This is a reproduction of a library book that was digitized

by Google as part of an ongoing effort to preserve the

information in books and make it universally accessible.

https://books.google.com
- - - -- 一 --
一 一
 FED - DOCS
PREX 3.2 : 3 34/2002 /v.1

ONDS
BALKANR

OUNDS
BATTLEGR

HOS

RA NI
DO REM
MSP
HSP
HV HVO

OICKA
CPICKA B
OBJ
EKA

T
P
C
КРАС

ARMITA

d
n
i
w
UNPROFOR AP ZAPADNBAOSAN
КРАЈИНА

VOLUME 1
 The numerous extracts reprinted from The Death of Yugoslavia by
Laura Silber and Allan Little, published by BBC Worldwide Limited /
Penguin , are Copyright (c ) Laura Silber and Allan Little 1996 .
Permission is gratefully acknowledged

Balkan Battlegounds is published by the Central Intelligence Agency

for public use. Comments and queries are welcome andmay be
addressed to :

Central Intelligence Agency

Attn : Office of Public Affairs
Washington, DC 20505
Telephone: [1 ] (703) 482-7778
FAX [ 1] (703) 482-3790

Sales information is available at:

Superintendent of Documents
P.O , Box 371954
Pittsburgh , PA 15250-7954
Telephone: [ 1] (202 ) 512-1800
FAX : ( 1 ] ( 202) 512-2250
http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port RoyalRoad
Springfield , VA 22161
Telephone: [ 1 ] (703) 605-6000
FAX : [ 1 ] (703) 605-6900
http://www.ntis.gov/

Document Expediting (DOCEX ) Project

Exchange and Gift Division
Library of Congress
101 Independence Avenue, SE
Washington , DC 20540-4230
Telephone: [ 1] (202) 707-9527
FAX : [ 1 ] ( 202) 707-0380

L SUP
OBA POR
T
GL &
MULTI-MEDIA Imaging& Publishing Support
PRODUCTION GROUP wheremim come's first

— - -
 Balkan Battlegrounds :

A Military History of the Yugoslav

Conflict, 1990-1995

Volume I

Central Intelligence Agency ,

Office of Russian and European Analysis,
Washington , DC 20505

May 2002

29 6350 950
XL
2/03 31150-63 NLB
- 一、 - - ---
一
 OGNIS

Balkan Battlegrounds:
A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict,
1990-1995
Volume I

Contents
Page
Foreword xi
Preface xiii
Glossary xix
Key Military Terms and Equipment

1
The Balkan Crises : Chronology of Significant Events, 1991-1995
Section I: Introduction ; Slovenia 1990-1991 41
Chapter 1: Loosed Anarchy : The Origins of the Balkan Conflict 43

Chapter 2 : “ Brotherhood and Unity:" The Yugoslav People's Army 46

Within a Dying State
Chapter 3 : Slovenia: Background to War 49

Chapter 4 : Slovenia : The 10 -Day War 57

Chapter 5 : Goliath Defeated : What Went Wrong in the JNA ? 68
Section II : Croatia 1990-1991 79

Chapter 6 : 1990 : The Origins of the Croatian War 81

Chapter 7 : 1991: Extending Politics by OtherMeans 85

Chapter 8 : The JNA Fails To Halt Secession 86
Chapter 9 : The Croatian Pot Boils Over 89

Chapter 10 : War : Croatia Attacks the JNA , September 1991 94

Chapter 11: The JNA, Serbia , and the Croatian War, 96
Fall -Winter 1991
Chapter 12: Ending the War : The Vance Plan 105

Chapter 13: Outcomes and Evaluation of the Forces 107

Section III: Bosnia 1991-1992 : Yugoslavia's Time Bomb 117
Chapter 14 : Bosnia : Yugoslavia's Time Bomb 119

Chapter 15 : Political Developments Along the Road 122

to War, 1990-1992
Chapter 16 : Serbia , the JNA, and the Bosnian Serbs : 127
January 1990 - April 1992
Chapter 17 : The Bosnian Muslims in 1992: The " Patriotic League" 130
-Bosnia's Muslims Begin To Organize
Chapter 18 : The Bosnian Croat Militaries: HOS and HVO 133
Chapter 19: The War Begins: The Bosnian War in 1992 134

Chapter 20 : Northeastern Bosnia , April 1992: The Axe Falls 137

Chapter 21: Bosnian Serb War Aims and Military Strategy, 1992 140

Chapter 22 : Bosnian Government War Aims and Military Strategy 142

Chapter 23 : Croatian Political Objectives and Military Strategy 144

in Bosnia , 1991-1992

Chapter 24 : Ethnic Cleansing as a Military Operation : 144

Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Kljuc, May - July 1992
Chapter 25 : The Battle for the Corridor : Operations in the Posavina 145
 Chapter 26 : The VRS Assault on Jajce , July -November 1992 147
Chapter 27 : The Bihac Pocket, 1992 148

Chapter 28 : Battles on the Drina, Round One: April to 150

December 1992

Chapter 29 : Sarajevo , 1992: The Siege Begins 152

Chapter 30 : The Battles for Herzegovina , 1992 154

Chapter 31: Dress Rehearsal for a New War: The 1992 158
Croat-Muslim Clashes
Chapter 32: Conclusions 160
Section IV : Bosnia 1993: Neighbor Versus Neighbor Versus Neighbor 177
Chapter 33 : The Bosnian War in 1993: 179
Neighbor Versus Neighbor Versus Neighbor
Chapter 34 : Searching for Peace : The Vance -Owen and 182
" Invincible ” Plans, 1993
Chapter 35 : Widening the Serb Corridor: Brcko , January -July 1993 183
Chapter 36 : Battles on the Drina, Round Two, December 1992 184
to August 1993
Chapter 37 : The Siege Continues, Sarajevo 1993 186
Chapter 38 : " The Man Who Would Be King" : Fikret Abdic and 187
the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia
Chapter 39:Neighbor Fighting Neighbor: The Croat-Muslim 189
Descent Into War

