Public documents (Rule 132, sec 19, 23 to 30) the latter's poor and incorrigible work attitude and

the latter's poor and incorrigible work attitude and incitement of others
to insubordination. 1

Petitioner Pascor filed a complaint against private respondent with the

G.R. No. 76595 May 6, 1988 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration tion (POEA) for acts
unbecoming a marine officer and for, character assassination," which
PACIFIC ASIA OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORPORATION, petitioner, case was docketed as POEA Case No: M-84-09-848. Private
vs. respondent denied the charges set out in the complaint and by way of
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and TEODORO counterclaim demanded an amount of US$ 1,500.00 which a court in
RANCES, respondents. Dubai had, he contended, awarded in his favor against petitioner's
foreign principal. In due course, on 4 September 1985, the POEA found
Acaban, Corvera, Valdez & Del Castillo Law Office for petitioner. private respondent liable for inciting another officer or seaman to
insubordination and challenging a superior officer to a fist fight and
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
imposed six (6) months suspension for each offense or a total of twelve
(12) months suspension, with a warning that commission of the same or
Valentin A Zozobrado for private respondent.
similar offense in the future would be met with a stiffer disciplinary
sanction. The POEA decision passed over sub silentio the counterclaim
of private respondent.  2

FELICIANO, J.:
On 10 October 1985, private respondent filed a complaint against
The petitioner, Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation (Pascor, in short), seeks the annulment and setting aside of the petitioner, docketed as POEA Case No: M-85-10-0814 and entitled
Resolutions of the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated 14 August 1986 and 19 November
1986, denying Pascor's appeal for having been filed out of time and denying its Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.
"Teodoro Rances v. Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation." In
this complaint, he sought to carry out and enforce the same award
Sometime in March 1984, private respondent Teodoro Rances was obtained by him in Dubai allegedly against Pascor's foreign principal
engaged by petitioner Pascor as Radio Operator of a vessel belonging which he had pleaded as a counterclaim in POEA Case No: M-84-09-
to Pascor's foreign principal, the Gulf-East Ship Management Limited. 848. Private respondent claimed that be had filed an action in the Dubai
Four (4) months later, and after having been transferred from one court for US$ 9,364.89, which claim was compromised by the parties
vessel to another four times for misbehaviour and inability to get along for US$ 5,500.00 plus "a return ticket to (private respondent's) country,"
with officers and crew members of each of the vessels, the foreign with the proviso that "the opponent" would pay "to the claimant" US$
principal terminated the services of private respondent Rances citing 1,500.00 'in case the wife of the claimant Rantes doesn't agree with the
amount sent to [her] Private respondent further claimed that since his
wife did not "agree with" the amount given to her as 'an allotment for the appeal had been filed one (1) day beyond the reglementary period and
3-month period (of April, May and June 1984), he was entitled to that, consequently, the POEA decision had become final and executory.
recover the additional US$ 1,500.00 "as mandated under the
Compromise Agreement which was the basis of the decision of the Petitioner opposed dismissal of its appeal and issuance of a writ of
Dubai Civil Court.   As evidence of this foreign award, private
3 execution, arguing that the one (1) day delay in filing its Memorandum
respondent submitted what purports to be an "original copy (sic) of the on Appeal had been occasioned by an excusable mistake.
decision" of the Dubai court written in Arabic script and language, With
a copy of an English translation by an unidentified translator and a copy On 20 May 1986, the POEA issued an order denying petitioner's appeal
of a transmittal letter dated 23 September 1984 signed by one Mohd for having been filed out of time. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,
Bin Saleh "Honorary Consul for Philippines." The full texts of the paid the docket fee and posted the required supercedes bond in
purported English translation of the Dubai award and of the transmittal connection with its appeal.
letter are set out in the margin. 
4

On 29 May 1986, the POEA denied private respondent's Motion for a

In its answer filed on 11 December 1985, petitioner Pascor made four Writ of Execution and elevated the case to the NLRC.
principal arguments: that the copy of the Dubai decision relied upon by
private respondent could not be considered as evidence, not having On 14 August 1986, public respondent NLRC denied petitioner's appeal
been properly authenticated; that Pascor was not a party to the Dubai as flied out of time. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was similarly
court proceedings; that the POEA had no jurisdiction over cases for the denied.
enforcement of foreign judgments; and that the claim had already been
resolved in POEA Case No: M-84-09-848, having been there dismissed In the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for
as a counterclaim. Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraint ' 9 Order, Pascor urges
that public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion or in
In a decision dated 14 April 1986, the POEA held petitioner Pascor excess of its jurisdiction in denying its appeal and motion for
liable to pay private respondent Rances the amount of US$ 1,500.00 "at reconsideration.
the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment." This decision
was served on petitioner's counsel on 18 April 1986, which counsel filed We think petitioner's contention has merit. The record shows, not an
a 'Memorandum on Appeal and/or Motion for Reconsideration" on 29 intent to delay the proceedings but rather a genuine and substantial
April 1986. effort on the part of petitioner Pascor to file, in a timely manner, its
Memorandum on Appeal which, in the circumstances of this case,
Private respondent moved the next day for dismissal of the appeal and should not have been disregarded by respondent NLRC. The
for issuance of a writ of execution, upon the ground that petitioner's circumstances surrounding the one (1) day delay in the filing of
petitioner's Memorandum on Appeal are summed up by petitioner in the Memorandum on Appeal on or about 4:15 P.M., 28 April 1986, because
following terms: the Memorandum was supposed to be filed with the POEA office in
Ortigas and not with the NLRC in Intramuros.
30.1. Mr. Ruben de la Cruz, who was newly hired as
messenger in the law firm representing the petitioner was The brevity of the delay in filing an appeal is not, of course, by itself a
tasked with the delivery of the memorandum on appeal in sufficient basis for giving due course to the appeal. In the present case,
the afternoon of April 28, 1986 (the last day for filing the however, the factual circumstances combine with the legal merits of the
same). case urged by the petitioner to move us to the conviction that
respondent NLRC should have recognized and heeded the
30.2. When Mr. de la Cruz read the caption of the requirements of orderly procedure and substantial justice which are at
memorandum, he noted that the same is addressed to the stake in the present case by allowing the appeal. In Siguenza v. Court
respondent NLRC and he erroneously concluded that it of appeals,   the Court stressed that the right to appeal should not be
5

should be filed with the offices of the NLRC in Intramuros, lightly disregarded by a stringent application of rules of procedure
Manila. especially where the appeal is on its face meritorious and the interests
of substantial justice would be served by permitting the appeal:
30.3. Wen Mr. de la Cruz presented petitioner's Appeal at
the docket section of respondent NLRC, he was advised In the case of Castro v. Court of Appeals (132 SCRA 782),
that the same should be filed with the offices of the POEA we stressed the importance and real purpose of the
in Ortigas, San Juan, Metro Manila. remedy of appeal and ruled:

30.4. Mr. de la Cruz upon being apprised of his error An appeal is an essential part of our judicial
immediately proceeded to the offices of the POEA in order system. We have advised the courts to
to have petitioner's (PASCOR's) appeal received but proceed with caution so as not to deprive a
unfortunately, by the time he arrived thereat, the POEA party of the right to appeal (National
office had already closed for the day. Thus, the appeal was Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v.
filed the following day. Municipality of Libmanan, 97 SCRA 138) and
instructed that every party-litigant should
To Support the above explanation, in addition to an affidavit executed be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
by Mr. Ruben de la Cruz, petitioner submitted a certification dated 2 proper and just disposition of his cause, freed
May 1986 executed by Evelyn G. Sauza, receive . receiving clerk of from the constraints of technicalities (A. One
respondent NLRC stating that she had read to receive the
 Feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA by respondent Rances was enforcement of the decision rendered by c.
590).<äre||anº•1àw> Dubai Court which purported to award him, among other things, an
additional amount of US$ 1,500.00 under certain circumstances. In the
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in complaint dated 23 October 1985, respondent Rances stated:
a very rigid and technical sense. The rules of
procedure are used only to help secure not Details of cause of action (Why are you complaining?) (To
override substantial justice. (Gregorio v. Court include place and date of occurrence of case of action and
of Appeals [72 SCRA 1201). Therefore, we amount of claim, if any) P 2,295 US$ salary for three (3)
ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals (83 months stated in the compromise of 1,500 TJS$ total of
SCRA 453) that a six-day delay in the 2,795.50 US$ [as] per decision from Civil Court of Dubai
perfection of the appeal does not warrant its U.A.E. 7

