the front from Lake Valence to the
Danube River. While it seemed as if the Red Army had an extraordinarily large
number of troops in this sector, a typical Soviet unit was small in comparison to
its German counterpart; for example, a Red Army tank corps in terms of men and
equipment was equivalent to a German panzer division. Tolbukhin also had other
units in his sector which, under orders from Stavka, he was forbidden to use. One
of these units was the 9th Guards Army, which was slated for the drive on Vienna.
Even if the 3rd Ukrainian Front’s situation grew critical, Tolbukhin knew from past
experience that his request to use such units was likely to be rejected. Overall,
German intelligence had accurately estimated the number of Soviet armies, corps,
and divisions against which the German forces would be attacking. But it failed to
detect the guards mechanized and guards cavalry corps positioned in the assault
route of the Sixth Panzer Army, failed to determine the location of two corps of
the 27th Army, and failed to accurately assess the strength and disposition of the
Soviets units. Although the German intelligence omissions were important, they were
nothing in comparison to other factors that would influence the Germans before and
during the offensive. The security measures that the Germans employed in an effort
to deceive the enemy, which in the end were futile, prevented orders from reaching
anyone below corps level. This had a detrimental effect on final preparations for
the offensive. In addition, some assembly positions were up to 20 kilometers from
the actual starting points. To make matters worse, commanders were not allowed to
conduct their own reconnaissance of enemy positions to their immediate front.
Dietrich and the staff of the Sixth Panzer Army had considerable concerns about the
location chosen for the attack. In addition to being vulnerable to a Soviet thrust
north of Szekesfehervar, several waterways and canals crossed the lanes of attack
and threatened to slow the German advance. Moreover, only two of the roads were
paved, and the dirt roads shown on the maps the Germans would be using were in
reality no more than narrow paths. Last but not least, the weather at that time of
year was apt to hinder the movement of the tracked vehicles of the German panzer
divisions. An early thaw in the spring of 1945 had turned the entire area into a
morass. The region’s canals and drainage ditches had been unable to contain the
runoff. During the first days of the offensive, the SS panzer divisions lost
vehicles due to the saturated condition of the terrain. German tanks often sank in
mud up to their turrets. The situation was particularly problematic for the King
Tigers. Commanders of some units participating in the offensive requested a
postponement of offensive operations until either the temperatures dropped low
enough to freeze the mud or climbed high enough to dry the ground. Hitler and his
advisers refused all such requests. The effects of the bad weather delayed the II
SS Panzer Corps to the extent that by March 5 some of its units still had not
reached their starting points. Hitler was adamant that the attack begin on time,
even if all participating units were not in place. The headquarters of Army Group
South had experience with these conditions but still did little to assist with the
requests. Rather than help those under his command, Balck echoed the orders coming
from Berlin. Throughout the war he had always been overly optimistic about an
operation’s potential outcome, and this operation proved no different than before.
