AT: Objectivism (Dogma)

Objectivism is dogma – it begs the question of what reason means

Robbins ’74. John, Ph.D in political philosophy at Johns Hopkins University, Answer to Ayn Rand, p.7
Rand is compelled to insist upon the autonomy of "reason ," i.e., its independence of
In her philosophy of Objectivism,

religious ideas, more vigorously than any other contemporary or recent philosopher. She has even
requested that the term "reason" be engraved on her tombstone." Other philosophers have been influenced or overwhelmed by the depth psychologies, by radical
historicism, or by existentialism and have questioned the traditional certitudes of secular thought, including the presupposition of theoretical autonomy. Prior to this modern skepticism, this dogma of autonomy was accepted uncritically, and it has been Rand's goal to reaffirm the

"reason" is simply a cue word

autonomy of "reason" ". . . as the ultimate judge in matters of truth and falsehood" " on pain of skepticism. Rand is the modern champion of "reason" against the modern philosophical skeptics. But

that has been used by all varieties of humanists since the world began . Its derivatives, "reasonable," "unreasonable," "rational" and "irrational" are the necessary

The word "reason" is a great empty vessel into

verbiage of all socialist legal systems, which are established to eliminate "unreasonable risks" to citizens or establish "reasonable standards" for their behavior.

which any and all meanings may be and have been poured Her ; without it or its equivalent it is inconceivable that humanist thought and society could exist."

position, and the position of all secular thinkers, is made problematic, not only by modern skepticism,
but also by the lack of one definite meaning for the word "reason." As Dooyeweerd points out, “the traditional dogmatic view of philosophical thought . . . implies that
the ultimate starting point of philosophy should be found in this thought itself. But due to the lack of a univocal sense, the pretended autonomy cannot guarantee a common basis to the different philosophical trends. On the contrary, it appears again and again that this dogma impedes
a real contact between philosophical schools and trends that prove to differ in their deepest, supra-theoretical presuppositions.”

AT: Objectivism (Contradictory)

Objectivism contradicts itself – it makes a standard for what survival is
Robbins ’74. John, Ph.D in political philosophy at Johns Hopkins University, Answer to Ayn Rand, p.109
How did the argument move from physical survival as the ethical standard to "man qua man," i.e., to a
"standard" already bristling with value judgments? By this substitution Rand may attack an action which
leads to survival as "evil" because it does not lead to the kind of survival she has implicitly selected as
proper for man." Rand switches the standard from survival to a certain kind of
smuggles ethics into her system by the backdoor: she

survival . (Perhaps it is best to emphasize here that the physical survival of man is the survival of man qua man. After all, man has not become a plant or an animal simply because he wants to survive at any price: he has merely become a coward, or a dictator.)

Rand's subtle substitution points up the centrality of what might be called the doctrine of forfeiture in
her ethics and politics: the doctrine consists in the notion that men who act in a certain way or ways
forfeit their humanity

AT: Objectivism (Environment)

Objectivism is pure capitalism and makes environmental destruction inevitable
Swierczek ’07. Michael, 1/28/07. “Another experience with Objectivism and Libertarian ideas.”
<http://world.std.com/~mhuben/swierczek_1.html>

Rand postulates that recessions and depressions are always the result of government
When discussing the economy in “Capitalism,” Ayn

interference with capitalism. She also believed gold should be an objective monetary standard . The case can be argued

This is a statement of hope, not fact.

to use precious metals as money. Even if this will lessen the chances of economic turmoil, it can not guarantee stability. If there is a drought, farmers will starve. If there is a fire, people
will be unemployed. If a disease ravages an area, the economy will suffer. That tactic occurs more than once in Objectivist and Libertarian literature: assuming laissez-faire capitalism will solve for a problem simply because no counterexample exists. Another example is monopoly. Ayn

Rand states that, in true capitalism without government interference, an abusive monopoly is
impossible. Assume crest starts placing nicotine and
Of course, since such a system hasn’t existed, no one may offer a counterexample. I would like to pose a hypothetical one: addictive narcotics.

heroin in its toothpaste. With no government interference, they have no need to label their products or
use a disclaimer. If other toothpaste manufacturers follow suit, in a few years we’re all hooked on
nicotine toothpaste. If not, Crest has a coercive monopoly . Either way, nothing an Objectivist or Libertarian would call illegal has happened, but an evil has been done.
Consider environmentalism. . Ayn Rand, and other Libertarians, made extensive use
This is where I first found a weakness in Objectivism

of the “Straw Man” logical fallacy in this arena . Rand, Objectivists, and To use this fallacy, a person sets up a weaker version of the argument and disproves it. Ayn

Libertarians do this by comparing all environmentists to people who want to preserve forests for the
sake of the spotted owl. That scenario is not the prime motivator for most environmentalists. The primary issues for most environmentalists include toxic chemical dumping, depletion of natural resources, and global warming.

Objectivists and Libertarians do allow the survivors and relatives to sue companies that dump toxic
wastes illegally. This is small consolation to the dead. Existing non-laissez-faire regulations attempt to discourage such dumping before people die, not after the damage is done. Look at the depletion of resources. Government-regulated fisheries and hunting

Unregulated fisheries and hunting grounds are rendered barren by

preserves maintain population levels sufficient to replenish themselves as time goes on.

extensive over-harvesting. Finally, global warming is a tremendous issue.

The initial capitalist gain is higher, but in the long run much valuable material is lost.
Animals, humans, and human industry consume oxygen and carbon to produce carbon dioxide. Plants and plankton consume carbon dioxide to produce oxygen and carbon. The number of humans and the amount of human industry is increasing geometrically. The amount of plants,

When is not important, because Libertarianism and

trees, and plankton are being decreased geometrically. Eventually – in ten, fifty, five hundred, of ten thousand years, the effects will be felt.

Objectivism possess ZERO governing mechanisms for slowing this change. There is no deterrent to stop a
laissez-faire industry from burning garbage now, and there won’t be one in three thousand years. If something is to
be done, it must be done now. Even if you dispute global warming – and that can only be done by refusing to acknowledge facts – you cannot deny increase rates of skin cancer, lung cancer, and other lung diseases. Unregulated pollution of any sort has a definite negative effect. There are
no Libertarian or Objectivist solutions to these issues, except the handy ostrich tactic of sticking your head in the ground and refusing to acknowledge them.

AT: Objectivism (Atrocities)

Rand’s world destroys reflection on atrocities, justifying Hitlers and extremism
Prescott ’05. Michael, 2005, New York Times bestselling author. “Romancing the Stone-Cold Killer:
Ayn Rand and William Hickman.” <http://michaelprescott.net/hickman.htm>

In her notes, Rand complains that poor Hickman has become the target of irrational and ugly mob
psychology : "The first thing that impresses me about the case is the ferocious rage of a whole society against one man. No matter what the man did, there is always something loathsome in the 'virtuous' indignation and mass-hatred of the 'majority.'... It is repulsive to
see all these beings with worse sins and crimes in their own lives, virtuously condemning a criminal... "This is not just the case of a terrible crime. It is not the crime alone that has raised the fury of public hatred. It is the case of a daring challenge to society. It is the fact that a crime has
been committed by one man, alone; that this man knew it was against all laws of humanity and intended that way; that he does not want to recognize it as a crime and that he feels superior to all. It is the amazing picture of a man with no regard whatever for all that society holds sacred,

let us pause to consider Rand's claim that average

and with a consciousness all his own. A man who really stands alone, in action and in soul." Before we get to the meat of this statement,

members of the public are "beings with worse sins and crimes in their own lives." Worse sins and crimes
and kidnapping, murdering, and mutilating a helpless little girl? If Rand honestly believed that the average American had worse skeletons than that in his closet, then her opinion
of "the average man" is even lower than I had suspected. We get an idea of the "sins and crimes" of ordinary people when Rand discusses the jury in the case: "Average, everyday, rather stupid looking citizens. Shabbily dressed, dried, worn looking little men. Fat, overdressed, very
average, 'dignified' housewives. How can they decide the fate of that boy? Or anyone's fate?" Their sin, evidently, is that they are "average," a word that appears twice in three sentences. They are "shabbily dressed" or, conversely, "overdressed" -- in matters of fashion, Rand seems hard

to please. They are "dried" and "worn," or they are "fat." They are, in short, an assault on the delicate sensibilities of the author. Anything "average" appalls her. "Extremist beyond all extreme is what we
need!" she exclaims in another entry. Well, in his cruelty and psychopathic insanity, Hickman was an extremist, for sure. Nothing "average" about him! Returning to the longer quote above, notice how briskly Rand
dismisses the possibility that the public's anger might have been motivated by the crime per se. Apparently the horrendous slaying of a little girl is not enough, in Rand's mind, to justify public outrage against the murderer. No, what the public really objects to is "a daring challenge to