dismissal. And again in Ramos v. Bagasao, 96

SCRA 396, this Court held that the delay in The Motion/Manifestation dated 3 December 1985 filed by respondent
four (4) days in filing a notice of appeal and a Rances may be quoted in extension
notion for extension of time to file a record on
appeal can be excused on the basis of equity. 1. Originally, complainant's claim was US$ 9,364.89 which
he filed with the Dubai Court for adjudication.
We should emphasize, however, that we have allowed the
of an appeal in some cases where a sent application of the xxx xxx xxx
rules would have denied it only when to do so would serve
the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of 2. The US$ 9,364.89 claim was compromised by the court
our equity junction. in a decision dated September 12, 1984. Xerox copy of the
decision is hereto attached as Annex "B" and the
In the case at bar, the petitioner's delay in their record on authentication as Annex "B-l' and made an integral part
appeal should not be strictly construed as to deprive them thereof.
of the right to appeal especially since on its face the appeal
appears to be impressed appeal especially with merit.  6 3. Pertinent portion of the decision referred to above reads
as follows:
We turn to the merits of the Petition. An examination of the complaint
and of the Manifestation and Motion filed by respondent Rances in Both parties came to a decision that the
POEA Case No: M-85-08-14, shows that the cause of action pleaded opponent would pay to the claimant the
 amount of Five Thousand & Five Hundred WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully
dollars for the withdrawal of the claimant and prayed of this Honorable Office to —
providing him return ticket to his country. The
opponent declared that he would pay One Cause or require respondent to remit and/or pay the
Thousand & Five Hundred Dollars to the undersigned or his wife of the amount of US$ 1,500.00 as
opponent in case the wife of the claimant mandated under the Compromise Agreement which was
doesn't agree with the amount sent to. the basis of the decision of the Dubai Civil Court. 
8

4. During the hearing leading to the Compromise, I It should be noted that respondent Rances submitted to the POEA only
emphasized that the allotment I was giving my wife was the Dubai Court decision; he did not submit any copy of the
US$ 765.00 per month and at the time the case was filed 'Compromise Agreement' (assuming that to have been reduced to
the allotment was already 3 months in arrears which writing) which he presumably believed to have been absorbed and
already amounted to US$ 2,295.00. superseded by the Dubai decision.

5. The amount sent my wife which is only P 13,393.45 That the cause of action set out in respondent Rances' complaint was
through PASCOR and confirmed by a Certification of the enforcement of the Dubai decision is further, indicated in the decision
Philippine National Bank, Dagupan City Branch, hereto dated 14 April 1986 rendered by the POEA. This decision provided in
attached as Annex 'C' is definitely very meager compared part as follows:
to the exchange value of US$ 2,295.00;
Complainant alleged that his original claim of US$ 9,364.89
6. My wife certainly did not agree and cannot agree or for unpaid salaries, termination pay and travel expenses
admit that only P 13,393.45 will be given her as an was filed in Dubai. In a decision rendered by the Dubai
allotment for the 3-month period; hence, urder the Court, his claim was compromised in the amount of US$
Compromise Agreement, we are entitled to recover the 5,500.00 plus return plane ticket. The amount of US$
additional US$ 1,500.00; 1,500.00 will be paid to his wife if she does not agree with
the amount sent to her. The three (3) months unremitted
7. The agreement insofar as the additional remittance to allotments refers to the months of April, May and June
my wife of US$1,500.00 is reasonable in that adding the 1984. As evidenced by the Allotment Shp, respondent
same to the P13,393.45 my wife received would sum up to approved the authority given by complainant stating that
US$2,295.00 corresponding to the accumulated 3 month the amount of US$ 765.00 be remitted to his wife belong
allotment due my wife. with the month of April 1984. The amount remitted to his
 wife for allotment cover the three (3) month period was only Even assuming (arguendo, merely) that the POEA has jurisdiction to
P 13,393.45. The basis of complainant's claim is the recognize and enforce a foreign judgment, still respondent Rances
reservation in the decision of the Dubai Court which states cannot rely upon the Dubai decision. The Dubai decision was not
that in case the wife of the claimant does not agree with properly proved before the POEA. The Dubai decision purports to be
the amount sent to her, the opponent shall pay US$ the written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a
l,500.00.  9
foreign country, and therefore a public writing under Section 20 (a) of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Sections 25 and 26 of Rules
Clearly, therefore, respondent Rances' action was for enforcement of 132 prescribe the manner of proving a public of official record of a
the Dubai decision to the extent that such decision provided for foreign country in the following terms:
payment of an additional amount of US$1,500.00 and that respondent
relied upon such decision. Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record. — An official
record or an entry therein, when admissible for any
Petitioner argues vigorously that the POEA had no authority and purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
jurisdiction to enforce the judgment of a foreign court. Under Section 1, thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
Rule 1, Book VI of the POEA Rules and Regulations, it will be seen that custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied.
the POEA has jurisdiction to decide all cases 'involving employer if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen." record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate maybe
Respondent Rances, however, relied not upon the employer - be made by a secretary of embassy or litigation, consul
employee relationship between himself and petitioner corporation and general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
the latter's foreign principal, but rather upon the judgment obtained by officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
him from the Dubai Court which had apparently already been partially the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
satisfied by payment to respondent Rances of US$ 5,500.00. The authenticated by the seal of his office.
POEA has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a claim for enforcement of
a foreign judgment. Such a claim must be brought before the regular Sec. 26. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever
courts. The POEA is not a court; it is an administrative agency a copy of a writing is attend for the purpose of evidence,
exercising, inter alia, adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. Neither the the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a
rules of procedure nor the rules of evidence which are mandatorily correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as
applicable in proceedings before courts, are observed in proceedings the case may be. The attestation must be under the official
before the POEA.  10
seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the
 clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. there is an untranslated exhibit written in the Visayan
(Emphasis supplied) language.  14

In the instant case, respondent Rances failed to submit any attestation In Teng Giok Yan v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,   the Court, speaking
15

issued by the proper Dubai official having legal custody of the original of through Mr. Justice Montemayor, had occasion to stress the importance
the decision of the Dubai Court that the copy presented by said of having a translation made by the court interpreter who must, of
respondent is a faithful copy of the original decision, which attestation course, be of recognized competence both in the language in which the
must furthermore be authenticated by a Philippine Consular Officer document involved is written and in English. The Court said:
having jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal letter, dated 23 September
1984, signed by Mohd Bin Saleh, Honorary Consul for Philippines' does [t]he trial court was certainly not bound by the translation
not comply with the requirements of either the attestation under Section given by the Chinese Embassy, specially in the absence of
26 nor the authentication envisaged by Section 25.  11 a delete assurance that said translation was correct and
that it was made by the Embassy Adviser himself. On the
There is another problem in respect of the admissibility in evidence of other hand, the translation made by the court interpreter is
the Dubai decision. The Dubai decision is accompanied by a document official and reliable not only because of the recognized
which purports to be an English translation of that decision., but that ability of said interpreter to translate Chinese characters
translation is legally defective. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised into English, but also because said interpreter was under
Rules of Court requires that documents written in a non-official the direct supervision and control of the court. .... 
16

language hke Arabic) shall not be admitted as evidence unless

accompanied by a translation into English or Spanish or In the instant case, there is no showing of who effected the English
Filipino.   In Ahag v. Cabiling,   Mr. Justice Moreland elaborated on the
12 13 translation of the Dubai decision which respondent Rances submitted to
need for a translation of a document written in a language other than an the POEA. The English translation does not purport to have been made
official language: by an official court interpreter of the Philippine Government nor of the
Dubai Government. Neither the Identity of the translator nor his
... Moreover, when there is presented in evidence an competence in both the Arabic and English languages has been shown.
exhibit written in any language other than Spanish, if there The English translation submitted by the respondent is not sworn to as
is an appeal, that exhibit should be translated into Spanish an accurate translation of the original decision in Arabic. Neither has
by the official interpreter of the court, or a translation that translation been agreed upon by the parties as a true and faithful
should be agreed upon by the parties, and both original one.
and translation sent to this court. In the case before us,
The foregoing does not exhaust the difficulties presented by reliance 1986, and that public respondent NLRC similarly acted without or in
upon the Dubai decision. The Dubai Court decision, even on the basis excess of jurisdiction in rendering its Orders dated 14 August 1986 and
of the English translation submitted by respondent Rances, does not 19 November 1986 denying petitioner's appeal and Motion for
purport on its face to have been rendered against petitioner Pascor nor Reconsideration. This, however, is without prejudice to the right of
against the foreign principal of petitioner. Respondent Rances simply respondent Rances to initiate another proceeding before the POEA
assumed that the decision was rendered against petitioner's foreign against petitioner Pascor, this time on the basis alone of the contract of
principal. The Dubai decision does not Identify the parties to the employment which existed between said respondent and petitioner or
litigation that was resolved by said decision. Accordingly, the Dubai petitioner's foreign principal; there, respondent Rances may seek to
decision can scarcely be enforced against petitioner Pascor. Further, show that he is still entitled to the allotments which he claims were not
even if the Dubai decision had on its face purported to be rendered remitted by his employer to his wife.
against petitioner Pascor, we must note that petitioner Pascor has
expressly denied that jurisdiction had ever been acquired by the Dubai ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the
court over the person of Pascor in accordance with the Rules of Resolutions of public respondent NLRC dated 14 August 1986 and 19
Procedure applicable before the Dubai Court.   Respondent Rances
17 November 1986 are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The
has not proved the contents of the Dubai Rules of Procedure governing Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 8 December 1986
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant. is hereby made PERCENT. No pronouncement as to costs.

