OFFICE OF EXECUTIVE INVESTIGATIONS
INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY
CASE NUMBER: EI-14-0165 DATE: June 22, 2020
CASE AGENT: Inspector Keith B. Riddick
SUBJECT(S): Darryl R. Daniels, Sheriff of Clay County Florida
February 3, 2018
INCIDENT DATE(S): __ February 6, 2018
October 10, 2019
INCIDENT nncan
acto Clay County, Fourth Judicial Cireuit
$815.06 Offenses against users of computers, computer systems,
ALLEGATION(S)/ computer networks, and electronic devices, a Third Degree Felony
CHARGE(S): §837.05 False Reports to Law Enforcement Authorities, a First
Degree Misdemeanor
INVESTIGATIVE PREDICATE:
‘The Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) Office of Executive Investigations (OEI) received
information from the Fourth Judicial Circuit Office of the State Attorney pertaining to allegations of official
misconduct by Clay County Sheriff, Darryl Daniels. Per the allegations, Sheriff Daniels used his elected position
as Sheriff to improperly cause the arrest for stalking of Cierra Smith, with whom he was having an intimate
personal relationship / affair.
During the course of the investigation, OEI Inspectors developed information that Sheriff Daniels had utilized
the Florida Criminal Information Center (FCIC) and National Crime Information Center (NCIC) databases for
personal, non-law enforcement related purposes.En SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATIO!
Pursuant to the investigation, OEI Inspectors conducted and reviewed queries of various law enforcement
sensitive databases and conducted multiple interviews. As a result of the investigation, the following facts were
established:
Background
EI Inspectors were involved in an ongoing investigation of events that occurred on May 5, 2019, where it was
alleged that Sheriff Daniels committed the crime of official misconduct when he used his elected position as
Sheriff to cause the arrest of Cierra Smith for stalking. Through the investigation it was established that Sheriff
Daniels and Mrs. Smith were involved in an affair that began while they were both employed at the Jacksonville
Sheriff's Office (JSO), Additionally, it was learned that Mrs. Smith’s former Spo. 23 an
Internal Affairs complaint with JSO (JSO 1A case Number 2018-0504) against Mrs. Smith on July 20, 2018,
which detailed, in part, the aforementioned affair between Sheriff Daniels and Mrs. Smith. Pursuant to the
investigation, OEI Inspectors reviewed the documents pertaining to the TA complaint against Mrs. Smith. The
report detailed JSO’s investigation into multiple complaints against Mrs. Smith to include alleged “Sex on Duty”
between her and Sheriff Daniels. Per Mrs. Smith’s sworn statement to OEI Inspectors, when the aforementioned
1A investigation was concluded and was to become public record, Sheriff Daniels decided to tell his wife about
their affair,
During the investigation, OEI Inspectors received information that Sheriff Daniels had contacted Armeshia
Johnson, Mi irlfriend. Per Ms. Johnson’s swom statement to OEI Inspectors, she was first
contacted by Sheriff Daniels via a text that stated “This is Darryl. Put your big girl panties on. We need to talk.”
Ms. Johnson advised that Sheriff Daniels then sent her “a bunch of pictures of things that were in regards to Cierra
Smith and said, “This will be used as evidence for Ms, Johnson relayed how she called Sheriff Daniels
who told her “a bunch of stuff that I already knew about what was going on. The relationship that he had with
Cierra and how [MM found out. And that, he stated Cierra was crazy, and he was coming forward now because
she was threatening to tell his wife. And he didn't want that so he was giving me things to givd{lto, kind of,
cover his butt in the situation.” Ms. Johnson explained that initially, she did not believe the caller was Sheriff
Daniels. Ms. Johnson stated that Sheriff Daniels told her he would prove it and then contacted her via Facebook.
