CASUALTY REPORT

Date: 19 February 2004

Case 199933248
File 01.40.01
DIVISION FOR INVESTIGATION OF

MARITIME ACCIDENTS

DANISH MARITIME AUTHORITY

Vermundsgade 38 C
Collision between the Danish fishing vessel DK-2100 Copenhagen Ø
METTE ELIASEN and the Maltese-registered
tanker FREYJA in the North Sea on 15 March Tel. +45 39 17 44 00
Fax +45 39 17 44 16
2003 CVR-no. 29 83 16 10
oke@dma.dk
www.dma.dk

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AND

BUSINESS AFFAIRS

The purpose of investigating accidents at sea is to obtain information about the actual circumstances of the accident
and to clarify the causes and the sequence of events that led to the accident in order that the Danish Maritime
Authority or others can take measures to reduce the risk of recurrences. The aim of such investigations is not to take a
position on the aspects of criminal liability or liability for damages in connection with the accident.
 Table of Contents

Page

1 The Casualty …………………………………………………… 3

2 Ship Particulars …………………………………………………… 4

3 The crew .…………………………………………………………… 5

4 Narratives …………………………………………………………… 6 – 10

5 Further information and investigation……………………………. 10 –13

6 Analyses……………………………………………………………… 14 -15

7 Conclusion………………………………………………………… 16

Additional Comments of the Malta Maritime Authority ……… 17

8 Appendix …...…………………………………………………… 18

Preface

A concerted investigation has been carried out by the Danish Division for Investigation of
Maritime Accidents in co-operation with the Malta Maritime Authority, Merchant Shipping
Directorate, in accordance with IMO Resolution A.849(20) adopted on 27 November 1997.

Comments of the Malta Maritime Authority have been submitted under section 7.

2
 1. The Casualty
Type of casualty: Collision

Location of casualty: The North Sea – approx. 58 n.m. W of Hirtshals, Denmark

Date and time: 15 March 2003 between 0918 and 0920 hours

Weather: Calm and dense fog

Injuries: None

Scene of casualty:

Anchor position
(METTE
ELIASEN)

3
 2. Ship Particulars
Name of ship: FREYJA METTE ELIASEN

Registration no: - HG 348

Home port: Valletta Hirtshals

Official no: 6284 J 2989

Call sign: 9HCD6 OXCN

IMO no.: 7392610 -

Type of ship: Chemical tanker Fishing vessel

Construction year: 1974 1983

Tonnage: 1662 GT 56.49 GRT

Length/breadth/depth 72.01 / 12.50 / 7.01 m 19.15 / 5.66 / 2.44 m

Length overall 77.10 m 20.00 m
Engine power: 1324 kW 219 kW

Crew: 10 3

Passengers: - -

Owner / Operator: Österreichischer Lloyd Ship Private

Management.
Classification society: Germanischer Lloyd Unclassed

Hull construction Steel – double bottom – double Wood

sides

4
 3. The Crew

METTE ELIASEN:
The skipper has been the owner of METTE ELIASEN since 12 May 1999. He holds a
certificate as a skipper, 3rd class on fishing vessels and one crewmember as 2nd hand.

The skipper and the two crewmembers have served as fishermen for 30, 20 and 15 years,
respectively.

FREYJA:
All the persons on board were in possession of certificates valid for the vessel’s size and
engine power.

The Malta Maritime Authority had issued the Safe Manning Certificate. This provides for the
safe manning for a restricted international area (GMDSS sea areas A1 + A2) as follows:

Rank / Position Required On board

Master 1 1
Chief officer 1 1
Deck officer None 1
Chief engineer 1 1
Second engineer officer 1 1
Rating forming part of a 3 3
navigational watch
Rating forming part of an None 1
engineering watch
Cook None 1

Total 7 10

The master had been on the vessel for several years – 3 months on and 2 months off. He
rejoined the vessel on 6 March 2003.

The chief officer joined the vessel on 7 January 2003.

The 2nd officer had been on the vessel 3 times in the last 2½ years, for a period of 7-8
months each time.

