AIR FORCE MANUAL 10-2503

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY

OF THE AIR FORCE 14 MAY 2019

Operations

OPERATIONS IN A CHEMICAL,
BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND
NUCLEAR (CBRN) ENVIRONMENT

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available on the e-Publishing website at

www.e-Publishing.af.mil for downloading or ordering
RELEASABILITY: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication

OPR: AF/A4 Certified by: AF/A4CX

(Col Michael J. Zuhlsdorf)
Supersedes: AFMAN10-2503, Pages: 132
8 May 2019

This publication implements AFPD 10-25, Air Force Emergency Management Program, and
supports the integration of AFPD 10-26, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Enterprise,
and AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management Program. This manual supports the
integration of actions into a single installation CBRN Defense Program by establishing essential
Ability to Survive and Operate (ATSO) standards and CBRN defense training and exercise
competencies. It includes current Air Force (AF) doctrine, operational concepts, tactics,
techniques, and procedures to enable both survival and the conduct and sustainment of operations
in CBRN environments. It also provides commanders with operational standards to use when
developing individual, unit, installation, and theater plans, training, and exercises. Within the
context of this document, preventative actions are taken throughout the preparedness phase of
attack management to protect the warfighter (force survivability) to enable mission continuation
through the use of intelligence, inspections, evaluations, the integrated risk management process
(IRMP), and improved security methods to prevent or lessen the effects of attacks/incidents. It
applies to Total Force units worldwide. Consult the cited instructions, manuals and their
supplements for specific policies, procedures and requirements. This publication may be
supplemented at any level, but all supplements must be routed to the office of primary
responsibility (OPR) listed above for coordination prior to certification and approval.

Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary
Responsibility (OPR) using the AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication; route
AF Forms 847 from the field through appropriate functional’ s chain of command. Ensure that all
2 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance
with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, Management of Records, and disposed of in accordance
with Air Force Records Information Management System, and Records Disposition Schedule. The
authorities to waive wing/unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier (“T-
0, T-1, T-2, and T-3”) number following the compliance statement. See AFI 33-360, Publications
and Forms Management, for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers.
Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval
authority, or alternately, to the publication OPR for non-tiered compliance items.

Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary
Responsibility (OPR) using the AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication; route
AF Forms 847 from the field through appropriate functional’ s chain of command. Ensure that all
records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance
with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, Management of Records, and disposed of in accordance
with Air Force Records Information Management System, and Records Disposition Schedule at
https://www.my.af.mil/afrims/afrims/afrims/rims.cfm recommended changes to AF EM
Division, 1260 Air Force Pentagon (4C1057), Washington, District of Columbia 20330-1260 or
usaf.pentagon.af-a4.mbx.a4cx-workflow@mail.mil.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This document has been substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. The recent
changes to this publication includes integrating the ability to survive and operate (ATSO) enabling
standards, which includes Air Force (AF)-unique guidance for conducting operations in highly
contested CBRN environments, and introduces new considerations for pre, trans, and post-attack
actions. It also incorporates analytical data specific to CBRN defense operations and provides
Commanders with courses of action to consider when preparing for, responding to, and recovering
from CBRN attacks/incidents.

Chapter 1— OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND STANDARDS 7

1.1. Introduction:............................................................................................................ 7

1.2. Doctrine, Policy, and Guidance: ............................................................................. 7

1.3. Mission. .................................................................................................................. 8

1.4. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment: ............................... 8

1.5. Operational Areas of Concern: .............................................................................. 10

Table 1.1. Overview of CBRN Exercise Competencies. ......................................................... 10

Table 1.2. Disconnects Between AF and MTTPs. ................................................................... 12

1.6. Standards. ............................................................................................................... 17

1.7. Operational Assumptions:....................................................................................... 17

AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 3

1.8. Leadership Challenges and Responsibilities:.......................................................... 19

1.9. Organization: .......................................................................................................... 21

1.10. Host Nation Support: .............................................................................................. 22

1.11. Noncombatant Protection: ...................................................................................... 22

1.12. CBRN Defense Force Structure: ............................................................................. 23

1.13. Training and Exercises: .......................................................................................... 23

1.14. CBRN Defense: ...................................................................................................... 24

1.15. Theater Basing Options: ......................................................................................... 25

1.16. Medical Operations: ................................................................................................ 26

Chapter 2— INSTALLATION CBRN THREATS 32

Section 2A— Threat Assessment 32

2.1. Background: ............................................................................................................ 32

2.2. Operational Environment. ...................................................................................... 32

Table 2.1. Elements of AF CWMD Operations. ...................................................................... 34

Figure 2.1. Typical Theater Ballistic Missile Systems. ............................................................. 34

2.3. Installation Threat Assessments:............................................................................. 35

Section 2B— CBRN Weapons Effects and Employment Strategies 36

2.4. Installation Attacks: ................................................................................................ 36

2.5. Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) Systems............................................................... 36

Figure 2.2. Typical Theater Ballistic Missile - Major Components. ......................................... 37

Figure 2.3. Estimated VX Liquid Agent Deposition Time Following a SCUD Airburst
Warhead Detonation 250 Meters (820 feet) Above Ground Level. ......................... 38

Table 2.2. Potential SCUD Missile Impacts by Raid Size (Notional Estimate). ..................... 40

Table 2.3. TBM Warning Time Assessments for Installation Attacks. ................................... 41

2.6. Aircraft Threats. ...................................................................................................... 42

Table 2.4. Example of Aircraft Warning Time Assessment for Installation Attack. ............... 43

2.7. Cruise Missiles and UAS Threats: .......................................................................... 43

Figure 2.4. Typical Land Attack Cruise Missile Systems. ........................................................ 44

4 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Chapter 3— COUNTER-WEAPONS of MASS DESTRUCTION (C-WMD) PASSIVE

DEFENSE PROGRAM 45

3.1. CWMD Operations and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear

(CBRN) Defense: ..................................................................................................... 45

3.2. Contamination Avoidance: ..................................................................................... 45

3.3. Protection: ............................................................................................................... 48

3.4. Contamination Control. ......................................................................................... 48

Chapter 4— CBRN COMMAND, CONTROL AND ATTACK WARNING 50

Section 4A— Command and Control 50

4.1. Installation Command and Control (C2) Organization. ......................................... 50

4.2. CAT and EOC Operations: ..................................................................................... 51

Table 4.1. CAT, EOC, and UCC Enabling Tasks. ................................................................... 52

4.3. CBRN Control Center:............................................................................................ 54

4.4. Continuity of Operations. ....................................................................................... 55

Figure 4.1. AF “Be Ready” Training Aid – USAF Attack Warning Signals. ........................... 56

4.5. Alarm Conditions. .................................................................................................. 56

Table 4.2. Report Enemy Activity. .......................................................................................... 58

4.6. Warning Time Assessment. ................................................................................... 59

Table 4.3. Main Operating Base (Notional Example) Alarm Notification Times (Seconds
from Declaration). .................................................................................................... 60

Table 4.4. Collocated or Bare Base (Notional Example) Alarm Notification Times
(Seconds from Declaration). .................................................................................... 60

Table 4.5. Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM, SCUD Variant) – Threat Warning Times
(Notional Example) (Seconds from Launch). .......................................................... 61

4.7. Installation Sectors or Zones:.................................................................................. 62

Figure 4.2. Installation Sector or Zone Identification (Notional Example)............................... 62

Figure 4.3. Historical Wind Direction for Osan AB, Korea. ..................................................... 64

Figure 4.4. Sample Split-MOPP Declaration after Initial Attack. ............................................. 65

Figure 4.5. Sample Split-MOPP Adjustment Due to Wing Shift. ............................................. 65

AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 5

Chapter 5— CBRN PROTECTION 66

Section 5A— Individual Protection 66

5.1. Introduction:............................................................................................................ 66

5.2. Individual Protective Equipment (IPE): .................................................................. 66

5.3. Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP): ....................................................... 67

Figure 5.1. AF “Be Ready” Training Aid, Mission Oriented Protective Postures (MOPP). .... 67

5.4. Task Qualification in MOPP. ................................................................................. 68

5.5. Forced Hydration. .................................................................................................. 68

5.6. Work-Rest Cycles. ................................................................................................. 68

5.7. MOPP Analysis and Management: ......................................................................... 68

Section 5B— Collective Protection 69

5.8. Collective CBRN Protection. .................................................................................. 69

Table 5.1. Classes of Collective Protection. ............................................................................ 70

Table 5.2. Collective Protection Operations - General Actions. .............................................. 72

5.9. Collective Protection Planning Factors (COLPRO). ............................................. 73

Table 5.3. Collective and Non-Collective Protection Shelter Operations – General Actions.. 74

Section 5C— Hardening. 75

5.10. Introduction:............................................................................................................ 75

5.11. Hardened. ............................................................................................................... 76

5.12. Special Hardening Considerations for CBRN Threats: .......................................... 77

Attachment 1— GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION 78

Attachment 2— PRE-CONFLICT, ATTACK RESPONSE, AND POST-CONFLICT

OPERATIONS 100

Section A2A— Pre-Conflict 100

Section A2B— Attack 103

Attachment 3— CBRN POST-ATTACK RECONNAISSANCE 106

Attachment 4— CBRN TRAINING AND EXERCISES 112

Attachment 5— CHEMICALLY CONTAMINATED OBJECT RULE (CCOR) 118

6 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Attachment 6— ANALYTICAL DATA TO SUPPORT CBRN PASSIVE DEFENSE

OPERATIONS 124
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 7

Chapter 1

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND STANDARDS

1.1. Introduction:
1.1.1. Top-level National, Department, and Air Force (AF) strategies drive revision to AF
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) defense operations. References
include the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy,
and the Department of Defense (DoD) strategy of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.
This manual provides revised guidance for conducting and sustaining operations in CBRN
environments. It also provides expanded procedures to enable total force Airmen to gain an
operational advantage in non-permissive environments. The operational concepts and actions
within this manual are tools intended to inform AF tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
Use these tools to complete the individual, mission essential, and collective tasks that enable
mission accomplishment in contested and CBRN environments.
1.1.2. The foundation of this manual is AF intent to continue operations in contested
environments (e.g. anti-access, area denial). Successful implementation is contingent upon
adopting a risk management approach to operate independently for an unknown duration.
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from across the installation assist commanders to develop and
implement courses of action. Key SMEs reside in Emergency Management (EM), Intelligence,
Bioenvironmental Engineering (BE), Security Forces (SFs), Explosive Ordnance Disposal
(EOD), and Fire and Emergency Services. All functional communities play a role in ensuring
Airmen have the Ability to Survive and Operate in non-permissive environments. It is the
Installation Emergency Manager's responsibility to brief commanders at their location on
guidance provided in this manual.
1.1.3. Commanders, supervisors, specialized teams, and Airmen use this manual to implement
courses of action based on a current threat analysis and their mission. Users must be proficient
within their AF specialty and understand basic CBRN defense concepts of operations. A
comprehensive installation CBRN defense training and exercise program will provide the basis
for CBRN defense knowledge and task training.
1.1.4. Procedures in this manual are fully executable in today's AF structure with existing
CBRN defense response equipment and material. The existing resources and equipment are to
be re-aligned within the commander’s areas of responsibility. Commanders will commit all
levels of resources to include manpower for specialized team support, Emergency Operation
Center (EOC)/Unit Control Center (UCC) representatives, specialized supplies and equipment
to execute the revised CBRN concepts of operations. (T-3).
1.2. Doctrine, Policy, and Guidance:
1.2.1. This manual implements guidance for organizing and employing Aerospace Forces at
the tactical level across a full range of military operations. It connects joint service and AF
doctrine requirements for CBRN defense. Commanders will use this guidance to execute
assigned missions as part of an air component of a joint or multinational force. Commanders,
supervisors, specialized teams, and Disaster Response Force elements will use this manual to
develop deliberate plans and conduct operations in what may be highly contested, non-
permissive CBRN environments.
8 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

1.2.2. AF and joint doctrine requires commanders to prepare their forces for employment
across the full range of military operations. This doctrine outlines AF operations in support of
a joint service task force or coalition operations. Joint doctrine publications include Joint
Publication 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, Joint Publication 3-11, Operations in
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, and Joint Publication 3-40,
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Joint Publication 3-27, Strategy for Homeland
Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities, February 2013; Joint Publication 3-28,
Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 31 July 2013; and Joint Publication 3-41, Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response, 21 June 2012.
1.2.3. This manual applies to the entire total force military Airmen and civilian personnel. AF
detached, forward operating area units and personnel assigned to duties outside of AF
jurisdiction will also comply with CBRN defense policies, plans, and orders of the host or the
supported organization.
1.2.4. Major Commands (MAJCOMs) and units will develop supplemental guidance to
integrate theater, MAJCOM, and host-nation procedures. (T-2). Supplemental guidance must
be as restrictive as possible, and not contradict, higher headquarters publications. Commanders
of forces operating in a joint command will follow the directives and procedures of the unified
commander. Commanders of forces in a multinational alliance or coalition should follow
multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and
procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders evaluate and then follow the
multinational command’s doctrine and procedures only after careful consideration of
operational risks involved.
1.3. Mission. The AF will fly, fight, and win in air, space and cyberspace with forces prepared
to operate in CBRN environments. To maximize military projection of airpower during and after
a CBRN attack, operations balance force survivability with mission continuation. Commanders
protect forces throughout all phases of operations. Organize, train, and equip all Airmen to execute
the mission. CBRN defense exercise competencies are provided in Table 1.1 and expanded upon
in Attachment 4.
1.4. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment:
1.4.1. The AF and joint forces should be prepared to conduct prompt, sustained, and decisive
military operations in CBRN environments. An enemy’s use of WMD or CBRN weapons or
any intentional or unintentional release of CBRN hazardous material can create effects that
disrupt or delay operations to achieve US and multinational objectives. The planning,
preparation and sustainment of operations in a CBRN environment are outlined in Joint
Publication (JP) 3-11 and adopted by Joint and AF planners during the Joint Intelligence
Preparation of the Operational Environment.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 9

1.4.1.1. Commanders and staffs will consider potential adversary CBRN capabilities when
developing strategy, plans, policy, operations, and doctrine. Understanding the CBRN
environment includes an analysis of the operational environment as outlined in JP 3-11.
Once the operational environment is analyzed, it is important to determine the type and
amount of resources needed to support capabilities for CBRN response activities as
outlined in DODI 6055.17, DoD Emergency Management Program and JP 3-41, Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response. This can include factors such as priority,
level of response capability, and the hazards, threats, and vulnerabilities identified during
risk management activities. (T-1).
1.4.1.2. Any analysis of the operational environment that is factored into strategy, plans,
policy, operations, and doctrine shall also be incorporated into all risk assessments
including the criticality assessment, all-hazards threat assessment; and vulnerability
assessment. Information should include specific potential state and non-state actor
capabilities (conventional and CBRN capabilities), units and equipment (order of battle),
CBRN materials, delivery systems, asymmetric capabilities (special operations forces);
potential effects, vulnerabilities; and adversarial intent. (T-1). Commanders will also
identify intelligence priorities and informational gaps presenting those collection
requirements to the intelligence staff in order to gain a better understanding to mitigate
threats and hazards. (T-1).
1.4.1.3. All installations and theaters will be postured to respond to all-hazards (see
Attachment 1 for definition); however for nuclear-specific missions or threats,
installations and personnel must be able to effectively respond to, detect, deploy
countermeasures, mitigate, and operationally recover from nuclear incidents or attacks
from an adversary.
1.4.2. At the operational level, the analysis of the Operating Environment includes issues such
as sociocultural factors, the location of adversary’s political and economic support structures,
military support units, force generation capabilities, potential third-nation or third-party
involvement, logistic and economic infrastructure, political treaties, press coverage, adversary
information activities, and the potential to affect the information environment. Typically the
Combatant Command J2 function publishes the evaluation of adversary CBRN capabilities,
strengths, and weaknesses to other service component headquarters (i.e., HQ PACAF, HQ
USAFE, etc.). The intelligence estimate is normally used for sharing this type of evaluation.
However, intelligence products from other official governmental agencies (Defense
Intelligence Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency) may provide relevant threat
information to assist with preparing the operational environment and can be requested through
the installation intelligence organization. Air Operations Centers (AOC) and AFFOR staffs use
the Combatant Command J2 intelligence estimate to assist with the development of air
component requirements within an operational plan.
10 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

1.4.3. Tactical level intelligence elements will provide initial threat assessments and
information on the enemy order of battle and military doctrine. They will also analyze attack
reports from other locations to identify enemy behaviors and predict future actions against the
installation. The installation All-Hazards Threat Assessment (AHTA) provides the installation
a mechanism for identifying relevant CBRN threat information. Installations will follow the
procedures outlined in DoDI 6055.17, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP)
3-2.46, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MTTPs) for Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Passive Defense, when developing the AHTA, Criticality
Assessment, and Vulnerability Assessments. (T-1).
1.4.4. Commanders must review each tasked operational and/or contingency plan to assess
and evaluate likely courses of action regarding an adversary’s CBRN capability and intent to
use. Commanders will organize, train, and equip Airmen to survive and operate in a CBRN
environment based on the evaluation of the CBRN threats identified in each operational and or
contingency plan and developing subsequent OT&E requirements. (T-1).
1.5. Operational Areas of Concern: The AF conducts operations in both mature theaters of
operation and austere regions. Installation CBRN defense TTPs must be flexible and adaptable to
varied basing realities. Forces located in or deployed to mature theaters primarily operating from
existing main or assembled operating bases. Main operating bases normally have an established
support, manpower, and facility infrastructure. Collocated or forward operating bases may have
an established support and facility infrastructure, but do not normally have assigned manpower.
Forces deployed to austere regions or to recently re-occupied areas may find installations without
pre-existing support and facility infrastructure. In addition, hostile action or civil unrest may
damage or destroy the installation infrastructure before the arrival of United States forces. See
Table 1.1 for the Overview of CBRN Exercise Competencies.

Table 1.1. Overview of CBRN Exercise Competencies.

Countering WMD Line of Effort Associated Major Competency

Proliferation Prevention. Actions taken to Understanding the AF’s role in
prevent or limit the spread of WMD. interdiction operations.
Counterforce. The ability to defeat the full suite Understanding the risk assessment and
of CBRN capabilities before they can be used. management processes for CBRN targets.

Active Defense. Attempts to intercept CBRN Understand the levels of command and
weapons enroute to their targets. control for operational warning and
reporting.
Passive Defense. Measures to maximize the Understand issues, constraints, and
ability to survive and operate in CBRN guidance for installation operations in a
environments. CBRN environment.
CBRN Response. Activities to reduce the Understand and demonstrate how to
impact from a CBRN incident. protect the force from CBRN effects.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 11

1.5.1. Units assigned to locations where CBRN threats exist will develop contingency plans
and conduct training and exercises for both the home station and deployment location (if
applicable) threat and mission. All other units will plan, train, and conduct exercises for
contingency operations at their deployment location(s). Develop plans, training, contingency
response checklists, and exercises based upon a realistic threat and assessment of resources
that will be available in a contingency. Deliberate plans that rely upon in-place resources, such
as the Installation Notification and Warning System (INWS) or fixed-site collective protection
facilities, may not be executable at austere locations. Commanders will train and exercise
forces to develop alternate methods or work-around procedures should critical resources be
destroyed or if host-nation or mutual-aid resources are unavailable. (T-2).
1.5.2. All units should prepare and plan for operations in highly contested, non-permissive,
CBRN contaminated environments. (T-2). Existing manpower and equipment force modules
must be reviewed to determine their adaptability for flexible operations in austere locations.
For guidance on conducting CBRN planning and execution refer to the list of references in the
back of this publication.
1.5.3. While MTTPs greatly aid in standardization, the publications are not prescriptive. The
following examples in Table 1.2. highlights some of the key areas where the AF has
consciously decided to take a different path than what is outlined in the respective MTTPs. Air
Force personnel will follow the guidance contained within this Manual where there are
discrepancies from MTTPs. Note: The examples provided in Table 1.2 originated from ATP
3-11.32, MTTPs for CBRN Passive Defense. Additional disconnects exist in ATP 3-11.32 and
other MTTPs. See Table 1.2 for some examples of disconnects with AF policy and MTTPs.
12 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Table 1.2. Disconnects Between AF and MTTPs.

Subject Language in MTTP AF Position

While it is desirable to keep
contaminated personnel and
equipment out of
uncontaminated areas, this is not
always possible during Major
Combat Operations (MCO)
activities. Recognizing this need,
“Contamination avoidance the Air Force developed and
General practices should include strict uses the chemically
Statement on enforcement of checkpoints to contaminated object rule (See
Use prevent contaminated personnel or Attachment 5) for handling
of Contaminated equipment from entering contaminated equipment.
Equipment and uncontaminated zones unless it is Contaminated personnel may
Personnel necessary for life-saving medical accompany the equipment as
evacuation.” part of the mission operation, or
contaminated personnel may
have to traverse an
uncontaminated zone in order to
get to their rest and relief area –
be it in a collective protection
facility or at an open-air toxic-
free area (TFA).
Operationally relevant chemical
warfare (CW) contamination
does not reach hundreds of
meters in height above AF
“If the height of the top of any
installations attacked with
inversion layer is lower than 800
missiles except in very rare
meters, this should be indicated in
cases. Those unusual scenarios
the CBRN Chemical Downwind
primarily affect “open door”
Report by the letter A appearing in
Airborne helicopters as opposed to fixed
the coded significant weather
Aircraft wing aircraft. Further, aircrew
phenomena. If the height of the top
Contamination members wear the appropriate
is lower than 400 meters, letter B is
Individual Protective Equipment
used, if lower than 200 meters,
(IPE) when CW hazards exist on
letter C. These letters signify the
the installation. As a result, the
lowest safe altitudes for aircraft to
AF does not issue CBRN flight
avoid airborne contamination.”
warnings to aircrew members
with the intent of having the
aircrew modify their existing
flight profiles.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 13

AF EM and Bioenvironmental
Engineering can provide precise
estimates of radiation exposure
due to nuclear detonation and
fallout using the actual decay
rate.

One tool for estimating

“For nuclear fallout after a nuclear exposures is the 7:10 Rule,
detonation (many different which means for every 7- fold
Radioactive
radionuclides, each with different increase in time after detonation,
Decay
half- lives), the seven-ten rule there is a 10- fold decrease in the
applies.” exposure rate. In other words,
when the amount of time is
multiplied by 7, the exposure
rate is divided by 10. For
example, let's say that 3 hours
after detonation the exposure
rate is 500 R/hr. After 21 hours,
the exposure rate will be 1/10 as
much, or 50 R/hr.
“Detailed equipment In an MCO environment the AF
decontamination (DED), detailed does not support CW
troop decontamination (DTD) and decontamination of areas,
detailed aircraft decontamination vehicles, equipment, and aircraft
(DAD) are conducted as part of a other than spot
reconstitution effort during breaks decontamination.”
in combat operations…..The DED,
DTD, and DAD restore items so Historical and technical test
that they can be used without reports show that Mission
protective equipment.” Oriented Protective Posture
(MOPP) reduction cannot take
“When a CBRN incident occurs, place; militarily-significant CW
Decontamination the joint force quickly responds to vapors continue to off- gas from
and initially mitigates the effects of contaminated surfaces after
contamination. The joint force decontamination activities have
performs only those actions been completed.
required to allow continuation of
the mission and to save lives. To The AF does not have
recover, the commander decides area/facility, vehicle, aircraft, or
whether decontamination is munitions decontamination
required to restore combat power teams for chemically-
and, if so, what level of contaminated items in MCO
decontamination is required (the environments.
levels of decontamination are
immediate, operational, Users accomplish spot
14 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

thorough, and clearance).” decontamination as necessary

through the use of M295 kits in
order to decontaminate areas of
vehicles, equipment, and aircraft
that will be continually touched.
Note: Specific areas below exemplify the variations of decontamination types and the
degree of deviations the AF has from sister services in these areas.
“Vehicle wash down should be
performed within one hour of
contamination for equipment that is
not painted with Chemical Agent
Resistant Coating (CARC); within Testing has shown the specified
six hours of contamination for decontamination technique is not
CARC painted equipment; and effective in regard to AF goals
Vehicle Wash
when the mission does not permit a and objectives. See paragraph
Down
thorough decontamination. 3.4.2 for more information on
“The vehicle wash-down crew may the Air Force approach to
use power driven decontamination resource decontamination.
equipment to spray 100 to 150
gallons of hot, soapy water on each
vehicle to wash off the gross
contamination.”
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 15

“Commanders conduct Operational

decontamination to minimize
contact hazards, accelerate the
weathering process, and limit cross
contamination of mission-critical
resources. Performing aircraft wash
down within 1 to 6 hours of
contamination speeds the
weathering process and may allow Testing has shown the specified
the aircraft to be operated and decontamination technique is not
maintained in reduced aircrew IPE effective in regard to Air Force
Operational Aircraft or MOPP levels. Aircraft goals and objectives. See
Decontamination operational decontamination is paragraph 3.4.2 for more
accomplished by decontaminating information on the Air Force
surfaces (exterior and interior) that approach to resource
must be touched during aircraft decontamination.
servicing and operations.”
“The site should have sufficient
fresh water to wet the entire
exterior of the aircraft. For planning
purposes, the following
recommendations are provided: F-
18, 300 gallons; and C-130, 800
gallons.”
“Even though a particular part of a
building is not intended for
occupation, it may still need to be
decontaminated to prevent the Testing has shown the specified
contamination from spreading.” decontamination technique is not
“Streets and sidewalks also absorb effective in regard to Air Force
Area liquid agents and then give off toxic goals and objectives. See
Decontamination vapors when heated by the sun. paragraph 3.4.2 for more
These surfaces may need information on the Air Force
decontaminating several times to approach to resource
reduce hazards.” “If possible, the decontamination.
contaminated area should be
marked and evacuated until
cleared.”
MTTP outlines “Selective De-
The selective de-masking
masking technique that requires
Chemical De- process does not fall within the
selected individuals to go through
masking Procedures Air Force’s range of acceptable
cycles of removing their mask,
risk.
donning their mask after specific
16 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

time periods, and then being

monitored for agent symptoms.
Entire population de-masks if
selected personnel did not exhibit
symptoms during the process.
Air Force does not generate
liquid contaminated waste (e.g.,
runoff from decontamination
operations) as part of CW-
“Separate waste by type (solid
related MCO activities. As such,
versus combustible versus
Contaminated Waste the Air Force consolidates all
noncombustible).”
Chemical Warfare contaminated
waste in its contaminated waste
collection points and centralized
Chemical
Warfare waste disposal area.
The MTTP technique of basing
“Use a chemical detector, if
Replacement of JSLIST replacement on whether
available, to ensure that vapor
Vapor or not a detector reading of zero
levels in the area are below detector
Exposed Joint can be obtained is not valid.
threshold sensitivity levels.
Service Testing has shown that the
However, if a reading of zero
Lightweight relevant factor is how much
cannot be obtained, report to one of
Integrated Suit agent the ensemble has been
the installation’s CCAs or MOPP
Technology exposed to. See the “re-use of
gear exchange points for suit
(JSLIST) vapor exposed JSLIST
exchange prior to reducing MOPP
Ensembles ensembles” segment of this
level 4.”
guide.
Neither the Air Force nor DoD
“Fuel may be used to burn grass or have a method for determining
short undergrowth. Burning also how far downwind the vapor
works on dirt surfaces. Soak the hazards from a burning operation
area with diesel fuel, kerosene, or will extend. As a result, adequate
Use of Burning as a
fuel oil and ignite remotely. Do not warning to friendly forces and
Decontamination or
use gasoline; it burns too quickly. non-combatants cannot be
Contaminated Waste
Burning causes vapor hazards provided – especially with the
Disposal Technique
downwind, and protective measures historical “wind shifts” that
have to be used by downwind units. occur over time. Consequently,
Area commanders should warn the Air Force does not use
these units of the vapor hazards.” burning as a contaminated waste
disposal technique.
“In the preparation phase, a Air Force procedures do not
Donning Masks biological trigger event has automatically direct the donning
Upon Indication of occurred which caused the unit to of protective masks because an
Biological Warfare assume protection. These trigger intelligence warning of an
Attack events range from an intelligence impending attack has occurred,
warning based on adversary as there is no way of knowing
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 17

capabilities and activity; a warning how long this posture would

from a biological detector; or other have to be maintained (and the
environmental indications of a Air Force biological detection
biological hazard (for example, protocols will provide the
personnel exhibiting symptoms, requisite protection). The Air
dead animals with no apparent Force does not automatically
trauma, and so forth).” direct the donning of protective
masks after indications of an
attack are seen (dead animals,
people exhibiting symptoms,
etc.). This is because the
incubation period of Biological
Warfare (BW) agents means that
the hazard has likely already
dissipated.