Ms, Johnson advised that Sheriff Daniels then wrote her via Facebook, saying: “’Hey, sexy booty.’ And, you
know, I asked him what does, you know, what does sexy booty mean? And he said, “Well, Cierra has a anaked
picture of you.’ And he described in detail the picture that I knew that Cierra had taken. And at that time, I knew
it was Darryl Daniels that was ~ I was talking to.” Ms. Johnson advised that she did not know where Sheriff
Daniels obtained her contact information, but stated: “...when Cierra would speak tof she would tcl
that Darryl could get her any information that she needed.” Ms. Johnson advised Mrs. Smith attacked her on
February 2018 and that after that incident, she blocked Sheriff Daniels on Facebook. Per Mrs. Johnson, on
February 20, 2018, after Sheriff Daniels found out that she blocked him on Facebook, he sent her a message on
her Instagram account advising her that she should not believe Mrs. Smith and to be careful with Mr. Iii
OE Investigative Summary EI-14-0165 - Page 2 of 8Additionally, OET Inspectors conducted a sworn recorded interview of Sheriff Darryl Daniels pursuant to the
ongoing investigation into allegations of official misconduct. Sheriff Daniels advised that he obtained Ms.
Johnson’ telephone number from either Mrs. Smith or via open sources on the internet, Sheriff Daniels advised
that he contacted Ms. Johnson “to get information tolfko provide him with information about Cierra because,
you know, he's, I'm not gonna paint a pincher, paint a picture of [Jas if he's a bad guy. I mean, he's made
some mistakes, but overall I think the guy's a nice guy. And I wanted to let him know, look, you, you're not,
dealing with the prom queen over here or some angel over here. There's a lot of things going on behind your back
that he thought I was the villain, Like, yeah, I'm not really the villain that you paint me out to be. There's a lot,
lot more going on that you need to know of.”
After the aforementioned Sheriff Daniels’ interview, OFI Inspectors obtained Transaction Archive Reports that
detailed Mrs. Johnson was queried in law enforcement sensitive databases during the time period in which she
‘was attacked by Mrs. Smith.
nN n Archive Reports (TAR)
ATAR is arecord of all transaction queries (a record that includes the type of query performed, the person making
the query and any notes related to the query) made through the Florida Crime Information Center (FCIC) and the
‘National Crime Information System (NCIC) regarding, in this incident, a person. FCIC is a secured system that
serves as the State of Florida’s primary law enforcement/criminal justice information exchange that provides
agencies with access to Federal, State, and local criminal justice information. In order to obtain access to
NCIC/FCIC, law enforcement agencies and users (to include CCSO) must sign agreements that confirm they will
abide by the rules, policies, and procedures governing the use of the system. The user agreements outline the
authorized uses of the system and the data contained within. It should be noted that per the user agreements,
authorized personnel may not conduct record inquiries without a specific law enforcement related purpose
Furthermore, it is prohibited to conduct record inquiries on family, friends, or one’s self. Such misuse is subject
to sanctions against the agency and the state, as well as civil and/or criminal penalties to the person misusing the
system.
Based on the information developed during the FDLE investigation, OE Inspectors requested TARs pertaining
to multiple individuals referenced during the investigation. Per the reviewed TAR records, OEI Inspectors
ascertained that Ms. Johnson was queried on several instances on February 6, 2018, between 11:38 hours and
11:50 hours, by CCSO member Connie Martin. According to the TAR, “Sgt. Kelley” was named in the “ATN”
field of several transactions.
Interviews of CCSO Members
‘SO Crime Intelligence Analyst (CIA) Connie Martin:
CET Inspectors conducted a sworn recorded interview of CIA Connie Martin pursuant to this investigation, CIA.
Martin stated that she had no independent recollection of why she ran Ms. Johnson on NCIC/FCIC, but advised
that if Sgt. Kelley’s name was detailed in the attention field, she must have queried Ms. Johnson at his request.
‘OEI Investigative Summary EI-14-0165 Page 3 of 8After the interview, CIA Martin contacted OFI Inspectors and advised that she spoke with Sgt. Kelley about the
query and he had informed her that Sheriff Daniels had asked for a dossier on Ms. Johnson.
CCSO Crime Intelligence Unit Supervisor Sgt. Con Kelley:
OBI Inspectors conducted a swom recorded interview of Sgt. Con Kelley pursuant to this investigation. Sgt.
