Sustainable Futures 1 (2019) 100002

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Sustainable Futures
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/sftr

Indian hegemony on water flow of the Ganges: Sustainability challenges in

the southwest part of Bangladesh
A B M Enamol Hassan
Department of Humanities, Chittagong University of Engineering and Technology, Bangladesh

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Keywords: The paper reveals adverse effects of Farakka barrage in the southwest part of Bangladesh, and to appraise the
Transboundary river operation of this dam as the delineation of Indian hegemony with consent and coercion of interest. The study
Water sharing is based on secondary source of data collection for having reviews and analyses of relevant literatures. India
Inequity
constructed a long barrage in the river of the Ganges without any consultation with its neighboring country
Treaties
Bangladesh. Consequently, there has been a significant disparity in the flow of water of the Ganges in Bangladesh
Hegemony
Sustainability between the periods of pre and post-Farakka Barrage. Afterwards, the southwest part of Bangladesh has been
facing serious challenges to sustainability due to water shortage in dry season and over flowing in rainy season.
Thus, India practices its hegemony upon Bangladesh in terms of having dialogue, agreement, and implementation
in regard to the operation of Farakka barrage.

1. Introduction Dispute” [36] and “Disputed Farakka Barrage” [39] for the southwest
part of Bangladesh.
Farakka Barrage, a dam across the Ganges River, located in the In- In fact, India constructed the barrage for its own benefit without
dian state of West Bengal [24]. The river flows through northern India considering the effect of this embankment upon the neighboring coun-
and enters into Bangladesh where it becomes the Padma River. Once try e.g., Bangladesh [31]. This kind of monopolistic activity could be
the Padma reaches the center of Bangladesh, and eventually drain into explained by the concept of Gramcian hegemony [16,33,40] in elabo-
the Bay of Bengal. [20,42]. The government of India constructed the rating a disputed issue between the two countries. To understand this
barrage across the Ganges at the place of Farakka about 17 kms up- hegemonic dealing with Bangladesh, this paper focuses on the question;
stream from Bangladesh border [36]. Since 1975, India has been op- how India did makes challenges to Bangladesh in achieving sustainabil-
erating the Farakka Barrage (Fig. 1) to divert water from the Ganges ity through the construction and operation of Farakka Barrage and si-
River to the Bhagirathi-Hooghly river system [8,36] to navigate Kolkata multaneously exercises hegemony in signing and implementing treaties
port [17,20] and to tackle future challenges of water crisis [3]. On the ([60], p.10) on sharing the water of the Ganges. This overarching ques-
other hand, Bangladesh, as a neighboring country of India [64], is highly tion is formulated based on the study purpose such as investigating
dependent on the flow of Padma (Ganges) river [10,35] which con- India’s hegemonic practice in constructing and operating the Farakka
tributes rigorously to Bangladesh’s economy, ecology and culture [2]. Barrage and exploring the adversity of this dam on the southwest part
It would provide the water supply for irrigation and inland navigation of Bangladesh. This purpose is accomplished through maintaining the
in the southwest part of Bangladesh [2,35,36], but it has been worst specific objectives; firstly, to investigate the historical background of
after the construction of dam because of illegal withdrawal of water Farakka Barrage. Secondly, to assess the operation and signing treaties
by India using the Farakka Barrage [36,45]. As a result, Bangladesh is between India and Bangladesh regarding Farakka Barrage in terms of
facing noticeable problems like water crisis, crop and grain damage, hegemonic practices. Thirdly, to assess the socio-economic impacts of
soil erosion, deforestation, and depletion of wildlife [42] that provide unequal sharing of Ganges water on in the southwest part of Bangladesh.
challenges in achieving ecological, social and economic balances [2] in
terms of sustainable development [12,44]. Consequently, the problem 2. The significance of the study
creating barrage is being regarded as one of the disputed issues between
Bangladesh and India [37], that is popularly known as “Death Barrage” The availability of water is a significant issue for giving the sus-
([60], p.10), while some researchers referred it as “The Ganges Water tainability of environment especially for Bangladesh, as it is a riverine