But Balck also had a tendency to blame others for shortcomings that ultimately were
his responsibility. The situation was exacerbated by Balck’s disdain for SS
officers due to previous experiences in the war. Specifically, Balck harbored a
grudge against Bittrich for the failed relief of the Ukrainian city of Tarnopol in
April 1944. German corps commanders participating in Operation Spring Awakening
distributed orders to their division commanders on the evening of March 5. With
herculean efforts, most units had by that time slogged their way through the mud to
their respective starting points. Hungarian liaison officers had warned the Germans
not to underestimate the mud season in their homeland, but their advice fell on
deaf ears. The II SS Panzer Corps, though, had not managed to reach its staging
area. Bittrich made multiple pleas to have the offensive delayed until his
divisions reached their starting points, but his superiors flatly rejected his
repeated requests. At 1 AM on March 6, Army Group E’s three divisions surged across
the Drava in five places. Throughout the course of the day, the Germans
consolidated their five small bridgeheads into two larger bridgeheads near Valpovo
and Donati Miholjac. Not surprisingly, the Bulgarians were unable to repulse the
Germans. Three hours later, the Second Panzer Army’s four divisions attacked
eastward in a drive to encircle Nagybajom. Thirty minutes after that the 1st SS
Panzer Division began a preplanned artillery barrage at 4:30 AM. Other German units
opened fire shortly afterward. Although the indirect fire did not have the results
hoped for by the German commanders, German tanks and assault guns employed direct
fire with good effect against the Soviet forces in the area. The I Cavalry Corps
gained ground at the outset but was pushed back by the Russians. Like the divisions
of I Cavalry Corps, the 12th SS Panzer Division stalled after marginal advances,
but it managed to hold onto its gains. The 1st SS Panzer Division made noteworthy
progress when it exploited some weak spots in the Soviet defense; however, its
gains were only two to four kilometers deep. As for the II SS Panzer Corps, its
advance elements did not attack until evening and made negligible progress. In
concert with the Second Panzer Army, the Sixth Army established a bridgehead across
the Hadas Ditch, which empties into Lake Valence. On either side of Seregelyes, the
1st Panzer Division and the 356th Infantry Division managed to advance only to the
north end of the village by nightfall. The 3rd Panzer Division was unable to bring
its full weight to bear as some of its units had not yet reached their jump-off
positions. By day’s end the attackers had advanced only three to four kilometers on
a 3.5-kilometer front. It was fortunate for Tolbukhin that the damage was not more
severe because III Panzer Corps had struck the seam between the 4th Guards and the
26th Armies. German air support was restricted on the first day due to inclement
weather. Tolbukhin and his staff had correctly predicted the German avenues of
attack. The 3rd Ukrainian Front commander instituted measures designed to further
strengthen the defense in the direct path of the German assault. He regrouped his
artillery and shifted elements from the XVIII Tank Corps into the second defensive
belt. In addition, the 27th Army’s XXXIII Rifle Corps was repositioned to block the
I SS Panzer Corps, which had made significant progress on the first day of the
operation given the weather conditions. Rain mixed with light snow greeted the
combatants at daybreak on March 7. The Germans renewed their attack across the
entire front. Along the Drava River, Army Group E was unable to significantly
enlarge its bridgeheads due to the mud. For the rest of the offensive, its
divisions stayed on the defensive. Farther north around Nagybajom, the Second
Panzer Army benefitted from captured enemy plans that detailed Soviet defenses.
Based on the intelligence gleaned from the plans, the Second Panzer Army shifted
the focus of its attack to its right wing. A stubborn Soviet defense permitted
little gain, and a stalemate ensued for the next few days. Between Lake Balaton and
Lake Valence, the main attack pressed on as worsening terrain conditions trapped
more German tracked vehicles, putting a strain on the already weakened infantry.
Against the layered defense, the I Cavalry Corps made few gains. To its left the SS
panzer divisions enjoyed some success. For example, the 1st SS Panzer captured
Kaloz, and the 12th SS Panzer drove six kilometers into the Soviets lines. The II
SS Panzer Corps, which was able to attack in force, also made significant headway,
advancing six kilometers. But the adjacent III Panzer Corps did not make any
attempt to attack. Dietrich severely criticized its commanders for their lackluster
performance. The IV SS Panzer Corps, though, did capture ground near
Stuhlweissenburg that strengthened its defensive position. An early morning frost