Kelley advised that after speaking with CIA Martin regarding the Ms. Johnson NCIC/FCIC query, he searched
through his records and located an email regarding Ms. Johnson, which he sent to Sheriff Daniels and copied to
CCSO Chief Wayne McKinney on February 6, 2018, at 12:12 hours. Sgt. Kelley provided a copy of the
aforementioned email and an attached document (o OEI Inspectors. The email stated the following message from
Sgt. Kelley: "Please advise if you require anything further.” The document attached to the email was titled
“Armeshia Brenae Johnson.docx.” The document provided Sheriff Daniels with Ms. Johnson’s Dallas, Texas.
address, her Texas driver’s license number, her date of birth, social security number and biological descriptors
for her race, sex, height, weight, and hair and eye color. ‘The document also detailed a vehicle year, make, model,
color, tag number and the vehicle’s identification number (VIN) to the Sheriff. A line of the documented advised
Sheriff Daniels: “Historical data reveals Ms. Johnson associated with a cellular phone number of (334) 549-
7776.” The email concluded with a paragraph detailing what appeared to be Ms. Johnson’s eriminal histories in
Georgia and Florida, as well as a reference to records pertaining to her behavioral history during her attendance
at Florida Agriculture and Mechanical University in Tallahassee, FL.
Pertaining to the reason for Ms. Johnson’s background query, Sgt. Kelley responded: “Generally, we would get
either -- it would come through the chain of command. Uh, so either Lieutenant Johnson or, in this case, because
I--CC'd Chief McKinney, uh, it would have come probably directly from the ~ from Chief McKinney himself.
And they would say something along the lines of, you know, ‘The Sheriff would like for you to look into this
person, or ~ or would, you know, wants to see what you can find out about this particular person.’ And so ~ and
then I would start looking, and in this case I apparently, uh, walked to Connie Martin's office and asked her if --
if she could assist with this request. And that's how she came to be involved.” Sgt, Kelley stated he did not recall
that Chief McKinney advised him why Sheriff Daniels wanted Ms, Johnson information.
Sgt. Kelley advised that while searching his records, he also located an email pertaining (in
Blots, smith’s estranged husband and Ms. Johnson’s paramour), which he sent to Sheriff Daniels on February
3, 2018, at 21:08 hours, Sgt. Kelley provided a copy of the aforementioned email to OEI Inspectors. Sgt. Kelley
advised the email was predicated by a telephone call from Chief McKinney, who told him “The Sheriff wanted
everything we could find out about this subject” The body of the email contained what appeared to
bc ED 2¢.cress, his Florida driver's license number and his social security number.
The email also reported a vehicle year, make, model, color, tag number and VIN. The last paragraph of the email
read: “I did not find anything in RMS for the subject or his vehicle. Other records (sic) searches available to me
at this time also did not produce anything other than a few older traffic violations. Please advise if you need any
additional information. Thank you.” It should be noted that RMS stands for records management system and was
in reference to CCSO’s internal records of local law enforcement involvements.
Pertaining to the aforementioned backgrounds of Ms. Johnson and [IN Set. Kelley advised that in
compiling the information for Sheriff Daniels he, or the analysts under his supervision, would have queried such
EI Investigative Summary EI-14-0165 Page 4 of 8Jaw enforcement databases as (LInX Law Enforcement Information Exchange), Accurint, eAgent (which houses
the NCIC/FCIC access portal), DAVID (Driver and Vehicle Information Database), ELVIS (Electronic License
and Vehicle Information System), as well as open sources like Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, or other such
social media platforms.
OEL Inspectors subsequently requested that the CCSO Information Technology run a query of Ms. Johnson and
HE 2. 211 CCSO databases to locate records that detailed if either of them was ever contacted by any
member of CCSO or if there was a record of any investigative nexus that would necessitate the queries requested
by Sheriff Daniels. Per the query results, there was no documentation in CCSO's RMS pertaining to Ms. Johnson.
Furthermore, the only reference to| s related to the aforementioned searches made by Sgt. Kelley at
Sheriff Daniels" request.
CCSO Chief Wayne McKinney:
EL Inspectors conducted a swom recorded interview of CCSO Chief Wayne McKinney pursuant to this
investigation. Chief McKinney relayed that he remembered calling Sgt. Kelley regarding i.