1.6. Standards. The AF standards for mission sustainment and mission capability restoration
following chemical or biological attacks are summarized below. Although specific standards are
not established for mission restoration following conventional weapons attacks, commanders
should use CBRN defense standards as a guide to restore the mission. AFI 10-2501 outlines the
peacetime response enabling standards and proficiency requirements. It includes response to
terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction.
1.6.1. Any assigned, attached, or geographically separated Air Force unit conducting combat
operations or in direct or indirect support of combat operations, must be able to:
1.6.1.1. Resume their primary mission as soon as possible after the end of a chemical or
biological attack or the discovery that a covert attack has occurred.
1.6.1.2. Support operational sustainment, in accordance with Installation Emergency
Management Plan (IEMP) 10-2, for up to 96 hours.
1.6.1.3. Support operational sustainment by reducing contamination-related casualties to
the lowest possible level.
1.6.2. Any AF unit conducting force projection operations in support of expeditionary forces
must be able to resume their primary mission capability within 6 hours after a chemical or
biological attack or the discovery that a covert attack has occurred.
1.7. Operational Assumptions:
1.7.1. There are many decisions Commanders and senior leaders will have to make during
Major Combat Operations activities involving CBRN materials. Most of these decisions are
hazard specific e.g., the item applies to Chemical Warfare but is not applicable to Biological
Warfare or Radiological Warfare scenarios.
1.7.1.1. Timing the release of people from shelters after enemy missile attacks.
1.7.1.2. Utilization of Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) options.
1.7.1.3. Implementation of Split-MOPP.
18 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

1.7.1.4. Use of “simplified” versus “advanced” version of the Chemically Contaminated

Object Rule.
1.7.1.5. Determination of aircraft CW contamination status.
1.7.1.6. Accomplishment of area, vehicle, and aircraft decontamination.
1.7.1.7. Re-use of protective ensembles.
1.7.1.6. Timing of de-masking decisions.
1.7.2. Mission priorities may require commanders to make decisions on protective postures
and recovery actions based on incomplete information. A high priority mission may require
acceptance of an increased casualty risk for some, or all, of the installation population.
Commanders should consult with their staff SMEs and consider both friendly and hostile force
capabilities. Factors to consider include the commander’s confidence in the intelligence
assessment and the importance of the mission to the current and overall operational or
contingency plan. Also, consider attack-warning timelines, alarm signals, force training,
equipment levels, collective protection, and the ability to communicate desired actions to all
installation forces. For hostile forces, consider their intent, probable order of battle, attrition (if
any) due to counterforce operations, theater situation, and past behaviors.
1.7.3. CBRN threats require the use of protective measures that could degrade the mission.
Commanders must balance mission-degrading defensive measures against sortie generation,
airlift throughput, and mission continuation. The threat of CBRN attack drives the
determination of the appropriate alarm condition and MOPP level (see paragraph 5.3.).
1.7.4. For nuclear operations, installations will function at different points on the operational
spectrum (e.g. once nuclear weapons are used and fallout arrives). Commanders will adjust the
“acceptable risk” for radiological doses based on mission requirements.
1.7.5. Additional funding, by itself, does not enhance AF capabilities to fly, fight, and win in
CBRN environments. The Air Force must have broad operational concepts to effectively use
the resources and manpower available. Commanders will tailor their response protocols in the
IEMP 10-2 to counter the CBRN threats for their specific installation and to meet specific unit
missions or objectives. (T-1).
1.7.6. The currently fielded chemical and biological agent detectors do not detect every
potential agent in all forms (solid, liquid, or gaseous state) at expected concentrations. These
detectors will detect field concentration of likely chemical warfare agents under most
conditions. If the agent concentration is below the detector's threshold level (lower limit of the
detector sensitivity), the detector will not indicate the agent present. Consequently, detector
operators can only determine that, if present, the agent concentration is below the instruments
level of detection sensitivity. Installation EM and Bioenvironmental specialists can provide
specific information on CBRN detector capabilities, limitations, and risk assessment.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 19

1.7.7. Civil aircraft that are under DoD contract and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) may
conduct flights into CBRN areas assessed as “Low” threat as determined by the Air Mobility
Command Threat Working Group with input from the FAA. They will not conduct operations
on installations or airbases that are under attack or contaminated at the time of flight arrival.
Depending upon the type of agent and scope of exposure, the crew may require medical
evaluations, treatment, or prophylaxis prior to departure. Air Mobility Command provides
CRAF and contract airlift crews with CBRN defense training and issues a ground crew
chemical ensemble before entry into these areas. If a CRAF aircraft or contract crew is caught
on the ground during a CBRN or WMD attack, the crew will be evacuated by first available
means and their aircraft grounded.
1.7.8. The airlift cargo owner is tasked to decontaminate cargo before and after on-loading or
off-loading. This is especially important for cargo movements from forward operating bases.
1.7.9. For airlift operations, only critical retrograde cargo will be moved from a contaminated
to an uncontaminated installation. Critical requirements are pre-designated in theater
operational plans.
1.7.10. The DoD must coordinate with applicable civilian authorities, and will only issue
guidance on contaminated aircraft movement after obtaining approval from the President of
the United States and United States Secretary of Defense. Carriers are issued War-Risk-
Insurance and any claims for hull loss and/or damage to include contamination will be
processed through United States Transportation Command and the Federal Aviation
Administration.
1.8. Leadership Challenges and Responsibilities:
1.8.1. Challenges. Leadership at all levels remains an essential element to effectively
conduct and sustain operations in a highly contested, non-permissive environment. Probably
the greatest challenge faced by leaders and supervisors is continuing mission operations,
despite the short and long-term impact of wartime operations upon themselves and their
subordinates. The physical and psychological effects of CBRN weapons upon personnel and
unit operations will range from limited to severe.
1.8.2. A leader's knowledge of an airman's abilities has always been a key component of
successful leadership and becomes even more important under CBRN conditions. Leaders
must anticipate that some people will have difficulty performing operations, such as operating
in protective equipment. The cause may be a lack of training (i.e. failure to complete task
qualification training), fatigue, poor health, or poor adjustment to the local climate. Stress and
physical conditions will magnify existing problems for some individuals and create new ones
for others. Operationally stressful training situations will provide an opportunity to both
identify and correct individual problems and to train leaders to recognize and resolve common
problems. Leaders and co-workers must watch for problems, take action to correct the situation
within their ability, or notify the Unit Control Center (UCC), unit commander, or medical staff
immediately.
20 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

1.8.2.1. If personnel within a unit become CBRN casualties, other unit members may
experience significant stress-related problems. Some, even though they were not exposed,
may believe they have CBRN agent symptoms too. Leaders must be aware of this potential
problem and request assistance from the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) or medical
personnel, if this situation occurs.
1.8.2.2. Several techniques are available to extend Airman, team, and unit performance
under CBRN conditions. Develop standard operating procedures and training leaders and
workers to perform tasks and missions under different alarm conditions (paragraph 4.7.)
and MOPP levels. Train all personnel on the procedures for day and night operations. Units
will train supervisors to use crew rotations, work and rest cycles, sleep discipline, and to
enforce hydration standards. (T-2). Align Crisis Action Team (CAT), EOC, and UCC
activities to support contamination footprint identification and isolation. In addition, focus
CAT, EOC, and UCC activities on management of forces under different protective
postures throughout the installation, climatic conditions, and threat scenarios.
1.8.3. Responsibilities. See AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Program, for specific Air
Staff, MAJCOM, installation, and functional area responsibilities for CBRN defense.
1.8.3.1. CBRN Task Qualification Training (TQT). TQT prepares individuals and teams
to perform mission essential tasks in CBRN threat environments. Unit supervisors and
trainers will conduct CBRN task qualification training for the target audiences IAW each
functional Air Force Specialty (AFS) Career Field Education and Training Plan (CFETP).
(T-1). Common core tasks are contained in AFTTP 3-2.42, Multi-service Doctrine for
CBRN Operations, this manual, and provided in the CBRN Defense training course.
1.8.3.1.1. AF Career Field Managers (CFM) and Functional Area Managers (FAM).
Each CFM, through the MAJCOM FAMs (e.g. Air Force Installation and Mission
Support Center (AFIMSC) and retained MAJCOM Program Managers (e.g. C-
MAJCOMs)) will provide expert guidance for their AFS. They are the critical link
responsible for integrating CBRN defense operational concepts into AF and MAJCOM
functional area programs. The FAMs will use the concepts and TTPs within this manual
to further develop their functional area-specific CBRN guidance and TTPs. The FAMs
will also include CBRN guidance and TTPs into the next revision of their functional
publications, CFETPs, job guides, and formal schools. MAJCOM FAMs will identify
critical tasks that must be performed in CBRN environments in CFETPs. This guidance
must be in sufficient detail to enable supervisors to identify the minimum individual
and unit training tasks required to conduct operations in CBRN environments. (T-1).
1.8.3.1.2. Installation Functional SMEs. Installation functional SMEs will incorporate
AF and MAJCOM guidance into unit-level publications, training or job guides,
checklists, and standard operating procedures. Functional SMEs assist first-line
supervisors to tailor unit specific CBRN defense TQT requirements based on core TQT
standards established by CFMs for their respective Air Force specialty and also assist
commanders to develop standard unit response and recovery procedures for likely
CBRN attack scenarios.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 21

1.8.3.2. Installation Area of Responsibility:

1.8.3.2.1. The Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC) is responsible for coordinating
security for all rear area forces including air bases. The JRAC may assign the in-place
or deployed Air Force commander an area of responsibility that extends beyond the
boundaries of the installation perimeter boundary. The installation commander
normally will delegate responsibility for security within the base area of responsibility
to the Defense Forces Commander. Responsibility for CBRN detection and marking in
the area outside of the base perimeter may or may not be the responsibility of the
installation. Specific requirements are determined by host-nation support agreements,
local sensitivities, the capability of other services, and coordination with the JRAC.
1.8.3.2.2. Security Forces patrols that operate outside the installation perimeter and
within the installation area of responsibility must have the ability to detect and report
CBRN contamination. This may require additional training on specialized CBRN
detection instruments. Another method is for specialists from EM to accompany
Security Forces patrols to detect and mark CBRN contamination and unexploded
ordnance (UXO) in the area of responsibility. Conversely, Security Forces patrols may
need to escort EM teams tasked to evaluate the extent of contamination within
unsecured areas of the installation perimeter or outside the installation boundaries.
Security Forces patrols outside the installation perimeter should assist in maintaining
the security of automatic and manual chemical and biological agent detectors. Security
Forces may not be able to immediately dedicate patrols specifically to these secondary
tasks, especially if actively engaged in their primary tasks for installation defense. EM
specialists tasked to provide CBRN defense support for Security Forces operations will
be postured for immediate response, armed, equipped with personal body armor, and
trained to perform their assigned tasks. The Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC),
the Communications Squadron, and EOC must closely coordinate operational planning
and communications requirements. Installations will identify requirements and TTPs
for off-base CBRN reconnaissance operations within the IEMP 10-2 and the Base
Support Plan, Part II, Chapter 11. (T-2).
1.9. Organization:
1.9.1. The CBRN defense operational concept is to use the existing MAJCOM, Component-
Numbered Air Force (C-NAF), and installation command and control relationships and
structures to execute CBRN defense operations. This structure provides a natural mix of forces
that includes senior leaders, functional area specialists, and augmentation. It maintains control
of a wide range of installation activities and enables the commander to respond effectively to
all threats and maintain mission focus. Adjustments may be necessary to support joint, theater,
and host-nation missions, but should not require the creation of a new or separate organization
or structure.
22 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

1.9.2. Commanders will organize their forces and develop a command and control structure
IAW the Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS) to meet operational requirements
under the most likely threat conditions. (T-1). Note: Consider how Command and Control (C2)
relationships and structures may be degraded when operating in a multi-domain C2
environment. Joint and Combined Operations. Most future conflicts will include Air Force
participation in a Joint or coalition campaign. Units operating from overseas bases are also
subject to host-nation agreements and requirements. Joint doctrine requires Air Force units to
integrate operational and support activities within the framework of the Joint organizations and
host-nation agreements.
1.10. Host Nation Support:
1.10.1. The availability of host-nation support may enable Air Force units to reduce support
and transportation requirements by securing agreements with host-nations. These agreements
may include forces, civilian manpower, supplies, equipment, and facilities designated for
installation use. MAJCOM, NAF, and installation planners should develop support agreements
to complement Air Force CBRN capabilities and reduce the need for pre-positioned or mobility
material. Any new agreements must fulfill existing regulatory requirements. Contact the Wing
Judge Advocate for further guidance on new agreements and for interpretation of any existing
agreement, including but not limited to, any Status of Forces Agreement or Defense Contract
Agency agreement.
1.10.2. Host-nation agreements should include all of the CBRN support Air Force units
receive from or provide to host-nation forces. Examples include exclusive or shared use of
CBRN attack warning and reporting systems, medical treatment, CBRN detection,
decontamination, and access to facility hardening equipment and supplies.
1.10.3. The Joint Forces Commander (JFC) normally establishes a single office to serve as the
executive agent to manage and coordinate host-nation support. Installation or Air Component
Command representatives use this office, according to JFC directions and guidelines, to
resolve conflicts when seeking host-nation support.
1.10.4. Provide CBRN training and equip host-nation forces with CBRN protective equipment
as required by host-nation agreements, Joint Forces, theater, or MAJCOM directives.
1.11. Noncombatant Protection:
1.11.1. United States Family Members and Contract Personnel. Provide CBRN training and
equipment to family members as required by DOS, DoD, Joint Forces, theater, or MAJCOM
directives. Provide CBRN training and equipment to contractors as required by contract
agreement, DoD Joint Forces, theater, or MAJCOM directives.
1.11.2. Non-Combatant Evacuation Order Operations. Treat all United States citizens equally
during noncombatant evacuation. Other nations may request evacuation support from the DOS.
Upon DOS approval, Other Country Nationals from countries who have been authorized
assistance will be included.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 23

1.11.3. Enemy Prisoners of War. Security Forces, in coordination with Supply and EM,
develop personnel protection plans and issue available CBRN defense clothing and equipment
items to the extent possible to EPWs, retained personnel, civilian internees, and other detainees
in Air Force custody. Make all reasonable attempts to transport these personnel to non-threat
areas to minimize risk and limit demands for individual protective equipment. MAJCOMs may
authorize units to procure and maintain additional personal protective equipment components
for this requirement. Security Forces and EM must coordinate use of protective equipment,
decontamination items, and containment facility protection. EPWs and retained personnel are
allowed to retain personal effects such as the helmet, canteen, protective mask, and chemical
protective garment. Train these personnel to recognize the installation attack warning signals
and take protective actions. Provide each civilian internee camp with adequate shelter to ensure
protection against the hazards of war.
1.12. CBRN Defense Force Structure:
1.12.1. CBRN defense actions require a force structure that includes both primary duty and
base augmentation forces. Primary duty CBRN defense forces are located within the Civil
Engineer Squadron EM Flight. The medical portion of the CBRN defense mission is performed
by several medical specialties. They include Bioenvironmental Engineering, Public Health,
Medical Laboratory, and direct patient care providers. These multifunctional forces develop
plans, provide CBRN technical expertise, and manage specialized teams. See Table A3.1. for
summation of CBRN defense pre-, trans-, and post-attack tasks for these forces.
1.12.2. In-place and deployed units provide augmentation manpower for unit post-attack
reconnaissance teams, unit control centers, shelter management teams, contamination control
teams, and contamination control area teams. The installation, MAJCOM, theater, or Air Force
planning agent determines actual requirements after considering the CBRN threat and missions
for each in-place and deployed location. Assignment to these specialized teams during
peacetime to gain reoccurring proficiency training on expected wartime tasks will not be
considered an additional duty and prioritized according to the CBRN threat. (T-2).
1.13. Training and Exercises:
1.13.1. The Air Force provides CBRN defense, emergency response, and specialized team
training at the individual Airman, team, supervisor, and senior leader levels. Training begins
with individual skills provided by the EM Flight during CBRN Defense training. TQT,
conducted by first-line supervisors, builds upon these skills. The next level expands to
incorporate increasingly larger and more complex team, unit, and installation-level training
and exercises. At each level, the first priority is to perform mission essential tasks in the CBRN
threat environment expected at the home station or deployment location. The next priority is
to perform those tasks in the expected CBRN threat environment at all other potential
deployment locations. Imposing CBRN conditions upon already heavy training schedules adds
complexity and increases the degree of difficulty and total training time. However, the
advantages are that trained Airmen, teams, units, and leaders can integrate multiple mission
scenarios and cope with complex and stressful situations while learning how to survive and
operate in CBRN environments.
24 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

1.13.2. Develop plans and implement training and procedures based upon a realistic
estimation of the enemy's ability to attack the installation and personnel. Attack scenarios,
especially for installation-level CBRN exercises and Readiness Assessments, should closely
resemble actual enemy tactics, number of attacks, and times of likely attack. For example, if
local exercises contain excessive numbers of simulated attacks during times convenient for
evaluation but unrealistic for the threat, supervisors cannot perfect the integration and flow of
combat turn or airlift operations in a hostile environment.
1.13.3. Installation CBRN exercises and Readiness Assessments will integrate the CBRN
Basic Standards of Proficiency listed in AFTTP 3-2.42 and Attachment 4 of this instruction
and be conducted IAW this instruction and at a frequency IAW AFI 90-201, Air Force
Inspection System. (T-1).
1.14. CBRN Defense:
1.14.1. CBRN Operational Concept. The Air Force operational concept for CBRN defense is
to organize, train, and equip the force to make risk-based decisions and gain operational
advantage. Air Force units will retain the ability to operate under all conditions, but will focus
their primary efforts on conducting combat operations under the CBRN conditions expected
in highly contested, non-permissive environments. Although Air Force CBRN training and
guidance addresses TTPs to reduce the effects of CBRN weapons used against airbases,
defense operations rely upon risk-based decision making, individual and collective protection
equipment, and integrated individual, unit, and installation actions.
1.14.1.1. The threat of CBRN agent use and presence of CBRN contamination following
attacks will increase logistic requirements and divert manpower and resources from other
base recovery and mission support operations. Single attacks and factors such as the type
of agent and environmental conditions, may require wearing protective equipment for
several minutes to hours. Multiple attacks, the use of newly developed chemical or
biological agents, and unfavorable weather conditions may extend wear times or require
repeated donning and doffing over extended periods.
1.14.1.2. Commanders determine what actions are executable based upon pre- and post-
attack threat assessment, availability of resources, and mission needs. Airmen and leaders
develop plans and execute attack response actions to limit contamination. They perform
immediate and operational decontamination and conduct rapid post-attack reconnaissance
to detect, identify, and/or isolate contaminated resources and areas. Contamination
avoidance planning includes the effective use of barriers, such as tarps or plastic sheeting,
and improved use of shelters and overhead cover enhance post-attack use of
uncontaminated assets. Pre-planned actions should be performed when attack warning is
received to reduce vulnerability and avoid contamination of personnel and critical
equipment.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 25

1.14.1.3. Personnel should use uncontaminated assets to the extent possible in the post-
attack environment. The UCC directs unit personnel to accomplish mission essential tasks
and stop non-mission essential tasks. The UCCs monitor the contamination status of
people, equipment, and areas. UCCs also instruct unit personnel to minimize movement,
especially between contaminated and uncontaminated zones. Individuals or teams do not
enter or exit contaminated areas or move contaminated equipment into uncontaminated
areas without UCC or EOC approval. Personnel go to contamination control areas or
reduce MOPP when directed by their unit or the EOC.
1.14.2. The installation commander assesses risk and directs protective measures for all forces
within the installation area of responsibility. Unit commanders use information from their UCC
and unit post attack reconnaissance (PAR) teams for initial hazard assessment. Within the
EOC, EM and medical personnel evaluate conditions (e.g., type of hazards present in sectors
or zones, weather conditions) and develop the appropriate recommendation. This
recommendation is presented to the installation commander and, if approved, authorization is
provided to unit commanders.
1.14.3. Unit commanders should indeed contribute to hazard definition. However, soliciting
unit commander requests for MOPP or protective measure reduction is contrary to the
installation commander model. Installation commanders make universal protective measures
decisions and should not be tasked with assessing units by exception or individual requests.
1.15. Theater Basing Options:
1.15.1. Techniques such as adaptive basing, dispersal, and redundancy, are theater or
MAJCOM options. For example, increasing the distance between the installation and CBRN
threat can reduce or eliminate the CBRN threat. Commanders can reduce CBRN defense
manpower and resource requirements and the need for extensive protective measures by
moving forces outside the optimal ranges of threat weapons systems. Other options include
relocating or dispersing high-risk, high-value assets among several bases and deploying
redundant assets. Another tactic is to increase counterforce and installation defense activities
to reduce threats during planned airlift or sortie generation periods. Based on mission priorities,
consider also delaying force deployment to allow counterforce measures time to reduce or
eliminate the threat of attack. These measures apply equally well to the threat of CBRN or
conventional attack.
1.15.2. Adaptive Basing. The primary reason for adaptive basing is to protect critical systems
from damage, destruction, contamination, or disruption of operations. The first priority should
include weapons systems, command and control, and CBRN support functions that would
experience high degradation from CBRN weapons effects or protective actions. By employing
this tactic for those weapons systems that can be moved, commanders can reduce support
requirements at threat bases and enhance the availability of critical assets for priority or time-
sensitive missions.
26 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

1.15.3. Relocation and Dispersal. Relocation and dispersal sites offer an operational
alternative if enemy attacks prevent or restrict operations at primary bases. Relocation plans
should be developed prior to attack and include both personnel and aircraft options. Consider
reciprocal agreements to provide temporary support at other Air Force or coalition forces
within the region. Within most theaters of operation, dispersal sites will not support full-scale
operations. However, dispersal remains a viable option if circumstances prevent operations at
primary bases. Feasibility issues include the time required to conduct operations, availability
of cross-servicing facilities, communication connectivity, and the availability and type of
munitions. Also, consider the significant logistical issues involved with moving or pre-
positioning people, equipment, and consumables to support dispersal site operations and
security.
1.15.4. Redundancy. An alternative to dispersal sites is to create redundancy by assigning
several installations to support the same or similar missions. Consider this option, for example,
when missile defense systems do not provide coverage for all operating locations. Redundancy
can allow an attacked base to concentrate on recovering from damage or contamination while
its assigned aircraft operate from another, pre-planned location. Planning should address the
necessary equipment, supplies, munitions, security, and personnel. Supporting bases should
have sufficient space to handle the additional aircraft and support requirements. Airlift may be
necessary to transfer resources between bases where distance or security prevents surface
movement.
1.15.5. Delayed Deployment. Under some circumstances, the Air Operations Center (AOC)
may be able to evaluate the pattern of attacks and delay the airlift flow or adjust arrival times
to coincide with periods of reduced threat. These adjustments may also provide additional time
for counterforce elements and the base defense forces to reduce or eliminate threats. When
forces must flow regardless of the threat, identify periods where enemy activity or their ability
to conduct attacks is low. For example, missile attacks or special operations force activities
may decrease during daylight due to the increased effectiveness of counterforce operations and
base defense forces. In this situation, consider increasing the airlift flow during daylight hours
and reducing flow during hours of darkness.
1.16. Medical Operations:
1.16.1. Introduction. For the purposes of this manual, the term medical treatment facility
(MTF) includes both fixed site MTFs and deployed medical facilities such as expeditionary
medical support. Comprehensive prevention, countermeasures, and medical surveillance
programs are required to minimize mission degradation from CBRN agent use.
Communication between line and medical personnel (i.e. bioenvironmental engineering,
public health, etc.) is critical in assessing environmental or other CBRN exposure risks.
1.16.1.1. CBRN weapons effects include blast, heat, shrapnel, chemical, radiological,
biological toxin-related illnesses, and biological warfare agent pathogen infections.
1.16.1.2. Passive defense measures may reduce, but are not expected to eliminate, injuries
that result from CBRN attacks.
1.16.2. Responsibilities and Support:
1.16.2.1. Medical duties involve providing or supporting medical care, casualty
prevention, and preventative medicine.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 27

1.16.2.2. Medical surveillance programs include disease incidence tracking and

epidemiological assessment to aid in the recognition of covertly delivered biological or
chemical agents. Disease countermeasures include personal protective and hygiene
measures (i.e. the use of bed nets and other disease vector countermeasures), the protection
of food and water, chemoprophylaxis, and chemical agent antidotes.
1.16.2.3. Medical duties include protecting the medical facility and patients who are under
the control of the medical system.
1.16.2.4. Bioenvironmental Engineering (BE) will perform Health Risk Assessments that
inform the combatant and the installation commander comprehensive risk assessment
decisions needed to prevent short and long term personal health effects.
1.16.2.5. Primary BE duties involve: Collect site-specific data to characterize exposure
pathways and levels to CBRN contaminants.
1.16.2.5.1. Conduct Chemical Warfare Agent Water Surveillance.
1.16.2.5.2. Perform CBRN Health Risk Assessments focused on critical missions as
determined by combatant and installation commanders (e.g. air crew/pilot staging area,
command and control, etc.).
1.16.2.5.3. Provide input to and interpret results from risk modeling tools to provide
predictive health risk assessments for supposed and quantified CBRN exposures.
1.16.2.5.4. Determine protective measures in CBRN operating environments. Provide
relevant threat control recommendations to the commander with respect to real-time
and future operations.
1.16.2.5.5. Consult with Shelter Management Teams to determine the adequacy of
collective protection for controlling health threats and perform health risk assessments
to determine when to release personnel from collectively protected facilities.
1.16.2.5.6. Advise senior leadership and affected communities on health risks
associated with operations and missions in a given CBRN environment.
1.16.2.5.7. Collaborate with EM to detect, identify, and quantify CBRN and other
agents to determine significance of risk, appropriate control measures, and community
risk.
1.16.2.5.8. Perform Hazard Quantification (quantify to characterize and treat). For
quantify-to-characterize and treat, BE obtains qualitative and/or quantitative exposure
measurements to characterize contamination in order to properly protect and treat
exposed personnel. For quantify-to-clear, BE obtains qualitative and/or quantitative
measurements to characterize CBRN agents and/or toxic industrial chemicals/materials
data for platforms/materials data for platforms and materiel extent of contamination,
pre/post period.
1.16.2.6. Intelligence Support. The medical commander and staff have a need-to-know
and must be provided operationally and tactically CBRN/WMD-related intelligence and
adversarial threat assessments.
28 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

1.16.2.7. The medical commander, through the medical intelligence officer provides
medical surveillance system information to the CAT, EOC, and other staff agencies. The
data from medical surveillance systems may be the first indication of CBRN attack.
1.16.2.8. Base Operating Support. Medical units will require base operating support as
detailed in concepts of operation, the installation IEMP 10-2, and the base support plan.
1.16.3. Casualty Management and Patient Treatment:
1.16.3.1. Medical Treatment:
1.16.3.1.1. Treatment, beyond self-aid and buddy care (SABC), is the responsibility of
medical personnel. Casualties become medical patients when they enter the five level
deployed medical treatment system that efficiently manages casualty flow from the site
of injury, to an MTF, and to the next echelon of care.
1.16.3.1.2. Medical personnel conduct the casualty care operations required to save
life or limb but within the scope of acceptable risk to the patient and medical personnel.
1.16.3.1.3. Medical personnel will not unnecessarily compromise collective protection
toxic free areas or place medical personnel or their patients at unnecessary risk. MTFs
are high-value, low-density assets.
1.16.3.1.4. Most clinical care cannot be provided in contaminated environments.
Commanders must recognize that MTFs will operate at much reduced efficiency in
environments with transient chemical vapors, biological contamination, or radiological
contamination and planning must include alternate medical facility identification.
Medical commanders must identify critical clinical resources that will be protected in
the event of CBRN attack to minimize mission degradation when assets are transferred
to an alternate facility.
1.16.3.2. A CBRN casualty is a person who enters the medical system for any CBRN-
related health issue, who displays symptoms of CBRN agent exposure, or has received one
or more injections of the Antidote Treatment Nerve Agent Auto injector or other
chemoprophylaxis.
1.16.3.3. Once a casualty enters the medical system and becomes a patient, the decision to
return to duty, including flight status, or to remain under medical treatment, rests with the
responsible medical official.
1.16.3.4. The medical facility will notify the unit to pick up patients who are being
returned to duty. Units will ensure a serviceable JSLIST, over boots, gloves, and M-50
protective mask is provided for the patient (if required).
1.16.4. Medical CBRN Countermeasures:
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 29

1.16.4.1. Commanders should ensure their personnel in or subject to deployment to

locations where CBRN threats exist receive treatment, based on advice from medical
authorities. Consider the medical threat, attack probability, logistics stockpiles, and other
available protective measures. Pre-exposure prophylactic administration of antibiotics is
generally not advisable due to unknown efficacy, potential adverse reactions, costs, and
possible waste of critical resources. Current DoD policy is that any off- label use of medical
countermeasures is subject to the Food and Drug Administration investigational new drug
policy. Medical commanders must know and understand current DoD, theater, joint task
force, and Air Force policy regarding these countermeasures prior to advising any off-label
use. However, they should use their medical judgment as the tactical situation dictates.
1.16.4.2. Commanders, supervisors, and medical personnel should emphasize good
sanitation and hygiene measures. They should protect food and water from contamination,
maintain personal cleanliness, and properly dispose of waste. Food and water sources are
good targets for covert contamination with chemical or biological agents. This
contamination can occur very early in the supply line and risks are greatest when foods are
procured locally in foreign countries. Commanders must establish secure and reliable
sources of food and must monitor the safety and security of the processes of food
procurement, food delivery, food preparation, and food service to ensure the safety of food
and water used for warfighter feeding. (T-1). These measures are some of the most
important and least costly protective measures against both naturally occurring diseases
and biological and chemical attacks. A food and water vulnerability assessment must be
conducted as part of the installation AHTA by medical, security forces, services, civil
engineering, and EM personnel. (T-1).
1.16.5. Transportation of Casualties:
1.16.5.1. Unit commanders, supervisors, and individuals are responsible for moving
casualties to a designated casualty collection point or an MTF. Consider designating unit
vehicles and drivers to support casualty movement.
1.16.5.2. Patient transportation planners should factor delays and shutdowns caused by
severe weather conditions, ground force attacks, attack damage, or CBRN contamination
into planning factors.
1.16.5.3. Large units should designate one or more unit casualty holding points. Areas
should provide overhead cover and protect casualties from the elements.
1.16.5.4. In some cases patient retrieval teams may be tasked to pick up casualties. Patient
retrieval operations must be a coordinated effort and include the EOC, UCCs, and medical
staff components.
1.16.6. Disposition of Protective Equipment, Personal Weapons, Ammunition, and Munitions.
Use the following guidelines for handling casualties equipped with the ground crew chemical
ensemble, field gear, and body armor and those armed with personal weapons, ammunition,
and munitions. Where possible, remove these items from casualties in a manner that enables
their return to operational use. Coordinate specific actions, training, and procedures for
constructing holding areas and handling these items with the security forces, emergency
management, and explosive ordnance disposal personnel.
30 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

1.16.6.1. Patients will retain their M-50 protective mask with filter, spectacle inserts, and
antidotes until they arrive at a medical treatment facility. Patients that are most likely to be
returned to duty should retain all of their serviceable protective equipment (helmet,
chemical-biological warfare defense equipment, antidotes, and canteen with water).
1.16.6.2. Armed personnel who become casualties should be relieved of their weapons,
ammunition, and munitions by personnel from their own unit prior to arrival at the casualty
or mortuary collection point if it is safe to do so. Unit members should return these items
to the unit armory or appropriate storage area. This action quickly returns valuable
resources to the unit and reduces the potential for disruption at the collection points. If it is
not safe to remove weapons, ammunition and munitions, notify the EOC to obtain EOD
support in order to safe any hazards.
1.16.6.3. Before the start of processing and after receiving proper training from security
forces and EOD personnel, medical personnel will search casualties and remove weapons,
ammunition, and munitions. For United States weapons, remove the ammunition, safe the
weapon, and store the weapon and ammunition in a holding area. Advise the owning unit
to retrieve their weapon(s) and ammunition Request security forces to retrieve weapon(s)
and ammunition, if the unit ownership cannot be determined. Treat all munitions (such as
grenades, mines, fuses, flares, and bulk explosive) and all non-United States weapons and
ammunition as unexploded ordnance. Place them within the unexploded ordnance holding
area and notify EOD personnel or the EOC.
1.16.7. Protective Measures within Medical Treatment Areas. The Air Force installation
commander may delegate the authority to determine MOPP levels and other protective
measures within medical areas or sectors to the medical commander. To implement this action,
the medical facility must have the capability to provide CBRN detection and identification
capabilities similar to that provided by installation CBRN Reconnaissance Teams. This
authority, if exercised, must be personally authorized by the installation commander. The
medical staff must also coordinate with the CBRN Control Center within the EOC construct
to ensure medical areas are not within the downwind vapor plume of an agent deposition
(droplet fall) area. Medical personnel will conduct detection, monitoring, and contamination
assessment within these designated areas.
1.16.8. Medical Personnel Billeting. Whenever possible, provide billeting for medical
personnel within the medical area or MTF. Use billeting space for the medical CBRN teams,
key providers, and for patient overflow.
1.16.9. Stress. Airmen may experience significant stress-related problems. Some individuals
or groups may believe they have CBRN agent symptoms even when they have not been
exposed. The medical system must be prepared to deal with this, and provide education and
field support to base units. This may include sending medical personnel to areas where
significant numbers of people believe they are experiencing CBRN symptoms, even though
exposure to CBRN agents was unlikely. The purpose is to alleviate people’s fears and quickly
restore mission focus.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 31

1.16.10. Unit First-Aid Supplies and Equipment. All units/work centers should maintain first-
aid supplies, litters, and emergency supplies appropriate for the unit/work center size and
mission. Add additional supplies when required to protect casualties from environmental
conditions (i.e., blankets, potable water, ponchos, or snow covers). Where available, use
existing unit protective shelter first aid kits and equipment to meet initial needs. The basis of
issue is one kit and six litters for each 100 personnel. Contact the home station or deployed
medical forces representative to determine specific requirements and types of supplies and
equipment. Units are responsible for resourcing and maintaining the serviceability of these
supplies.
32 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Chapter 2

INSTALLATION CBRN THREATS

Section 2A—Threat Assessment

2.1. Background:
2.1.1. Commanders assess the most likely threats at home station and their deployed locations;
then tailor their forces to conduct operations to counter them. This chapter provides
information on likely installation threats and discusses how potential adversaries might employ
these Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). For some threats, it provides information to assist
in determining the enemy order of battle.
2.1.2. Installations are targets of many different types of weapons systems. Analyze specific
installation threats to apply this information under wartime conditions. Defensive planners
should understand unique capabilities, characteristics, attack profiles, and weaknesses of these
weapons to develop countermeasures and defensive plans. This chapter discusses those
commonalities and provides a framework to evaluate and mitigate threats to installations.
2.1.3. State and non-state actors exploit vulnerabilities across the land, air, maritime, space,
and cyberspace domains. Adversaries constantly evolve their methods to threaten the United
States, our citizens, partners, and installations worldwide. The danger from hostile state and
non-state actors who are trying to acquire and employ CBRN weapons is increasing.
2.1.4. The overall threat from weapons of mass destruction will continually evolve and expand
amongst our adversaries, in particular, the threat posed by biological and chemical warfare
agents. The threat model with regard to traditional Chemical Warfare, Fourth Generation, and
Pharmaceutical Based Agents is actively evolving. Countering these threats with official
programs of record is a deliberate process, with several checks and balances along the way.
The Air Force is working within the Chemical – Biological Defense Enterprise to improve
upon recent rapid acquisition successes. When Chemical – Biological Defense Enterprise
programs of record lag behind emerging threats and hazards Major Command commanders
have options within their disposal. It is acceptable to invest in material and non-material
solutions as bridge capabilities to address existing gaps. Consider collaborating across the
government and industry who develop best practices and innovative capabilities based on war-
fighter demand signals, the evolving threat picture, and current requirements.
2.2. Operational Environment. Air Force (AF) people and weapons systems are vulnerable to
Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) threats worldwide. This potential for attack
requires the AF to adopt deliberate, pre-planned courses of action to counter general CBRN threats.
It also requires the ability to adjust actions to counter specific threats identified through
intelligence analysis or post-attack reconnaissance information.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 33

2.2.1. The Asymmetric Threat. Adversaries understand the strength of the United States
military. Consequently, our adversaries are more likely to try asymmetric methods of attack as
a means to counter our strengths. Some states may see asymmetric strategies as a means to
avoid direct engagements with dominant United States conventional forces and a way to “level
the playing field” while operating below the threshold of war (e.g. gray zone operations).
Conversely, they may resort to the use of CBRN weapons as well as conventional weapons or
explosives. Threat forces include special operations forces, or other forces using small unit
tactics. Employment of weapons and tactics that can inflict a large number of casualties or are
intended to cause panic and confusion in order to disrupt to operations.
2.2.2. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Operations. CWMD operations
include those activities taken to detect, deter, disrupt, deny, or destroy an adversary’s CBRN
capabilities and to minimize the effects of an enemy CBRN attack on operations. The four
elements of the program (Table 2.1.) are proliferation prevention, counterforce, active defense,
and passive defense. Strategic enablers exist to support each element. The integration of these
concepts into air, space, and cyberspace operations enables United States forces to operate
despite confrontation with an adversary employing CBRN weapons. Counterforce operations
and active defense thin the threat, lessen the number of attacks that friendly forces have to
absorb, and reduce the burden on passive defense measures.
2.2.3. Installation Threat Overview. Installation threats may include attacks by air (including
Unmanned Aerial Systems), ground, missile, and special operations forces (SOF). Depending
upon the theater of operations and installation location, enemy forces could employ CBRN
weapons against multiple locations, single bases, or as part of a covert SOF attack. For the near
future, the theater ballistic missile (TBM) remains the dominant CBRN weapon delivery
system against an installation during wartime. Examples of typical TBM systems can be found
in Figure 2.1. SOF ground forces also may conduct random installation attacks with standoff
weapons against targets of opportunity such as aircraft and centers of gravity. These forces
may also use standoff weapons or saboteurs to target specific parts of the installation, such as
command and control systems; critical utility nodes; petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL)
storage and distribution systems; and large sources of toxic industrial materials on or near the
base. Ground forces normally are limited to small arms and conventional explosives, but could
employ small quantities of chemical or biological weapons. See Table 2.1 for the Elements
of Air Force AF CWMD Operations.
34 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Table 2.1. Elements of AF CWMD Operations.