Chapter 40 : Central Bosnia Afire: The HVO’s Lasva Valley 191

Offensive, April 1993
Chapter 41: The Alliance Shattered : TheMostar and Herzegovina 194
Battles,May 1993
Chapter 42 : The Bosnian Army Fights Back : The Lasva Valley 194
Counteroffensive, June- July 1993
Chapter 43: The Three -Sided War: Zepce, Zavidovici, 196
and Maglaj, June-July 1993
Chapter 44 : Zagreb Intervenes To Stem the Tide , July 1993 197

Chapter 45: The Contest for the Southern Road : Bugojno , 198
Gornji Vakuf, and Prozor, July -December 1993
Chapter 46 : The Croat-Muslim War in Herzegovina, June-July 1993 200
Chapter 47: The Conflict That Wasn't: The Croat-Muslim Alliance 201
Holds in Parts of Bosnia
Chapter 48: Seesaw and Stasis : The Croat-Muslim War, 202
August- December 1993
Chapter 49: Conclusion : The End of 1993 207
Section V : Bosnia 1994: The Turning Point 217

Chapter 50 : The Bosnian War in 1994 : The Turning Point 219

Chapter 51: Bosnian Serb War Aims, Military Strategy , and 220
Political-Military Relations, 1994
Chapter 52: Bosnian Government Objectives and Military 223
Strategy in 1994

iv

-
-

- - - -
-

- - --- - -
 CIONIS

Chapter 53: Bosnian Croat War Aims and Military Strategy in 1994 224
Chapter 54 : My Enemy, My Ally — The End of the Croat-Muslim War 226
and the Washington Agreement, January -March 1994
Chapter 55 : Operation “ Drina 93" : The Bosnian Serb " End the War" 228
Offensive , November 1993 to March 1994
Chapter 56 : The Bosnian Army's “ Spring Offensive " Commences, 230
March 1994
Chapter 57: The ARBiH Spring Offensive Continues, April - June 1994 232

Chapter 58 : The Battle of Vozuca , Ozren Mountains, June - July 1994 235

Chapter 59 : The Northeast Bosnia Battles, August-November 1994 235

Chapter 60 : Last Man Standing — The ARBiH -VRS Battles in 237
Central Bosnia , August-November 1994
Chapter 61: Bosnian Army Operations in Southeast Bosnia , 239
September-November 1994
Chapter 62: Combined Croat-Muslim Operations in West-Central Bosnia , 242
October -November 1994
Chapter 63: The Western Theater 244
Chapter 64: Conclusion 251
Section VI: Croatia 1993-1994: Biding Its Time, Building Its Army 265

Chapter 65: General Bobetko and the Army Reorganization, 267

November 1992
Chapter 66 : Back to the Frontlines: War Renewed , 268
January 1993 -March 1994
Chapter 67:Mladic's Little Brothers — The Krajina Serb Army 269

Chapter 68: The New HV_Doctrine, Training, and Force Structure , 272
1993-1994
Chapter 69: The Diplomats Fail - Croatia Irredenta and the 276
March 1994 Cease - Fire
Section VII : The Bosnian and Croatian Wars in 1995 : 281
The Long and Bloody Path to Dayton
Chapter 70 : The Bosnian Army in 1995 283

Chapter 71: The HVO in 1995 — Still Playing in the Minor Leagues 285

Chapter 72 : The Rocky Road Toward Croat-Muslim Federation , 287

March 1994 - November 1995

Chapter 73: The “ Red Generals " Refuse to Bow - Political-Military 288
Relations and the Strategic Debate in Republika Srpska, 1995
Chapter 74 : Dudakovic Takes the Initiative — The Battles Around 292
Bihac City, January - February 1995
Chapter 75 : Abdic -Krajina Serb Operations in Bihac , January -June 1995 293

Chapter 76 : The Croatian -Serbian War Begins Again , January -June 1995 295

Chapter 77: The " Skok” Operations- The HV Continues its Drive, 295
Spring 1995
Chapter 78 : “ Who Will Rule the Airwaves ?” — The Contests for 300
Mts . Vlasic and Stolice , 1995
Chapter 79 : ARBiH 1st and 5th Corps Offensive Operations, 304
March - July 1995

V
 Chapter 80 : The Sarajevo Breakout Attempt, June 1995 307

Chapter 81: The Fall of Srebrenica ,July 1995 — Bosnia's Darkest Hour 316

Chapter 82: Srebrenica — The Military Forces 321

Chapter 83: The Battle , 6-11 July 1995 324
Chapter 84: Srebrenica : After the Battle 340

Chapter 85 : Srebrenica — Analysis and Aftermath 350

Chapter 86 : The Demise of Zepa - A Second Safe Area Falls 355

Chapter 87 : Srebrenica Aftermath — Gorazde and Operation 360

“ Daring Lion ”
Chapter 88: The Fateful Krajina Serb Offensive Against Bihac , July 1995 361

Chapter 89: Operation “ Oluja” —The Fall of the Krajina Serb Republic , 367
August 1995
Chapter 90 : “ Deliberate Force” —NATO Airpower Over Bosnia , 377
30 August - 20 September 1995
Chapter 91: Operation “Maestral" and Operation " Sana 95" -Decision 379
in Western Bosnia

Chapter 92 : The ARBiH Offensive Operations, September October 1995 384

Chapter 93 : End Game— The Fall of SanskiMost and Mrkonjic Grad , 390
October 1995
Chapter 94 : Evaluation — The Cease - Fire Agreement and the Final 391
Offensives
Chapter 95 : Conclusions — The Slovenian , Croatian , and Bosnian 396
Wars of 1991-95