By the same logic, Jack the Ripper and Ted Bundy posed "a daring challenge to
society." I suppose this is one way of looking at Hickman's actions.

society." So did Adolf Hitler, only on a larger scale.

A2 Coercion Bad --- Aff Ans

---Coercion is good --- It’s key to protect liberty and property rights. Blanket
rejection in the name of liberty is self defeating.
Klein 2007
(Daniel B. Klein is a professor of economics at George Mason University. May 14, 2007. Economist’s Views. “Acceptable Government
Coercion?” http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2007/05/acceptable_gove.html) Sherman

But, as Klein notes, just because something is coercive, doesn’t mean that it is wrong. The coercive power
of the state is useful when it protects our lives and property from outside harm. If we think that state-
sponsored redistribution is desirable, then we are willing to accept more coercion to help the less
fortunate. We also rely on state-sponsored coercion regularly when writing private contracts. The ability
of creditors to collect depends on the power of the state to coerce borrowers.
---The affirmative view of freedom from coercion as the absence of law is a fallacy
that artificially inflates the importance of government while simultaneously masking
private coercion and violence which is worse because under the affirmative’s view .
Kienitz 2002 (Paul Kienitz, “I’m Still Not a Libertarian: So I Guess That Means I’m Opposed to Personal Freedom,” 6/22,
http://world.std.com/~mhuben/pk-is-against-liberty.html, AFJ)

The second fallacy is one that I personally refer to as the

Libertarian Fallacy, since unlike the Revolutionary Fallacy it is specific to this
branch of philosophy.  It is popular with several subtypes of conservatives and most anarchists, as well as with Libertarians.  It can
be
expressed as the idea that freedom is measured by absence of laws.   Another say of stating it is that only
the government can restrict your rights.  (Some Libertarians strongly support this wording, saying that a law removes or restricts
your rights, but a private entity can only infringe on your rights without changing them.)  To me, this is an artificial double standard, which labels
a restraint on your freedom by one outfit in a completely different way than the same restraint by a different outfit, because one has the label of
"government" and the other does not.  Indeed, much
of the fabric of reasoning in Libertarianism is based on presuming
that the government is uniquely unlike any other entity, and therefore must be judged by entirely different
standards from how anything else is appraised. To me, the question is how much power others have over
you and how constrained your choice of actions is, not whether the constraint is by public action rather
than private action.  In the viewpoint of those who hold this fallacy, what matters is how free you are  on
paper, not how free you are in what choices are actually open to you right now in real life.   According to this
view, a destitute person with no public support is more free than one who gets some kind of pension or welfare, despite the fact that the latter is
the one who can do many things that are closed off to the former.

---Private coercion is worse-greater impact on the poor.

Taylor 2003 (Ian L, “Why I am not a Libertarian”, Airs, 2003, http://airs.com/ian/essays/libertarian/libertarian.html) SWOAP
A key reason that libertarians give for their dislike of government is that government action constrains
personal liberty. Taxation is a typical example: if you don't pay your taxes, the government will send men with guns to collect them.
Libertarians consider this to be an unacceptable form of coercion. However, there are many types of
coercion which come from the private sector. For example, your employer may tell you that you must
start working mandatory unpaid overtime. This effectively lowers your hourly wage. Naturally, you can quit, but
there may not be any other jobs in town, and you may not be able to afford to move, or to get training for another type of job. (I
didn't just make up this example--there is a class action lawsuit against Walmart about this). For another example, your landlord may
decide to raise the rent, or to stop doing maintenance on the heating system, unless you agree to do some personal chores. Naturally,
you can move elsewhere, but there may not be any other place available which is close enough to your
work, or all the other places may be more expensive . These and other typical examples of coercion by
the private sector have a greater effect on people who happen to be poor. Poor people generally have
fewer options. Many people become poor through no fault of their own , for reasons such as an unexpected death in the
family or being laid off. Such people are very vulnerable to many types of private sector coercion. In general, in daily life in the
U.S., coercion by the private sector is much more obvious day to day than coercion by the government. The
government normally leaves people alone other than garnishing their paycheck. The private sector rarely
leaves people alone, and limits our choices every day-- most obviously at our jobs. The fact that private
sector coercion is not backed by the threat of direct violence does not mean that it is not coercion. Indirect
violence, in the form of loss of income, shelter, or food, is just as effective as direct violence . People
sometimes cite a couple of reasons why private sector coercion seems different from government
coercion: you can refuse to take part, or you can move somewhere else. However, those reasons are
misleading. Refusing to take part can mean losing your job and/or becoming homeless. Moving
elsewhere, besides being expensive in itself, is only possible if there is a job elsewhere. It's true that in
principle, if everything works out, you have a choice. But in practice, if something goes wrong, you do
not. Moreover, you actually have the same choices with a government. If you refuse to pay your taxes, you may eventually be put in jail. But at
least you will be fed and sheltered. Or you can always move to a different country. There are countries with very minimal governments, such as
Afghanistan or Somalia. While those choices may not seem appealing, they are just as real as the choices you have to avoid private sector
coercion.

A2 Property Rights First --- Aff Ans

---Libertarianism’s freedom of property and self-ownership directly contradict each
other --- Gives contracts the right to invoke coercive state power.
Freeman 2001 (Samuel R. Philosophy & Public Affairs, Volume 30, Number 2, Spring 2001 “Illiberal Libertarians: Why
Libertarianism Is Not a Liberal View” p. 131-133,
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/philosophy_and_public_affairs/summary/v030/30.2freeman.html, Accessed 7/12/12, Chan)