5
 4. The Narratives
METTE ELIASEN

The following is based on verbal information given to the Danish Division for Investigation of
Maritime Accidents by the skipper and one of the two fishermen on METTE ELIASEN as
well as on a brief damage report written by the skipper:

The fishing vessel was at anchor in position 57°29’3N 008°08’6E in connection with anchor
seining. It was emphasized that the position indicated was the position of the anchor. In
accordance with the usual procedure, the anchor was marked by means of a line with two
rather large buoys.

The DGPS position of the anchor was noted very carefully to be able to find the gear again.

The depth was approximately 130 meters at this position.

At 0630 hours, the crew initiated the fishing procedure by setting the gear while sailing in a
northeasterly direction. The seine line was fastened to the anchor gear.

The first seine line had a length of approximately 1.7 nautical miles.

Subsequently, the seine line was set in a northwesterly direction – with a length of
approximately 1.9 nautical miles – and from this position the vessel returned to its starting
point.

Then, the fishing vessel was connected to the anchor gear again, and the crew got ready to
bring the lines in.

The skipper was on the bridge during the entire fishing operation.

From 0735 to 0900 hours, the crew hauled in the seine by means of the ship’s hydraulic
winch.

Then, the seine was floating astern of the fishing vessel reaching approximately 70 meters
aft.

The fishing vessel was lying still on a southwesterly course.

It is normal procedure for the skipper to go on deck to assist bringing in the seine net when
it has been hauled back, which he also did on the day of the collision.

Shortly before the skipper went on deck, at approximately 0910 hours, he saw a relatively
large echo on the radar at a distance of approximately 2 nautical miles. The radar was set
to a range of 4 nautical miles.

The skipper did not plot the echo, which afterwards turned out to be FREYJA. From the size
of the echo, the skipper estimated that it was a merchant vessel.

6
The engine was running since the hydraulic system on board the vessel was used in
connection with the work.

The skipper was standing on the starboard side aft – operating the winch – at a distance of
approximately five meters from the wheelhouse entrance. One of the fishermen was
standing on the port side aft, and the other fisherman was on deck in front of the
wheelhouse on the starboard side.

The weather was calm with dense fog and there was no sea. The skipper described the
surface of the sea as “glassy”.

The fishing vessel carried day and night signals for fishing in the forepart of the vessel.

During the work, the skipper suddenly saw an orange-coloured vessel emerging from the
fog at a distance of 30-40 meters.

The vessel, which later proved to be FREYJA, was heading right towards METTE
ELIASEN.

The skipper noticed the name of the ship on both sides of the stem.

The skipper called out to the other crewmembers to hold on and then he ran to the
wheelhouse.

The skipper knew that a collision could not be avoided only by the manoeuvres of the other
vessel so he immediately reversed the engines. He did this in spite of the risk that the gear /
seine, which was still floating in the water astern of the fishing vessel, would get stuck in the
propeller. At the same time, he called the other ship on channel 16 and sounded a signal
with the ship’s whistle.

He had not sounded signals with the whistle prior to this, and the skipper and the fishermen
had not heard any signal from FREYJA prior to the collision either.

The skipper heard FREYJA reverse its engine forcefully and he noticed that FREYJA was
turning slowly to starboard.

The fisherman who had been standing aft considered running forward to release the anchor
wire, but he realised that he did not have sufficient time to do so. Instead, he ran on to the
deck astern of the wheelhouse to prepare the life raft for launching. He explained that he
was fully aware that his colleague can not swim.

From where he was standing next to the raft, he was able to see a person who later turned
out to be the master of FREYJA standing on the bridge wing on the port side.

FREYJA hit the starboard bow of the fishing vessel forcefully at an angle of approximately
110 degrees between the vessels.

The time of the collision was approximately 0920 hours local time according to the skipper.

7
The fishing vessel heeled over hard to the port side, and the forepart of the vessel was
practically lifted out of the water and the fishing vessel was pushed astern.

The damage on FREYJA was described as a long hole with a length of approximately 2
meters in the side of the vessel under the vessel’s name approximately 2½ meters above
the waterline.

FREYJA disappeared out of sight in the dense fog on the port side of the fishing vessel.

The fisherman who had been standing next to the life raft ran to the front to check the
extent of the damage, and he ascertained that the damage in the forepart of the ship was
above the “skandeck” and that the ship was not taking in water.