E-mail address: enamsoc@cuet.ac.bd

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sftr.2019.100002

2666-1888/© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license. (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
A.B.M.E. Hassan Sustainable Futures 1 (2019) 100002

potential sources of conflict over transboundary water sharing agree-

ments. For instances, Indus Water Treaty in 1954 between India and
Pakistan; Gandaki River Treaty and Mahakali River Treaty in 1954 and
1996 respectively between India and Nepal; and Ganges River Treat in
1996 between India and Bangladesh [39]. Another disputed project is
“The Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project” that was constructed on the
Kishanganga River. India planned to build up a tunnel and a power gen-
eration system by diverting water from this transboundary river of India
and Pakistan. Pakistan placed objection to this water diversion that vi-
olates the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) and demanded that India should
stop the construction. However, India challenged this position and con-
structed the structure forcibly claiming that there is a provision to trans-
fer water under this treaty. India’s such kind of hegemonic operation ul-
timately is being supported and recognized by many other international
hegemonic countries and institutions as well. In 1976, USSR strongly
supported India’s position of avoiding multilateral discussion to solve
Fig. 1. Showing the Farakka Barrage in the Ganges river (Source: dispute of the Ganges water distribution [36]. There is a great example
www.google.com/search?q=farakka).
in this regard is norm challenger or rule breaker, where India broken
up the norms of the treaty on “Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”
and successfully achieved recognition of other trading states of nuclear
weapons. Recently, India sought membership in the Nuclear Suppliers
Group [58]. Moreover, India dismissed negotiations of World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) in 2008 on the Doha Development Round of trade lib-
eralization just by speaking about the conditions of so-called subsistent
farmers of this country [41]. In fact, much research has been conducted
on the domination of India in regional politics and economics, and very
few studies discuss India’s unilateral role in distributing water of trans-
boundary rivers. However, there is no literature on unequal diversion
of water led by India using the notion of hegemony especially on the
Ganges basin, as it is historically a controversial issue in South Asian
Fig. 2. Construction of Farakka Barrage collapsed the natural flow of the Ganges regional sustainability.
river (Source: www.google.com/search?q). Therefore, this study tries to insert the concept of hegemony as an
analytical framework into the construction and operation of Farakka
Barrage to explore Indian domination practices in the Ganges water di-
country in the South Asian region (Bangladesh Poribesh Andolon [11], version processes focusing on the knowledge gaps in existing literatures
2005). The agricultural activities of Bangladesh significantly depend and opportunities for further research.
upon the flow of rivers for water supply in its irrigation system [32],
fisheries, conservation of biodiversity, transportation, and human con- 3. Method
sumption [39]. In this sense,
The Ganges river (the Padma in Bangladesh) was a source of sup- The study area is identified in the south-west part of Bangladesh,
plying water for irrigation, fishing, trade and business, transportation, which is the downstream, and affected with flood during the rainy sea-
conservation of forest and wildlife (Food and Agriculture Organization son (monsoon) in one hand, and also affected with salinity, sedimenta-
[[21], 2011; [42,47]). However, the construction of Farakka Barrage tion, drought and desertification during the dry season (non-monsoon)
collapsed the natural flow of the Ganges significantly (Fig. 2) and its in other hand [55]. Thus, the study is based on secondary sources of
operation directed by Indian government fostered the unequal distribu- data collection. In reviewing and analyzing literature, all required in-
tion of water that resulted in drought, desertification, salinity, and sed- formation is assembled from government and non-government sources
imentation in the south-west part of Bangladesh [42]. The government like books, journal articles, and periodicals that were retrieved from in-
of Bangladesh was trying best to negotiate with India spontaneously ternet search engines such as Google scholar, and ProQuest Central.
from the very beginning of the dam’s operation, but India did not re-
spond positively. Instead it has been operating the dam in the diver- 3.1. Analytical framework
sion of water to Kolkata port through the feeder canal (and also in the
generation of the power supply) avoiding transboundary consent and The notion of hegemony, used as the framework for the analysis
regional ecological balance [37]. This kind of unequal diversion of wa- (conceptual ground), usually covers various characteristics of the so-
ter of the Ganges as a transboundary river led by India could be judged cial environment. The first introducer of the concept, Gramsci [28] ex-
and explained through the concept of hegemony ([7].) that legalizes plored hegemony as the ideological predominance of a particular group
the operation of Farakka barrage. As India declared itself indirectly as or class, herein state, over others to fulfill own needs and interest. Gram-
a holder of hegemon in South-Asian region retaining the status-quo in sci stressed on intellectual factors with dominant leadership that un-
terms of military power, territorial borders, institutional arrangements, derlies ideological superiority [67]. The author saw that the rule of
and strategic perceptions regional context [46]. Moreover, all neighbor- one class over the others does not depend not only on material power
ing countries like Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka [63] but also on some non-materialistic factors that are implicated in-
viewed India also as a hegemonic country. As it has privilege to exercise deed in modern time. The dominant state must establish its own po-
power and to disregard interests of these neighboring countries [56]. litical and cultural authority as conventional norms of practices in the
Ultimately, India has been considering this region as its own peripheral issues of conflict of interest. In fact, the hegemony is not being prac-
space of influence with affirmation of maintaining stability and tran- tised in the forms of domination or coercion directly [19,26,48], rather
quility in this sub-continent ([57], p.37). Thus, there is ever-growing it depends on consent [16], integration [68], influence [49], attraction
a tenuous relations in South-Asia that perceived a competition and a [6], ideological means [15], and changing rules and enjoying unusual
A.B.M.E. Hassan Sustainable Futures 1 (2019) 100002