on the third day of the offensive saw some road improvement. This was lost as
temperatures rose, exacerbating the muddy conditions. The offensive finally looked
like it might have a chance when the I SS Panzer Corps made the first real gains
across a wide front when the 1st SS Panzer Division breached the enemy’s second
defense line. Exploiting this momentum, the I Cavalry Corps also gained significant
ground. The II SS Panzer Corps failed to follow up the gains of the previous day
and became bogged down in heavy fighting near Sarosd. Orders were given for the
23rd Panzer Division to assemble behind the 44th Grenadier Division to be ready for
a possible breakthrough. The 3rd Panzer Division was brought forward to attack
Adony on the Danube River while the III Panzer Corps captured Seregelyes and an
additional couple of kilometers. These advances continued to be contested by the
Soviets. Tolbukhin brought forward more of his reserves beginning on March 8,
especially artillery and Katyusha rocket batteries. With the exception of XVIII
Tank Corps, most of the Soviet mechanized forces had been held back. The following
day major developments occurred between Lake Balaton and the Sarviz Canal. The I
Cavalry Corps made a surprisingly deep penetration with its 3rd Cavalry Division
overcoming several defensive lines. These gains were assisted by the success of a
night attack by the 1st SS Panzer Division. By the end of March 9, Dietrich had two
corps through the Soviets’ primary defensive line. But the localized success had a
drawback. The III Panzer Corps also enjoyed considerable success as its units
advanced along the southern shore of Lake Valence before being stopped by Soviet
forces at Gardony. With his infantry suffering heavy attrition, Bittrich became
deeply concerned over the losses suffered by his troops from combat and exposure to
the elements. The 9th Panzer Division had lost more than a third of its strength by
that point in the offensive. Tolbukhin also became increasingly worried about the
losses his units were incurring. The tempo of battle on March 9 compelled him to
commit all of his reserves, except for a few small units. He informed Stavka that
the situation was critical, and he asked if they would release to him the 9th
Guards Army. His superiors flatly refused the request. They instructed him to make
do with the forces at hand. As a result, Tolbukhin began to alter areas of
responsibility along the front. He reduced the length of front for which the 26th
Army was responsible. The result was that the 27th Army had to take up the slack.
Its commander was startled to find that he was suddenly responsible for a critical
portion of the front line. Tolbukhin also shifted units from the 4th Guards Army in
the second echelon and placed them directly in the path of Dietrich’s advancing
Sixth Panzer Army in an effort to slow the enemy’s momentum. Frontline troops on
both sides shivered in their positions on March 10 as the skies opened up and snow
and freezing rain fell in western Hungary. This exacerbated the already poor road
conditions. Nevertheless, the Second Panzer Army south of Lake Balaton experienced
considerable success when the 16th SS Panzergrenadier Division exploited the seam
between the Soviet 57th Army and the First Bulgarian Army. The panzergrenadiers
advanced five kilometers, reaching the village of Kisbajom. Meanwhile, the 25th
Hungarian Infantry Division entered battle in the I Cavalry Corps’ sector. After a
full day of savage house-to-house fighting, the understrength Hungarians captured
the high ground around Enying. The 3rd Cavalry Division and the 1st SS Panzer
Division reached the Sio Canal and secured sections of its bank in preparation for
a crossing. Elsewhere, the 12th SS Panzer, 2nd SS Panzer, and 44th Grenadier
Divisions all made gains. In the Sixth Army’s sector, the 3rd Panzer Division
surprised a pair of Soviet divisions by attacking amid a heavy falling snow. The
panzer troops fought their way into the enemy’s second echelon of defense near
Seregelyes. Its fellow division, the 1st Panzer, captured several villages. The
pressure of battle compelled some of the German commanders to point fingers of
blame at each other. Balck was accused of having misinformed Guderian about the
status of the IV SS Panzer Corps. Balck reported that the corps had enough reserves
to deal with a Russian counterattack when it no longer had such capability. As for
Tolbukhin, he shifted units from relatively secure areas to critical ones to limit
the enemy’s gains. The weather improved on March 11, which enabled both Luftwaffe
and Red Army ground attack aircraft to fly multiple sorties. With the support of
their aircraft, Soviet troops were able to push back elements of the 16th SS
Panzergrenadier Division around Kisbajom. The Second Panzer Army requested a change
in the direction of its attack, but this was rejected by Wohler. Instead, Wohler
ordered the Second Panzer Army to renew its attack within the next 48 hours to keep