Jr. According to the Chief, Sheriff Daniels would call him and ask him to have a “workup” or a “background”
done on a person. Chief McKinney advised that “something like this occurred occasionally from time to time”.
Sh
Darryl Danii
On June 15, 2020 OEI Inspectors conducted a second sworn recorded statement with Sheriff Daniels pursuant to
this investigation. Sheriff Daniels relayed that he had completed the training from the Criminal Justice
Information Services (CJIS) and understood that the state and CCSO information systems (NCIC/FCIC, CCSO
Records, Management System) were not for personal use. Sheriff Daniels advised that he did not have access the
aforementioned systems. OEI Inspectors asked Sheriff Daniels if he had ever for personal reasons used, or
requested a CCSO member to use, any state or CCSO system to search for information on any individual to
include Armeshia Johnson _— Sheriff Daniels replied that: “We can go, you can throw twenty or
thirty names out there, I have not.... The answer to those questions is that no, Thave not”... “Ihave not personally
or ordered or requested or caused anybody else to run names on my behalf or for somebody else.”
Florida State Statute 815.06
Pursuant to this investigation, OE Inspectors and FDLE Office of General Counsel (OGC) researched the
applicable State of Florida criminal statutes pertaining to the allegations that Sheriff Daniels caused a member of
CCSO to misuse the NCIC/FCIC system for his personal purposes. OEI Inspectors and OGC identified Florida
State Statute 815.06 - Offenses against users of computers, computer systems, computer networks, and electronic
devices. This statute stated in part:
* As used in this section, the term “user” means a person with the authority to operate or maintain a
computer, computer system, computer network, or electronic device (i.e. Sheriff Daniels, Sgt. Kelley, and
CIA Martin.)
OEL Investigative Summary EI-14-0165 Page S of 8¢ A person commits an offense against users of computers, computer systems, computer networks, or
electronic devices if he or she willfully, knowingly, and without authorization or exceeding authorization,
‘accesses or causes to be accessed any computer, computer system, computer network, or electronic device
with knowledge that such access is unauthorized or the manner of use exceeds authorization.
It should be noted that the computer system eAgent was accessed in order to obtain the information
contained in the emails forwarded to Sheriff Daniels by Sgt. Kelley. Furthermore, per the user agreement
signed by members of CCSO in order to have access to ¢/Agent, the use of the system for personal, non.
law enforcement related purposes constituted a manner of use which exceeded authorization.
‘© The violation of the statute in the aforementioned manner constituted a felony of the third degree.
Upon further research, it was ascertained that Florida State Statute 815.06 was amended on October 1, 2019.
Prior to this date, the language “....the manner of use exceeds authorization”, did not constitute part of the statute;
thus, use of the eAgent computer system in that manner was not a criminal violation under Florida state law. Tt
should be noted that the requests made by Sheriff Daniels for the information of Ms. Johnson and|
occurred during February, 2018, before the language of Florida State Statute 815.06 was amended and adopted
to its current version.
section uo | INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
The following findings are based on the evidence, documentation, and information obtained during OEI’s
investigation:
© Per Mrs. Smith’s and Sheriff Daniels’ previous swom statements, they were involved in an affair which
began while they were both employed by the Jacksonville Sherif?"s Office.
‘Per JSO records, on July 20, 2018, Mrs. Smith’s estranged husband I led a complaint with
SO Internal Affairs about the aff
* Per Armeshia Johnson’s and Sheriff Danicls sworn statements, Sheriff Danicls contacted Ms. Johnson,
«Per Ms. Johnson’s statement Mrs. Smith attacked her in February 2018.
© PerMs. Johnson’s statement: “. ‘when Cierra would speak tof she would telfIMBbat Darryl could
get her any information that she needed.”
OBI Investigative Summary E1-14-0165 Page 6 of 8* Per Chief McKinney’s and Sgt. Kelley’s statements, on February 3, 2018, Sheriff Daniels requested that
CCSO law enforcement conduct a background on Ms, Johnson,
‘© Based on Sheriff Daniels’ request, CIA Martin used the NCIC/FCIC system to query information on Ms.
