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VOL. 285, JANUARY 30, 1998 679

People vs. Correa
*
G.R. No. 119246. January 30, 1998.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ANTONIO CORREA y CAYTON @ “BOYET,” RITO GUNIDA y
SESANTE @ “DODONG,” and LEONARDO DULAY y SANTOS
@ “BOY KUBA,” accused-appellants.

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Evidence; Witnesses; The

testimony of a single witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to
produce a conviction.—There is no law requiring that a testimony of a
witness be corroborated in order to be believed. The testimony of a single
witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to produce a conviction. The
failure to present all the eyewitnesses to an act does not necessarily give rise
to an unfavorable presumption, especially when the testimony of the witness
sought to be presented is merely corroborative. A corroborative testimony is
not necessary where the details of the crime have clearly been testified to
with sufficient clarity.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The non-presentation by the prosecution of
certain witnesses is not a valid defense for the accused, neither does it work
against the prosecution’s cause.—The matter of selecting and presenting
witnesses for the People is a prerogative of the public prosecutor. Thus, the
non-presentation by the prosecution of certain witnesses is not a valid
defense for the accused, neither does it work against the prosecution’s cause.
Where, as here, the accused believes that the testimonies of said witnesses
are important to his cause, as when he expects them to make declarations

_______________

* EN BANC.

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inconsistent with that of the principal prosecution witness, then he should

avail of them even by compulsory judicial process if necessary.
Same; Same; Same; Findings of fact of the trial court accorded great
weight and respect.—We should accord great weight and respect to the
findings of fact of the trial court which is in a better position to determine
questions involving the credibility of witnesses, it having directly heard
them and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. In the
absence of any showing that the trial court had overlooked certain
substantial facts which would alter the conviction of the appellants, we do
not find any reason to overturn the trial court’s findings as to facts.
Same; Same; Same; As between the positive declaration of the
prosecution witness and the negative statements of the appellants, the
former deserves more credence.—What is of paramount importance in the
present case is the positive identification by prosecution witness SPO3 Jesus
Faller of the three (3) appellants, who were caught in flagrante delicto
transporting the subject dried marijuana flowering tops. This should prevail
over the appellants’ alibi and denials of having committed the crime with
which they were charged in the lower court, since as between the positive
declaration of the prosecution witness and the negative statements of the
appellants, the former deserves more credence.
Same; Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; The use by the
appellants of a motor vehicle in this case should not be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance because the very act of transporting the
prohibited drug is what is being punished under Section 4 of Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425.—True, Section 20, Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code considers as aggravating circumstance a situation when “the crime be
committed x x x by means of motor vehicles, airships, or other similar
means.” However, the use by the appellants of a motor vehicle in this case
should not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because the very
act of transporting the prohibited drug is what is being punished under
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972), as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 (the “heinous
crimes” law).

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Same; Same; Same; Same; The use of a motor vehicle is inherent in the
crime of transporting the prohibited drug.—The act of transporting a
prohibited drug, like the one at bar, is a malum prohibitum since it is
punished as an offense under a special law. The use of a motor vehicle is
inherent in the crime of transporting the prohibited drug. It is a wrongful act
because it is prohibited by law. Without the law punishing the act, it cannot
be considered a wrong. As such, the mere commission of said act is
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constitutive of the of-fense punished and suffices to validly charge and

convict an individual caught committing the act so punished, regardless of
criminal intent.
Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; The right to be secure from
unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may
be made either expressly or impliedly.—The appellants are now precluded
from assailing the warrantless search and seizure when they voluntarily
submitted to it as shown by their actuation during the search and seizure.
The appellants never protested when SPO3 Jesus Faller, after identifying
himself as a police officer, opened the tin can loaded in the appellants’
vehicle and found eight (8) bundles. And when Faller opened one of the
bundles, it smelled of marijuana. The NBI later confirmed the eight (8)
bundles to be positive for marijuana. Again, the appellants did not raise any
protest when they, together with their cargo of drugs and their vehicle, were
brought to the police station for investigation and subsequent prosecution.
We have ruled in a long line of cases that: “When one voluntarily submits to
a search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is
precluded from later complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, page 631). The right to be secure from
unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may
be made either expressly or impliedly.”

APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,

Branch 35.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Virgilio Y. Morales for accused-appellant.

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MARTINEZ, J.:

The courts should not hesitate to wield the sword against drug
traffickers whose conscience has been seared by their insatiable
greed for instant wealth, thus propelling them to boldly pursue their
abominable trade, utterly unconcerned of the pernicious effects of
their venomous merchandise which have destroyed the lives and
shattered the dreams of hapless victims, especially the vulnerable
youth.
This the trial court did in the present case when it imposed the
most severe penalty of death and a fine of Ten Million Pesos against
the three (3) appellants for delivering and transporting more than 16
kilograms of prohibited dried marijuana flowering tops.