privileges for hegemonic interests [56]. It also encompasses normative Upstream riparian country (India)
ideas, values and beliefs that become the dominant worldview of a soci-
ety. It produces the stability of power structure in politically organized
Consent Reluctance Dialogue
societies which are sustained by state relating strength, consensus, co-
ercion [40], persuasion, moral; order; discipline; law and freedom [22].
Moreover, Bhasin [7] explored the term “hegemony” on the basis of Hegemony on water sharing of the Ganges
“egoistic” and “self-serving goals” which prioritizes the self-interest ig-
noring the interest of other parties. The researcher characterized hege-
Downstream riparian country (Bangladesh)
mony with some key points such as change the existing rules in favor
of them; seeking special rights to enjoy; promoting individual interest
rather than group interest; and code of conduct will be directed to reg-
Lower flowing of water in dry season Over-flowing of water in rainy season
ulate individual state. Cox [16] used the term to peripheral countries in
the international arena, which is supposed to be consent embodying and
absorbing the hegemonic rule of the dominant state. In the environmen- Challenges to sustainable development
tal issue, hegemony could be a source of environmental veto power in
which economically dominant states can use their power in the interest Fig. 3. Analytical framework of practising hegemony of India over Bangladesh.
of environmental action. Such kind of dominating role over the weak
countries could block or lose the progress of international affairs and
herein the issue regards to the distribution of transboundary river [23]. all spheres ([57], p.37). India fears that the neighbors would gang-up
Pedersen [50] assumed that great regional powers might follow hege- against her and demand unrealistic concessions in a multi-lateral milieu,
mony, which is necessarily coercive and based on the exercise of power. while the neighbors suspect that India seeks to take undue advantage of
The hegemonic country endeavors to change the policies of other states the weak bargaining capacity (dialogue ) of each state in bilateral dia-
in favoring their own goals. It gives threats of military intervention if logue. Neighbors view Indian bilateralism as an instrument of coercive
sub-ordinate states do not comply with their will. In such a way, the hegemony (consent), while India considers multilateralism as an unnec-
weaker state is bound to legitimize the hegemonic position of stronger essary burden. The author also added that India had shown reluctance
state [33]. In the perspective of South-Asian region, it is stated that India for updating “the Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950 and the Indo-Bangladesh
had been given a tag as the regional hegemonic country in South Asia Treaty of 1972″ [14] despite repeated demands by the state [56]. Thus,
in terms of its foreign affairs and policies, geographic aspects [66,66] the most viable meeting point for India’s policies and regional percep-
and military interventions [14]. India dominates the whole area polit- tions will be the notion of hegemony- a mix of consent, reluctance, and
ically, economically, and geographically. In this case, “the Gujral Doc- dialogue as of dominant elements to perpetuate its power over the weak-
trine” and “the Indira Doctrine” could be the good examples that were ening country forever. Based on this conceptual statement, an analytical
designed to perpetuate its regional hegemon [7]. India established its framework (Fig. 3) is formed with a blending of reluctance, lack of con-
unilateral policy e.g. no seeking reciprocity with South Asian neighbors sent and unequal bargaining capacity (dialogue) of two riparian states
through the Gujral Doctrine. In this context, Altaf Gauhar, a Pakistani to understand the Indian hegemony upon Bangladesh.
journalist, commented that, “ The Gujral Doctrine is not a doctrine of
good neighborly relations but a Bharti (Indian) Plan to seize the neigh- 3.2. Analysis and discussions
bor peacefully” [62].Thus, India refused to assist Sri-Lanka and also all
