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THIRD DIVISION

CARMEN ALEDRO-RUNA, G.R. No. 225896

Petitioner,
Present:

VELASCO, JR., Chairman,

BERSAMIN,
- versus -
LEONEN,*
MARTIRES, and
GESMUNDO, JJ.

LEAD EXPORT AND AGRO- Promulgated:

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent. July 23, 2018

Q~ ~
x-- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - -- -- -- -- - - -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

GESMUNDO, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari filed by Carmen Aledro-Rui'ia

(petitioner) against Lead Export and Agro-Development Corporation
(respondent), assailing the Decision 1 dated February 15, 2016 and
Resolution2 dated July 21, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 03735 which denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. She prays
that the assailed decision be reversed and set aside, and that a new judgment
be rendered declaring her to have a better right to possess the parcels of land
subject of the instant case.

* On official business.
1
Rollo, pp. 35-50; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, with Associate Justices Rafael Antonio
M. Santos and Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas, concurring.
2
Id. at 52-53.

f1I
DECISION 2 G.R. No. 225896

The Antecedents

This case originated from three (3) different civil cases involving two
(2) parcels of land, Lots 3014 and 5722, covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. (P-6303) P-1781 and Original Certificate of Title No. (P-6224) P-
l 712, respectively. The two parcels of land were registered under the name
of Segundo Aledro (Segundo).

Segundo allegedly executed two (2) contracts covering the subject

parcels of land on separate dates: 1) Contract of Lease executed on August 4,
1972 between him and Alfredo A. Rivera (Rivera) for a period of fifteen ( 15)
years; and 2) Deed of Absolute Sale involving the same lands executed by
Segundo and Mario D. Advento (Advento) on March 24, 1981.

On October 8, 1982, Advento sold the subject properties to Andres M.

Ringor (Ringor).

On April 25, 1988, Farmingtown Agro-Developers, Inc. (FAD!), a

corporation engaged in the growing and selling of Cavendish bananas,
leased the two (2) parcels of land from Ringor for a period of twenty-five
(25) years.

First Case: Civil Case No. 95-13

On January 31, 1995, a complaint was filed by the heirs of Segundo,

namely: petitioner, Antero, Basilisa, Nilo, Romeo, Edilberto and Expedito,
all surnamed Aledro and represented by Sofia Aledro (Sofia) against
Advento and FADI before the Regional Trial Court of Panabo City, Branch
34 (RTC Br. 34), for Real Action over an Immovable, Declaration of Nullity
of Deed, and Damages. 3

On March 31, 1997, the RTC Br. 34 dismissed the complaint. The
heirs of Segundo then appealed before the CA.

Meanwhile, in December 2000, FADI merged with respondent, the

latter as the surviving corporation. In March 2001, respondent's former
corporate name, Lead Export Corporation, was changed to Lead Export &
Agro-Development Corporation. Consequently, respondent absorbed FADl's

3
Rollo, p. 36.

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 DECISION 3 G.R. No. 225896

occupational and possessory rights pertaining to Lots 3014 and 5722. 4

.
On October 12, 2001, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of
the RTC Br. 34 and remanded the case thereto for further reception of
evidence.

Allegedly, on September 18, 2003, the heirs of Segundo (including

petitioner), then represented by their attorney-in-fact, Nilo Aledro (Nilo),
and assisted by their counsel, filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice on the
ground of lack of interest to prosecute the case and to protect Advento and
FADI from fmther prosecution respecting the subject matter of the case. 5

On September 30, 2003, the RTC Br. 34 issued an Order6 dismissing

the case with prejudice. No appeal was filed, thus, the order became final
and executory.

Second Case: Civil Case No. 41-2005

Another complaint was filed by Sofia, widow of Segundo, in 2005

before the RTC of Panabo City, Br. 4 (RTC Br. 4) against Advento for
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale and Quieting of Title, alleging that
through fraud, she and Segundo were made to believe that they were signing
a contract of lease on March 24, 1981 and not a deed of absolute sale.

Summons was issued against Advento, but it was returned unserved.