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While the conviction of the appellants of the crime charged is

proper, we find, however, that the penalty of death imposed by the
trial court is not in accordance with the law.
On 12 July 1994, an Information was filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (Branch 35), docketed as Criminal Case No.
94-137528, indicting appellants Antonio Correa y Cayton @
“Boyet,” Rito Gunida y Sesante @ “Dodong,” and Leonardo Dulay
y Santos @ “Boy Kuba” for 1
having violated Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, allegedly committed as
follows:

“That on or about June 18, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, not
being authorized by law to possess, sell, deliver, transport, give away to
another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, knowingly and jointly deliver or transport eight (8) bundles of
dried flowering tops of MARIJUANA wrapped in pieces of papers and
plastic tapes weighing 16.1789
2
kilograms, a prohibited drug.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”

_______________

1 Otherwise known as “The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.”

2 RTC record, p. 1.

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The Information indicated that the appellants3 were “All Under

Arrest” and that “No Bail (was) Recommended.”
When arraigned, the appellants pleaded “NOT GUILTY.”
After trial, the lower court found the appellants guilty as charged,
the dispositive portion of the decision dated 03 March 1995 reading
thus:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered pronouncing the three accused

ANTONIO CORREA y CAYTON, @ “Boyet,” RITO GUNIDA y
SESANTE @ “Dodong,” and LEONARDO DULAY y SANTOS @ “Boy
Kuba” guilty beyond reasonable doubt of unlawful delivery and
transportation of dried marijuana flowering tops weighing 16.1789
kilograms, penalized under Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, and further amended by Section 13 in relation to Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 7659, and sentencing each of the said three accused to
DEATH to be executed by the means provided by law, and to pay a fine of
P10,000,000.00, plus the costs.

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“The eight (8) bundles in brick form of dried marijuana flowering tops
(Exhibits B-1 to B-8, inclusive), weighing 16.1789 kilograms are ordered
confiscated and forfeited to the Government to be disposed of in accordance
with law under the direction and supervision by the Dangerous Drugs
Board. Within ten (10) days following the promulgation of this judgment,
the Branch Clerk of this Court, is ordered to turn over the two (2) bundles of
dried marijuana flowering tops left with this Court to the Dangerous Drugs
Custodian, National Bureau of Investigation, as appointed by the Dangerous
Drugs Board, for appropriate disposition. The other six (6) bundles of said
dried marijuana flowering tops have been left in the custody of the NBI,
Forensic Chemistry Division.
“The owner-type jeep with plate No. FMR 948 used by the three accused
as a means to commit the offense is also ordered confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the Government, unless it can be shown that it is the property of a
third person not liable for the offense.
“Serve a copy of this Decision on the Executive Director, Dangerous
Drugs Board, for his information
4
and guidance.
“SO ORDERED.”

_______________

3 Ibid., pp. 1-2.

4 Penned by Judge Ramon P. Makasiar; RTC record, pp. 131-154.

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The verdict of conviction by the trial court rested mainly on the

testimony of prosecution witness SPO3 Jesus Faller, a police officer
assigned5 at Police Station 3, Western Police District, City of
Manila. He was among the nine-member police team of the Drug
Enforcement Unit—Western Police District Command (DEU-
WPDC) which arrested
6
the three (3) appellants in the early morning
of 18 June 1994. His account of the arrest, as correctly narrated in
the Appellee’s Brief, is as follows:

“About a week prior to June 18, 1994, the Police Operatives from the Drug
Enforcement Unit of the Western Police District Command (DEU-WPDC)
had placed under surveillance the movements and activities of appellant
Leonardo Dulay on account of confidential and intelligence reports received
in said Unit about his drug trafficking around Bambang Street, Tondo,
Manila. The police surveillance brought forth positive results and confirmed
Dulay’s illegal drug trade (TSN, Nov. 22, 1994, pp. 16-17).
“On June 17, 1994, at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, the Unit’s
Operatives, DEU-WPDC, U.N. Avenue, Ermita, Manila was alerted by a
police informant that Dulay, coming from Quezon City, would deliver and

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transport that night, to Bambang Street, Manila a certain quantity of drugs.

Dulay reportedly would pass A. Bonifacio Street on board a semi-stainless
owner-type jeep with Plate No. FMR-948. Forthwith, a nine-man team
headed by SPO3 Jesus Faller was organized to pursue and bag the suspect.
Thereafter, the operatives, together with the informer proceeded to A.
Bonifacio Street on board three vehicles. They inconspicuously parked
along the side of North Cemetery, boundary of Quezon City and Manila, at
around 11:00 o’clock that same evening, and waited for the suspect (Id., pp.
4; 19-20).
“Around 3:00 o’clock in the morning of June 18, 1994, the police
informant spotted the approaching vehicle of Dulay and immediately alerted
the waiting policemen. The operatives tailed the subject jeepney, taking care
that its passengers would not notice that they were being followed (Id., p. 5).

_______________

5 Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), hearing of 22 November 1994, p. 3.