other neighboring countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan [18]. She is Bangladesh, the then East Pakistan, frequently offered India to sit to-
the only country in South Asia that shares a large coastline and shared gether in meeting for consideration of two countries needs and desires
borders with other countries [14]. The tag has resulted in both seeing at the very beginning of the dam construction project. At the beginning
India as a leader and confirmed it’s super-ordinate position in this sub- of Bangladesh independence, India was agreed to have consent and a bi-
continent [18] as well as a threat to other countries, as there were a large lateral discussion between these two countries in starting the operation
number of armed conflicts between India and its neighboring countries of Farakka Barrage. The dynamics of bilateral relationship was broken
[14] especially for border and transboundary river water distribution is- after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman that violated water
sues. More than a threat, it is the suspicion and anxiety of other nations, sharing negotiations. Thus, India started to withdraw water unilaterally
which has given India the tag. Therefore, India has become a regional [36]. India denied to have any bilateral discussion (reluctance) and fully
hegemonic country, which has been perpetuated also by its rich geo- remained unresponsive to the approach of Bangladesh invitation [39].
graphical [56,65] and demographical features [56]. It is also supported Aftermath, India did not cooperate to arrange any meeting in finding a
by Lovelle [42] who explicitly stated that India occupies a unique posi- solution together. Pakistan had expressed concerns at that time on the
tion in the South Asian region. By virtue of its size, location, and eco- possible effects on its East part (later Bangladesh) with severe objections
nomic potential, India assumes a natural leadership role in the region of the Farakka barrage. However, India did not consider it, because the
[7]. It is also seen that India, holding a position of the world’s ten largest project was just under initial investigation and termed Pakistan’s con-
economy, institutionalized its status as a newly emerging global power cern over the probable adversity as hypothetical (Abbas,1982). On the
([57], p.03). Thus, it claims a leadership position, while neighbors ac- other hand, Pakistan attempted enough to solve this bilateral problem
cuse her of exercising hegemony [56], but they had no choice and had with the interference of third party. It was offered by Pakistan since
to reconcile themselves to India’s dominating rules [18]. Nevertheless, 1957 to raise the Ganges water dispute at some international forums
they have been trying, separately or together, to debilitate India’s re- like United Nations, International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
gional and natural dominance [14]. However, the researcher revealed opment, international Court of Justice, and World Bank. All the parties
that India’s regional role would be clearly defined and explained only ultimately proposed to abide by the international river law in ensur-
when the concept of hegemony is incorporated in the regional poli- ing the impartial distribution of water. Later, Pakistan also expressed
cies of all South-Asian countries. Bhasin [7] also said that numerous to follow Article 33 of the UN Charter to settle this dispute. Another
bilateral contentions characterize India’s relation with her South Asian initiation was also taken by Bangladesh in 1976 on bilateral discussion
neighbors. Because India favors a bilateral dialogue for addressing the to solve the problem. Nothing has been implemented because of India’s
regional issues [36], while the neighbors (Bangladesh, Nepal) demand disinclination on interference of a third party [36] or any other human-
a multilateral regional approach and there is also an internal pressure itarian organizations. In fact, India was completely reluctant to share
to ensure the multilateral systems in protecting the national interest in the water of the Ganges on equity basis with Bangladesh (country of
A.B.M.E. Hassan Sustainable Futures 1 (2019) 100002

