A.C. No.

6486             September 22, 2004

EMMA T. DANTES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CRISPIN G. DANTES, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Despite variations in the specific standards and provisions, one requirement remains constant in all
the jurisdictions where the practice of law is regulated: the candidate must demonstrate that he or she
has "good moral character," and once he becomes a lawyer he should always behave in accordance
with the standard. In this jurisdiction too, good moral character is not only a condition precedent1 to
the practice of law, but an unending requirement for all the members of the bar. Hence, when a
lawyer is found guilty of grossly immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.2

In an Affidavit-Complaint3 dated June 6, 2001, filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Emma T. Dantes, sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Crispin G. Dantes on the ground of
immorality, abandonment, and violation of professional ethics and law. The case was docketed as
CBD Case No. 01-851.

Complainant alleged that respondent is a philanderer. Respondent purportedly engaged in illicit

relationships with two women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children with them. From the
time respondent’s illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular support to complainant and their
children, thus forcing complainant to work abroad to provide for their children’s needs. Complainant
pointed out that these acts of respondent constitute a violation of his lawyer’s oath and his moral and
legal obligation to be a role model to the community.

On July 4, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued an Order4 requiring respondent to
submit his answer to the Affidavit-Complaint.

Respondent submitted his Answer5 on November 19, 2001. Though admitting the fact of marriage
with the complainant and the birth of their children, respondent alleged that they have mutually
agreed to separate eighteen (18) years before after complainant had abandoned him in their
Balintawak residence and fled to San Fernando, Pampanga. Respondent claimed that when
complainant returned after eighteen years, she insisted that she be accommodated in the place
where he and their children were residing. Thus, he was forced to live alone in a rented apartment.

Respondent further alleged that he sent their children to the best school he could afford and provided
for their needs. He even bought two lots in Pampanga for his sons, Dandelo and Dante, and gave
complainant adequate financial support even after she had abandoned him in 1983.

Respondent asserted that complainant filed this case in order to force him to remit seventy percent
(70%) of his monthly salary to her.

Subsequently, the IBP conducted its investigation and hearings on the complaint. Complainant
presented her evidence, both oral and documentary,6 to support the allegations in her Affidavit-
Complaint.

From the evidence presented by the complainant, it was established that on January 19, 1979,
complainant and respondent were married7 and lived with the latter’s mother in Balintawak. At that
time, respondent was just a fourth year law student. To make ends meet, complainant engaged in the
buy and sell business and relied on dole-outs from the respondent’s mother.

Three children were born to the couple, namely, Dandelo, Dante and Daisy, who were born on
February 20, 1980,8 October 14, 19819 and August 11, 1983,10 respectively. Complainant narrated
that their relationship was marred by frequent quarrels because of respondent’s extra-marital
affairs.11 Sometime in 1983, she brought their children to her mother in Pampanga to enable her to
work because respondent had failed to provide adequate support. From 1986 to 2001, complainant
worked abroad as a domestic helper.
Denying that there was a mutual agreement between her and respondent to live separately,
complainant asseverated that she was just compelled to work abroad to support their children. When
she returned to the Philippines, she learned that respondent was living with another woman.
Respondent, then bluntly told her, that he did not want to live with her anymore and that he preferred
his mistresses.

Complainant presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates of Ray Darwin,
Darling, and Christian Dave,12 all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of respondent and his
paramour13 to prove the fact that respondent sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit affairs with
two different women. Letters of complainant’s legitimate children likewise support the allegation that
respondent is a womanizer.14

In an Order dated April 17, 2002, respondent was deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine
complainant, after he failed to appear during the scheduled hearings despite due notice. He,
however, submitted his Comment/Opposition to the Complainant’s Formal Offer of Evidence with
Motion to Exclude the Evidence from the Records of the Proceedings15 on August 1, 2002.

Subsequently, on May 29, 2003, respondent submitted a Motion to Adopt Alternative Dispute
Resolution Mechanism. Respondent’s motion was denied because it was filed after the complainant
had already presented her evidence.16 Respondent was given a final chance to present his evidence
on July 11, 2003. Instead of presenting evidence, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion to Dismiss, which was likewise denied for being a prohibited pleading under the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent submitted his Position Paper on August
4, 2003.

In respondent’s Position Paper,17 he reiterated the allegations in his Answer except that this time, he

argued that in view of the resolution of the complaint for support with alimony pendente lite18 filed
against him by the complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,19 the instant
administrative case should be dismissed for lack of merit.

On July 7, 2004, the IBP submitted to us through the Office of the Bar Confidant
its Report20 and Resolution No. XVI-2004-230 involving CBD Case No. 01-851.21 The IBP
recommended that the respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.

Except for the penalty, we find the above recommendation well-taken.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

"Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

"Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar."

"Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession."

The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community.22 To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyer’s conduct must not only be immoral,
but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as
to be reprehensible to a high degree23 or committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.24

In Barrientos vs. Daarol,25 we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the
Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping
mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief
that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession
and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles
but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral
character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of
legal learning.

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has three ostensible purposes,
namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect
prospective clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from themselves.26

Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also
throughout their legal

career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.27 They may
be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.28

Undoubtedly, respondent’s acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the
subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the
imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainant’s testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary
evidence, sufficiently established respondent’s commission of marital infidelity and immorality.
Evidently, respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the
law profession. He has made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity.29

In Toledo vs. Toledo,30 we disbarred respondent for abandoning his lawful wife and cohabiting with
another woman who had borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan,31 we ruled that
abandoning one’s wife and resuming carnal relations with a paramour fall within that conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community.

We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova,32 that moral delinquency which affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such, includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community as exemplified by behavior which makes a mockery of the inviolable
social institution of marriage.

The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member
of the bar.33 Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should never be decreed.34 However, in the present case, the seriousness of the
offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it appears to be the most appropriate
penalty.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing Atty. Crispin G. Dantes is hereby DISBARRED and his name
is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the
respondent’s record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar
of the

Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
B.M. No. 2112               July 24, 2012

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES,

EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United
States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if
granted, to resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in support of
his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:

1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco;

2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;

3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;

4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;

5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar petition
filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice of law after
availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In
December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments and eventually
became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to resume his
practice of law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a
continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioner’s
membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225,
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking
the oath of allegiance to the Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another
country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member
of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not
automatic.2 R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the
Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.3

It can not be overstressed that:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.1âwphi1 It is so delicately affected with
public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful
observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the
conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and
confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege.4

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC
required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following documents
in relation to his petition:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;

6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;

7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of

Immigration, in lieu of the IC;

5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good moral
character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;

6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;

7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and

8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-

MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all
the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended
that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.

Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to the
petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the

condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the
payment of appropriate fees.

Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for the re-
acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and Bar.
G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA &

VICTORIANO TENAZAS petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN
MUNING respondents.

Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.

Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue presented in
this petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8
December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting
respondent Quintin Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the said case.

The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs.
Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision,
on 29 March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and
Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates,
counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of
the total backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a
reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation
indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the
same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of
the backwages. Munings petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not
a lawyer.

The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates
through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in
behalf of the complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin
Muning.

On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation
for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:

Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%

Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10%

Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%

The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be
voided in the present petition.

Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late filing but
his motion was overruled on 20 January 1965.1 He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that
the motion contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and
considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer to the petitioner for
review.2 The case was considered submitted for decision without respondent's brief.3

Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et
al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968,4 that an agreement providing for
the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees
with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An
award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present
case.
The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —

In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be
required to be represented by legal counsel ...

is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial
Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds that —

it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and cross
examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of
evidence.

thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members
of the bar.

The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on
behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such
representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing —

Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be

entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for
his services, ...

imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's

fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since
respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila
and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly
public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to
those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the
profession, as well as being subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients
and the public.

On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:

But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting persons
not licensed or admitted to the bar from practising law, and under statutes of this kind,
the great weight of authority is to the effect that compensation for legal services cannot
be recovered by one who has not been admitted to practice before the court or in the
jurisdiction the services were rendered. 5

No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law unless he

has been duly admitted to practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the time.6

The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated;7 that acting as an
attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or
both,8 and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in
violation of law;9 and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless
confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition,
aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures. 10

And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-
lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by seeking to
recover as an "agent" and not as an attorney. 11

The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees
should suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of
Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction;
such special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an exception.

The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which
are deductible from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it was the union
PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union
members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the
present petition that was subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas),
their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.

We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees which
are deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor organization is
permitted to institute an action in the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the union was
organized "for the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic well-being"; 13 hence, if an
award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party,
under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides:

Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any order
of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,

since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of
litigations.

Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court
of Industrial Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their
appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious
situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by
positive action to that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo,
it may not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the
persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the
backwages as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other
respects. Costs against respondent Muning.
 [G.R. No. X92-1. July 30, 1979.]

PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP,

SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR,
FLORENTINO P, FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO.
ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES, JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO
H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C.
IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and
ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE

FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J.
ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA. REYES,
JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA,
petitioners.

RESOLUTION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty.
Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty.
Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to
continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed
away. In the Court’s Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered
consolidated.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:chanrob1es virtual 1aw

library

1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a
firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the
Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name,
or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual
property of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or
partnership." 1

2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature

has authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such
firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to
those engaged in the practice of accountancy — a profession requiring the same degree
of trust and confidence in respect of clients as that implicit in the relationship of attorney
and client — to acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates that there is no
fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a
firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm
name has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3

3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the
name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible
by local custom, is not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. . . ." 4

4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their

respective deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general
circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new
letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased partners were connected
with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and international law directories
of the fact of their respective deceased partners’ deaths. 5

5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner’s name in a

professional firm’s name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in
the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily
identifies the individual members of the firm. 7

6. The continued use of a deceased partner’s name in the firm name of law partnerships
has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal
profession of most countries in the world. 8

The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in
1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the Dean case) continued its practice of including in its
firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this
Court advising the firm to desist from including in their firm designation the name of C.
D. Johnston, "who has long been dead."cralaw virtua1aw library

The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964,
entitled Register of Deeds of Manila v. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of
Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the
Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the
name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a
Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising
substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by petitioners, prayed that
the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.

On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce Enrile and
Associates for their continued use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court
found no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required
Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from including in their
firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in view
of the personal and confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client and
the high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be
allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception.
Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from their firm
name."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the
Court.

The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.

A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo,
De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership names of
the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not
include the name of one or more of the partners.

"Those who, not being members of the partnership include their names in the firm
name, shall be subject to the liability of a partner."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must
either be those of living partners and, in the case of non-partners, should be living
persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits
a third person from including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the
liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable
as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers.
Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits all agreement for the
payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or
net, of the fees received from the future business of the deceased lawyer’s clients, both
because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such payments will
not represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient." Accordingly, neither
the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of
their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there can be no
corresponding liability.chanrobles law library : red

Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms
of the names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm
name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the
profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself
starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on
that old firm’s reputation established by deceased partners.

B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by petitioners,
supra, the first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code
entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with the exemption
from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the
deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership which continues the
business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as part
thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to
formal reorganization.

Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to
protect rather than of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose
reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has
been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot
arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9

"As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the succeeding
partners or parties have the right to carry on the business under the old name, in the
absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a commercial partnership is a
partnership asset inseparable from the good will of the firm . . .." (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204,
p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand,

". . . a professional partnership the reputation of which depends on the individual skill of
the members, such as partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good will to be
distributed us a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and
reputation may be, especially where there is no provision in the partnership agreement
relating to good will as an asset. . . ." (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied).

C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by

other professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically
allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy. 10

"A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
association for a particular purpose. . . . It is not a partnership formed for the purpose of
carrying on trade or business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that
"the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper." 12

"The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable to the
practice of law from those pertaining to business is that the law is a ‘profession.’ . . .

"Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the Legal
Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as ‘a
group of men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service,
— no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood.’

x       x       x

"Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business

are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without making much money.

2. A relation as an ‘officer of court’ to the administration of justice involving thorough

sincerity, integrity, and reliability.

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and

unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on
their practice, or dealing directly with their clients." 13

"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a
privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its
possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special
privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16

D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association 17 in support of their petitions.

It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of
a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice
is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no
imposition or deception is practiced through this use.

It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the
continued use of a deceased or former partner’s name in the firm names of law
partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, identify the more active and/or more
senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of
petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their firm names have
evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership changed.

"The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the partners
designated by it is proper only where sustained by local custom and not where by
custom this purports to identify the active members. . . .

"There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to the propriety
of adding the name of a new partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased
partner who was never a partner with the new one." (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp.
207-208) (Emphasis supplied)

The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a
deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal
counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm
title.

E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently avowed the continued use of a
deceased partner’s name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it
is sanctioned by custom.

In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which
petitioners Salazar, Et. Al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court
sustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten
partners of the firm bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by custom
and did not offend any statutory provision or legislative policy and was adopted by
agreement of the parties The Court stated therein:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and offends no
statutory provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of
both the American Bar Association and the New York State Bar Association provides in
part as follows: ‘The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner, when
permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition
or deception is practiced through this use.’ There is no question as to local custom. Many
firms in the city use the names of deceased members with the approval of other
attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The Appellate Division of the First
Department has considered the matter and reached the conclusion that such practice
should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)

x       x       x

"Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in question. The
use of the firm name herein is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the
partners." 18

Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice.
Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly
observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no
judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of
justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other
fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local custom. and of the elements
requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a
matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of
adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social
custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such
statute. Not so with the latter.

Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal
system. 22 When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its
Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased partners in
their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against which no custom or practice to
the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law which
clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any partner. 23 Customs
which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice
and should not be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade."cralaw virtua1aw
library

". . . It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public service.’A

trade’ . . .’aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers
beneficial to mankind.’ If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think of free
competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may seem
to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in order each to acquire as much
of the world’s good as he may within the limits allowed him by law. But the member of a
profession does not regard himself as in competition with his professional brethren. He is
not bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill and
learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be no such thing as a lawyers
or physicians’ strike. The best service of the professional man is often rendered for no
equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in a way
worthy of his profession even if done with no expectation of reward. This spirit of public
service in which the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of
sound administration of justice according to law. The other two elements of a profession,
namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have their justification in that they
secure and maintain that spirit."25cralaw:red

In fine, petitioners’ desire to preserve the identity of their firms in the eyes of the public
must bow to legal and ethical impediments.

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the
names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may,
however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms
indicating the years during which they served as such.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library
 [A.C. NO. 5738 : February 19, 2008]

WILFREDO M. CATU, Complainant, v. ATTY. VICENTE G.

RELLOSA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot1 and the building erected

thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and
brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth
C. Diaz-Catu2 and Antonio Pastor3 of one of the units in the building. The latter
ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was
initiated against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa  of Barangay 723, Zone 79
of the 5th District of Manila4 where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to

conciliation meetings.5 When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate
action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against

Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11.
Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case.
Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint,6 claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a
lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants
despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the
litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong

barangay was to hear complaints referred to the barangay's Lupong
Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio
against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with
utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The
parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina
and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his
legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free
because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the
commission of a patent injustice against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to
thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties
to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of
the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. 7

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he

presided over the conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina
and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he
represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by
Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings
including the answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and
notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition

under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:8

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions

of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and
existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of
any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx       xxx       xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials

and employees during their incumbency shall not:

xxx       xxx       xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by

the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend
to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent's violation of this prohibition constituted

a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS

OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
(emphasis supplied)

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension

from the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the
commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.9 This
was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.10

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as

well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Applies Only to

Former Government Lawyers

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who
has left government service and in connection "with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that
Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
"engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they]
had intervened while in said service."

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the

act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.
Section 90 of RA 7160, Not Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, Governs The
Practice of Profession of Elective Local Government Officials

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during

their incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession
"unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions." This is the general
law which applies to all public officials and employees.

For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 716012 governs:

SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. - (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors
are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation
other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.

(b)  Sanggunian  members may practice their professions, engage in any

occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided,
That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is
the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of

the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation
to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving
the local government unit of which he is an official; and cralawlibrary

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when

the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the
Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours
of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned
do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession

by elective local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the
practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to
Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private
practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus
derogat generalibus.13

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and

barangays are the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice
mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the
municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of
the sangguniang bayan for municipalities and the punong barangay, the
members of the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang
kabataan for barangays.
Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors
are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation
other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is
because they are required to render full time service. They should therefore
devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang

panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in
any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other
words, they may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach
in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and
municipal mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at
least once a week.14 Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice
their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session
hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or
authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors,

mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to
a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any
occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the
members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius.15 Since they are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is
that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason
because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang
barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.16

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his

profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or
authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service
regulations.

A Lawyer In Government Service Who Is Not Prohibited To Practice

Law Must Secure Prior Authority From The Head Of His Department

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his

time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private
practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department
concerned.17 Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private

business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial,
credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission
from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be
absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and
responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to
engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be
fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency
of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which
do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and
public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and
he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an
officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior

written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before
he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed
to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the
laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their
paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To
underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first
canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written
permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting
ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY

AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he

disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible
and improper conduct of a member of the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and
comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity
of the legal profession.19

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an

attorney for violation of the lawyer's oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of
the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of

professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7
and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months
effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of

the word delicadeza.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and
entered into the records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of
the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for
their information and guidance.

[Adm. Case No. 98. July 13, 1953.]

In the matter of Attorney FELIX P. DAVID.

 D. Felix P. David on his own behalf.

The Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. and the Attorney
General, Mr. Esmeraldo Umali on behalf of the government.

SYLLABUS

1. LAWYERS; THE TERM "EXERCISE THE PROFESSION." - To practice the profession of

lawyer is to practice the acts of said profession. Preparing and presenting motions
asking for the execution of a sentence, the demolition of the houses of the defendants in
the case asking the Court to order the sheriff to give him the amounts charged in the
matter are acts that are part of the exercise of the profession of advocacy; to present a
plea and memorandum before the Court of Appeal is to practice the profession of
lawyer, because an agent cannot do it; To collect rents from the more than one hundred
defendants issuing receipts and signing them as the plaintiff's lawyer is to practice the
profession.

2. ID .; ID .; - The fact that the lawyer had not put in his motion asking for execution
that acted as lawyer but as agent and employee of the plaintiff, does not alter the
nature of his services that are certainly professional lawyer services. Hiding that he
acted as a lawyer and pretending he was only an agent, his situation worsens; The one
who, covered with a mask, shoots at his enemy is more guilty than the one who makes
it face-to-face and in public view.

3. ID .; LAWYER SUSPENDED TO EXERCISE THE PROFESSION. - The suspended lawyer

who exercises the profession during the period of the suspension must be completely
disabled to practice said profession in the Philippines with the consequent cancellation of
the certificate issued in his favor as such lawyer.
DECISION
PAUL, M .:

In administrative case No. 35, the respondent was suspended due to bad practices in
the exercise of his legal profession for a period of five years from November 9, 1949.
The respondent admits this suspension in his written report submitted on 17 March
1951; However, he continued to practice in the period of suspension, November 9, 1949
to November 8, 1954.

On February 28, 1950, the respondent filed a plea (Exhibit J) in the case CA GR No.
4792-R, Tan Tek Sy v. Maliwanag, not as a lawyer for Tan Tek Sy, but with the following
words: "for and in behalf of Tan Tek Sy"; on January 26, 1951, it was sent by certified
mail notification of the decision in said case (Exhibit G), confirming the decision of the
Court of First Instance; On March 13, 1951, I filed a motion in that court - already
returned the file - requesting the issuance of an execution order, which motion is signed
as follows: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"SO TEK YES

"By (Sgd.) FELIX P. DAVID,

"c / o Atty. Felix P. David,

"Corner Dagupan and Azcarraga St.,

"Philippines Saw Mill & Construction,

"Manila"

The respondent presented, therefore, the writing not as practicing lawyers usually do,
but as an agent of Tan Tek Sy.