6 Ibid., pp. 3-4.

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People vs. Correa

“Upon reaching the intersection of Bambang Extension and Jose Abad

Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila, the subject vehicle stopped and parked at a
corner. Thereupon, the operatives also stopped and parked their vehicles
around the suspect’s vehicle and accosted the passengers of the owner-type
jeepney. Appellant Antonio Correa was at the driver’s seat with appellant
Leonardo Dulay sitting beside him in the front seat and appellant Rito
Gunida at the back seat (Id., p. 21). The team inspected a cylindrical tin can
of El Cielo Vegetable Cooking Lard (Exhibit ‘B’), about two feet high,
loaded in the vehicle of the appellants. The can contained eight bundles of
suspected dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in pieces of paper and
plastic tapes. The team seized the suspected contrabands and marked each
bundle consecutively with ‘IDR-1’ to ‘IDR-8’ (Exhibits ‘B-1’ to ‘B-8’
inclusive). The three suspects were brought to the police headquarters at
DEU-WPDC for investigation (Id., pp. 5-9; Exhs. ‘E,’ ‘F’ and ‘G’).
“The packages of suspected marijuana were submitted to the National
Bureau of Investigation for laboratory analysis to determine their chemical
composition. The tests confirmed that the confiscated stuff were positive for
marijuana and weighed 7
16.1789 kilograms (TSN, Nov. 15, 1994, p. 11;
Exhs. ‘D’ and ‘D-1’).”

The appellants, on the other hand, had a different story on their

arrest. The trial court, in its decision subject for review, has
summarized the appellants’ version thus:

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“The common defense interposed by the three accused is in the nature of

alibi. The core of their contention is that they were arrested without warrant
in Camarin D, Caloocan City. They also denied that they were delivering
and transporting dried marijuana flowering tops when they were
apprehended.
“Also stripped of incidental details, the version of the defense is to the
effect that on June 17, 1994, at about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon,
Leonardo Dulay rushed to the Metropolitan Hospital his gravely ill and very
weak six months old son Jon-Jon. He was accompanied by his co-accused
Antonio Correa, who drove the owner-type jeep which they used, and a
neighbor known only as ‘Bulik.’ At around 11:00 o’clock the same evening,
Leonardo Dulay, Antonio

_______________

7 Rollo, pp. 118-120.

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Correa and ‘Bulik’ went back home to get the things of the sick child.
However, when they were already near the house of Leonardo Dulay in
Camarin D, Caloocan City, some elements of the Western Police District
Command blocked their (accused) way, and apprehended them for an
alleged charge of trafficking on ‘shabu,’ and were brought to the WPDC
headquarters at U.N. Avenue, where they were detained.
“x x x according to accused Rito Gunida, he was picked-up by the police
in his house at Camarin II, Area D, Caloocan City, on June 17, 1994, at
around 12:00 o’clock midnight. The arresting officers rose (sic) him from
his sleep. He was also taken to the headquarters of the WPDC at U.N.
Avenue, and there placed in a cell.
“In addition to their respective declarations, the three accused likewise
offered the testimonies of Marilene de la Rosa, Violeta Almugela, Juanito
Balino, Rogelio
8
Altis and Pascual Gillego to corroborate the claim of the
defense.”

Assailing the verdict of conviction, the appellants interpose the

following assignment of errors:

“THE LOWER COURT ERRED:

IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE, AS ALL THE

ACCUSED WERE APPREHENDED AT THEIR RESPECTIVE
RESIDENCES IN CAMARIN, KALOOKAN CITY, NOT IN MANILA AS

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THE LAWMEN MADE IT APPEAR WHERE THE THREE (3)

ACCUSED ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE OFFENSE.

II

IN ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY CONFISCATED

FROM THE ACCUSED, THE SAME BEING INADMISSIBLE BEING
THE FRUIT OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH CONDUCTED WITHOUT
ANY SEARCH WARRANT.

_______________

8 RTC record, p. 136.

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People vs. Correa

III

IN BASING ITS DECISION OF CONVICTION OF APPELLANTS

SOLELY ON THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF SPO3 JESUS
FALLER OF THE WPDC DESPITE THE PARTICIPATION OF THE
OTHER EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE OPERATIVES THAT ALLEGEDLY
TOOK PART IN THE ARREST OF THE THREE (3) ACCUSED.

IV

IN CONVICTING THE THREE (3) ACCUSED DESPITE THE

FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH
9
THE GUILT OF
THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.”

The appellants’ submission is palpably without merit.

The first, third and fourth assigned errors aforequoted are closely
interrelated and, therefore, the same shall be discussed jointly.
The appellants plead in exculpation that their version should be
believed because the defense has “indubitably established” that they
were arrested in their respective residences in Camarin, Caloocan
City by the police team of SPO3 Jesus Faller of the Western Police
District Command, Manila. The appellants claim that—

“x x x. Witnesses Juanita Balino, Marlene dela Rosa, Violeta Almojuela and

Rogelio Altis are unanimous in their declaration that the arresting officers
were in Camarin, Kalookan City, when they arrested the three accused. As
against the testimony of SPO3 Jesus Faller, the positive declaration of the
foregoing witnesses for the defense should prevail. Since SPO3 Jesus Faller
belongs to the Western Police District Command, he orchestrated his
testimony to make it appear that the arrest of the three accused and the
confiscation of the alleged marijuana took place in Bambang, Sta. Cruz,
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Manila, which is too far and remote from the residences of the three accused
who are all residents of Camarin, Kalookan City. The arrest of the three
accused in Camarin, Kalookan City, were illegal and the

