Republic of the Philippines 7.

I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN,

SUPREME COURT now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and
Manila who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is
not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted
EN BANC by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit,
Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be
G.R. No. L-16749             January 31, 1963
deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the
Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.  month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees, 
vs.
xxx     xxx     xxx
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved

M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest,
LABRADOR, J.: remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal
and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may
Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her
court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts lifetime: ....
of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen
the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his
and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to
to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be
of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E.
Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen
the following provisions:
Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY 11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of
No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one
of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should
descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law
CHRISTENSEN DANEY. of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign
elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case
xxx     xxx     xxx were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which
requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable.
It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an
acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE
legitimate from the time of her birth. OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO
THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the
United States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the V
successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be
governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO
absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman,
117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United
Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also
reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.  no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines,
as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's
The most important assignments of error are as follows: brief:

I In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of

record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901,
NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of
CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California,
INHERITANCE.  U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.

II In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States

and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913, during which
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento,
TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS California.
AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL
LAW. Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the
year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for
III the United States and came back here the following year, 1929.
Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country,
and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI
DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case
THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES. not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

IV Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the

Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II.
Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but
returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective
Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and
 "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical
July 21, 1953.) presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an
inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."
California shortly after the making of his last will and testament (now Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning,
in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode,
Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one.
City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3) (Goodrich, p. 29)

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in
Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to
the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have law of the country where it is situated.
owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate
that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect
of California. to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
from mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode. under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere regardless of the country where said property may be found.
physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in the meaning of the term "national law"is used therein.
California when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was
never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary
United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its own private
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The
executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not,
that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can
by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following refer to no other than the private law of the State of California. 
principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean of personal property? The decision of the court below, sustains the
the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a
been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he
domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P.
a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code
between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, of California, which is as follows:
while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his
presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal
have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner,
clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only and is governed by the law of his domicile.
for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home,"
he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the
denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been
Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts,
testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman.
argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with
of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted
abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the the renvoi. 
testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the
State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where
hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of
therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the
of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is
of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines. applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the
internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs,
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus: will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the
domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is
the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France,
i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?" leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France.
The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose among X's next of kin.
to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of
Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There
having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables
looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile.
been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing
"endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized be for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute
legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and
to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law,
back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the original however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the
Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go- distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the
round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things
this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action:
at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal resolve itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts
law as the rule of reference. statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French
court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the latter course, thus applying its own law.
the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of
their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the
way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-
dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law
litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term
both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will
 for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, (2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the
Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.) court shall respect:

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be (a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right
resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question may to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute,
arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by
foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where
has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the act in question occurred.
the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and
the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as (b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law,
the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a
postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto question to the same system of law.
would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be
decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.) xxx     xxx     xxx

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the
advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium
forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire
the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon
of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the
of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of
The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the nationality — that is the English law — he must accept this reference
American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)  back to his own law.

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule,
its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced
the article are quoted herein below:  jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In
re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the
the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in
country' means the whole of its law. most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

xxx     xxx     xxx When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states,
and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the property,
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death
International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as
theses: completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the
devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the
application of foreign laws. same rules should determine the validity of an attempted
testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the
 domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the
The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict parent recognizing them.
of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition
as in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs.
the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The general Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton
principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.)
domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case
application. It had its origin in that international comity which was one at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not
of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the
intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state
notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of
is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, the California Civil Code.
pp. 442-443.)
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will
pointed out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed
explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other California, not by the internal law of California..
jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal
law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case
rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the
California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs
Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the against appellees.
express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law
for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said
Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited
above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on
conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes
the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile.
The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers
back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of
his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can
not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave
the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a
football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country
of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule
of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as
the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for
children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the