Program Area Scope

Denying attempts by would-be
Proliferation Prevention proliferates to acquire or expand their
chemical or biological capabilities.
Destroy or degrade an adversary’s
Counterforce Operations offensive capability before it can be
used against friendly forces.
Actions to destroy enemy weapons and
Active Defense delivery vehicles while enroute to their
targets.
Contamination avoidance, protection,
Passive Defense
and contamination control.

Figure 2.1. Typical Theater Ballistic Missile Systems.

2.2.3.1. Conventional Threats:

2.2.3.2. Theater missile attacks with high-explosive warheads are the primary
conventional threat to installations. Large-scale installation attacks by aircraft armed with
conventional weapons are unlikely, unless air dominance is lost. If attacking aircraft reach
the installation, they would most likely attack large, high visibility targets such as airfield
surfaces, troop concentrations or tent cities, tactical and cargo aircraft in open areas, POL
storage tanks, and visible command and control structures.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 35

2.2.3.3. Mass artillery or rocket attacks on an installation are unlikely unless the ground
situation changes and the installation comes within range of conventional artillery or
multiple launch rocket forces. Installation operations cannot be conducted within the
effective range of significant amounts of enemy artillery or multiple launch rocket systems.
2.2.3.4. CBRN Threats. The evolving threat environment throughout the world indicates
an increased need for vigilance and emphasis on CBRN defense. Many of the countries
engaged in offensive CBRN programs combine their efforts with theater missile, cruise
missile, and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) programs. There are recent reports of
newly engineered and altered forms of biological agents and new chemical agents. The
possibility exists that new agents could be developed to challenge the effectiveness of
current detectors, protective equipment, or medical countermeasures.
2.2.3.5. Nuclear Threat. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology is expected
to continue. Inspections and intelligence might not always predict technical advances
toward nuclear weapons development. Tactical nuclear warheads and the ability to respond
to and recover from nuclear fallout are a growing concern for installations.
2.2.3.6. Biological Threat. The Defense Intelligence Agency estimates that multiple nation
states have biological warfare (BW) programs. Some have achieved weaponization, and
others could attain that status very soon. A number of other countries have the
infrastructure, technical expertise, and the degree of secrecy needed to create a BW
program.
2.2.3.7. Chemical Threat. Over 20 nations are assessed to have begun chemical warfare
(CW) programs. While a small number are believed to have abandoned their active
programs, many remain committed to CW agent production and the weaponization of a
variety of agents. There are specific concerns with so-called “Fourth Generation Agents”
developed more recently than V-series agents.
2.2.3.8. Toxic Industrial Material Threats. There is a growing concern that the wide
availability of many Toxic Industrial Materials (TIMs) makes them potential tools for
asymmetric attacks against installations. Hostile forces could target storage sites, such as
industrial plants or treatment facilities located on or near an installation. Depending on the
type and quantity of TIMs, a deliberate release could present a short or long term hazard at
the release site and for those within the downwind chemical plume.
2.2.3.9. The Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment conducted by the
Combatant Command J2 and MAJCOM staff will provide more accurate information on
the specific CBRN threats to include delivery platforms.
2.3. Installation Threat Assessments:
2.3.1. Baseline CBRN Threat Assessment. Commanders are required to develop or annually
update baseline CBRN hazard threat assessment for their home station location and for
deployment locations. (T-2). This assessment, is developed as one part of the installations
Integrated Risk Management Process (IRMP), which is comprised of four required annual
assessments; Criticality, Hazard, Vulnerability, and Capability. Within the IRMP the
Installation Commanders are required to develop an installation level All-Hazards Threat
Assessment (AHTA), which is used for deliberate and execution planning, exercise scenario
development and evaluations, and installation Vulnerability Assessments. As a minimum,
36 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

commanders must use the information in the most current version of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, CBRN Warfare Capstone Threat Assessment, available at www.disa.smil.mil. The
AHTA must also incorporate current intelligence and force protection information from
theater, MAJCOM, and NAFs. It also includes input from the local intelligence organization,
the AF Office of Special Investigations (OSI), Security Forces, Civil Engineers, and Medical
organizations. This assessment should be conducted IAW AFI 10-2501, AF Emergency
Management Program.

Section 2B—CBRN Weapons Effects and Employment Strategies

2.4. Installation Attacks:

2.4.1. The primary CBRN weapons employment means against OCONUS installations are
assessed to be TBMs. Other delivery methods include attacks from fixed and rotary wing
aircraft, artillery, land or sea launched cruise missiles, and remotely piloted vehicles.
2.4.2. This section includes a brief description of threat weapons and characteristics. It
provides likely installation attack scenarios and suggests countermeasures and defensive
actions. It does not address all potential threat weapons. Always consult with the local
intelligence unit or agency and air defense unit for base-specific information on ground, air,
and missile threats. Request detailed information on warhead and fuse types, attack scenarios,
and installation defensive system capabilities.
2.5. Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) Systems
2.5.1. Description:
2.5.1.1. Many overseas installations and planned deployment locations are within the
effective range of one or more TBM systems (Figure 2.1.) deployed by our potential
adversaries. TBMs have unique characteristics that must be considered when planning
defensive actions. These unique traits, coupled with the difficulty in targeting and
destroying TBMs prior to and after launch, require installations to develop threat-specific
responses to effectively counter the threat and minimize mission degradations.
2.5.1.2. Potential adversaries are currently capable of attacking and contaminating entire
airbases with TBMs equipped with liquid chemical agent filled warheads. Most medium
and long-range TBMs are relatively inaccurate, and this inaccuracy increases with the
range to the target. Accordingly, foreign strike planners use such techniques as firing
additional systems or using bomblet or sub-munition load stop compensate for this
deficiency. Agent coverage is further affected by variables such as the weather, height of
burst, and method of agent dissemination. TBMs equipped with a biological agent war head
may be able to affect somewhat larger areas. The immediate hazard from most biological
agents is from inhaling the agent as the cloud passes over the installation. The amount of
the biological agent that settles during the cloud’s passage does not present significant
operational contact hazards for extended periods. Re-suspension hazards are possible but
do not pose as great an operational risk as compared to risks during the initial cloud passage
and agent settling. Personnel must be aware of the potential for creating re-suspension
hazards by actions such as removing contamination avoidance covers from assets during
post attack operations. Personnel should use methods that do not create inhalation hazards
and wear the appropriate protective equipment.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 37

2.5.2. Weapon Characteristics. TBMs are surface-to-surface missiles that currently are used
primarily as area attack weapons, though as more advanced TBMs with better guidance and
control systems enter service, they may become capable of precision attack. The improved
guidance, control, and enhanced accuracy provides TBMs with the capability and
characteristics required to deliver a CBRN warhead to a target that is not within the range or
ability of other weapons systems, such as manned aircraft or artillery, to successfully attack.
Figure 2.2. shows the major components of a single-stage, non-separating warhead TBM,
which constitutes most of the current TBM threat. These missiles are launched on an initial
steering vector, but once launched, they continue toward their pre-programmed target on an
established trajectory. When the appropriate distance to a target has been covered, the fuel
supply to the engine is cut off and the missile continues on a ballistic (unguided) trajectory to
the target. TBM ranges extend from about 50 miles to greater than 2000 miles. Depending on
the range to target, the missile can reach a terminal velocity of approximately 2100 to 3600
miles per hour (Mach 3 to Mach 5) by the time the warhead explodes and the remaining missile
components impact the ground. Older TBM warheads and missile bodies remain as a single
unit until the warhead functions. New and longer-range missiles have warheads designed to
separate from the missile body inflight. This separation allows the warhead to slow down to a
terminal velocity of about 750 miles per hour (Mach 1). Lower terminal velocities will
generally provide a more effective means to deliver wider range of chemical or biological
agents.

Figure 2.2. Typical Theater Ballistic Missile - Major Components.

2.5.3. Weapon Effects. The primary threat from a TBM is the warhead. TBM warheads are
fused (designed to explode or function) to optimize the effect of the warhead fill. Warheads
may be fused for air, ground, or sub-surface bursts. The warheads may contain a conventional
explosive, nuclear weapon, or a chemical or biological agent fill. Multiple-missile attacks may
include more than one type of warhead. Use post-attack reconnaissance to determine what
happened in an attack and direct protective actions accordingly.
38 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

2.5.3.1. Ground Burst Warheads. TBMs with conventional warheads are designed to
explode upon or shortly after impact with the ground. The very high missile speed and a
600-to-1,000 pound conventional warhead combine to produce a devastating explosion at
the point of impact. Significant damage will occur to buildings and utilities within the
immediate area and a large impact crater is likely. Ground burst warheads with chemical
and biological agents create the greatest hazard within the immediate area surrounding the
impact point. Most of the agent effectiveness will be lost from the force of warhead impact.
2.5.3.2. Airburst Warheads. Airburst warheads provide the most effective area coverage
and dispersion pattern for chemical and biological agents. Larger agent droplets or solid
particles will generally fall more quickly, while smaller droplets and particles will fall
further downwind and at a slower rate. Similarly, the vapor released as liquid agents
evaporate will move from the point of release toward the ground and in a downwind
direction. An airburst warhead with a biological agent fill produces significantly greater
downwind hazard than a chemical warhead. If an agent, such as VX, is released at an
optimal burst height of about 250 meters (about 800 feet) above ground level, the agent
falls to the ground over the next 60 minutes in the downwind direction of the prevailing
wind. The average size of the VX liquid droplets that reach the ground from such an attack
are expected to be about 200 to 250 microns, or about the thickness of four sheets of paper.
Figure 2.3. shows the estimated deposition timeline for liquid VX droplets released in an
airburst. One of the simplest and most effective countermeasures to avoid contamination
from airburst weapons is to remain under overhead cover (and in protective equipment)
until after the liquid agent or solid particle fallout reaches the ground. Specific chemical
agent deposition, or droplet fall times, vary based on the agent type, burst height, weather
conditions, and the missile speed at detonation. The main reason for keeping personnel
under overhead cover is the longer personnel remain under cover, the less personnel will
require decontamination and will result in less resources required to recover from attack
and restore mission operations.

Figure 2.3. Estimated VX Liquid Agent Deposition Time Following a SCUD Airburst
Warhead Detonation 250 Meters (820 feet) Above Ground Level.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 39

2.5.3.3. Sub Munition Warheads. TBMs may also be equipped with warheads filled with
chemical or biological agent sub munitions. Sub munition warheads are filled with multiple
small bomblets that are released at altitude to disperse over a wide area. This configuration
can deliver a wider range of agents to the target but reduces the total amount of agent
carried. Sub munitions may also be used to deliver agents that are not robust enough to
survive release from a ground burst or supersonic airburst. Although an airburst may
disperse the individual sub munitions over a large portion of an installation, any liquid or
solid agent contamination will be limited to the immediate impact area of each bomblet.
For further information on chemical and biological agent sub munitions, consult current
intelligence assessments.
2.5.4. Secondary Threats:
2.5.4.1. Several significant secondary threats also exist during and after TBM attacks.
Many TBMs, such as the SCUD and SCUD variants, have warheads that are not designed
to separate from the missile body. These missiles often remain as one unit until the warhead
functions or it impacts the ground, although stresses encountered during descent can cause
SCUD variants modified for extend range to break up prior to impact. When an airburst
warhead functions (or if the missile is hit with an anti-ballistic missile), the missile
components (body, fuel tanks, guidance and propulsion sections) continue on a ballistic
trajectory and impact within the targeted area. Missile components from a separating
warhead TBM will follow a different trajectory and will not normally impact the targeted
installation.
2.5.4.2. In addition to potential explosive, chemical or biological hazards, the missile may
impact abuilding or create a crater. Other hazard may be present from the remaining missile
fuel and oxidizer or from the facility or structure the missile hit (e.g., fuel, power lines, and
munitions). Personnel in Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) 4 are protected from
potential chemical and biological hazards, but are not fully protected from the unused or
unburned missile oxidizers and fuel hazards. Depending on the quantity remaining, the
residual propellants present a potential toxic chemical hazard to emergency response
forces, rescue workers and utility and pavement repair crews. These substances may also
cause M8 paper to falsely indicate the presence of chemical agents or mask the presence
of the actual agent. Emergency response forces should follow procedures within the
Emergency Response Guidebook when missile propellant hazards are suspected or found.
Consult current intelligence assessments to determine the most likely hazards from threat
missile systems and develop response procedures accordingly.
2.5.4.3. Security forces, maintenance personnel, post-attack reconnaissance teams, and
others who work outdoors, are most likely to discover craters caused by the impact of a
TBM missile body or warhead. Personnel should treat these craters as hazardous until
assessed by Emergency Management personnel for CBRN hazards and/or cleared by EOD
personnel of explosive hazards. Be aware that vapors from missile propellants may be
present and hazardous. Unless required to rescue injured personnel, do not come closer
than 100 feet from the crater edge or visible debris. If the situation warrants, in a safe
manner approach suspicious areas, craters, and missile debris from the upwind side. M8
paper can then be used to check for CBRN contamination on non-porous surfaces (bare
metal and glass) and also check the pre-positioned M8 paper sites within the immediate
area. These actions will greatly assist the Civil Engineer EOD and Emergency Management
40 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

personnel analyze the situation and begin hazard reduction. 2.5.4.4. Employment
Strategies. Patriot or Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) located within or
near the installation also present indirect hazards to installation forces. Personnel within
the immediate area of these missile defense batteries, such as security forces or repair
crews, may receive little or no warning of a missile launch. A sudden launch may throw
debris that could injure unprotected personnel. Hazards also may exist from falling
components of the Patriot/THAAD missiles that either impact the enemy missile or self-
destruct over the installation. Supervisors shall ensure that safety measures are in-place for
all maintainers and/or security forces personnel. Units and/or functions with missions in
proximity of Patriot/THAAD operations need to understand and take actions to ensure
procedures are in place to mitigate, reduce the likelihood of personnel injuries from the
Patriot/THAAD systems. TBM attacks are most effective when large numbers of missiles
are launched and programmed to arrive at a single target area within a short period.
Depending on the number of missiles launched, an attack of this type could saturate missile
defenses and allow one or more missiles to enter the installation area. Another tactic is to
launch smaller numbers of missiles spaced several hours apart. Although missile defenses
will likely destroy these missiles, this tactic forces the installation to implement mission-
degrading defensive actions and disrupts operations. In addition, some damage may occur
from falling missile components. However, accuracies are improving as threat nations
continually strive to develop or acquire improved guidance systems and longer range
weapons with larger warheads. See Table 2.2 for the Potential SCUD Missile Impacts
by Raid Size (Notional Estimate) under several potential attack scenarios and current
accuracy assumptions.

Table 2.2. Potential SCUD Missile Impacts by Raid Size (Notional Estimate).

Missiles Possible Warheads Possible Missile

Inbound* Limited Patriot arhead
DefenseImpacts
No Patriot Defense Body Impacts**

3 0-1 1 2
6 1 2-3 4-6
12 2 4-5 8-10
18 5 6-7 12-14
*Assumes one attack with 50-50 mix of chemical and conventional warheads, against a
target with a 1000-meter (3280 foot) radius, using a time-on-target employment strategy.
**Assumes non-separating warhead missile (such as SCUD variants) with or without
Patriot defenses.

2.5.5. Defensive Actions and Countermeasures:

AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 41

2.5.5.1. TBMs are not smart weapons and do not seek and identify specific targets on the
installation. Permanent and expedient hardening methods are effective ways to increase
physical protection for people, critical facilities, and infrastructure. Train personnel to pre-
plan actions and conduct "last second" contamination avoidance and protective actions.
When attack warning is received, safely terminate current operations (such as fueling,
munitions loading, and medical care) and take reasonable actions to protect people and
material. Actions may include moving equipment, vehicles and aircraft under cover, and
closing windows, doors, canopies, and hatches.
2.5.5.2. Missile warning systems are different within each theater of operations. The
installation may receive missile launch warning from the Theater Air Control Center or
other ballistic missile defense command and control node. Actual warning timelines are a
combination of events that begin with the missile launch, and end with the impact on or
near the installation. Quick actions are required by each link in the warning chain to
maximize pre-attack actions at the targeted installation. Delays in warning or slow response
by key staff may limit or eliminate the ability to accomplish mitigating actions. Preplanning
for these scenarios and quick decisions by the staff may allow the installation to launch
sorties that would otherwise be delayed or lost.
2.5.5.3. Installation staffs must analyze their warning system and develop likely timelines
for each warning event from missile launch to impact. (T-2). Table 2.2. shows a method
to identify the warning timelines from three different launch sites capable of targeting the
installation. An actual analysis would include the actual or expected time for each event in
the warning chain. These events may show that a window of opportunity exists for the
commander to direct last minute actions to continue missions or protect highly vulnerable
resources. See Table 2.3 for the TBM Warning Time Assessments for Installation
Attacks.

Table 2.3. TBM Warning Time Assessments for Installation Attacks.

Launch Time (In Minutes) to Complete Action

Location Missile Theater Theater CAT* CAT Alarm Total Flight Difference
Launch Detect Warns Receives Decision Red Time Time
and
Blue
Site 1 0 :30 1:00 :30 1:00 :30 3:30 4:30 +1:00
Site 2 0 :30 1:00 :30 1:00 :30 3:30 4:45 +1:15
Site 3 0 :30 1:00 :30 1:00 :30 3:30 6:10 +2:40
Note: Use actual TBM threat information, distances, and warning transmission times to develop
a warning time assessment for a specific location.
* CAT – Assumes Army Missile Defense personnel are collocated with the CAT.
42 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

2.5.5.4. Protective actions for missile attacks are not always as simple as declaring Alarm
Red or Blue (Korean Peninsula). The operations and support staff must use the warning
timelines to develop and practice missile launch responses for likely day and night mission
and support scenarios. Depending on the estimated time to impact, the commander may
direct some operations to continue (such as tactical and cargo aircraft launch-to-survive)
or safely terminate (fueling, aircraft taxi, munitions loading). Pre- planned actions may
include direction through functional area channels to implement "last second"
contamination avoidance and protective actions regardless of Alarm Red/Blue declaration.
Pre-planned actions and coordinated execution can limit the inherent risk to personnel and
reduce attack damage and contamination.
2.6. Aircraft Threats.
2.6.1. Description. A successful enemy air attack against an installation depends upon the
enemy order of battle and their ability to penetrate air defenses and target the base. Weapons
may include gravity bombs, rockets, precision-guided munitions, or aircraft cannon. Consult
with the supporting intelligence office to determine enemy capabilities and weapons systems.
2.6.2. Employment Strategies. The type of aircraft and the ordnance delivery profile will
dictate the specific aircraft attack profile. By flying at higher altitudes, attacking pilots can
detect targets at greater ranges, but attacking aircraft then become more vulnerable to air
defense systems. To reduce that vulnerability, we can anticipate that enemy aircraft will attack
using low-level maneuvers. A low-level approach significantly reduces the time available for
the pilot to recognize and engage the target. Consult with the supporting intelligence office to
determine employment strategies. Commanders will consider the need for installation
camouflage, concealment, and deception measures during the development of the Base Support
Plan, Part II. (T-2).
2.6.3. Countermeasures and Defensive Actions:
2.6.3.1. Theater warning systems should detect and warn the installation of enemy fighter
and bomber aircraft activity and track their flight profiles. However, it may be more
difficult to track helicopters, light aircraft, or remotely piloted vehicles. If no prior warning
of aircraft attack is received, use the missile attack procedures to warn and protect the
installation.
2.6.3.2. The aircraft attack warning process is similar to the missile warning process, with
the exception that warning times may permit the commander to implement pre-planned,
Alarm Yellow actions. Table 2.4. highlights several examples of aircraft warning time
assessments for installation attacks for three likely installation attack egress routes. The
actual analysis includes the actual or expected time for each event in the warning chain.
These events show how long the installation can take advantage of Alarm Yellow actions
and establish an approximate time for declaration of Alarm Red or Blue. Alarm Yellow
actions should be pre-planned and time-phased to achieve the highest defensive posture
possible shortly before Alarm Red or Blue is declared.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 43

Table 2.4. Example of Aircraft Warning Time Assessment for Installation Attack.

Time (In Minutes) to Complete Action

Attack Alarm
Ingress Cross Theater Theater CAT CAT Red Total Flight
Difference
Route Threshold Detect Warns Receives Decision and Time Time
Blue
1 0 :30 1:00 :30 1:00 :30 3:30 19.00 +15:30
2 0 :30 1:00 :30 1:00 :30 3:30 23:00 +19:30
3 0 :30 1:00 :30 1:00 :30 3:30 27.00 +23:30
Note: Use actual aircraft threat information, distances, and warning transmission times to
develop a warning time assessment for a specific location.
2.6.3.2.1. Leaders should identify a distance around the installation that is the
threshold of concern for enemy aircraft. Determine the threshold distance by analyzing
real-time warning provided by the theater and installation warning systems. Consider
the speed of the enemy aircraft, speed and range of standoff munitions, likely attack
profile and ingress routes, status of pre-attack task completion, and the time required
to achieve higher alarm conditions or protective postures. If enemy aircraft cross the
threshold, declare Alarm Yellow, notify the base populace of the situation, and direct
actions to reduce mission degradation. The commander makes the decision of when to
warn the base populace. Actions taken in Alarm Yellow should prepare the base for
attack and minimize the need for "last second" actions.
2.6.3.2.2. As soon as the enemy aircraft depart the immediate area, be prepared to
declare Alarm Black and begin post-attack recovery actions. Maintain vigilance over
the departing aircraft until they cross the aircraft attack threshold. If the aircraft were
observed using spray tanks, assume a chemical or biological attack, and consider
leaving personnel (other than specialized reconnaissance teams) under cover for
approximately 15 minutes in order to allow for the liquid chemical agent deposition, or
droplet fall phase. If bombs or missiles were used, unexploded ordnance or
contamination may be present. Agents delivered by aircraft bombs will settle to the
ground within a few minutes and recovery actions may be accelerated.
2.7. Cruise Missiles and UAS Threats:
2.7.1. Description. Cruise missiles (Figure 2.4.) and UAS are pilotless air vehicles that use
propulsion and aerodynamic lift during all or nearly all of their flight. The primary purpose of
a cruise missile is to place ordnance on a target. UAS can be employed in numerous missions
with various payloads. Consult with the supporting intelligence agency for specific information
on cruise missile and UAS types, payloads, flight profiles, and countermeasures.
2.7.2. Cruise Missile Threats. Depending upon the type, cruise missiles may be equipped with
CBRN or conventional payloads. These missiles are designed to follow a remotely controlled
or programmed course that roughly parallels the earth’s surface. They are attractive for use as
a biological warfare agent delivery platform because they do not expose pilots or aircraft to the
agent hazards; and they have a level flight profile that enhances the efficiency of spray
dissemination.
44 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

2.7.3. UAS Threats. UAS have not been noted as delivery systems for chemical warfare
agents, although much speculation has taken place. To date, most UAS have had insufficient
payload capabilities to make them useful military platforms for delivery of chemical agents.
Unless launched in conspicuously large numbers (large enough to become detectable), the best
results expected from current UAS designs delivering chemical agents would be for
harassment, or, if launched in small numbers, for a covert attack. With recent improvements
in the range, size, and payload capacity, modern UAS may become candidates for militarily
useful delivery of chemical agents. These vehicles are attractive for use as a biological agent
delivery platform because there is no risk of aircrew or aircraft exposure and the level flight
profile enhances the efficiency of spray dissemination. In addition, sub-munition dispensers
are feasible for large-payload capacity UAS.

Figure 2.4. Typical Land Attack Cruise Missile Systems.

AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 45

Chapter 3

COUNTER-WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (C-WMD) PASSIVE DEFENSE

PROGRAM

3.1. CWMD Operations and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN)
Defense:
3.1.1. Air Force (AF) Counter-Proliferation Program includes activities to detect, deter,
disrupt, deny, or destroy an adversary's chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
capabilities and to minimize the effects of attacks. The primary program elements include
proliferation prevention, counterforce, active defense, and passive defense. In addition to these
primary elements, two crosscutting elements apply within each of the four primary elements.
They are command, control, computers, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C4ISR) and C-WMD. This manual covers CBRN defense operations under
the passive defense area of the AF Counter- Proliferation Program.
3.1.2. CBRN passive defense measures improve the capability of personnel to survive and
sustain operations in CBRN environments (e.g. Ability to Survive and Operate). The major
elements are contamination avoidance, protection, and contamination control. These elements
and their subcomponents are an integral part of the Joint and AF CBRN Passive Defense
Program.
3.2. Contamination Avoidance:
3.2.1. Introduction. Contamination avoidance includes all actions taken to minimize the
impact of CBRN contamination on operations. Successful avoidance measures will
significantly reduce and often prevent personnel, equipment, vehicles, aircrafts and cargo
contamination. Operational advantage is gained by reducing protective measures which, lessen
requirements for personnel and equipment decontamination. Measures include limiting
contamination entry into facilities, detection and identification, prediction, marking, dispersal,
relocation and rerouting, and sampling. Review specific contamination avoidance actions,
ensure they do not conflict with functional area subject matter expert requirements. If conflicts
arise, contact the responsible functional area subject matter expert.
3.2.2. Cover and Limit Entry. A crucial part of contamination avoidance is preventing asset
contamination. Develop low cost standard operating procedures to put equipment not in use
under overhead cover. Cover outside equipment with at least two layers of barrier material to
prevent contamination. Use water repellant plastic sheets, canvas, tarpaulins, etc. as locally
produced CBRN protective covers. Remove, safely discard, and replace the top layer if
contamination occurs. When removing contaminated barrier material, remove and fold the
material in a manner to encapsulate the contaminated surface. Place the covers in containers
or plastic bags and neatly stack to simplify waste removal. Note: Place aircraft, vehicles,
aerospace ground equipment, munitions, and bulk supplies into shelters or under overhead
cover. Close facility windows, turn off (or close outside air intake) ventilation systems at time
46 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

of attack, and implement single-entry procedures. Pre-plan specific actions when attack threats
increase. Include these actions, for example, within alarm condition checklists. Personnel can
accomplish easy, last second actions to protect critical equipment once the attack warning is
given. Actions include placing tools, weapons, and equipment under cover, closing aircraft
canopies, building, vehicle windows, and equipment access panels.
3.2.3. Detection and Identification. CBRN agent detection and identification provide
commanders the information needed to determine protective postures and to tailor protective
actions to specific agent threats. Early detection provides more time to implement protective
measures. Accurate agent identification enables selection of the most effective protective
actions (including medical treatment) and limits mission degradation. Protective actions
include medical treatment, and limits mission degradation that results from taking unnecessary
actions. CBRN detection and identification includes the use of point detection methods, risk
assessment, and all available medical and non-medical intelligence assets. Major Command
(MAJCOM) commanders can utilize staff subject matter experts to identify and compare
detection and identification capability gaps when and/or if official Chemical – Biological
Defense Enterprise programs of record lag behind emerging threats and hazards. MAJCOM
commanders may minimize risk and bridge capability gaps by investing in emerging material
and non- material solutions through direct partnerships with government and industry who
develop innovative best practices. Bridge solutions based on emerging regional threats
provides a pragmatic and decentralized approach to improving detection and identification.
They also inform higher headquarters enterprise priorities, synchronization, and other efforts.
3.2.4. Detection for Protection and Warning. Standoff detection provides warning in sufficient
time to implement protective measures before exposure to agent contamination occurs. For
attacks upwind, detection must occur at sufficient upwind distances to provide a reasonable
amount of time for detection, processing, and information transmission. Detection of the
leading edge of the cloud is preferable, since it can give more warning time. Warning of an
upwind attack may come from upwind detectors placed outside the installation or from other
units monitoring the area upwind. There are currently a multitude of technological challenges
to the AF Detection for Protection and Warning strategy. MAJCOM commanders may
minimize risk and bridge capability gaps by investing in emerging material and non-material
solutions through direct partnerships with government and industry who develop innovative
best practices. Bridge solutions based on emerging regional threats provide a pragmatic and
decentralized approach to improving detection and identification. They also inform higher
headquarters enterprise priorities, synchronization, and other efforts.
3.2.5. Detection for Treatment. Detection for treatment focuses on identification of biological
agent type dispersed in an attack for earliest possible treatment. Agent discrimination is
extremely important as some aspects of treatment are agent-specific. Agent sampling and
analysis continue to be the primary means of accomplishing this detection role. Sampling is a
local action, while analysis can occur locally or at designated medical laboratories, depending
on capabilities. Medical personnel collect and submit clinical samples from patients and
perform environmental sampling and detection.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 47

3.2.5.1. Detection for Verification. Detection for verification provides critical information
to the President of the United States and United States Secretary of Defense to support
decisions concerning the need for tailored response in a timely manner. Specific procedures
for sampling and transporting samples to a laboratory may vary depending upon the
installation location and host-nation requirements. Follow theater and MAJCOM direction
for the overall process and responsibilities for the collection and evacuation of samples for
analysis. Reference U.S. Army forensic laboratories and technical escort, which is a
potential source in verification of confirmation testing
3.2.5.2. Detection for Reduction. Detection for reduction means detecting to identify when
contamination reaches levels that enable removal of the protective mask and suit. Note.
Given existing detection technology, this capability may not provide reliable information
Use various types of surfaces when conducting agent detection. For example, some
chemical warfare agents will remain much longer on glass and in shaded areas than on
items such as painted surfaces, concrete, and asphalt. This comparison provides valuable
insight to commanders when considering appropriate actions.
3.2.5.3. Detection for Surface Contamination. Detection for surface contamination is the
ability to detect deposited contamination on surfaces. The results determine the need for
immediate or operational decontamination and appropriate protective equipment. They
may support the need for alternate routes to avoid contaminated terrain if personnel cannot
wait the short time period for agent absorption. Results may also adjust protective measures
for people handling contaminated material.
3.2.6. Prediction. CBRN contamination hazard prediction allows commanders to determine
the probable effect of contamination on current and future operations. Emergency Management
specialists combine manual and automated methods to predict the location, movement, and
persistency of contamination. These methods use post-attack detector data, physical
observations, and automated predictions to identify known contamination and likely hazard
areas. Prediction tools and specialist expertise enable a rapid assessment of mission impact and
a means to quickly communicate contamination information to higher headquarters, joint
service, and coalition forces.
3.2.7. Marking. Notify others of required precautions by marking confirmed contamination.
Marking can significantly reduce the spread of contaminants by identifying areas, vehicles,
aircraft, equipment, or material to avoid or decontaminate (if possible). Mark CBRN
contamination immediately upon discovery. This action warns others of the hazard and avoids
the need for a secondary site visit. Provide the location and type of contamination or
observation to the unit control center if mission requirements prevent expedient marking.
Consider expedient methods to mark first, then ensure further assessment or survey by
explosive ordnance disposal and emergency management personnel. Use (when possible)
deliberate North Atlantic Treaty Organization standard marking methods. Installation
Readiness & Emergency Management Flights must clarify how CBRN Mission Oriented
Protective Posture Zone marking procedures are different in the Installation Emergency
Management 10-2 Plan and other locally developed checklists. (T-3).
48 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