Tolbukhin off balance and take the pressure off the Sixth Panzer Army. The
Hungarians continued to advance along Lake Balaton, but they ground to a halt at
Siofork. The German divisions that reached the Sio Canal spent the day securing its
north bank and continued to search for crossing locations. While forward elements
of the 12th SS Panzer Division were able to locate an intact bridge over the Sio,
they were unable to exploit their discovery because it was blocked by burning
vehicles. The 23rd Panzer Division attacked Sar Egres, but it could not control the
village. Despite the good weather of March 11, Dietrich sent a direct request to
Hitler asking him to temporarily halt the offensive due to the rain and mud. Not
surprisingly, Hitler rejected the request. Elements of the II SS Panzer Corps and
the III Panzer Corps nevertheless managed to drive four kilometers into the Soviet
27th Army in some places. The German armies involved in the offensive faced a
determined, veteran commander. As Dietrich’s and Balck’s panzer divisions sought
desperately to punch through the Soviet defenses, Tolbukhin masterfully shifted his
resources in ways that prevented a decisive breakthrough. The Soviets’ defenses
forced the Germans to make tactical adjustments. To catch the Red Army units by
surprise, the Germans refrained from conducting preliminary artillery barrages
before making an assault. On the seventh day of the offensive, Army Group E ran out
of steam. From that point forward its units did nothing more than hold their ground
and fix the enemy units arrayed against them so that they could not be shifted to
other sectors. Tolbukhin, who already was deeply concerned over the condition of
the 26th Army, watched in dismay as the German 4th Cavalry Division and 1st SS
Panzer Division established bridgeheads across the Sio. These bridgeheads were
approximately three kilometers deep and three kilometers wide. In addition,
elements of the 1st SS Panzer Division entered Simontornya. On the opposite bank of
the Sarviz Canal, most of the units of the II SS Panzer Corps could make no
progress, although the redoubtable soldiers of the 44th Grenadier Division cleared
the village of Aba. To the north, the three panzer divisions of the III Panzer
Corps advanced two kilometers mainly because they benefited from the support of a
heavy panzer battalion that used its King Tigers to blast Soviet positions. Despite
the impressive gains made by the German forces that secured the Sio Canal
bridgeheads, the soldiers of the 3rd Ukrainian Front had succeeded in preventing a
breakthrough. March 13 marked a week since the Germans launched what was to be
their final offensive. The weather improved, and the roads began to dry out.
Despite this, the Germans were unable to make any significant progress. There were
two noteworthy exceptions. First, the 23rd Panzer Division captured Sar Egres.
Second, the 1st SS Panzer Division occupied Simontornya. A change occurred in the
nature of the fighting when the Soviet forces, which up to that point in the German
offensive had only used self-propelled guns, introduced tanks to the battle. The
Soviets continued to hold their defensive lines, though Tolbukhin withdrew one
division that had the potential to be encircled. The IV SS Panzer Corps reported
increased enemy troop movement. If the enemy counterattacked, Dietrich believed his
veterans would have sufficient time to establish strong defensive positions. German
intelligence at the army and army group levels misinterpreted this activity in the
2nd Ukrainian Front as local reinforcement movement and not as preparation for a
major offensive. Stavka transferred Maj. Gen. A.G. Kravchenko’s crack 6th Guards
Tank Army, which had approximately 500 tanks, and the 9th Guards Army from their
positions near Budapest to the rear of the 4th Guards Army. The Germans did not
detect the arrival
of Kravchenko’s armored units. On March 14, the German panzer forces were able to
maneuver better than in previous days due to the arrival of better weather. But by
that time, the panzer force divisions participating in the offensive had shrunk to
50 percent strength. With the sun peeking out from behind the clouds, the 16th SS
Panzergrenadier Division received orders to spearhead an attack that day, which
only made limited progress in the face of heavy artillery fire from the Soviet 57th
Army. Dietrich watched helplessly as his cavalry divisions lost all offensive
capability. Although his panzer divisions were still able to make small gains
against the enemy, it became increasingly apparent that there would be no armored
break- through. Bittich’s II SS Panzer Corps held its ground in bitter fighting
near Sarkeresztur. At that point Dietrich was greatly concerned about his flanks,
which were vulnerable to enemy counterattack. Reports flooded into his headquarters
about increased Soviet vehicle activity, particularly in the passes of the Vertes
Mountains northwest of Lake Velencze. Balck responded by frantically organizing