Fig. 4. Annual water discharges of the Ganges river at Hardinge Bridge (1934–
1989) during post-Farakka period (Sources: [47]: 622). Fig. 5. Showing average discharge of water of the Ganges in pre and post-
Farakka period (Source: [43]).

downstream riparian) that was a vivid instrument of practising hege-

mony upon Bangladesh.
Indeed, the flow of the Ganges has been contributing to the sustain-
ability of the southwest part of Bangladesh regarding ecological, eco-
nomic and social ground [55]. However, since the dawn of Bangladesh,
Farakka Barrage has been in an ever-growing disputation over the water
sharing issues of the Ganges with India [51]. India started the construc-
tion of the Farakka Barrage in 1962 and continued the construction work
until 1970 (Government of India [GoI], 1975; 1982) without any con-
sultation and making consent with its neighboring countries like Nepal
and Bangladesh; those certainly have a right to get participation in the
discussion of Ganges issue. However, commissioning the Farakka Bar-
rage in 1975 and thereafter, India has been enjoying most of the water
flow of the Ganges to her end [3]. India thinks that naturally the most Fig. 6. Monthly discharge of the Ganges water at Hardinge Bridge (Source:
segmentation (79%) of this river is possessed by India [47], so it is right [47], p. 625).
of India to occupy the full volume of water of the Ganges. India had done
it successfully because of its advantageous position regarding geography
(big upper riparian country), politics and economy. On the other hand, precipitation in Nepal as upper riparian to India and that could not be
Bangladesh is a very small and lower riparian country in South Asia attributed to the decrease of the Ganges water [47]. However, the main
that makes the country politically weak, environmentally fragile, and attribution is the Farakka barrage of decreasing water the Ganges that
economically vulnerable in comparison to India [30]. Consequently, In- India operated in its own interest. Therefore, the construction of the
dia had taken a new dimension of dominations through the operation Farakka barrage is a symbol of developing a sense of individual own-
of the Farakka barrage for the diversion of water of the Ganges. The ership instead of collective ownership over the transboundary river at
leading causes behind this dominating role regarding the Farakka bar- the cost of interests of co-riparian states [69] that gives birth of cause
rage are its geographical power, material power, ideological power that to Indo-Bangladesh water sharing dispute [43].
increase bargaining capacity (dialogue) of India. Thus, India had been The ex-Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Bangladesh’s found-
capable to control Bangladesh in terms of hegemony by setting agendas ing leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman signed the wide-ranging Indo-
and clauses in treaties. It influences the terms of negotiations and agree- Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Peace in 1972. As
ments that may encourage weaker parties to comply with the decision per the treaty, the two nations established a Joint River Commission to
taken by comparatively stronger countries [13], herein India. In sum, work for the common interests and sharing of water resources, irriga-
all above powers allow India to practise hegemony to control over the tion, floods and cyclones control [27]. However, it was a general com-
total allocation of the Ganges water between these two countries. It was mission that had not any particular reflection on sharing the Ganges
seen since the commencement of the operation of the Farakka barrage, water for the dry season. Subsequently, two Treaties and two Memo-
India controls over the water discharge that diverted 40,000 Cusecs wa- randum of Understanding (MoU) were signed between Bangladesh and
ter (average) through diversion canal to the Bhagirathi-Hooghly river India for sharing the water of the Ganges River. The first contact was
system [8] to navigate Kolkata port [17,20,36]. Mirza [47] pointed to “Ganges Water Agreement signed” on 1977 for five years; second con-
non-homogeneity operation in the annual water discharges during the tact was “MoU” on 1982; third contact was “MoU” on 1985 that was
period of post-Farakka showing in Fig. 4. lasted until 1988; and the last contact is “The Ganges Water Treaty” on
This monopolistic operation substantially decreased the flow of wa- 1996 for 30 years [39]. The last treaty is so-called a historical event be-
ter in Bangladesh part during the dry season. The average pre-Farakka tween these two countries and the hallmark of peace, cooperation, and
flow (1934–1975) was 2340 m3 /sec, whereas during post-Farakka the friendship. As the governments of these two countries signed the agree-
average flow is only 1236 m3 /sec (1975–1995) at Hardinge Bridge point ment for sharing water between India and Bangladesh on equity basis
(Fig. 5) (Bangladesh Ministry of Water Resources [9], 1996). during the dry (when Bangladesh needs water the most) and rainy sea-
November to December of each year is non-monsoon period, and son [14]. In fact, it was discovered that the treaty was not as like as the
February and March were the worst among the seven months of the dry stakeholders anticipated to have the flow of the Ganges river especially
season (Fig. 6). In this season, February and March are peak months to in dry season [39].The treaty allows India unilaterally to withdraw up
harvest rice crop (boro, rabi) that require adequate water for irrigation. to 40,000 cusecs of flow at Farakka between January and May in each
However, there was great a crisis of water in these months because of year. If the flow rate falls below 70,000 cusecs, water withdrawals are
upper withdrawal of the Ganges water [47]. equally divided between India and Bangladesh. On the other hand, the
In decreasing the flow of the Ganges, India blamed decrease of pre- treaty allows India to measure the flow of water based on the average
cipitation in the upstream drainage basin in Nepal as giving responsi- flow by the period of 1949 to 1998 at Farakka barrage point [51,52]
bility to natural factor. In fact, there was no significant fluctuation of that also another sign of monopolistic operation. Because, it might not
A.B.M.E. Hassan Sustainable Futures 1 (2019) 100002