3.2.8. Sampling. Sampling includes field collection procedures that facilitate laboratory
analysis and verification of CBRN attacks. Sampling is a post-attack action that validates an
attack and confirms adherence to appropriate protective measures. CBRN reconnaissance
teams must be organized, trained, and equipped to properly collect, package, and transport
samples to higher echelon laboratories for follow-on analysis. (T-2).
3.2.9. Relocation, Re-route and Dispersal. Other methods to decrease the spread of
contamination and to preserve resources are to relocate, re-route or disperse personnel and
assets prior to an attack and reevaluate after an attack. Reduce probability of contamination by
moving resources to uncontaminated areas, taking routes that limit exposure to contamination,
and dispersing resources.
3.3. Protection:
3.3.1. Protection provides survival and sustainment measures for operation in a CBRN
environment when contamination cannot be avoided. It includes the physical measures taken
to protect people and resources from the effects of CBRN weapons. Protection is provided by
individual protective equipment and collective protection. Commanders use a combination of
individual and collective protection to optimize performance of mission essential forces.
3.3.2. Some protection measures are threat-specific. Other measures provide broader
protection against multiple threats. Theater and Joint Task Force requirements may establish
additional requirements beyond AF minimum standards. Individual protection includes ground
and aircrew individual protective equipment and other specialized equipment. Collective
Protection provides toxic free areas. Collective Protection configurations are incorporated into
hardened or unhardened facilities, added to field expedient shelters, or employed as stand-
alone systems.
3.3.3. Physical protection combined with threat-based protective actions and procedures to
minimize mission degradation provide the most effective defense against CBRN weapons
effects. Determine specific protection measures by the expected threat, unit mission, and type
of resource needing protection. Other factors also affect the ability to employ the optimum
protective measure. They include the availability of equipment, material, manpower, and time
to achieve the desired result. For example, the most cost-effective methods to protect facilities
or structures are to include it as part of new construction or through expedient modifications
prior to the start of hostilities. The next choice is to pre-plan the action, stockpile or contract
for resources at or near the required locations, and add manpower and resource needs to the
base or joint support plan. However, neither method is fully effective if the facility occupants
do not: follow established procedures, maintain system serviceability or operate the system
properly.
3.4. Contamination Control. Contamination control is a combination of standard disease
prevention measures and traditional CBRN contamination avoidance and decontamination
measures. This includes procedures for avoiding, reducing, removing, weathering, or neutralizing
the hazards resulting from the contamination. Effective decontamination operations help sustain
or enhance the flow of operations by preventing or minimizing performance degradation,
casualties, or loss of material. Ineffective decontamination wastes manpower and material better
spent on other, more productive missions.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 49

3.4.1. Disease Prevention. Pre- and post-exposure medical interventions help prevent most
biological warfare agent effects. Communication between commanders and medical personnel
is critical in assessing potential and actual exposure risks. Information from post attack
reconnaissance, sampling, and agent identification is likewise critical to the success of medical
operations.
3.4.2. Decontamination.
3.4.2.1. Purpose. Decontamination operations help sustain military operations in CBRN
environments by minimizing mission performance degradation, casualties, and loss of
resources. They include individual, team, and unit actions to reduce, remove, weather, or
neutralize (render harmless) the primary hazards resulting from CBRN contamination. The
immediate decontamination priority is exposed skin, followed by the protective mask, over
garment, personal weapon, and other individual equipment. Decontamination actions
beyond the immediate and operational level are manpower, time, and resource intensive
processes. Decontamination efforts should be limited to actions that are necessary to permit
mission accomplishment. A more cost-effective approach is to devote resources to
developing and executing an aggressive pre-attack contamination avoidance and cover
plan. Successful actions reduce or eliminate most common installation contamination
hazards and significantly reduce the requirement for decontamination at all levels.
3.4.2.2. Installation decontamination operations will be conducted IAW AFTTP 3-2.56,
Multi-Service TTPs for CBRN Contamination Avoidance. (T-1).
3.4.2.3. Contamination Control Teams:
3.4.2.3.1. Immediate and operational levels of decontamination do not normally
require activation of the Unit contamination control team (CCT). Vehicle, equipment,
munitions, and aircraft crew chiefs lead and oversee immediate and operational
decontamination on their assigned assets. Personnel use the Reactive Skin
Decontamination Lotion (RSDL) and M295 decontamination kits or other expedient
methods to perform operational levels of decontamination. Activate CCTs if thorough
decontamination is required. Consider using this team to resupply unit members with
expendable assets (M8 and M9 paper, RSDL and M295 decontamination kits, plastics
covers and bags, bleach solution) and sustain unit contamination control and immediate
and operational decontamination activities. Also, consider using the team to
establish/maintain the unit contaminated waste collection points and local zone
transition points.
3.4.2.3.2. Units conduct thorough decontamination planning by identifying command
and control relationships, team requirements, equipment requirements,
decontamination assets, and contaminated waste collection points. Develop team
checklists to guide activities. Focus these plans and checklists on unit tasks such as
critical cargo movement and post-conflict decontamination operations. Commanders
will identify decontamination requirements in the Installation Emergency Management
Plan 10-2, Base Support Plan, and/or CBRN Defense Plan. (T-2). Decontamination
information in this manual supplements, does not replace other references (such as
specific guides for nuclear weapon accidents, terrorist WMD, or hazardous material
emergency response).
50 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Chapter 4

CBRN COMMAND, CONTROL AND ATTACK WARNING

Section 4A—Command and Control

4.1. Installation Command and Control (C2) Organization. C2 is critical to a wing’s ability
to survive and operate and allows commanders to synchronize and integrate force activities. C2
ties together all the wing’s operational functions, support function and applies to all levels and
positions of command. C2 enhances the commander’s ability to make sound and timely decisions
and successfully executes them. Unity of effort in complex operations is achieved by
decentralizing execution of overarching plans or via mission command. Unity of command is
strengthened through adherence to the following C2 tenets: defined authorities, roles, and
relationships; mission command, information management, and knowledge sharing;
communication, timely decision making, coordination mechanisms, battle rhythm discipline,
responsive, dependable, and interoperable support systems; situational awareness, and mutual
trust. This C2 structure is designed to conduct and sustain operations while simultaneously
responding to events or incidents that impede air, space or cyberspace operations using the
following entities.
4.1.1. Crisis Action Team (CAT). Led by the installation commander, the CAT serves as the
top echelon of installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defense
operations. The primary focus of the CAT is flight operations, installation security, and support
to other forces on the installation. The CAT includes senior officers from operations,
maintenance, mission support, medical group, and members from joint and/or combined
organizations (e.g. ballistic missile defense, partner nations). Members of the wing special staff
or senior officers representing major tenant units or host-nation forces may also be present.
The CAT supports the installation commander by assessing the situation, determining mission
priorities and defensive actions, and directing subordinate units. Effective response requires a
team effort since most CBRN defense countermeasures and response actions have far-reaching
impact on mission accomplishment and sustainment. The direction provided by the installation
commander and staff integrates actions of all functions. This integration requires direct input
and feedback from other command and control centers such as the base defense operations
center, air defense element, and host-nation or coalition forces command posts. Commanders
will use Joint Publication Annex 3-30, Command and Control, and Air Force (AF) Manual
(AFMAN) 10-2502, Air Force Incident Management System, for designing their C2 structures
to support CBRN operations. (T-2).
4.1.2. Emergency Operations Center (EOC):
4.1.2.1. The EOC gathers information, directs, and monitors execution of the installation
CBRN defense survivability, recovery, and sustainment operations. The EOC collects,
analyzes, prioritizes, displays, and reports information on the status of the base. It
recommends courses of action and executes pre-planned and CAT-directed actions. The
EOC concentrates resources and expertise at the right place and right time to implement
the commander's direction. (T-2).
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 51

4.1.2.2. Design the EOC in accordance with Unified Facility Criteria 4-141-04,
Emergency Operations Center Planning and Design. (T-0). The EOC operates in
accordance with AFMAN 10-2502. (T-2).
4.1.3. Unit Control Center (UCC):
4.1.3.1. UCCs prioritize squadron operational activities and allocation of available
resources. Additional functions of UCCs is communicating between the EOC, other UCCs,
and unit personnel. Staff the UCCs with functional representatives needed to execute C2
actions. The C2 node for a squadron implements CBRN defense functions and deploys
forces in response to incidents or events affecting a wing’s mission. (T-2).
4.1.3.2. UCCs have plans, checklists and status boards to accurately account for and track
status of resources (personnel, equipment, and material), collect damage assessment
information, identify work requirements, prioritize recovery actions, manage
contamination control, recovery efforts and provide timely and accurate information to the
EOC. The UCC must be tailorable to fit the requirements of each unique location and
mission. (T-2).
4.1.3.3. UCC will maintain communications capability, rosters, communications out plan,
etc. to ensure communications with their unit and the EOC. The unit should be able to
contact all personnel to direct actions. Specifically, contact personnel on work detail which
may be outside the reach of base warning and notification systems. (T-2).
4.1.3.4. At a minimum, the following UCCs and/or functional C2 centers will be
established: Operations Control Center, Maintenance Operations Center, Base Defense
Operations Center, Air Terminal Operations Center, Civil Engineer Damage Control
Center, Force Support Control Center, Medical Control Center, Transportation Control
Center, Emergency Communications Center, and CBRN Control Center. (T-2).
4.2. CAT and EOC Operations:
4.2.1. CAT, EOC, and UCC enabling tasks are outlined in Table 4.1. CAT, EOC, and UCC
Enabling Tasks. These elements conduct operations under the concept of centralized control
and distributed execution. Centralized control allows the organization to focus limited
resources on priorities that lead to overall base mission success. Once tasks and priorities are
established, the CAT or EOC delegates action accomplishment to subordinate commanders or
specialized teams. This process achieves span of control and fosters initiative, situational
responsiveness, and tactical flexibility during multi-domain operations. It enables the CAT and
EOC to monitor the status of multiple operations and reduce information and task overload. It
also allows members to focus on primary missions and be responsive to changing tactical and
operational situations. Units should conduct integrated exercises and drills during both
peacetime training and CBRN defense operations.
52 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Table 4.1. CAT, EOC, and UCC Enabling Tasks.

Crisis Action Team (CAT)

Priority Tasks
1 Preserve life
2 Prevent further loss of combat power
3 Maintain or restore base integrity and security
Maintain or restore command and control over ground and airborne
4
forces
5 Maintain or restore primary mission capability

6 Provide support to joint service, coalition and host-nation forces

Direct installation alarm conditions and Mission Oriented Protective

7
Posture (MOPP) levels

8 Provide warning to joint service, coalition and host-nation forces

Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
Priority Tasks
Recommend alarm condition and MOPP levels for commander
1
approval.
Direct forces and monitor status of CBRN pre-, trans-, and post-attack
2
actions.
3 Collect, analyze, prioritize, display, record, and report information.

4 Develop courses of action to survive attacks and restore operations.

5 Coordinate actions with joint service, coalition, and host-nation forces

Develop plans and support major accident and natural disaster
6
response.
7 Support non-combatant evacuation order operations.
Operate the CBRN Control Center and CBRN warning and reporting
8
system.
Coordinate installation contamination avoidance, dispersal, and
9
blackout operations.

Coordinate installation hardening and camouflage, concealment, and

10
deception actions.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 53

Unit Control Center (UCC)

Priority Tasks
Maintain accountability and status on assigned unit personnel and
1
resources.
2 Provide attack warning and MOPP condition changes to unit personnel.

3 Maintain status of zone or sector alarm conditions and MOPP levels.

Direct forces and monitor status of CBRN pre-, trans-, and post-attack
4
actions.
5 Collect, analyze, prioritize, display, record, and report information.
Develop and initiate courses of action to survive attacks and restore
6
operations.
7 Assign, equip, and direct unit PAR and specialized teams (if assigned).

8 Support non-combatant evacuation order operations.

Implement unit contamination avoidance, dispersal, and blackout
9
actions.
Implement unit, hardening, and camouflage, concealment, and
10
deception actions.

4.2.2. Design operations to allow individuals and functions flexibility to shift decisively from
one incident or objective to another. Representatives must process and integrate real-time
information to produce coherent courses of action or modifications to existing ones. (T-3).
4.2.3. Post-attack recovery decisions focus installation resources on lifesaving, preventing
further loss of combat power, maintaining or restoring base integrity and security, restoring
command and control, primary mission restoration, and support to other forces. Devote
minimum resources necessary for secondary missions or those that do not support larger
operational or strategic objectives. This requires the CAT and EOC to maintain a full
operational view, clearly communicate installation commander's objectives and priorities to
subordinate levels.
4.2.4. EOC Director and each Emergency Support Function (ESF) maintains situational
awareness on status of key operations in their areas of responsibility. Each also maintains a
permanent record or log of actions. This log of actions provides continuity between shift
changes and assists in the preparation of daily situation reports. Provide alternate EOC periodic
updates to prepare for assumption of operations in case the primary EOC is damaged or
destroyed.
54 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

4.2.5. Consider several factors when developing courses of action in the stressful and
constantly changing CAT or EOC environment. Consider the impact new orders may have
upon operations previously directed or in progress. Also, consider the real-time ability to notify
all affected units, teams, and personnel. These issues are critical when using progressive
notification requiring each successive link to notify the next link in the chain. For example,
changes in alarm condition or Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) level may result
in conflicting information flowing at the same time within the same communication chain.
4.2.6. Effective upward and downward information flow is the foundation of successful
operations. If information does not make it to the intended receiver, the primary or supporting
mission could fail. Upward information flow begins with an individual, crew, or team, and
moves upward to the UCC, the EOC, and CAT. Command Post incorporates information from
the CAT and EOC and forwards essential elements to joint force, theater, and Major Command
Centers in accordance with AFMAN 10- 206, Operational Reporting. (T-1). The CAT and
EOC keep the UCCs informed. The UCCs, in turn, notify their unit personnel. Installations are
required to include detailed communication flow, process, standards, and responsibilities in
their Installation Emergency Management Plan 10-2 and/or another suitable installation level
plan (i.e. Installation Communications Plan or C2 Plan). (T-3).
4.2.7. Checklists ensure critical steps are not missed and support continuity of operations over
shift changes. Develop and use checklists at each command and control level to support general
installation requirements and functional area responsibilities. Organize the checklists to enable
users to rapidly identify actions under each alarm condition.
4.3. CBRN Control Center:
4.3.1. The CBRN Control Center operates within the EOC construct with manning provided
by the local Readiness and Emergency Management Flight. The physical location of the CBRN
Control Center varies based on location specific requirements and desires. Source additional
subject matter expertise from other specialties or joint partners when available and desired.
Primary purpose of the cell is to advise the installation commander and staff on CBRN hazards,
countermeasures, and protective actions and manage CBRN specialized team operations. The
CBRN Control Center plots and maintains the status of CBRN hazards on the installation,
within off-base areas of operational concern, and at potential recovery installations. The ESF-
5, through the CBRN Control Center, directs the CBRN reconnaissance teams and collects
information from ESF representatives. The CBRN Control Center manages the base shelter
management, contamination control area, and contamination control teams. Another key
function is to support installation responsibilities for theater CBRN warning and reporting and
to coordinate operations with United States joint service, coalition, and host-nation forces.
Consequently, the CBRN Control Center may include host-nation CBRN defense specialists
and provide reciprocal manning at the host-nation CBRN Control Center. MAJCOMs, NAFs,
and installations will organize, train, equip, and operate CBRN CCs in accordance with Allied
Tactical Publication (ATP) 45, Warning and Reporting and Hazard Prediction of CBRN
Incidents, AFMAN 10- 206, Operational Reporting, Air Force Tactics Techniques and
Procedures (AFTTP) 3-2.56. Multi- Service TTPs for CBRN Warning and Reporting Hazard
Prediction Procedures, and AFTTP 3-2.70, Multi-Service TTPs for CBRN Aspects of
Command and Control. (T-2).
4.3.2. CBRN Warning and Reporting Information System (CBRN-IS):
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 55

4.3.2.1. System Description. The CBRN Control Center is the installation link with the
theater CBRN- IS. CBRN Control Center personnel use standard plotting tools to plot
known and suspected CBRN contamination and predict future hazards in accordance with
ATP-45. Following a CBRN event, the CBRN Control Center incorporates information
from unit and base post-attack reconnaissance (PAR) reports, analyzes data, and develops
standard hazard and warning templates and computer models. The CBRN Control Center
also reports CBRN events to joint and combined forces units as required in accordance
with ATP-45 and Major Command or Numbered AF guidance. These tools allow
commanders and staffs to better understand and articulate protection needed against likely
hazards for specific locations. This understanding provides improved force protection with
fewer encumbrances from constant, and largely unnecessary, high states of individual
protection for personnel. Trained Emergency Management specialists use CBRN-IS to
verify information generated by any CBRN hazard model with available field detectors
before reducing protection levels. (T-1).
4.3.2.2. Joint Warning and Reporting System (JWARN) and Joint Effects Model (JEM).
AF CBRN CCs use JWARN and JEM software integrated into CBRN-IS as standard
warning, reporting and modeling programs. (T-1). It provides the installation with a
comprehensive analysis and response capability to minimize the effects of CBRN attacks,
accidents, environmental hazards, or hazards from toxic industrial materials. JWARN
includes software components that enable CBRN warning, reporting, and battlefield
management. It will provide additional data processing, production of plans and reports,
and access to specific CBRN information to improve the efficiency of Emergency
Management specialists.
4.3.3. Hazard Duration Analysis. CBRN Control Centers use the most current AF Hazard
Duration Tables developed by AF/A10S in conjunction with other data available (i.e. sample
and detector results) for estimating the likely chemical hazards associated with adversary use
of chemical warfare agents. (T-1).
4.4. Continuity of Operations. Develop procedures and checklists to maintain unit integrity and
continuity of operations for the CAT, EOC, and unit control centers. Where available, establish
alternate control centers, or equivalent C2 functions. Include manning and redundant
communications systems in planning to maintain unit cohesion and mission continuity. Alternate
C2 elements and systems provide ability to continue operations during failure or damage to the
primary element or system. Update status boards and event logs to duplicate information available
in the primary function. Locate the alternate function a reasonable distance from the primary to
avoid damage or destruction of both functions from a single event. Consider using the alternate
function as the off-shift bed down location for primary UCC personnel.
4.4.1. Attack Warning Signals: Commanders use AF standardized warning signals to
posture installations for attacks, warn of attacks in progress, initiate post-attack recovery
actions, and return the base to a normal CBRN defense state of readiness. The effective use of
a rapid, multi-capability installation warning system is crucial to force protection and mission
operations. Without it, installation actions can become slow and disjointed. Combined missile
and ground force attacks can add confusion to attack warning execution. Figure 4.1. displays
the AF “Be Ready” training aid, USAF Attack Warning Signals for CBRN Threat Areas.
56 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Figure 4.1. AF “Be Ready” Training Aid – USAF Attack Warning Signals.

4.4.2. Warning signals communicate commander’s intentions, direct personnel and units to
take pre- planned defense actions, or notify personnel to take cover. Signals to initiate pre-
planned actions, such as air base defense or post attack reconnaissance, may be specific to
functional areas. Other actions, such as assuming pre-designated MOPP conditions or seeking
protective cover, may apply to the base population. Warning signals provide air, missile,
artillery, and ground attack warnings. They can also warn if a covert attack with a chemical
weapon is discovered.
4.4.3. Warning signals are difficult to communicate to personnel within high noise areas, at
night, and during bad weather. Develop alternative methods to warn personnel located inside
hardened aircraft or personnel shelters, at end-of-runway checkpoints, or performing tasks in
high noise areas. Methods may include use of warning guards, flashing or high intensity lights,
vehicle or air horns, or hand signals. Aircrew members who receive warning while inside the
aircraft should execute their pre- planned actions and alert passengers and ground support
personnel.
4.5. Alarm Conditions. Alarm conditions initiate or limit individual and installation wide
movement and actions. Commanders declare alarm conditions to initiate passive defense actions.
Unless local or theater requirements dictate otherwise, bases where CBRN threats exist use the AF
training aid for attack warning signals and alarm conditions obtained through the installation “Be
Ready Program” (see Figure 4.2.). Alarm Conditions can be declared for the entire installation or
for one or more defense sectors or zones. Alarm conditions, combined with supplemental
instructions through the chain of command, are the most effective way to establish the defensive
posture of an installation. When CBRN threats are present, the commander further directs MOPP
levels and options to provide the minimum level of individual protection for the current mission
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 57

and situation. MOPP levels let individuals know what to wear for minimum protection against
CBRN hazards.
4.5.1. Mission Essential Tasks. Commanders may direct mission-essential tasks or functions
to continue during any alarm condition. Develop standing operating procedures to rapidly
identify critical missions and develop courses of action that minimize risk.
4.5.2. Warning Systems. Use warning signals that are compatible with host-nation, local, or
theater systems. The base warning system must provide effective coverage for all installation
areas. Display warning signal visual aids in all work centers and common use areas (such as
billeting, post office, latrines, dining facilities, and recreation areas). Provide local warning
signal and protective action information, such as a handout, to all permanent party and transient
personnel upon arrival. Transient personnel include aircrew, passengers, noncombatants, and
all other personnel not assigned to the installation.
4.5.3. AF Standard Alarm Conditions for Areas Where a CBRN Threat Exist:
4.5.3.1. Alarm Green - Attack Is Not Probable. Alarm Green is the normal condition of
readiness because there is no active threat of attack at the present time.
4.5.3.2. Alarm Yellow - Attack Is Probable In Less Than 30 Minutes. This condition
indicates attack against the installation or identified location is expected in near term.
Surveillance measures indicate that an aircraft or missile attack is imminent or an enemy
ground force is present and a direct threat to the installation. Evaluate current and near term
operational requirements, decide what missions to continue or terminate, and direct forces
to take actions. The CAT, EOC, and UCCs should implement pre-planned Alarm Yellow
actions to protect personnel and material and mitigate the effects of CBRN attack. Develop
standard actions to execute within 20 to 25 minutes or less of Alarm Yellow declaration.
Individuals who are not performing mission essential tasks or functions report to their
assigned shelter or seek the best available cover. Direct additional actions based upon the
current situation or missions. Assume MOPP 2 or as directed by the Installation
Commander.
4.5.3.3. Alarm Red or Blue (Korean Peninsula). Knowledge of the specific type of attack
allows personnel to respond with the most effective actions to counter the threat. The most
effective installation response to a missile or air attack is not the most effective means to
respond to a ground force attack. Therefore, two conditions of Alarm Red or Blue are used
to warn the installation. One condition warns of an air or missile attack while the other is
used to provide ground attack warning. Individuals and units should assume that a missile
attack is imminent or in progress if sufficient information is not provided to determine the
type of attack (air, ground, or missile). For example, an individual may hear only the words
"Alarm Red or Blue" over a radio or public address system, see a red flag, or see other
personnel taking cover. Without further information or direction, the individual should
assume a missile attack is imminent and take protective actions.
58 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

4.5.3.3.1. Alarm Red or Blue - Attack by Air or Missile Is Imminent or In Progress.

This condition indicates the installation, or identified location, is under missile or
aircraft attack or an attack will begin within minutes. The CAT, EOC, UCCs, and each
individual should implement pre-planned protective actions for missile and aircraft
threats. Evaluate operational requirements, terminate current missions as safely as
possible, and take cover. Where possible, direct aircraft to launch-to-survive or taxi
into the nearest protective shelter. Direct additional actions based upon the current
situation or missions. Report observed attacks. Assume MOPP 4 or as directed by the
Installation Commander.
4.5.3.3.2. Alarm Red or Blue, Ground Attack - Attack by Ground Force Is Imminent
or In Progress. This condition indicates the installation, or identified location, is under
attack by a ground force or an attack will begin within minutes. The CAT, EOC, UCCs,
and each individual should implement pre- planned protection actions for ground attack
threats. All units evaluate operational requirements and terminate current missions as
safely as possible. Direct personnel to assume assigned defensive positions or take
cover. Use the S-A-L-U-T-E format in Table 4.2 for the Report Enemy Activity.
Support Security Forces operations where possible. Direct additional actions based
upon the current situation or missions. Assume MOPP 4 or as directed by the
Installation Commander. Table 4.3. S-A-L-U-T-E format is used to Report Enemy
Ground Force Activity.

Table 4.2. Report Enemy Activity.

Report Area Information to Report
Size The number of persons and vehicles seen or the size of an object.

Activity Description of enemy activity (assaulting, fleeing, observing).

Location Where the enemy was sighted (grid coordinate or reference point).

Distinctive signs, symbols, or identification on people, vehicles, aircraft,

Unit
or weapons (numbers, patches, or clothing type).

Time Time the activity was observed.

Equipment Equipment and vehicles associated with the activity.

4.5.3.4. Alarm Black - Attack Is Over, CBRN Contamination and Unexploded Ordnance
Hazards are suspected or present. This condition indicates an attack is over and initiates
base recovery. CBRN hazards (facility damage, UXO, CBRN contamination) are likely to
be present and yet be marked or reported. Individuals remain under overhead cover until
directed otherwise, perform self-aid and buddy care, and perform immediate
decontamination (if contaminated). Base specialized and unit PAR teams begin surveys
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 59

when directed by the commander. All units evaluate operational requirements, determine
actions required to resume sortie generation, and direct forces. The CAT, EOC, and UCCs
implement pre-planned Alarm Black actions to recover primary mission capability. Direct
additional actions based upon the current situation or missions. Assume MOPP 4 or as
directed by the Installation Commander.
4.6. Warning Time Assessment. Analyze the installation attack warning process to identify
limitations and failures and find opportunities to exploit capabilities and strengths. Warning times
will vary by threat and the real-time ability of both theater and installation warning systems to
disseminate warning information. Analyze the warning system performance for each primary
threat (e.g. missile, aircraft, & ground) to the installation. Use the analysis to develop a chain-of-
events timeline that identifies each primary and secondary warning event from initial event
detection through notification to the lowest level. These timelines enable the CAT or EOC to
develop and practice pre-planned scenarios and quickly adjust strategies to react to attack
situations. For example, installations may receive little (several minutes) or no warning of missile
or artillery attacks. However, aircraft, cruise missile, and remotely piloted vehicle attack warning
times (due to different flight profiles) may be long enough (tens of minutes) to allow extensive
pre-planned actions. Regardless of the warning times, commanders and their staffs must quickly
analyze the available attack information, evaluate the effect on current operations, and decide on
the most effective courses of action within the time available.
4.6.1. Analyze and determine how long it takes to notify the installation population under each
alarm condition and MOPP change. How long does it take to notify 90% of the airbase
population once the commander directs an alarm condition or MOPP level change? Identify
locations where warning signals are difficult to hear or see and take actions to provide
supplemental notification for personnel in these areas. Develop procedures to mitigate
command, control, and communications difficulties in high noise or hard-to-contact areas such
as aircraft shelters, end-of-runway checkpoint, and hardened personnel shelters. Consider also
the effect of darkness or bad weather on notification times. See Table 4.3. for the Main
Operating Base (Notional Example) Alarm Notification Times (Seconds from Declaration) and
Table 4.4. Collocated or Bare Base (Notional Example) Alarm Notification Times (Seconds
from Declaration) that provides a comparison of notional warning timelines for two installation
types: Table 4.3. shows a main base with an established warning and reporting infrastructure,
while Table 4.4 shows how warning timelines may increase at a bare base that relies only upon
deployed assets.
60 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Table 4.3. Main Operating Base (Notional Example) Alarm Notification Times (Seconds
from Declaration).
Primary 50% 90% 100%
Alarm Alternate Methods
Methods Warn Warned Warned
Radio, Phone, Cable ed
Television, Common
Green Giant Voice 30 90 120
Operating Picture COP),
AtHoc
Radio, Phone, Cable
Yellow Giant Voice 30 90 120
Television, COP, AtHoc

Giant Voice, Radio,

Red Siren Phone, Cable 15 15 45
Television, COP, AtHoc
Giant Voice Radio,
Phone, Cable
Black Siren 15 15 45
Television, COP,
AtHoc
Note: This example assumes a permanent installation siren system with base-wide,
public address system, cable television network, and radio nets available. Determine
actual times through installation exercises and evaluations.

Table 4.4. Collocated or Bare Base (Notional Example) Alarm Notification Times (Seconds
from Declaration).
Alarm Primary Alternate 50% 90% 100%
Methods Methods Warned Warned Warned
Green Radio, Runner 90 150 180
Phone
Yellow Radio, Runner 90 150 180
Phone
Red Siren Radio, 15 15 45
Phone,
Runner
Black Siren Radio, 15 15 45
Phone,
Runner
Note: The example assumes an installation siren system, telephone network, and radio
system package has been deployed or is available at the site. Determine actual times
through installation exercises and evaluations.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 61

4.6.2. Evaluate in detail the attack warning and notification process, from theater down to unit
and individual level. Determine the actual timelines for the existing warning and command
and control systems. Develop a warning time projection for each threat weapon system.
Determine if a "window of opportunity" exists to conduct "last minute" attack preparations or
to launch aircraft sorties. Implement standing operating procedures to take advantage of any
opportunities and reduce local warning delays. See Table 4.5. for the Tactical Ballistic Missile
(TBM, SCUD Variant) – Threat Warning Times (Notional Example) (Seconds from
Launch) that provides a notional example for an attack with a SCUD variant. Missile has a
projected flight time, based upon distance from launch site and expected missile performance,
of 450 seconds. In this example, the installation has about four minutes to take additional
protective actions (missile flight time minus warning time). Although the available time is too
short to implement general Alarm Yellow actions (based on voice notification times), there is
time to direct specific actions within some functional areas and for individuals and teams to
perform “last second” contamination avoidance actions. For example, the operations areas may
focus on launching or delaying sorties and sending taxiing aircraft to shelters. Support and
logistics areas have time to direct mobile units to move to cover and fuels and munitions forces
to safely terminate operations. Personnel on the flight line can increase protection by using
those extra minutes warning to place critical equipment under cover and close hanger and
aircraft shelter doors.

Table 4.5. Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM, SCUD Variant) – Threat Warning Times
(Notional Example) (Seconds from Launch).
TBM Flight Launch CAT Potential Declare Complete Impact
Time Detect Warned Preparation Alarm Alarm or Burst
Time Red or Red or
Blue Blue
Planned 60 mins 60 mins 240 mins 30 mins 60 mins 450 mins
4.6.3. Develop a "playbook" approach that outlines likely threat scenarios and standard actions
for each primary mission profile. Include considerations for daytime and nighttime operations
and key responses to alarm conditions. Train the CAT and EOC staffs to quickly adjust
standard actions, when required, based upon actual circumstances and mission requirements.
Planned timing of certain activities is situation dependent. For example, the decision to release
all or part of the base populace from protective positions following an attack is based on a
balance between mission task criticality and force protection issues.
4.6.4. Test the warning system periodically to verify system operation and warning timelines.
Develop alternate notification for areas of the base where the warning systems are not
available. Exercises and Readiness Assessments are a standard measure to test people,
procedures, and systems. They identify gaps in pre-attack plans and preparation. Conduct
limited exercises and immediate action drills to verify effectiveness of warning and notification
systems down to the unit control center and work center levels and reinforce individual
knowledge of protective actions in accordance with AFTTP 3-2.42. Schedule exercises during
both day and night operations. Notify personnel in advance to avoid confusion over exercises
versus actual attack notifications and ensure the exercise continues through to its natural point
of ending.
62 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

4.7. Installation Sectors or Zones:

4.7.1. Concept. The objective of split MOPP operations is to place Airmen in the protective
posture they require for the Chemical Warfare (CW) hazard at hand versus defaulting to a “one
base, one MOPP” stance. This goal is achieved by placing chemical zones that have significant
CW contact and/or vapor hazards in MOPP 4, with the other zones reverting to MOPP 2. Once
a split-MOPP capability is established, the commander can rapidly implement defensive
actions in areas where threats are present and reduce mission-degrading protective actions in
other areas. The need for increased mission accomplishment capability must outweigh the
potentially high-risk of split-MOPP implementation.
4.7.1.1. Some missiles may impact off base, but a CW payload may present a delayed
hazard if the detonation point was upwind of the airbase.
4.7.2. Operations:
4.7.2.1. Prior to hostilities, the EOC must identify installation zones or sectors appropriate
for the base geography and mission (Figure 4.2.). Consider factors such as work center
disposition, physical features of the installation, and convenience for movement between
sectors or zones. If possible, use the same sector or zone identifications used by the Security
Forces to identify installation defense sectors. This simplifies preparation, training, and use
by the base population and EOC staff. It also reduces map clutter and the potential for
confusion if multiple terms and actions are used for the same areas. Once planners develop
the sectors, the installation must conduct training to ensure UCCs and all personnel fully
understand and are able to execute their responsibilities.

Figure 4.2. Installation Sector or Zone Identification (Notional Example).