Summons by publication was effected, but Advento still failed to file an
answer. Hence, he was declared in default. 7

On May 30, 2007, the RTC Br. 4 rendered a decision in favor of Sofia.
It ordered the removal of cloud cast upon the OCTs of the subject parcels of
land. It also declared the agreements of lease as having expired and
terminated. Lastly, the deed of absolute sale executed by Segundo in favor of
Advento on March 24, 1981 was declared as null and void. 8

On April 17, 2009, the RTC Br. 4 issued a Certificate of Finality9 of

its decision.

4
Id. at 37.
5
Id. at 37.
6
Id. at 120.
7 Id. at 38.
8
Id.

;J
9
ld. at 127.
DECISION 4 G.R. No. 225896

Present Case: Civil Case No. 218-10

On September 30, 2010, petitioner filed a case for unlawful detainer,

damages and attorney's fees against respondent before the I st Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Carmen-Sto. Tomas-Braulio E. Dujali, Davao
(MCTC).

Respondent countered that it had a right of possession over the subject

properties based on the contract of lease executed on April 25, 1988 between
Ringor and FADI. It further argued that its possessory rights were based on
the deeds of absolute sale between Segundo and Advento, and later between
Advento and Ringor.

Respondent also argued that the case should be dismissed based on res
judicata because a previous complaint had already been filed by petitioner as
one of the heirs of Segundo against Advento and FADI for real action over
an immovable, declaration of nullity of deeds and damages which was
dismissed with prejudice. 10

On May I 0, 2011, the MCTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioner

and ordered respondent, among others, to vacate the two (2) parcels of land.

Respondent appealed before the RTC Br. 34.

Meanwhile, Ringor sold the subject properties to Wilfredo Gonzales

(Gonzales) and Oscar Q. Cabufias, Jr. (Cabunas) on January 7, 2012. They
entered into a contract of lease with Lapanday Foods Corporation
(Lapanday), an affiliate of respondent, which provided for a lease contract
period commencing on January 1, 2013, after the expiration of the lease
between respondent and Ringor.

Meanwhile, this case was referred to a judicial dispute resolution

(JDR), but the same failed. Thus, it was re-raffled to the RTC Br. 4.

On October 1, 2012, the RTC Br. 4 reversed and set aside the MCTC
decision for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the action should have been one
for recovery of the right to possess or ace ion publiciana because the alleged
dispossession had exceeded the mandatory requirement of effecting the last

;I
10
Id. at 39.
 DECISION 5 G.R. No. 225896

demand to vacate within the year of dispossession. 11

Thus, pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, the RTC

Br. 4 took cognizance of the case and referred it for court-annexed mediation
(CAM) and JDR proceedings. 12

Respondent moved for reconsideration, but it was denied. Pre-trial

was conducted. Trial then ensued.

After the parties' respective memoranda were filed, the RTC Br. 4
rendered a decision 13 on May 20, 2014 dismissing the case for lack of merit.
It ruled that the case was barred by res judicata and thus, upheld the validity
of the deeds of sale covering the series of transaction involving the subject
properties and the contract of lease between Ringor and respondent. 14
Further, the trial court sustained respondent's assertion of being the lawful
lessee of the subject properties, having the right to occupy and possess the
same by virtue of contract of lease with Ringor. 15

Aggrieved, petitioner sought relief from the CA.

The CA, however, denied the appeal and affirmed in toto the decision
of the RTC Br. 4. In so ruling, the CA found that the principle of res judicata
applied in the case and that petitioner's action had already prescribed.

As regards the issue of res judicata, the CA explained that all the
requisites for the application of the principle exist. One, the first case had
already attained finality. The petitioner did not take any step to have the
dismissal order set aside within the reglementary period to appeal. 16 Two, the
RTC Br. 4 had jurisdiction over the first case. 17 Three, the case was
dismissed with prejudice. 18 Four, between the first and second actions, there
was identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. 19 Hence, the
ruling dismissing Civil Case No. 95-13 operated as a bar to a subsequent re-
filing. 20

11
Id. at 40.
12 Id.
13
Id. at 160-175.
14
Id. at 174.
15
Id. at 175.
16
Id. at 45.
17
Id. at 46.
is Id.
19
Id. at 47.
20
Id. at 48.