In civil case No. 3658 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled Malayan Saw Mill,
Inc. against Tolentino, the respondent filed a brief on September 25, 1950, requesting
an order to demolish the houses of the defendants (Exhibit TO); On October 10, 1950,
he filed a motion asking that the Manila Sheriff be authorized to pay "the amount or
such other amount as may be collected by the Sheriff from time to time" (Exhibit B); On
November 13, 1950, I filed another motion (Exhibit C) requesting another demolition
order, signing the three briefs, Exhibits A, B and C, as the plaintiff's attorney; Exhibits B
through B-34 show that he was receiving payments of amounts from several defendants
as the plaintiff's lawyer; The oldest receipt is dated February 12, 1950 and the last
December 7, 1950.

In defense, the respondent says that he appeared as a lawyer for Tan Tek Sy since the
Municipal Court of Manila in 1948; that, upon being suspended, he had advised his client
to seek another lawyer to prepare the allegation that should be presented before the
Court of Appeal; that when there were only two or three days left and his client could
not present it, he wrote it and presented it at the request of his client; that he prepared
the allegation with the intention that his client signed it, but since he was in Dagupan
and could not sign it and there was only one day left, then he signed it as follows: "Felix
P. David, for and in behalf of the appellee. " On September 25, 1950, I presented to the
Court of Appeal a memorandum in response to that of the appellant, signed as the
allegation is.

"In order - the defendant says - to show that I did not have the intention to disregard
the suspension of the Supreme Court, I did not with the knowledge of Tan Tek Sy even
identified myself as the attorney for the appellee but in good faith, I signed for and in
behalf of the appellee without designating that I am practicing as attorney-at-law.
" cralaw virtua1aw library

We do not believe that the action of the respondent is justified by presenting the
allegation and his memorandum on behalf of his client being suspended in the exercise
of his profession; knowing that he was suspended, he should not have presented them
as an agent or as a lawyer; He was obliged not to continue serving his client before the
Court of Appeal; He had to warn his client that he was suspended in the exercise of his
legal profession and should advise him to employ another in his place if he wanted to
have representation; it should not contravene the express order of this Court; I should
know that he who is not a practicing lawyer cannot appear for a litigator before a court
except before a justice of the peace. When he presented his plea and his memorandum
with the following words "For and in behalf of the Appellee" it violated article 31 of Rule
127 which states that "In other courts, a party may direct its own litigation personally or
with the help of a lawyer, and his appearance must be made personally or through a
duly authorized member of the Forum. " An agent or a proxy or a suspended Forum
member cannot appear for a litigator.

To explain the presentation of motions in case No. 3655, Malayan Saw Mill, Inc. against
Tolentino, the respondent says that I act in good faith, that I present them not to
disobey the decision of this Court but to be able to collect their fees. As an official of the
Forum, the lawyer must comply with this Court's decision above any other
consideration. We believe that he does not work in good faith who, putting his interest in
the collection of his fees, exercises the profession knowing that he was forbidden to
exercise it. Even if he had not submitted his motions exhibits A, B and C and issued
receipts B to B-34 for amounts collected from the defendants, the respondent could
have collected his fees, already demanding directly from his client, and claiming them in
accordance with the article 33 Rule 127.
The defendant says that if he appeared on March 2, 1950 in the case No. 7679 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, Juan de la Torre v. Philippine Trust Co., it was on
behalf of his brother-in-law Juan de la Torre and also the I do not charge fees for his
appearance because I knew I was suspended in the profession. Although this
appearance was not taken into account, the respondent cannot be saved for having
provided the various professional services already reported.

To practice the legal profession is to practice the acts of that profession. Preparing and
presenting motions asking for the execution of the sentence, the demolition of the
houses of the defendants, asking the court to order the Sheriff to give him the amounts
charged, are acts that are part of the practice of the legal profession; to present a plea
and memorandum before the Court of Appeal is to practice the profession of lawyer,
because an agent cannot do it; to collect rent from the 109 defendants issuing 35
receipts and signing them as the plaintiff's lawyer, is to practice the profession.

The fact that he had not put in his motion asking for execution order in Malayan Saw
Mill, Inc. against Tolentino, who acted as a lawyer but as an agent and employee of the
Philippines Sawmill and Construction, does not alter the nature of his services that are
certainly professional lawyer services; but, hiding that he acted as a lawyer for Tan Tek
Sy and pretending that he was only an agent, his situation is aggravated: the one who,
covered with a mask, shoots at his enemy is more guilty than the one who does it face
to face and in sight of the public; hence the criminal law imposes more severe penalty in
the first case.

The evidence in the records shows that the defendant Felix P. David practiced the
profession of lawyer intentionally disobeying the decision of this Court of September 30,
1949, Administrative Cause No. 35.

Therefore, he is disqualified from practicing the legal profession in the Philippines, the
certificate issued in his favor to practice the profession is declared canceled and he is
ordered to return it to the Notary of this Court.

A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC               December 7, 2010

JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant,
vs.
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga
(respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of violating Rule
6.02,1 Rule 6.032 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing
conflicting interests.

Factual Background

In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in
Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously part of
Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open for disposition pursuant to
Proclamation No. 2476,4 issued on January 7, 1986, and Proclamation No. 172,5 issued on October
16, 1987.

To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary
Catalino Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a
recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands declared open for disposition. The
Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the
Committee members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987
to 1998); the respondent’s district includes the areas covered by the proclamations.

The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02

In the complaint,6 the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman
and as a member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainant’s
sales application because of his personal interest over the subject land. The complainant alleged that
the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the complainant’s father, Miguel P. Olazo,
for the latter to contest the complainant’s sales application and claim the subject land for himself. The
complainant also alleged that the respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various
dates, sums of money as payment of the latter’s alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant
further claimed that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel
Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondent’s deceased wife.

As a result of the respondent’s abuse of his official functions, the complainant’s sales application was
denied. The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were
subsequently given due course by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03

The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel
Olazo, the complainant’s brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel
Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of
the respondent’s promptings, the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the
purpose of nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The
complainant claimed that the respondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to one Rolando
Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard executed an
"Assurance" where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01

The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge
that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The
complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed
areas and does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of his sales application by the Committee
on Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No.
119.

The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he
engaged in the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer
for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.

In his Comment,7 the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious charge filed
against him by the complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council
when he was nominated as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now
pending with the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended.

With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of the antecedent
events.

The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he later
conveyed these rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazo’s rights over the subject land and
the transfer of his rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly recognized by the Secretary of the
DENR before whom the conflict of rights over the subject land (between Miguel Olazo and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez, on one hand, and the complainant on the other hand) was brought. In its decision,
the DENR found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and his application over the subject
land was given due course. The respondent emphasized that the DENR decision is now final and
executory. It was affirmed by the Office of the President, by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme
Court.

The respondent also advanced the following defenses:

(1) He denied the complainant’s allegation that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant) that the
respondent had been orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent argued that this
allegation was without corroboration and was debunked by the affidavits of Miguel Olazo and
Francisca Olazo, the complainant’s sister.