Fig. 7. The proposed link canal connecting the Brahmaputra and the Ganges.

be well measured due to decreasing the flow of the Ganges gradually the Ganges waters for irrigation in India. Politically, Bangladesh thinks
during the post-Farakka period. It is also not mentioned about the min- that the presence of the proposed link canal would give India one more
imum guaranteed flow of water for Bangladesh in case the quantum valve to turn off”. Moreover, the excavation of link canal would cost
of water reduces substantially. In article II (ii) of 1996 Treaty, “every several millions of money and in effect, divide the northern part of
effort would be made by the upper riparian to protect flows of water Bangladesh from other parts of the country. It would certainly makes
at Farakka as in the 40-years average availability as mentioned above” various types of problems for Bangladesh like transportation problem,
[25]. In this clause, “every effort” was needed to be defined and clari- hydraulic problems, losing thousand acres of agricultural land, escalat-
fied concretely that India denied with reluctance. It is very significant ing pushed migration by displacing poor peasants and also creating food
for Bangladesh to protect the flow in case of decreasing by the upstream crisis [36]. Moreover, the operations of the Ganges flow after construct-
withdrawal of water. As well, this treaty does not make any account- ing the Farakka Barrage are not conformed to many international river
ability or legal obligation of the upstream country (India) to protect the laws that is discussed below-
flow in case of withdrawing water before Farakka point [52]. For that
reason, there are some experts mainly in Bangladesh who demanded to 3.3. Judgement of the project according to international water regulations
review this treaty that was certainly failed to secure country’s national
interest [39]. The Doctrine of Community Interests, as one of the international
In the protection of the Ganges flow during the dry season, river management models, proposes that state boundaries should be ig-
Bangladesh proposed to construct a series of dam for storing water dur- nored and water system of transboundary river ought to be managed
ing the monsoon season in the upstream reaches of the Ganges near to with the collaboration of all other riparian countries. In that case, all
Indo-Nepalese border. Many experts said that both countries could be basin states would have a collective right of action and no state could
benefitted by the construction of these dams. However, India denied dispose of the water without consultation with other concerned states.
this proposal by saying that Bangladesh could dig a link canal across In fact, the "community of interests" approach leads to the implementa-
the North-Western part of Bangladesh connecting the Brahmaputra with tion of basin-wide development programs designed by all riparian states
the Ganges at above point of the Farakka Barrage [36] (Fig. 7). In fact, in the basin [70].
the construction of the link canal would not be favorable to Bangladesh Salman [53] also referred to some of the international water regu-
instead it certainly would be benefitting India as for passing more wa- latory related doctrines, principles and laws. As such, the international
ter from the Brahmaputra to the feeder canal of the Bhagirathi-Hooghly law regarding transboundary river prohibits riparian states from caus-
river system along with very negligible effect to the Ganges flow. Is- ing harm to other states, and call for cooperation and peaceful resolution
lam ([36]: 924) said “the link canal raises considerable doubt and mis- of disputes. For collaboration and peaceful resolution, the law empha-
trust that the canal might be used to substitute the Brahmaputra for sizes absolute territorial integrity and continuation of the natural flow
the Ganges in flushing out the Calcutta port, enabling India to divert of an international river into its territory from the upper to downstream
A.B.M.E. Hassan Sustainable Futures 1 (2019) 100002