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DECISION 6 G.R. No. 225896

With regard to the issue of prescription, the CA ruled that:

In Civil Case No. 95-13, plaintiff, as one of the co-heirs of

Segundo Aledro, filed the complaint for nullification of both the contract
of lease and the deed of sale before the RTC Branch 34 on January 31,
1995, or almost twenty-three (23) years from the execution of the lease
contract and fourteen (14) years from the execution of the deed of sale in
1981, which is clearly beyond the ten-year prescriptive period provided
under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code to institute an action upon a
written contract. Moreover, it is beyond the four-year prescriptive period
provided under Article 1391 of the New Civil Code to annul a contract
where the consent of a contracting party is vitiated by fraud. 21

The CA also observed that during Segundo's lifetime, he did not take
any act to impugn the validity of the sale or the lease. In the absence of any
contrary evidence, the deed of sale and the contract of lease were deemed
perfectly valid. 22

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was

denied.

Hence, the present petition raising the following:

ISSUES

A.
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE RULING OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISMISSING
PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND
THAT IT IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE IS A
DECISION, ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTORY,
DECLARING THAT THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF
LAND AS CLEARED FROM DOUBT AND THAT
THE DEEDS OF ABSOLUTE SALE RELIED BY
RESPONDENT WAS ALREADY NULL AND
VOID[.]

B.
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

21
Id. at 49.
22 Id.

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 DECISION 7 G.R. No. 225896

ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT RULE THAT

PETITIONER HAS THE BETTER RIGHT TO
POSSESS THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND[.]

c.
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION HAS ALREADY
23
PRESCRIBED[.]

Prescinding therefrom, the pivotal issues for resolution are: 1) whether

or not the case is already barred by res judicata; and 2) whether or not
petitioner has the better right of possession.

The Court's Ruling

Ordinarily, when findings of the trial court are affirmed by the

appellate court, such findings are deemed conclusive and binding upon this
Court. This is in consonance with the settled rule that the Court is not a trier
of facts. Its authority under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited only to
questions of law. However, when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible, or when the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts, 24 the Court is cloaked with the authority to review factual findings
made by the lower courts.

The time-honored principle is that litigation has to end and terminate

sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of
justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause therein
should be laid to rest. 25

Corollarily, once a judgment has become final and executory, the

issues resolved therein cannot be re-litigated in a subsequent action under
the principle of res judicata.

Petitioner argues that res judicata by prior judgment is not applicable

in this case because its essential requisites do not exist. She maintains that
the order26 dismissing Civil Case No. 95-13 is not a judgment on the

23
Id. at 19. (sentence case in the original)
24 ligtas v. People, 766 Phil. 750, 762-764 (2015).
25
Guerrero v. Director, land Management Bureau, et al., 759 Phil. 99, 108 (2015).
26
Rollo, p. 120.

rl
DECISION 8 G.R. No. 225896

merits; 27 that there was no actual determination of the substantive issues

therein; 28 that there was no determination of the parties' rights and liabilities;
no pronouncement that the possession of the subject parcels of land was
granted to respondent; and there was no order cancelling the titles of the
subject parcels of land registered in the name of Segundo. 29

On the other hand, respondent maintains that petitioner's action is

already barred by res judicata because: 1) the dismissal of Civil Case No.
95-13 was an order on the merits 30 as it was a dismissal with prejudice; 31 and
2) there is, between the first and present cases, identity of parties, identity of
subject matter and identity of causes of action. 32 It further argues that the
dismissal was upon motion of the plaintiffs, through one of the heirs of
Segundo, Nilo Aledro, who was assisted by the plaintiffs' counsel. That
pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 1733 of the Rules of Court, a complaint shall not be
dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon approval of the court and
upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. 34 Specifically,
respondent explains that:

The dismissal of Civil Case No. 95-13 was an order on the merits.
Precisely, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-13 specified its dismissal to
be WITH PREJUDICE because having settled with Mario V. Advento and
respondent's predecessor, they considered the case as having been
adjudicated on the merits and they wanted the defendants in the case to be
protected against further suits involving the same subject matter. 35

Thus, respondent strongly maintains that the dismissal is equivalent to

an adjudication on the merits and has the effect of res judicata. 36

27
Id. at 19.
28
Id. at 21.
29 Id.
30
Id. at 229.
31
Id. at 227.
32
Id. at 229-230.
33
SECTION 2. Dismissal Upon Motion of Plaintiff. - Except as provided in the preceding section, a
complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon approval of the court and upon such
terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to
the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint.
The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a
separate action unless within fifteen ( 15) days from notice of the motion he manifests his preference to
have his counterclaim resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal
under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without
the approval of the rnurt.
34
Rollo, p. 230.
35
Id. at 229.
36
Id. at 227.

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 DECISION 9 G.R. No. 225896

No determination of the
parties' rights and liabilities

There is res judicata where the following four (4) essential conditions
concur, viz.: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court
rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and ( 4) there must be,
between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of
action. 37

On its face, the present case should have been barred by res judicata
because: 1) there is a final order rendered in the first case; 2) the court that
rendered the final order had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; 3) the final order was on the merits by virtue of the prejudicial
dismissal of the complaint; and 4) there is, between the first and the present
cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.

The Court, however, agrees with the petitioner that res judicata should
be disregarded.

The order of dismissal by the trial court reads:

This treats of the Motion to Dismiss dated September 18, 2003

filed by the plaintiffs, through their counsel, Atty. Vincent Paul L.
Montejo, praying this Court to grant their motion ..

WHEREFORE, there being no objection on the part of the

defendants, through their counsel, Atty. Honesto A. Carroguis, to the
dismissal of this case, the written motion adverted to above is hereby
granted and this case is hereby dismissed, as prayed for by the plaintiffs,
with prejudice.

SO ORDERED. 38

A careful scrutiny of the above order shows that there was no

judgment on the merits.

A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits

when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the

37 Cebu State College ofScience and Technology v. Misterio, et al., 760 Phil. 672, 684 (2015).
38
Rollo, p. 120.

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 DECISION 10 G.R. No. 225896

disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections; or

when the judgment is rendered after a determination of which party is right,
as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or
formal or merely technical point. 39 It is not required that a trial, actual
hearing, or argument on the facts of the case ensued, for as long as the
parties had the full legal opportunity to be heard on their respective claims
and contentions. 40

Here, the order specifically stated that the dismissal is with prejudice,
and as such, it is understood as an adjudication on the merits. Under Sec. 2,
Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal upon motion of the plaintiff is
without prejudice, except otherwise specified in the order. However, res
judicata is to be disregarded if its rigid application would involve the
sacrifice of justice to technicality, particularly in this case where there was
actually no determination of the substantive issues in the first case. 41 There
was no legal declaration of the parties' rights and liabilities. The CA
remanded the case for further reception of evidence precisely because there
were substantive issues needed to be resolved. The RTC, however, dismissed
the case allegedly upon motion of the plaintiffs, through one of the heirs,
Nilo, who prayed that the dismissal be with prejudice. The court granted the
dismissal without any sufficient legal basis other than because it was what
the plaintiffs prayed for.

The Court notes that the plaintiffs' filing of the motion to dismiss is
no longer a matter of right. As likewise provided under Sec. 2, Rule 17, a
complaint shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon
approval of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper. While there was approval by the court, the terms and conditions
upon which the prejudicial dismissal was granted was not shown. The order
granting the dismissal did not comply with Sec. 2, Rule I 7 as it did not
clearly set forth therein the terms and conditions for the dismissal. Sec. I,
Rule 36 of the Rules of Court mandates that a judgment or final order
determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court.