(2) He denied the complainant’s allegation that he offered the complainant ₱50,000.00 for the
subject land and that he (the respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence on Miguel
Olazo to claim the rights over the subject land. The respondent also denied that he had an
inordinate interest in the subject land.

(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazo’s affidavit
where the latter asserted his rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely attested to the
truth.

(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter decided to sell his
rights over the subject land for the medical treatment of his heart condition and the illness of
his daughter, Francisca Olazo. The respondent insisted that the money he extended to them
was a form of loan.

(5) The respondent’s participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez involved the payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel Olazo.

(6) Manuel’s belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January
20, 2000, regarding what his father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier Sinumpaang
Salaysay with Francisca Olazo, dated August 2, 1997. In the said Sinumpaang Salaysay,
Manuel categorically asserted that his father Miguel Olazo, not the complainant, was the
farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his agreement to the transfer of rights
(Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in favor of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, and the
withdrawal of his father’s application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s application.

(7) The complainant’s allegation that the respondent had pressured and influenced Miguel
Olazo to sell the subject land was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and
 corroboration. The DENR decision was clear that the complainant had no rights over the
subject land.

The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
alleged that during his third term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of
the complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for
deliberation of the Committee on Awards. Rather, their conflicting claims and their respective
supporting documents were before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This office
ruled over the conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling became the basis of the decision
of the Secretary of the DENR.

Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility since the provision applies to lawyers in the government service who are allowed by
law to engage in private law practice and to those who, though prohibited from engaging in the
practice of law, have friends, former associates and relatives who are in the active practice of law.8 In
this regard, the respondent had already completed his third term in Congress and his stint in the
Committee on Awards when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24, 1999.

Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility since he did not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting applications
of the complainant and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the applications were not submitted to the
Committee on Awards when he was still a member.

The Court’s Ruling

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.9 He may be disciplined by this
Court as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer.10

The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondent’s actions constitute a
breach of the standard ethical conduct – first, while the respondent was still an elective public official
and a member of the Committee on Awards; and second, when he was no longer a public official, but
a private lawyer who represented a client before the office he was previously connected with.

After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of
evidence, we resolve to dismiss the administrative complaint.

Accountability of a government lawyer in public office

Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of ethical
conduct to be observed by government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to
the standard of conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713 for government employees, a lawyer in the
government service is obliged to observe the standard of conduct under the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government
service is more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government
service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also bear
the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their
private activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official functions.11

The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It
imposes the following restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer:

A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private
interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public
duties. We previously held that the restriction extends to all government lawyers who use their public
offices to promote their private interests.12
In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,13 we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or
anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be
affected by the functions of his or her office. In Ali v. Bubong,14 we recognized that private interest is
not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing the interest of relatives. We also ruled that
private interest interferes with public duty when the respondent uses the office and his or her
knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives.15

In Vitriolo v. Dasig,16 we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher
Education) of extorting money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office to
be a serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.17 We reached the same
conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the respondent (an employee of the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, based on the
evidence showing that he demanded money from the complainant who had a pending application for
visas before his office.18

Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano19 we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for
violating Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing
that he demanded and received money from the complainant who had a pending case before this
Court.

Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof that
the respondent abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on
Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

First, the records do not clearly show if the complainant’s sales application was ever brought before
the Committee on Awards. By the complaint’s own account, the complainant filed a sales application
in March 1990 before the Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the complainant’s sales application
was pending before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting
claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it
was only on August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its
decision, or after the term of the respondent’s elective public office and membership to the Committee
on Awards, which expired in 1997.

These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his
private interests in the discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales application was not
brought before the Committee on Awards when the respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis
exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain personal benefits. We note in this regard that the
denial of the complainant’s sales application over the subject land was made by the DENR, not by the
Committee on Awards.

Second, the complainant’s allegation that the respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to get the subject
land does not specify how the orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is the
uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated May 25, 2003,20 categorically stating
that the respondent had no interest in the subject land, and neither was he a contracting party in the
transfer of his rights over the subject land. In the absence of any specific charge, Olazo’s disclaimer
is the nearest relevant statement on the respondent’s alleged participation, and we find it to be in the
respondent’s favor.

Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support his
claim that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father (namely: the letter,
dated June 22, 1996, to the DENR Regional Director-NCR;21 the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July
12, 1996;22 and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 199623), do not contain any reference to the
alleged pressure or force exerted by the respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely
showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed
areas) surveyed. They also showed that the respondent merely acted as a witness in the
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that may be rendered
by one relative to another, and do not show how the respondent could have influenced the decision of
Miguel Olazo to contest the complainant’s sales application. At the same time, we cannot give any
credit to the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only hearsay
but are contrary to what Miguel Olazo states on the record. We note that Manuel had no personal
knowledge, other than what Miguel Olazo told him, of the force allegedly exerted by the respondent
against Miguel Olazo.
In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation - backed by corroborating
evidence - of the nature of the transaction in which he gave the various sums of money to Miguel
Olazo and Francisca Olazo in the year 1995. In her affidavits dated May 25, 200324 and July 21,
2010,25 Francisca Olazo corroborated the respondent’s claim that the sums of money he extended to
her and Miguel Olazo were loans used for their medical treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated May 25, 2003, asserted that some of the money borrowed from the respondent was
used for his medical treatment and hospitalization expenses.

The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondent’s claim that the latter’s
involvement was limited to being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo.
According to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo agreed that a portion of the loan would
be directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent and the amount paid would be
considered as part of the purchase price of the subject land.26

It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the dates
when the sums of money were extended by the respondent – on February 21, 1995, September 2,
1995 and October 17, 1995, and the date when the Deed of Conveyance27 over the subject land was
executed or on October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money were extended prior to the transfer
of rights over the subject land. These pieces of evidence are consistent with the respondent’s
allegation that Miguel Olazo decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay the loans he
obtained from the respondent and, also, to finance his continuing medical treatment.

Private practice of law after separation from public office

As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his separation
from the government service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January
20, 2000, of Manuel and the document entitled "Assurance" where the respondent legally
represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of
evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that there was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In Cayetano v. Monsod,28 we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we
ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.

Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government
lawyers to engage in private practice after their separation from the service.

Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and

omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during
their incumbency shall not:

xxxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; x x x

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional
concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to
be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession
during their incumbency.29 By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of
his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the
Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her
official functions.30 The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of
lawyers separated from the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any
matter before the office he used to be with.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers,
after leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is the term "intervene" which we previously interpreted to include an act of
a person who has the power to influence the proceedings.31 Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit
of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted
engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously
exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.1avvphi1

As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the
sales application covering Manuel’s land when the former was still a member of the Committee on
Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the
practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the
preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.,32 we specifically described private
practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.