Appendixes
A. Order of Battle: Slovene Territorial Defense Forces (IO ), June-July 1991 431
B. Order of Battle: Yugoslav People's Army ( JNA), Fifth Military District 435
During Slovenia Operations, June- July 1991
C. Skeleton Order of Battle, Yugoslav People's Army (JNA ) Strategic 441
Offensive, Late September 1991 to 1 January 1992
D. Skeleton Croatian Army (Croatian National Guard ) Order of Battle , 445
October 1991 - January 1992
E. The Organization of the Croatian Army, January 1995 447
F. The Organization of the Krajina Serb Army, January 1995 455
G. Skeleton Bosnian Serb Army Order of Battle , July 1995 459
H. Skeleton Bosnian Army Order of Battle , October 1995 469
I. Croatian Defense Council Order of Battle , October 1995 481
J. Sketches and Photos of Key Wartime Commanders 485

vi
 COGNIS

Index 493

Maps (In Separate Case )

1 - Slovenia: The Ten Day War, June-July 1991
2 — Croatia: Battle of Vukovar, September-November 1991
3 — Croatia: Eastern Slavonia, September 1991 - January 1992
4Croatia : Western Slavonia, September 1991- January 1992
5 — Croatia : Banija-Kordun -Lika Operations, October 1991 - January 1992
6 — Croatia : Knin -Zadar-North Dalmatia Operations, January 1992
7 - Croatia : Dubrovnik, October 1991 -January 1992
8 - Bosnia : Kupres, April 1992
9 — Bosnia: Posavina Corridor, April-June 1992
10 — Bosnia : Posavina Corridor, June-July 1992
11 - Bosnia : Posavina Corridor, August 1992 - January 1993
12 — Bosnia : Bosanski Brod , July -October 1992
13 — Bosnia : Jajce , July -November 1992
14Bosnia : Zvornik -Srebrenica , April-December 1992
15 — Bosnia: Foca-Gorazde, May-December 1992
16 — Herzegovina: Dubrovnik , April-June 1992
17 - Herzegovina : Dubrovnik , June-October 1992
18 — West-Central Bosnia, January 1994
19 — Bosnia : Brcko, July 1993
20 — Bosnia : Srebrenica-Cerska , January 1993
21 - Bosnia : Srebrenica -Cerska,March- April 1993
22 — Bosnia : Gorazde- Trnovo, January -August 1993
23— Bosnia : Bihac , 1993
24Bosnia : Vitez, June 1993 - January 1994
25 — Bosnia : Kiseljak , December 1993
26_Herzegovina : Jablanica -Konjic, 1993
27 — Bosnia : Vares-Stupni Do, October-November 1993
28 — Bosnia : Sapna- Teocak , November-December 1993
29 — Bosnia :Maglaj- Tesanj, November-December 1993
30 — Bosnia : Olovo , November 1993– January 1994
31 - Bosnia : Bihac, February 1994
32 — Bosnia : Gorazde, April 1994
33 — Bosnia : Cemerska, May 1994
34Bosnia : Cemerska, August -November 1994

vii
35 — Bosnia : Vozuca , June- July 1994
36 — Bosnia : Doboj-Gradacac , August-November 1994
37 — Bosnia : Bihac, August-September 1994
38 — Bosnia : Bihac, October 1994
39 — Bosnia : Bihac,November December 1994
40 — Bosnia : Livno Valley , November -December 1994
41 - Bosnia : Donji Vakuf, 1994
42 — Bosnia :Mount Vlasic , 1994
43 — Bosnia : Tesanj-Teslic , 1994
44Bosnia :Mt. Stolice, 1994
45 — Bosnia : Kladanj, May 1994
46 — Northern Herzegovina, 1994
47 — Bosnia : Mt. Bjelasnica & Mt. Treskavica , 1994
48 — Bosnia : Kupres, October-November 1994
49 — Bosnia : Bihac , January -August 1994
50 — Croatia : Operation Oluja , 4-8 August 1995
51 — Western Bosnia , September October 1995
52 — Bosnia & Croatia: Livno Valley , April-June 1995
53 — Croatia : Western Slavonia ,May 1995
54Bosnia : Orasje ,May -June 1995
55 — Bosnia : Bihac, January - July 1995
56 — Bosnia : Bihac , July 1995
57 — Bosnia & Croatia: Livno Valley , 25-30 July 1995
58 — Bosnia:Mt. Vlasic,March 1995
59 — Bosnia : Mt. Stolice , 1995
60 — Bosnia :Mt. Treskavica, 1995
61 - Bosnia : Donji Vakuf, 1995
62 — Bosnia: Srebrenica & Zepa , July 1995
63 — Bosnia :Ozren Mountains, September October 1995

A : The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia , 1990

B : Republic of Croatia , 1990
C : Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1990
D : Ethnic Composition in the Former Yugoslavia , 1991
E : Military Terrain of Former Yugoslavia
F : JNA Strategic Offensive Plan , 1991
G : Sarajevo : The JNA Attacks, 2 May 1992
H : Sarajevo : The Bosnian Army Attempts to Capture Four Key Hilltops, 8 June 1992
I: National Battalions in UN Forces in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Early 1993
J: Areas of Control in Bosnia and Herzegovina , July 1993
K : Sarajevo and Vicinity , Early January 1994
L : Areas of Control in Bosnia and Herzegovina, September 1994

viii
-

-- -- -- - - ---
 WHOVNJS

M : Corps Boundaries and Headquarters in Croatia, January 1995

N : Bosnian Army Offensive Operations in Sarajevo Region , June 1995
O : UN Forces in Croatia , Early 1995

P :UN Deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, October 1995

Q : Areas of Control in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20 October 1995

ix
一、 -- - - 一 --- 一 --
-
 © 20ANVIS

Foreword

Yugoslavia has been identified as one of those places where they produce
more history than they can consume locally. In the United States, where
widespread and unapologetic ignorance of history is commonplace, the grip
of long-ago battles and long -dead kings on the thinking of apparently edu
cated , cultured , Westernized people in the former Yugoslav federation can
be baffling. William Faulkner had the old South in mind when he wrote ,
“ The past is not dead . It is not even past," but his observation certainly
applies to the former Yugoslavia as well. To understand the former Yugosla
via's present and future , therefore , a study of its history becomes essential.
Thorough and accurate in its research and analysis, this work aims to
advance the reader's understanding of the military events that have shaped
the devolution of Yugoslavia and the evolution of its daughter states.