Johnson.
© Per Sheriff Daniels’ sworn statement, he denied using state or CCSO resources to obtain information on
Ms, Johnson.
* Per CCSO IT, no records were recovered from any CCSO system that substantiated the need to query Ms.
Johnson using NCIC/FCIC for a legitimate CCSO law enforcement related purpose.
‘© Per Sgt. Kelley’s statements, on February 6, 2018, Sheriff Daniels requested that CCSO law enforcement
conduct a background on
Based on Sheriff Daniels’ request, Sgt. Kelley used the NCIC/FCIC system to query information on
Per Sheriff Daniels’ swom statement, he denied using state or CCSO resources to obtain information on
‘* Per CCSO IT, no records were recovered from any CSO system that substantiated the need to queryii]
EBB esing Ncicircic for a tegitimate CCSO law enforcement related purpose.
© Per OEI Inspector's research, during February 2018, Florida State Statute $15.06 did not contain the
language that criminalized the act of causing the use of a computer system (i.e. eAgent) in a manner that
exceeded authorization.
Based on the information and records reviewed during this investigation, it was determined that on February 3,
2018, and February 6, 2018, Sheriff Darryl Daniels willfully and knowingly caused members of CCSO to access
the eAgent computer system and obtain information through NCIC/FCIC of Ms. Johnson on for his
personal use and in a manner that exceeded authorization, Furthermore, it was determined that Sheriff Daniels’
actions did not substantiate a violation of Florida State Statute 815.06 as it was written / defined during the time
that his actions occurred.
EI Investigative Summary E1-14-0165, Page 7 of 8On October 10, 2019, Sheriff Darryl Daniels, while under oath, knowingly provided false information to FDLE
Inspector Keith Riddick and Special Agent Supervisor Luis Negrete, both law enforcement officers; to wit he
denied having used CCSO law enforcement resources or official databases to obtain information on Ms. Johnson,
Additionally, on June 15, 2020, Sheriff Darryl Daniels, while under oath, knowingly provided false information
to FDLE Inspector Keith Riddick and Special Agent Supervisor Luis Negrete, both law enforcement officers; to
wit he denied having caused a CCSO member to use state or CCSO law enforcement resources to obtain
information on Ms. Johnson on
Li STATE ATTORNEY
A copy of this document, all related Investigative Reports and corresponding documents were provided to the
State Attorney's Office in and for the Fourth Judicial Circuit for their review and prosecutorial determination,
NOTARIZATIONS
I swear the foregoing is true and correct SWORN to and SUBSCRIBED
This (A_day of Rusu 20 RO
tobiendl
Inspector Keith B. Riddick
Florida Department of Law Enforcement
Office of Executive Investigations
2331 Phillips Road
Tallahassee, FL 32308
EI Investigative Summary El-14-0165 Page 8 of 8OFFICE OF EXECUTIVE INVESTIGATIONS
INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY
RUMOR EEC ON
CASE NUMBER: EI-14-0165 DATE: June 22, 2020
CASE AGENT: Inspector Keith B. Riddick
SUBJECT(S): Darryl R. Daniels, Sheriff of Clay County Florida
INCIDENT DATE(S): June 4, 2019 and June 15, 2020
INCIDENT nn rem
LOCATIONG): Clay County, Fourth Judicial Cireuit
{§838.022, Official Misconduct, a third degree felony
§918.13, Tampering with Physical Evidence, a third degree felony
aa y §837.05 False Reports to Law Enforcement Authorities, a First
Degree Misdemeanor
INVESTIGATIVE PREDICATE:
The Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) Office of Executive Investigations (OEI) received
information from the 4" Judicial Circuit Office of the State Attomey, pertaining to allegations of official
misconduct by Clay County Sheriff, Darryl Daniels. Per the allegations, Sheriff Daniels used his elected position
as Sheriff to improperly cause the arrest for stalking of Cierra Smith, with whom he was having an intimate
personal relationship / affair.