Finally, if it be assumed (arguendo, once more) that the Dubai Court SO ORDERED.
had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of Pascor's foreign
principal — Gulf East Ship Management Ltd. — it still would not follow
that Pascor would automatically be bound by the Dubai decision. The
statutory agency (or suretyship) of Pascor is limited in its reach to the
contracts of employment Pascor entered into on behalf of its principal
with persons like respondent Rances.   Such statutory inability does not
18

extend to liability for judgments secured against Gulf East Ship

Management Ltd., in suits brought against Gulf East outside Philippine
territorial jurisdiction, even though such a suit may involve a contract of
employment with a Filipino seaman.

We conclude that the POEA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in

rendering its Decision dated 14 April 1986 and its Order dated 20 May
G.R. No. 112090 October 26, 1999 It appears that a separate case for homicide, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 91-3487, was filed against the accused   but was tried
3

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, separately before the same judge.

vs.
APOLINAR LAZARO y SERVANIA, accused-appellant. Upon arraignment in Criminal Case No. 91-3483 (the illegal possession
case), accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty and thereafter,
GONZAGA-REYES, J.: trial on the merits ensued.

This is an appeal from the decision   dated 1 March 1993 of the

1
To prove its case, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses,
Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 24, finding accused-appellant namely: Pfc. Edilberto Puncia, Sgt. Alejandro Bonnet, Cpl. Jose
Apolinar Lazaro y Servania guilty of the crime of illegal possession of Manzanero, and Major Jose A. Tuazon.
firearms and ammunition under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
1866 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion The facts as shown by the evidence of the prosecution reveal that on
perpetua and to pay the costs. 05 May 1990, at around 3:30 p.m., Police Sergeant Alejandro Bonnet
was on board a Mobile Patrol conducting an inspection of traffic
The information   dated 6 May 1991, docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-
2
policemen. While cruising along Panganiban Drive in Naga City, his
3483, filed against accused-appellant alleged: attention was called by bystanders who were shouting that there was a
bloodied man beside the driver of a Toyota type jeep that was traveling
That on or about May 5, 1991, in the City of Naga, south. This prompted P/Sgt. Bonnet to go after the said vehicle.  4

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable

Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, When the Toyota jeep stopped along Gen. Luna Street, Bonnet was
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, able to see a man with blood all over him beside the driver. P/Sgt.
custody and control one (1) handgun, Cal. 38 Revolver TM- Bonnet then instructed the driver to follow the mobile patrol to the Bicol
Squires Bingham, SN-1029315 with 6 empty shells on (sic) Regional Hospital.   When they arrived at the Bicol Regional Hospital,
5

the chamber, said accused not having any license and/or he saw that his station commander, Police Major Jose A. Tuazon, was
permit to possess and carry the same from the authorities waiting for them.
charged with the issuance thereof. That the aforesaid
firearm has been used in shooting two persons one of It appears that earlier Police Major Tuazon received a telephone call at
whom died and the other has (sic) serious condition at the around 4:00 a.m. informing him that a shooting incident had occurred at
Mother Seton Hospital. Queborac, Naga City  . Major Tuazon then immediately dispatched
6
Capt. Guisic and Pat. Barbosa to the crime scene in order to investigate police station, he learned that the name of the driver was Apolinar
the report. 1âwphi1.nêt Lazaro, herein accused-appellant.

Moments later, Major Tuazon received another telephone call, this time A certification dated August 20, 1991, issued by Supt. Antonio T. Sierra,
from the Naga City Hospital informing him that a wounded man, on Chief of the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) at Camp Crame was
board a yellow colored Toyota Tamaraw jeep driven by a person armed presented in court by the public prosecutor. The certification stated that
with a handgun, was brought for treatment at the hospital  . Thereafter,
7
accused-appellant is not a licensed or registered firearm holder of any
Major Tuazon, together with Pfc. Edilberto Puncia proceeded to the kind or caliber. 
16

Naga City Hospital. Upon their arrival, they were informed that the
Toyota jeep had already left with the injured person and was on its way For his part, accused-appellant recounted the circumstances which led
to the Bicol Regional Hospital. The police officers immediately to his capture at the Bicol Regional Hospital. He Testified that on 5 May
proceeded to the said hospital. They took a shorter route and were able 1991, at around 9:00 a.m., he, together with his nephew Manolo Lazaro
to arrive ahead of the Toyota jeep. After a short wait, they saw the and Ricardo Ronquillo went to Marupit, Camaligan, Camarines Sur for a
Naga City Police Mobile Patrol arrive at the hospital escorting a Toyota drinking spree.   While drinking, accused-appellant and Ricardo
17

Tamaraw jeep.  8 Ronquillo allegedly had a little discussion about a fishing net. They left
the place at around 3:00 p.m. onboard a Toyota Tamaraw jeepney
The injured person was brought inside for treatment. As he was being driven by his nephew, Manolo Lazaro.   On the way back, Manolo
18

previously informed that the driver of the jeep was armed with a Lazaro stopped the jeep in order to urinate and while he was alighting
handgun, Major Tuazon ordered the said driver to step out of his jeep. therefrom, accused-appellant saw Ronquillo draw a gun and point it at
He then saw the driver with a handgun tucked in his waist, pull out the him (accused-appellant). Allegedly in self-defense, accused-appellant
handgun   from its holster   and drop it at the back of the driver's seat  .
9 10 11
grappled for the possession of the gun and as a result, he and
Upon seeing the gun, Major Tuazon pulled the driver out of the vehicle, Ronquillo fell to the
got hold of the gun which turned out to be a .38 caliber revolver bearing ground.   As they continued grappling for the gun, accused-appellant
19

Serial Number 1029315  . The gun contained six empty shells. 

12 13
heard several shots go off. Immediately after the shots were fired and
while still grappling for possession of the gun, he heard somebody
Major Tuazon then confronted the driver and asked him why he was shout that he was hit. He realized that it was his nephew, Manolo
carrying a gun and whether he had a license to possess said firearm. Lazaro, who was shot and who was telling accused-appellant to bring
The driver did not respond to his question  .
14
him to the hospital. As he was still grappling with Ronquillo, he could
not immediately do anything about his nephew's cries for help. After a
Maj. Tuazon brought the driver to the police headquarters and turned while, accused-appellant felt Ronquillo weakening and stop moving. He
over the firearm to the duty investigator, Cpl. Jose Manzanero.   At the
15
then drove Manolo Lazaro to the hospital as he was shouting for help.
Accused-appellant claimed that he did not know what had happened to were not inflicted accidentally as more than one shot was inflicted on
Ronquillo after he left him at the scene of the incident. He also could the victim. 
26

not recall where he had placed the gun.  20

In sur-rebuttal, accused-appellant testified anew and stated that both he

Accused-appellant declared that he drove the Tamaraw jeepney to the and Ronquillo fell from the jeepney while grappling for the gun. He
Naga City Hospital but they were not accepted as the hospital had no testified that during the struggle, there were times when the gun was in
facilities for emergencies.   While driving to another hospital, he noticed
21
his possession and there were also times when it was in the possession
a police car trailing them. He then gave a signal to the police car to of Ronquillo.   He cannot recall who was holding the gun when it was
27

escort them to a hospital. One of the policemen then alighted from the fired.
car and inspected the jeepney. The policeman did not take anything
from the jeepney. The policeman then signaled accused-appellant to After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dated 1 March
follow the patrol car to the Bicol Regional Hospital.   When they
22 1993   finding accused-appellant guilty as charged, the dispositive
28