In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell within the definition of practice of law, the
available pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before
the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These are
matters for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against
the respondent’s favor.

Violation of Rule 1.01

Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the above
discussion, we already struck down the complainant’s allegation that respondent engaged in an
unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.

We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainant’s claim that the respondent
violated paragraph 4(1)33 of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified applicant. The
matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s qualifications to apply for a sales application over lots covered
by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the
decision dated April 3, 2004,34 when the DENR gave due course to his sales application over the
subject land. We are, at this point, bound by this finding.

As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the President, the
Court of Appeals35 and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R.
No. 173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed by the
complainant after finding, among others, that no reversible error was committed by the Court of
Appeals in its decision.36

All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers.37 The respondent generally is under no
obligation to prove his/her defense,38 until the burden shifts to him/her because of what the
complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first place been proven, nothing has to be
rebutted in defense.39
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the
complainant’s failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical
infractions warranting the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary power.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02,
Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme
Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit.

A.M. No. P-220 December 20, 1978

JULIO ZETA, complainant,
vs.
FELICISIMO MALINAO, respondent.

BARREDO, J.:

Administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao court interpreter of the Court of First Instance of
Catbalogan, Samar charging as follows:

l — ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. — MR. Malinao has been appearing in the

municipal court of this town for parties like attorney when he is not an attorney. Reliable
information also says he has been appearing in the municipal courts of Daram,
Zumarraga, Talalora and even Sta. Rita. He is not authorized to do so we believe. He
makes it his means of livelihood as he collects fees from his clients. He competes with
attorneys but does not pay anything. We believe that his doing so should be stopped for
a good government. These facts can be checked with records of those municipal courts.

2 — GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. — Being employed in the Court of First

Instance he would instigate persons, especially in his barrio to grab land rob or coerce.
In fact he has cases in the municipal court in this town involving himself and his men.
He incite them telling them not to be afraid as he is a court employee and has influence
over the judges. Those persons being ignorant would believe him and so would commit
crimes. This act of Mr. Malinao is contrary to good order and peace as he is using his
supposed influences to urge persons to commit crimes.

3 — CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. — Information has it that he is unfaithfully filing his

time record in the CFI. Even he has been out practicing in the municipal courts
sometimes he would fill his time record as present. He receives salary for those absent
days. This can be checked with time record he has submitted and if he has any
application for leave. He may try to cure it by submitting application for leave but this
should not be allowed as he has already committed crime.

4 — VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL SERVICE LAW.-WE have

reliable information it is prohibited for a civil service employee to engage in private
practice any profession or business without permission from the Department Head. Mr.
Malinao we are sure has not secured that permission because he should not be allowed
to practice as he is not an attorney. If that were so, he violated that Executive Order and
Civil Service Law and we are urgently and earnestly requesting the Commissioner of
Civil Service to investigate him on this. If warranted he should be given the
corresponding penalty as dismissal because we believe he deserve it. (Page 2,
Record.)

After respondent filed the following 3rd indorsement relative to the above complaint:

Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, Manila, thru the
Honorable District Judge, Court of First Instance, Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar, and
thru the Honorable Judicial Superintendent, Department of Justice, Manila, the
undersigned's reply to the preceding endorsements, to wit: That the alleged letter-
complaint of one Julio Zeta is not inclosed in the first indorsement, which absence has
also been noticed and noted on the right hand corner of the said first indorsement by
the Clerk of Court, of this Court; that despite this absence, and without waiving,
however, his right to any pertinent provision of law, but for respect and courtesy to a
Superior, he hereby states that he has not violated any rule or law, much less Sec. 12,
Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules; that his participation for defendants' cause was
gratuitous as they could not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and
the absence of one in the locality, said assistance has also checked the miscarriage of
justice by the Presiding Municipal Judge, now resigned; that he is attaching herewith a
carbon-original of a pleading submitted by Atty. Simeon Quiachon the attorney of record
for the defendants in Civil Case No. 24, entitled 'Jose Kiskisan versus Fidel Pacate, et
al. for Forcible Entry, in the Municipal Court of Talalora, Samar, which is a 'Motion To
Withdraw Exhibits', as Annex 'A', as part of this reply. (Page 5, Rec.)
the Department of Justice that had jurisdiction over the matter then, referred the said complaint and
answer to District Judge Segundo Zosa, Court of First Instance, Catbalogan, Western Samar, for
investigation, report and recommendation, and after due hearing, Judge Zosa submitted his report
pertinent parts of which read thus:

Inspite of diligent efforts exerted by the Court to subpoena the complainant, Julio Zeta, who is said to
be a resident of Zumarraga, Samar the same had failed because the said Julio Zeta appears to be a
fictitious person

Inspite of the failure of the complainant to appear in the investigation in connection with
his complaint against Felicisimo Malinao, the Court nevertheless proceeded to
investigate the case against him by calling Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar,
Judge Juanito Reyes of Zumarraga, Samar and Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram,
Samar.

Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, declared that according to his docket books
the respondent appeared as counsel for Vicente Baculanlan in criminal case No. 1247
in the Municipal Court of Sta. Rita, Samar, for grave threats and in criminal case No.
1249 for the same accused and Romulo Villagracia for illegal possession of firearm on
August 5, 1960 and on September 17, 1970.

Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar, declared that the respondent appeared as
counsel in civil case No. 39 in the Municipal Court of Daram, Samar, entitled Felix
Versoza versus Victor Payao, et al., for forcible entry on December 15, 1962, January
26, 1963, February 18, 1963 and on March 1, 1963.

Judge Juanito Reyes declared that on March 27, 1969, the respondent appeared as
counsel for the defendant in civil case No. 318 of the Municipal Court of Zumarraga
entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible entry and again on June 17,
1970 in the same case.

From the certification of the Clerk of this Court, it appears that the respondent had the
following entries in his daily time record:

1. Was on leave from office on August 5, 1960 and September 17, 1960;

2. Was present in office on December l5, 1962;

3. Was present in office on January 26, 1963, and present also on February 18, 1963
but undertime by 1 hour;

4. Was on leave from office on March 1, 1963;

5. Was on leave from office on March 27, 1969; and

6. Was present in office on June 17, 1970 but undertime by 5 hours.

Comparing the dates when the respondent appeared before the aforementioned
Municipal Courts with his daily time records, he made it appear that on December 15,
1962 and February 18, 1963 he was present in his office although according to the
testimony of Judge Miguel Avestruz he was before his Court on December 15, 1962 as
well as on February 18, 1963. Again according to Judge Juanito Reyes the respondent
appeared in his Court on June 17, 1970. The respondent again made it appear in his
daily time record that he was present with an undertime of five hours. The respondent
did not offer any plausible explanation for this irregularity.