4.7.2.2. Split-MOPP implementation is a sequential event. It requires a chain of events to

occur that provides the commander with the opportunity to implement the tactic. It also
requires the CAT and EOC to determine mission priorities and provide course-of-action
recommendations to the commander.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 63

4.7.2.3. When an attack warning is declared, all personnel assume the appropriate MOPP
and take protective actions. Once the attack is over and Alarm Black is announced, the
EOC should direct CBRN Reconnaissance Teams and other specialized teams to conduct
CBRN reconnaissance and report their results. The EOC staff, in consultation with the
CBRN Control Center and medical representatives, analyze the post-attack results,
considers the sensitivity of available detectors, identifies the contamination footprint(s),
downwind hazards, and determine what sectors or zones are affected. For TBM attacks
with airburst warheads, the actual liquid contamination footprint may take up to 60 minutes
to completely form. Therefore, the commander must know the means of chemical agent
delivery before implementing split MOPP or directing personnel other than those
performing mission essential tasks, to leave shelter or overhead cover.
4.7.2.4. Following the attack analysis and mission assessment, the EOC will provide each
UCC with the commander's decision and installation hazard locations. Each UCC is
responsible for controlling their forces and limiting movement between contaminated and
non-contaminated sectors or zones during Alarm Black. Individuals are expected to remain
in a shelter or under overhead cover until otherwise directed by their UCC or other
authority. When contamination is present on the installation and movement is required,
individuals do not move between sectors or zones without direction from their UCCs or
approval from other authority.
4.7.2.5. Consider assigning zone or sector chiefs to establish transition points and control
the movement of mission critical equipment and personnel between contaminated and
uncontaminated areas. These transition points should have instructional signs that direct
individual actions. Consider placing individual detection and decontamination assets (M8,
M9 paper, RSDL, and M295 decontamination kits) at these areas and ready for immediate
use. Commanders must plan to control movement of mission critical equipment and
personnel between zones without pre-positioned detection and decontamination assets and
signs due to their vulnerability from conventional munitions employed during the early
stages of conflict. (T-2).
4.7.3. Primary Split-MOPP considerations. Factors are status of the chemical droplet fall
phase, receipt of sufficient CW reconnaissance results, and knowledge of current and projected
wind directions.
4.7.3.1. Premature split MOPP declarations prior to the chemical droplet fall phase
completion is assumed risk. It is exceedingly dangerous to make split MOPP declarations
of “MOPP 2” for areas that may yet receive CW contamination from missile impacts that
occurred off the installation.
4.7.3.2. Not all CW reconnaissance results need to be received prior to a split MOPP
declaration however, sufficient reports must be received and analyzed to provide a better
picture of the type and estimated CW contamination presence on the installation.
4.7.3.3. The primary residual hazard after CW agent deposition and absorption has
occurred will be from off gassing. CW agents in liquid form will interact with wind currents
at surface level resulting in toxic vapors within and downwind of the contaminated area.
Consider wind direction changes likely to occur in the near future as opposed to only
thinking about the wind direction at the moment.
64 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

4.7.3.4. Commanders prepare to quickly change split MOPP declarations due to variances
in wind direction and its impact on the hazard contours. Figure 4.3 below shows some
historical data extracted from Osan, air base, Korea in the spring timeframe. The numbers
on the horizontal axis represent hours after attack.

Figure 4.3. Historical Wind Direction for Osan AB, Korea.

4.7.3.5. The Emergency Operations Center and UCCs must actively track the projected
wind direction(s) in relation to split MOPP decisions on the installation. Figure 4.4. and
Figure 4.5. provide an example split MOPP adjustment due to wind shift.
4.7.3.6. The level of nerve agent vapor exposure remaining in various locations may be
below the detection threshold of the AF’s primary CW detectors. This complicates
defensive actions in the aftermath of nerve agent attacks. It is unlikely that direct readings
of the hazard level will be obtainable simultaneously at multiple locations on the airbase.
4.7.3.7. Weather events can produce temporary spikes in vapor concentrations arising
from sorbed CW agents (i.e. rapid increases in temperature, onset of rain). The probability
of dangerous amounts of vapor transiting from contaminated areas into MOPP 2 zones will
increase during these “vapor spike” periods.
4.7.3.8. The amount of time that has passed after the attack is perhaps the largest
determining factor to consider when assessing whether or not wind shift could result in an
unacceptable amount of people being adversely affected. The danger of wind shift will be
negligible at time periods past the “times after attack” as shown in the Figures 4.4. and
4.5.
4.7.3.9. Commanders should not keep the entire installation in MOPP 4 because of a
concern that wind shift conditions could adversely affect a small percentage of people in
what would normally be considered MOPP 2 zones. It is unlikely that the base populace
could maintain this posture for the days specified under certain conditions, and the mission
would be severely degraded. Rather, personnel should remain vigilant for the onset of early
symptoms and take appropriate first aid buddy care actions. These actions will minimize
the severity of the effects on the small percentage of the population that is affected.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 65

Figure 4.4. Sample Split-MOPP Declaration after Initial Attack.

Figure 4.5. Sample Split-MOPP Adjustment Due to Wing Shift.

66 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Chapter 5

CBRN PROTECTION

Section 5A—Individual Protection

5.1. Introduction:
5.1.1. Protection includes physical measures and Tactics Techniques Procedures (TTPs) used
to protect people and resources from effects of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Individual protection, collective protection, and hardening provide
physical protection. Some measures, such as collective protection and hardening, are threat-
specific. Other measures provide protection against multiple threats. This combination of
physical protection measures and TTPs enable commanders to minimize mission degradation
and provide the most effective defense against CBRN weapons effects.
5.1.2. Standard levels of individual protection and corresponding individual protective actions
are core elements for survival and mission success. Individual protection levels are the Mission
Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP). MOPP levels allow commanders to increase or decrease
level of protection rapidly without providing a prolonged explanation. The commander
determines the initial MOPP level, based on MOPP analysis, and adjusts MOPP levels as
CBRN risks and mission priorities change. Individual protective actions are taken by personnel
in response to alarm condition changes, discovery of unexploded explosive ordnance, CBRN
contamination, or direct attack.
5.1.3. CBRN collective protection and conventional hardening measures further enhance
survival, limit attack damage and contamination, and support mission sustainment. Threats,
unit mission, and resources to protect drive specific measures. Key factors include the
availability of equipment, materials, manpower, and the time needed to implement the desired
measure.
5.2. Individual Protective Equipment (IPE):
5.2.1. Basis of Issue:
5.2.1.1. IPE for ground personnel includes the Ground crew Chemical Ensemble (GCE)
and field gear. It provides individuals with the minimum personal clothing and equipment
needed to protect them from most CBRN hazards. Commanders use IPE basis of issue and
authorizations found in Air Force (AF) Instruction 10-2501, AF Emergency Management
Program, for issuing IPE to personnel. (T-2).
5.2.1.2. The GCE includes the protective mask, filters, over garment, gloves, glove inserts,
and over boots. Also included are a booklet of M8 paper, roll of M9 paper, RSDL (which
is provided by the base medical function) and M295 decontamination kit.
5.2.1.3. Commanders and supervisors must plan for additional specialized equipment
required by some functions to perform wartime missions.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 67

5.3. Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP):

5.3.1. Introduction:
5.3.1.1. MOPP levels for ground forces are protection options. These options allow
commanders to balance protection requirements and performance degradation with
mission requirements. Standard MOPP levels also allow commanders to rapidly
communicate their decision to their forces.
5.3.1.2. MOPP training aid available through the installation “Be Ready Program”,
provides standard MOPP levels for AF personnel (Figure 5.1).
5.3.1.3. Use MOPP levels and alarm conditions to quickly increase or decrease individual
protection against CBRN threats. MOPP levels and alarm conditions are used in
conjunction with each other however, may not always be used together (i.e. Alarm Yellow
does not automatically mean MOPP 2). Higher MOPP levels provide greater protection at
the cost of increased performance degradation. MOPP 4, the highest level, provides full
respiratory and contact protection against field concentrations of CBRN agents. However,
it also causes performance degradation due to increased heat and mental stress, loss of
visual and tactile acuity, and reduced hearing. When deciding to increase or reduce MOPP,
or implement MOPP options, commanders must consider the specific threat, temperature,
work rate, level of task difficulty, and mission requirements.

Figure 5.1. AF “Be Ready” Training Aid, Mission Oriented Protective Postures (MOPP).
68 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

5.3.1.4. Authority to Declare MOPP. The installation commander determines MOPP

levels for the installation. Individuals normally receive MOPP direction from their chain
of command, the installation notification and warning system (INWS) and crisis action
team directives. (T-1). Commanders leverage Emergency Management (emergency
support function-5 in Emergency Operations Center) and Bioenvironmental Engineering
(emergency support function-8) to inform independent factors of MOPP level decisions.
5.4. Task Qualification in MOPP. CBRN task qualification training prepares individuals and
teams to perform tasks in contaminated environments. Supervisors should focus efforts on tasks
that are the most essential for mission accomplishment. They should develop alternate task
timelines or workarounds to prevent mission delays. For MOPP operations review individual and
unit tasks, sort them into categories, and target appropriate tasks for increased training emphasis.
Include consideration for climatic conditions (current or deployment locations) and adjust
requirements to reflect seasonal changes. Train leaders, especially first-line supervisors to
recognize and adjust manpower, material, or task timelines to reflect lower or higher priorities.
Use the following guidelines to identify and prioritize tasks:
5.4.1. Tasks accomplished in MOPP 3 or 4 and require little or no change in performance
(routine and commonly practiced tasks). Most tasks fall into this category.
5.4.2. Tasks that cannot be delayed and performance is severely degraded in MOPP 4. Increase
the emphasis on training and the development of manpower or material work-around. Train
leaders and supervisors to recognize these situations and adjust normal task completion
timelines to reflect MOPP-related delays.
5.4.3. Tasks ineffectively accomplished in MOPP 3 or 4, but can be delayed until the threat
allows reduction to MOPP 2 or lower. Train leaders and supervisors to recognize these
situations and adjust work requirements to reflect lower priorities.
5.4.4. Tasks that cannot be delayed and performance is severely degraded in MOPP 3 or 4.
Training or work-around methods does not improve performance. Identify these as shortfalls
or limiting factors and forward through the chain of command for resolution.
5.5. Forced Hydration. Dehydration is a severe problem when people work in moderate or high
temperatures while wearing the GCE. Properly hydrated personnel not only perform better in
MOPP, but also recover more quickly after strenuous activity. Ensure personnel drink water
regularly before donning MOPP and while in MOPP. Installation Bioenvironmental Engineering
and/or other medical support staff, in close coordination with Emergency Management and the
Command Post, are responsible for associating and communicating force hydration standards into
localized planning during elevated MOPP levels. (T-2).
5.6. Work-Rest Cycles. Commanders will follow the guidance in AFI 48-151, Thermal Injury
Prevention Program, 7 April 2016 for work-rest cycles. (T-1).
5.7. MOPP Analysis and Management:
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 69

5.7.1. The projected threat environment at an installation will not always call for extended
MOPP 4 conditions. During the pre-attack phase, Emergency Management and
Bioenvironmental Engineering personnel can use intelligence information and current weather
conditions to provide detailed information on protection requirements and predict agent
persistence. After an attack, Emergency Management personnel in coordination with
Bioenvironmental Engineering personnel will use the information collected from base and unit
post attack reconnaissance (PAR) teams to identify the type of agents used, likely duration of
exposure, and minimum protection requirements. The commander and staff can then determine
what courses of action to employ. Emergency Management and Bioenvironmental Engineering
personnel can further assist the commander to determine risk and assist units to employ
response and recovery courses of action.
5.7.2. Most installations can execute their missions in contaminated environments if the base
populace is well trained and leadership understands the threat environment. Mission essential
tasks can be completed while wearing IPE or using approved MOPP options. Most senior
leaders know they cannot expect the same work rates in MOPP 4 as achieved in MOPP 0. They
must re-evaluate their ability to meet mission requirements and communicate changes to their
forces. The short-range and long-range consequences to personnel may range from
insignificant (cool or mild conditions) to catastrophic (hot and dry conditions) depending on
task and climate.
5.7.3. High heat conditions may prevent mission execution due to IPE degradation. Use
MOPP options to extend operations, but they are not the solution for every situation. When
contamination is present,
5.7.4. MOPP reduction decisions are among the most difficult to make because of the many
considerations that affect the final decision. Commanders must evaluate the situation from both
the installation survivability and mission perspective. Factors include the criticality of the
current missions, the installation contribution to theater war plan execution, detector
capabilities, potential effects of personnel exposure, and the impact on the casualty care
system. Courses of action should consider trade-offs between short-term or intermediate-term
results and the intermediate- term and long-term effects on installation mission sustainment.

Section 5B—Collective Protection

5.8. Collective CBRN Protection.

70 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Table 5.1. Classes of Collective Protection.

Classes and Characteristics Available Solutions
Class I - Fully Integrated System
Permanent modifications to structures or Hardened and unhardened structures with
stand-alone collective protection systems. integral systems, Survivable Collective
Protection System, Interim Transportable
CBRN filter units fully integrated with Collective Protection System, Joint
existing heating, ventilating, and air Transportable Collective Protection
conditioning (HVAC) systems. System, Chemically Protected EMEDS.
Air dampers control ventilation openings
Permanent airlock and Contamination
Control Area (CCA) integration.
Class II – Partial Integration
Permanent modifications and sealing Hardened and unhardened structures with
measures. partially integrated systems, KMU-450
Partial integration of HVAC filter units or Shelter Modification Kit.
alternate systems allow heating and
cooling.
Air dampers control ventilation openings.
Permanent or partial airlock integration.
Permanent or temporary CCA.
Class III - Expedient
Selected portions sealed by temporary Expedient or retrofit modifications
measures such as plastic sheeting,
barriers, and tape.
Uses mobile or transportable filter units.
HVAC integration may or may not be
employed.
Temporary Airlock and CCA.
Class IV - Secondary Enclosure
Structure unsuitable for expedient M20/M28 Liner System, Interim
collective protection but suitable for Transportable Collective Protection
housing internal enclosures or liner System, Joint Transportable Collective
systems. Protection System erected inside
May allow use of existing HVAC. structures.
Temporary Airlock and CCA.
Class V – Shelter In-Place
Fully enclosed, unpressurized structure. Applicable to most permanent installation
Portions may be expediently sealed, such structures when other methods are
as with plastic sheeting and to delay entry unavailable; applicable to some temporary
of vapor or particulate material. structures with low air leakage rates.
Turn HVAC system off or place in
recirculation mode.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 71

Decontaminate with the RSDL and M295

decontamination kit or 5% bleach solution
prior to entry.
Personnel move to higher floors in multi-
storied structures.
May enable temporary MOPP reduction
or mask removal.
5.8.1. Introduction. Collective CBRN protection is an important aspect of installation CBRN
defense. Ideally, it provides a temperature-controlled, contamination-free environment to
allow personnel relief from continuous wear of IPE. The basic concept for most facility
collective protection solutions is to provide overpressure, filtration, and controlled entry and
exit. Maintaining a higher internal air pressure than external pressure and filtering incoming
air prevents contaminated external air from infiltrating the shelter. The result is a toxic-free
area (TFA) where personnel can operate without protective equipment. One or more self-
purging airlocks provide controlled entry and exit.
5.8.2. Purpose. Collective protection (COLPRO) supports two mission sustainment areas that
quickly erode in a CBRN environment: personnel rest and relief (breaks and sleeping), and
work relief (command and control, medical treatment, MOPP recovery time after maximum
work effort). Each installation must assess collective protection requirements based upon the
likely threats and mission requirements. Specific collective protection solutions may include a
mixture of permanent, mobile or transportable, or expedient or temporary collective protection
systems.
5.8.3. Types of Collective Protection:
5.8.3.1. Commanders should use transportable and expedient collective protection
measures to augment existing capabilities. See Table 5.1 for the descriptions of the five
classes of collective protection. Commanders may use any combination of Classes I
through IV collective protection to meet the requirement to protect the in-place and
deployed base population. Use Class V shelters to enhance protection for personnel that do
not have Classes I through IV collective protection.
5.8.3.2. Medical facilities must have collective protection to enable medical forces to
conduct sustained operations in CBRN-contaminated environments. The medical
commander and installation must plan for degradation of clinical operations and identify
alternate medical treatment facilities if contamination renders primary facilities unusable.
5.8.4. Operating Collective Protection Systems. Assign and train unit shelter management
teams to operate and maintain Classes I through IV collective protection systems. For Class V
collective protection facilities, the teams must be able to configure the facility to provide
maximum protection. The Base Civil Engineer is responsible for training unit teams on system
operations, maintenance, contamination control area processing, facility configuration, and
shelter management techniques and procedures. See Table 5.2. for general actions for
collective protection shelter management operations.
72 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Table 5.2. Collective Protection Operations - General Actions.

Alarm Green
Operationally check shelters with overpressure systems and upgrade configuration to
ready status.
Set up CCA for operations and install serviceable filters as directed by EOC.
Shelters teams without collective protection seal the building, locate the building
HVAC shutoff, and establish entry decontamination station.
Test standby power and check fuel levels.
Report shelter status to the UCC and CBRN Control Center.
Stock shelter with CCA supplies, IPE, detectors, and other assets required in
IEMP 10-2.
Place shelter on standby if warning time is sufficient to place system in operation prior
to attack.
Action to accomplish if the previous condition was Alarm Black.
Shelters without collective protection turn HVAC systems on, open doors and
windows, and ventilate the structure for at least 30 minutes before personnel remove
their masks.
Replenish supplies used in previous operations, refill fuel tanks, and replace filters
when directed.
Operationally check shelters with overpressure systems.
Alarm Yellow
Activate collective protection system.
Control entry and exit.
Shelter teams without collective protection filtration systems shut off heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) and close all doors, windows, and other vents
or exterior openings.
Personnel not assigned essential tasks enter and remain in shelter until directed
otherwise.
Report shelter status to the UCC and CBRN Control Center.
Alarm Red or Blue (Korean Peninsula)
Notify personnel and direct all to take cover if within unhardened structure.
Direct shelter occupants to assume the appropriate MOPP.
Allow personnel entry until the attack begins, then secure entry and exit.
Monitor system operation throughout the attack.
Alarm Black
Report shelter status to the UCC and CBRN Control Center and EOC.
Verify system operation and check available detectors.
Observe personnel for agent effects.
Direct personnel to unmask if system operation remains normal (shelters with filtration
systems only).
Direct personnel to don the protective mask if agent effects are observed.
Direct PAR team to begin their survey when directed by the UCC.
Begin entry and exit operations to support mission requirements.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 73

5.9. Collective Protection Planning Factors (COLPRO). Use the planning factors in Table
5.2. to identify collective protection requirements for fixed-site structures. The guidance in Table
5.2. intends to support but not replace the more technical/detailed information provided in the
Unified Facilities Criteria 4-024-01, Security Engineering Procedures for Designing Airborne
Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Protection for Buildings (10 June 2008). Use technical
manuals or manufacturer guidelines for systems such as the Stand Alone Large (SAL), Structured
Kit Improvement (SKI), and/or Tent Kit 2 (TK2).
5.9.1. There are four distinct categories of mission sets for determining COLPRO
requirements:
5.9.1.1. Command and Control (C2). CAT, EOC, and BDOC.
5.9.1.2. Critical Mission Ops. Aircrew, Sq. Ops, AFE, Comm, Intel & Medical.
5.9.1.3. R&R for Standard Ops. Tent City residents.
5.9.1.4. R&R for Labor Intensive Ops. SF, MX, Fuels, Munitions & CE.
5.9.2. Use a planning factor of 32 square feet per person to determine total square footage
COLPRO requirements.
5.9.3. Commanders will determine fixed-site and expeditionary COLPRO requirements and
identify those requirements in the Base.
74 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Table 5.3. Collective and Non-Collective Protection Shelter Operations – General Actions.
Component Minimum Standard
Military specification filter or
Air Filtration commercial filters that meet
MIL-PRF-32016; spare filters to
enable operations for up to 96 hours
under local threat and environmental
conditions.
Ventilation 10 cubic feet per minute, per occupant.
Class I pressurization (which is 0.30
Toxic Free Area (TFA) inch water gage/75 pascals minimum),
30-35 square feet floor space per
occupant, recirculation filters desirable,
pressure and airflow gauges visible to
personnel in the TFA, audible and
visual alarm to warn of low air pressure
or system malfunction.
Contamination Control Area (CCA) Overhead cover for removal,
storage, decontamination, and
disposal of IPE, expendable
material to support the planned
entry and exit rate, and CCA
procedures.
Allows movement with purging airflow
Airlock between CCA and TFA, timer to
indicate completion of purging cycle,
pressure and airflow gauges visible to
personnel in the TFA. Match airlock
entry and exit rate to support planned
processing over 24 hours.
Detection Detector for monitoring the TFA.
Hardening Location and AOR-specific.
Latrine Capability One per 20 occupants.
IPE Storage in TFA Two cubic feet per occupant desirable.
Food, Potable Water, and Expendable Material Up to 96 hour supply per occupant,
based on current environmental
conditions.
Backup Electrical Power Desirable
Protective Mask in TFA At least one in possession of each
occupant (may be personal mask or
any other mask approved for AF
use).
Food Storage As required to support planned
occupancy.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 75

5.9.4. Units prepare shelters for operation by sealing cracks and holes, closing all doors and
windows, locating HVAC shutoff (may be more than one) and preparing entry
decontamination stations. The innermost rooms of a structure provide the best protection
against contamination hazards.
5.9.5. When Alarm Yellow or Red is declared, turn the HVAC system off. This prevents the
system from drawing contaminants into the building and increasing agent concentrations if a
CBRN attack or hazardous materials release occurs.
5.9.6. If contamination is present on the installation, decontaminate personnel entering the
structure to limit the entry of liquid or particulate contamination. If chemical detectors
previously indicated vapor contamination inside the shelter, personnel must verify that no
residual contamination remains before they remove their protective masks. Once
contamination outside the facility has dissipated, turn the HVAC system on, open all doors and
windows, and ventilate the facility to expedite removal of any remaining internal airborne
contamination.

Section 5C—Hardening.

5.10. Introduction:
5.10.1. Use permanent and expedient hardening measures to strengthen buildings and utility
systems or provide barriers to resist the destructive effects of weapons. Successful hardening
measures will protect people and weapons systems from primary and secondary weapons
effects. Incorporate permanent hardening into structures during initial construction or add later
as a modification or retrofit. Expedient hardening, such as rapid erection of sandbag walls or
building soil berms, is the primary hardening method for expeditionary forces.
5.10.2. Selection of specific hardening measures will depend upon the threat, facility
construction, type of vehicle or equipment to protect, and available resources. Generally,
including hardening requirements into new facility construction or initial force bed down
during peacetime is the most cost effective method. Expedient hardening methods provide
increased protection for expeditionary forces but require a significant commitment of
manpower, specialized equipment, and material. At the lowest level, units and airmen construct
expedient bunkers, earth berms, sandbag walls, fighting positions, and foxholes to protect
people and resources.
5.10.3. Installation hardening is not a new concept. Throughout history, defenders of fixed
positions have gone to great lengths to increase the survivability of vital assets. At most
locations, the scope of initial hardening needs will far exceed our actual construction
capability. Consequently, units must implement expedient hardening measures to protect unit
resources from attacks. Commanders will integrate and evaluate expedient hardening tasks
during installation Readiness Assessments (T-2).
5.10.4. The Civil Engineering Squadron, specifically a 3E3X1 (trainer must at least be a 5-
skill level journeyman), is responsible for training on hardening procedures at the installation
level. (T-3).
76 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

5.11. Hardened. A hardened structure allows the occupants, systems, and supporting
infrastructure to continue to operate during and after attacks. The structures may include a Class I
collective protection systems and typically are constructed below ground level and under rock or
concrete cover. These structures provide substantial protection against direct attacks with current
and projected chemical, biological, and conventional weapon threats for that location. They
provide complete protection against direct and indirect small arms fire. They also provide
protection against the collateral effects (blast, heat, fallout, radiation, electromagnetic pulse) of
nuclear weapons. When combined with standard DoD force protection measures, hardened
structures provide the highest level of facility protection for operations.
5.11.1. Semi-Hardened. Semi-hardened structures allow the occupants, systems, and
supporting infrastructure to survive attacks and continue to operate immediately following
attacks. They may be constructed at or below ground level and include Class II or better
collective protection system. These structures provide protection against the collateral effects
(blast, heat, broken glass shards, fragmentation, shock, and contamination) of attacks with
current and projected chemical, biological, and conventional weapon threats for that location.
They provide complete protection against direct and indirect small arms fire. They also provide
limited protection against the collateral effects (blast, heat, fallout, radiation, electromagnetic
pulse) of nuclear weapons. When combined with standard Department of Defense (DoD) force
protection measures, these structures provide a high level of protection for operations.
5.11.1.1. Splinter Protected. Use splinter protection to protect structures, people, and
resources. When combined with standard DoD force protection measures, these structures
provide a moderate level of protection for operations. Splinter protection allows the
occupants to survive attacks and limits damage to systems, supporting infrastructure, and
resources. It limits the collateral effects (blast, heat, fragmentation, and shock) of
conventional weapon attacks. It also provides limited protection against direct and indirect
small arms fire and from collateral effects (blast, heat, fallout, radiation, electromagnetic
pulse) of nuclear weapons. Splinter protected structures may include collective protection.
5.11.1.2. Siting Consideration. Evaluate the location and natural protection of the assets
in their function. At a minimum, site these facilities or assets to enhance physical
protection, facilitate defense, and reduce vulnerability to uncontrolled vehicle or pedestrian
access. When combined with standard DoD force protection measures, there structures
provide a limited level of protection for operations.
5.11.2. Execution. The most cost-effective method is to incorporate hardening into new
facility construction. Modify or retrofit existing structures to meet minimum standards.
Implement expedient hardening for expeditionary operations or when the host-nation does not
provide hardened structures. Base protection actions on an analysis of the expected cost, degree
of risk, and the expected benefits. Continually reassess these decisions and actions as the threat
environment changes.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 77

5.12. Special Hardening Considerations for CBRN Threats:

5.12.1. Bunker and defensive fighting position (DFP) construction complicates the use of
standard protective actions in a contaminated environment. Many structures are below ground
level and limit ventilation. As a result, chemical agent vapors are concentrated and remain
hazardous for longer periods. In addition, the durable, non-porous construction materials used
to construct most of these structures do not readily absorb liquid agents. Finally, personnel
normally remain inside these structures for extended periods and contamination sources are
relatively close the occupant's respiratory tract. Personnel working in these structures must
adhere to strict contamination avoidance measures and keep the structure well-ventilated.
Continue these precautions even after reduced outside MOPP levels. Use automatic and
manual agent detectors to verify contamination levels within these structures and upon non-
porous surfaces are at or below safe levels.
5.12.2. Unpainted concrete is the material of choice for bunker and DFP construction in
CBRN environments. It provides suitable conventional protection and is one of the best
materials for liquid chemical agent absorption. If using sandbags, use the older burlap bags in
lieu of the newer plastic versions. Burlap absorbs liquid chemical agents at a faster rate than
plastic sandbags. Construct bunkers and DFPs with a 2- to 3-foot overhang for observation
ports and doors. Construct doors with a small L- shaped entryway. Both of these methods
minimize the amount of agent contamination that enters the structure. Use a non-porous
surface, such as AM-2 matting, to construct the floor and simplify decontamination. Avoid
using non-porous camouflage netting unless the tactical situation requires netting. Liquid
chemical agent hazards persist for longer periods on non-porous materials.

WARREN D. BERRY, Lt Gen, USAF

DCS/Logistics, Engineering & Force Protection
78 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Attachment 1
GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References
AFI 10-201, Force Readiness Reporting, 03 March 2016
AFI 10-244, Reporting Status of Air and Space Expeditionary Forces, 15 June 2012
AFI 10-403, Deployment Planning, and Execution, 20 September 2012, Incorporating Change 1,
23 February 2017
AFI 10-404, Base Support and Expeditionary (BAS&E) Site Planning, 27 August 2015
AFI 10-801, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 23 December 2015
AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management Program, 19 April 2016
AFI 10-2519, Public Health Emergencies and Incidents of Public Health Concern, 26 June 2015
AFI 15-128, Air Force Weather Roles and Responsibilities, 07 February 2011
AFI 23-101, Air Force Material Management, 12 December 2016
AFI 25-101, Air Force War Reserve Materiel (WRM) Policies, and Guidance, 14 January 2015
AFI 25-201, Intra-Service, Intra-Agency, and Inter-Agency Support Agreements Procedures, 18
October 2013
AFI 31-101, Integrated Defense (FOUO), 05 July 2017
AFI 32-7086, Hazardous Materials Management, 04 February 2015 AFI 33-360, Publications
and Forms Management, 01 December 2015 AFI 41-106, Medical Readiness Program
Management, 09 June 2017
AFI 48-151, Thermal Injury Prevention Program, 07 April 2016
AFI 65-601, Volume 1, Budget Guidance and Procedures, 24 October 2018
AFI 90-201, The Air Force Inspection System, 20 November 2018
AFI 90-1601, Air Force Lessons Learned Program, 18 December 2013
AFMAN 10-206, Operational Reporting (OPREP), 18 June 2018
AFMAN 10-207, Command Posts, 11 April 2018
AFMAN 10-2608, Disease Containment, 13 November 2015
AFMAN 33-363, Management of Records, 01 March 2008, Incorporating Change 2, 09 June
2016
AFMAN 41-209, Medical Logistics Support, 04 January 2019
AFPAM 10-219, Volume 1, Contingency and Disaster Planning, 9 June 2008, Certified Current
17 September 2013
AFPAM 10-219, Volume 2, Civil Engineer Contingency Response and Recovery Preparation, 18
October 2018
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 79

AFPAM 10-219, Volume 3, Civil Engineer Contingency Response and Recovery Procedures, 07
May 2015
AFMAN 10-2502, Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS) Standard and Procedures,
13 September 2018
AFMAN 10-2503, Operations in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN)
Environment, 06 July 2011
AFMAN 15-129, Volume 1, Air and Space Weather Operations - Characterization, 6 December
2011, Incorporating Change 1, 21 March 2017
AFMAN 15-129, Volume 2, Air and Space Weather Operations - Exploitation, 07 December
2011
AFMAN 32-1007, Readiness, and Emergency Management (R&EM) Flight Operations, 20
April 2016
AFPD 10-2, Readiness, 06 November 2012
AFPD 10-25, Emergency Management, 28 April 2014
AFTTP 3-2.12, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance, 01
July 2015
AFTTP 3-2.37_IP, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for CBRN Consequence
Management Operations, 01 July 2015
AFTTP 3-2.42_IP, Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Operations, 01 July 2011
AFTTP 3-2.44, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Reconnaissance and Surveillance, 01 Mar 2013
AFTTP 3-2.46, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Passive Defense, 01 May 2016
AFTTP 3-2.55, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats and Hazards, 01 Jun
2018
AFTTP 3-2.56, Multi-Service Reference for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Warning and Reporting and Hazard Prediction Procedures, 01 December 2017
AFTTP 3-2.62, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search
Operations, 01 August 2016
AFTTP 3-2.67, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Defense Support of Civil
Authorities (DSCA), 13 October 2015
AFTTP(I) 3-2.69, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Treatment of Chemical
Warfare Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries, 2 August 2016 (FOUO)
AFTTP 3-2.70, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for CBRN Planning, 24
September 2018
AFTTP 3-2.83, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Installation Emergency
Management, 1 April 2013
80 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

AFTTP 3-4, Airman’s Manual, 11 January 2019

AFTTP 3-4.8, Operating in an Improvised Explosive Device Environment, 30 September 2015
AFTTP 3-42.2, Health Service Support Casualty Prevention for Expeditionary Operations,
20 April 2004
AFTTP 3-42.3, Health Service Support in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environments, 26
August 2002
AFTTP 3-42.32, Home Station Medical Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear(CBRN) Incidents, 31 October 2013
CJCSM 3500.04F, Universal Joint Task Manual, 1 June 2011
DoDD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), 19 April 2018
DoDD 3150.08, DoD Response to Nuclear and Radiological Incidents, 20 January 2010
DoDD 5160.05 E, Roles, and Responsibilities Associated with the Chemical and Biological
Defense(CBD) Program (CBDP), 8 September 2017
DoDI 6055.17, DoD Emergency Management (EM) Program, 31 August 2018
DoDI -2000.16V1, DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation, DoD AT Standards,
Incorporating Change 1, 5 May 2017
DoDI -2000.16V2, DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation, DoD Force Protection
Condition (FPCON) System, 2 October 2006, Incorporating Change 1, 5 May 2017
DoDI 3150.10, DoD Response to U.S. Nuclear Weapon Incidents, 2 July 2010
DoDI 6055.17, DoD Emergency Management (EM) Program, 13 February 2017, Incorporating
Change 1, 14 November 2017
DoDM 3150.08, Nuclear Weapons Accident Response Procedures (NARP), 22 August 2013
HAFMD 1-38, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, 01 April
2015
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5, Management of Domestic Incidents, 28
February 2003
JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, 18 November 2015, validated 14 November
2017
National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF), 2nd Edition, June 2016
National Incident Management System (NIMS), 3rd Edition, October 2017
National Response Framework (NRF), 3rd Edition, Jun 2016
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8, National Preparedness, 30 March 2011
Unified Facility Criteria (UFC) 4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings,
12 December 2018
Unified Facility Criteria (UFC) 4-021-01, Design and O&M: Mass Notification Systems, 9 April
2008, Incorporating Change 1, 01 January 2010
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 81

Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-024-01, Security Engineering: Procedures for Designing
Airborne Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Protection for Buildings, 10 June 2008
Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-141-04, Emergency Operation Center Planning and Design,
15 July 2008, Incorporating Change 1, 01 September 2008
42 United States Code (U.S.C). §11001et seq., Emergency Planning Community Right-to-Know
Act (EPCRA) of 1986
USAF War and Mobilization Plan, WMP-1, CE Supplement, (Updated Annually)

Adopted Forms
Air Force Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFI—Air Force Instruction
AF—Air Force
AFMAN—Air Force Manual
AFPAM—Air Force Pamphlet
AFRIMS—Air Force Records Information Management System
AFTTP—Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
AT—Antiterrorism
ATSO—Ability to Survive and Operate
CARC—Chemical Agent Resistant Coating
CBRN—Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CBRNE—Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-yield Explosives
CCA—Contamination Control Area
CCOR—Chemically Contaminated Object Rule
CW—Chemical Warfare
C-WMD—Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction
DAD—Detailed Aircraft Decontamination
DED—Detailed Equipment Decontamination
DTD—Detailed Troop Decontamination
DOD—Department of Defense
DODI—Department of Defense Instruction
DSCA—Defense Support of Civil Authorities
EOC—Emergency Operations Center
EOD—Explosive Ordnance Disposal
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EPA—Environmental Protection Agency

FOUO—For Official Use Only
HAZMAT—Hazardous Materials
IAW—In Accordance With
IED—Improvised Explosive Device
IEMP—Installation Emergency Management Plan
IPE—Individual Protective Equipment
IRMP—Integrated Risk Management Process
JSLIST—Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology
MAJCOM—Major Command
MCO—Major Combat Operations
MOPP—Mission Oriented Protective Posture
MTTP—Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility
OPREP—Operational Reporting
RDS—Records Disposition Schedule
SME—Subject Matter Experts
TFA—Toxic Free Area
UAS—Unmanned Aircraft Systems
UCC—Unit Control Center
UFC—Uniformed Facilities Criteria
U.S.—United States
WMD—Weapon of Mass Destruction

Terms
Active Defense—The employment of limited offensive action and counterattacks to deny a
contested area or position to the enemy.
All-Hazards—“All-hazards” includes any toxic chemicals or materials, biological, radiological,
and or nuclear threats, natural or manmade that warrants an all-hazards approach to characterize
exposures or health risks.
All-Hazards Approach—A methodology to develop emergency management strategies for all
different types of potential incidents. “All-hazards” include any incident, natural or manmade that
warrants action to protect the life, property, health, and safety of military members, dependents,
and civilians at risk, and minimize any disruptions of installation operations.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 83

Air Defense—Defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or aerodynamic

missiles, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack.
Airfield Damage Assessment Team—The airfield damage assessment team conducts airfield
damage assessment to determine airfield operability and define a minimum operating strip for
installation and coalition aircraft to maintain operational sortie generation capability. The airfield
damage assessment team is normally comprised of EOD and Engineer Assistant team members.
Air Force Emergency Management Program—The single, integrated AF program
implementing the mission, vision, strategic goals, and objectives along with the management
framework of the AF EM Program to prevent, prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate
the direct and indirect consequences of an emergency or attack. The Office of the Civil Engineer,
AF/A4C, manages the AF EM Program.
Air Force Incident Management System—An AF accepted methodology designed to
incorporate the requirements of HSPD-5 and OSD guidance while preserving unique military
requirements. Provides the AF with a single, comprehensive approach to incident management.
Air Force Specialty—A group of positions requiring common qualifications; each AFS has a title
and code.
Air Mobility Command—The Air Force component command of the United States
Transportation Command.
Air Operations Center—The senior agency of the Air Force component commander that
provides command and control of Air Force air and space operations and coordinates with other
components and Services.
Air Staff—Offices in HQ USAF below the Secretariat level (under and including the Chief of
Staff, USAF).
Area of Responsibility—A defined area of land and/or sea in which responsibility is specifically
assigned to the commander of the area for the development and maintenance of installations,
control of movement, and the conduct of tactical operations involving troops under the
commander’s control along with parallel authority to exercise these functions.
Assigned Aircraft—Aircraft allocated to a unit by serial number on an assignment order
according to aerospace vehicle distribution directives.
Avoidance—Actions to prevent contamination of mission-essential resources and personnel,
whether directly from agent deposition or by transfer from contaminated surfaces.
Awareness—The continual process of collecting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence,
information and knowledge to allow organizations and individuals to anticipate requirements and
to react effectively.
Ballistic Missile—Any missile that does not rely upon aerodynamic surfaces to produce lift and
consequently follows a ballistic trajectory when thrust is terminated.
Base Defense Operations Center—A command and control facility established by the base
commander to serve as the focal point for base security and defense.
Base Operating Support—Directly assisting, maintaining, supplying, and distributing support of
forces at the operating location.
84 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Biological Agent—A microorganism (or a toxin derived from it) that causes disease in personnel,
plants, or animals or causes the deterioration of material.
Biological Hazard—An organism, or substance derived from an organism, that poses a threat to
human or animal health.
Career Field Education and Training Plan—CFETP is a comprehensive core- training
document that identifies: life-cycle education and training requirements; training support
resources, and minimum core task requirements for a specialty. The CFETP aims to give personnel
a clear path and instill a sense of industry in career field training. It is the formal training contract
between the AF Career Field Manager and AETC for formal accession and life- cycle skills
training.
Career Field Manager—AF focal point for a designated career field within a functional
community. Serves as the primary advocate for the career field, addressing issues and coordinating
functional concerns across various staffs. Responsible for career field policy and guidance. Must
be appointed by the FM and hold the rank of chief master sergeant for enlisted Airmen.
CBRN Defense—Measures taken to minimize or negate the vulnerabilities to, and/or effects of, a
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear hazard or incident.
CBRN Environment—An operational environment that includes chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards and their potential resulting effects.
CBRN Hazard—Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear elements that could create
adverse effects due to an accidental or deliberate release and dissemination.
CBRN Reconnaissance Team—Tactical response team staffed by expert CBRN specialists
(AFSC 3E9X1, Emergency Management) assigned to counter-CBRN response UTCs (4FPW);
detects, identifies, quantifies, and collects CBRN material ensuring mission continuation and force
survivability.
CBRN Weapon—A fully engineered assembly designed for employment to cause the release of
a chemical or biological agent or radiological material onto a chosen target or to generate a nuclear
detonation.
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, And Nuclear Environment—An operational environment
that includes chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards and their potential
resulting effects.
Chemical Agent—A chemical substance which is intended for use in military operations to kill,
seriously injure, or incapacitate personnel through its physiological effects. The term excludes riot
control agents, herbicides, smoke, and flame.
Chemical Hazard—Any chemical manufactured, used, transported, or stored that can cause death
or other harm through toxic properties of those materials, including chemical agents and chemical
weapons prohibited under the Chemical Weapons Convention as well as toxic industrial chemicals.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 85

Chemical Warfare—All aspects of military operations involving the employment of lethal and
incapacitating munitions/agents and the warning and protective measures associated with such
offensive operations. Since riot control agents and herbicides are not considered to be chemical
warfare agents, those two items will be referred to separately or under the broader term "chemical.”
The term "chemical warfare weapons" may be used when it is desired to reflect both lethal and
incapacitating munitions/agents of either chemical or biological origin.
Civil Authorities—Those elected and appointed officers and employees who constitute the
government of the United States, the governments of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, United States territories, and political subdivisions thereof.
Civilian Internee—A civilian who is interned during armed conflict, occupation, or other military
operation for security reasons, for protection, or because he or she committed an offense against
the detaining power.
Civil Reserve Air Fleet—A program in which the Department of Defense contracts for the
services of specific aircraft, owned by a United States entity or citizen, during national emergencies
and defense- oriented situations when expanded civil augmentation of military airlift activity is
required.
Coalition—An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.
Collection Point—A point designated for the assembly of personnel casualties, stragglers,
disabled materiel, salvage, etc., for further movement to collecting stations or rear installations.
Collective Protection—Systems protecting those inside a building, room, shelter or tent against
contamination through the combination of impermeable structural materials, air filtration
equipment, air locks, and over-pressurization.
Combatant Command—A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under
a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of
Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See JP 1.
Combat Power—The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force that a military
unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time.
Command & Control—The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated
commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control
functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications,
facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and
controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.
Contamination—(1) The deposit, absorption or adsorption of radioactive material or of biological
or chemical agents on or by structures, areas, personnel or objects. (2) (DOD only) Food or water
made unfit for consumption by humans or animals because of the presence of environmental
chemicals, radioactive elements, bacteria or organisms, the by-product of the growth of bacteria
or organisms, the decomposing material (to include the food substance itself) or waste in the food
or water.
Contamination Avoidance—Actions to prevent contamination of mission-essential resources and
personnel, whether directly from agent deposition or by transfer from contaminated surfaces.
86 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Contamination Control—A combination of preparatory and responsive measures designed to

limit the vulnerability of forces to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and toxic industrial
hazards and to avoid, contain, control exposure to, and, where possible, neutralize them.
Contamination Control Area—An area in which contaminated IPE is removed; people,
equipment, and supplies are decontaminated to allow processing between a toxic environment and
a toxic free area; the last area an individual can safely don IPE before moving into a contaminated
area.
Contingency—An emergency involving military forces, caused by natural disasters, terrorists,
subversives or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation,
contingencies require plans, rapid response and special procedures to ensure the safety and
readiness of personnel, installations and equipment.
Contingency Operation—A military operation that is either designated by the Secretary of
Defense as a contingency operation or becomes a contingency operation as a matter of law (Title
10, United States Code, Section 101[a][13]).
Contingency Plan—A branch of a campaign plan that is planned based on hypothetical situations
for designated threats, catastrophic events, and contingent missions outside of crisis conditions.
Continuing Mission—A mission where the aircraft and crew transits home station, either as an
enroute stop or to remain overnight, then continues on with the same mission and on the same
flight orders.
Contract Personnel—Any employee of a private enterprise operating under contract with the US
Government.
Control Center—A unit command and control function. Control centers monitor unit resources
and mission capability, and coordinate unit activities during disaster operations. Also called Unit
Control Centers (UCCs).
Cordon—A physical barrier surrounding the incident scene where controls are established to
preclude unauthorized entry.
Crisis Action Team—The Crisis Action Team directs actions supporting the installation's
strategic mission. As the focal point for base-wide notification and operation, the Crisis Action
Team receives and sends orders, information and requests pertinent to the assigned task.
Critical Requirement—An essential condition, resource, and means for a critical capability to be
fully operational.
Cruise Missile—A guided and powered missile that flies at constant speed for the majority of its
route and relies upon aerodynamic forces for lift.
Cyberspace Operations—The employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose
is to achieve objectives or effects in or through cyberspace (JP 3-0). Cyberspace Operations are
categorized as Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO), Defensive Cyberspace Operations
(DCO), and DoD Information Networks (DoDIN) Operations (DoDIN Ops). (Described in JP 3-
12).
Decontamination—The process of making any person, object or area safe by absorbing,
destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing chemical or biological agents, or by
removing radioactive material clinging to or around it.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 87

Defense Support Of Civil Authorities—Refers to DOD support, including Federal military

forces, DOD civilians and DOD contractor personnel, and DOD agencies and components, for
domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities. (DOD) Support
provided by US Federal military forces, Department of Defense civilians, Department of Defense
contract personnel, Department of Defense component assets, and National Guard forces (when
the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and
requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code, status) in response to requests for
assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other
domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also called DSCA. Also known
as civil support. (DODD 3025.18).
Deployment—(1) The movement of forces within operational areas. (2) The relocation of forces
and material to desired operational areas. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or
home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental U.S., inter-theater and
intra-theater movement legs, staging and holding areas.
Detection—In CBRN environments, the act of locating CBRN hazards by use of CBRN detectors
or monitoring or survey teams.
Disaster—Within the context of this AFMAN: a natural disaster, major incident, or enemy attack.
Disaster Response Force—The Air Force base level organization that responds to disasters or
incidents, establishing command and control and supporting disaster operations.
Dispersal—Relocation of forces for the purpose of increasing survivability.
Distribution System—That complex of facilities, installations, methods, and procedures designed
to receive, store, maintain, distribute, and control the flow of military materiel between the point
of receipt into the military system and the point of issue to using activities and units.
Electromagnetic Pulse—The electromagnetic radiation from a nuclear explosion caused by
Compton- recoil electrons and photoelectrons from photons scattered in the materials of the
nuclear device or in a surrounding medium. The resulting electric and magnetic fields may couple
with electrical/electronic systems to produce damaging current and voltage surges.
Emergency—Any of the occurrences listed in the definition of civil emergencies, or other
catastrophe in any part of the U.S., which, in the determination of the President, requires Federal
emergency assistance to supplement state and local efforts to save lives and protect property,
public health, and safety, or to avert or lessen the threat of a disaster.
Emergency Decontamination—The physical process of immediately reducing contamination of
individuals in potentially life-threatening situations with or without the formal establishment of a
decontamination corridor. Note: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) does not require
runoff control when a process is used to save lives or reduce injury.
88 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Emergency Operations Center (EOC)—For the purposes of the Air Force Incident Management
System, the EOC is the command and control support element that directs, monitors, and supports
the installation’s actions before, during, and after an incident. The EOC is activated and recalled
as necessary by the installation commander. The EOC updates the Crisis Action Team with
ongoing incident status updates and seeks support through the Crisis Action Team when on-scene
requirements surpass the installation’s inherent capability and the installation’s cumulative
capabilities acquired through mutual aid agreements. EOCs may also support mobile command
systems and joint information activities. According to the National Response Framework, the EOC
is defined as the physical location at which the coordination of information and resources to
support attack response and incident management activities normally takes place. An EOC may
be a temporary facility or may be located in a more central or permanently established facility,
perhaps at a higher level of organization within a jurisdiction. EOCs may be organized by major
functional disciplines such as fire, law enforcement, and medical services, by jurisdiction such as
Federal, state, regional, county, city, tribal, or by some combination thereof.
Emergency Operations Plan—A formal written document that describes, in detail, how the
installation will conduct operations in an emergency. This document describes how personnel and
resources will be protected in major incident and natural disaster situations; details who is
responsible for carrying out specific actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities,
supplies, and other resources available for use in the disaster; and outlines how all actions will be
coordinated.
Emergency Responders—The response elements of a Disaster Response Force that deploy to the
incident scene after the first responders to expand command and control and perform support
functions. Emergency responders include follow-on elements such as Firefighters, Law
Enforcement personnel, Security Personnel and Emergency Medical Technicians, as well as;
Emergency Management personnel, EOD personnel, Physicians, Nurses, Medical Treatment
Providers at medical treatment facilities, Readiness Officers, Public Health Officers,
Bioenvironmental Engineering and Mortuary Affairs Personnel. Not all emergency responders are
first responders, but all first responders are emergency responders. Emergency responders are not
assigned as augmentees or to additional duties that will conflict with their emergency duties.
Emergency Response Forces—A group organized or available for a certain purpose with
specialized vehicles to support the Air Force mission. Example would be Fire Department
personnel and assigned fire truck or Security Forces personnel and assigned patrol vehicles.
Essential Task—A specified or implied task an organization must perform to accomplish the
mission.
Evacuation—(1) The process of moving any person who is wounded, injured, or ill to and/or
between medical treatment facilities. (2) The clearance of personnel, animals, or materiel from a
given locality. (3) The controlled process of collecting, classifying, and shipping unserviceable or
abandoned materiel, U.S. and foreign, to appropriate reclamation, maintenance, technical
intelligence, or disposal facilities.
Executive Agent—A term used to indicate a delegation of authority by the Secretary of Defense
or Deputy Secretary of Defense to a subordinate to act on behalf of the Secretary of Defense.
Expeditionary Force—An armed force organized to achieve a specific objective in a foreign
country.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 89

Expeditionary Operation—An expeditionary operation is a military operation conducted by an

armed force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country. The missions of military
expeditions may vary widely. Examples of missions of military expeditions include providing
humanitarian assistance in times of disaster or disruption; establishing and keeping peace in a
foreign country; protecting U.S. citizens or commerce abroad; retaliating for an act of aggression
by a foreign political group and destroying an enemy government by defeating its armed forces in
combat.
Explosive Hazard—Any material posing a potential threat that contains an explosive component
such as unexploded explosive ordnance, booby traps, improvised explosive devices, captured
enemy ammunition, and bulk explosives.
Explosive Ordnance—All munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion materials
and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic
missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth
charges; demolition charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridge and propellant
actuated devices; electro-explosive devices; clandestine and IEDs; and all similar or related items
or components explosive in nature.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal—The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe,
recovery, and final disposal of UXO or other hazardous explosive devices, including damaged or
deteriorating munitions and explosives.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Personnel—Military personnel who have graduated from the
Naval School, Explosive Ordnance Disposal; are assigned to a military unit with a Service-defined
EOD mission; and meet Service and assigned unit requirements to perform EOD duties.
Facility—A real property entity consisting of one or more of the following: a building, a structure,
a utility system, pavement, and underlying land.
Family Members—The spouse, child, or other person actually residing in the member’s
household who is dependent on the member for over half of his or her financial support.
First Responders—The Disaster Response Force element that deploys immediately to the disaster
scene to provide initial command and control, to save lives and to suppress and control hazards.
Firefighters, law enforcement and security personnel, key medical personnel provide the initial,
immediate response to a CBRN incident. All first responders are emergency responders, but not
all emergency responders are first responders. First responders are not assigned as augmentees or
to additional duties that will conflict with their emergency duties.
Force Planning—In the context of joint planning, it is an element of plan development where the
supported combatant command, in coordination with its supporting and subordinate commands
determines force requirements to accomplish an assigned mission.
Force Projection—The ability to project the military instrument of national power from the U.S.
or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations.
Force Protection—Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of
Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information.
90 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Force Structure—The composition of Department of Defense organizations, both military and

civilian, that comprise and support United States defense forces as specified by the 90 National
Defense Authorization Acts of current and applicable previous years, and defines the
organizational hierarchy through which leadership authorities are exercised.
Forward Operating Base—An airfield used to support tactical operations without establishing
full support facilities.
Functional Area Manager—The principal advisor to a commander, functional director, or
Deputy Chief of Staff on the management and oversight of all personnel and equipment within a
specific functional area that supports operational planning and execution.
Hazardous Materials—Any material that poses a threat to human health and/or the environment.
Typical HAZMATs are toxic, corrosive, ignitable, explosive or chemically reactive.
Health Threat—A composite of ongoing or potential enemy actions; adverse environmental,
occupational, and geographic and meteorological conditions; endemic diseases; and employment
of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (to include weapons of mass
destruction) that have the potential to affect the short- or long-term health (including psychological
impact) of personnel.
Height Of Burst—The vertical distance from the Earth’s surface or target to the point of burst.
High Altitude—Conventionally, an altitude above 25,000 feet.
Home Station—An airfield where the aircrew usually operates from for day-to-day missions and
aircraft maintenance is available. This includes deployed locations during a deployment.
Health Risk Assessment—A process used to identify and evaluate occupational and
environmental health threats in populations or at locations over time. It results with estimates of
the overall mission impact, recommended control options, and associated uncertainties. Further
defined in AFMAN 10- 2503.
Host-nation—A nation that receives the forces or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners or
North Atlantic Treaty Organizations to be located on, to operate in or to transit through its territory.
Host-nation Support—Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces
within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually
concluded between nations.
Hostile Environment—Operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as
the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct.
(JP 3-0) (US DoD)
Identification—The determination of which CBRN material or pathogen is present.
Immediate Decontamination—Decontamination carried out by individuals immediately upon
becoming contaminated. It is performed in an effort to minimize casualties, save lives, and limit
the spread of contamination. Also called emergency decontamination.
Immediate Response—Any form of immediate action taken in the United States and territories
to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage in response to a request
for assistance from a civil authority, under imminently serious conditions when time does not
permit approval from a higher authority.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 91

Improvised Explosive Device—A weapon that is fabricated or emplaced in an unconventional

manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals designed
to kill, destroy, incapacitate, harass, deny mobility, or distract.
Incident—An occurrence or event, natural or human caused, that requires an emergency response
to protect life or property. Incidents can, for example, include major disasters, emergencies,
terrorist attacks, terrorist threats, wildland and urban fires, floods, HAZMAT spills, nuclear
incidents, aircraft incidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tropical storms, war related
disasters, public health and medical emergencies and other occurrences requiring an emergency
response.
Incident Management—A national comprehensive approach to preventing, preparing for,
responding to, and recovering from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.
Individual Protective Equipment—In chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear operations,
the personal clothing and equipment required to protect an individual from chemical, biological,
and radiological hazards and some nuclear hazards.
Information Environment—The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that
collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.
Installation Commander—The individual responsible for all operations performed on an
installation.
In Support of—Assisting or protecting another formation, unit, or organization while remaining
under original control.
Integrated Defense—The integration of multidisciplinary active and passive, offensive and
defensive capabilities, employed to mitigate potential risks and defeat adversary threat to Air Force
operations.
Intelligence—The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis,
evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas.
Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation,
analysis, or understanding.
Intelligence Estimate—The appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence
relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open
to the enemy or adversary and the order of probability of their adoption.
Intelligence Information—Intelligence information and related materials include the following
information, whether written or in any other medium, classified pursuant to E.O. 13526 or any
predecessor or successor Executive Order: 1) Foreign intelligence and counterintelligence defined
in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and in Executive Order 12333, 2) Information
describing US foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities, sources, methods,
equipment, or methodology used for the acquisition, processing, or exploitation and the results of
the exploitation; and any other data resulting from US intelligence collection efforts; and, 3)
Information on Intelligence Community protective security programs (e.g., personnel, physical,
technical, and information security).
Joint Doctrine—Fundamental principles that guide the employment of United States military
forces in coordinated action toward a common objective and may include terms, tactics,
techniques, and procedures.
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Joint Force—A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or
attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander.
Joint Intelligence—Intelligence produced by elements of more than one Service of the same
nation.
Joint Publication—A compilation of agreed to fundamental principles, considerations, and
guidance on a particular topic, approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that guides
the employment of a joint force toward a common objective ( CJCSI 5120.02).
Joint Task Force—A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense,
a combatant commander, a sub-unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander.
Judge Advocate—An officer of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps of the Army, Air Force, or
Navy, or officers of the Marine Corps or Coast Guard designated as a judge advocate.
Large Frame Aircraft—Any aircraft operating with multiple aircrew positions. These aircraft are
typically used for airlift (passenger & cargo), aerial delivery, aerial refueling, airborne warning &
control, aerial reconnaissance and long range strategic bombing. Some examples of LFAs would
include but not be limited to C-5, C-17, C-130, C-21, E-3, MC-12, KC-10, KC-135, RC-135, RC-
26 etc.. Aircraft types not typically associated with LFAs would be those more closely associated
with the Fighter and RWA categories.
Main Operating Base—In special operations, a base established by a joint force special
operations component commander or a subordinate special operations component commander in
friendly territory to provide sustained command and control, administration, and logistical support
to special operations activities in designated areas.
Medical Care—Inpatient, outpatient, dental care, and related professional services.
Medical Group—The base-level organization responsible for the coordination and delivery of
health care services to eligible beneficiaries.
Medical Surveillance—The ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation of data
derived from instances of medical care or medical evaluation, and the reporting of population-
based information for characterizing and countering threats to a population’s health, well-being
and performance.
Medical Treatment Facility—A facility established for the purpose of furnishing medical and/or
dental care to eligible individuals.
Missile Defense—Defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy missiles, or to nullify
or reduce the effectiveness of such attack.
Mission Essential Tasks—Tasks deemed essential to mission accomplishment and defined using
the common language of the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) in terms of tasks, conditions, and
standards. Service and interagency task lists augment the UJTL to provide a comprehensive
integrated menu of tasks, conditions, and standards which include measures of effectiveness and
their associated criteria of performance that support all levels of DoD in executing the NMS across
the full ROMO.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 93

Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP—)—A flexible system of protection against

CBRN contamination. This posture requires personnel to wear only that protective clothing and
equipment (MOPP gear) appropriate to the threat level, work rate imposed by the mission,
temperature, and humidity.
Mitigation—Activities designed to reduce or eliminate risks to persons or property or to lessen
the actual or potential effects or consequences of an incident. Mitigation measures may be
implemented prior to, during or after an incident. Mitigation measures are often developed IAW
lessons learned from prior incidents. Mitigation involves ongoing actions to reduce exposure to,
probability of or potential loss from hazards. Measures may include zoning and building codes,
floodplain buyouts and analysis of hazard-related data to determine where it is safe to build or
locate temporary facilities. Mitigation can include efforts to educate governments, businesses and
the public on measures they can take to reduce loss and injury.
Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) Gear—Military term for individual protective
equipment including suit, boots, gloves, mask with hood, first aid treatments, and decontamination
kits issued to military members.
Mutual Aid Agreement—Written agreement between agencies, organizations or jurisdictions
that they will assist one another on request by furnishing personnel, equipment or expertise in a
specified manner. Reciprocal assistance by local government and an installation for emergency
services under a prearranged plan. Mutual aid is synonymous with "mutual assistance," "outside
aid," "memorandums of understanding," “memorandums of agreement,” "letters of agreement,"
"cooperative assistant agreement," "intergovernmental compacts," or other similar agreements,
written or verbal, that constitute an agreed reciprocal assistance plan for emergency services for
sharing purposes. Mutual Aid Agreements between entities is an effective means to obtain
resources and should be developed whenever possible. Mutual Aid Agreements should be in
writing, be reviewed by legal counsel and be signed by a responsible official.
Natural Disaster—An emergency situation posing significant danger to life and property that
result from a natural cause. (DOD). An emergency situation posing significant danger to life and
property resulting from a natural cause. Also, see domestic. (JP 3-29).
Nerve Agent—A potentially lethal chemical agent that interferes with the transmission of nerve
impulses.
Noncombatant Evacuation Operation—An operation whereby noncombatant evacuees are
evacuated from a threatened area abroad, which includes areas facing actual or potential danger
from natural or manmade disaster, civil unrest, imminent or actual terrorist activities, hostilities,
and similar circumstances, that is carried out with the assistance of the Department of Defense.
Nuclear Environment—The environment created by nuclear weapon effects (air blast, thermal
radiation, nuclear radiation, fallout, and EMP).
Nuclear Weapon—A complete assembly (i.e., implosion type, gun type, or thermonuclear type),
that upon completion of the prescribed arming, fusing, and firing sequence, is capable of producing
the intended nuclear reaction and release of energy.
Operational Area—An overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms (such as area of
responsibility and joint operations area) for geographic areas in which military operations are
conducted.
94 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Operational Decontamination—Decontamination carried out by an individual and/or a unit,

restricted to specific parts of operationally essential equipment, materiel and/or working areas, in
order to minimize contact and transfer hazards and to sustain operations. This may include
decontamination of the individual beyond the scope of immediate decontamination as well as
decontamination of mission- essential spares and limited terrain decontamination.
Operational Plan—A detailed, written plan used to execute a military operation.
Operations Center—The facility or location on an installation, base, or facility used by the
commander to command, control, and coordinate all operational activities.
Order of Battle—The identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the
personnel, units, and equipment of any military force.
Overseas Installation—A facility or group of facilities at a fixed geographical location under the
control of a DoD component, and other facilities designated by a Unified Combatant Commander,
base, camp, post, station, yard, center, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a
Military Department that is located outside the U.S. and outside any territory, commonwealth, or
possession of the U.S.
Passive Defense—Measures taken to reduce the probability of and to minimize the effects of
damage caused by hostile action without the intention of taking the initiative.
Personal Effects—All privately owned moveable, personal property of an individual.
Personal Protective Equipment—The protective clothing and equipment provided to shield or
isolate a person from the chemical, physical, and thermal hazards that can be encountered at a
hazardous materials incident.
Planning Factor—A multiplier used in planning to estimate the amount and type of effort
involved in a contemplated operation.
Precision-guided Munition—A guided weapon intended to destroy a point target and minimize
collateral damage.
Preparedness—The range of deliberate, critical tasks and activities necessary to build, sustain,
and improve the operational capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from
domestic incidents. Preparedness is a continuous process involving efforts at all levels of
government and between government and private-sector and nongovernmental organizations to
identify threats, determine vulnerabilities, and identify required resources.
Prevention—Actions to avoid an incident or to intervene to stop an incident from occurring.
Prevention involves actions to protect lives and property. It involves applying intelligence and
other information to a range of activities that may include such countermeasures as deterrence
operations; heightened inspections; improved surveillance and security operations; investigations
to determine the full nature and source of the threat; public health and agricultural surveillance and
testing processes; immunizations, isolation or quarantine; and, as appropriate, specific law
enforcement operations aimed at deterring, preempting, interdicting or disrupting illegal activity
and apprehending potential perpetrators and bringing them to justice.
Primary Mission—The wartime mission that is most resource demanding. The only exception is
when a unit has a less resource demanding mission of higher priority, such as a specific OPLAN.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 95

Program Manager—The individual responsible for, and has authority to, accomplish program
objectives for development, production, and sustainment in order to meet the user's operational
needs. Individual is also accountable for credible cost, schedule, and performance reporting to the
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA).
Qualification Training—Actual hands-on task performance training designed to qualify an
individual in a specific duty position. This portion of the dual channel OJT program occurs both
during and after the upgrade training process. It is designed to provide the performance skills
required to do the job.
Readiness—The ability of U.S. military forces to fight and meet the demands of the national
military strategy. Readiness is the synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels: (a) unit readiness
- The ability to provide capabilities required by Combatant Commanders to execute their assigned
missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was
designed. (b) Joint readiness - Combatant Commander’s ability to integrate and synchronize ready
combat and support forces to execute his or her assigned missions.
Recovery—The development, coordination and execution of service and site restoration plans for
impacted communities and the reconstitution of government operations and services through
individual, private-sector, nongovernmental and public assistance programs that: identify needs
and define resources; provide housing and promote restoration; address long-term care and
treatment of affected persons; implement additional measures for community restoration;
incorporate mitigation measures and techniques, as feasible; evaluate the incident to identify
lessons learned; and develop initiatives to mitigate the effects of future incidents.
Recovery Operations—Operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, recover, and return
isolated personnel, human remains, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security.
Response—Activities that address the short-term, direct effects of an incident. Response includes
immediate actions to save lives, protect property and meet basic human needs. Response also
includes the execution of emergency operations plans and of incident mitigation activities designed
to limit the loss of life, personal injury, property damage and other unfavorable outcomes. As
indicated by the situation, response activities include: applying intelligence and other information
to lessen the effects or consequences of an incident; increased security operations; continuing
investigations into the nature and source of the threat; ongoing public health and agricultural
surveillance and testing processes; immunizations, isolation or quarantine; and specific law
enforcement operations aimed at preempting, interdicting or disrupting illegal activity and
apprehending actual perpetrators and bringing them to justice.
Response Task Force—A DOD response force appropriately staffed, trained and equipped to
coordinate actions necessary to control and recover from a radiological incident. The specific
purpose of the response task force is to recover weapons and provide radiological incident
assistance. Response task forces are organized and maintained by those Combatant Commanders
whose Component Commands have custody of nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear weapon
components. Response task forces are not structured to respond to terrorist use of CBRN or
radiological dirty bombs.
96 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Detained Personnel—Detainees who fall into one of the following categories: a. Designated
enemy medical personnel and medical staff administrators who are exclusively engaged in either
the search for, collection, transport, or treatment of the wounded or sick, or the prevention of
disease; b. Staff of National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and that of other volunteer aid
societies, duly recognized and authorized by their governments to assist medical service personnel
of their own armed forces, provided they are exclusively engaged in the search for, or the
collection, transport or treatment of wounded or sick, or in the prevention of disease, and provided
that the staff of such societies are subject to military laws and regulations; c. Chaplains attached
to enemy armed forces.
Risk Assessment—The process of detecting hazards and their causes, and systematically
assessing the associated risks.
Rules Of Engagement—Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the
circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue
combat engagement with other forces encountered.
Risk Management—The systematic process of identifying hazards, assessing risk, making
control decisions, implementing control decisions and supervising/reviewing the activity for
effectiveness. (Source: AFI 90-802; AFI 63-101/20-101; AFI 31-101; AFI 10-2501; AFI 32-2001;
DoDI 6055.1).
Sampling—The process of collecting a representative amount of gas, liquid, solid or
characteristics of one of these, soil, powder, etc. to analyze.
Security—(1) Measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself against
all acts designed to impair its effectiveness. (2) A condition that results from the establishment and
maintenance of protective measures that ensures a state of inviolability from hostile acts or
influences. With respect to classified matter, it is the condition that prevents unauthorized persons
from having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security.
Security Forces—Duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a
state.
Senior Leader—An Air Force service member in the rank of Chief Master Sergeant, Colonel,
Brigadier General, Major General, Lieutenant General, General, or selected to serve in one of these
ranks. A senior leader also includes members of Senior Executive Services (SES).
Severe Weather—Any weather condition that poses a hazard to property or life.
Shelters—Structures that protect personnel from exposure to chemical-biological contamination.
As a minimum, they provide a physical barrier that keeps a portion of the contamination away
from the people inside.
Smart Weapon—A guided weapon intended to destroy a point target and minimize collateral
damage.
Sociocultural Factors—The social, cultural, and behavioral factors characterizing the
relationships and activities of the population of a specific region or operational environment.
Sortie—In air operations, an operational flight by one aircraft.
Specialized Teams—The teams formed from the existing installation and unit personnel resources
to support emergency response operations.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 97