reached the hospital, accused-appellant went down from the Tamaraw portion of which reads:
jeepney and assisted in bringing down his nephew, Manolo Lazaro.
Accused-appellant was then told by the policemen to ride in the police WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court finds
mobile car. As they were about to leave the hospital, he saw several accused Apolinar "Poly" Lazaro guilty beyond reasonable
persons searching the jeepney. The policemen then brought him to the doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and
City Jail where he remembered being asked why he was carrying a Ammunition under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
gun.   When the gun was shown to him, accused-appellant stated that
23 1866 and hereby sentences said accused to suffer the
he was not sure whether it was the same gun he was grappling with penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the costs. The
Ronquillo for, as the incident happened quite fast. He also cannot handgun (Exh. A) and the spent shells (Exhs. B, B-1 to B-
remember Major Tuazon's account that accused-appellant pulled the 5) are confiscated and ordered forfeited in favor of the
gun and holster from his waist. What he remembers is that after government.
alighting from the jeepney, he went around the jeepney and assisted
Manalo because the latter was then leaning on the side of the Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant raises the sole assignment
jeepney.  24 of error that the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented Dr. Joel Jurado who testified that ammunition qualified by homicide.  29

he conducted the autopsy on Ricardo Ronquillo. He found that the

cause of death was due to loss of blood from his gunshot In cases involving illegal possession of firearms under P.D. 1866  , as
30

wounds.   The victim died instantaneously. In his opinion, the injuries

25 amended, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements
thereof, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact Q: And, where did he dropped (sic) the said
that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the handgun, as you said?
corresponding license or permit to possess the same.  31

A: Right at his back, at the back of the driver's

In the case at bench, the first element is beyond dispute as the subject seat.
firearm and six empty shells were recovered from the accused-
appellant while he was alighting from the Tamaraw jeepney. Thus, Q: So, he just dropped it on the seat behind
Major Tuazon testified: the driver's seat?

Q: What did you actually do when the car A: Yes, sir.

stopped?
Q: And, that gun has a holster?
A: Being aware that the driver was then
armed, I was ready to get hold of him, and A: Yes, Sir. Inside a holster bag tacked on his
when I saw the gun tacked on his waist, he waist.
pulled it and dropped it at his back.
Q: When he pulled that gun — did he pull that
Q: You said he pulled a handgun from his gun alone?
waist, will you please indicate on what
particular place was it placed? A: He pulled it together with the holster.

A: It was near, it was more in front of his waist. Q: And he placed the gun inside the holster
(The witness is pointing to the rightside middle right behind the driver's seat?
portion of his waistline).
A: He pulled the gun together with the holster
Q: And, in relation to the driver, where were and dropped the same at his back.
you then when you saw him pulled (sic) that
gun? Q: By the way, what kind of gun was that? A
revolver?
A: I was very near because I wanted to get
hold of him. A: Yes, Sir.
 Q: And, what did you do upon seeing that the effect which reads — this is to certify that Apolinar Lazaro
gun together with the holster was dropped by is not a licensed or registered firearms holder of any kind or
the accused at his back? caliber . . . (the fiscal is reading)

A: I pulled the driver out, and immediately got I would like to request that it be marked as Exhibit "D," for
hold of the gun. 
32
the purpose of this is to show to the Honorable Court that
this accused is not a registered licensed holder of the
The subject firearm, its holster and the six empty shells were identified subject firearm, and your Honor, may I please be allowed
and offered in evidence during the trial. to rest my case.

As to the second element, accused-appellant contends that the With the formal offer of evidence for the prosecution, with
prosecution failed to prove the absence of a license to carry a firearm the testimonies of Pfc. Ed. Puncia, Sgt. Alejandro Bonet,
as the prosecution merely marked in evidence a certification from the Cpl. Jose Manzanero, and Maj. Jose Tuazon, and the
Firearms and Explosive Section in Camp Crame without presenting the following (documentary) exhibits —
person who issued the certification himself, a certain Antonio Sierra.
Over the objection of accused-appellant's counsel, the lower court xxx xxx xxx
admitted the exhibit on the ground that the same is an official public
record and because the fiscal stated that he himself saw the signatory Exhibit "D" is the certification of the firearms explosive
sign the document. office to the effect that herein accused is not a licensed or
registered holder of any firearm. This is dated August 20,
The records of the case show that the prosecution merely presented in 1991.
court the certification from the Firearms and Explosive Office before
formally offering its documentary evidence. Thus: Exhibit "D-1" which I request to be marked as such — the
signature of Antonio A. Sierra, the issuing officer of the
PROS. ESTELA: firearms and explosives office. The signature was affixed in
my presence when I personally procured this certification
I am, Your Honor, please, formally submitting the from the Camp Crame.
certification issued at Camp Crame on August 20, 1991 of
the firearms and explosives office, issued by the firearms With all of these evidence, testimonial, physical and
and explosive office, issued by A.T. Sierra, Service Sup. documentary evidence, we close the presentation of
MNSA, PNB Chief . . . firearms and explosive office to the evidence for the prosecution.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ: Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting and
relying upon the said certification considering that the person who made
xxx xxx xxx the document was not presented in court to testify. Thus, accused-
appellant argues, the certification should have been excluded for being
We have no objection to its submarkings. We are, hearsay.
however, objecting to Exhibits "D" and "D-1" being self-
serving as the author of said certification was not There is no merit in the above argument.
presented for cross-examination.
On several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a
xxx xxx xxx representative of, or a certification from, the PNP Firearms and
Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm
PROS. ESTELA: would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
possession of illegal firearms.   Moreover, the rule on hearsay evidence
33

xxx xxx xxx admits of several exceptions.

And, as to Exhibit "D" and Exhibit "D-1", this is an official One such exception is that provided for under Rule 130, Section 44 of
document which is an exception to the hearsay rule. This is the Rules of Court which states as follows:
an official public document.
Rule 130, Section 44. Entries in official records. — Entries
COURT: in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
No other objections? performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law,
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
xxx xxx xxx
Relative to this provision, Rule 132, Section 28 of the same Rules
Exhibit "D" is a public document, which was procured in allows the admission of the said document. Thus:
line of duty, and considering that according to the Fiscal he
himself was a witness to the signatory of the same. Rule 132, Sec, 28. Proof of lack of record. — A written
statement signed by an officer having custody of an official
All the exhibits are admitted. record or by his deputy that after diligent search no record
or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records
 of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above Criminal Case No. 91-3483. The prosecution, he contends, did not
provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his produce any eyewitness to the homicide. Instead, the alleged
office contains no such record or entry. eyewitness to the homicide, Manolo Lazaro, was only presented in
Criminal Case No. 91-3487, the homicide case, which was being tried
In the case at bench, the Certification issued by the Commanding separately.
Officer of the PNP-Firearm and Explosives Office, which is the
repository of all records regarding firearms in the Philippines, is We do not find it necessary to consider accused-appellant's arguments.
competent and admissible evidence to prove that accused-appellant is The enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, which amended the
not a licensed holder or possessor of a firearm of any kind or caliber. provisions of P.D. 1866, has rendered said arguments moot and
Indeed, the certificate of a custodian that he has diligently searched for academic.
a document or an entry of a specified tenor and has been unable to find
it ought to be as satisfactory an evidence of its non-existence in his Accused-appellant was convicted of illegal possession of firearms
office as his testimony on the stand to this effect would be. 
34 under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 which was the governing law at the
time the crime was committed in 1991. Section 1 of P.D. 1866 provides:
Accused-appellant finally argues that assuming that he is guilty, he
should only be convicted of the crime of simple illegal possession not Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition,
qualified by homicide. He offers two propositions in support of this Disposition or Possession of Firearms, Ammunition or
argument. Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. — The penalty
First, accused-appellant argues that the information filed against him in of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
Criminal Case No. 91-3483 did not clearly allege the crime of homicide. perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
Instead, he argues, it was the separate information for homicide filed in unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or
Criminal Case No. 91-3487 which alleged all the elements of homicide. possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition, or
He states further that the case for homicide, for which he was likewise machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used
convicted, is now the subject of an appeal with the Court of Appeals. in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.