riparian countries. Another principle stated that every riparian state has Bangladesh is based on general observation instead of a quantitative
a right to use the waters of the transboundary river, but should be under assessment of water requirements [1].
a corresponding duty to ensure that such usage does not harm other ri-
parian countries. Furthermore, this principle establishes the community
of co-riparian states to vest the rights over the waters of the entire river 3.4. Impacts of Farakka barrage and challenges to sustainable development
occupied by the collective body of the riparian states.
The author also pointed out the Madrid Declaration, adopted in Until 1975, the flow of the river was entirely natural [47] and that
1911, which established an absolute prohibition against activities that time the sharing of water was as usual [37]. However, following the
may cause of injury to other riparian states. Moreover, it is also referred operation of Farakka Barrage, the flow of the Ganges in Bangladesh re-
to “Helsinki Rules” on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers’ duced significantly in the dry season, while the discharge of water is
established the clause " reasonable and equitable utilization" of the wa- currently being increased in the monsoon. The fluctuation of Ganges
ters of an international drainage basin among the riparian states as the flow significantly degraded the total ecological system such as disrup-
fundamental principle of international water law. It also mandates each tion of fisheries, forestry, agriculture, navigation and growing salinity
riparian state to consider geography and hydrology of the basin, climate intrusion from the coast [24,47] that make challenges to sustainable
affecting the basin, and the economic and social needs of each basin. In development in southwest part of Bangladesh. As a literature revealed
giving peaceful solution to disputes, Helsinki Rules recommended mul- water scarcity is very responsible for deteriorating the environmental
tilateral negotiation by referencing to joint agencies/ commissions, or conditions. In particular, water scarcity triggers risk factors that enhance
to unbiased third parties for arranging arbitration [36]. local and regional conflict and tensions [61]. However, it demonstrated
Hence, according to the judgment of above principles and models, that the annual minimum flow of water failed to meet the threshold
Ganges water diversion system could be managed by the corroboration limit in every subsequent year of Farakka barrage construction. Simi-
of all riparian countries of the Ganges basin, i.e., Nepal, India, China, larly, maximum yearly flows also were unable to reach the threshold
and Bangladesh [52]. This kind of collective water resource manage- limit in the post-Farakka period. Therefore, both floods and droughts
ment approach with all riparian states would reduce the Ganges water are seen that is being more frequently occurred in the post-Farakka pe-
diversion conflicts [51]. Unfortunately, no treaty does not provide any riod [24]. Bangladesh has been a predominantly agrarian economy, is
mechanism to incorporate other two riparian countries like Nepal and still facing severe water crisis for irrigated agriculture in the southwest
China as the parties of interest [52] for India’s unwillingness. Ultimately, part, which is a Ganges-dependent area (International Commission on
India has the upper hand in this arrangement because; the upper Ganges Irrigation and Drainage [34], n.d.] [47]). The Ganges–Kobadak (GK) Ir-
flows almost entirely through India. If the flow is reduced at Farakka, rigation Project, the largest surface water project in the country [5], was
there is little in the arrangement that ensures India from discharging conceived in 1954 to improve the quality of life and economic solvency
water from its upstream level of the Ganges. of the people living in the southwest region by achieving self-sufficiency
The existence of the Ganges Water Treaty does not necessarily in food through increasing agricultural productivity. However, it is pa-
equate to meaningful co-operation between the parties. Given the thetic that the level of surface and groundwater drastically fell in the
high dependency on the Ganges’ waters and Bangladesh’s position dry season after the Farakka Barrage went into operation, and subse-
as a lower riparian, the arrangement between Bangladesh and India quently, the rice production had declined in a significant rate in the