With respect to the crime of falsification of his daily time record as shown by the
evidence, he had made it appear that he was present in his office on December 15,
1962, February 18, 1963 and June 17, 1970 when as a matter of fact he was in the
Municipal Court of Daram attending to a case entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor
Payao, et al., for forcible entry as well as in the Municipal Court of Zumarraga attending
to Civil Case No. 318 entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible entry.
 The Inquest Judge respectfully recommends that he be given stern warning and severe
reprimand for this irregularity.

With respect to the fourth charge, for violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, Republic Act
2260, as amended, again the evidence shows that respondent had been appearing as
counsel in the municipal courts of Sta. Rita, Daram and Zumarraga in violation of the
rules of the Civil Service Law. (Pp. 28-31, Record.)

We have carefully reviewed the record, and We find the conclusions of fact of the Investigator to be
amply supported by the evidence, particularly the documents consisting of public records and the
declarations of the judges before whom respondent had appeared. It is clear to Us that respondent,
apart from appearing as counsel in various municipal courts without prior permission of his superiors
in violation of civil service rules and regulations, falsified his time record of service by making it
appear therein that he was present in his office on occasions when in fact he was in the municipal
courts appearing as counsel, without being a member of the bar, which, furthermore, constitutes
illegal practice of law. We, therefore, adopt the above findings of fact of the Investigator.

The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic) for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they
could not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality"
cannot, even if true, carry the day for him, considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he did so
without permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified his time record of service to conceal his
absence from his office on the dates in question. Indeed, the number of times that respondent acted
as counsel under the above circumstances would indicate that he was doing it as a regular practice
obviously for considerations other than pure love of justice.

In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense committed by respondent is grave, hence it
warrants a more drastic sanction than that of reprimand recommended by Judge Zosa. We find no
alternative than to separate him from the service, with the admonition that he desist from appearing in
any court or investigative body wherein Only members of the bar are allowed to practice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Felicisimo Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed from his position as
interpreter in the Court of First Instance, CFI, Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to
reemployment in the judicial branch of the government.

A.M. No. 2266 October 27, 1983

HERMINIO R. NORIEGA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL R. SISON, respondent.

Herminio R. Noriega for complainant.

Emmanuel R. Sison in his own behalf.

GUERRERO, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed on June 3, 1981 by Herminio R. Noriega against Atty.
Emmanuel R. Sison "admitted to the Bar on March 31, 1976) on the ground of malpractice through
gross misrepresentation and falsification.

Complainant Noriega alleges that respondent Sison is a regular and permanent employee of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a Hearing Officer and as such, "is mandated to
observe strictly the civil service rules and regulations, more particularly ... the prohibition of
government employees to practice their professions"; that to circumvent the prohibition and to evade
the law, respondent assumed a different name, falsified his Identity and represented himself to be
one "Atty. Manuel Sison", with offices at No. 605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City, "at the times that he
will handle private cases"; that "Manuel Sison" is not listed as a member of the Bar in the records of
the Supreme Court; that under his said assumed name, respondent is representing one Juan
Sacquing, the defendant in Case No. E01978 before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila, submitting pleadings therein signed by him respondent) under his assumed name, despite his
full knowledge That "Manuel Sison" is not a member of the Bar and that his acts in doing so are illegal
and unlawful. 1 Xerox copies of pertinent documents, pleadings, orders and notices are annexed to
the complaint to support the material allegations therein.

As requireD, respondent filed his Answer on August 20, 1981. He attached thereto a copy of the
written authorization given by Julio A. Sulit, Jr., Associate Commissioner of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, for him to appear as counsel of Juan Sacquing, a close family friend, in the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court JDRC of Manila, Respondent alleges that he never held
himself out to the public as a practicing lawyer; that he provided legal services to Sacquing in view of
close family friendship and for free; that he never represented himself deliberately and intentionally as
"Atty. Manuel Sison" in the Manila JDRC where, in the early stages of his appearance, he always
signed the minutes as "Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison", and in one instance, he even made the necessary
correction when the court staff wrote his name as Atty Manuel Sison"; that due to the "inept and
careless work of the clerical staff of the JDRC", notices were sent to "Atty. Manuel Sison", at 605
EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City, where respondent's parents conduct a printing office and establishment,
which notices were honored by the personnel of said office as respondent's family has called
respondent by the nickname "Manuel"; that respondent did not feel any necessity to correct this error
of the JDRC since he "could use his nickname 'Manuel' interchangeably with his original true name as
a formal name, and its use was not done for a fraudulent purpose nor to misrepresent"; and, that this
administrative case is only one of the numerous baseless complaints brought by complainant against
respondent, the former being a disgruntled loser in an injunction case in the SEC heard before
respondent as Hearing Officer.

In resolving this disbarment case, We must initially emphasize the degree of integrity and
respectability attached to the law profession. There is no denying that the profession of an attorney is
required after a long and laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability the attorney acquires
a fixed means of support for himself and his family. This is not to say, however, that the emphasis is
on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social prestige and intellectual standing
necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason of the fact that every attorney is deemed
an officer of the court.

The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been wisely put by Chief Justice
Marshall of the United States Court when he said:

On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the
prosperity of his life may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be
 lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it is extremely desirable that
the respectability of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the bench
should be preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought
to be exercised with great moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised. 2

The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of
livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts and clients
may rightly repose confidence in them. 3

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to
exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear,
convincing, and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence
is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 4

This Court has also held in re Atty. Felizarda M. de Guzman 5 that to be made the basis of
suspension or disbarment, the record must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the
exercise by this Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done as well as the
motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is
innocent of the charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved; and as an officer of the
court, that he performed his duty in accordance with his oath.

Examining the facts of this case, We hold that the allegations in the complaint do not warrant
disbarment of the respondent. There is no evidence that the respondent has committed an act
constituting deceit, immoral conduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer, wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of the court, or corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney to a part to a case without
attorney to do so. 6

There is no violation of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations for his appearance as counsel for the
defendant in the JDRC Case No. E-01978 was with authority given by the Associate Commisioner Of
SEC, Julio A. Sulit, Jr.

This Court also holds that under the facts complained of supported by the annexes and the answer of
respondent likewise sustained by annexes attached thereto and the reply of the complainant, the
accusation that respondent with malice and deliberate intent to evade the laws, assumed a different
name, falsified his Identity and represented himself to be one "ATTY. MANUEL SISON" with offices at
No. 605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City at the times that he will handle private cases, is not meritorious.
Neither is the charge referred to is that pending the slantiated. The only case DRC Case No. E-01978
wherein respondent appeared as counsel for the defendant. It being an isolated case, the same does
not constitute the practice of law, more so since respondent did not derive any pecuniary gain for his
appearance because respondent and defendant therein were close family friends. Such act of the
respondent in going out of his way to aid as counsel to a close family friend should not be allowed to
be used as an instrument of harrassment against respondent.

