151-A Phil.

783

[ G.R. No. L-26356, June 27, 1973 ]

CARLOS SALIWAN AND IGMIDIO SALIWAN, PLAINTIFFS-

APPELLEES, VS. ANTONIO AMORES (CALIWAN) AND FRANCISCA
CALIWAN, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
DECISION

TEEHANKEE, J.:
In this appeal on purely questions of law, the Court sustains the appeal and reverses the
adverse decision of the Samar court of first instance ordering defendants-appellants to deliver
possession of the lands in question to plaintiffs-appellees, notwithstanding its findings that
"plaintiffs' possession is unlawful" and that defendants are the children of the acknowledged
original owner of the lands, Monico Amores, whose rights and ownership were transmitted
upon his death to defendants as his sole and rightful heirs.
The case originated as a forcible entry case filed on 10 April 1962 by plaintiffs, "in concept
of owners," in the municipal court of Giporlos, Samar for the recovery of three parcels of
agricultural land from defendants, who allegedly entered the same "by means of force,
intimidation, strategy and stealth" and ejected the tenants and encargado therefrom in
October, 1961 and for payment of "reasonable rental" of P150.00 per month.
At the trial in the municipal court, evidence in support of the parties' conflicting claims of
ownership of the lands was received. Plaintiffs are the nephews of Monico Amores,
acknowledged owner of the lands and claim to have taken possession thereof with Monico's
other brothers and nephews after Monico's death in 1945 as Monico died allegedly "without
issue." The municipal court's decision states that "(O)n the other hand, defendants by their
evidence have shown that they are the only heirs of Monico Amores who married Valeriana
Daep" and that in compliance with Monico's express instructions to the encargado, the latter
delivered in 1960 possession of the lands to them upon their request.
Ruling, however, that "by preponderance of evidence, . . . prior physical possession of the 3
parcels of land . . . is heavily in favor of the plaintiffs," the municipal court rendered
judgment on 31 October 1964 in favor of plaintiffs "condemning defendants to vacate and
restore possession of the 3 parcels of land to plaintiffs" without damages or rentals for the use
of the property.[1]
Defendants appealed in due course to the Samar court of first instance which conducted a
pre-trial conference and trial de novo. The lower court's decision expressly recites that at the
pre-trial the issues of defendants' filiation and ownership (as children of Monico and
therefore his sole heirs) and of prior physical possession of the lands, were joined by the
parties, as follows:
"In the pre-trial conference the parties agreed
"(1) to the identity of the three parcels described in the complaint;
"(2) that said parcels were originally owned by Monico Amores, and
"(3) that, according to the defendants, Antonio Amores and Francisca Caliwan are brother
and sister, children of Monico Amores and Valeriana Daep; but the plaintiffs contend that
Monico Amores had no issue and that his wife was Valentina Dogorio.
The primary issues therefore funnel down to the following questions: (1) whether or not the
defendants are children of Monico Amores and (2) if they are, whether as such they have
been in physical possession of the land in question prior to the month of October, 1961."[2]
On the first issue of filiation of defendants-appellants, the lower court, after reciting the
evidence, oral and documentary, determined that they were the children of Monico Amores
born of his second marriage to Valeriana Daep and expressly found and so held "that the
defendants' father was Monico Amores" and not of a certain Tomas Caliwan who was
claimed to be their father.
On the second issue of prior possession of the lands, the lower court thus recited the evidence
of the parties:
"According to the evidence for the plaintiffs, after the death of Monico, his brothers and
sisters, named Crispulo, Manuela, Gregorio, Tornan, Emerrenciana and Roman (the last is
now in the United States) succeeded him in the ownership and possession of the lands. They
designated Saturnino Llevado and Placido Cabling as tenants under the administration of
Vicente Padul. They possessed the land from 1946 to 1961, when the defendants ousted
them.
"These parcels were declared for taxation purposes in the name of Monico Amores under Tax
Dec. 17568 corresponding to the property in Lologayan, Paya (Exh. B), Tax Dec. No. 389 in
Bugho, Paya under the name of Monico Amores and Valentina Dogorio; and Tax Dec. No.
390, in Pili, Paya, under the names of Monico Amores and Valentina Dogorio. According to
the two last tax declarations, which were issued after the death of Monico, the administrators
of the property were respectively Gregorio Amores and Marcelo Llevado. The taxes were
paid by Gregorio Amores (1945-47; 1949-1957; 1952-1953; 1955-1956; 1957-1961). Felix
Dogorio (1948) and Elpidio Amores (1952-56; 1957). Gregorio Amores was a brother of
Monico; Felix Dogorio was a nephew of Velentina Dogorio and Elpidio Amores was the son
of Gregorio.
"According to the evidence for the defendants, even during the lifetime of Monico, he had
tenants in his three parcels of land. Marcelo Llevado was his tenant in Pili and Bugho, and
Placido Cabling, in Lologayan. They were designated tenants by Monico himself. Llevado
testified that when Monico Amores left with his second wife to Tubabao, said tenants, who
were residents of Paya, took care in the clearing and harvesting of the lands. After their death,
Crispulo Amores, a brother of Monico with whom the children lived in Tubabao, received the
shares of the land owner. This arrangement continued until the children had become of age
