Understanding Trusts and Estates: Third Edition
Understanding Trusts and Estates: Third Edition
UNDERSTANDING
TRUSTS AND ESTATES
THIRD EDITION
By
Roger W. Andersen
Professor of Law
University of Toledo
College of Law
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(Pub.00728)
Chapter 1, Lawyers, Estates, and Trusts, is reproduced
from Understanding Trusts and Estates, Third Edition,
by Roger W. Andersen, Professor of Law, University of
Toledo College of Law. Copyright © 2003 Matthew
Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis
Group. All rights reserved.
Chapter 1
LAWYERS, ESTATES, AND TRUSTS
1
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it because there was no common disaster. 4 The lawyer had left a gap, and
the nephews lost out.
The court allowed the nephews’ claim, following a growing, but not
uniform, trend toward ignoring defenses based on lack of privity—“they
were not my clients”—and statutes of limitation—“the claim is too late
because it arose when the will was drafted, not at the later death.” 5 Courts
have recognized that unless lawyers’ duties are extended to will beneficia-
ries and unless statutes of limitation are applied from the time a mistake
is likely to be found, lawyers will escape liability for their mistakes. 6 After
all, by the time most will drafting errors are identified, the client is in no
position to complain.
Cases like Ogle are important because they remind us that we serve
people whose lives are affected by how carefully we practice our craft. As
you work your way through this text, keep in mind that the doctrine you
learn is not important in its own right, but because the use and abuse of
this doctrine can affect the lives of real people.
against drafting attorney in both tort and contract); Auric v. Continental Casualty Co., 331
N.W.2d 325 (Wis. 1983) (will beneficiary allowed to maintain an action against attorney). But
see Miller v. Mooney, 725 N.E.2d 545 (Mass. 2000) (rejecting tort liability); Barcelo v. Elliott,
923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996) (lack of privity barred will beneficiary’s claim against drafting
attorney). See generally Martin D. Begleiter, Attorney Malpractice in Estate Planning—You’ve
Got to Know When to Hold Up, Know When to Fold Up, 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. 193 (1990); Bradley
E.S. Fogel, Attorney v. Client – Privity Malpractice, and the Lack of Respect for the Privacy
of the Attorney-Client Relationship in Estate Planning, 68 Tenn. L. Rev. 261 (2001). Helen
Bishop Jenkins, Privity—A Texas-Sized Barrier to Third Parties for Negligent Will Draft-
ing—An Assessment and Proposal, 42 Baylor L. Rev. 687 (1990); Mary Elizabeth Phelan,
Unleashing the Limits on Lawyers’ Liability? Mieras v. DeBona: Michigan Joins the Main-
stream . . . 72 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 327 (1995).
Some courts have abolished the privity defense in contexts not involving wills. See, e.g.,
Holsapple v. McGrath, 521 N.W.2d 711 (Iowa 1994) (allowing a claim by grantees of a faulty
deed).
The increased malpractice exposure serves as a spur to reform outmoded doctrines which
haunt this area of law. See Jesse Dukeminier, Cleansing the Stables of Property: A River Found
at Last, 65 Iowa L. Rev. 151 (1979).
6 Lawyers may also be liable for the mistakes of their employees. See John W. Wade, Tort
Liability of Paralegals and Lawyers Who Utilize Their Services, 24 Vand. L. Rev. 1133 (1971).
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[A] Probate
process under which assets are collected and dispersed to successors, whether there is a will
or not. See McGovern & Kurtz at 467-68. In more common usage, however, “probate” has come
to mean the entire process, and the term is used in that sense here.
2 See generally § 2[B], infra.
3
Several states allow married couples to hold property as “community property,” which is
shared equally. At death, the decedent’s one-half of the community property may pass through
probate or may pass directly to the other spouse. See generally Robert L. Mennell and Thomas
M. Boykoff, Community Property in a Nutshell (2d ed. 1988). See also § 28[A], infra.
4 The court may be called a probate court, a surrogate’s court, or even an orphan’s court.
5
The personal representative owes fiduciary duties to the estate’s beneficiaries. See
generally Chapter 14, infra.
6 See generally McGovern & Kurtz at 973-77.
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capacities as well.
8 Anyone who wants to transfer probate property at death must make a valid will. People
who make wills are called “testators” and are said to die “testate.” See generally Chapter 3,
infra.
9
In the past, the term “executrix” has been used if the personal representative was female.
Since gender has no legal consequence in this context, “trix” endings are gradually making
their way out of our language. In this text, use of the “or” suffix makes no assumption about
the gender of the person involved.