The ruling in Zeta vs. Malinao (87 SCRA 303) wherein the respondent was dismissed from the
service because being a government employee, he appeared as counsel in a private case, cannot be
applied in the case at bar because the respondent in said Zeta case had appeared as counsel without
permission from his superiors.

Although the complaint alleges violation of civil service rules, the complainant however states that the
basis of his complaint for disbarment is not the respondent's act of appearing as counsel but the
unauthorized use of another name. 7

A perusal of the records however, reveals that whereas there is indeed a pleading entitled
"Objection/Opposition to the 2 Formal Offer of Evidence" (Annex "C" to the Complaint for Disbarment,
which is signed as "Manuel Sisori", counsel for defendant, 605 EDSA, Cubao, Quezon City, p. 7 of
the Records), there is, however, no showing that respondent was thus motivated with bad faith or
malice, for otherwise lie would not have corrected the spelling of his name when the court staff
misspelled it in one of the minutes of the proceeding. Moreover, We find no reason or motive for
respondent to conceal his true name when he have already given express authority by his superior to
act as counsel for Juan Sacquing in the latter's case pending before the JDRC And while it may be
True that subsequent errors were made in sending notices to him under the name "Atty. Manuel
Sison, ' the errors were attributable to the JDRC clerical staff and not to the respondent.

At most, this Court would only counsel the respondent to be more careful and cautious in signing his
name so as to avoid unnecessary confusion as regards his Identity.

At this point, We are constrained to examine the motives that prompted the complainant in filing the
present case. An examination of the records reveals that the complainant was a defendant in the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Case No. 1982 filed by the Integrated Livestock Dealers
Inc. and Teofisto Jiao against seven (7) respondents including the complainant, seeking to oust the
complainant and his codefendants from acting as officers of the Integrated Livestock Dealers lnc.
then pending before respondent as Hearing Officer of the SEC, who after trial decided the case
against the herein complainant. From this antecedent fact, there is cast a grave and serious doubt as
to the true motivation of the complainant in filing the present case, considering further that other
administrative charges were filed by the complainant against respondent herein before the SEC,
JDRC and the Fiscal's office in Manila.

We hold that complainant's repeated charges or accusations only indicate his resentment and
bitterness in losing the SEC case and not with the honest and sincere desire and objectives "(1) to
compel the attorney to deal fairly and honestly with his client;" (Strong vs. Munday 52 N.J. Eq. 833,
21 A. 611) and "(2) to remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney." (Ex parte
Brounsal Cowp 829; 83 Reprint; 6 C.J., p. 581; see In re de los Angeles Adm. Case No. 225, Sept.
31, 1959, cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 6, p. 242).

In the light of the foregoing, We find no reason or necessity to refer this complaint to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(Promulgated June 21, 1988)
 
CHAPTER I. THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man's cause.
Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a
fair settlement.
CANON 2 - A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT
AND CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION.
Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the
oppressed.
Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he shall not refuse to render legal
advice to the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latter's rights.
Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed unless the
circumstances so warrant.
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE,
HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name shall be used. The
continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its
communications that said partner is deceased.
Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdrawal from the firm and his name shall
be dropped from the firm name unless the law allows him to practice law currently.
Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to representatives of the mass media in
anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.
CANON 4 - A LAWYER SHALL PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL
SYSTEM BY INITIATING OR SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN LAW REFORM AND IN THE
IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE
IN CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH
STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW
STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICES IN
THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR TASKS.
Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that
justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the
innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his
private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

CHAPTER II. THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
 
Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a
material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.
Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any person known by
him to be unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant attribute.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND

CANDOR TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING
TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
 
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of
another lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
 
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the bar in good standing.
Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law, except:
(a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter's death,
money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons specified in the
agreement; or
(b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or
(c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan even if the plan is
based in whole or in part, on a profit sharing agreement.

CHAPTER III. THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
 
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language
or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a
provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not
been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice.

CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS.
 
Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.
Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before
the Courts.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.
Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.

CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO
ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
 
Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately prepared himself on the law and
the facts of his case, the evidence he will adduce and the order of its proferrence. He should also be ready
with the original documents for comparison with the copies.
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs,
let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court
processes.
Rule 12.05 - A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness during a break or recess in the trial, while
the witness is still under examination.
Rule 12.06 - A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent himself or to impersonate
another.
Rule 12.07 - A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor needlessly inconvenience him.
Rule 12.08 - A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
(a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument, and the like; or
(b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event
he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.

CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN
FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF
INFLUENCING THE COURT.
 
Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for
cultivating familiarity with Judges.
Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party.
Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another branch or agency of the
government in the normal course of judicial proceedings.

CHAPTER IV. THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT

CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE NEEDY.
 
Rule 14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of the latter's race, sex.
creed or status of life, or because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said person.
Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient cause, an appointment as
counsel  de officio or as amicus curiae, or a request from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of its
chapters for rendition of free legal aid.
Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an indigent client if:
(a) he is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently;
(b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client or between a present
client and the prospective client.
Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his professional fees shall observe
the same standard of conduct governing his relations with paying clients.

CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
 
Rule 15.01. - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as practicable
whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and if so, shall
forthwith inform the prospective client.
Rule 15.02.- A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect of matters
disclosed to him by a prospective client.
Rule 15.03. - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Rule 15.04. - A lawyer may, with the written consent of all concerned, act as mediator, conciliator or
arbitrator in settling disputes.
Rule 15.05. - A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the case.
Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body.
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness.
Rule 15.08. - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice
of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS PROFESSION.
 
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also
have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided
for in the Rules of Court.
Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interest are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is
handling for the client.

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
 
Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not
qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain
as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.

CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS
OF THE LAW.
 
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client
and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to
obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the course of the
representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to
rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with
the Rules of Court.
Rule 19.03 - A lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case.

CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.

 
Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
(a) the time spent and the extent of the service rendered or required;
(b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he
belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Rule 20.02 - A lawyer shall, in case of referral, with the consent of the client, be entitled to a division of
fees in proportion to the work performed and responsibility assumed.
Rule 20.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge and consent of the client, accept any fee,
reward, costs, commission, interest, rebate or forwarding allowance or other compensation whatsoever
related to his professional employment from anyone other than the client.
Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort
to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.

CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT
EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
 
Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except;
(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
(b) When required by law;
(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial
action.
Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course
of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client
with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of his client, give information from his files to
an outside agency seeking such information for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data
processing, or any similar purpose.
Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to partners or associates thereof
unless prohibited by the client.
Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be required to prevent those whose services are
utilized by him, from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of the clients.
Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a client's affairs even with members of his
family.
Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about a particular case except to avoid
possible conflict of interest.

CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND
UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
 
Rule 22.01 - A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following case:
(a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he is
handling;
(b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules;
(c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;
(d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the
employment effectively;
(e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the retainer
agreement;
(f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
(g) Other similar cases.
Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn
over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperative with his successor in the
orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.