The skipper was in contact with the master of FREYJA on VHF channel 16 and further
communication was continued on channel 10.

They were offered assistance from the master of FREYJA and the skipper of METTE
ELIASEN described the communication as good. The master, who is from Iceland, spoke a
Danish/Norwegian dialect. The master was very co-operative and he acted very
professionally after the collision.

Both the master of FREYJA and the crew of the fishing vessel very shocked. The master of
FREYJA said several times that he was very sorry about what had happened.

METTE ELIASEN received calls from a number of ships offering their assistance.

Shortly after the collision, the skipper informed the master of FREYJA that there was no
need for further assistance.

The fog cleared and approximately one hour after the collision the weather was clear and
sunny with good visibility.

FREYJA stayed in the area until the seine and the other gear had been hauled on board
METTE ELIASEN. This lasted longer than normally because they had to use other methods
for this work because of the damage in the forepart of the ship. The two ships remained in
contact over the radio until the fishing vessel arrived in Hirtshals later that evening.

During the voyage to Hirtshals, the crew of METTE ELIASEN observed that small quantities
of water were entering the ship as it was making speed.

The master of FREYJA informed the skipper that FREYJA was heading for Grenaa,
Denmark. The skipper later heard that the ship had been diverted to Frederikshavn.

During the voyage, the master contacted Hirtshals Ship Insurance. He assumed that they
would contact the relevant authorities.

METTE ELIASEN arrived in Hirtshals on 15 March 2003 at 1755 hours.

8
FREYJA
The following is based on a summary of the events compiled from statements given to the
Malta Maritime Authority by the master, the chief officer, the 2nd officer, the chief engineer
and the able seaman:

FREYJA was en route from Grangemouth, UK, to Grenaa, Denmark, fully loaded with a
cargo of 1294 tonnes of fish oil in bulk.

Draft upon departure was 4.7 m forward and 5.4 m aft.

At 2200 hours on 14 March, the visibility was good.

At 0600 hours on 15 March, the 2nd officer handed over the navigational watch to the chief
officer. No problems were relayed during the change of the watch. At this time, the sea was
reported to be calm and the visibility was described as very good with very little wind and no
traffic was observed on the radar.

The vessel was on autopilot and proceeding on a course of 077º. Three VHF sets were on
channel 16.

At 0700 hours, the weather started getting foggy and the master and an AB were called on
to the bridge. From this time and up to the time of the collision, the master and the chief
officer were both on the bridge. The master was watching the port side radar, and the chief
officer on duty was watching the starboard radar. The AB, who also formed part of the
bridge navigational team at the time, was standing as a lookout on the starboard bridge
wing.

At 0800 hours, the speed of the vessel was reduced to manoeuvring speed. At this time,
the visibility varied from about 100 meters to a maximum of about 300 meters.

At 0917 hours, a fishing buoy was seen on the starboard side of FREYJA. At the same
time, the lookout on the starboard bridge wing sighted a fishing boat very close to the port
bow of FREYJA. In order to try to avoid the collision, the engines were set to “full astern”. At
the same time, the autopilot function was turned off and the vessel was steered manually.

At 0918 hours, FREYJA collided with the fishing vessel, which shortly after the collision
proved to be METTE ELIASEN.

The point of impact on FREYJA was the port bow just astern of the portside anchor, and the
point of impact on the fishing vessel was the starboard bow. At the time of the collision, the
visibility was about 100 meters.

FREYJA continued to go astern to assess the damage to the fishing vessel and to check if
assistance was needed.

The master of FREYJA and the skipper of METTE ELIASEN communicated on VHF and
the master ascertained that nobody was injured on board the fishing vessel and that the
fishing vessel did not require any assistance.

9
At about 1020 hours, after the vessels had exchanged information, METTE ELIASEN
headed towards Hirtshals.

At 1030 hours, FREYJA continued her voyage.

5. Further Information and Investigation

METTE ELIASEN – Electronic chart information (Radar overlay)

In connection with the investigations made by the Danish Division for Investigation of
Maritime Accidents on board METTE ELISASEN on 19 March 2003, it was possible to
analyse the ship’s movements by producing the ship’s track before and after the collision.