seems to favor India’s hydro-interests. Since Bangladesh is a deltaic southwest region of Bangladesh [1]. Kolås, et al. [39] exhibited a com-
floodplain; the country is highly susceptible to flooding. Given the parative analysis of local conflict between dry season and monsoon sea-
treaty’s restrictions, if the river flow were to reach two million cusecs at son in the Padma (the Ganges) and revealed that there are significant
Farakka, not only would the river breach its banks, but also the treaty incidences of conflict occurred in dry months that in monsoon months
would not allow India to withdraw more water for flood alleviation. (Fig. 8).
These shortcomings indicate that the Ganges Water Treaty is not a Crow et al. [17] revealed that the more direct consequences include
comprehensive water-management solution, but rather an arrangement changes in the hydraulic, hydrological, and morphological characteris-
for dividing water allocations. It has not solved any of the issues that tics of the Ganges and its distributaries, resulting in a drastic decline in
Bangladesh must address because of the Farakka Barrage and does little the river stage. This has caused excessive siltation in the rivers, forma-
to ensure Bangladeshi food and water security [42]. tion of new char lands (islands) (Fig. 9), and reduction in convenience
Bangladesh’s share decreased about 8 percent under the 1996 Treaty capacity.
[71]. It is noteworthy that for the three non-monsoon months (March- The Gorai, as one of the main distributaries of the Ganges in
May), the share of Bangladesh has decreased from about 61 percent un- Bangladesh, is blocked in the dry season for siltation [36,38,47]. The
der the 1977 Agreement to about 50 percent under the 1996 Treaty. decline of flow of the Ganges in dry season has also caused lowering of
Water allocated to Bangladesh in 1996 Treaty has been found to be the groundwater level and affected the year-round water balance. As a
approximately 50 percent less than the pre-Farakka average flow at result, crops are being damaged, water shortage for drinking and indus-
Hardinge Bridge point in Bangladesh, which means this treaty is un- tries that are giving the birth of adverse health effects. Consequently,
likely to make any noticeable difference in solving the water crisis in there have been significant adverse impacts on the ecosystem, fisheries,
the dry season in the Southwestern part of Bangladesh [59]. There- forestry, and livelihoods.
fore, the 1996 Treaty does not provide any minimum guaranteed flow River navigation, the heart of Bangladesh’s transport network, was
for Bangladesh if the flow at Farakka reduces substantially [4,52,54], also affected. The country already lost about 15,600 km inland navi-
though there was a consent in making this agreement between these two gational route and another 3300 km has become risky for navigation
countries. due to the upstream withdrawal of water in India [5]. In the south-
The Ganges Treaty did improve the flow into Bangladesh, but it was western part of Bangladesh, where 65% of crops were directly affected
lower than the flow that was available during earlier agreement periods by Farakka barrage because it has changed the agricultural pattern of
and lower by a considerable extent, for example, 40 percent of natural the region in which 34% crops were extinct due to the scarcity of wa-
state during March and April [72]. A recent concern is that Bangladesh ter. Moreover, a significant number of fisherman, boatman, businessman
is getting a lower volume of water than it should get as per the Treaty. and farmer has changed their livelihood pattern during post Farakka
One of the reasons is the decrease in flows arriving at Farakka because period. For the scarcity of water, the composition of flora and fauna is
of upstream water uses [54]. However, this agreement did not contain currently being decreased [45] and in such a way, it is challenging day
any guarantee of minimum water for Bangladesh, and the problem is by day to have sustainability of development in the south-west part of
still severe. In part, this is because the impact of Farakka Barrage on Bangladesh.
A.B.M.E. Hassan Sustainable Futures 1 (2019) 100002

Fig. 8. Occurrence of local conflict in dry season and monsoon seasons in Padma basin (Source: [39], p.73).

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