_______________

9 Appellants’ Brief, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 57-58.

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People vs. Correa

alleged confiscation of evidence invalid, granting that there really were

evidence confiscated from the three accused. To cure the flaw in the arrest
of the accused and the warrantless confiscation, Faller made it appear that
the accused were transporting marijuana in Bambang, Sta. Cruz, Manila
and that they tailed the accused until Bambang Street, when in truth and in
fact, the three accused were illegally apprehended in Camarin, Kalookan
City, and they really have to pass through A. Bonifacio Street, on their way
to Western Police Headquarters at the U.N. Avenue.
“To avoid inconsistencies in their statements and oral declaration in
court, the other eight (8) members of the arresting team x x x were not
presented as witnesses and their testimonies were withheld by the
prosecution. We do not find any reason why not one of them corroborated
the testimony of SPO3 Faller. There is a legal presumption that if an
evidence is intentionally withheld when there is opportunity to offer the
same, (the said evidence) is deemed to be adverse to the party withholding
the same. Not a 10single corroboration came for the said eight members of the
arresting team.” (Emphasis ours)

That is all the appellants could say in assailing the credibility of

prosecution star witness SPO3 Jesus Faller. Nothing was mentioned
about any inconsistencies in the testimony of Faller. Neither was
there any suggestion that Faller harbored ill-feeling against the
appellants.
The appellants’ allegations that “(t)o cure the flaw in (their)
arrest,” SPO3 Jesus Faller “orchestrated his testimony” and “made it
appear that the accused were transporting marijuana in Bambang,
Sta. Cruz, Manila” and were arrested thereat, and that “(t)o avoid
inconsistencies in their statements and oral declaration in court, the
other eight (8) members of the arresting team . . . were not presented
as witnesses,” are nothing but mere conjectures and suspicions
which have zero probative value. Conjectures and suspicions are not
evidence; ergo, they prove nothing.
Moreover, the testimonies of the other members of the
apprehending team would, at best, have been merely corroborative
of Jesus Faller’s testimony. Thus, the trial court did not

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_______________

10 Appellants’ Brief, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 67-68.

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err in giving credence to the uncorroborated testimony of Jesus

Faller and in rejecting the appellants’ defense of alibi and denial.
There is no law requiring that a11 testimony of a witness be
corroborated in order to be believed. The testimony of a single
witness, if12 credible and positive, is sufficient to produce a
conviction. The failure to present all the eyewitnesses to an act
does not necessarily give rise to an unfavorable presumption,
especially when the testimony
13
of the witness sought to be presented
is merely corroborative. A corroborative testimony is not necessary
where the details14 of the crime have clearly been testified to with
sufficient clarity.
The matter of selecting and presenting 15
witnesses for the People is
a prerogative of the public prosecutor. Thus, the non-presentation
by the prosecution of certain witnesses is not a valid defense for the16
accused, neither does it work against the prosecution’s cause.
Where, as here, the accused believes that the testimonies of said
witnesses are important to his cause, as when he expects them to
make declarations inconsistent with that of the principal prosecution
witness, then he should 17
avail of them even by compulsory judicial
process if necessary.
In any case, the public prosecutor’s choice of SPO3 Jesus Faller
as the only witness to testify on the appellants’ arrest was proper.
Faller was the one who received from the informant the confidential
information about 18
the illegal drug trafficking activities of appellant
Leonardo Dulay. Since the said

_______________

11 People vs. Marilao, 177 SCRA 271, 278.

12 Ibid., citing People vs. Cortez, G.R. No. L-32246, 30 June 1988; People vs.
Trigo, 174 SCRA 93.
13 Ibid., citing People vs. Salufrania, 159 SCRA 401.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., citing People vs. Obenque, 147 SCRA 488; People vs. Laureta, 159 SCRA
256; People vs. Pinto, 230 SCRA 847, 857.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 TSN, 22 November 1994, p. 16.

690
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information was so confidential, Faller placed appellant Dulay under

police surveillance with19
only PO3 Ebia and their informant as his
(Faller’s) companions. After a week of surveillance, the informant
again reported to Faller in the evening of 17 June 1994 that the
appellants would deliver illegal drugs that night to Bambang on
board a vehicle, and it was Faller who also headed the nine-man
police team in tailing the appellants and20
arresting them after finding
the illegal drugs in their possession. Thus, Faller was the best
witness to testify on the circumstances of the appellants’ arrest.
We have carefully examined the testimony of SPO3 Jesus Faller
to determine whether or not his testimony is a product of fabrication
and we find his testimony to be credible. Moreover, being a law
enforcer, Faller is presumed to have regularly
21
performed his duty in
the absence of proof to the contrary. We fully agree with the
observation of the trial court when it said:

“Apart from their inherently weak defense, the three accused have not
provided this Court with any other ground to warrant disbelief of the
testimony of SPO3 Jesus Faller. They have not as much as hinted that SPO3
Jesus Faller was ill-motivated in testifying against them. This witness of the
People is a police officer. As such he is presumed to have carried out and
performed regularly his official duties, especially in the absence of any
indication in the record showing otherwise. It has not been claimed that
SPO3 Jesus Faller has a personal stake and interest in the final outcome of
this case, or that he would be benefited or some personal advantage would
inure to him if the three accused were convicted. Whatever is the result of
this case he would continue to receive his usual remuneration as a police
officer. More than these, SPO3 Jesus Faller has been subjected to a lengthy
and searching cross-examination by an able and determined defense counsel
de parte, such that any falsehood in his narration could have been easily
detected and exposed. However, he came out from the ordeal with his
narration unimpaired and maintained.