every possible reserve unit to bolster the German and Hungarian forces in his
sector of the battlefront. He reluctantly committed his last reserve, the 6th
Panzer Division, to the battle. After making some initial headway, its attack was
easily contained by the reinforced Soviet XVIII Tank Corps. Even the most
optimistic of the German commanders realized by that time that the offensive had
ground to a halt. Although they also were exhausted, the Russians sensed that they
had won the battle. At that point, the armies of the 3rd Ukrainian Front began
making preparations to resume offensive operations. Tolbukhin’s subordinate
commanders ordered their units to move into the staging areas for the drive on
Vienna. The good weather held on March 15. The Second Panzer Army resumed its
advance. To the north the Sixth Panzer Army and the III Panzer Corps of the Sixth
Army tried to gain new ground on their respective fronts, but they had nothing
appreciable to show for the blood spilled that day. The II SS Panzer Corps remained
on the defensive. The only positive developments for the Germans were that the 1st
SS Panzer Division slightly expanded its bridgehead and the 44th Grenadier Division
erected a pair of pontoon bridges capable of handling tanks. Hitler and his
advisers debated the merits of reorganizing their forces for a new direction of
attack. Unwilling to abandon his objectives, Hitler allowed the reorganization to
proceed after an entire day was squandered in the debate. The upshot was that the
lengthy delay put some of the units of the I SS Panzer Corps in greater danger from
the looming Soviet assault than they would have been if they had received
permission to adjust their positions. March 16 dawned much like the previous 10
days. Heavy fighting occurred the length of the battlefront. Taking advantage of
the good weather, the Soviet Air Force stepped up its operations flying numerous
sorties against the Sixth Panzer Army and Sixth Army. On the southern end of the
battlefront, the Russians attacked Army Group E’s bridgeheads. As for the Second
Panzer Army, it only made negligible gains. Elsewhere, the I Cavalry Corps and II
SS Panzer Corps remained on the defensive. The momentum had shifted by that point,
and even the best plans for reorganization were nullified by the Red Army’s
resumption of offensive operations. Both Ukrainian Fronts attacked in force on
March 16. The 4th Guards Army and the 9th Guards Army, with the 6th Guards Tank
Army and 46th Army following in reserve, struck the left flank of Balck’s Sixth
Army northwest of Lake Velencze. The Soviets targeted the Hungarian divisions,
which were the weakest of the enemy’s units. In heavy fighting on the second day of
the offensive, the Soviet 46th Army overran the 1st Hungarian Cavalry Division.
Wohler responded by cancelling all offensive operations. The Germans had completely
abandoned the Drava bridgeheads by March 20. The panzer troops fought tenaciously
against the advancing Russians to protect a narrow escape corridor and avoid being
surrounded and cut off. The fighting grew in intensity in the following days, and
during that time the German retreat corridor narrowed to no more than two miles in
width. Speed was of the essence, and the retreating German units abandoned their
equipment and supplies as necessary to ensure their escape. Some of the SS panzer
divisions fell back without orders. Hitler threw a tantrum. He immediately
dispatched a representative to Hungary to summarily strip the SS troops of their
armbands, which had been bestowed upon them to signify that they were elite troops
of the Third Reich. As the Germans withdrew, low-flying Russian Ilyushin Il-2
Sturmovik ground attack planes pounded their columns from above and Russian tanks
and tank destroyers pursued them on the ground. Dietrich’s and Balck’s panzer
divisions fell back as quickly as possible given the conditions. Elements of
Dietrich’s 6th SS Panzer Army fought for a short time on the outskirts of Vienna,
but the weight of the Russian attack forced them to retreat to avoid being
encircled. On April 2, the Soviet 57th Army and 1st Bulgarian Army captured the
Nagykaniscza oilfields. The Germans suffered 14,800 casualties compared to 33,000
Russian casualties. Malinovsky captured Bratislava on April 4, and Tolbukhin
secured Vienna on April 13 after an 11-day battle. In the final analysis, Hitler
would have done well to heed Guderian’s advice to commit the Sixth Panzer Army to
the defense of the Oder line to slow the Russian advance on Berlin. Georg Maier,
deputy chief of staff for operations for the Sixth Panzer Army, offered a fitting
summation of the failed offensive. “Time, pressure, poor weather, extremely
difficult terrain conditions, [and] Hitler’s impatience joined forces with the
well-prepared enemy defense to form a combined front,” he wrote. This article by
John E. Spindler originally appeared on Warfare History Network. This piece was
originally featured in May 2018 and is being republished due to reader's interest.