It must be stressed that what appears to be essential to a judgment on

the merits is that it be a reasoned decision, which clearly states the facts
and the law on which it is based. 42 Technicalities should not be permitted
to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and
39
Philippine Postal Corp. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 722 Phil. 860, 884(2013).
4
° Camarines Sur IV Electric Cooperative, Inc., et al. v. Aquino, 762 Phil. 144, 156 (2015).
41
Philippine National Bank v. The Intestate Estate of De Guzman, et al., 635 Phil. 128, 135 (20 I0).
42
Supra note 39 at 157.

11
 DECISION 11 G.R. No. 225896

obligations of the parties. Where the ends of substantial justice shall be

better served, the application of technical rules of procedure may be
relaxed. 43

The broader interest of justice as well as the circumstances of the case

justifies the relaxation of the rule on res judicata. The Court is not precluded
from re-examining its own ruling and rectifying errors of judgment if blind
and stubborn adherence to res judicata would involve the sacrifice of justice
to technicality. This is not the first time that the principle of res judicata has
been set aside in favor of substantial justice, which is after all the avowed
purpose of all law and jurisprudence. 44 Therefore, petitioner is not barred
from filing a subsequent case of similar nature.

Subsequent buyers are

buyers in bad.faith,·
petitioner has the better
right to possess the land

Respondent argues that petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest's

inaction for almost twenty (23) years from the time of execution of the lease
contract in 1972, and fourteen (14) years in the case of the deed of absolute
sale executed in 1981 barred them from seeking the nullification of the said
agreements. These arguments, however, were not resolved in the first case
which was dismissed allegedly upon motion of the plaintiff heirs.

Parenthetically, the Court cannot simply ignore the fact that the
second case, Civil Case No. 41-2005 - an action for declaration of nullity of
deed of sale and quieting of titles where the trial· court declared the deed of
absolute sale executed by Segundo in favor of Advento as null and void, and
ordered the removal of cloud upon OCT Nos. (P-6303) P-1781 and (P-6224)
P-1712, had long attained finality. Said decision was annotated at the back of
the certificates of title. Hence, even assuming arguendo that the argument of
prescription may be correct, the same becomes immaterial because by virtue
of the final and executory decision in Civil Case No. 41-2005, the only issue
left for resolution is who, between the petitioner - the heir of the registered
owner - and the respondent lessee, has a better right to possess the subject
properties.

43
Millennium Erectors Corp. v. Magallanes, 649 Phil. 199(2010).
44
De Leon v. Balinag, 530 Phil. 299 (2006). ·
 DECISION 12 G.R. No. 225896

It is a hombook rule that once a judgment has become final and

executory, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court
rendering it or by the highest court of the land, as what remains to be done is
the purely ministerial enforcement or execution of the judgment. 45

Respondent's possession as a lessee was based on a contract of lease

executed in its favor by the alleged subsequent buyers of the subject
properties, namely Ringor and later, by Gonzales and Cabufias. These buyers
only had unregistered deeds of sale in their favor. It is baffling why these
deeds, despite the long span of time, were never registered.

Interestingly, respondent kept on insisting that res judicata has already

set in, but respondent, nor any of its predecessors-in-interest, did not cause
the cancellation of the certificate of title registered in the name of Segundo.
Since 1981 when Segundo allegedly sold the subject property to Advento,
two subsequent transfers have been made, the last buyers being Gonzales
and Cabufias. Yet, the certificates of title of the parcels of land undisputedly
remain under the name of Segundo and have never been transferred to any of
the subsequent buyers up to the present. Neither were the purported deeds of
sale executed in favor of Ringor, Gonzales and Cabufias, and other
subsequent transferees registered nor annotated on the certificates of title of
the subject properties.

Thus, when Ringor purchased the lands from Advento, and was later
purchased by Gonzales and Cabufias from Ringor, they did not directly deal
with the registered owner of the land. The fact that the lands were not in the
name of their sellers should have put them on guard and should have
prompted them to inquire on the status of the properties being sold to them.