I claimed that the most central liberal institution is the protection of¶ the basic rights and liberties needed to secure individual freedom and¶
independence. Libertarians would have us believe that they accept all ¶ the basic rights that liberals do and
simply add more liberties, namely,¶ absolute freedom of contract and of property. Libertarians then claim¶ their
view offers us even greater liberty, as if it they were just improving¶ upon liberalism, drawing its natural conclusion. The problem is these
added liberties, when combined with the libertarian account of¶ self-ownership, undermine the idea of
basic liberties. For what libertarian¶ self-ownership ultimately means is that we stand toward our¶ person, its
capacities, and the rights of moral personality in the same¶ normative relationship as we stand to our
rights in things. All rights are¶ conceived as property rights. Rights to liberties then become just one¶ among several kinds
of rights that persons own and have at their disposal.¶ Basic liberties are of no greater moral or political significance ¶
than any other kind of property right. But given the crucial role of¶ absolute freedom of contract—that all
contractual agreements are to¶ be publicly recognized and enforced—it follows that all liberties can¶ be
alienated, just like any economic good.¶ Consequently, there is no place in a libertarian scheme for
inalienability,¶ the idea that certain rights are so essential to maintaining the¶ dignity and independence of persons that they cannot be given
up by¶ consent. So Nozick says, “My nonpaternalistic position holds that¶ someone may choose (or permit another) to do to himself anything,¶
unless he has acquired an obligation to some third party not to do or allow it.”54 Read within the context of
a libertarian acceptance of
complete¶ freedom of contract, permitting another to do “anything” to oneself ¶ implies the capacity to give
another the right to invoke the coercive¶ powers of the state (or anyone else) to force you to comply with¶ your earlier
agreements, no matter what you have agreed to or how¶ much you presently object to it. Not surprisingly, then, Nozick later¶ says that a free
system allows a person to sell himself into slavery. 55¶ Assuming the transaction is freely entered into, it is the role of the¶
minimal state to enforce it against the unfortunate person who once¶ consented to enslavement, but who now, quite understandably, has¶ had a
change of mind. It
should follow that there is nothing morally¶ objectionable about owning slaves and treating
people as objects¶ against their will56; moreover, it is not unjust for the State, or any third¶ party, to compel people to abide by their
slavery or other servitude¶ contracts.¶ Earlier I argued that it is a mistake to conceive of servitude agreements¶ as simply private matters between
consenting adults protected¶ by freedom of association. If
genuine freedom of association were involved, ¶ then either
party could terminate the relationship freely. But ¶ here we have something very different: contractual
transfers of rights¶ in oneself, the result of which negates a person’s freedom of association ¶ as well as
other basic rights. Contracts by their nature are no¶ longer simply private relationships that leave others’ rights and duties¶ unaffected; they
become publicly enforceable agreements altering¶ others’ rights and obligations. Contracts impose upon others duties to¶ recognize and respect
contractual terms, and upon governments duties¶ of coercive enforceability. These facts should not be obscured by¶ the common locution of
“private contracts.” Libertarians
describe full¶ alienability of rights as if it were a matter of showing respect for
people’s¶ freedom and voluntary choices. A better description of a social system that enforces complete or
even partial dominion over human¶ beings is that it is a perverse property system. For it is not as if libertarians¶ put
a premium upon maintaining individuals’ freedom of action,¶ much less so their independence, or their capacities to exercise¶ their rights and
control significant aspects of their lives. Instead
what¶ is fundamentally important for libertarians is maintaining a
system of¶ historically generated property rights, whatever the consequences for ¶ individuals’ freedom,
independence, or interests. Libertarianism is, in¶ the end, not so much about liberty as it is about protecting and enforcing¶ absolute
property and contract rights. The liberties that libertarians¶ provide are defined by reference to absolute property in
persons¶ and in things; who has these rights in the end is not morally¶ important, so long as their holdings
come about by observing libertarian¶ transfer procedures and side-constraints.

A2 Taxation Bad --- Aff Ans

---Taxation is good --- Governmental forced exchanges are beneficial to the
individual and are equivalent exchange because people have what they would
choose.
Epstein 2004 (Richard A.,  Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law at the New York University School of Law, Natural Rights Liberalism
from Locke to Nozick, Volume 22, Part 1, “One Step Beyond Nozick's Minimal State: The Role of Forced Exchanges in Political Theory”,
http://journals.cambridge.org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=275209&jid=SOY&volumeId=22&issueId,
Accessed 7/14/12, Chan)

Nozick is mistaken in his treatment of taxation, which looks solely at the cost and never at the benefit
side. Here, and in other contexts, he fails to see how allowing forced exchanges introduces an extra degree of (analytical)
freedom into the overall analysis, which requires close attentio n. It is now possible to have, as it were, justice in forced
transactions so long as the party who is subject to coercion is left better off than before. This is not an effort to introduce into the law some
Rousseauian notion that individuals may be forced to be free, for the use of forced exchanges is not designed to alter or override the preference
structures that ordinary individuals hold. It is only intended to allow them to move to higher levels of utility (albeit with lower levels of political
freedom) than they could achieve through voluntary transactions in light of the well-known coordination problems that arise in the provision of
public goods. The full range of examples should make it clear how risky matters become once forced exchanges are allowed into the system.
Clearly the permissible domain of forced exchanges should not be infinite, and one advantage of Nozick's more limited rules of acquisition,
transfer, and protection is that they preclude petty and tyrannical abuses from the outset, abuses that often take place when the state uses its
eminent domain power. But the
price of his parsimonious assumptions is to block any coherent account for the
legitimacy of the state at all. The key challenge, therefore, is to develop a set of rules that permit some forced exchanges while
guarding against the potential for systematic abuses, including the forms of redistribution that were the subject of Nozick's attack. Within the
American constitutional tradition (which speaks to concerns that transcend America's borders), this effort is dominated by two conditions that
require some attention. 24 The forced exchanges in question should be made with “just compensation,” and should only be allowed in those cases
where they are for “public use.” This formulation is suggestive of and consistent with the following set of conditions for allowing forced
exchanges under the eminent domain power.¶ First, the transaction costs of voluntary arrangements must be high if not prohibitive. This
condition alone suggests that it is not appropriate for me to take your watch while leaving its replacement cost in your mailbox. There are many
individuals who can supply watches through ordinary market exchanges; why take the risk of abuse when the voluntarist solution is so attractive?
It is clear that the public use requirement precludes this transaction, even if it must allow many others.
Rightly understood, the function of this requirement is to allow the state to supply public goods when the
transaction costs of voluntary arrangements among multiple parties are prohibitive. ¶ Second, the individual
whom the state coerces must receive compensation that leaves him at least as well off by his own lights as
he was before the forced exchange was undertaken . The point here is that coercion is justified not by some abstract appeal to
the good of the community at large, but only by a specific showing that it causes no harm (or perhaps even works some net benefit) to the very
individual who bears the brunt of that coercion. The requirement here raises obvious questions of valuation, but the reference to “his own lights”
is intended to highlight the role of subjective value in the context of coerced transactions as another barrier against the abuse of state power. This
requirement raises, in turn, some serious issues of measurement that cannot be escaped once any forced exchanges are allowed as legitimate. ¶
Third, the
transaction should work to the net benefit of those individuals who acquire the property in
question. This condition will be easy to satisfy when ordinary individuals are able to use the coercive
power of the state for their own advantage. They will only initiate transactions from which they hope to benefit. But the
requirement is much more demanding in those cases when government agents act for the benefit of the community (against one of its members),
using revenues that they have obtained through coercive means, for example, taxation. In one sense this position seems to be in tension with the
view that all government coercion should be exercised for the benefit of those to whom it is directed. But in fact that condition is not violated
here, because the willingness
to provide full compensation means that the state power is only used to prevent a
single individual or group from making a disproportionate exaction from the population as a whole. So
understood, this third condition reveals the two-sided nature of the question of political legitimacy. Taken in connection with the second
condition, it changes the view of the world from one of dominant reliance on the ideas of property and consent to reliance on the idea of making
Pareto improvements, that is, bringing about new states of the world in which at least one person is better off and no one is worse off than before.
This test is a “social” test insofar as it requires the welfare of each individual within the group to be taken into account before comparing two
social states of affairs with each other. Voluntary transactions routinely generate Pareto improvements because no one will enter into them if they
expect to be left worse off than before. Indeed, in virtually all voluntary, or win-win, situations, the transaction satisfies an even stronger
condition in that all players regard themselves as better off with the deal than without it. Although the drafters of the Fifth Amendment adopted
the “just compensation” standard before the formulation of the Pareto principle more than a century later, their views mirrored what that principle
requires. We count as a social improvement any change that benefits each and every member of the society
against whom coercion has been exercised. For these purposes, it does not matter whether that coercion has been exercised by
general taxation and regulation or by the specific taking of particular pieces of property. ¶ Fourth, in many cases it is desirable and
feasible to have not only gains shared by all individuals in the group, but also a pro rata division of gain,
so that no individual gains from public action more than any other. Stated otherwise, the ideal is that each person should
get the same rateof return on his investment in collective activities as anyone else. Thus, in a simple three-person society in which A, B, and C are
forced to contribute respectively (say by a tax on real property) 100, 200, and 300, then ideally, if A receives a 10 return (for a total of 110) on his
contribution, B should receive 20 (for a total of 220), and C should receive 30 (for a total of 330). This is the same distribution that they would
receive in any voluntary joint venture, and the coercive venture should follow the voluntary one in choosing this stable baseline in order to
prevent a dissipation of surplus by factional intrigue. This fourth condition is needed because the simple just compensation requirement under
conditions two and three is intended only to ensure that no individual loses from the use of state coercion. It does not speak about the distribution
of the gain across other members of society. The Pareto test is satisfied if A ends up with property and public benefit worth 101 or more, B ends
up with 201 or more, and C with 301 or more. The full 60 units of gain in the hypothetical example could be the focal point of factional struggles,
or rent-seeking, that could wholly dissipate its amount. The highly stringent test of pro rata division is hard to satisfy in practice, but the point of
this requirement is to prevent any two members of this three-party group from ganging up on the third in order to gobble up the lion's share of the
surplus, even if the just compensation test has been met. The
principles here, moreover, are easily expandable to any
number of individuals. If the pro rata standard can be met, the level of political intrigue can be kept low .
This is one argument for the flat or proportionate tax, whose form eliminates partisan battles over the steepness of any progressive tax. In making
this argument, I do not mean to gloss over the serious measurement problems that are raised when voluntary transactions are not available to
determine the value that each person attaches to some collective good such as law and order. There can be no doubt that these are highly variable
in different contexts, and in
practice we often assume that the benefit achieved from any given transaction is
proportionate to the stake that individuals have in society, even when it is unlikely that this is the case in
reality. Stated otherwise, there is nothing in this (or any other) model of governance that constrains public
debate over whether to wage war or to make peace with foreign nations. But this is a problem that dogs
any theory of collective action, even for the devotees of the minimal state.