Second, accused-appellant argues that assuming that the information in If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
Criminal Case No. 91-3483 sufficiently alleged the said qualifying unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
circumstance, he still could not be convicted of the crime of illegal (Emphasis supplied)
possession of firearms and ammunition qualified by homicide as the
prosecution failed to prove the fact of homicide during the trial of
Under the ruling in People vs. Quijada,   violation of P.D. 1866 is an
35
three: Provided, however, That no other crime was
offense distinct from murder or homicide and the accused is culpable committed by the person arrested.
for two separate offenses.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of
Republic Act No. 8294 has since amended P.D. No. 1866 by reducing unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall
the penalties for simple and aggravated forms of illegal possession and be considered as an aggravating circumstance. (emphasis
considering the use of an unlicensed firearm simply as an aggravating supplied)
circumstance in murder or homicide. The law now provides:
In view of these amendments introduced by R.A. 8294, this Court has
Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, recently in the case of People vs. Molina,   and reiterated in People vs.
36

Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Feloteo,   that there can be no separate conviction of the crime of illegal
37

Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the possession of firearms under P.D. 1866. Thus in People vs. Molina, it
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. — The penalty was held:
of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of
not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be Fortunately for appellants, however, RA 8294 has now
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully amended the said decree and considers the use of an
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low unlicensed firearm simply as an aggravating circumstance
powered firearm such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and in murder or homicide, and not as separate offense. The
other firearm of similar firepower, ammunition, or intent of Congress to treat as a single offense the illegal
machinery, tool or instrument used in the manufacture of possession of firearm and the commission of murder or
any firearm or ammunition: Provided, That no other crime homicide with the use of such unlicensed firearm is clear
was committed. from the following deliberations of the Senate during the
process of amending Senate Bill No. 1148:
The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period and a
fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be Senator Drilon. On line 18, we propose to
imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm retain the original provision of law which says,
which includes those with bores bigger than .38 caliber and "If homicide or murder is committed with the
9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .45 and also lesser use of unlicensed firearm." And in order that
caliber firearms but considered powerful such as caliber . we can shorten the paragraph, we would
357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms suggest and move that the use of the
with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or unlicensed firearm be considered as an
aggravating circumstance rather than In 1995, the Supreme Court held that when
imposing another period which may not be in the crime of killing another person is
consonance with the Revised Penal Code. committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, the ruling in the case of People vs.
So that if I may read the paragraph in order Barros was that the crime should only be
that it can be understood, may I propose an illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated
amendment to lines 18 to 22 to read as form. But in the later case, in May 1996, in the
follows: "If homicide or murder is committed case of People vs. Evangelista, the court
with the use of the unlicensed firearm, SUCH apparently took another position and ruled that
USE OF AN UNLICENSED FIREARM SHALL when a person is killed with the use of an
BE CONSIDERED AS AN AGGRAVATING unlicensed firearm, it is possible to file two
CIRCUMSTANCE." separate information(s) — one for murder and
one for illegal possession of firearms.
xxx xxx xxx
In other words, in two successive years, the
Senator Santiago. Mr. President. Supreme Court issued two different ways of
treating the problem. The first is to treat it as
The president. With the permission of the two one crime alone in the aggravated form, and
gentlemen, Senator Santiago is recognized. the second is to treat is as two separate
crimes.
Senator Santiago. Will the principal author
allow me as co-author to take the [f]loor to So at this point, the Senate has a choice on
explain, for the information of our colleagues, whether we shall follow the 1995 or the 1996
the stand taken by the Supreme Court on the ruling. The proposal of the gentleman, as a
question of whether aggravated illegal proposed amendment is to use the 1995 ruling
possession is a complex or a compound and to consider the offense as only one
offense. May I have the [f]loor? offense but an aggravated form. That could be
acceptable also to this co-author.
Senator Revilla. Yes, Mr. President.
The Presiding Officer [Sen. Flavier] So, do I
Senator Santiago. Thank you. take it that the amendment is accepted?
 Senator Revilla. Yes, it is accepted, Mr. In the case at bench, it is not disputed that accused-appellant
President. was charged, tried and convicted for two separate crimes of
illegal possession and homicide. Accused-appellant, in his brief,
The Presiding Officer [Sen. Flavier.] Thank refers to the homicide case in arguing that his conviction in the
you. Is there any objection to the amendment? illegal possession case was not proper.   Similarly, the Solicitor-
39

[Silence] There being none, the amendment is General, in his Brief, mentioned the homicide case in justifying
approved. the sentence handed down by the trial court.   Finally, the
40

records themselves show that trial in the two cases proceeded

Although the explanation of the legal implication of the separately.   The two separate cases, Criminal Case No. 91-
41

Drilon amendment may not have been very precise, such 3487 (for homicide) and Criminal Case No. 91-3483 (for illegal
modification, as approved and carried in the final version possession of firearm) were not tried jointly, although filed in the
enacted as RA 8294, is unequivocal in language and same trial court. Criminal Case No. 91-3487 was appealed to the
meaning. The use of an unlicensed firearm in a killing is Court of
now merely an aggravating circumstance in the crime of Appeals.  42

murder or homicide. This is clear from the very wordings of

the third paragraph of Section 1 of RA 8294, which reads: In view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act 8294 to
Presidential Decree 1866, separate prosecutions for homicide and
If homicide or murder is committed with the illegal possession are no longer in order. Instead, illegal possession of
use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an firearms is merely to be taken as an aggravating circumstance in the
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an homicide case.
aggravating circumstance.
R.A. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997. The crime involved in the case at
Furthermore, the preceding paragraphs, also in Section 1, bench was committed on May 5, 1991. As a general rule, penal laws
state that the penalties for illegal possession of firearms will generally have prospective application except where the new law
shall be imposed "provided that no other crime is will be advantageous to the accused. In this case R.A. 8294 will spare
committed." In other words, where murder or homicide was accused-appellant from a separate conviction for the crime of illegal
committed, the separate penalty for illegal possession shall possession of firearm. Accordingly, said law should be given retroactive
no longer be meted out since it becomes merely a special application.
aggravating circumstance.  38

In People vs. Valdez,   this Court stated:

43
Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, fifteen of murder from four reclusion perpetua to that of four-fold
days after its publication on June 21, 1997. The crimes death. Insofar as this particular provision of Republic Act
involved in the case at bar were committed on September No. 8294 is not beneficial to accused-appellant because it
17, 1995. As in the case of any penal law, the provisions of unduly aggravates the crime, this new law will not be given
Republic Act No. 8294 will generally have prospective retroactive application, lest it might acquire the character of
application. In cases, however, where the new law will be an ex-post focto law.
advantageous to the accused, the law may be given
retroactive application (Article 22, Revised Penal Code). Accordingly, and in line with the above ruling, the accused-appellant
Insofar as it will spare accused-appellant in the case at bar should be spared from a separate conviction for the crime of Illegal
from a separate conviction for the crime of illegal Possession of Firearms, which is the subject of the present review. 1âwphi1.nêt

possession of firearms, Republic Act No. 8294 may be

given retroactive application in Criminal Case No. U-8749 IN VIEW WHEREOF, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision
(for Illegal Possession of Firearm) subject of this present finding accused-appellant guilty for violation of P.D. 1866. Accused-
review. appellant is hereby acquitted of the said crime. Criminal Case No. 91-
3483 is DISMISSED.
As a word of caution, however, the dismissal of the present
case for illegal possession of firearm should not be SO ORDERED.
misinterpreted as meaning that there can no longer be any
prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm. In
general, all pending cases involving illegal possession of
firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no
other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294
are involved (murder or homicide under Section 1, and
rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d
'etat under Section 3).

However, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the case at

bar cannot be considered as a special aggravating
circumstance in Criminal Case No. U-8747 (for Complex
Crime of Multiple Murder), also under review herein,
because it will unduly raise the penalty for the four counts
G.R. No. 146550             March 17, 2006 (spouses Delfin). The document, so it appears, bore the signatures of
Esperanza and Estrella, as well as the thumb marks of Teresa, Maria,
FELIPA DELFIN, GINA MAALAT, SHIRLEY TAMAYO, RECIO and Cipriano, and was acknowledged before a notary public. On 18
DAÑOS, and ROBERTO DELFIN, Petitioners, November 1980, the spouses Delfin registered the Deed of Absolute
vs. Sale with the Register of Deeds of the Province of Capiz. Thereupon, a
PRESENTACION D. BILLONES, ROSARIO D. DEMONARCA new title, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-17071, was issued in
(accompanied by husband Pedro and Demonarca), WENEFREDO the name of the spouses Delfin.3
DEGALA (representing Pedro Degala), RAMON DELA CRUZ
(representing his deceased wife Maria Daradar dela Cruz), Meanwhile, on 26 March 1965, an Extra-Judicial Partition and Absolute
TERESITA DALIVA DEVIENTE (daughter of Esperanza Daradar Deed of Sale4 involving Lot No. 3414 then covered by TCT No. T-16804
Daliva), and JOLLY DATAR (representing his deceased mother was made between Teresa Daños, Trinidad Degala, Leopoldo Degala,
Trinidad D. Datar) and the COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. Presentacion Degala, Rosario Degala and Pedro