The United States really has no choice but to try to understand the history of
the former Yugoslavia. Since the end of the Cold War, the former Yugosla
via has been the point of origin of new enemies and potential allies. It is the
locus of open -ended US military deployments . The former Yugoslavia has
become the central issue of US relations with Europe, east and west. All the
elements of US national security policy - military, diplomatic, developmen
tal, and intelligence — willmost likely have to engage the multifaceted real
ities of the former Yugoslavia more deeply than with those of happier lands.

To accept that the United States will be a vital part of the postwar shaping of
the Balkan states, yet to be in ignorance of what actually went on in the
wars that turned Yugoslavia into the former Yugoslavia , would be foolish .
Imagine a traveler from those lands stepping off the packet from Trieste to
Baltimore in 1866 , aware only of newspaper accounts of a long and bloody
civil war. He knows who has won, but remains ignorant of the military par
ticulars of the war. This hypothetical traveler would have puzzled at refer
ences to Pickett's Charge , General Sherman and his March to the Sea , or
Andersonville and would have been unconscious of the many myths grow
ing from their hard realities. Hewould not understand that these wars would
shape American life , politics, and culture for generations . The wars of the
former Yugoslavia had their own versions of all these in full measure . Both
myths and realities will shape the futures of these countries .

We are all entitled to our own opinion . We are not entitled to our own his
tory. The misuse of history has been widespread in portrayals of events in
the former Yugoslavia. This applies not only to themythmakers and self
exculpators in the region but also to those watching it from the United

xi
States, as any reading of newspaper op -ed pages during the recent Kosovo
crisis would make painfully obvious . The “ lessons ” of the former Yugosla
via are regularly invoked to demonstrate a wide variety of propositions
about an equally wide variety of topics, some appropriate , others less so . If,
in the United States, future military and political analysts seek to use these
lessons as more than rhetoric , they will have to turn to the history of the
recent Balkan wars.

This work , the first comprehensive military analysis of the wars of the
former Yugoslavia , aimsto present, objectively and analytically, such a his
tory. If the journalistic accounts and contemporaneous analyses of regional
specialists were the proverbial first draft of history, then this two -volume
book is surely the second . It has used the full spectrum of open sources and
a plethora ofmaps to tell the story of the wars in the former Yugoslavia ,
from the events leading to the first shots in Slovenia to the Dayton cease
fire in Bosnia. It aimsnot least at military narrative but also at analyzing the
complex parallel processes at work on the battlefield and in the emergence
of professionalnational armed forces. It examines the relationship of local
and regional actions and trends within a national and international context.
These relations and connectionsmay not have been obvious in the “ first
draft,” but they are here, set out along with the narrative ofmilitary actions
and accompanied by detailed maps .

The history of the most prolonged series of armed conflicts in Europe since
1945 has obvious applicability to those who will have to deal with the
region . Staff colleges, regional analysts, and others will find this book a
framework for contemplating the nature of contemporary and future war
fare in the former Yugoslavia and similar regions. They, like the lay readers ,
will have to deal with the long-lasting results of such emotionally charged
military actions as the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia , the siege of Srebrenica ,
and the Sarajevo marketplace shelling incidents. In these pages they will
find the raw material of such events professionally researched , accurately
presented , and soberly analyzed .

David C. Isby
Washington DC , 1999

xii

- - - - - - -
 S
CON

Preface

Balkan Battlegrounds provides a military history of the conflict in the

former Yugoslavia between 1990 and 1995. It was produced by two military
analysts in the Central Intelligence Agency who tracked military develop
ments in the region throughout this period and then applied their experience
to producing an unclassified treatise for general use.

**: *****

Since the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the

years 1990-92 , much has been written about the genesis of the crisis, the
diplomatic efforts to end the ensuing wars, and the war crimes that these
wars spawned . Many journalists, and a number of United Nationsmilitary
officers, have published personal accounts of their time spent in Yugoslavia ,
Bosnia in particular. To date, however, we know of no comprehensive anal
ysis of the 1990-95 war in Yugoslavia as military history. Our objective in
preparing this study was to detail the military events of 1990-1995 and ana
lyze why campaigns and battles proceeded as they did and whether they
achieved the political objectives or war aims for which they were fought.

A key goal in our study was to dispel the many myths thathave sprung up
with regard to the conflict. Chief among these myths is the perception that
the war was fought by hordes of heavily armed “ paramilitary ” thugs , oper
ating outside of any government or only loosely controlled by a govern
ment, or that the so -called “ armies” consisted of nothing more than loosely
organized regional warlords and militias and that it was these thugs who
were responsible for the “ ethnic cleansing” that infamously distinguished so
many of the campaigns. In fact, virtually all ofthe fighting was done by
professionally led , relatively well-organized citizen armies, and the contrary
view is largely the product ofmirror- imaging by Western officers who regu
larly disparaged the appearance, discipline, and professionalism of the
armies involved . In opposition to these superficial assessments, our
research showed that each army quickly developed a regular structure with
a centralized staff controlling a hierarchy of formations and units including
specialized tactical and support elements, such as air defense , transport,
training, military police, and communications. Each force had a defined
chain of command and all the features of a regular army, including a general
staff that developed operationaland tactical doctrines to achieve strategic
objectives successfully, a professional or professionalizing officer corps,

xiii
 procedures for the promotion or replacement of officers , and a training
establishment for officers and enlisted personnel. Having evolved from , in
many cases, reservist territorial forces and locally formed ad hoc militias
who learned their first lessons on the battlefield , these armies did notmeet
Western professional standards. They were not in business to fightthe West,
however, only each other, and gauging their military effectiveness by the
standards of NATO or the former Warsaw Pact has led to a distorted view of
the conflict.