Clearly, Ringor, Gonzales and Cabufias cannot be considered buyers

in good faith because of their failure to exercise due diligence as regards
their respective sale transactions. While this Court protects the right of the
innocent purchaser for value and does not require him to look beyond the
certificate of title, this protection is not extended to a purchaser who is not
dealing with the registered owner of the land. In case the buyer does not deal
with the registered owner of the real property, the law requires that a higher
degree of prudence be exercised by the purchaser. 46

45
One Shipping Corp., et al. v. Pena.fie!, 751 Phil. 204, 210 (2015).
46
Heirs ofthe late Fe/fr M Bucton v. Sps. Go, 721 Phil. 851, 864 (2013).

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 DECISION 13 G.R. No. 225896

While registration is not necessary to transfer ownership, it is,

however, the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third
persons are concerned. 47 Since Advento did not register the deed of sale and
no transfer certificate was issued in his name, it did not bind the land insofar
as Ringor, Gonzales and Cabufias, as subsequent buyers, are concerned.

Moreover, the Court observes that Gonzales and Cabufias represented

themselves as the registered owners of the subject property in the Contract
of Lease48 they executed in favor of Lapanday Foods Corporation, a
corporation which the respondent admitted as its affiliate. Ordinarily, with
such a representation, it is human nature to require the presentation of the
certificate of title to prove one's alleged ownership. In this case, however,
Lapanday Foods Corporation did not require the presentation of the
certificates of title. This led Us to the belief that respondent, including its
affiliate Lapanday Foods Corporation, and its predecessors-in-interest knew
right from the beginning that the unregistered deeds of sale, which showed
the transfers of the subject properties to different persons while the former
maintain in possession thereof, were but a sham.

Ultimately, in this jurisdiction, a certificate of title serves as evidence

of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein and that a person who has a Torrens title
over a land is entitled to the possession thereof. 49 Thus, as against the
registered owner and the holder of an unregistered deed of sale, it is the
former who has a better right to possess. 50 In this case, it is the petitioner
who, being an heir of the registered owner Segundo, acquires a better right
of possession over the parcels of land covered by OCT Nos. (P-6303) P-
1781 and (P-6224) P-1712.

Registered owner's action to

recover possession is not barred
by prescription or by !aches

An action to recover possession of a registered land never prescribes

in view of the provision of Sec. 44 of Act No. 496 to the effect that no title
to registered land in derogation of that of a registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. It follows that an action by
the registered owner to recover a real property registered under the Torrens

47
Section 50, Act No. 496; Saberon, et al. v. Ventani/la, Jr., et al., 733 Phil. 275, 299 (2014).
48
Rollo, pp. 147-149.
49
Heirs of Maligaso, Sr. v. Spouses Encinas, 688 Phil. 516, 523 (2012).
5
° Catindig v. Vda. de Meneses, 656 Phil. 361, 372-373 (2011).

;/
 ... '

DECISION 14 G.R. No. 225896

System does not prescribe. 51 The rule on imprescriptibility of registered

lands not only applies to the registered owner but extends to the heirs of
the registered owner as well. 52 Therefore, petitioner's right to recover
possession did not prescribe.

Likewise, laches did not bar petitioner's right of recovery. An action

to recover registered land covered by the Torrens System may not generally
be barred by laches. Neither can laches be set up to resist the enforcement of
an imprescriptible legal right. 53 It is a principle based on equity and may not
prevail against a specific provision of law, because equity, which has been
defined as "justice outside legality," is applied in the absence of and not
against statutory law or rules of procedure. 54

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated February 15, 2016 in CA-G.R. CV No. 03735 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the 1st Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Carmen-Sto. Tomas-Braulio E. Dujali, Davao del Norte dated
May 10, 2011 in Civil Case No. 218-10 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

51
Heirs of Nieto v. Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan, 564 Phil. 674, 679 (2007).
52
Id. at 680.
53
Akang v. Municipality of /sulan, Sultan Kudarat Province, 712 Phil. 420, 439 (2013).
54
Supra note 51 at 681.
DECISION 15 G.R. No. 225896

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITER<YJ. VELASCO, JR.

(On official business)

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

s ~axtTIRES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been/eached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the o
Court's Division.

PRESBITE~J. VELASCO, JR.

Assa iate Justice
Chairpers n, Third Division
'

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DECISION 16 G.R. No. 225896

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CA
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296)
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended

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