_______________

19 Ibid., pp. 16-17.

20 Ibid., pp. 17-23.
21 People vs. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646.

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“It is a familiar rule consistently applied by the Supreme Court in a long line
of cases, thereby making further citations academic, that where there
appears no evidence in the record indicating that the principal prosecution
witness has been actuated by improper motive in testifying against the
accused, the presumption is that he has not been so actuated and his
testimony is entitled to full faith and belief.
“The contentions of the defense that on June 18, 1994, at about 5:00
o’clock in the afternoon, Leonardo Dulay and Antonio Correa rushed the
gravely ill six months old son of the former to the Metropolitan Hospital
located at Magdalena Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, according to Leonardo
Dulay (TSN, Dec. 13, 1994, p. 11), or at the corner of Masangkay and
Mayhaligue Streets, according to Antonio Correa (TSN, Dec. 19, 1994, p.
22), and that at around 11:00 o’clock in the evening on the same date they
returned to Camarin in Caloocan City to get the things of the child, but they
were not able to do so because elements of the Western Police District
Command, who were waiting near the house of Leonardo Dulay, arrested
them (TSN, Dec. 13, 1994, pp. 12 & 15; Id., Dec. 19, 1994, pp. 23-26), do
not deserve belief by this Court. Aside from the observed discrepancy in
their testimonies about the location of the Metropolitan Hospital, the
Booking Sheets and Arrest Reports (Exhibits E and G) conclusively reveal
that as early as 4:00 o’clock in the morning on June 18, 1994, they had been
in the custody of the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Western Police District
Command at U.N. Avenue, Ermita, Manila, undergoing police investigation.
Although objected to by the defense counsel on the ground that Antonio
Correa and Leonardo Dulay signed Exhibits E and G, respectively, without
the assistance of counsel, these documents, however, were offered by the
prosecution and admitted by the Court only for the purpose of showing that
a police investigation was conducted following the arrest of the two
accused. The signatures of the two accused on these documents are, thus,
immaterial and will not alter the fact that they were in the Office of the
DEU-WPDC at U.N. Avenue, Ermita, Manila, from 4:00 o’clock in the
morning on June 18, 1994, being investigated by the police authorities in
connection with the offense now in question.
“One more thing. The clear implication of the claim of the defense is that
the sick child of Leonardo Dulay was confined in the Metropolitan Hospital,
otherwise its contention that Leonardo Dulay and Antonio Correa went back
to Camarin, Caloocan City to get the things of the child would bear no
sense. The hospital records of said

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child are, therefore, the best evidence which would conclusively confirm
their pretense. Surprisingly, however, and for no stated reason, the defense
failed to offer in the evidence those hospital records of the son of Leonardo
Dulay. The significance of this omission is fatal to the cause of the defense.

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It means that there were no such hospital records because no child of

Leonardo Dulay was hospitalized on or about June 18, 1994, and that this
was merely fabricated by the defense to provide some loopholes through
which these two accused may elude the law.
“The alibi of Rito Gunida that he was sleeping in his house at Camarin
II, Area D, Caloocan City, on June 17, 1994, when at around midnight he
was awakened and arrested by some policemen cannot outweigh and prevail
over the testimony of SPO3 Jesus Faller that he and his co-police officers
arrested this accused, together with Leonardo Dulay and Antonio Correa, on
June 18, 1994, at more or less, 3:45 o’clock in the morning at Bambang
Extension corner Jose Abad Santos Avenue in Tondo, Manila, in the act of
delivering and transporting marijuana, using a motorized vehicle. In
weighing conflicting statements and declarations of opposing witnesses, the
accepted rule consistently applied by the courts is that where the testimony
of the principal witness of the prosecution regarding the commission by the
accused of the offense in question is positive, clear and trustworthy, like in
the case at bar, the latter’s denials and explanation cannot outweigh and
prevail over such positive, clear and trustworthy evidence of the
prosecution. (People vs. Chavez, et al., 117 SCRA 221, 227; People vs.
Campana, 124 SCRA 271, 281.)
“The attempt of the defense to corroborate its claim that the three
accused were arrested in Camarin, Caloocan City, and not in Bambang
Extension corner of Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila, with the
testimonies of Marilene de la Rosa, Violeta Almugela, Juanita Balino,
Rogelio Altisi and Pascual Gillego, did not provide any improvement to its
weak and crippled position.
“Marilene de la Rosa is the niece of Leonardo Dulay who finances her
studies. (TSN, Jan. 9, 1995, p. 4.) In view of her close relationship with her
uncle and the financial support he extends to her, it would be unnatural if
she does not feel a very strong bias in favor of her uncle and provider.
“Violeta Almugela contradicted the testimonies of Leonardo Dulay and
Antonio Correa on a vital aspect of their defense. In the course of her direct
examination, she declared:

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People vs. Correa

ATTY. MORALES (Defense counsel)

Madam witness, where were you on June 17, 1994, at about
midnight?
A: I was at the Hospital, sir.
Q: What Hospital are you referring to?
A: Infant Jesus, sir.
Q: What time did you arrive at Infant Jesus Hospital?
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A: At 5:00, sir.
Q: Who were with you when you arrived?
A: I was with Boy Dulay and Josephine Dulay and a certain
Antonio, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Where did you proceed?
A: We proceeded to Metro Hospital, sir.
Q: Where is that situated?
A: At Tayuman, Tondo, sir. (TSN, Jan. 9, 1995, pp. 12-14.)

“Leonardo Dulay, on the other hand, declared under the direct examination
of his counsel:

Q: Where is that Metropolitan Hospital situated?

A: In Magdalena, sir.
Q: Magdalena what?
A: At Magdalena, Sta. Cruz, Manila, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When did you bring your son to the Metropolitan Hospital?
A: On June 18, sir.
Q: What time?
A: 5:00 o’clock, sir. (TSN, Dec. 13, 1994, pp. 11-12)

“There was no mention in the testimony of Leonardo Dulay that his sick son
was first taken to the Infant Jesus Hospital at 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon
on June 18, 1994.
“Antonio Correa, testifying on the same incident, gave another version.
He declared:

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People vs. Correa

Q: Where is Metropolitan Hospital?

A: At Masangkay corner Mayhaligue Street.
Q: What City?
A: Manila, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Why did you go to Metropolitan Hospital?

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A: In order to have the child of Leonardo Dulay medically

attended, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What time did you bring the son of Dulay to the Metropolitan
Hospital?
A: From 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon up to past 11:00 o’clock.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, what time did you leave the Metropolitan Hospital?
A: Past 11:00 o’clock, sir. (TSN, Dec. 19, 1994, pp. 22-23)

“The discrepancies in the testimonies of defense witness Violeta Almugela,

accused Leonardo Dulay and accused Antonio Correa cannot be lightly
ignored as discrepancies in minor details, because such alleged incident
forms a major link in the defense of the accused, and the main basis of their
alibi defense.
“The testimony of Juanita Balino deserves but a passing consideration by
this Court. According to her on June 17, 1994, at about midnight she was in
her house in Camarin Petchayan, Caloocan City, when Boy Dulay, Antonio
Correa, Gunida and one Violeta Almugela were taken by armed police
officers. But because after they passed by she got afraid she went back to
sleep. (TSN, Jan. 9, 1995, pp. 23-24). Her testimony was so trivial, such that
even the Assistant Prosecutor found her unworthy for further cross-
examination.
“We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity
to our common knowledge, usual observation, and daily experience. To be
worthy of credence, the testimony of a witness should be so natural,
reasonable and probable in view of the event which it describes or to which
it relates, so as to make it easy for the mind to accept. In this case, despite
the startling occurrence which happened before her eyes, which even scared
her, Juanita Balino nonchalantly went back to sleep, unconcerned with what
may hap-

695

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People vs. Correa

pen next. This is not the usual way a person of her age, 57 years old, and
status conducts himself(sic) in the face of a shocking event.
“Rogelio A. Altis, Sr., a barangay kagawad of Barangay 178, Zone 15, of
Caloocan City, had no personal knowledge of the alleged incident which
supposedly took place at about midnight on June 17, 1994. He learned it
only on June 20, 1994, when one Ursula Gunida reported it to him. (TSN,
Jan. 11, 1995, p. 3) It has not been explained why it took Ursula Gunida
until June 20, 1994 to report to the barangay authorities the incident which
allegedly happened on June 17, 1994.
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“The same may be said with respect to the testimony of defense witness
Pascual Gillego. He admitted that he learned of the alleged arrest of the
three accused only from his neighbors. But he took no steps to report the
matter to his superiors in the barangay. x x x. (TSN, Jan. 11, 1995, pp. 6, 9).
“The testimonies of Rogelio Altis, Sr. and Pascual Gillego are hearsay,
and as such it has no probative value and should be disregarded whether
objected to or not. If no objection is made, it becomes evidence only by
reason of want of such objection, but its admission does not confer upon it
any new attribute in point of weight. Its nature and quality remains the
same, so far as its intrinsic weakness and incompetency 22to satisfy the mind
are concerned. (People vs. Valero, 112 SCRA 661, 675.)”