Although there were many highly publicized clashes between civilian and
military leaders and occasional claims of “ rogue ” military commanders act
ing without political authorization , all of the military forces were subordi
nate to their civilian leaderships and responded to political direction on key
issues:

· Professionalism and the Officer Corps: All of the militaries succeeded in

professionalizing their officer corps and fighting forces — establishing
full-time officer corps functioning in obedience to higher authority and
with a common doctrine . Professionalization was largely a “ top- down ”
process,beginning with the senior military leadership (usually former
Yugoslav People's Armyofficers ) and progressing down through the
ranks . The armies also formalized their military structures, established
and enforced standards of conduct for their officers and troops , and either
incorporated independent militias or disbanded those that resisted their
control. Disciplinemight be uneven within individual units of the forces,
butmilitary police elements enforced obedience to orders from general
staff to brigade level.

.
Military Doctrine: Although they lacked the doctrinal history and sophis
tication of Western militaries , the various armies each developed combat
doctrines tailored to their military capabilities for the pursuit of defined
political-military strategies. The manpower-short Bosnian Serbs, for
example , sought to use their advantages in artillery, firepower,mobility,
and training to minimize casualties. Conversely, the Bosnian Army con
sciously adopted a strategy of attrition and limited territorial gains that
employed light infantry tactics suited to its superiority in numbers and its
deficiencies in equipment.

Training : All of the combatants worked actively to develop a professional

officer corps with a uniform program of education. They made the most
of the personnel inherited from the Yugoslav People's Army ( JNA) and
either used former JNA officer cadre and training schools or established
their own training centers for basic and advanced training, officer courses ,

xiy

- - - - - - - - - — -
 S
CIONE

and a variety of other schooling. All regularized their rank structures and
command organizations . Troop instruction evolved from ad hoc , personal
weapons training to moderately effective regular programs including
small- unit exercises and preattack rehearsals.

• Combat Operations: The scope of combat operations steadily increased

during the war, and the adversaries reached the capability of planning and
undertaking complex military operations involving tens of thousands of
combatants over frontages of dozens or hundreds of kilometers . Coordi
nation and execution of actual operations would still be flawed , but they
would be based on a well-established cycle of political direction , plan
ning, instruction , logistic support, and combat.

The myth of the so -called “ paramilitaries” has persisted , although few , if

any,major independent paramilitary units operated after 1992. Of the origi
nal independent forces, nearly all were either incorporated into the contend
ing armies or disbanded ; the rest were only nominally independent.Many
units that carried odd or irregular unit designators, such as the “ Black
Swans ” or “ Panthers,” were former paramilitary units that had been
absorbed into the regular armies and were firmly under their command and
control. Throughout the war, all of the so -called Serb “ paramilitaries” were
in fact volunteer units formed by the Yugoslav and Serb armies and attached
to regular units or were military formations such as Arkan's Serbian Vol
unteer Guard — covertly formed , trained , and directed by Serbian State
Security

In addition , we believe that misunderstandings regarding the nature of the

forces involved have led to a perception in somequarters that the 1990
1995 wars involved a large number ofinsurgents operating in the mountains
as part of a protracted guerrilla war. With the sole exception of the Ten -Day
War in Slovenia — which escapes classification — the Balkan conflict
involved conventional, positional warfare , more akin to World War I than
Tito's partisan struggles in World War II. Trench and bunker lines , fronted
by extensive minefields, faced each other throughout Croatia and Bosnia
across a no man's land that would have looked familiar to men of the
1914-18 war. Until late 1995most combat operations were attempts to gain
control over key roads , hills, and villages a few kilometers or meters from
the frontline, not rapid strikes deep into enemy territory .

Finally, in detailing the full extent of the combat operations in Yugoslavia,

we hope to take the spotlight off the siege of Sarajevo and place it on the
trenches lacing the mountains of Croatia and Bosnia . The status of Sarajevo

XV
 was key to the war aims of both the Muslim -led Bosnian Government and
the Bosnian Serb Republic , as well as a potent symbol in the West of the
wars' brutalities . The presence ,however, of Western media in the city — and
less frequently, elsewhere — distorted Sarajevo's centrality to the conflict.
We hope to refocus attention on other battlefields where the outcome of the
war was actually decided .

Given the dearth of primary archival material, the authors ' research for this
project relied heavily on local and Western daily press accounts — by radio ,
television , and wire services — contemporary localnewspaper or magazine
interviews with military commanders, articles in wartime and postwar offi
cialmilitary journals, and the memoirs of some of the commanders.Many
of the local press reports, articles, and books provided a surprising amount
of specific information on military operations, including geographic objec
tives , order of battle , commanders , and the outcome and aftermath of the
operations. The challenge facing the authors was to use their experience as
intelligence analysts to ensure that the various unclassified sources they
used primarily of Balkan origin — did not distort the record of events they
have attempted to capture .

Typically, in researching an individual campaign or battle, the authors

would cull the local daily radio and wire service reports, supplemented by
Western press reports, to develop a timeline ofmilitary events. These events
were then tracked on 1/50,000-scale terrain maps. Comparison of the
opposing sides ' reports made it possible to deduce the battle's actual evolu
tion and outcome. Contemporary and postwar accounts in military journals,
magazines and newspapers, and the published memoirs of leading partici
pants , were used to fill gaps, add unit information , and describe where the
battle fit into the overall campaign.