Special Operations—Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques,

equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments
and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility,
conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high
degree of risk.
Special Operations Forces—Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Services
designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to
conduct and support special operations.
Staging Area—A staging area is a place where personnel or equipment in transit is assembled or
processed. Resting and feeding places for personnel, are referred to as staging areas.
Standing Operating Procedure—A set of instructions applicable to those features of operations
that lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness.
Storage Tank—A stationary aboveground or below ground device that contains an accumulation
of regulated substances.
Support Agreement—An intra-service, intra-agency, or inter-agency support agreement for a
Supplier to provide support to a Receiver. It can take the form of a Defense Department (DD)
Form 1144, Memorandum of Agreement, or Memorandum of Understanding. It is used to
document recurring support in order to provide the unit commander with the capability to ensure
resources are expended wisely and to help eliminate unnecessary resource duplication. It can also
be used for single or non- recurring reimbursable support and non-reimbursable support.
Supporting Base—The installation closest to where a geographically separated family member
resides. A supporting base may perform an FMRC for family members requesting government
sponsored travel. All FMRC documentation is provided by the supporting base EFMP-M office to
the sponsor’s servicing base EFMP-M office for processing of all EFMP functions including, but
not limited to recommendations for local clearances at the conclusion of the FMRC, FDIs, and
initiation/removal of the ALC “Q” to/from the sponsor’s personnel record.
Specialized Teams—The teams formed from the existing installation and unit personnel resources
to support emergency response operations. For the purposes of this AFMAN, emergency response
support teams that are part of the Disaster Response Force include the emergency management
support team, shelter management teams, contamination control teams, and post attack
reconnaissance teams. Other teams that support emergency response, but have functional
responsibilities beyond emergency response, are not considered part of the Disaster Response
Force. Examples of such teams are search and recovery or crash recovery.
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures—Applies basic and operational doctrine to military actions
by describing the proper use of specific weapons systems or detailed tactics, techniques, and
procedures to accomplish specific military operations.
Target Audience—An individual or group selected for influence.
Task Force—A component of a fleet organized by the commander of a task fleet or higher
authority for the accomplishment of a specific task or tasks.
Note—Unlike decontamination during conventional warfare activities, Environmental Protection
Agency requires runoff control for this type of process. Also known as thorough or nine-step
process decontamination.
98 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Terrorist—An individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result.
Theater of Operations—An operational area defined by the geographic Combatant Commander
for the conduct or support of specific military operations. Multiple theaters of operations normally
will be geographically separate and focused on different missions. Theaters of operations are
usually of significant size, allowing for operations in depth and over extended periods of time.
Thorough Decontamination—Decontamination carried out by a unit to reduce contamination on
personnel, equipment, materiel, and/or working areas equal to natural background or to the lowest
possible levels, to permit the partial or total removal of individual protective equipment and to
maintain operations with minimum degradation.
Threat—An indication of possible violence, harm or danger.
Threat Assessment—In antiterrorism, examining the capabilities, intentions, and activities, past
and present, of terrorist organizations as well as the security environment within which friendly
forces operate to determine the level of threat.
Time of Flight—In artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire support, the time in seconds from the
instant a weapon is fired, launched, or released from the delivery vehicle or weapons system to the
instant it strikes or detonates.
Toxic Industrial Chemical—A chemical developed or manufactured for use in industrial
operations or research by industry, government, or academia that poses a hazard.
Toxic Industrial Material—A generic term for toxic, chemical, biological, or radioactive
substances in solid, liquid, aerosolized, or gaseous form that may be used, or stored for use, for
industrial, commercial, medical, military, or domestic purposes.
Toxic Industrial Materials—A generic term for toxic or radioactive substances in solid, liquid,
aerosolized, or gaseous form that may be used, or stored for use, for industrial, commercial,
medical, military, or domestic purposes. Toxic industrial material may be chemical, biological, or
radioactive and described as toxic industrial chemical, toxic industrial biological, or toxic
industrial radiological.
Unexploded Ordnance—Explosive ordnance that has been primed, fused, armed or otherwise
prepared for action and then fired, dropped, launched, projected, or placed in such a manner as to
constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or material, and remains unexploded
either by malfunction or design or for any other cause.
Vulnerability Assessment—A DOD, command or unit-level evaluation (assessment) to
determine the vulnerability of terrorist attack to an installation, unit, exercise, port, ship, residence,
facility or other site.
Unexploded Ordnance—Explosives ordnance that has been primed, fused, armed or otherwise
prepared for action, and has been fired, dropped, launched, projected or placed in such a manner
as to constitute a hazard to operations, installations, personnel or material and remains unexploded
either by malfunction or design or for any other cause.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 99

Vulnerability—(1) The susceptibility of a nation or military force to take any action by any means
through which its war potential or combat effectiveness may be reduced or its will to fight
diminished. (2) The characteristics of a system that cause it to suffer a definite degradation
(incapability to perform the designated mission) as a result of having been subjected to a certain
level of effects in an unnatural (manmade) hostile environment.
Vulnerability Assessment—A process that examines a friendly operation or activity from the
point of view of an adversary, seeking ways in which the adversary might determine critical
information in time to disrupt or defeat the operation or activity.
Weapons Of Mass Destruction—Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable
of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties, and excluding the means of transporting
or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon.
Weapons System—Items that can be used directly by the Armed Forces to carry out combat
missions.
100 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Attachment 2
PRE-CONFLICT, ATTACK RESPONSE, AND POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS

A2.1. This chapter contains three sections that provide common actions and considerations
for wartime operations. Section A2A covers pre-conflict actions and preparedness; section A2B
lists attack actions. It provides pre-attack and post-attack actions for alarm conditions Green and
Yellow, trans- attack actions for Alarm Red or Blue (Korean Peninsula), and post-attack actions
to accomplish in Alarm Black. Section A2C provides post-conflict actions to support reconstitution
after hostilities cease.

Section A2A—Pre-Conflict

A2.2. Introduction:
A2.2.1. In-place and deployed forces must be prepared to conduct combat operations as
required by Air Force (AF), theater, or Major Command (MAJCOM) directives. Pre-conflict
actions prepare forces for operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
(CBRN) threat areas. These actions require a readiness strategy designed to train and equip
forces to counter the expected threats. This strategy includes training and equipping personnel,
identifying shortfalls and limiting factors, and developing or reviewing base and joint support
plans. Use existing unit and installation-level exercises and Readiness Assessments to
compliment training requirements, emphasize airman common core skills, and focus on team
and unit task integration. If unit and/or installation exercises aren’t already being conducted,
then those locations are accepting levels of risk beyond what the AF as an enterprise is willing
to accept. Include exercise objectives to evaluate leadership effectiveness and assess unit
readiness.
A2.2.2. When a crisis or conflict arises, mobility operations and force deployments begin. In-
place forces will begin their transition to wartime operations and prepare to accept and bed
down the deploying forces. These wartime operations build upon deliberate planning
assumptions and focus efforts on the current threat, situation, and mission. Pre-, trans-, and
post-attack actions support transition to wartime operations, survival, recovery, and mission
sustainment. Successful conflict termination is followed by an orderly transition of forces from
combat to post-conflict operations.
A2.2.3. Effective wartime operations require coordinated and integrated actions at all levels.
When appropriate, the actions within this chapter identify one or more responsibility levels for
execution. At the highest level, the Crisis Action Team (CAT) and Emergency Operations
Center (EOC) direct installation-level actions to maintain overall mission focus and operations
tempo. At the intermediate level, the unit commander directs actions through their unit control
center, subordinate work centers, and team leaders. At the lowest level are actions that are the
responsibility of each Airman. This separation by level allows for rapid identification of both
tasks and responsibilities. It also supports and simplifies the development and integration of
installation and unit standard operating procedures and execution checklists.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 101

A2.3. Plans and Training:

A2.3.1. Identify and train deploying or in-place military, Department of Defense (DoD)
civilian, contract, and host-nation personnel who have not received CBRN Defense training
within the previous 18 months and In accordance with (IAW) AFI 10-2501. Train personnel,
including those TDY and transient, to accomplish last-second contamination avoidance actions
and seek overhead cover and physical protection prior to attacks.
A2.3.2. Identify and train other non-combatants at overseas locations in accordance with
theater or Department of State directives.
A2.3.3. Form the Installation Threat Working Group. Assess the current CBRN threat at both
home station and the deployment location.
A2.3.4. Review the IEMP 10-2 and the base or joint support plan for each potential deployed
and transient location. Ensure plans include the procedures, manpower, and material to enable
an installation to accomplish the tasks in Table 1.2. Coordinate with the plan OPR and advise
the reception base or transient location of unique support requirements. Where possible,
conduct a site survey at each deployment location.
A2.3.5. Develop plans and standing operating procedures to protect sortie generation and
strategic airlift throughput capability. Include procedures for cross-functional actions and
support.
A2.3.6. Identify CBRN manpower and material support requirements beyond unit type code
(UTC) requirements within host-nation agreements and inter-service support agreements.
Include support provided by the host-nation and support provided to the host-nation at both the
installation and unit level.
A2.3.7. Identify and provide collective protection spaces for in-place and deployed Air Force
personnel as required by theater or MAJCOM guidance. If theater or MAJCOM guidance is
not provided, plan to provide rest and relief collective protection for at least 30 percent of the
force and toxic free area rest and relief for at least 20 percent of the force per shift. Use any
combination of Class I-IV transportable, fixed facility, or expedient collective protection
systems. Include additional space, if required, to protect transient aircrew and passengers. For
planning, assume collective protection shelters and toxic free areas used for rest and relief will
operate two twelve-hour shifts and provide the capability to protect at least 50 percent (30
percent with collective protection, 20 percent with toxic free areas) of the installation
population per shift. Consider adding additional capability to account for system attritions.
Plan to sustain this capability for up to 96 hours (continuous or 12-hour segments) within a 30-
day period.
A2.3.8. Identify and provide contamination control area (CCA) capability for in-place and
deployed Air Force personnel as required by theater or MAJCOM guidance. If theater or
MAJCOM guidance is not provided, plan to process at least 20 percent of the installation
population during a 24-hour period. Include additional capability, if required, for transient
aircrew and passengers. Reduce the CCA processing requirements by the number of personnel
that will use Class I through IV collective protection CCA. Where feasible, include procedures
102 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

to rapidly process minimally injured (ambulatory) personnel through non-medical CCA. This
speeds access to medical treatment and reduces the burden upon medical decontamination
teams. For planning, assume the CCA will operate two twelve-hour shifts and provide the
capability to process at least 10 percent of the installation population per shift. Consider adding
additional capability to account for system attritions and CCA surge processing capability.
Plan to sustain this capability for up to 96 hours (continuous or 12-hour segments) within a 30-
day period.
A2.3.9. Identify CBRN augmentation manpower needs for installation and unit teams. Assign
and train personnel. Requirements may include contamination control area, post-attack
reconnaissance, shelter management, and command and control teams. Deliberate planning
guidelines for identifying specialized team and augmentation support for CBRN defense will
be included in the BSP Part II, Chapter 11, CBRN Defense Plan. (T-2).
A2.3.10. Ensure the installation has identified an effective defense sector and CBRN zone
plan. Train the base populace and command and control elements to execute these operations.
A2.3.11. Consolidate multiple planning requirements into existing plans or documents
whenever possible. For example, include hardening, dispersal, and contamination avoidance
cover planning in the IEMP 10-2 and the base or joint support plan.
A2.4. Material:
A2.4.1. Identify the minimum theater, MAJCOM, and local requirements for CBRN
equipment. Develop plans and procedures to obtain the quantity of material needed to meet
minimum requirements and sustain operations for up to 30 days.
A2.4.2. Issue Individual Protective Equipment (IPE) and medical pre-treatment materials and
nerve agent antidotes to and train DoD civilian and contract personnel (in accordance with
contract) deploying to or stationed in CBRN threat areas. Issue IPE to and train host-nation
personnel in CBRN threat areas as required by theater or MAJCOM guidance. Direct personnel
to inspect their equipment to identify deficiencies and provide assistance to resolve
discrepancies. Do not issue equipment to deploying personnel that will reach shelf-life limits
within 180 days of the deployment date. Identify shortages and unresolved deficiencies to
higher headquarters.
A2.4.3. Verify individuals have completed mask-fit training.
A2.4.4. Verify individuals have required eyeglasses and protective mask inserts. Correct
deficiencies.
A2.4.5. Protect bulk stored or palletized IPE and CBRN equipment from weather,
contamination, abuse, and theft. Double-wrap with plastic tarps or contamination avoidance
covers. Periodically check for damage.
A2.4.6. Stockpile or plan to deploy materials that are essential for plan and mission execution.
Contamination control items must be available at the in-place or deployment location. This
includes items such as: bulk plastic sheeting, contamination avoidance covers,
decontamination solutions, or other approved decontamination products or systems. Available
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 103

options include pre-positioning, War Reserve Material, unique contamination-control UTCs,

and established unit-level UTCs. Periodically review these requirements for the appropriate
type, quantity, and procedures to ensure material serviceability. Stockpiles should be
convenient to their point of use, configured for rapid dispersal to improve survivability, and
secure from pilferage.
A2.5. Medical:
A2.5.1. Verify individuals are medically qualified to deploy.
A2.5.2. Ensure individuals have received all required immunizations.
A2.5.3. Review medical intelligence sources for CBRN threats and treatment methods.

Section A2B—Attack

A2.6. Overview. Pre-attack actions begin upon receipt of the mobility warning order or when the
in- place forces are directed to transition to wartime operations. Pre-attack action executed during
Alarm Green and Alarm Yellow prepares the installation for attack. Trans-attack actions focus
primarily upon individual and weapons system survival. Post-attack actions focus upon saving
lives, detecting and mitigating hazards, mission restoration, and sustainment. Actions within any
of the attack phases may be a continuation or refinement of actions initiated during earlier
operations. If attacks have already occurred, priority restoration operations will continue when
Alarm Green is declared. The installation will also replenish, repair, or replace lower priority
resources expended, damaged, or destroyed in previous attacks or operations. Alarm Green -
Attack is Not Probable:
A2.6.1. Update the current CBRN threat intelligence information. Review current intelligence
information every 12 hours (or as new information is available). Review attack reports from
other theater locations to determine enemy behavior and tactics.
A2.6.2. Upon initial declaration, recall forces and activate the CAT, EOC, and unit control
centers. Direct 24-hour operations for primary and alternate command and control functions.
Review standard operating procedures and conduct action drills for likely threat and mission
scenarios. Identify time- phased actions by threat, mission priority, and the availability of
resources. Initial CBRN defense priorities should focus on attack detection and warning,
protection, and mitigation of specific threats and threat weapon systems. Follow-on priorities
include recovery, mission sustainment, defense enhancements, and maintenance of existing
capabilities.
A2.6.3. Contact the theater or joint force agency responsible for air, ground, and missile attack
warning and defense. Verify the procedures and timelines for how the installation receives
theater missile, aircraft, and ground forces attack warning and how the installation reports
attacks. Identify each primary warning point and determine the time required to warn the
installation under each likely attack scenario. Identify secondary warning methods and plan
for 24-hour coverage. Test both the primary and secondary warning methods and procedures.
104 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

A2.6.4. Review installation warning signals and alarm conditions. Provide visual aids and
current information to each unit control centers, the base population, and all assigned, attached,
coalition, and host-nation forces. Develop multilingual visual aids and public address systems
announcements. Include warning procedures for geographically separated units, non-
combatants, and enemy prisoners of war.
A2.6.5. Develop command and control system procedures to rapidly receive notice of TBM
launch, adjust mission focus, and disseminate warning to all base personnel.
A2.6.6. Verify the operation and coverage of the base warning system. Verify the actual times
required to notify the installation population under each warning method. Commanders will
verify the Installation Notification and Warning System (INWS) is able to provide attack
warning and notification IAW DoDI 6055.17. (T-0).
A2.6.7. Implement MOPP operations based upon the current threat. Consult with Emergency
Management and Medical personnel to determine the projected MOPP, work-rest cycles, and
hydration standards for the next 24-hour period. Notify the base populace and re-evaluate every
12 hours or when climatic conditions significantly change. Determine the need for MOPP
options and direct when appropriate. Based upon threat, direct personnel to wear field gear and
personal body armor (if issued) in addition to the current MOPP. On a case-by-case basis,
delegate MOPP authority to subordinate commanders. Direct personnel who wear contact
lenses to remove them and wear spectacles or spectacle inserts.
A2.6.8. Implement the installation zones or sector plan to support the movement of
contaminated assets (people and equipment) between zones or sectors. Identify critical post
attack recovery teams (EOD, airfield damage assessment, building damage assessment, CBRN
reconnaissance, and firefighting) and sector or zone crossing procedures to facilitate quick
movement in support of post attack recovery operations. UCCs must ensure that personnel
moving from contaminated zones or sectors to uncontaminated zones or sectors do not
inadvertently reduce MOPP when split-MOPP operations are executed.
A2.6.9. If the previous alarm condition was Alarm Red/Blue or Black, re-evaluate the status
of protective actions. Replenish material expended during contamination control or
decontamination operations. Redistribute material, such as IPE and nerve agent antidotes, to
support priority missions or units with high usage rates. Take action to replace casualties.
Review previously reported damage. Verify damage, contamination, and UXO reports were
received and action is complete or underway to resolve the situation. Initiate action to collect
and dispose of contaminated waste, unclaimed weapons and ammunition, and UXO that is
declared safe for movement to holding areas. Prepare a written record that identifies the
location of previously contaminated areas, unrecovered human remains, contaminated waste
burial sites, missile and bomb craters, and unrecovered UXO.
A2.6.10. Review the probable CBRN attack threat scenarios and actions with Security Forces,
Emergency Management, and intelligence personnel at each shift change. Review the status of
planned and in-progress medical pretreatments.
A2.6.11. Direct individuals to keep their canteens full at all times. Direct units to store potable
water within unit work areas to support unit operations for a minimum of 24-hours without
resupply. Direct commanders and supervisors to enforce hydration requirements.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 105

A2.6.12. Develop and implement an installation Ground Sector and CBRN zone plan. Practice
likely post-attack scenarios with command and control elements. Ensure unit control centers
understand their responsibility to maintain control of their personnel when they enter or exit
contaminated areas. Provide zone or sector information or maps to each unit control center and
all assigned, attached, coalition, and host-nation command and control centers.
A2.6.13. Evaluate installation medical treatment capabilities based on the current threat and
brief the commander and staff. Establish procedures for casualty collection. Identify casualty
collection points (CCP) and notify each unit control center, the base population, and all
assigned, attached, coalition, and host-nation forces. Consider collocating the CCP with the
CCA.
A2.6.14. Establish base mortuary procedures for processing contaminated and
uncontaminated remains. Identify and staff the mortuary collection point. Identify and prepare
sites for temporary interment of human remains. Provide the information to the EOC, each
UCC, the base population, and all assigned, attached, coalition, and host-nation forces.
A2.6.15. Activate CBRN specialized teams. Assign personnel where needed to bring teams
up to 100 percent of required manning for 24-hour operations. Direct responsible units to verify
team material is serviceable and operators are proficient. Conduct team drills and training to
meet local proficiency standards.
A2.6.16. Maintain watch for covert attack indications. Periodically remind personnel to
remain observant for signs of a covert or suspicious activity. Provide specific information on
threats, if available.
A2.6.17. Increase protection for food and water supplies. Direct units to store a 24-hour supply
of Meals, Ready to Eat (MRE) within their unit area. If CBRN attacks have occurred
previously, consider the need to use uncontaminated MRE or packaged foods and bottled water
until food service supplies are determined to be uncontaminated.
A2.6.18. Develop or implement the installation CCA plan. Identify primary and alternate CCA
on-base locations. The CCA (including Classes I through IV collective protection shelter
capability) must be able to process the required percentage of the installation population over
a 24-hour period.
106 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Attachment 3
CBRN POST-ATTACK RECONNAISSANCE

A3.1. Mission. Post-attack reconnaissance (PAR) is a base-wide effort that incorporates an

integrated network of unit control centers, protective shelters, defensive fighting positions, and
specialized teams to report information to the Unit Control Center (UCC) and EOC. PAR includes
those deliberate individual, specialized team, and unit actions taken before and after an attack to
assess damage and report status to the chain of command. PAR operations provide commanders
at each level with a rapid means locating casualties, fires, contamination, and unexploded ordnance
(UXO); identifying and marking hazards; and determining status of assessing damage to facilities
and, or equipment in unit areas. Commanders and staffs use information collected during PAR to
determine the need for and priority to conduct recovery operations, such as determining the
Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) level(s), firefighting, casualty treatment, UXO
removal (safing), rapid runway repair, and facility restoration.
A3.2. Operations. The responsibility for post-attack assessment does not rest with any single
organization or specialized team, but with every individual assigned to an installation. Unit and
base teams provide reconnaissance for specific unit areas while individuals provide information
on activities within their immediate area. Accurate and timely post-attack reporting allows the
UCC and EOC to assess the total status of mission resources and assign recovery forces to respond
where they are most effective. Actions such as marking hazards and notifying people within the
area of post-attack hazards prevents or minimizes further damage, injury, or the spread of
contamination. Just as important as reporting actual damage or contamination is reporting that no
damage or contamination has occurred.
A3.3. Airman (Individual) PAR Actions. Individual actions are normally limited to a person’s
immediate work area, assigned equipment, or vehicle. See Table A3.1 for the Post-Attack
Reconnaissance Enabling Tasks that summarizes PAR enabling tasks and responsibilities for pre-
attack preparations and post-attack actions. When directed to leave their shelter or protected areas,
individuals should survey the interior of the structure (if inside) or immediate area (if out- side).
Personnel should look for evidence of damage, UXO, or contamination and provide aid to casual-
ties. They must remain in protected shelters or under overhead cover (situation permitting) until
directed otherwise by the EOC or their UCC. This delay will provide time for CBRN
Reconnaissance and Damage Assessment teams to confirm or deny CBRN agent use and assess
damage. If hazards are found, they should be marked. Notify other personnel within the area of
the hazard or hazards and report the results to the UCC or EOC.
A3.4. Unit PAR Teams:
A3.4.1. Concept of Operations. Unit PAR teams are normally directed through the UCC and
conduct explosive ordnance reconnaissance activities, survey for contamination, implement
contamination avoidance actions, survey unit assets for damage and fire, and perform casualty
care. Prior to attacks, the teams should be responsible for executing unit plans for pre-
positioning M8 paper on unit assets and areas, dispersing and maintaining security of unit
assets, implementing dispersal and expedient hardening measures, placing and maintaining the
serviceability of contamination avoidance covers, and assisting unit shelter and other
specialized teams prepare for operations. Units responsible for large areas and multiple PAR
teams may find it more efficient to group teams and areas under sub-unit control centers (or
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 107

equivalent) that, in turn, report to the UCC. UCCs consolidate PAR team information and
report it to their unit ESF representative or to a location designated in IEMP 10-2. PAR teams
should mark hazards (i.e., UXO and contamination) as they are discovered. However,
extensive marking may create unacceptable delays that prevent rapid reconnaissance of the
assigned areas. Under these circumstances, an initial PAR survey may be conducted to identify
major hazards and determine if contamination is present. Once the initial survey is complete
and the results are reported, return and properly mark hazards and contamination.

Table A3.1. Post-Attack Reconnaissance Enabling Tasks.

Responsibility Level
Pre-Attack Installation Unit Airman
Assemble and inspect PAR team equipment X X

Survey area of responsibility X X X

Identify primary and alternate routes X X

Identify facility power, gas, and fuel cutoffs X X X

Pre-position M8 paper X X X

Identify expedient firefighting assets X X X

Identify location and inspect first-aid kits X X

Identify blackout actions X X X

Review UXO identification chart X X X

Identify resources that require contamination covers X X X

Implement contamination avoidance actions X X X

Post Attack Installation Unit Airman

Survey pre- determined route X X X

Find and report casualties, fire, damage X X X

108 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Conduct explosive ordnance reconnaissance X X X

Mark hazards where needed X X X

Report CBRN detector alarms and indicators of attack X X X

Post, check, and report on M8 X X X

Conduct expedient firefighting X X

Take injured to the casualty collection point X X

Report enemy activity (S-A-L-U- T-E format) X X X

Report enemy casualties and abandoned weapons X X X

Survey vehicles and equipment for damage X X X

Maintain contact with the UCC or EOC X X X

Request UCC or EOC assistance X X X

Advise UCC or EOC on ability to conduct mission X X

Verify integrity of collective protection systems X

Verify the operation of CBRN detectors X

Practice contamination avoidance X X X

Conduct immediate decontamination X X X

A3.4.2. Organization. PAR teams are organized, trained, and equipped by the unit. The
minimum size for a PAR team is two people. This enables one member to maintain a constant
watch for hazards, provide security, and call for assistance if accidents or injuries should occur.
There is no maximum number of PAR team members; however, team size should be kept to a
minimum to reduce the number of people exposed to post-attack hazards and still accomplish
the mission. Larger teams may be appropriate depending on the unit mission, weather, or if
additional security protection is required. PAR teams should be knowledgeable of the unit area,
mission and assigned equipment. Organize, train, and equip enough teams to enable a complete
reconnaissance of all unit areas of responsibility within 15-20 minutes after the start of the
reconnaissance mission. Commanders will identify and assign enough in-place installation
personnel to conduct PAR team operations for a minimum of 96 hours. (T- 2).
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 109

A3.4.3. Training. Specialized training, beyond that received in the current CBRN Defense
Training course and Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance (EOR), is not required. Team
proficiency is gained through practice and unit exercises.
A3.4.4. Equipage. Table A3.2. Recommended Equipment for a Two-Person PAR Team that
provides a recommended list of team equipment items suitable for a two-person PAR team.
Where appropriate, designate vehicles and communications equipment for team use. Adjust
actual team equipment needs to match the threat, area of coverage, terrain, weather, and
mission. Team equipment may be dedicated and stored into team kits. The team may use
existing equipment from shelter management team or other unit team kits.
A3.5. Specialized PAR Teams. Various base specialized teams fill this role in one or more areas.
They include EOD teams, CBRN reconnaissance teams, rapid airfield damage assessment teams
(RADR), and Bioenvironmental Engineer teams. Specific actions and duties of these teams are
contained within functional area publications. The CBRN reconnaissance teams operate under the
direction of the Base Civil Engineer, through the EOC, and include CE readiness personnel. The
primary mission of the CBRN reconnaissance team is to deploy and maintain the base CBRN
detection network and conduct post-attack reconnaissance of base areas. Civil Engineer CBRN
teams also provide pre-attack and post- attack expert assistance to base and unit PAR teams. The
teams also provide pre-attack and post-attack expert assistance to base and unit shelters, mortuary
collection points, casualty collection points, contamination control areas, and to units that request
assistance or supplemental training. These teams work with base and unit representatives to resolve
technical issues related to CBRN defense. During the pre-attack phase, they assist teams and units
develop M8 paper detection post plans and PAR survey routes, brief team members, develop
training drills for team member to practice for likely scenarios, and provide training on specialized
equipment. During the post-attack phase, these teams may be tasked to assist or advise on
operations for units and teams within their area. Although their first priority is base CBRN defense,
these teams provide the EOC with a rapid response capability that can provide on-the-spot advice
and assistance to base recovery teams.
110 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Table A3.2. Recommended Equipment for a Two-Person PAR Team.

Item Quantity
Flashlight (high quality, 5000 2 each
candlepower) with Batteries*
Chemical Light Stick, White 2 boxes
Chemical Light Stick, Red 2 boxes
Surveyors Tape, White 2 rolls
Radio on Unit Network with Spare 1
Batteries*
M8 Paper 5 booklets
M9 Paper 2 rolls
Personal Weapon and Ammunition 1
Hot, Cold, and Wet Weather Gear (as 2 sets
appropriate)*
Magnifying Glass 1
CBRN Marking Kit or local equivalent 1 set
Masking Tape (1-2” Wide) and Indelible 2 Rolls/2 Pens
Marking Pen*
Map or Diagram of PAR Routes and
Responsibility Area
*Indicates this item is normally a dual-use unit resource and designated for team use in
wartime.
A3.6. Post Attack Reconnaissance. The EOC or UCC may direct PAR operations to begin
immediately following the attack or they may delay operations to avoid or reduce exposure to
CBRN contamination fallout or UXO hazards. Specialized base teams (EOD, airfield damage,
assessment, BEE, and CBRN reconnaissance) may be directed to start operations immediately
following the attack to provide senior leadership with a quick-look assessment of airfield status
and the overall post-attack situation. If communications fail, commanders may also direct
specialized teams to "auto-roll" as soon as the attack is over.
A3.6.1. Hazard and Contamination Avoidance:
A3.6.1.1. When conducting post-attack reconnaissance, be cautious when traveling or
walking. Make every reasonable effort to avoid crossing through cordoned and
contaminated areas. If chemical contamination is present on vehicles or equipment, use the
M295 decontamination kits to decontaminate. Concentrate on areas where individuals will
sit or touch. Examples include access handles, equipment controls, bare metal, glass, and
other non-porous surfaces. Do not enter damaged structures or walk across downed power
lines.
A3.6.1.2. Consider site security when selecting pre-positioned base CBRN detector and
unit M8 paper sites. Detection sites should be located within areas where minimum owner-
user security procedures are in force. The intent is to reduce the possibility that pre-selected
and routinely checked sites could be mined or PAR teams targeted for ambush during
routine operations. As a rule, detection sites should not be located outside of the
installation-controlled areas or base perimeter unless they are coordinated with and
approved by security forces.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 111

A3.6.1.3. Personnel who travel outside of installation-controlled areas may receive little
or no warning or indication that they are in a contaminated area. They must look for
contaminated area marking signs, be alert for the initial symptoms of contamination, and
have protective equipment ready for immediate donning at all times.
A3.6.1.4. Personnel within facilities, expedient bunkers, and defensive fighting positions
(DFPs) should preposition some M8 paper in locations where it can be observed without
having to physically leave the protected position. This will generally mean placing the M8
paper on a raised sur- face that is slightly canted towards the observation point. Binoculars,
camera feeds on M-8 paper, and/or or a spotting scope can be used during daylight to better
observe M8 paper from the protected position or from beneath over- head cover. For
nighttime operations consider innovative methods (i.e. maybe attach a rope or string to the
observation stand or pad and pull it to an opening to observe the M8 paper. Use a white
light to accurately read the M8 paper colors).
A3.6.2. CBRN Hazard Marking. Follow MAJCOM or theater standards for marking hazards.
When these standards are not provided, use the standard hazard markers to mark CBRN and
UXO hazards. Construct expedient markers when standard markers are unavailable. Construct
the markers to the approximate size and shape of the examples using any suitable material.
Options for expedient marking include locally produced marking signs or decals and the use
of masking tape, chalk, or paint to mark the hazard. If no markers are available, use any means
to mark the hazard that draws attention to the problem and communicates to others that a hazard
exists.
A3.6.3. PAR Reporting:
A3.6.3.1. How to Report. Individuals and unit PAR teams report post-attack information
through their UCC by the fastest available communication means. Each element that
receives a PAR report has two responsibilities. The first is to provide the information to
the next level in their chain of command or designated agency. The second responsibility
is to provide the information to others within the unit or within the area affected by the
hazards. If normal communications fail, submit PAR reports to the next higher level in the
chain of command.
A3.6.3.2. What to Report. Report information on casualties; unexploded ordnance; tactics
employed by the enemy; nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons indicators; and damage
to equipment, facilities, vehicles, aircraft, or roads. Look for activated CBRN detectors,
M8 and M9 paper positive indications, operating or spent munitions delivery systems or
spray tanks, aerosol generators, and sub munitions or bomblets. Include your name, rank,
unit, present location, and a phone number or method of contacting you for further
information. Be as accurate in your details as possible. The UCC and EOC will consolidate
PAR reports to provide a complete assessment of the installation.
112 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Attachment 4
CBRN TRAINING AND EXERCISES

A4.1. Competencies. In order to obtain Airmen's expeditionary skills (ES), the AF is using a
tiered proficiency training and deliberate exercise approach, targeting mission essential tasks,
functions, and tasks, UTC capabilities, and combat skill tasking’s. ES must be relevant,
synchronized, standardized and integrated across the AF to provide Combatant Commanders with
Combat “Ready Now” Airmen trained to support requirements while maximizing resources. ES
training and exercises are optimized when incorporated as a continuum across an Airman’s career.
A4.2. A robust CWMD operational capability for the AF is: Not achieved through a single
individual or skill-level, nor is it the responsibility of a single functional community. CWMD
capability is realized through a life-cycle approach using Force Development principles to create
an integrated whole-base capability. It is not developed as the result of a single lesson,
schoolhouse, or exercise event, but rather the culmination of growing CBRN-smart Airmen
capable of owning this operational environment regardless of an adversary’s intent, will,
possession, or use of CBRN weapons.
A4.3. The AF corporate structure provides: Opportunities for Airman to receive education and
training through installation education and outreach programs, accession programs, functional
training, and professional military education. However, these developmental mechanisms
represent only a portion of the life-cycle approach to developing Expeditionary Airman who can
survive and operate in a CBRN environment. Wartime exercises and Readiness Assessments
complete the integrated operational approach to developing CWMD warfighters.
A4.4. Extensive research on joint and service component doctrine: Have yielded a
comprehensive list of tasks that should be performed to sustain mission operations regardless of
CBRN threats and/or contamination. CWMD exercise competencies are aligned to the applicable
Universal Joint Task Library (UJTL) and AF-specific mission essential tasks. Commanders at all
levels will ensure the CWMD exercise competencies listed in Table A4.1. Wartime CWMD
Exercise Competencies of this instruction, and the proficiency standards listed in AFTTP 3-2.42,
are integrated into installation exercises and Readiness Assessments that require an operational
wartime focus. (T-2). Note. CONUS installations conducting the annual peacetime CBRN exercise
IAW AFI 90-201, Table 5.2., will develop exercise desired learning objectives (DLOs) from the
preparedness standards listed in DoDI 3020.52. (T-0).
A4.5. Installation Wing Inspection Team (WIT) members: Will develop functional DLOs for
each applicable CWMD exercise competency and coordinated with the installation Inspection
General’s exercise planner for inclusion into the CBRN exercise and/or Readiness Assessment
Master Sequence of Events List (MSEL). (T-2).
A4.6. Installations will: Develop and conduct realistic CBRN exercises with joint, combined,
and coalition and interagency partners. (T-0).
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 113

Table A4.1. Wartime CWMD Exercise Competencies.