Image: Wikimedia Click here to read the full article.

German Spies Stole the Design For This Monster Tank From Britain

Key Point: These tanks never served during World War II, but Germany carried the
experience with it into the war. During the interwar years, multi-turreted tanks
were all the rage. Post-war, the British developed the A1E1 dual-turreted tank,
which formed the basis for a number of other inter-war multi-turreted tank designs—
including one secretly developed in the Soviet Union based on a stolen British
design. After the armistice ending World War One, Germany was forbidden from
building or developing tanks, so their heavy tank development project was conducted
in secret, codenamed Großtraktor, or Heavy Tractor, to disguise the project’s true
purpose. The German design was helped by British A1E1 plans that were acquired via
spy, an officer in the British Army and Nazi sympathizer. Since Germany was barred
from tank development, they had to conduct training outside of Germany, and set up
a clandestine tank training camp near Kazan, in the Soviet Union. Many of the
tankers that trained there went on and became influential in Germany’s tank corps
during the Second World War. Heavy and Slow These heavy tanks were quite large for
their time. Though they weighed nearly 25 tons, their armor protection was not
spectacular, just half an inch to three quarters of an inch thick. This modest
protection package was quite poor, and would not have offered the crew much
protection. Despite the abysmal armoring the tank actually had a respectable amount
of firepower for its time, and came equipped with a whopping three turrets that had
four guns. The main turret was armed with a 75 millimeter gun that could fire a
high-explosive shell, and had a secondary 37 millimeter gun that could shoot armor
piercing and high explosive rounds. The secondary gun was fitted either next to the
main gun, or above it. The guns could not aim independently. The tank also had two
identical turrets at front and rear that were essentially modified Panzer I
turrets. These turrets were armed with a general purpose MG 34 machine gun. The
front turret was below the main turret, while the rear turret was on the tank’s
back left corner. Because of the tank’s large internal volume, the crew was six in
total, presumably a commander, driver, three gunners, and a loader. Still, the
tanks were quite slow, and could barely make 15 miles per hour on paved roads,
while cross-country performance was even worse. Range was very limited, just 75
miles or so. Into the Fray These three-turreted tanks were more useful as
propaganda than in actual combat, though three were deployed during the German
invasion of Norway. On the way to combat, two of the heavy tanks experienced
mechanical problems, preventing them from fighting. The one tank that did make it
to the front didn’t do well. Using anti-tank rifles, the defenders were able to
score a number of hits on the tank, killing one tanker. The tank beat a hasty
retreat and was combat ineffective. Though these tanks were not useful in actual
combat, they allowed the German army to secretly gain experience in tanking—a skill
that would prove to be extremely valuable during the Second World War. Caleb Larson
holds a Master of Public Policy degree from the Willy Brandt School of Public
Policy. He lives in Berlin and writes on U.S. and Russian foreign and defense
policy, German politics, and culture. This first appeared in May 2020.
Image: Soviet Multi-Turreted Heavy Tank T-35. Kubunka Tank Museum, Russia.
Flickr/Andrey Korchagin. Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0
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