The ship’s track from Hanstholm is shown at the bottom of the picture.

The setting of the seine lines is shown in the centre of the picture.

The right side of the picture shows the ship’s track towards Hirtshals after the collision.

FREYJA – Extract from logbook entries

Deck log book

0600 GPS 57º20.1´N 006º54.0´E
0700 GPS 57º23´0 N 007º18.8´E
0800 GPS 57º25.8´N 007º40.7´E
0900 GPS 57º28.8´N 008º02.8´E
0918 GPS 57º29.6´N 008º09.7´E Collided with fishing vessel METTE ELIASEN
Engine logbook
0800 Reduced speed
0918 Full astern, ship drifting

10
FREYJA – Reconstruction based on the above logbook entries

FREYJA – Engine details

The vessel is driven by an internal combustion engine type 6M 452 AK (manufacturer: MAK
Maschinenbau GMBH N), with 6 cylinders.

All machinery in the engine room was reported to be in good working condition, the steering
gear was tested by the inspector from the Malta Maritime Authority and found in satisfactory
condition.

Nautical equipment

METTE ELIASEN was, among others, equipped with:

Two radars
FURUNO 48 SM – FR 1505 DA
FURUNO COLOR RADAR 72 SM – FRC 1411
Two DGPS units – the code Shipmate
Two computers with electronic sea charts – sea map
Three VHF sets
GMDSS equipment – SPERRY

There was no radar reflector fitted on board. The skipper of the METTE ELIASEN has
stated that on several occasions, he has tested the vessels ability as a radar target – with
positive results.

During the inspection, the radars and VHF sets were found in good working condition. A
ship surveyor from the Danish Maritime Authority tested the GMDSS installation in the port
of Hirtshals on 13 November 2002.

FREYJA was, among others, equipped with:

Two radars
FURUNO – FR 2110 – 20 inch ppi
RATHEON – 2106 – 8 inch ppi
Gyro and autopilot – ROBERTSON serviced 20 February 2003
Magnetic Compass – CASSENS & PLATH

11
 Three VHF sets
One MOTOROLA TRITON C
Two FURUNO FM8500
Two GPS units
FURUNO
MAGNAVOX MX100
GMDSS equipment – FURUNO
Echo sounder – ATLAS KRUPP

The master reported that all navigational equipment was in good working order throughout
and that no item of the equipment failed at any time. The port radar – FURUNO – was fitted
with a new magnetron on 7 February 2003.

All the above equipment was tested by the inspector from the Malta Maritime Authority and
found in good working condition. Particularly the radars were noted to be in very good
condition and to show a very good picture. The screen was good even at the centre, and
there were no blind sectors in front.

All navigation charts and publications were up to date to MN-7 of 2003 (13 February 2003).

Bridge manning during restricted visibility

According to the skipper, the wheelhouse on METTE ELIASEN was unmanned during the
period from shortly after 0910 hours until the collision.

The chief officer of FREYJA explained that, as soon as the vessel entered the fog at about
0700 hours, he called the master and the AB. The master came to the bridge at 0800
hours.

Logbook entries:
“0700: AB “name extracted” on lookout, due to bad visibility + fog signal”.
“0800: Captain on bridge”.

The AB who was keeping a lookout from the starboard bridge wing did not see the fishing
buoy on the starboard side of the vessel until 0917 hours.

Restricted visibility procedures

On board FREYJA, it was not indicated whether restricted visibility procedures were being
followed in accordance with checklist “B9”.

On board METTE ELIASEN, it was stated that, except for the warning signal given by the
skipper just before the collision, no other signals was given by the vessel nor was any
heard from FREYJA.

Human factors
Fatigue

METTE ELIASEN:

The vessel was at anchor from 15 March at 0130 hours. The crew started working at 0530
hours. While the fishing gear was being set – during the period from 0630 to approx. 0735
hours - the two fishermen were resting / having breakfast.

12
FREYJA:

The master is not part of the normal watch schedule, which normally looks as follows:
Chief officer: 0600 – 1200 and 1800 – 2400 hours
2nd officer: 0000 – 0600 and 1200 – 1800 hours

The master slept until 0700 hours on the day of the incident.