10 If a decedent owns property in different jurisdictions, different statutes may apply to
identify who inherits. Personal property is governed by the law of the decedent’s domicile, and
real property is governed by the law of its location. See generally William M. Richman &
William L. Reynolds, Understanding Conflict of Laws §§ 66, 86 & 87 (2d ed. 1993).
11 See generally Chapter 2, infra.
12
Usually the surviving spouse is first on the list, followed by other relatives and, finally,
other qualified persons.
13 Other titles sometimes indicate special circumstances. If the named executor is out of
the country for a while, it might be necessary to appoint a “special administrator” to get things
started. If the will only names people who cannot serve, a court will appoint someone who
could be called an “administrator with will annexed,” to indicate that—despite the “administra-
tor” title—there is indeed a will.
14
E.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-12.
15
Many states allow small estates to pass without court administration, or with minimal
court involvement. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 29-1-8-1; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2113.03. See
also UPC §§ 3-1201 to 3-1204. A few states allow an administration independent of judicial
supervision once the will has been proved and there has been an inventory, an appraisal, and
a list of claims established. See Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 145.
16 See Richard V. Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: A Possible Answer to Probate
expands that term to include anyone who takes real or personal property by will. UPC
§ 1-201(10), (11). The “residuary devisees” are those who would take under a will clause which
follows any gifts to individuals or groups and reads: “I give all the rest of my property to . . .”
22 See UPC §§ 3-312 to 3-322. See also Eugene Scoles, Succession Without Administration:
due care in this context, see In re First Nat’l Bank of Mansfield, 307 N.E.2d 23 (Ohio 1974),
discussed in § 56[B], infra.
24 485 U.S. 478, 99 L. Ed. 2d 565, 108 S. Ct. 1340 (1988). See generally Sarajane Love, Estate
Creditors, The Constitution, and the Uniform Probate Code, 30 U. Rich. L. Rev. 411 (1996).
25 Pope also illustrates the folly of not being thoughtful (or at least wary) of others involved
in the probate process. Here, the executor and the hospital each knew of the death and pending
bill, yet neither bothered to contact the other in the context of settling the estate. Instead,
they spent substantial funds litigating.
26 See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 70 L. Ed. 2d 738, 102 S. Ct. 781 (1982).
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process standards for adequate notice, which now apply to both in personam and in rem actions.
28 In this context, an “interested party” is someone who would benefit from the will being
invalidated. Most commonly, challengers are persons who would take under an earlier will
or under the intestate statute if there were no valid will.
29 The most common grounds for contest are that the testator (will maker) lacked mental
capacity, was subject to undue influence, or failed to follow technical rules regarding the will’s
execution. See Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests—An Empirical Study, 22 Real Prop. Prob.
& Tr. J. 607 (1987). See generally Chapter 3, infra.
Procedures for contesting wills vary. In some jurisdictions, a contest may be brought in the
probate court. In others, it must be in the court of general jurisdiction. See generally Page
ch. 26.
30 For a good illustration of the problems a personal representative might face, see Estate
Ed’s retirement plan names Marge as the next beneficiary, and there is
some life insurance, again payable to Marge. They have no other assets
beyond clothes, jewelry, and furniture. The only debts are pending charge
card bills. Ed’s will gives everything to Marge; the children are making no
claims.
On these facts, there is no good reason to bother probating Ed’s estate.
The only assets Ed owned alone (the tangible personal property) are already
in the house, so there is no problem with assembling estate assets. Marge
fully intends to pay off the charge cards, so creditors are not a worry. Since
Marge’s survivorship interest gives her the house, there is no potential title
problem.
The example suggests some situations that could call for probate. If a
bank account were in Ed’s name alone, letters of authority from a probate
court might be the only way to get the bank to release the money. On the
other hand, perhaps something else could be worked out informally. If Ed
had owned a business, cutting off creditor’s claims might be important.
Though the Pope case, discussed above, would require reasonable efforts
to find and notify creditors, going through probate would provide some
security against creditors who appeared later. Before deciding, you would
want to know how likely their appearance would be. If children from a
former marriage are questioning the will’s validity, you may need a hearing,
but you may be able to reach a settlement. If the house had been in Ed’s
name alone, probate probably would be necessary to vest a clear title in
Marge. Some title insurance companies, however, might be willing to insure
a title in Marge’s name on the strength of affidavits, instead of requiring
a probate court order. For any number of reasons, you may want to advise
Marge to use the probate process, but you ought to have reasons.