Coercion = heg/peace
Coercion is necessary for US hegemony and international peace
Stephen B. Johnson 2002 “The US in Space: Cooperation and Coercion”
www.irpp.org/po/archive/apr02/johnson.pdf
From the dawn of the Space Age in the 1950s, the United States has used space as a vehicle for the projection of
American power. The means used have ranged from reconnaissance satellites and intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) to overt propaganda efforts such as the Apollo manned lunar project. Many other space programs have
helped the United States influence the behavior of other countries and thus contribute to American military and
political clout the world round. Science projects have strengthened international ties and promoted
cooperation, and commercial space efforts such as the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization (Intelsat) have projected capitalist and democratic values into and through space. U.S. space
endeavors began at the peak of the Cold War with the Soviet Union in the 1950s, primarily as a counter-
poise to a global communist threat. Throughout the Cold War, space programs grew because they
continued to enhance American economic and military power and to project American ideology. With the
end of the Cold War, these programs continue to enhance American might, and remain significant assets in the new
battle against Islamist radicals worldwide. In this new struggle between two fundamentally irreconcilable
political and ideological systems, space assets likely will prove just as critical as they did in the Cold War.
According to Webster's* power is the "possession of control, authority, or influence over others." How
influence is best achieved, of course, has been debated by political scientists and philosophers for
millennia. Military theorists have focused on the use of coercion to achieve the ends of the Mate. But
coercion is only one way to project power In many instances, persuasion can be far more effective.
Coercion requires a tremendous effort, whether in fighting a schoolyard bully or a hostile nation. Victory
usually goes to the stronger combatant, which mean* that combatants serious about achieving victory
must prepare themselves for the ultimate test. By contrast, persuasion it much more subtle and can succeed
even when raw strength fails. Even rulers of the most vicious kind can seldom last long unless they can
convince at least some of their citizen* that their cau»c is just. Coercion of an entire population is simply
impossible without the help of at least some individuals who do not need to be coerced. Most of the time, persuasion
governs the relationships among people and states. Coercion is a last resort for those few situations in which
persuasion fails. Whether projected by persuasion or coercion, the power of a nation-state stems from a
number of source*. At one end of the spectrum is the material basis for power "technology/' Deeply
intertwined with the development and application of technology is the economic system of a society.
Between them, the technologies and the economic system (what Marx called the "forces of production"
and the "relation* of pro duction," respectively) determine how much the society produce*, who within
the society pro duces what* and finally who receives and uses the products of production. Communisms
collapse was convincing evidence that state directed economies are generally lev* efficient than
capitalist economies in which individuals and non-state organizations seek to fulfill their own needs.
Simply put, "post industrial" society is far too complex for any stale bureaucracy to understand and
operate. Societies that are more efficient at allocating and distributing resources will in the long run be
far more capable of producing the material goods needed for civilian and military uses than a heavy
handed state that attempts to regulate all facets of economic life. The political system, which is related
to, but not identical with the economic system is also crucial. In complex societies the over
centralization of decision making is less effective over the long term, which is one reason why truly
demo crutic societies have demonstrated mt;ce long-term stability than their more authoritarian alter
natives and enemies. Only with real representation of the many interests within a society can its government meet
the society** needs over the long haul In long term competition between lib cral democracies and authoritarian
systems, liber &\ democracies will almost invariably win. Finally* the value system or ideology of a society is
a critical factor both in its long term stability and its appeal to it* own people and to others outside it. In
this respect, numbers matter Ideologies that have strung appeal to the vast majority of the population of a society
(and to those looking at ttiat society from the outside) will in the long term win out over competing idc
olugics that cannot claim such *m appeal Societies not only need these pillars of power, they need the
means to project them. For this they must use some combination of coercion and persuasion. Military and police
forces are a society*s means to project coercive power Persuasion is mure subtle. We typically think of politicians
and diplomats negotiating agreement* between states. But the most persuasive means are often those that
are not planned, particularly not planned by the state. Religion remains a force to be reckoned with, but just as
powerful, if not more so, is the force of "material culture," spread through books, movies, radio,
television, cloth ing, food, technologies, and a host of other mate rial and nun material goods. The great
power of the West is exerted most frequently in the form of hamburgers, basketball shoes, movie stars, news
broadcasts, and other symbols of material culture and individual freedom. It is not surprising that the Soviet Union
tried to isolate its people from these corrupting messages and pruducts, and that non Western countries frequently
try to reduce or eliminate these influences today.
 Impact turn – taxation is good (1/2)
Taxing isn’t evil, doesn’t affect people massively and is actually pretty freaking awesome.
Harriss in 74. (C. Lowell, Prof. economics @ Columbia, The American Journal of Economics and
Sociology, Property taxation: What’s Good and What’s Bad about it, Jan 1974,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3485546.pdf, DT)