when they took over the possession of the lands. That was in June, 1960."[3]
The lower court, having found defendants-appellants to be Monico's children then concluded
that "all the rights of Monico over the lands were transmitted to them upon his death"
together with the right of possession, under Article 533 of the Civil Code. Without any
finding that defendants, whom the lower court recognized as the lawful owners of the lands
by succession from their father, had actually used force to secure physical possession of the
lands from the encargado and although declaring that "plaintiffs' possession is unlawful," the
lower court rendered judgment "declaring the plaintiffs entitled to the possession of the lands
in question and ordering the defendants to vacate the same" for the avowed purpose of
restoring the status quo, (but without any award, like the municipal court, for damages or
rentals for the use of the property), as follows:
"x x x         x x x         x x x
In view of the findings reached by the Court that the defendants Francisca Amores and
Antonio Amores are the children of Monico Amores, it may be concluded that all the rights
of Monico over the lands were transmitted to them upon his death. And with reference to
possession, Article 533 of the Civil Code provides that
'The possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption
and from the moment of the death of the decedent in case the inheritance is accepted.'
When Monico died, Francisca who is the older of the defendants, was only six years old.
Minors, however, may acquire possession of things. According to Article 335 of the same
Code:
'Minors and incapacitated persons may acquire the possession of things; but they need the
assistance of their legal representatives in order to exercise the rights from which the
possession arise in their favor.'
No such legal representative was designated. Instead, the brothers and sisters of Monico took
possession of the lands as shown by their payment of the land taxes and by their securing of a
tax declaration with one of them named as administrator (Exhs. F, F-1 to F-10; F-11 to F-12;
F-13 to F-16; F-17, F-18 to F-20) and divided the income among themselves.
"The plaintiffs' possession is unlawful but they cannot be turned out of possession by the
defendants by taking the law into their own hands. The plaintiffs cannot be deprived of their
possession by force. The defendants should have resorted to the remedy provided by law and
sought the enforcement of their rights through the courts. (Ligaya vs. Hon. Labrador, G.R.
No. 46262, Nov. 29, 1938).
"Under the circumstances, it becomes the duty of the Court to return the parties to their status
quo until one of them brings a case for ownership (Mediran contra Villanueva, 37 Jun. Phil.
788)."[4]
If the case at bar were strictly a forcible entry case involving solely the issue of possession de
facto as against possession de jure, the lower court's judgment could probably be sustained in
line with the cases cited by the late Chief Justice Moran, holding that "(I)f plaintiff can prove
a prior possession in himself, he may recover such possession even from the owner himself.
Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority of time,
he has the security that entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a
person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria" since one
cannot take justice unto his own hands and by force take his property from the person holding
it.[5]
The lower court failed to appreciate however that even before the municipal court as well as
before it, the issues joined by the parties were those of possession de jure and of lawful title
and ownership of the lands in question.
Hence, both in the municipal and lower courts, plaintiffs presented evidence to support their
claim that Monico Amores died without issue and that they with other brothers and nephews
of Monico therefore "succeeded him in the ownership and possession of the lands" - in the
words of the lower court's decision. [6] Defendants in turn presented documentary evidence
including the register of marriages of Balangiga, recording the marriage of Monico Amores
with "Val . . . 'aip" (Valeriana Daip) and the baptismal certificate of defendant Antonio
Amores, recording his baptism on 2 March 1941 as the legitimate son of said couple (with
plaintiffs presenting documentary counter-evidence) - on the basis of which the lower court
found and held "that the defendants' father was Monico Amores."
In other words, the case below ceased to be a simple one of forcible entry but clearly and by
common assent and understanding of the parties one for judicial determination of who, as
between them, are entitled to the possession de jure and ownership of the lands. Hence, the
primary issue joined between them as to the filiation of defendants - in the lower court's
language: "whether or not the defendants are children of Monico Amores." [7] Plaintiffs
disputed strongly such claim of defendants as to their filiation, since during Monico's lifetime
they indisputably took charge of the lands on his behalf and apparently continued to do so
after his death on the premise that they succeeded to the possession and ownership thereof as
his collateral heirs — but that if he died with issue (i.e. the defendants) then, necessarily they
would have to recognize that they were in law holding the lands on behalf of defendants as
Monico's children and concede their obligation to turn over the physical possession to them.
We then have at bar a case where in effect by the very issues joined by the parties and by the
