Dumlao v COMELEC, G.R. No.

L-52245, 22 January 1980

FACTS
Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate
of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of
the Constitution which provides that “….Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official
who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and
who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he
seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he
has retired.”
He likewise alleges that the provision is directed insidiously against him, and is based on “purely
arbitrary grounds, therefore, class legislation.

ISSUE
Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 22 is valid.

HELD
In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or
municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he
had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes
relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically
significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the
same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume
again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the
challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it
permit such denial.

The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribed is a
classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated
by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is
germane to the purpose of the low and applies to all those belonging to the same class.

WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared
valid.

Espinas v COMELEC, G.R. Noz 198271, 1 April 2014

FACTS
The Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) is a government-owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC) created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD) 198, as amended,
otherwise known as the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973.
Petitioners are department managers of the LWUA who, together with 28 other LWUA officials,
sought reimbursement of their extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses (EME) for the period
January to December 2006. According to petitioners, the reimbursement claims were within the
ceiling provided under the LWUA Calendar Year 2006 Corporate Operating Budget approved by
the LWUA Board of Trustees and the Department of Budget and Management.

On April 16, 2007, the Office of the CoA Auditor, through the Supervising Auditor assigned to
the LWUA issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. AOM-2006-27, revealing that the
31 LWUA officials were able to reimburse 16,900,705.69 in EME, including expenses for official
entertainment, service awards, gifts and plaques, membership fees, and seminars/conferences.
Out of the said amount, 13,110,998.26 was reimbursed only through an attached certification
attesting to their claimed incurrence. According to the AOM, this violated CoA Circular No.
2006-0110 which pertinently states that the claim for reimbursement of such expenses
shall be supported by receipts and/or other documents evidencing disbursements.

During the CoA Exit Conference held sometime in April 2007, LWUA management officials,
including herein petitioners, manifested that they were unaware of the existence of CoA Circular
No. 2006-01, particularly during the period January to December 2006.

After the post-audit of the LWUA EME account for the same period, SA Cruz issued Notice of
Disallowance No. 09-001-GF(06) dated July 21, 2009, disallowing the EME reimbursement
claims of the 31 LWUA officials, in the total amount of P13,110,998.26, for the reason that they
were not supported by receipts and/or [other] documents evidencing disbursements as required
under [Item III(3)] of [CoA Circular No. 2006-01].

Pursuant to the CoAs 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure, petitioners appealed the notice of
disallowance to the CoA Cluster Director contending that the certification they attached in
support of their EME reimbursement claims was originally allowed under Section 397 of the
Government Accounting and Auditing Manual, Volume I which is a reproduction of Item III(4) of
CoA Circular No. 89-30017 dated March 21, 1989 viz.:

4. x x x The corresponding claim for reimbursement of such expenses shall be supported by

Further, petitioners alleged that CoA Circular No. 2006-01 is violative of the equal
protection clause since officials of GOCCs, such as the LWUA officials, are, among
others, prohibited by virtue of the same issuance from supporting their reimbursement
claims with certifications, unlike officials of the national government agencies who have
been so permitted.

To this end, petitioners argued that the employees of NGAs and GOCCs are similarly situated
and that there exists no substantial distinction between them.

Finally, petitioners submitted that CoA Circular No. 2006-01 was not duly published in the
Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation and thus, unenforceable.

Petitioners' appeal was denied by CoA Cluster Director IV Divinia M. Alagon. Unconvinced,
petitioners elevated the ruling to the Commission Proper which affirmed Notice of Disallowance
No. 09-001-GF(06) but differed from CoA Cluster Director Alagons reasoning. Dissatisfied,
petitioners filed the present certiorari petition, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the CoA.

ISSUE
Whether or not grave abuse of discretion attended the CoAs ruling in this case.

HELD
The petition lacks merit.

The CoAs audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check-and-
balance system inherent in our system of government. As an essential complement, the CoA
has been vested with the exclusive authority to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and
properties. This is found in Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which
provides that:

Sec. 2. x x x.

(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to
define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required
therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.

As an independent constitutional body conferred with such power, it reasonably follows that the
CoAs interpretation of its own auditing rules and regulations, as enunciated in its decisions,
should be accorded great weight and respect.

The CoA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is
tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and
ultimately, the people's property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the
constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form
of government.

It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities,
especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the
doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are
entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also
finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would
amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this
Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings.

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, 25 August 1994

FACTS
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as
well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue
Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S.
No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.

ISSUE
Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution

HELD
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis.
To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not
only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to
concur with amendments but also to propose amendments.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax
bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application
must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs
and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is
withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate
days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the
same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The
presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bilby the President the
requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed
with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.