During the course of the investigation, OEI Inspectors received information that Sheriff Daniels had allegedly
attempted to have his agency issued cellphone’s content erased (wiped), thereby destroying any evidence
contained within it relating to FDLE’s ongoing investigation.EE sv v1s0v or nvesricarion
Pursuant to the investigation, OEI conducted multiple interviews, reviewed phone records, and conducted forensic
examinations of Sheriff Daniels’ CCSO issued cell phone. As a result of the investigation, the following facts
were established:
Backgroun
Per CCSO Incident #2019-011418 records, on May 6, 2019, Clay County Sheriff Darryl Daniels was driving to
his home in Orange Park, Florida, when his paramour of approximately six years, Cierra Smith, began following
in her vehicle, Sheriff Daniels, who later stated he feared for his safety, contacted CCSO and requested
assistance regarding a “suspicious person”. Per CCSO Incident #2019-011418 records, based on Sheriff Daniels”
statements during the initial incident investigation and his request to pursue charges against Mrs. Smith for
stalking, Mrs. Smith was arrested.
Per CCSO Incident #2019-011418 records, on May 7, 2019, the incident investigation was tured over toa CCSO
Detective for further investigation. The following day (May 8, 2019), Sheriff Daniels advised that he no longer
wanted to pursue charges against Mrs. Smith, and the CCSO investigation into CCSO Incident #2019-011418
was concluded. On May, 2019, based on concerns held by members of the Fourth Judicial Circuit Office of the
State Attorney about the manner in which the incident was handled, FDLE began an inquiry into the allegations
that Sheriff Daniels committed the crime of official misconduct by using his elected position as Sheriff to cause
the unwarranted arrest of Cierra Smith for stalking
During FDLE’s investigation, OEI Inspectors conducted various interviews pertaining to CCSO Incident #2019-
011418, specifically, Mrs. Smith, IMM Sheriff Danicls, and CCSO Undersheriff Walden. Based on
these interviews the following facts were established:
© Sheriff Daniels divulged his intimate personal relationship / affair with Mrs. Smith to his wife, I
HER '« 2f0rementioned JSO 1A was concluded and was subject to public records laws. Per Mrs.
‘Smith's statement, the rl ~ release of the JSO IA investigation was what prompted Sheriff
Daniels to divulge the affair to
© Per Sheriff Daniels’ statement, just prior to divulging his affair to a: deleted the
information/communication between him and Mrs. Smith from his personal cellphone because “...I think
the intent would be if - if T got a track record of or a trail of information that is not gonna be shining
favorable light on me, uh, just delete it.”
© OBI Inspectors received a letter from [EEN cvising that Ms. Smith". has also performed acts of
extortion to Daryl Daniels as well as the following individuals." mentioned multiple
individuals, to include Florida Highway Patrol “officer” Ahkem Jordan, and Terrell Washington, a US
Navy Chief, as having been extorted by Mrs. Smith.
EI Investigative Summary EI-14-0165 Page 2 of 14«Per phone records, on May 6, 2019, at 20:32 hours, Sheriff Daniels contacted Undersheriff Walden via
cellphone (approximately one hour after Mrs. Smith was arrested for stalking.) Per Undersheriff Walden’s
statement, during the aforementioned phone call, Sheriff Daniels advised him that he was recusing himself
from anything to do with the investigation and requested Undersheriff Walden "to have oversight of that
and just make sure everything's above board and we're doing what we're supposed to be doing."
‘As part of the investigation into official misconduct, OEI Inspectors worked to establish and corroborate the
extent of the relationship between Sheriff Daniels and Mrs. Smith. This involved looking into financials such as
Cash App”, a cash transfer application (which both Sheriff Daniels and Mrs. Smith stated they used for the
exchange of funds during the time of their affair), searching and reviewing the communication between them,
delving into the allegations that Sheriff Daniels had attempted to sever the relationship with Mrs. Smith by
providing her ex-husband with information of other affairs, and information pertaining to the JSO IA investigation
into multiple complaints against Mrs. Smith to include alleged “Sex on Duty” between her and Sheriff Daniels.
During the course of the investigation, OEI Inspectors were advised that, after the FDLE investigation into Sheriff!
Daniels’ actions commenced, Sheriff Daniels requested a replacement for his CCSO issued cellphone and that he
ordered for the data in the old cellphone to be erased. Based on the information, OET Inspectors interviewed
various members of CCSO’s information technology (IT) unit.