1. Viability of Local Government. The tax now helps to finance local activity, enough to make local
government as meaningful and as viable as it remains. Cities, towns, counties, and school districts do at
times fail to meet our aspirations for good government. And state and national government are also
less than perfect; so is the world of business and of non-profit organizations. Be reality as it may, the
use of localities, as distinguished from state and nation, to get some of the things we expect from
collective (governmental, political) action has merit. Property taxation offers people in different
localities an instrument by which they can make truly local choices significant. People in one locality are
not forestalled, inexorably, by the decisions of voters elsewhere. Who among us would want to limit his
children to a level of education which might satisfy, say, a majority of voters in a state? This tax helps to
provide freedom and opportunity to do things differently-not to be held down to a level set by
others who may live in areas which are quite different. 2. Voter Influence on His Taxes-and
Government Spending. Either an increase in assessed valuation or a boost in the tax rate requires a
positive act. Such tax-raising action can lead to more voter resistance than will an automatic rise in
income tax from established rates which apply to growing income. Voters have an opportunity to relate
a) budget proposals which will require higher taxes, b) to the desirability of more government spending.
Is not the ability to reject more spending and taxes a desirable element of "the good society?" 3.
Benefit and Justice. The equity which we seek in public finance consists of various forms. One feature
associates costs with benefits (in the making of decisions and in the results). Fairness of this type is
evident as property taxation does adjust the payments for different quantities of services from one
community to another to local burdens. Generally, the localities in which burdens are highest are those
providing residents the most services. Here is an element of justice in a basic sense, a quid pro quo.
Within communities the relation of benefits received per family to tax paid will be crude. Families with
relatively large property holdings pay more tax than others who get equal services. Yet the
intercommunity aspect commands respect. 4. Fairness-Capturing Some of Socially Created Values:
"Unearned Increments." Socially created increments in property values are sometimes substantial. The
property tax can capture a portion for financing government. Considerable property value increases
(above general inflation) have appeared in the last two decades. Nationwide, land prices have probably
risen by at least half a trillion dollars in 20 years or so. In my view, more of the increment would better
have gone to local government treasuries. Property taxation could capture more of values due (a) to
social growth and (b) local government spending for financing local services. Is this not almost the
epitome of fairness in taxation? I shall say more about this potential-one which makes property taxation
the very opposite of the customary assertion that it is the most unfair tax. To some extent, I submit, it
can be a "most fair" tax. 5. Equity-New Measures ("Circuit Breakers") to Relieve (Some of) the Poor.
With rapidity unusual in tax policy, states have enacted provisions for granting property tax relief for the
aged poor and some other groups. Experience indicates that this one defect can be largely eliminated
without undue loss of revenue. I say more lately about this widely acclaimed de- vice for improving the
equity of property taxation. 6. Good Results of Age. "An old tax is a good tax"; this is an ancient
proverb, and it is not completely true, of course. Nevertheless, property taxation has worked its way
through the economy, especially the portion represented by rates other than the most recent increases.
Some elements have been capitalized, and other adjustments have been made as owners and users
have taken the tax into account. Inequalities and crudities lose some of their sting as men adjust over
the years. 91 92 the American Journal of Economics and Sociology 7. Some of the Tax is No Real
Burden. Part of the tax is no current burden on the present owner or user. In many communities
probably 15 to 20 per cent of the property tax represents (a) tax on land values (b) at rates which
have existed for such a long time that most present owners allowed for it in the price they paid. The
annual payment of this portion constitutes no true burden on the user. Part of what the owner pays
over to the local treasury each year does not really leave him worse off, compared with what would
have been his situation if the tax had not applied when he bought the property

Alternative fails – coercion inevitable

Restriction of freedom is inevitable, even under libertarian ethics. Freeing of slaves proves.
LaFollette 79 (Hugh, Chair in Ethics @ University of South Florida,
http://www.hughlafollette.com/papers/libertar.htm, 194-206)

Consequently, everyone's life is not, given the presence of negative general rights and negative general
duties, free from the interference of others. The "mere" presence of others imposes duties on each of
us, it limits everyone's freedom. In fact, these restrictions are frequently extensive. For example, in the
previously described case I could have all of the goods I wanted; I could take what I wanted, when I
wanted. To say that such actions are morally or legally impermissible significantly limits my freedom,
and my "happiness," without my consent. Of course I am not saying these restrictions are bad. Obviously
they aren't. But it does show that the libertarian fails to achieve his major objective, namely, to insure
that an individual's freedom cannot be limited without his consent. The libertarian's own moral
constraints limit each person's freedom without consent.7This is even more vividly seen when we look
at an actual historical occurrence. In the nineteenth century American slaveholders were finally legally
coerced into doing what they were already morally required to do: free their slaves. In many cases this
led to the slave owners' financial and social ruin: they lost their farms, their money, and their power. Of
course they didn't agree to their personal ruin; they didn't agree to this restriction on their freedom.
Morally they didn't have to consent; it was a remedy long overdue. Even the libertarian would agree.
The slave holders' freedom was justifiably restricted by the presence of other people; the fact that there
were other persons limited their acceptable alter natives. But that is exactly what the libertarian denies.
Freedom, he claims, cannot be justifiably restricted without consent. In short, the difficulty in this: the
libertarian talks as if there can be no legitimate non-consensual limitations on freedom, yet his very
theory involves just such limitations. Not only does this appear to be blatantly inconsistent, but even if
he could avoid this inconsistency, there appears to be no principled way in which he can justify only his
theory's non-consensual limitations on freedom.
 AT: Objectivism

Their objectivist view of morality is itself immoral and egotistical—fails to be rational and impartial

Barry and Stephens 13 (Bruce and Carroll U., “Objections to an Objectivist Approach to Integrity,” The Academy of Management
Review, JSTOR)//MY

Rand's philosophy is decidedly un-postmodern, which may in small part account for her pariah status within contemporary academe. However,
the exclusion of Rand from the academic mainstream of moral philosophy seems to reflect dissatisfaction less with the focus or ide-ology of her
analysis than with its execution. Critics (see especially O'Neill, 1971, and Rob-bins, 1974; see also several essays contained within Den Uyl &
Rasmussen, 1984) have effectively documented numerous logical contradictions and inconsistencies within
her writings and have taken issue with the ideological stricture with which she has defended her views
and dismissed her critics. Moreover, critics note (and amply document) that Rand constructs false dichotomies,
placing her views in opposition to (and, ultimately, above) factitious assessments of the sorry state of human
nature and social institutions. For example, according to Rachels, Rand depicts any degree of altruism as so self-
abnegating that nobody, with the possible exception of certain monks, would find it congenial. As Ayn Rand
presents it, altruism implies that one's own inter-ests have no value, and that any demand by others calls
for sacrificing them. If that is the alternative, then any other view, including [objectivism], will look good
by comparison. But this is hardly a fair picture of the choices. (1986: 71; emphasis in original) With a penchant for straw-
man argumentation, Rand's analysis often appears to take the form of a solution in search of a problem.
Rachels (1986) classifies Rand's philosophy in the broad category of ethical egoism, which fails to meet at
least one-and arguably both-of his criteria for the moral minimum. Briefly stated, Rachels assumes that most
theories of economics, and, by inference, of commerce, rely on a model of self-interest. To advance
one's own interests is to be pragmatic and (often) hedonistic; ethics come into play only when the
interests of others are incorporated into the calculus of personal and business decision making. The
moral minimum consists of two components: rationality and impartiality. At first glimpse, Rand's objectivism, with
its emphasis on rationality and goal orientation, appears to fulfill the initial criterion. However, Hobbes' (1651/1950) argument that
unalloyed pursuit of self-interest does not result in maximization of individual or social-system utilities
casts the rationality of such a strategy into some doubt . And the Randian insistence on the primacy and
the moral superiority of personal goals clearly violates the impartiality criterion, since it privileges the
self above others. Thus, Rand's theory of objectivism has met with disapprobration within the discipline of
philosophy, not on the basis of its ideology but because of its failure to meet the basic standards of rigor
in the field. According to Rachels, an ethicist of no discernible ideological bent, "Theories that reject the minimum
conception encounter serious difficulties because they do so. Most philosophers have realized this, and
so most theories of morality incorporate the mini-mum conception, in one form or another. They
disagree not about [the parameters of] the minimum, but about how it should be expanded" (1986: 11).
Becker acknowledges the existence of alternative approaches to ethics, but he makes no attempt to reconcile them with objectivism. Rather, he
asserts that the intention behind his objectivist focus is to present a perspective that has not received attention in the business ethics literature.
A tacit assumption lurking behind this statement is that Rand's objectivism is a legitimate theory of moral philosophy that has simply escaped
objectivism is a school of thought whose coherence and
the parochial purview of business ethicists. On the contrary,
value have escaped the legitimation of essentially the entire discipline of moral philosophy.
Ayn Rand was wrong and her philosophy is used to justify greed-cap can’t solve and altruism is real
and good