very nature of the proof presented by them, the question of physical possession could not
properly be determined without settling that of lawful or de jure possession and of ownership
— and hence the jurisdiction of the municipal court over the forcible entry case was lost and
the action should have been dismissed. Similarly, the lower court had no jurisdiction over the
case on appeal and could have dismissed the case as appealed from the municipal court.
But in line with Rule 40, Section 11,[8] since the parties not only did not object to, but in effect
invoked, the original jurisdiction of the lower court and submitted as a primary issue the
question of defendants' filiation and their evidence thereon, the lower court tried the case on
the merits and rendered judgment accordingly, holding defendants to be the children of
Monico and plaintiffs' prior possession of the lands (to whose ownership defendants
succeeded in law as Monico's only children and forced heirs) as unlawful - since obviously
plaintiffs' claim that they succeeded Monico in such ownership and possession of the lands as
his collateral heirs lost all basis in the face of its findings that defendants were Monico's
children and direct heirs.
Such judgment of the lower court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction is now the subject
of this appeal by defendants on pure questions of law on the facts as determined by the lower
court after due trial. Plaintiffs did not appeal from the judgment and are bound by such facts
as found by the lower court as to defendants' filiation and plaintiffs' "unlawful possession."
On the facts as found and on the issues as raised and tried, there is no question that the
complaint for forcible entry in the municipal court should have been ordered dismissed, since
the question of ownership was so necessarily involved that it became impossible to decide the
question of bare possession without first settling that of ownership and the municipal court
thereby lost its jurisdiction over the case.[9] For if defendants proved to be the children of
Monico, as eventually found by the lower court, then plaintiffs could not claim prior
possession, since they claimed to step into Monico's shoes as possessors after his death, by
alleged right of succession as his collateral relatives.
But defendants-appellants' submittal that the case at bar should be dismissed on the said
ground of lack of appellate jurisdiction on the part of the lower court flowing from the
municipal court's loss of jurisdiction would lead only to "needless delay and multiplicity of
suits in the attainment of the same result" [10] and ignores, as above stated, that the case was
tried and heard by the lower court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction by common
assent of the parties by virtue of the issues raised by the parties and the proof presented by
them thereon. In analogous cases, where the parties had commenced to present their evidence
on the issue of title, the Court in setting aside an order of the court of first instance upholding
the jurisdiction of the municipal court to try the case on the merits, ordered that the case be
"ordered returned to the court of first instance . . . for that court to proceed with the trial in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction."[11]
On the basis of the undisputed facts, wherein the lower court found that all the rights of
Monico Amores over the lands were transmitted upon his death to defendants as his children
and that plaintiffs' prior possession was unlawful, the lower court erred in declaring plaintiffs
entitled to possession of the lands and in ordering defendants to vacate the same.
The issues of possession de jure and ownership were squarely submitted to the lower court.
Having resolved then in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs, who did not appeal and
who filed no brief to dispute in any manner such findings, the lower court manifestly erred in
not dismissing the case instead of ordering defendants to vacate the lands "until one of (the
parties) brings a case for ownership" as if the case before it were still a forcible entry case -
when in fact it had found defendants to be the lawful owners by hereditary succession of the
lands and entitled to their de jure possession.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed and set aside, and in
lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and declaring defendants-
appellants as children of Monico Amores and owners of the lands in question by right of
succession, duly entitled to the possession thereof. No costs.
Makalintal, Acting C.J., Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, and Esguerra,
JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., did not take part.

[1] Record, pp. 34-38.

[2] Record, pp. 39-40; italics supplied.
[3] Record, pp. 42-43.
[4] Record, pp. 43-44.
[5] 3 Moran's Comments on Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. p. 304, and cases cited.
[6] Record, p. 42.
[7] Idem., p. 40.
[8]"SEC. 11. Lack of Jurisdiction. - A case tried by an inferior court without jurisdiction over
the subject matter shall be dismissed on appeal by the Court of First Instance. But instead of
dismissing the case, the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may
try the case on the merits if the parties therein file their pleadings and go to the trial without
any objection to such jurisdiction." (Rule 40).
[9] Cf. 3 Moran's Comments, 1970 Ed. p. 309 and cases cited.
[10] Galutera vs. Maersk Line, 11 SCRA 251, 255 (1964).
[11]Teodoro vs. Balatbat, 94 Phil. 247, 250 (1954), italics supplied. See also Castro vs. de los
Reyes, 109 Phil. 64 (1960).
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