This study is organized in two volumes to make it useful to both the nonspe
cialist general reader and to professional soldiers, Balkan scholars, and mil
itary historians. Volume I is a narrative covering the genesis of Yugoslavia's
breakup in 1990 through the end of the Bosnian war in October 1995. It is
divided into an introduction and sections covering the Ten -Day War in Slo
venia , the 1991 war in Croatia , each year of the Bosnian war from 1992
through 1994, the development of the Croatian Army and the progress of
the Croatian -Serb conflict, and a 1995 section that combines Croatia and
Bosnia . Volume II, which will appear within a year, consists of a set of
annexes covering the 1991 War in Croatia and the 1992-1994 periods of the
Bosnian war. These providemore detailed accounts of individual battles,
campaigns, and other topics, such as the organization of the Bosnian Serb

xvi
-
-

-
-

- - - - - - - -
1
 WIOSNYS

Army and the status of the UN Protection Force . Because many parts of
Volume I are summaries of an annex in Volume II, the source references are
frequently given in the appropriate annex . For the year 1995 , however, the
authors dispensed with separate annexes and incorporated most of the infor
mation thatwould have been included in an annex within themain text or in
supporting endnotes. A separate Map Case accompanies Volume I.

The recent book Knin Je Pao U Beogradu (Knin Fell in Belgrade ) was
received as this study was being prepared for publication , and the authors
were unable to fully incorporate information from this book in Volume I.
Written by Major GeneralMilisav Sekulic , a senior former Krajina Serb
ArmyMain Staff officer, this book sheds new light on the Krajina Serb
Army - especially the July 1995 operation against Bihac and the Croatian
offensive against the Krajina in August 1995. As time permits, an adden
dum in Volume II will address this information .

We gratefully acknowledge our debt to BBC Worldwide Limited /Penguin ,

and to authors Laura Silber and Allan Little for allowing us to quote liber
ally from their book , Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation , which helped provide
much of the political context for ourmilitary analysis. We consider their
work the best overall account of the conflict yet published , integrating polit
ical,military ,and humanitarian events into an easily readable narrative . We
particularly appreciate their incisive analysis of the origins of the breakup
and the events preceding the outbreak of the Croatian war in September
1991. Their study was one of the few to detect the splits between the Yugo
slav People's Army and Slobodan Milosevic in 1990-1991 and to note that,
at least initially, the Yugoslav /Serb side was not a monolith .

The conclusions, judgments, and opinions we have expressed in this book

are solely and entirely those of the authors and are not to be represented
as emanating from the Central Intelligence Agency or the United States
Government.

The Authors
McLean , Virginia
December 2001

xvii
- -- -- - 一 一 一
一
 Glossary

Key Military Termsand Equipment

Military Forces and Organizations

ARBiH Armija Republika Bosna i Hercegovina — Bosnian Army

HV Hrvatska Vojska - Croatian Army

HRM Hrvatska Ratna Mornarica — Croatian Navy

HRZ Hrvatsko ratno zrakoplovstvo — Croatian Air Force

HRZ i PZO Hrvatsko ratno zrakoplovstvo i protuzracna odbrana - Croatian Air Forces
and Air Defense

HVO Hrvatsko Vijece Odbrane — Croatian Defense Council/Bosnian Croat Army

JNA Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija — Yugoslav People's Army (prewar )

JRM Jugoslovenska Ratna Mornarica - Yugoslav Navy

NDH Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska — Independent State of Croatia

(WW II Croat state )

RSK Republika Srpska Krajina — Krajina Serb Republic

RV i PVO Ratno vazduhoplovstvo i protivvazdusna odbrana — Yugoslav Air and

Air Defense Force

SSNO Savezni Sekretarijat za Narodnu Odbranu — Federal Secretariat of

National Defense

SVK Srpska Vojska Krajina — Krajina Serb Army

TO Teritorijalna Odbrana — Territorial Defense

VJ Vojska Jugoslavija — Yugoslav Army

VRS Vojska Republika Srpska - Bosnian Serb Army

xix
V i PVO Vazduhoplovstvo i Protivvazdusne Odbrana — Bosnian Serb Air and
Air Defense Force

ZNG Zbor Narodne Garde - National Guard Corps (pre- 1992 Croatian military)

Interior Ministry, Internal Security, and Intelligence Organizations

MUP Ministarstvo Unutrasnje Poslova — Ministry of Internal Affairs

SBP Specijalne Brigada Policija — Special Police Brigade (RS)

UB Uprava Bezbednosti — JNA /VJ Security Directorate

KOS Kontraobavestajna Sluzba — old name for JNA Security Directorate

SDB Sluzba Drzavne Bezbednosti - State Security Service (Serb — old term ]

RDB Rezor Drzavne Bezbednosti — State Security Department (Serb - new term ]

SJB Sluzba Javne Bezbednosti — Public Security Service

SIS Signurnosno Izvestajna Sluzba — Security and Intelligence Service

(HV /HVO )

SSUP (Savezni Sekretarijatza Unutrasnje Poslove)—Federal Secretariat

of Internal Affairs

Political Parties

HDZ Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica — Croatian Democratic Union (Croatia )

SDA Stranka Demokratske Akcije - Party of Democratic Action (Bosnian

Muslim )

SDS Srpska Demokratska Stranka — Serbian Democratic Party (Bosnian Serb )

SPS Socialisticka Partija Srbije- Serbian Socialist Party

XX

-
-

- - -
-

- - - - -
 --

Military Echelons

General Staff/ Generalstab ( JNA and ARBiH ), Glavni Stozer (HV /HVO ),
Main Staff Glavnistab (VRS and SVK )

Corps Korpus (JNA, VJ, VRS, SVK, ARBiH )/Zbor (HV/HVO )

Division Divizija

Brigade Brigada

Regiment Puk

Battalion Bataljon (JNA , VJ, VRS, SVK , ARBiH )/Bojna (HV /HVO )

Artillery or Air Divizion

Defense Artillery
Battalion

Company Ceta ( JNA, VJ, VRS, SVK , ARBiH )/Satnija (HV /HVO )