We should accord great weight and respect to the findings of fact of

the trial court which is in a better position to determine questions
involving the credibility of witnesses, it having directly heard
23
them
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. In the
absence of any showing that the trial court had overlooked certain
substantial facts which would alter the conviction of the appellants,
we do not find any reason to overturn the trial court’s findings as to
facts.
What is of paramount importance in the present case is the
positive identification by prosecution witness SPO3 Jesus Faller of
the three (3) appellants, who were caught in flagrante delicto
transporting the subject dried marijuana flow-

_______________

22 Rollo, pp. 25-30.

23 People vs. Sanchez, 199 SCRA 414.

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ering tops. This should prevail over the appellants’ alibi and denials
of having committed the crime with which they were charged in the
lower court, since as between the positive declaration of the
prosecution witness and the negative24
statements of the appellants,
the former deserves more credence.
In the second, and final assigned error, the appellants assail the
admission of the seized marijuana flowering tops as evidence
against them, arguing that the same was “the fruit of an illegal
search conducted without any search warrant.”
The appellants’ contention is untenable. However, it would serve
no useful purpose to discuss at length this alleged error, for the
following reasons:

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The appellants are now precluded from assailing the

(1) warrantless search and seizure when they voluntarily
submitted to it as shown by their actuation during the search
and seizure. The appellants never protested when SPO3
Jesus Faller, after identifying himself as a police officer,
opened the tin can loaded 25
in the appellants’ vehicle and
found eight (8) bundles. And when Faller 26
opened one of
the bundles, it smelled of marijuana. The NBI later
confirmed 27 the eight (8) bundles to be positive for
marijuana. Again, the appellants did not raise any protest
when they, together with their cargo of drugs and their
vehicle, were brought to the police station for investigation
and subsequent
28
prosecution. We have ruled in a long line of
cases that:

_______________

24 People vs. Melgar, 157 SCRA 718.

25 TSN, 22 November 1994, p. 21.
26 Ibid., p.8.
27 Ibid., pp. 9-11; Exhibits D and D1.
28 People vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 113474, 13 December 1994, 239 SCRA 174,
184; People vs. Ramos, et al., G.R. Nos. 101804-07, 25 May 1993, 222 SCRA 557,
575; People vs. Tabar, G.R. No. 101124, 17 May 1993, 222 SCRA 144; People vs.
Malasugui, No. 44335, 30 July 1936, 63 Phil. 221; Vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil.
689 [1938]; People vs. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 [1991]; People vs. Rodrigueza, 205
SCRA 791 [1992]; People vs. Omaweng, G.R. No. 99050, 02 September 1992, 213
SCRA 462-463.

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People vs. Correa

“When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on

his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof
(Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, page 631). The right to
be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and
such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.”

(2) The appellants effectively waived their constitutional right

against the search and seizure in question by their voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court, when they
entered a plea of not 29guilty upon arraignment and by
participating in the trial.

We agree with the trial court that the appellants conspired to commit
the offense which they knew to be unlawful:
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“The established circumstances of this case, considered collectively,

demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt the conspiracy among the three
accused to commit the offense at bar. They were apprehended at the same
time; travelling together in a motorized vehicle from the time they were first
spotted by the arresting police officers at A. Bonifacio Street until their
actual arrest at Bambang Extension corner Jose Abad Santos Avenue in
Tondo, Manila; at an unholy hour of the night (until) around 3:00 to 3:45
o’clock in the morning on June 18, 1994; with Antonio Correa at the
steering wheel, Leonardo Dulay seated in front beside the driver and Rito
Gunida seated at the back of the motor vehicle; carrying for delivery and
transportation a large quantity of dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in
tightly with plastic tapes and concealed in a big tin can of El Cielo
Vegetable Cooking Oil (Exhibit B). These factors leave the mind of this
Court at ease and free from any doubt that indeed the three accused had
conspired and helped one another in the delivery and transportation of the
said contraband. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 6425 provides:

‘Sec. 21. Attempt and Conspiracy.—The same penalty prescribed by this Act for the
commission of the offence shall be imposed in case of any attempt or conspiracy
commit the same in the following cases:

________________

29 People vs. Macam, 238 SCRA 306, 315 [1994], citing People vs. Rabang, 187
SCRA 682 [1990].

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698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Correa

(a) x x x xxx xxx

(b) sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of
dangerous drugs; 30
x x x x x x x x x’”

It was also duly established that the total weight of the dried
marijuana flowering tops involved in this case is 16.1789 31kilograms
as testified to by NBI Forensic Chemist Emilia A. Rosales.
The only error committed by the trial court, as we stated in the
beginning, is its imposition of the death penalty on the appellants.
Although this matter is not assigned as an error by the appellants,
however, in a criminal case, an appeal to this Court throws the whole
case open to review and it becomes our duty to correct an error as
may be found in the judgment appealed 32
from, whether it is made the
subject of assignment of errors or not.
The trial court considered the appellants’ use of a motor vehicle
in the commission of the offense as an aggravating circumstance,
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thus raising the penalty from reclusion 33

perpetua—which is the
imposable penalty prescribed by law —to death. Justifying the
penalty of death, the trial court made the following observation:

“In view of the volume of dried marijuana flowering tops involved in this
case, and the attendance of the aggravating circumstance that the crime was
committed by means of a motor vehicle, the Court, with deep regret and
sorrow, finds no other alternative but to impose on each of the three accused
the supreme penalty of death and fine prescribed by law. Undoubtedly the
three accused used an

_______________

30 RTC Decision, pp. 21-22; Rollo, pp. 33-34.

31 TSN, 15 November 1994, pp. 9-10.
32 People vs. Olfindo, et al., 47 Phil. 1; People vs. Borbano, 76 Phil. 702, 708.
33 Sec. 4, Art. II, R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Sec. 13, R.A. No. 7659, in relation to Sec.
20, Art. IV, R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Sec. 17, R.A. No. 7659.