Competency Targeted Audience

Understand CWMD Interdiction Policy. Air Operations Center, AFFOR Staff,
Crisis Action Team, Operations Support
Squadron.
Understand planning considerations for air Air Operations Center, AFFOR Staff, Crisis
interdiction operations of in-transit CBRN Action Team, Operations Support Squadron.
weapons and materials.
Understand the potential national, Air Operations Center, AFFOR Staff, Crisis
international, and diplomatic connections Action Team, Operations Support Squadron.
stemming from CWMD operations.
Understand the consequences of hitting Air Operations Center, AFFOR Staff, Crisis
CBRN targets including desired and Action Team, Operations Support Squadron.
collateral effects.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct air Air Operations Center, Operations
CWMD interdiction operations. Support Squadron.

Understand national and AF contributions to Air Operations Center, AFFOR Staff, Crisis
proliferation prevention. Action Team, Operations Support Squadron,
Wing Plans & Programs.
Demonstrate knowledge of joint, combined, Air Operations Center, AFFOR Staff,
and coalition theater options in a CBRN- Crisis Action Team, Emergency
contaminated environment. Operations Center, Unit Control Centers,
Operations Support Squadron.
Understand the importance of establishing Air Operations Center, AFFOR Staff,
interagency agreements to share intelligence Crisis Action Team, Intelligence
on CBRN threats and hazards. functions (e.g. MAJCOM, NAF,
Installation), Staff Judge Advocates,
Wing Plans & Programs.
Understand interagency cooperation related Air Operations Center, AFFOR Staff,
to CWMD homeland defense. Crisis Action Team, Wing Plans &
Programs.
Identify typical CBRN agents and elements, All Airmen
their delivery means, and their
characteristics and effects.
Know CBRN detection capabilities, Crisis Action Team, Emergency
methods, and limitations, as well the Operations Center, Unit Control Center,
operational connections of Post Attack Reconnaissance Team,
detection/detector results. CBRN and Medical SMEs, Specialized
Teams.
114 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Demonstrate the ability to identify CBRN Air Operations Center, Crisis Action
targets. Team, ISR functions (e.g. MAJCOM,
NAF, Installation), Operations Support
Squadrons.
Demonstrate the application of the targeting Air Operations Center, Crisis Action
process to CBRN targets while minimizing Team, ISR functions (e.g. MAJCOM,
risks to friendly forces. NAF, Installation), Operations Support
Squadrons.
Understand and apply the standing Rules of Air Operations Center, Crisis Action
Engagement (ROE) to CBRN targets. Team, ISR functions (e.g. MAJCOM,
NAF, Installation), Operations Support
Squadrons, Staff Judge Advocates.
Understand the differences between pre-, Air Operations Center, AFFOR Staff,
trans-, and post-strike information Crisis Action Team, Communications
operations. Squadron, ISR functions (e.g.
MAJCOM, NAF, Installation),
Operations Support Squadrons.
Demonstrate the ability to integrate CWMD Air Operations Center, AFFOR Staff,
Active Defense into the development of the Crisis Action Team, Communications
Air, Space, and Cyberspace Tasking Orders. Squadron, ISR functions (e.g.
MAJCOM, NAF, Installation),
Operations Support Squadrons.
Understand the levels of Command and All Airmen.
Control (C2) and demonstrate the ability to
report up and down the chain, relative to
CBRN threats.
Recognize indicators of enemy CBRN use. All Airmen.
Understand the integration of AF, joint, and Air Operations Center, AFFOR Staff,
coalition CWMD detection networks and Crisis Action Team, Emergency
CBRN warning and reporting system Operations Center, CBRN
procedures and capabilities. Zone/Area/Collection/Control Centers,
Command Post, & Watch Centers.
Understand the planning challenges for Air Operations Center, AFFOR Staff,
operating in CBRN environments in non- Crisis Action Team, Emergency
permissive environments. Operations Center, Operations Support
Squadrons, & Wing Plans & Programs.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 115

Understand the process for transporting Air Operations Center, AFFOR Staff,
contaminated/contagious personnel (to Crisis Action Team, Emergency
include casualties and remains) and materiel Operations Center, Unit Control Center,
(to include forensic samples). CBRN and Medical SMEs, Force
Support Squadron, Logistics Readiness
Squadrons, Operations Support
Squadrons, Wing Plans & Programs.
Understand planning considerations for the AFFOR Staff, Crisis Action Team,
development of a medical surge plan. Emergency Operations Center, Medical
Control Center, Surgeon General, &
Medical Group.
Identify approval process required to Air Operations Center, AFFOR Staff, Crisis
operate mobility aircraft to/from CBRN Action Team, Operations Support Squadron,
contaminated airfields. & Deployment Control Center.
Understand considerations, constraints, and Air Operations Center, AFFOR Staff,
guidance (e.g. exchange zone) for airlift, Crisis Action Team, Emergency
aerial refueling, and base operations in a Operations Center, Operations Support
CBRN environment. Squadron, & Deployment Control
Center.
Understand installation plans specific to All Airmen
CBRN response and associated health risks
assessments for exposure to CBRN
agents/materials.
Understand the process for warning airborne Air Operations Center, Crisis Action
aircraft of CBRN attacks against airfields. Team, Emergency Operations Center,
Command Post, Operations Support
Squadron.
Demonstrate the ability to identify inbound Air Operations Center, Crisis Action
CBRN threats. Team, Command Post, Operations
Support Squadron
Identify the installation’s CBRN Crisis Action Team, Emergency
threats/vulnerabilities as part of the Operations Center,
Integrated Defense Risk Management CBRN/Medical/Security Forces SMEs,
Process. Wing Plans & Programs.
Perform combat lifesaving skills in a CBRN All Airmen.
contaminated environment to include
medical prophylaxis and Self-Aid Buddy
Care (SABC).
Conduct CBRN casualty movement. All Airmen.
116 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Demonstrate the ability to monitor local CBRN/Medical SMEs, Medical Group,

populations for diseases of operational Public Health Environmental Officer,
importance. Crisis Action Team, Emergency
Operations Center.
Understand and demonstrate how to protect All Airmen.
individuals, equipment, and assets from
CBRN effects through contamination
control and contamination avoidance.
Understand and demonstrate the ability to All Airmen.
react to AF, Joint, Host-nation, combined,
and coalition warning systems and signals
(e.g. Alarm Conditions, MOPP Levels).
Understand Post-Attack Reconnaissance All Airmen.
procedures and responsibilities for
identifying, marking, and reporting CBRN
materials, to include unexploded ordnance.
Understand DOD and AF policy and Air Operations Center, AFFOR Staff,
guidance as it relates to Defense Support to Crisis Action Team, Emergency
Civil Authorities (DSCA). Operations Center
Recognize behavioral and physical All Airmen
symptoms associated with CBRN
agent/material exposure.
Understand wartime sheltering procedures All Airmen
for CBRN threats.
Understand decontamination levels (e.g. All Airmen
immediate, operational, thorough,
clearance).
Understand planning considerations for Air Operations Center, AFFOR Staff,
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Crisis Action Team, Emergency
(NEO) in CBRN environments. Operations Center, Staff Judge
Advocate, Wing Plans & Programs.
Understand the process for managing mass Crisis Action Team, Emergency
care in support of displaced personnel, to Operations Center, CBRN/Medical
include food, shelter, and hygiene in a SMEs, Force Support Squadron.
CBRN environment.
Understand the requirement for collecting All Airmen.
lessons learned and preparing after-action
reports during all phases of a CBRN
incident.
Demonstrate the ability to properly don, All Airmen.
seal, clear and check the CBRN protective
mask within nine (9) seconds.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 117

Understand and demonstrate the ability to All Airmen.

respond to and recover from an insider
threat.
Demonstrate individual weapons All Airmen.
sustainment (e.g. clearing/safing, loading,
firing, reloading, unloading,
maintenance/cleaning, immediate action).
Demonstrate individual tactics (e.g. react to All Airmen.
contact, react to indirect fire, react to
ambush, react to sniper, and break contact).
Demonstrate the ability to conduct land All Airmen.
navigation to include: map reading, compass
reading, point to point, etc.
Demonstrate the ability to use radios, pro- All Airmen.
words, phonetics, brevity codes, and
communication out procedures.
Demonstrate the ability to recognize and All Airmen.
react to unexploded ordnance.

Demonstrate the ability to conduct tactical All Airmen.

combat casualty care (e.g. tourniquet,
bleeding, airway, nasopharyngeal airway,
sucking chest wound, shock,
head/neck/spinal, abdominal, eye,
sprains/fracture, and burns.
Demonstrate the ability to self-protect (e.g. All Airmen.
grappling, strikes, break contact, weapon
takeaways).
Demonstrate the ability to conduct mounted All Airmen.
operations by reacting to contact, vehicle
cross load, and vehicle rollover.
Demonstrate Urban Operations through All Airmen.
movement and building defense and
retrograde tactics.
Demonstrate the ability properly wear the All Airmen.
protective mask, ground crew ensemble;
employ M8/M9; conduct individual
decontamination; conduct vehicle and
equipment decontamination; and use the
buddy system through response and
recovery operations to CBRN
environments.
118 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Attachment 5
CHEMICALLY CONTAMINATED OBJECT RULE (CCOR)

A5.1. Object Rule. Use of the “simplified” or “advanced” version of the CCOR.
A5.1.1. The primary difference between the simplified and advanced versions of the CCOR
is that the hazard duration is fixed at 24 hours for the simplified versus being variable based
on the CW agent involved with the advanced option.
A5.1.2. In the advanced version, the Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) 4 period
around a contaminated object in an otherwise uncontaminated area is 12 hours for the blister
agent distilled mustard (HD) and nerve agent Sarin (GB); 18 hours for the nerve agents Tabun
(GA), Soman (GD), and Cyclosarin (GF); and 24 hours for V-series agents.
A5.2. The most influential considerations are: The likely CW threat agent(s), the installation’s
CW detection capability, and the perceived advantage of terminating the MOPP 4 portion of the
CCOR prior to 24 hours will have on mission operations.
A5.2.1. If an adversary’s perceived threat to airbases will likely be V-series agents, there is
not a difference in the MOPP 4 timeline between the advanced and simplified versions of the
CCOR – they are both 24 hours.
A5.2.2. The primary CW detectors in the field (Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD), M256
series, M8/M9 paper) do not differentiate between the G-series agents e.g., GB versus GD. As
a result, it may not be possible for an installation to fully utilize the advanced version of the
CCOR. That being said, if the commander safe-sided the G-agent choice within the context of
the CCOR, the decision would result in the termination of the MOPP 4 portion at 18 hours
versus the 24-hours dictated by the simplified version of the CCOR.
A5.2.3. In the vast majority of scenarios, the CW hazard duration timeline associated with
terrain is much longer than the MOPP 4 timeline associated with the CCOR. The CCOR is
designed for contaminated items that are in otherwise uncontaminated areas e.g., a
contaminated fuel truck transitions to a MOPP 2 zone in order to accomplish a mission there.
In order to weigh the benefits of a shorter MOPP 4 timeline for CCOR activities, the
installation must have an idea of how often contaminated assets are going to be used in
uncontaminated areas of the base.
A5.2.4. It is unlikely the installation warfighters will effectively track the CCOR-related
timing actions. As a result, leadership should consider making the appropriate announcements
to the installation work centers through the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) e.g.,
“properly mark each vehicle that was contaminated with CW agents in liquid form”, “the
MOPP 4 timeframe for contaminated vehicles has passed”, etc.
A5.3. Utilizing the “simplified” version of the CCOR will: Be the most effective choice (easier
to track, one set of rules instead of multiple choices – especially if more than one agent is used in
the attack and/or there are multiple attacks) in most scenarios.
A5.3.1. Installations should treat aircraft as if they are physically contaminated with CW
agents due to the following:
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 119

A5.3.1.1. It is very difficult to determine when aircraft have been physically contaminated
by CW agents in liquid or solid form. CW droplets and particles are very small, below the
limits of normal human vision in many cases. The absorptive characterization of CW
agents combined with the fact that the Air Force (AF) does not put M8 paper on aircraft
further complicates matters. However, personnel should place M8 paper detection paints
in the aircraft turn areas, aircraft parking areas, etc.
A5.3.1.2. The AF does not consider an aircraft that may have been exposed to a CW agent
as inoperable. However, analysis shows vapor contamination will not absorb into aircraft
surfaces and subsequently be released at levels above the thresholds specified in the 2014
DoD Chemical Clearance Guidelines. The threshold for the 2014 DoD Chemical Clearance
Guideline levels is the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Acute Exposure Guideline
Level (AEGL) 1 criteria. Airborne concentrations below the AEGL-1 represent exposure
levels that could produce mild and progressively increasing but transient and non-disabling
odor, taste, and sensory irritation or certain asymptomatic, non-sensory effects.
A5.3.1.3. The proximity of the aircraft in relation to known results from M8 paper
detection points is the primary method for ascertaining the contamination status of the
aircraft. Barring empirical evidence otherwise, use Table A5.1 to determine the CW
contamination status of aircraft.
120 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Table A5.1. Determination of Contaminated Aircraft Decision Aid.

Threats Is the Aircraft Contaminated?
NO YES Notes
Chemical
Potential for Chem X
Threat in theater
but no Chem
Activity Reported
yet
Chem Activity in X
theater but no Chem
activity on
installation or Close-
by
Chem Threat in X
Vapor form only on
installation
Chem threat in liquid X Verified by
form on installation prepositioned M8
but not near aircraft paper

Chem threat in liquid X Verified by

form near airfield prepositioned M8
paper
Chem threat in solid X
form (dusty) on
aircraft
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 121

Biological
Potential for Bio X
threat in theater but
no Bio activity
reported yet
Bio activity in X
theater but no bio
activity on
installation or
close-by
Bio activity X Due to the time it
reported/confirmed takes to recognize a
on installation bio attack has taken
place, the hazard will
have passed and it
will be impossible to
determine what
aircraft have been
Radiological/Nuclear exposed
Potential for rad/nuke X
threat in theater but
no activity reported
yet
Rad activity in X
theater but no rad
activity on
installation or
close-by
Radiological X Confirmed by
contamination radiation
detected on instruments
installation and
aircraft
* Detection and identification of isotope should be done as soon as possible
A5.4. When dealing with liquid contamination refer to: Table A5.2., when dealing with liquid
contamination. The guidelines were calculated based on one-hour of exposure at the distances
specified as no longer requiring MOPP 4.
122 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Table A5.2. Chemically Contaminated Object Handling Guidelines.

Applicability
Chemically Contaminated Object Handling Guidelines apply when chemical
contamination is liquid in nature (e.g., when the resource has been exposed only to
agents in vapor or dusty form, these special handling procedures will not be necessary
past the point of the hazard duration.)
The use of the special handling procedures embodies a safety factor that goes beyond
existing DOD guidance, allowing the removal of Individual Protective Equipment
(IPE) whenever detectors no longer detect a chemical agent vapor hazard.
The small object category covers resources that have 10 square meters or less of metal
and/or glass surfaces. Examples include aerospace ground equipment, munitions
trailers, munitions, and vehicles such as pick-up trucks, high mobility multipurpose
wheeled vehicles, and one and one-half ton stake-bed trucks.
The large object category covers resources that have more than 10 square meters of
metal and/or glass surfaces. Examples include 44-passenger buses, fuel trucks, fire
trucks, and all aircraft.
A5.4.1. The times associated with the guidelines are not absolute guarantees of safety. The
AF developed the guidelines for sustained mission operations and to prevent a few
contaminated resources from unnecessarily driving the MOPP level in the entire CBRN zone.
The guidelines do not automatically equate to a point at which personnel may safely operate
for indefinite periods in close contact with the resource. Personnel must be cognizant of the
circumstances that affect the time estimates and remain alert for evidence of chemically-
induced symptoms in themselves or co-workers.
A5.4.2. Installations may choose to employ the simplified version of the Chemically
Contaminated Object Rule guidelines, or if operational circumstances and base population
capabilities warrant, bases may choose to use the more advanced Chemically Contaminated
Object Rule protocols.

Table A5.3. Simplified Chemically Contaminated Object Guidelines.

Time Small Object Large Object
0-1 Hour MOPP 4 in all Zones
1-3 Hours MOPP 4 within 10 feet MOPP 4 within identified
Zone(s)
3-24 Hours MOPP 4 within 50 feet
A5.4.3. Advanced Chemically Contaminated Object Rule Protocols.
A5.4.3.1. Advanced Guidelines for Handling Small Contaminated Objects. If the CBRN
reconnaissance team has identified the specific agent involved, the installation may choose
to use the hour values in Table A5.4., below instead of using the generic procedure. The
below list is not inclusive of all chemical agents.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 123

A5.4.3.2. Advanced Guidelines for Handling Large Contaminated Objects. The

installation may choose to use the timelines outlined in Table A5.4., if the CBRN
reconnaissance team has the ability to determine whether a resource was contaminated at
a concentration level of less than 50 mg/m², and if the base population has a mechanism
that allows them to determine when they are 500 feet from a large contaminated resource.

Table A5.4. Advanced Chemically Contaminated Object Rule Guidelines.

Agent Time (Hours) Small Object Large Object
After Attack
All 0-1 MOPP 4 MOPP 4
All 1-3 MOPP 4 within 10 feet MOPP 4 for all operations
within 50 feet,
contamination level is ≤
50 mg/m².
MOPP 4 for all operations
within 500 feet,
contamination level is 50
mg/m².
Mustard (HD, HL, 3-12 MOPP 4 within 10 feet MOPP 4 within 50 feet
HN, L)
12-24 MOPP 2 with gloves* MOPP 4 within 50 feet
24+ MOPP 2 with gloves* MOPP 2 with gloves*
Sarin (GB) 3-12 MOPP 4 within 10 feet MOPP 4 within 50 feet
12-24 MOPP 2 with gloves* MOPP 4 within 50 feet
24 + MOPP 2 with gloves* MOPP 2 with gloves*
Tabun (GA) Soman 3-18 MOPP 4 within 10 feet MOPP 4 within 50 feet
(GD) Cyclosarin
(GF) 18-24 MOPP 2 with gloves* MOPP 4 within 50 feet
24 + MOPP 2 with gloves* MOPP 2 with gloves*
VX 3-24 MOPP 4 within 10 feet MOPP 4 within 50 feet
24+ MOPP 2 with gloves* MOPP 2 with gloves*
*Personnel will use gloves of any sort (leather, rubber, cloth, etc.) when operating on
or handling the contaminated equipment. Although a contact hazard is unlikely,
relatively small amounts of the agent may still be present. The use of gloves will
ensure that unnecessary bare skin contact with agent residue is avoided.
124 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Attachment 6
ANALYTICAL DATA TO SUPPORT CBRN PASSIVE DEFENSE OPERATIONS

A6.1. Air Force (AF) Position on Decontamination. The AF does not believe decontamination
needs to take place unless there is a tangible operational benefit and/or a reasonable increase in
personnel safety is achieved. For example, if the warfighter is in Mission Oriented Protective
Posture (MOPP) 4 at the beginning of the decontamination activity and has to remain in MOPP 4
at the end of the decontamination process, the AF believes the decontamination actions were not
necessary.
A6.2. Decontamination Activities. Decontamination activities are designed to remove the
“contact/transfer” hazard. As a result of CW agent evaporation and absorption characteristics, the
severity and danger of the contact hazard degrades very rapidly. Tangentially, many people
erroneously believe CW contamination is easily transferred from surface to surface. The truth is
that this is not really a significant operational hazard, to include with modern “composite”
materials. See Table A6.1., A6.2, A6.3 and A6.4

Table A6.1. Average Amount of VX Transfer from Surface to Joint Service Lightweight
Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) Fabric.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 125

Table A6.2. Average Amount of TGD Transfer from Surface to JSLIST Fabric.

Table A6.3. Average Amount of HD Transfer from Surface to JSLIST Fabric.

126 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Table A6.4. Average Amount of CW Agent Transfer from Carbon Composite Fuselage
Material from C-17 Aircraft to JSLIST Fabric.

A6.3. Regardless of the effectiveness of the decontamination technique: In regard to

removing the contact/transfer hazard, people will have to remain in MOPP 4 because of the toxic
vapors that continue to be generated by the absorbed agent. It is this off-gassing phenomena that
can keep segments of an AF installation in MOPP 4 for days. See Figure A6.1 and Tables A6.1
and A6.2
Figure A6.1. Projected Hazard Duration for Thickened VX in South Korea in the summer.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 127

Table A6.5. Hazard Associated with Average Vapor Reading after Decontamination
Activity during Large-Frame Aircraft Decontamination Demonstration (LFADD).

Events Average Vapor Reading Representative Effect on

after Event (mg/m3) Unprotected People**
Initial Contamination of N/A (5 g/m2 challenge N/A
Aircraft level with 300 micron
drops).
Weathering for 1-Hr (no N/A N/A
physical decontamination)
After 15-minute exposure:
Lethal to 5% of population
Post Flight (after 2-Hr Severe incapacitation
flights at ~10,000 feet) 0.579 effects to 42% of remaining
population Mild
incapacitation effects to the
remainder of personnel.

After “Birdbath” (normal After 30-minute exposure:

corrosion control wash of Lethal to 50% of
aircraft) population
0.404 Severe incapacitation
effects to 94% of remaining
population Mild
incapacitation effects to the
remainder of personnel.

Completion of First Mild incapacitation effects

Decontamination (Hot 0.063 to 100% of population after
Soapy Water with Type V 2.4 minute exposure.
Aircraft Cleaning
Compound)
Completion of Second Mild incapacitation effects
Decontamination (Bleach 0.04 to 100% of population after
with pre-rinse corrosion 3.9 minute exposure.
inhibitor and post-rinse
reducing agent)
Completion of Third Mild incapacitation effects
Decontamination (Hot 0.013 to 100% of population after
Soapy Water with Type IV 24 minute exposure.
Aircraft Cleaning
Compound)
*WDTC-TR-04-073, Formal Test Report for the LFADD, December 2004.
**Data derived from “Vapor Consequences” segment of AF/A10S Toxicity
Calculation Tool.
128 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

A6.4. If CW droplets in liquid form are still on the surface: AF warfighters do accomplish
“spot” decontamination of resource areas that are going to be touched. Personnel use the M295 kit
for the activity, and the reasons for this action are:
A6.4.1. Prevent cross contamination to the point that CW agents in liquid form do not enter
the inside of the aircraft or vehicles. For example, maintenance personnel perform spot
decontamination of the ladder and F-16 “rails” so the pilot(s) do not come into contact with
liquid contamination and transfer the agent (in however small an amount) into the cockpit as
they are climbing into the aircraft.
A6.4.2. Incorporation of a safety factor that mitigates mistakes personnel may make while
wearing CW ensembles e.g., the glove gauntlet has come out from under the JSLIST sleeve
and bare skin is exposed, the person has a hole in their rubber glove, etc.
A6.4.3. See Table A6.6 below for a summary of M295 kit spot decontamination effectiveness
by light condition (Reference Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) System
Evaluation report for the Sorbent Decontamination System, October 2002).

Table A6.6. Visible Liquid Removal and M8 Paper Results by Light Condition.

A6.4.4. Even if there is physical contamination on people’s JSLIST ensembles, there is a

significantly reduced danger to personnel as long as they wear their CW protective equipment
properly, and subsequently process through personnel decontamination stations (also known
as “contamination control areas (CCA)).”
A6.4.4.1. The ensemble components are designed to provide sufficient protection from
agent penetration and CCA activities are designed to prevent the physical contamination
form coming into contact with the warfighter’s skin.
A6.4.4.2. The protective capabilities of the CW individual protective boots, gloves, and
ensembles provide full protection for at least 24 hours after contact with CW agents in
liquid form.
A6.5. The decision of whether or not to accomplish CW decontamination in the aftermath
of an attack has immediate ramifications. For example, aircraft sorties may be lost or delayed
for a period of hours if the decision is made to decontaminate the aircraft operating surfaces.
Consequently, it is imperative Commanders have clear, realistic ideas about what can and cannot
be achieved through CW decontamination.
A6.6. Vehicle, aircraft, and area decontamination cannot: Completely reduce the CW hazard
to zero or near-zero, and as a result the area or resource will have restrictions on its use, regardless
of whether or not CW decontamination has taken place. For example, previously contaminated
aircraft must receive the appropriate foreign clearance approvals prior to flights leaving the CBRN
contested environment.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 129

A6.7. Listen critically to statements people make about area, vehicle, and aircraft
decontamination. Ensure everyone is clear regarding what type of decontamination (CW,
biological, radiological) and the level of effort (individual, teams) being discussed. For instance,
some statements may be true for radiological decontamination but are absolutely not true for CW
decontamination.
A6.8. Comprehensive area, vehicle, and aircraft decontamination activities (no matter how
rigorous) are not: Likely to achieve operationally significant results, which will enable the
immediate removal of protective equipment. The effective implementation of the Chemically
Contaminated Object Rule (CCOR), combined with individual “spot” decontamination is the best
way to approach CW-related vehicle and aircraft decontamination during Major Combat
Operations (MCO) environments.
A6.9. Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST): Ensemble re-use that
have been exposed to CW agent vapors. Existing guidance in AFMAN 10-2503, Operations in a
CBRNE Environment, specifies that people report to the contamination control area (CCA) to
process through the personnel decontamination station and replace their JSLIST ensemble when
the suit is “contaminated”. However, the verbiage does not specifically say that “contaminated”
equates to “ensembles that have been physically contaminated by CW agents in liquid or solid
form”. Consequently, many people erroneously believe that they must replace their JSLIST
ensembles if it may have been exposed to CW vapor contamination e.g., they were in a MOPP 4
zone at any point.
A6.9.1. Unless personnel remained in functioning collective protection facilities for the entire
time (both while on shift and while in off-shift/rest and relief status), it is likely that people
will have been exposed to at least low-level concentrations of CW vapors at some point during
each 24-hour period.
A6.9.2. It will be challenging to verify that the individual and their ensemble were exposed to
CW vapor contamination. CW vapors are colorless and the M9 paper affixed to the ensemble
will not react to agents in vapor form.
A6.9.3. In September 2016, the AF Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction approved the
reuse of JSLIST ensembles that had been exposed to only CW vapors i.e., the suits were not
directly contaminated with CW agents in liquid or solid form. The approved reuse period was
15 days. As of the time of the development of this guide, the reuse guidance has not been
formally included in AF publications e.g., AFIs, AFMANs, etc. The basis for the CWMD
Council’s decision included the following:
A6.9.3.1. The Operational Requirements Document for the JSLIST (17 May 2000)
specified that for Army and AF requirements the JSLIST had to be designed to protect the
wearer from a dosage of at least 5000 mg-min/m3of CW agent (HD, GD, VX) vapor. The
AF CBRN Survivability vapor challenge criteria for CW agents in vapor form is 100 mg-
min/m3 per attack e.g., the JSLIST is designed to protect from far more CW vapor than is
expected from missile attacks.
130 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

A6.9.3.2. The JSLIST is designed to provide the minimum required level of protection
against liquid CW after 45 days of wear (protects from penetration of 10 g/m2 of agent).
Testing has shown that JSLISTs worn for 60 days still provide adequate protection from
liquid concentration of Distilled Mustard (HD) and persistent nerve agents. Further, testing
showed there is no statistical difference in aerosol penetration for new JSLIST ensembles
compared to JSLIST suits worn for 45 days (the established maximum wear time for the
ensemble.
A6.9.3.3. In order to maximize personnel safety, there will likely be a need for war-
fighters to wear JSLIST ensembles for as long as a vapor hazard exists on the installation.
This generally equates to one-to-four days for each attack, with each succeeding attack re-
starting the clock. Consequently, the number of CW attacks an installation is likely to
experience is an important factor.
A6.9.3.4. There is no way of knowing for certain how many CW attacks each installation
may experience. However, different Defense Planning Scenarios may provide some
general insights. Table A6.7. provides an overview of two separate scenarios. NOTE: The
attacks in each scenario were spread out over a period of weeks.

Table A6.7. Summary of Selected Defense Planning Scenarios.

Scenario # of Attacks Per Location % of Bases in “Range of

Attacks”
Greater than 20 19%
1 10 - 19 14%
1–9 24%
0 43%

Greater than 20 0%
2 10 - 19 24%
1–9 29%
0 47%
A6.9.3.5. Based on a basis of issue of two (2) or even four (4), it is clear that people will
have to reuse their vapor exposed JSLIST ensembles. Despite the increase in Chemical
Warfare Defense Equipment C-Bag Asset Basis of Issue, for CBRN threat areas, it is not
logistically feasible to have enough Chemical Warfare Defense Equipment assets on hand
to automatically discard Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST)
Ensembles that are only exposed to vapor contamination from chemical warfare agents.
Accordingly, units will plan to reuse any JSLIST Ensemble, which has been exposed to
chemical warfare agents vapor contamination for up to 15 days.
AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 131

A6.9.3.6. It is highly unlikely installations will have the personnel decontamination

capacity to support running essentially everyone on the site through the contamination
control area (CCA) locations at the end of each shift (see Table A6.8). This is especially
true if attacks occur early in the deployment process and full complements of EM personnel
are not yet at the installation. Note: For most people, this CCA processing time would be
added to the length of their existing shift e.g., a person works 12 hours, travels to the
appropriate CCA location, and waits 4-hours to be processed resulting in a total work day
of 16-17 hours (every day there is CW contamination on the installation).

Table A6.8. Processing Line and Time Estimates for Open-Air CCA Personnel
Decontamination.

# People to Process # Fully Established CCA Required Time to Process

Lines People**
1 ~6.9 hours
500 2 ~3.64 hours
3 ~2.56 hours

1 Not tenable (requires 12 hours)

1000 2 ~6.89 hours
3 ~4.72 hours

1 Not tenable (requires 12 hours)

1500 2 ~10.14 hours
3 ~6.89 hours

1 Not tenable (requires 12 hours)

2000 2 Not tenable (requires 12 hours)
3 ~9.05 hours

1 Not tenable (requires 12 hours)

3000 2 Not tenable (requires 12 hours)
3 Not tenable (requires 12 hours)
4 ~10.14 hours
Note: Based on 77 person-per-hour processing rate established by AF Civil Engineering
Center CCA during the validation Phase 2 Sustainment Exercise, Results and Conclusions
dated July 2000. Time estimate included a 25-minute “spin up” time before line begins
throughput of 77 people per hour.
*Collective protection facilities can only process ~ 20 personnel per hour because of the time
associated with the “airlock” step (which doesn’t exist with open-air CCA processing.)
132 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

A6.9.3.7. There is not an operationally significant danger from CW ensembles absorbing

CW vapors and subsequently releasing CW vapors to personnel as a secondary hazard in
open-air situations (see Table A6.6.). While the secondary hazard is greater in small
collective protection spaces (size of a single general purpose medium tent), the danger is
still very low.