DECISION Degala, on one part, and the spouses Delfin, on the other. The deed,
bearing either the thumb marks or the signatures of the sellers, was
TINGA, J.: likewise notarized. Said document was registered by the spouses Delfin
on 24 June 1980. Thus, TCT No. T-16804 covering Lot No. 3414 was
This treats of the petition for review on certiorari assailing the cancelled and a new one, TCT No. T-16805, was issued in the names
Decision1 and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. of the spouses Delfin on 24 June 1980.5
54035 entitled Presentacion D. Billones, et al. v. Felipa Delfin, et al.,
promulgated on 13 October 2000 and 26 December 2000, respectively, The spouses Delfin then consolidated Lots No. 213 and No. 3414 and
which reversed the 27 May 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, subdivided the resulting lot into six (6) smaller lots.6 Lot No. 1, covered
Branch 15 of Roxas City. by TCT No. T-19618, was sold to Roberto Delfin on 21 October 1989;
Lot No. 2 covered by TCT No. T-19619 to Recio Daños on 25 April
The antecedents are as follows: 1985; Lot No. 3 covered by TCT No. T-19620 to Gina Maalat on 14
June 1989, and; Lot No. 4 covered by TCT No. T-19621 to Shirley
On 29 July 1960, a Deed of Absolute Sale2 over Lot No. 213, covered Tamayo on 11 August 1989. Lot No. 5 remained with the spouses
by RO-5563 (14516) of the Cadastral Survey of Panitan, Capiz, was Delfin, while Lot No. 6 was used as an access road.7
executed by Teresa Daños, Esperanza Daradar, Estrella Daradar and
Maria Daradar, with the marital consent of Cipriano Degala, husband of On 12 April 1994, herein respondents, claiming to be the heirs of the
Teresa Daños, in favor of the spouses Rodolfo Delfin and Felipa Belo former owners of Lots No. 213 and No. 3414, filed an action for
annulment, reconveyance, recovery of ownership and possession and Giving credence to the claims of petitioners, the trial court ruled that
damages.8 According to them, it was only in 19899 when they respondents’ claim of ownership over the subject properties was not
established by a preponderance of evidence. Compared to
discovered that Teresa Daños, sick and in dire need of money, was respondents’ verbal claims of ownership, the spouses Delfin were able
constrained to mortgage the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 3414 to to prove that they bought the properties from the original owners, the
the spouses Delfin for P300.00 sometime in 1965.10 Taking advantage trial court added. The trial court held that the deeds of sale being duly
of her condition, the spouses Delfin made her sign a document executed notarial and public documents, they enjoy the presumption of
purporting to be a mortgage, but which turned out to be an extrajudicial regularity which can only be contradicted by clear and convincing
partition with deed of absolute sale. As to Lot No. 213, respondents evidence. In addition, respondents’ claims based on fraud were barred
averred that the Deed of Sale covering the property was fictitious and by prescription, having been filed more than four (4) years from the time
the signatures and thumb marks contained therein were all forged the instruments were registered with the Register of Deeds, and they
because three (3) of the signatories therein died before the alleged sale are estopped from annulling the documents by reason of laches, the
in 1960, namely: Estrella Daradar, who died in 1934, and Esperanza action having been filed 15 years after the deeds were registered. The
Daradar and Cipriano Degala, who both died in 1946.11 As proof trial court also denied respondents’ claims for damages.15
thereof, respondents presented certifications12 on the deaths of
Esperanza Daradar and Cipriano Degala by the Local Civil Registrar of Respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed
Panitan, Capiz. the ruling of the trial court. In its Decision,16 the Court of Appeals ruled
that while an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive
To counter respondents’ arguments, petitioners alleged that trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of the
respondents’ action was already barred by prescription and laches. certificate of title over the property, such prescriptive period does not
Further, they argued that the spouses Delfin, as well as the subsequent apply if the person claiming to be the owner of the property is in
owners of the subject properties, are innocent purchasers for value and possession thereof, such as respondents in this case.17 Moreover,
in good faith, whose titles to the lots at the time of the purchase were all considering that a similar action for reconveyance was filed by
clean and free from liens and encumbrances.13 The documents respondents as early as 1989 which was eventually dismissed without
prejudice, respondents’ action to annul the two (2) deeds on the ground
evidencing the conveyance of the properties were personally and of fraud has not yet prescribed, according to the Court of Appeals.18
unilaterally executed by the vendors-signatories therein without any
intervention from the spouses Delfin, and duly acknowledged before a The appellate court annulled the Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of
notary public, petitioners averred.14 Sale covering Lot No. 3414. The appellate court noted that: (i) Teresa
Daños was a very old and sickly woman; (ii) she and her children
lacked formal education to fully comprehend the document to which
they affixed their signatures and/or thumb marks; (iii) P300.00 was (1) Annulling the Extra-Judicial Partition and Deed of Absolute
inadequate consideration for a lot consisting of 1,565 square meters Sale dated March 26, 1965 and Deed of Absolute Sale dated July
even in 1965; (iv) respondents were allowed to remain in the subject 9, 1960;
properties; and (v) the questioned document was registered in the
name of the spouses Delfin 15 years after the alleged date of its (2) Reinstating OCT No. RO-5563 (14516) referring to Lot 213
execution, when most of the alleged vendors have already died. These registered in the names of Teresa Daños (1/2 portion), and the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the said document show children of Lucia Daños, namely: Esperanza Daradar, Estrella
that the real intention was merely to secure the loan of P300.00. Thus, Daradar and Maria Daradar (1/2 pro-indiviso) and OCT No.
what took place was in fact, an equitable mortgage and not a sale.19 (4650) RO-5529 referring to Lot 3414 registered in the names of
the late spouses Cipriano Degala and Teresa Daños, and
As for Lot No. 213, the Court of Appeals held that the Deed of Absolute canceling the TCTs issued thereafter;
Sale could not have been executed on 9 July 1960. Relying on the
certifications of death presented by respondents, the Court of Appeals (3) Ordering plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, to pay
ruled that the defense of due execution cannot prevail over the fact that defendant Felipa Belo Delfin the amount of P300.00 within thirty
two (2) of the signatories therein have already died prior to said (30) days from the date of finality of this decision;
date.20 Roberto Delfin, Recio Daños, Gina Maalat, and Shirley Tamayo,
buyers of the subdivided lot, could not be considered as purchasers in (4) Ordering defendants-appellees to free Lots 3414 and 213
good faith nor entitled to be protected in their rights because they were from any and all obligations and encumbrances that may have
informed by respondents prior to the purchase that they, and not the been attached to both lots and thereafter to deliver possession of
spouses Delfin, are the real owners of the lots, the appellate court the same to plaintiffs-appellants; and
added.21
(5) Ordering defendants-appellees, jointly and severally, to pay
The Court of Appeals thus ruled: plaintiffs-appellants P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and [sic]
for attorney’s fees and P10,000.00 as litigation expenses.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby
GRANTED. The Decision dated May 27, 1996 of the Regional Trial Costs against defendants-appellees.
Court of Roxas City, Capiz, Branch 15 presided over by Judge Roger B.
Patricio is hereby REVERSED and SET SIDE and a new one entered: SO ORDERED.22