CCSO Personnel Interviews
EI Inspectors conducted sworn recorded interviews of the following CCSO personnel ident
of the CCSO IT unit:
Systems Manager Stacy Wase:
OEI Inspectors conducted a sworm recorded interview of CCSO IT Systems Manager Stacy Wase pursuant to this
investigation. Mrs. Wase advised: “... Sheriff Daniels did come to Dominic and have him swap out his phone
and asked him to wipe the other phone.” Mrs. Wase stated that at the time the Sheriff brought the phone to Mr.
Antoniello, he (Mr. Antoniello) was the IT Manager; therefore, CCSO’s phone program was under his
supervision. Mrs. Wase confirmed that the phone in question was issued to Sheriff Daniels by CCSO, Mrs. Wase
relayed that it was standard procedure to wipe a cell phone when it is tumed back in to the CCSO IT.
Mars. Wase explained that she found out about the incident with Sheriff Daniels and his agency cell phone during
a conversation with Mr. Antoniello. Mrs. Wase stated: “Dominic called me in his office. We were talking about
other stuff, and he did have the phone sitting on his desk with a pin number on top of it. And he explained to me
what happened. And he felt uneasy about the situation, as I would, and he just felt it wasn't right. So he didn't -
~ he kept the phone. ‘The phone has not been wiped to my knowledge. And itis, to my knowledge, unless he
gave it somebody else, is in the safe in his office.” Mrs. Wase also advised that Mr. Antoniello did not tell her
anything about why the Sheriff wanted the phone wiped. Mrs. Wase also advised that CCSO personnel do not
normally switch their phones out, unless the phone is broken.
OBL Investigative Summary EI-14-0165 Page 3 of 14CCSO IT Applications/Development Manager Dominic Antoniello:
OEI Inspectors conducted a swom recorded interview of CCSO IT Applications/Development Manager Dominic
Antoniello pursuant to this investigation. According to Mr. Antoniello, CCSO command staff and other members
were issued smart phones based on their duties. Mr. Antoniello advised that CCSO primarily issued iPhones, but,
some members, to include Sheriff Daniels, were issued Android devices.
Mr. Antoniello advised that on June 4, 2019, at approximately 12:07 hours, he received a phone call from Sheriff
Daniels, who “asked if we had any new phones to give or if he could get a new phone, um, and I told him ~'cause
Tknew he had an Android at the time, And I told him that, um, if we - if you wanted an Android, it would take
me a little bit ‘cause we didn't have any spare ones; but if he had an iPhone, I'd get him one today. Um, and he
said to go ahead and get the iPhone ready today.” Mr. Antoniello further advised “... And I want to ~ I want to
say there was some sort of mention about something on the phone that doesn't need to come out kind of deal, but
T'm not 100 percent sure on that. Just there's something -- I can't remember the exact words either. I know there
was something about -- that -- that gave me that impression that he just wants to get rid of his phone and not have
it anymore.” Mr. Antoniello stated that he met with Sheriff Daniels later that day and exchanged his Android
phone for an iPhone. It should be noted that the phone log from Mr. Antoniello’s CCSO issued cellphone
corroborated his aforementioned statement that he received a call from Sheriff Daniels at 12:07 hours on June 4,
2019.
Mr. Antoniello expounded on the comment made by Sheriff Daniels during his phone conversation to request a
phone replacement “I'm trying to think of the words he used. It's not that, Like T said, it was something that had
to do with ‘there's stuff on this phone that doesn't need to see light’ or something, that ~ to that extent. It was
something on —‘I need a new -- I need a new phone. There's something on here that doesn't need to see light’
kind of thing. I mean, at the time | assumed there were text messages or something or, um, you know, some sort
of app or something that was used to communicate with the girlfriend. That's what I assumed.”