Bekiempis ’11 – (Victoria, “Confessions of a Recovering Objectivist,” The Guardian, 6/10/11,

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jun/10/confessions-recovering-objectivist-ayn-rand)//SR

Ayn Rand is one of those people whom you just want to go away, but won't. I say this not with hate or ignorance, but with deep familiarity.
When, as a self-absorbed college freshman, I first came across the Russian emigre author of The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged, she seemed
like the coolest thinker ever – what selfish person doesn't want to hear that being selfish doesn't just feel good, but actually is good, too? I
quickly devoured nearly all of her atrocious tomes with a sort of blind hunger – that ferocious pseudo-intellectual reading you do only to
confirm your beliefs, if you will. Indeed, I devotedly hung on her every word, even becoming an officer of my university's Objectivist club. At one
point, I may even have been president. Much to the lament of my philosophy classmates, I was that girl who frequently (and loudly!) argued in
favor of Rand's illogical claims that altruism doesn't exist; that selfishness is a virtue; and that "rational egoism" is the only right way to live.
Thankfully, I grew out of that phase. Not surprisingly, but a few years of minimum-wage work cleaning up cat faeces, without benefits, and
other thankless, unstable odd jobs made me question Objectivism's foundations and rekindled an earlier interest in anarcho-syndicalism.
Eventually, leaving Rand was no more different or difficult than, say, leaving a friend who had grown to annoy me over time – sure, I was very
intimate with her ideas, but that just gave me more insight into their outright dysfunctionality, and the strength to say "sayonara!" What's scary
is that so many Americans have not grown out of that mentally puerile phase. Instead, this contingent – now largely comprised of Tea Party
radicals – remains mired in her pop philosophy. (Only now has Republican Congressman Paul Ryan, perhaps realizing that supporting an atheist
adulterer might hurt his veep chances,changed his tune from Objectivist fanboy to follower of Thomas Aquinas.) Granted, it's doubtful that any
political group so suspicious of the intelligentsia would actually read Rand's 1,200 page magnum opus, Atlas Shrugged, but her
ideas are
clearly being used to justify inequality, giving credence to institutionalized wealth-based elitism. This has to
stop, and stop now. But not just for the reasons that typically get brought up. Anti-Rand commentators have long pointed out both
the pragmatic and personal problems with Rand. As evidenced by the Great Recession, for example, anything even remotely
close to the unfettered capitalism advocated by Rand plainly does not work. Also, as evidenced by her personal life, she
was more a hypocritical, questionable character than a moral role model. As a teenager in Russia, "she watched her family
nearly starve while she treated herself to the theater." She railed against government benefits but cheerfully collected social security and
Medicare . She championed integrity, but bastardized Nietzsche's best ideas. And her writing skills aren't just mediocre; if anything, her
penchant for 200-page monologues and wooden characters suggests that they're non-existent. And she has this thing for rapey scenes; and her
approach to BDSM goes for a Mad Men-esque chauvinist chic – not healthy sex positivism. Of course, all that doesn't actually say anything
about her "philosophy"; it just makes the case that she's a jerk and a hack. That said, her theory – and summarily, its corollaries – are belied by
the abject sketchiness of their most basic premise: rational egoism . Far smarter, more articulate people than me have pointed this out, but
what needs to be emphasized is that Rand conflates descriptive psychological egoism (people act in their self-interest) with normative ethical
egoism (acting in self-interest is the right thing to do). Part of this "ought-from-an-is"-type assumption is that altruism does not exist – very
much the backbone of her belief system. West Valley College's Sandra LaFave does a great job following this line of thought and pointing out
why it doesn't work. The basic claim of egoists, LaFave notes, is that people "always and invariably act in their self-interest". However, most
moral codes call for altruism, which, in egoists' account, is "demanding the impossible". Moral codes, so egoists' thinking goes, should not
demand "the impossible", so we should take up a "more realistic" system such as – ta-da! – ethical egoism. To accept this conclusion, you have
to accept the premise that psychological egoism is a given fact in the first place. To date, neither Rand nor anyone else has been able to prove
definitively that the proverbial soldier who dives on a grenade acts selfishly, not altruistically. Even if, for the sake of argument, we accepted
that all acts were selfish, there certainly seem to be a great many unselfish-looking selfish acts (diving on the grenade to save your comrades),
as well as selfish-seeming selfish acts (blowing your kid's college tuition money on a shopping spree.) LaFave points out that this "empirical
distinction" renders across-the-board selfishness more of a semantic trick than something that meaningfully describes ethics. Go ahead and
claim all human acts come from self-interest, fine. This seems kind of silly, however, when the morality of said selfish acts will still be measured
by how altruistic they seem. Another key concern is that psychological egoism might not be final stage of an individual's ethical development.
We start off selfish, say some theorists, but we must move beyond convention and toward post-conventional social contract and conscience for
true moral growth. Even if we were to concede that these foundational problems do not deal a death-blow to Objectivism – which would be
very generous of us (yet generous in a selfish way, of course) – it still seems perverse to peg so much on so shaky a foundation. The kernel of
this belief system is nothing more than a philosophically hollow shell. It should absolutely not play a role in policy-
making – especially when the end result would be disastrous. I outgrew Rand; now I wish America would, too.
Objectivism fails in the real world

Milanovic ’10 – (Nikola, “Denying Objectivism,” Stanford Progressive, March 2010, http://www.stanford.edu/group/progressive/cgi-bin/?
p=183)//SR