The chief officer slept from 2400 to 0540 hours and took over the watch at 0600 hours. The
previous day, the chief officer had kept his normal watch and rested.

The 2nd officer was on watch on the bridge from 0000 – 0600 hours. He then went to sleep
until he was called after the incident. The previous day, he had kept his normal watch and
rested.

The lookout (AB) had worked until 1730 hours on the previous day and relaxed in the
evening. He went to sleep at about 2200 hours and woke up at about 0700 hours on the
day of the incident.

Consequences of the collision

METTE ELIASEN was hit on the bow, which is very strongly built.

FREYJA was damaged on the starboard side behind the anchor approx. 2.5 meters above
the sea level. The damage is described as a hole about 0.5 m2 in size. All ballast tanks
were sounded – and no leakage was found.

13
 6. Analyses
Human factors
Fatigue

Nothing indicates that the event was influenced by a lack of rest of any of the watch-going
crewmembers on board the two vessels.

Conduct of the crew

METTE ELIASEN

The skipper saw FREYJA on the radar at a distance of approx. 2 n.m. about 10 minutes
before the collision. The skipper assumed that the target (FREYJA) did not pose any
danger to the fishing vessel and the work on deck was continued.

COLREG (Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at sea)

Conduct of vessels in restricted visibility:
Rule 19(d) prescribes: A vessel which detects by radar alone the presence of another
vessel, shall determine if a close-quarters situation is developing and/or risk of collision
exists.
In any condition of visibility:
Rule 7(a) prescribes: Every vessel shall use all available means appropriate to the
prevailing circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of collision exists … and Rule
7(c) prescribes: Assumptions shall not be made on the basis of scanty information,
especially scanty radar information.

After having observed FREYJA, the skipper failed to perform any risk of collision
assessment as prescribed by COLREG.
The fact that FREYJA was on collision course was therefore discovered too late and the
skipper precluded himself from the opportunity to attract the attention of FREYJA
- in accordance with COLREG Rule 36 – Signals to attract attention
- or by means of VHF radio

Danish Maritime Authority Order no. 240 of 27 April 1998 on watch-keeping on board ships
In Section 2 and Section 4 the following is laid down:

2. It is the responsibility of the master of any ship to ensure that outside port or protected
anchorage a safe navigational and engineering watch is maintained at all times, and, on
ships required to be fitted with radio equipment, a safe radio watch.

4. On small ships and vessels where on-board arrangements, employment of the ship or
the size of its crew make full compliance with these watch-keeping requirements
impracticable or unreasonable, the requirements shall be complied with to the extent
possible with regard to existing conditions. In all cases a proper lookout from the deck or
wheelhouse shall be maintained outside port or protected anchorage.

14
It is the opinion of the Division for Investigation of Accidents that the principles of watch-
keeping were not fully complied with. It was not possible to maintain a proper lookout from
the deck under the existing conditions with dense fog.

The fishing vessel failed to fulfil its obligation in accordance with COLREG, Rule 35(c) –
Sound signals in restricted visibility.

FREYJA

On the basis of the information available, it is the opinion of the investigators that the
officers on the bridge should be well experienced with the vessel and its equipment, the
vessel’s manoeuvring characteristics, the company’s procedures, standing orders, the
Safety Management System and procedural checklists. There was, however, no indication
that the restricted visibility procedures were being followed in accordance with the checklist.

According to the statements given, the speed was reduced to manoeuvring speed at 0800
hours. However, the positions on the charts (see fig. on page 11) do not indicate the
slowing down of the vessel. According to the calculations, which are based on the positions
at 0700, 0800, 0900 and 0918 hours, respectively, the speed was approx. 12 knots
throughout the entire period until shortly before the collision.

It is the opinion of the investigators that the requirements of COLREG – Rule 6, safe speed
and Rule 19, conduct of vessels in restricted visibility – were not complied with.

There was conflicting information as to whether a fog signal was actually given.

METTE ELIASEN was not observed on the radar. As the fishing vessel had a length of 20
meters and based on it’s construction, it should, in the opinion the Danish investigation
Division, have produced a good radar echo, particularly as the sea was flat calm.