‘Mr. Antoniello stated that the only thing backed up from their issued phones to the CCSO servers are contacts,
calendars and emails that go through the ageney’s email server. Mr. Antoniello explained that he made a forensic
examination of the phone so that he could get Sheriff Daniels’ calendar entries in order to fulfill a public records
request relative to this investigation. Mr. Antoniello further advised that the CCSO members’ issued cellphones
had the capability to download and delete any application from the phones. Mr. Antoniello released the phone (in
the same condition as he received it from Sheriff Daniels) and a thumb drive containing the forensic examination
results to OEI Inspectors.
Chief Wayne McKinney:
EI Inspectors conducted a sworn recorded interview of CCSO Chief Wayne McKinney pursuant to this
investigation. Per Chief McKinney, he was Mr. Antoniello’s supervisor at the time Sheriff Daniels turned his
phone in. Chief McKinney advised that Mr. Antoniello expressed concern about erasing the phone as indicated
by the Sheriff. Per Chief McKinney, he told Mr. Antoniello “to lock the phone away, it may be evidence at this
point, and I don't want any -- I don't want to give it back to the company, or -- ‘cause we do an exchange program
with the phones. I said, “Just hold onto it, lock it away and keep it secure until such a time when we're sure the
EI Investigative Summary EI-14-0165 Page 4 of 14investigation's over and there's no -- it's not considered a piece of evidence anymore”. Chief McKinney advised
that he did not remember Mr. Antoniello relaying to him Sheriff Daniels’ comment about there being something
‘on the phone “that didn’t need to see the light of day.” Chief McKinney stated: “I just remember there was
nothing wrong with that ~ specifically with the phone and it was kind of conceming why he would just all of a
sudden wanna swap it out because of the investigation and it was a concer all the way around.”
n of Sheriff ‘ell Pho
1CSO Issued
Fore
Pursuant to this investigation, OEI Inspectors obtained a search warrant for the content within Sheriff Daniels’
CCSO issued phone. A review of the forensic examinations performed on the phone revealed that items, to
include call logs, text messages, images, and internet searches, were deleted from the phone prior to Sheriff
Daniels exchanging it for a new one; the examination also showed that the phone had, at one time, a “Secure
Digital (SD)” card in the phone that was no longer there. The forensic examinations of the phone were able to
locate the following items of interest:
System Applications/Communications Material:
© A‘Call Log” detailing that all 112 calls listed were deleted. As part of his position, Sheriff Daniels was
issued the phone shortly after he took office in January of 2017. One of the deleted call entries dated
March 17, 2017; the remaining 111 calls covered a time span from 4:47 PM on May 13, 2019, through 2:
47 PM on June 4, 2019 (after the incident being investigated by FDLE into the allegations that Sheriff
Daniels used his position to cause the undo arrest of Mrs. Smith for stalking.) It should be noted that one
of the deleted phone call records was determined to be the aforementioned call from Sheriff Daniels to
Mr. Antoniello on June 4, 2019, at 12:07 hours.
«There were 78 Short Message Service (SMS) messages were deleted (SMS is the most widely used text
‘messaging format.) It should be noted that one of the deleted messages was determined to be a Multimedia
Messaging Service (MMS) message (text) sent from Sheriff Daniels’ cellphone on June 4, 2019, at 15:59
hours to| The text read “IT is in my office switching my phone. I'll be
dropping off grid in a few then Il install the app to the new phone.” It should be noted that this MMS
corroborated Mr. Antoniello’s statements regarding Sheriff Daniels contacting him to replace his CCSO
issued cellphone.
‘* The forensic examinations also determined that additional images and voicemail messages were at one
time stored in a secured digital (SD) card within the cellphone. OEI Inspectors were not able to review
these images and voicemails due to the SD card being extracted from the phone before Sheriff Daniels
provided the phone to Mr. Antoniello to be erased.
‘* A “Chat Log” listing only two “Kik Messenger” (sic) chats - both had been deleted. Kik Messenger is a
widely used encrypted messaging service.
‘© The application “Snapchat”. There were no chats available on the cellphone. It should be noted that per
Mrs. Smith and Sheriff Daniels, they used “Snapchat” to communicate during their affair.
OBI Investigaive Summary El-14-0165 Page Sof© Six deleted phone applications of unknown name or type.
Identified Images
© An image was identified of a news article that detailed a recorded communication between Sheriff Daniels