699

VOL. 285, JANUARY 30, 1998 699

People vs. Correa

owner-type jeep with plate No. FMR 948 as a means to carry, deliver and
transport their illegal merchandise; to elude detection of their drug
trafficking activities by the police authorities; and to facilitate escape in
34
case their crime is discovered. (People vs. Espejo, 36 SCRA 400.)”
(Emphasis ours)

True, Section 20, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code considers as

aggravating circumstance a situation when “the crime be committed
x x x by means of motor vehicles, airships, or other similar means.”
However, the use by the appellants of a motor vehicle in this case
should not be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because
the very act of transporting the prohibited drug is what is being
punished under Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 (the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended by Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 7659 (the “heinous crimes” law). The said law
provides:

“SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of

Prohibited Drugs.—The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.

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Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if

the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in
any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a
victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.”
(Emphasis ours)

The act of transporting a prohibited drug, like the one at bar, is a

malum
35
prohibitum since it is punished as an offense under a special
law. The use of a motor vehicle is inherent in the crime of
transporting the prohibited drug. It is a wrongful

_______________

34 Decision, p. 23; Rollo, p. 35.

35 People vs. Lo Ho Wing, et al., G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991, 193 SCRA
122, 130.

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700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Correa
36
act because it is prohibited by law. Without 37
the law punishing the
act, it cannot be considered a wrong. As such, the mere
commission of said act is constitutive of the offense punished and
suffices to validly charge and convict an individual 38caught
committing the act so punished, regardless of criminal intent.
Admittedly, the law does not define how the act of transporting
can be committed. But, how else can one transport something to
another place except by the use of a carrier. Black’s Law Dictionary
defines “transport”
39
as “to carry or convey from one place to
another.” Under Section 4, “Transportation of Prohibited Drugs” is
by itself an offense. Again, Black defines “transportation” as “the
movement 40
of goods or persons from one place to another, by a
carrier.”41 The operative words in the definition are “to carry or
convey.” The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to
support a finding that the act of transporting was committed and
42
it is
immaterial whether or not the place of destination is reached.
Simply stated, the motor vehicle which was used to transport
prohibited drugs was not purposely sought to facilitate the
commission of the crime since such act of transporting constitutes
the crime itself, punishable under Section 4, Article II of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended. That a motor vehicle was used in
committing the crime is merely incidental to the act of transporting
prohibited drugs. The use of a motor vehicle is inherent in the crime
of transporting as it must of necessity accompany the commission
thereof; hence, such use is not an aggravating circumstance.

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_______________

36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 1979 edition, p. 1344.
40 Ibid. (Emphasis ours).
41 People vs. Lo Ho Wing, et al., supra.
42 Ibid.

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People vs. Correa

Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 23 of

Republic Act No. 7659, reads:

“Art. 62. Effects of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating

circumstances and of habitual delinquency.—Mitigating or aggravating
circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the
purpose of diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with the
following rules:

1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime

specially punishable by law or which are included by the law in
defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be
taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.
xxx xxx xxx
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating
circumstances inherent in the crime to such a degree that it must of
necessity accompany the commission thereof.
x x x x x x x x x.”

(Emphasis ours)

The case of People vs. Espejo cited by the trial court in support of its
ruling that the use of a motor vehicle in this case is an aggravating
circumstance, is one for robbery with homicide punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, which has an entirely different factual setting
and, therefore, the ruling therein should not be applied in the case at
bench. In any event, the finding of the trial court that the appellants’
use of the motor vehicle was intended “to elude detection of their
drug trafficking activities by the police authorities and to facilitate
escape in case their crime is discovered” is baseless. The
prosecution failed to establish this matter. Such intention cannot
simply be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence as conclusively as the crime itself.

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There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance which

attended the commission of the offense in this case, and considering
that the quantity of the subject prohibited drug exceeded 750 grams,
the proper penalty that should be im-

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People vs. Correa

posed on each of the

43
appellants is reclusion perpetua and a fine of
Ten Million Pesos.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 35, in Criminal Case No. 94-137528 is hereby
MODIFIED in the sense that the accused-appellants ANTONIO
CORREA y CAYTON, RITO GUNIDA y SESANTE and
LEONARDO DULAY y SANTOS shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua in its entire duration. In all other respects, the
judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against
the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (C.J.), Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,

Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban,
JJ., concur.

Judgment modified.

Note.—Unless expressly required by law, the testimony of a

single witness is enough. (People vs. Canuzo, 255 SCRA 497
[1996])

——o0o——

_______________

43 Sec. 4, Art. II, R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Sec. 13, R.A. No. 7659, in
relation to Sec. 20, Art. IV, R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Sec. 17, R.A. No. 7659.

703

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