Artillery Battery Baterija

Platoon Vod

Primary Brigade Types in Yugoslav Conflict

Guards Gardijska Brigada (gbr)

Liberation Oslobodilacka Brigada ( obr)

Mountain Brdska Brigada (bbr)

Motorized Motorizovana Brigada (mtbr )

Mechanized Mehanizovana Brigada (mbr)

Armor Oklopna Brigada (okbr)

Infantry Pesadijska Brigada (pbr)

Light Infantry Laka Pesadijska Brigada (lpbr)

xxi
 Yugoslav People's Army/Yugoslav Army/Bosnian Serb Army/Krajina
Serb ArmyMilitary Ranks

Army General ArmijskiGeneral (four stars )

Colonel General General- Pukovnik (three stars )

Lieutenant Colonel General- Potpukovnik (two stars )

General

Major General General-Major (one star )

Colonel Pukovnik

Lieutenant Colonel Potpukovnik

Major Major

Captain 1st Class Kapetan I Klase

Captain Kapetan

Lieutenant Porucnik

Junior Lieutenant Potporucnik

Croatian Army/Bosnian Croat ArmyMilitary Ranks

Staff General StozerniGeneral ( four stars )

Corps General General Zbora (three stars )

Colonel General General- Pukovnik (two stars )

Major General General-Bojnik (one star )

Staff Brigadier Stozerni Brigadir (no US equivalent )

Brigadier Brigadir (US colonel equivalent)

Colonel Pukovnik (US lieutenant colonel equivalent)

Major Bojnik

xxii

- -
-

- - --
 ---

Captain Satnik

Senior Lieutenant Natporucnik

Lieutenant Porucnik

Bosnian ArmyMilitary Ranks

Army General Armijski General ( overall Bosnian Army Commander )

Division General Divizion General (two stars)

Brigadier General BrigadniGeneral (one star)

Brigadier Brigadir (no US equivalent — not a general officer rank )

Colonel Pukovnik

Lt. Colonel Potpukovnik

Major Major

Senior Captain Nadkapetan

Captain Kapetan

Senior Lieutenant Nadporucnik

Lieutenant Porucnik

Weapons

Tanks
M - 47 US-manufactured MBT (90 -mm gun )

M - 84 Yugoslav -manufactured MBT (125 -mm gun ), variant of the T- 72

T -72 Soviet-manufactured MBT (125 -mm gun )

T -54 /55 Soviet-manufactured MBT ( 105-mm gun )

T - 34 Soviet-manufactured WW IImedium tank (85-mm gun )

xxiii
 Light Tanks
PT- 76 Soviet-manufactured light amphibious tank (76 -mm gun )

Tank Destroyers
M - 18 Hellcat US-manufactured WW II tank destroyer (76 -mm gun )

M - 36B2 US-manufactured WW II tank destroyer (90 -mm gun )

SU - 100 Soviet-manufactured WW II tank destroyer ( 100 -mm gun )

ACVs
M -80 Yugoslav -manufactured IFV (20 -mm cannon )

M -60 Yugoslav-manufactured APC ( 12.7 -mm machinegun )

M -60 PB Antitank version of the M -60 with 2 x 82 -mm recoilless rifles

BTR -50 Soviet-manufactured tracked APC , used as command vehicle

BOV Yugoslav -manufactured 4 x 4 wheeled APC

M - 83 BOV- 1 Antitank version of the BOV with 6 x AT- 3 ATGM

BOV - M Militia /police variant of the BOV

M - 86 BOV -VP Military police variant of the BOV

Reconnaissance Vehicles
BRDM - 2 Soviet-manufactured amphibious scoutcar

Artillery
203 mm

M2 US -manufactured 203-mm (8 -inch ) towed howitzer [alternate designator

for M115 )

155 mm

M -1 US-manufactured 155-mm towed howitzer [alternate designation for

M - 114 ]

M -65 Yugoslav -manufactured variant of US M - 1/M -114 105 -mm towed howitzer

M - 114 US-manufactured 155-mm towed howitzer ( alternate designation for M - 1 ]

xxiv

-
 VONVIS

M -59 “ Long Tom ” US-manufactured 155 -mm towed field gun

M -46 /84 Yugoslav -manufactured 155 -mm gun -howitzer [M -46 gun with a 155-mm
barrel]

152 mm

D - 20 Soviet-manufactured 152 -mm towed howitzer

M -84 NORA Yugoslav -manufactured 152-mm towed gun - howitzer

M - 1937 Soviet-manufactured 152-mm towed gun -howitzer ( Soviet designator

ML -20 ]

130 mm

M -46 Soviet-manufactured 130 -mm towed field gun

122 mm

281 Soviet -manufactured 122 -mm tracked SP howitzer

D - 30 Soviet-manufactured 122 -mm towed howitzer

M - 38 Soviet-manufactured 122-mm towed howitzer [Soviet designator M - 30 ]

105 mm

M - 56
Yugoslav -manufactured 105-mm towed howitzer (fires US -pattern
ammunition )

M2A1
US-manufactured WW II 105-mm towed howitzer (alternate name for
M101 ]

M - 18 /43 German -manufactured WW II 105 -mm towed howitzer

M - 18 /61 German -manufactured WW II 105-mm towed howitzer ( upgraded M - 18 /43

adapted to fire US -pattern ammunition ]

M - 101 US-manufactured WW II 105-mm towed howitzer [alternate name for

M2A1]

XXV
100 mm

T - 12 Soviet-manufactured 100 -mm antitank gun

76 mm

M - 48B1 Yugoslav-manufactured 76 -mm mountain gun (“ Tito gun " )

M - 42 ZIS - 3 Soviet-manufactured 76 -mm field gun

Surface - to - Surface Rockets

FROG - 7 Soviet-manufactured 544 -mm unguided rocket launcher (450 -kg warhead ]
(9P113 “ Luna - M ” )
Multiple Rocket Launchers
262-mm / 12 tube Yugoslav-manufactured truck -mounted MRL
LRSV M -87 “ Orkan ”