COLREG, Rule 7 prescribes:

Proper use shall be made of radar equipment if fitted and operational, including long-range
scanning to obtain early warning of risk of collision …

Improper radar watch-keeping, insufficient risk of collision assessment or incorrect use of

the radars may be the reason for not having detected METTE ELIASEN on the radars.

Nothing indicates that the collision was caused by technical defects in the navigational or
steering systems on board.

Consequences of the collision

FREYJA was heading directly towards METTE ELIASEN – approx. amidships – and the
collision could not have been avoided by FREYJA’s manoeuvres alone.

The prompt reaction by the skipper on METTE ELIASEN limited the consequences of the
collision to relatively minor damages. It is the opinion of the Division for Investigation of
Maritime Accidents that, had the skipper not reversed the engine, it would have been a far
more hazardous situation for the crew on board the fishing vessel, and the vessel would
probably also have been lost.
15
 7. Conclusion
Immediate cause of the collision

The crew on FREYJA did not observe METTE ELIASEN on the radar.

Latent failures
Not listed in any order of priority

It was identified, as a result of the investigation that the bridge team onboard FREYJA did
not comply with the onboard bridge procedures and COLREG – Rule 6 regarding “safe
speed”.

Both vessels were in dense fog, however, the lookout onboard FREYJA was not effective
and onboard METTE ELIASEN there was no lookout all together.

After having observed FREYJA on the radar, approx. 10 minutes before the collision, the
skipper on METTE ELIASEN failed to check by radar whether there was a risk of collision.

METTE ELIASEN failed to give fog signal, which may have been of significant importance
under the prevailing circumstances.
There was conflicting information as to whether FREYJA gave fog signal.

19 February 2004

Thomas Rekvad
Ship Surveyor

16
Additional Comments of the Malta Maritime Authority

There may have been a live ware deficiency on the bridge of FREYJA. From the
information available, when the master entered the bridge it is unclear who had the conn.
This possible misunderstanding may have led the duty officer to assume that the master,
being his senior, had the conn. There are many casualty investigation reports, which
identify this error and it seems that this point was not explored by the investigation in this
case.

On FREYJA the bridge team did not follow good seamanship procedures by not going on
hand steering when the vessel entered the fog.

The METTE ELIASEN did not have a radar reflector on board. Although the vessel’s
superstructure, masts and winches etc. are in steel / aluminium, the vessel is mainly
constructed from wood. The skipper of the METTE ELIASEN has stated that on several
occasions, he has tested the vessels ability as a radar target – with positive results.

Notwithstanding the above, wood is a bad reflector. In addition, one would have to take into
consideration that the METTE ELIASEN was end on rather than beam on. This would even
more so have given a very bad echo on the radar, considering that the METTE ELIASEN
did not have a radar reflector. In addition, the vessel has a gross tonnage of 56.49.

Even if one considers the fact that the METTE ELIASEN is a fishing trawler to which the
SOLAS Convention does not apply, however, one may still look at SOLAS Regulation
V/19.2.1.7, which requires ships (which are therefore not of wooden construction) of less
than 150 GT to have a radar reflector (or other means) to enable detection by ships
navigating by radar at both 9 and 3 GHz. The question which therefore arises automatically
is that if the SOLAS Convention considers that a steel ship of less than 150 GT shall be
fitted with a radar reflector to ensure adequate reflection, how much more important is a
radar reflector onboard a wooden trawler of 56.49 GT?

Thus, although in this respect the METTE ELIASEN was not in breach of any international
regulations because under SOLAS Regulation I/3, Regulation V/19.2.1.7 does not apply,
however, considering the intention of SOLAS Regulation V/19, the Malta flag Administration
is of the opinion that the lack of a radar reflector is an important causal factor – a missing
defence, which may have actively contributed to the collision.

17
 8. Appendix

METTE ELIASEN

The photo has been taken outside

the entrance to the wheelhouse.

The skipper was standing at the

winch aft when he saw FREYJA
emerging from the fog.

One of the fishermen was standing

aft – port side.

The photo has been taken in the

forepart of the accommodation –
starboard side.

The other fisherman was operating

the winch at this location when the
skipper saw FREYJA emerging
from the fog.

Wheel-
House

The position of the skipper ( ◊ ) and the crew (o) on deck

18