In the present petition for review under Rule 45, petitioners claim that
the Court of Appeals erred in finding that respondents retained
possession of the subject properties. Moreover, petitioners posit that registration of the deed or from the issuance of the title, registration
respondent’s allegations of fraud and forgery confine their action to a being constructive notice to all persons.29 However, an action for
four (4)-year prescriptive period which has long expired. Additionally, reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in
they argue that respondents failed to: (i) prove the inadequacy of the possession of the property subject of the acts.30
selling price of Lot No. 3414; (ii) prove the frail condition of Teresa
Daños; (iii) show that fraud attended the sale of Lot No. 213; (iv) show In essence, petitioners insist that respondents failed to prove that fraud
that Roberto Delfin, Recio Daños, Gina Maalat and Shirley Tamayo are attended the sale of Lots No. 213 and No. 3414. The Court agrees.
not purchasers in good faith; and (v) overcome the presumption of
regularity enjoyed by the notarized deeds of sale. Petitioners also A contract or conduct apparently honest and lawful must be treated as
question the award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in favor such until it is shown to be otherwise by either positive or circumstantial
of respondents.23 On the other hand, respondents for the most part evidence.31 A duly executed contract carries with it the presumption of
merely reiterated the ruling of the Court of Appeals.24 validity. The party who impugns its regularity has the burden of proving
its simulation.32 A notarized document is executed to lend truth to the
The complete resolution of the issues presented before the Court statements contained therein and to the authenticity of the signatures.
requires a determination of facts, which this Court, not being a trier of Notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity which can be
facts, does not normally exercise in an appeal by certiorari.25 This rule, overturned only by clear and convincing evidence.33
however, is subject to exceptions, such as where the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals and the trial court are conflicting or As plaintiffs in the action before the trial court, respondents have the
contradictory,26 as in the instant case. burden to establish their case by a preponderance of evidence, or
evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which
When one’s property is registered in another’s name without the is offered in opposition to it. Hence, parties who have the burden of
former’s consent, an implied trust is created by law in favor of the true proof must produce such quantum of evidence, with plaintiffs having to
owner.27 Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are rely on the strength of their own evidence, not on the weakness of the
deducible from the nature of the transaction by operation of law as defendant’s.34
matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties.
Meanwhile, constructive trusts are created in order to satisfy the As regards Lot No. 3414, respondents specifically alleged that the
demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise against spouses Delfin "tricked the plaintiffs and their late mother into signing a
one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the fictitious and simulated document," and that "TCT No. T-16805 was the
legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good product of a fictitious and simulated transaction [that] was obtained
conscience, to hold.28 An action for reconveyance based upon an through fraud, the same should be declared null and void".35 They
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the claimed that the original owners of Lot No. 3414 did not intend to
execute a deed of extra-judicial partition and absolute sale but only a who is in possession."37 Actual possession of land consists in the
mortgage instrument. However, all that respondents came out with manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as those a
were bare allegations that the said owners were either old and sickly or party would naturally exercise over his own property.38
illiterate; that the purported selling price of P300.00 was
unconscionable; and that petitioners failed to eject respondents from Contrary to the appellate court’s illation, respondents have not
the subject land, as respondents were unable to present any evidence established possession of the subject properties. Save for the lone
to substantiate their claims, much less the charge of fraud. testimony of Orlando Buday, a neighbor, that Rosario Degala Daradar
was the only one still residing in the properties in dispute, no other
Respondents did not present any witness to testify on the execution of evidence was presented to show that respondents are in actual
the deed, nor on the condition of the signatories thereto. At best, their occupation and possession thereof. Not even Rosario herself testified.
witnesses merely testified as to the identity of the previous owners of Doubts also arise as to the veracity of respondents’ claim of possession
the property. Worse, petitioners Presentacion Degala Billones and since respondents themselves averred in their complaint that the
Rosario Degala Demonarca, both signatories to the subject deed, were spouses Delfin had immediately taken possession of the subject
not presented to testify on the real circumstances surrounding the properties in the same year that the sale was made, and appropriated
assailed transaction. As for the selling price of P300.00, suffice it to say the produce found in the subject lots from then on.39 Admissions made
that respondents did not even present a witness to testify as to its in the complaint are judicial admissions which are binding on the party
alleged unconscionability vis-a-vis the prevailing market value of the who made them and cannot be contradicted40 absent any showing that it
property at the time of the sale. Meanwhile, the belated registration of was made through palpable mistake. No amount of rationalization can
the document with the Register of Deeds can be explained by the fact offset such admission.41 By their very own admissions, it can be inferred
that the original of OCT No. 4650 covering Lot No. 3414 was either lost that respondents or their predecessors-in-interest did not exercise
or destroyed and was reconstituted only in 1971, while the original copy actual occupancy, as they had ceased to perform acts of dominion over
of the deed of sale was lost by Felipa Delfin.36 the property upon the sale thereof.

Even respondents’ claim of possession of the subject properties has not

been sufficiently proved. This Court has uniformly held that "the one
who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner
thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked
before taking steps to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession
gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party
and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one
Fraud may be, and often is, proved by or inferred from circumstances, and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
and the circumstances proved may in some cases raise a presumption foreign country; (ii) documents acknowledged before a notary public
of its existence. However, while fraud may be proved by circumstances except last wills and testaments; and (iii) public records, kept in the
or presumed from them, it cannot be demonstrated by mere Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
construction, but must be proven in all cases.42 Respondents indeed therein.45 Public documents may be proved by the original copy, an
failed to prove that fraud attended the execution of the Extra-Judicial official publication thereof, or a certified true copy thereof;46 and when a
Partition and Deed of Absolute Sale. Their bare and unsupported copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence,
allegations are not enough to overthrow the presumption of the validity the attestation by the officer having legal custody of the record must
of said agreement or to raise the presumption of fraud. state that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be.47 A duly-registered death certificate is
Considering that respondents failed to establish the existence of fraud considered a public document and the entries found therein are
in the spouses Delfin’s acquisition of Lot No. 3414, it cannot be said presumed correct, unless the party who contests its accuracy can
that implied or constructive trust was created between respondents and produce positive evidence establishing otherwise.48 Nevertheless, this
the spouses Delfin. The action for reconveyance of Lot No. 3414 must presumption is disputable and is satisfactory only if uncontradicted, and
fail. Further, in view of respondents’ failure to show their valid title to Lot may be overcome by other evidence to the contrary.
No. 3414 or even their occupation thereof, the case cannot prosper
even when it is viewed as one for quieting of title. The documents presented by respondents were mere certifications and
not the certified copies or duly authenticated reproductions of the
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals annulled the Deed of Absolute purported death certificates of Esperanza Daradar
Sale dated 9 July 1960 covering Lot No. 213 because "one of the
vendors therein was already dead,"43 relying on the certifications issued and Cipriano Degala. They are not the public documents referred to by
by the Local Civil Registrar. In assailing this declaration, petitioners the Rules of Court, nor even records of public documents; thus, they do
once more point out that the Deed of Sale, being a duly notarized not enjoy the presumption granted by the Rules. Respondents did not
document, should be given full faith and credit. Also, they argue that the even present the local civil registrar who supposedly issued the
appellate court’s conclusion is based on the disputable presumption certifications to authenticate and identify the same. Likewise,
that identity of names means identity of persons. respondent Jolly Datar who adverted to the certifications did not testify
on how the certifications were obtained, much less his role therein.49 As
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the a consequence, the trial court did not admit the certifications as
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the independent pieces of evidence but merely as part of the testimony of
facts therein stated.44 Public documents are (i) the written official acts, respondent Jolly Datar.50 A document or writing which is admitted not as
or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies an independent evidence but merely as part of the testimony of a
witness does not constitute proof of the facts related therein.51 Clearly Under the circumstances, therefore, respondents were unable to
then, the certifications cannot be given probative value, and their overthrow the presumption of validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
contents cannot be deemed to constitute proof of the facts therein Said deed, as well as the titles derived as a result thereof must be
stated. accorded respect and must remain undisturbed.

More importantly, the very exhibits of respondents dispel the Anent the charge of bad faith on the part of petitioners, the Court takes
presumption of regularity of the issuance of the certifications of death note of respondents’ statement in their Plaintiff-Appellants’ Brief,56 to wit:
relied upon by the Court of Appeals. The certifications state that both
Esperanza Daradar and Cipriano Degala died in 1946 at ages 24 and From the facts and circumstances of this case, Lot 213 and 3414 both
63, respectively. However, a careful study of the records of the case of Panitan Cadastre which were consolidated, into one single lot, per
shows that in OCT No. RO 5563 (14516),52 Esperanza Daradar was consolidated plan as appearing at the back of TCT No. T-17071, and
already 20 years old in 1929, making her date of birth to be sometime in after the two lots were consolidated, and the same was subdivided, into
1909. This is totally incongruous with her supposed age of 24 years in six smaller lots, Lots 1, 4 and 5 thereof still remained in the names of
1946, which places the year of her birth in 1922. Likewise, the Court appellees spouses Rodolfo Delfin and Felipa Belo, while Lots 2 and 3
takes note of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. thereof were transferred by the said spouses’ appellees to Recio Daños
31739,53 wherein the appellate court in its statement of facts found that and Gina Maalat, respectively. These two transferees are innocent
Esperanza Daradar died on 10 August 1940, while Estrella Daradar purchasers for value which appellants admit, and this appeal is only an
died on 15 June 1943, contrary to the claim of respondents in this appeal by appellants against defendant-appellees spouses Rodolfo
case.54 The Esperanza Daradar named in the OCT and the one referred Delfin and Felipa Belo, and not against Recio Daños and Gina
to in the aforesaid Decision could not have been the same Esperanza Maalat.57 (Emphasis supplied.)
Daradar in the Local Civil Registrar’s certification.
In effect, contrary to the testimony of respondents’ witness Myrna
As for the Cipriano’s thumb mark on the deed, suffice it to say that his Degala-Distura that her mother warned petitioners against buying the
consent was not in fact needed to perfect the sale. Teresa Daños subject lots,58 respondents admitted that the only persons they consider
Degala’s share in Lot 213 was paraphernal property and, under the to be not innocent purchasers are the spouses Delfin. However, in view
provisions of the Civil Code applicable at the time of the sale, she could of respondents’ failure to prove the fraud attributed to the spouses
alienate or dispose of the said property without the permission or Delfin, the Court has no choice but to declare all petitioners to be
consent of her husband.55 Thus, with or without such thumb mark, purchasers for value and in good faith.
whether it was forged or not, the Deed of Absolute Sale remains valid
and effectual. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 13 October 2000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated 27 May 1996 is and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed
REINSTATED. forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of
Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D.
No pronouncement as to costs. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the
father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage
SO ORDERED. contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he
never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to
Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil
Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the
solemnizing officer.