When someone has died, we need to collect the assets, take care of
creditors, resolve any disputes among claimants, and get clear title into the
hands of the right survivors. If we need the probate system to accomplish
one of those tasks, we should use it. If not, we shouldn’t.
[1] Trusts
Because trusts are so flexible, they are the most useful single estate
planning device. Professor Scott, the dominant figure of 20th century trust
law, reminds us that “[t]he purposes for which trusts can be created are
as unlimited as the imagination of lawyers.” 35 Scott challenges us to use
trusts creatively to meet the needs of our clients. Trusts are flexible because
the essential elements are so few: (1) an intention to create a trust with
(2) property (sometimes called the res) (3) held by someone (the trustee)
(4) to benefit someone else (the beneficiary). The property serves as the
principal (or corpus) of the trust, invested to generate income for the
beneficiaries. Of course, there must be someone to create the trust. This
person might be called the settlor, donor, trustor, or testator, depending
upon the situation and local custom.
One person can assume any number of different roles, just so long as the
trustee owes a duty to someone else. The settlor could be a trustee, by
announcing that property she owned was now being held in trust for the
benefit of others. One of those beneficiaries could even be the settlor/trustee
herself. The only limit is that one person cannot be both trustee and sole
beneficiary. 36 Of course, different people might assume each of those roles.
It is quite common, for example, for a settlor to give money to a bank as
trustee to invest for members of the settlor’s family.
A trust may be created by lifetime transfer or by will. If a trust is created
during the life of the settlor, it is called a “living” (or “lifetime” or “inter
vivos”) trust. If a trust is created by will, it is called a “testamentary” trust.
Questions involving living trusts can be resolved in courts of general
jurisdiction, but there is no ongoing judicial supervision. Testamentary
trusts are typically subject to the continuing jurisdiction and supervision
of the probate court.
To see when a trust might be appropriate, consider a couple who want
to provide for their young children if the parents die while the children are
minors. Each of the parent’s wills could give everything to the surviving
parent. If one died but the other survived, the survivor would continue to
care for the children. If there were no surviving parent, 37 however, the will
could give everything in trust to the local bank to manage for the children.
In addition, life insurance might be made payable to the trustee. While the
children were young, the income (and perhaps principal) from the trust
would help support them. Once the children reached adulthood, the trustee
could distribute the principal. Later we will examine some of the variations
35 1 Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts 4 (Little, Brown 4th ed.
1987-1991).
36 The basic notion is that without someone to enforce a trustee’s duties, there are no duties.
Technically, we may say there is no separation between legal title (held by the trustee) and
equitable title (held by the beneficiaries). For discussion, see §§ 12[B], [C], [D], infra.
37 Suppose a car crash, or deaths from different causes but close in time, as in Ogle, discussed
in § 1, supra.
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available to shape the trust to the needs of particular families. For now,
concentrate on understanding the trust’s basic structure.
42 Sometimes retirement benefits are created by contract and sometimes the trust form is
Uniform Probate Code: Reflections on Recent Revisions, 55 Alb. L. Rev. No. 4 (1992). See also
Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code: Older and Better, or More Like the Internal
Revenue Code, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 639 (1993); Mary L. Fellows, Traveling the Road of Probate
Reform: Finding the Way to Your Will (A Response to Professor Ascher), 77 Minn. L. Rev. 659
(1993); Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1033 (1994). The Uniform Laws Annotated lists 16 adopting states of various UPC
versions: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota and Utah.
8 U.L.A. 1 (2002 Pocket Part).
47 Iowa’s new trust code is based on a UTC draft. See Martin D. Begleiter, In the Code We
Trust—Some Trust Law for Iowa at Last, 49 Drake L. Rev. 165 (2001).
48 See generally David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions
academic lawyers and practitioners monitors how the UPC is working and
recommends both piecemeal and comprehensive (as in 1990) revisions.
Facilitated by overlap of interest and personnel, the JEB-UPC has worked
cooperatively with groups revising the Restatement of Property and the
Restatement of Trusts.
Those Restatements, like others you have learned about, are the product
of the American Law Institute, an organization of judges, lawyers and law
professors founded in 1923 to clarify, simplify and otherwise reform the law.
Two projects are particularly relevant to our topic: The Restatement (Third)
of Property (Wills and Other Donative Transfers) and the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts. Both are ongoing efforts, but the directions in which they
are moving can guide us as to how the law of the future—the law you will
be using—will look.
As unlikely as it may seem, the law of wills and trusts is full of life. Its
subject matter is people, and its doctrine is in the process of reforming to
take advantage of newly developed approaches and to meet new needs.