Determining one’s political, social, and economic beliefs, if done right, is a difficult affair, and one that many Stanford students undoubtedly
grapple with. In my own pursuit for developing the best outlook on life, I came across the peculiar philosophy of an author named Ayn Rand as
a sophomore in high school. Her ideas, entitled “Objectivism,” have enjoyed a recent intellectual resurgence on Stanford’s campus. This
movement brings to mind my own trajectory as an objectivist, which began with scholarly infatuation but ended with bitterly realistic rejection.
Rand’s principles are, like so many doctrines, attractive on paper but inapplicable to the real, modern world . Objectivism
strives to provide a comprehensive answer to questions of metaphysics, politics, morality, and epistemology. This article is not an effort to
unravel the rationale behind the philosophy. Instead, it is a comprehensive look at what the objectivist viewpoint means in everyday life. How
does Rand’s philosophy play out in practice? The central tenet of the movement is that there is a non-subjective reality that can be accessed
through reason, and that when we access it, it becomes clear that rational pursuit of self-interest is the best way to lead one’s life. Based on
Rand’s aggrandizement of self-interest, her followers believe in libertarian politics, centered around capitalism and the rights of the individual.
The world is in a period of economic recession. Inequality is a pervasive fact for the international community . Systematic
discrimination, unjust wars, and insurmountable barriers to opportunity still impact many people. It’s these
facts that make objectivism an unrealistic worldview. The objectivist standpoints on universal healthcare, government
welfare programs, progressive or redistributive taxation, and economic stimuli are all the same: they contend that these programs
are unjust. But in a country where businesses are declaring bankruptcy, homes are foreclosing at alarming rates, and people are falling
below the poverty line and into the unemployment line, can objectivism be a rationally ethical view? One that doesn’t
violate our intuitions about morality? The answer is no, it can’t be. Rand’s intellectual roots can be traced back to Adam
Smith, the famous 18th century economist who championed self-interest. The prevailing system before Smith was feudalism, which is now
universally abhorred because it held that entitlements were God-given. In feudalism, some people were born into luxury while others were
born into poverty, and this was seen to be the natural, and therefore right, order of things. Much like the insurmountable caste system that
creates a birthright hierarchy of some over others, feudalism arbitrarily justified inequalities due solely to coincidence of birth. Smith, rebelling
against the feudal mindset, argued that through capitalism order, self-interest, and personal liberty could all coexist. Markets are amazing man-
made institutions in that they provide incentives to maintain order. For instance, if I try to cheat people by charging an exorbitant amount for
something I produce, other vendors will enter the market with lower prices, and I will be punished by losing customers. Markets also allow for
personal liberty; I can buy from who I want, and am not tied to one creed or a single employer. In this way, markets eliminate hierarchies by
creating horizontal, instead of vertical relationships; I am not dependent on any one vendor, just as they aren’t dependent on any one
customer. Smith, like Rand, argued that this was all possible because people pursue their own rational self-interest. This pursuit harmonizes
liberty and order by bringing people into a network of anonymous, mutually beneficial exchanges. This is the central concept of objectivism:
reciprocal self-interest creates a motivation that allows us to avoid depending on altruism (in the words of economist Albert Hirschman). For
example, if I had to depend on a doctor’s beneficence to receive a life-saving treatment, I might be out of luck. But because the capitalist
Smith, though Rand’s intellectual
system allows me to pay him (in his interest) in exchange for the treatment (in my interest), we both win.
heirs all idolize him, came to different conclusions than the founder of objectivism. He did not support laissez-faire
capitalism or even mention it in his writings because he realized that markets could create dependency and
subordination due to the equivalency of money to power. Smith, in his utilitarian analysis of capitalism, understood that markets
engender inequality to an extent that is bad for society, and that they create an inflexibility of options in which people
lose their equality of opportunity based on the conditions they’re born into or the paths they take. For this reason, he
(unlike the libertarian objectivists) supported some government intervention in the economy. The reason Rand’s viewpoint is so
dangerously misguided in the modern world is because it rests on the faulty underlying assumption that the state
people are born into is justified. In his paper, Altruism in Philosophical and Ethical Traditions, Will Kymlicka argues that people
today are seen by the Western world as free and equal, and that they therefore deserve equality of opportunity. This
being the case, any inequalities that result in the world should be due to people’s own choices and decisions. Like Thomas Jefferson asserted in
the Declaration of Independence, certain beliefs are held to be true: “that all men are created equal” with the rights of “Life, Liberty, and the
 these rights are meaningless in the objectivist’s world. Without the opportunity or
pursuit of Happiness.” But
tools to improve their social position, a right to the pursuit of happiness is hollow to people
disadvantaged by inequality. Kymlicka holds that people’s fates should be determined by their choices, not by
the circumstances that they are born or thrust into. This is not how the world works, however. Consider four people: one born in a war-torn
region of Africa, one born into a poor family in inner-city New York, one born into a middle-class home in Florida, and one born into wealth in
Beverly Hills. These people all have the same right to pursue their own happiness, but they are not born equal. They lack equality of
opportunity. This inequality is not the result of their decisions, but
is instead the result of systematic injustice. To deny
that this is injustice would be to deny that people should be born with equal opportunity. This is what objectivists ignore:
that pursuit of our rational self-interest is meaningless if we are born without tools to pursue it. A popular
philosopher in the objectivist tradition, Robert Nozick, equated tax to theft because he considered it an unjustified sequestration of
money, the same as a robber stealing one’s wallet at gunpoint. Famed economist Milton Friedman agreed in his classification of such taxes as
this, like objectivism, assumes that the conditions we are born into are justified , exactly
charity through violence. But
what feudalism assumed centuries ago. The fact of the matter is that our birthright entitlements are not justified. I was born
into an upper-middle class family, but this wasn’t my right. So how can I get upset when some of the taxes I pay go to support the poor
autoworker in Detroit or the luckless homeowner in East Palo Alto? If people are born in worse situations than I am, it’s luck of the draw, but
not a justified luck of the draw. The reason they were born with less opportunity than I is because of systematic, institutional injustices that
exist in our society and create inherent inequality. That
is why policies like redistributive taxation , government-funded
education, and unemployment insurance are justified: they serve to level the uneven playing field we are born into.
I loved objectivist libertarianism because it made me feel comfortable about my privilege. I read just about all of Rand’s work and attended
seminars on her philosophy. It was easy to accept my abundance of opportunity as a right, but it didn’t quiet a nagging thought in the back of
my head: I shouldn’t feel so deserving of being privileged. Like Kymlicka assesses, it’s easy to accept gross inequalities without batting an eye
when they are viewed as natural. Objectivists accept them the same way feudalists accepted serfdom, the way Sharia law accepts the
subjugation of women, the way India accepted castes. Viewed as the natural order of things, objectivism justifies inequalities that are the result
of systematic injustice in how our societies and economies are organized today. Rand sought to defend inequalities that were not the result of
merit, providing no fairness in the available processes of acquiring property or the resultant distribution. In her best-known collection of essays,
The Virtue of Selfishness, Rand affirmed that compassion is a vice, selfishness a virtue, and that good people should not respond altruistically to
others’ predicaments. This doctrine only makes sense to those who believe the inequality of birthright to be naturally justified. Objectivism is a
good way to make yourself feel intellectually comfortable with being born into privilege. It is a reassuring self-justification for many that they
shouldn’t feel insecure about their luck. Maybe they should. Inequality is a natural fact of life, but it’s one that can be reduced and marginalized
by the right political and economic systems. We need to pursue these systems, instead of ignoring inequality the way objectivism would have us
do.