For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims
G.R. No. 167684             July 31, 2006 that she and Jaime were married civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a
church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the Most Holy
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner, Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with
vs. the local civil registry of Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent. estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been
married to her for 25 years.
DECISION
The trial court made the following findings:
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the 19, 1969, he and defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the
December 2004 which set aside the Decision2 of the Regional Trial city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh.
Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January "A") in civil rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff
2002. alleged, was an aide of defendant's father accompanied them,
and who, together with another person, stood as witness to the
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before civil wedding. That although marriage license no. 2770792
the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through machinations, allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was
duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he
never applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious
verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated
Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9,
March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no. and received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply
2770792 was ever issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and
and defendant were again wed, this time in church rites, before March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"),
Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that
Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church
another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage issued him a certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff
license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and and defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April
expenses for the church wedding and reception were jointly 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a "purely
shared by his and defendant's parents. After the church wedding, religious ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19, 1969
he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792
first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
continued to support him financially, he and defendant lived in
Spain for some time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of
marital relationship turned bad because it became difficult for him San Juan, identified the Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March
to be married he being a medical student at that time. They 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr.,
started living apart in 1976, but they underwent family counseling the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to
before they eventually separated in 1978. It was during this time locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have
when defendant's second son was born whose paternity plaintiff been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against defendant
in the United States in 1981 and later secured a judicial Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had
separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983. a steady romantic relationship after they met and were introduced
to each other in October 1968. A model, she was compelled by
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when
manifested that when his service was engaged by plaintiff, and plaintiff who was afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with
after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage, him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on
he made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they
where the supposed marriage license was obtained and with the came back to Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's
home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told drugs but failed as it has become a habit to him. They had no
her not to worry. Her parents were hostile when they learned of fixed home since they often moved and partly lived in Spain for
the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will take about four and a half years, and during all those times, her
care of everything, and promised to support plaintiff and mother-in-law would send some financial support on and off,
defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he asked while defendant worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who was
her to marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her family, supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their marriage became
more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and
a minister and where she was made to sign documents. After the this led to a break up in their marriage. Later, she learned that
civil wedding, they had lunch and later each went home plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding,
which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged, since Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not
defendant's mother just came from hospital. Her family did not aware of the civil wedding of his daughter with the plaintiff; that
participate in the wedding preparations. Defendant further stated his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they
that there was no sexual consummation during their honeymoon returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife
and that it was after two months when they finally had sex. She ever since. His grandsons practically grew up under his care and
learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their guidance, and he has supported his daughter's expenses for
wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic
problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and
has unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of corroborated that it was plaintiff's family that attended to all the
which he would take endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her
preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which she sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed
called "intrafemural sex," while real sex between them was far in civil rites some time prior to the church wedding. She also
and between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During their stated that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff
marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and defendant.
defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98,
pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that
things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like because of irreconcilable differences with defendant and in order
amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce each other;
him from sleep and then would take barbiturates or downers, like that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the
"mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the
 knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite
certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under
21). During his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil
certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no.
2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the marriage Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil
contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6 and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family
Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the Office of the
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the Solicitor General for its record and information.7
marriage of the parties, the trial court made the following justifications:
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court
marriage, the lack or absence of a license renders the marriage and held:
void ab initio. It was shown under the various certifications (Exhs.
"I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994),
Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent the Supreme Court explained that: "The presumption of regularity
one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption,
license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
"F") was fictitious. Such a certification enjoys probative value presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."
under the rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, x x x. In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local
civil registry of San Juan testified that they "failed to locate the
xxxx book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered,"
for the reason that "the employee handling is already
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage retired." With said testimony We cannot therefore just presume
between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage
by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19, contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of
1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the
religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such
 marriage license was issued but rather, because it "failed to 3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the
locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is presumption of validity of a marriage arising from the admitted
registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for "fact of marriage."9
scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have contained
an entry on marriage license no. 2720792. At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the
certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no
xxxx Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of
the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage and void ab initio.
on the basis of a mere perception of plaintiff that his union with
defendant is defective with respect to an essential requisite of a We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not
substantiated with facts on record.8 Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the
time of the marriage of the parties are Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which
the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005. Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential
requisite for the validity of marriage. The marriage between Carmelita
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime. and Jaime is of no exception.

He raises the following issues for Resolution. At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one
involving a marriage that is null and void on the ground of absence of a
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in marriage license based on the certifications issued by the Local Civil
accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cariño v.
of the marriages in question; Cariño13:

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and [A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
relied on the presumption of regularity of officials acts, particularly Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.
the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from the In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a
contents of the marriage contracts in question which show on certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
their face that a marriage license was purportedly issued by the license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present
Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
 probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the
keep a record of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are
license. required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including
the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)
petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It
then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must
is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the
Although she was declared in default before the trial court, particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent
petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of
absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the
issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by
her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy
marriage cannot stand. that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized records of his office contain no such record or entry.
without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the
undoubtedly void ab initio. Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in connection with Marriage License
No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and deserved to
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications be accorded probative value.
issued by the Local Civil Registrar should be read in line with the
decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
was held that: Metro Manila, was dated 11 March 1994. It reads:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
that despite diligent search, a particular document does not
exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified
tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
 No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by (SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
this Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage License Number             Local Civil Registrar
2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:
force locating the above problem.
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
San Juan, Metro Manila
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no
March 11, 1994 Marriage License Application was filed and no Marriage License
No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this
Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR. CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
            Local Civil Registrar
This is to further certify that the said application and license do
The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides: not exist in our Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear
to be fictitious.
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This certification is being issued upon the request of the
This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were interested party for whatever legal intent it may serve.
ever issued by this Office with regards to Marriage License
Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said San Juan, Metro Manila
number.
July 25, 2000
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full
force locating the above problem. (SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
            Local Civil Registrar
San Juan, Metro Manila

September 20, 1994 Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and
understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the
above problem." It could be easily implied from the said statement that
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to A No, sir.
locate and determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792
due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed to state with Q Why not?
absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of
Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the marriage applications that your office maintains as required by
fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in
evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the COURT
logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be
secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.
xxxx
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
COURT
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring
to this Court among other things the register of application of/or Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage
(sic) for marriage licenses received by the Office of the :Local license 2880792 is the number issued by their office while
Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, with respect to license no. 2770792 the office of the Local
1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with you those records? Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was
never issued. Then ask him how about no. 2880792 if the
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir. same was ever issued by their office. Did you ask this
2887092, but you could not find the record? But for the
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which now,
subpoena? was this issued or not?

A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . . A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19

Q Did you bring that with you?

Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means
utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of
regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans
in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted. toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is among weight.24
the disputable presumptions.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
In one case, it was held: strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.25
evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there is no
other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived
one which may be overcome by other evidence. One such together for several years producing two offsprings,26 now adults
disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or duty themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the petition for
has been regularly performed. x x x.21 declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual
sometime in 1991.27 We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.22 allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.28

The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family
disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the case at as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that
bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the
of the first and second certifications. State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on
good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non- social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of
issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we the family members alone.29
believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found.
In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is
a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what
they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by
our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume
marriage."30

This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima

facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.31

By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his
emotion or deepest sentiments. As we have said in Carating-Siayngco
v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like this one, where
neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every
individual problem.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the
Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.