Pascal’s Wager
It’s try or eternal damnation—belief in God carries the greatest potential reward while
not believing is leads to the greatest impact
Michael in 2010
(Patrick, Tulane University, 1994, Bachelor of Science. University of New Orleans, 2003, Master's in
Education, “Why I Do (And You Should) Believe in God: A Logical Approach”, June 9 th, 2010,
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/5473316/why_i_do_and_you_should_believe_in.html?
cat=34)
The choice of whether or not to believe in God is certainly a personal decision. There is nothing I can do in this article to convince you to believe
in God. Of course, I could talk about the time I fell asleep while driving and awoke in just enough time to slam on the brakes and avoid a serious
accident with the stopped car in front of me. Or I
could point out how unlikely it is, even with the billions of stars in
the universe, that our planet could randomly be the perfect size, be the perfect distance from the
perfect sized sun and be tilted at the perfect angle, for life to exist . Unless you have had a profound personal, spiritual
experience or a strong, theistic upbringing, it can be very difficult making this decision. Although the Christian Bible is clear in pointing out that
faith is required to fully accept and believe in God, there
is a logical way to examine the theistic and the atheistic
perspectives and the consequences of each being right or wrong. Scenario 1: Believe in God; You Are
Wrong For the sake of argument, let us assume that the average life expectancy of a human is approximately 70 years. Let's say that at 18
years of age, you decide to believe in God. Most of the world's religions have as one of their rewards the promise of eternal life for those who
believe in the god(s) of their religion and live accordingly. So if you spend your adult years praying, doing service for others, going to spiritual
exercises, etc. and God does not exist, then atheists may claim that you have wasted the tiny few years that you were given to live in the
universe. This argument may or may not be true. If you treated your faith in a mechanistic manner, in which your
good deeds were nothing more than items on a checklist to be accomplished to receive eternal life, then
you may well be disappointed if all your efforts were in vain. However, many theists would tell you that
they truly enjoy living for others and gain a certain measure of peace by their faith. These people would
be disappointed if God did not exist, yet probably would not "do it all differently" if given the chance . So,
in some cases, it could be said that theists wasted the majority of their finite years by believing in God. Scenario 2: Believe in God;
You Are Right If you are able to come to the decision that you honestly, truly, deep down, really believe
in God and you are correct, then, according to most religions, you will have achieved not only eternal
life, but most likely a very happy, positive eternal life. At this point, someone could ask, "What if you picked the wrong God
to believe in?" I have no answer to this. In the Christian faith, it is very clear that one must believe that Jesus is the son of God to go to heaven.
Personally, I find it hard to believe that the Jews or Muslims, who believe in the same God as the Christians, would not go to heaven. And how
could those who live in remote regions of the world, who have never learned of the Christian God, somehow be punished for that? I may be
wrong, but I feel that God will take care of such things and these people will end up alright. In any case, your
best chance of earning
eternal life is to believe in some God. In my opinion, the joys and experiences of heaven will be so great
and profound, that we are incapable of comprehending them. We only use 10% of our brains and we
have no conception of other universes or dimensions. Clearly, heaven is a reward well worth living for!
Scenario 3: Do Not Believe in God; You Are Right If you do not believe in God, that does not make you a bad person. Most
atheists are good people, love their families and help others. Unfortunately, they have just not been able to make the personal decision to
believe in God. This could be because they were raised atheist, had a bad experience related to religion, have no proof of God, or have been
brainwashed by our secular culture. However, there can be no question that if you are an atheist, then you are living for this life. Although
many theists would say they are happy in the life they chose, regardless of the disappointing conclusion if this scenario were correct, there are
certainly those who would say they would have tried to have more fun! Of course, the alternative is also true. If
you do not believe in
God and you are correct, that does not imply you had a happy, fulfilling 70 years. Maybe you did; maybe
you didn't. Of course, if there is no God, then you can say that you were correct and you spent your
limited time in the universe living your life accordingly. Scenario 4: Do Not Believe in God; You Are
Wrong The consequences of this scenario are so dire, they are almost unspeakable. While most
religions offer the promise of eternal life for believers, exactly what happens to non-believers varies
widely. Possible endings include simple death, eternal "life" apart from God or the popular Christian
belief in eternal damnation in hell. If we are to believe that the promises of the rewards of heaven are so great, that both Biblical
and artistic renderings cannot do them justice, then we must logically consider that hell could be incomprehensibly worse than we think. Even if
there is no physical pain, if you have to exist eternally in some void knowing there is a God and a heaven and you can never get there, that
would be maddening. Do
not dismiss the concept of "eternal life." Theoretical physicists are constantly
discovering breakthroughs that make virtually anything possible in our universe. Previously thought to
be science fiction, virtually all physicists now agree that concepts such as time travel, space warping,
extra dimensions and parallel universes (all of which make heaven, hell and eternal life seem very
plausible) are very likely to be true . Again, please, please consider the ultimate, dire, potential consequences
of not believing in God. Conclusion After considering these scenarios, there is no doubt that believing in God carries
the greatest potential reward and not believing in God entails the strongest possible risk. By both
measures, it stands to reason that you should believe in God . However, please be aware that this discussion cannot force
you to believe in God. Even when you see that my argument is logical, you still have to actually believe in God; not just see that it would make
sense to believe in God. If you would like to believe in God, but don't, then you should read more literature on the subject, or speak to a friend
who believes. Regardless of when you make the decision, God will be ready to welcome you!
Religion First
Religion is not a choice between worldview, but an inevitable pre-cognitive practice. It
is from this starting point that the affirmative fails.
Lewin 17 (David, PhD, lecturer for the School of Education at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow,
“Educational Philosophy for a Post-secular Age, New Directions in the Philosophy of Education, pg. 44)

Smith’s argument is reminiscent of that developed by the theologian Paul Tillich. Tillich (1964, 8) argued that faith
is less about the
intellectual or cognitive content of beliefs than with our ultimate concern, a concern which grasps us as
much as we grasp it. Both Tillich and Smith see worship operating at a level that might be seen as part of
our ‘pre-understanding’ or framing of the world (both thinkers owe an intellectual debt to Heidegger in this and other
respects). The significance of this is that liturgy or concern happens whether we like it or not (rather like Heidegger’s notion
of care – Sorge – as the structure of Dasein’s being-in-the-world). This disrupts the notion of religion as a choice or
decision, as well as disrupting the propositional/worldview conception of religion since it is, in a sense,
pre-cognitive. Like Smith, Tillich is skeptical of the voluntarist conception of religious life, which tends to
frame religion in terms of making choices between competing worldviews . Tillich regarded other concerns (e.g.,
political, social or moral concerns, or indeed personal interests and consumerist concerns) as preliminary or provisional and understood that
preliminary concerns could be – problematically – treated as ultimate. Tillich (1967, vol. 1, 13ff) applies the term idolatry to the elevation of a
provisional concern to ultimate status. In other words, where
we stake our lives on a successful career with financial
rewards, then we effectively worship the provisional as though it were ultimate . Theologians like Tillich could no
doubt read Smith’s account of cultural liturgy more critically: as an account of idolatry. But it is the continuity between secular and religious
concerns in Tillich and Smith that is important here.12 Clearly then, religion
is not just what we do on the Sabbath, or what
we believe (or even what we say we believe) in propositional terms, our theory of the world. It is these
things but a lot more that is less visible and less cognitive. Equally, the religious nature of a school, for example, is not
easily defined as though it can be contained within a mission statement, or the confessions of faith by its staff or students.

AT: Problem of Evil

Evil happens as a result of free will—God creatures capable of being moral, everyone
is responsible for their own actions
Platinga 74 [ Alvin Platinga is an American analytic philosopher, the John A. O'Brien Professor of
Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Notre Dame and the inaugural holder of the Jellema Chair in
Philosophy at Calvin College; “God, Freedom, and Evil” m. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1974//]
So how does the Free Will Defense work? And what does the Free Will Defender mean when he says that people are or may be free? What is
relevant to theFree Will Defense is the idea of being free with respect to an action. If a person is free with
respect to a given action, then he is free to perform that action and free to refrain from performing it ; no
antecedent conditions and/or causal laws determine that he will perform the action, or that he won’t. It is within his power, at the
time in question, to take or perform the action and within his power to refrain from it. Freedom so conceived is
not to be confused with unpredictability. You might be able to predict what you will do in a given situation even if you are free, in that situation,
to do something else. If
I know you well, I may be able to predict what action you will take in response to a
certain set of conditions; it does not follow that you are not free with respect to that action. Secondly, I shall say that an
action is morally significant, for a given person, if it would be wrong for him to perform the action but
right to refrain or vice versa. Keeping a promise, for example, would ordinarily be morally significant for
a person, as would refusing induction into the army . On the other hand, having Cheerios for breakfast
(instead of Wheaties) would not normally be morally significant . Further, suppose we say that a person is
significantly free, on a given occasion, if he is then free with respect to a morally significant action. And
finally we must distinguish between moral evil and natural evil . The former is evil that results from free
human activity; natural evil is any other kind of evil .8 Given these definitions and distinctions, we can make a preliminary
statement of the Free Will Defense as follows. A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely
perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free
creatures at all. Now God can create free creatures, but He can’t cause or determine them to do only
what is right. For if He does so, then they aren’t significantly free after all; they do not do what is right
freely. To create creatures capable of moral good , therefore, He must create creatures capable of moral
evil; and He can’t give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so.
As it turned out, sadly enough, some of the free creatures God created went wrong in the exercise of their freedom ;
this is the source of moral evil. The fact that free creatures sometimes go wrong , however, counts neither against God’s
omnipotence nor against His goodness; for He could have forestalled the occurrence of moral evil only
by removing the possibility of moral good.