128 -mm /32 tube Yugoslav-manufactured truck -mounted MRL

M -77 “ Oganj”

128 -mm / 32 tube Yugoslav-manufactured towed MRL

M -63 “ Plamen ”

128 -mm / 12 tube M91 Croatian -manufactured towed MRL

122 -mm 40 tube Romanian version of the Soviet-manufactured BM - 21 truck -mounted MRL
APR -40 BM - 21
“Grad ”

107 -mm /12 tube Chinese -manufactured towed MRL

Type 63 MRL
Single - Tube Rocket Launchers
LRL - 128 -mm Yugoslav -manufactured single-tube rocket launcher
M -71 " Partizan ”

LRL - 107 -mm Chinese -manufactured single -tube rocket launcher

Type 85
Mortars
M -69
Yugoslav-manufactured 82 -mm mortar

M - 74 Yugoslav -manufactured 120 -mm mortar

M -75 Yugoslav -manufactured 120-mm mortar

UBM - 52 Yugoslav -manufactured 120 -mm mortar

xxvi
-

- - - - -
1
 Recoilless Rifles
M60A Yugoslav-manufactured 82-mm recoilless rifle

M79 Yugoslav -manufactured 82-mm recoilless rifle

Antitank Guided Missiles (ATGM )

9K11 /9M14 Soviet-manufactured ATGM , 120 -mm warhead
(AT- 3 Sagger a.k.a.
Maljutka)

9K111 /9M111 Soviet-manufactured ATGM , 120 -mm warhead

( AT-4 Spigot a.k.a.
Fagot)

9P148 /9M113 Soviet-manufactured ATGM , for mounting on ACVs

(AT- 5 Spandrel a.k.a.
Konkurs )

9K115 /9M115 Soviet-manufactured ATGM , 120 -mm warhead

(AT- 7 Saxhorn a.k.a.
Metis )

MILAN West European -manufactured ATGM , 125 -mm shaped -charge warhead

TF - 8 Chinese -manufactured ATGM , 120 -mm warhead

(Red Arrow 8 )
Antitank Rocket Launchers
Armbrust German -manufactured disposable antitank rocket launcher

M57 Yugoslav-manufactured 44 -mm rocket- propelled grenade

RBR M80 Yugoslav-manufactured copy of64-mm US LAW antitank rocket

(“ Zolja " )

RBR M79 Yugoslav -manufactured 90 -mm antitank rocket launcher

(“ Osa ” )
Small Arms
M48
Yugoslav -manufactured bolt -action rifle (copy of German WW II
Gewehr 98 k )

M53 Yugoslav -manufactured 7.92 -mm machinegun (copy ofGerman WW II

MG -42 ]

M56 Yugoslav -manufactured 7.62-mm submachinegun

xxvii
M57 Yugoslav -manufactured 7.62-mm copy of the Tokarev TT- 33

M59/66A1 Yugoslav -manufactured 7.62-mm rifle , variant of the Simonov SKS

M60 “ Tromblon " Yugoslav-manufactured rifle grenade

M70 Yugoslav -manufactured 7.62-mm assault rifle, variant of the AK -47

M72 Yugoslav -manufactured 7.62-mm light machinegun , variant of the RPK

M76 Yugoslav -manufactured 7.92 -mm sniper rifle

M84 Yugoslav -manufactured 7.62-mm general purpose machinegun , variant of

the PKM

Aircraft

Jet Aircraft
G - 2 /N -60 Galeb Yugoslav -manufactured trainer version of the J -21 Jastreb (two seats,
straight wings )

G - 4 /N -62 Super Galeb Yugoslav -manufactured fighter/ground attack aircraft (two seats, swept
wings ]

IAR - 93 Romanian version of the J - 22 Orao .

IJ-22 Recce version of the Orao

INJ-22 Trainer /recce version of Orao

J -21 Jastreb Yugoslav-manufactured ground attack aircraft (one seat, straightwings ]

J - 22 Orao Yugoslav -manufactured ground attack aircraft [one seat, swept wings]

MiG - 29 Fulcrum Soviet-manufactured fighter aircraft. Twin tails .

MiG - 21 Fishbed Soviet-manufactured fighter aircraft. Turbojet engine in fuselage

NJ-22 Two- seater trainer version of the J- 22 Orao

NJ-62 Super Galeb combat capable trainer

N -62R Super Galeb trainer

xxviii
 Propeller Aircraft
AN - 2 Colt Soviet-manufactured general purpose aircraft . A biplane

J -20 Kraguj Yugoslav -manufactured light ground attack aircraft

UTVA -60 Yugoslav -manufactured utility aircraft. Resembles a Cessna

UTVA -66 Yugoslav -manufactured utility aircraft. Resembles a Cessna

UTVA -75 Yugoslav -manufactured utility aircraft. Resembles a Cessna

Helicopters
Mi-8 “ Hip C ” /HT-40 Soviet-manufactured transport helicopter (57-mm rockets, door guns]

Mi- 8 “Hip E /F ” Soviet-manufactured transport helicopter [ 3,000 -kg payload ]

M -17 “ Hip H ” Soviet-manufactured transport helicopter [4,000 -kg payload ]

Mi- 24 “ Hind” Soviet-manufactured attack helicopter ( 1,500 -kg ordnance payload ]

SA - 342 /HN -42 Yugoslav license -manufactured ( French ) “ Gazelle” light attack helicopter

SA - 342 /HN - 45 Yugoslav license -manufactured “ Gazelle" light attack helicopter

GAMA [mounted with AT- 3 ATGM and /or SA -7 SAM ]

SA - 342/HI-42 SA -342 "Gazelle " recce version

Surface - to -Air Missiles (SAMS)

SA - 2 Guideline Soviet-manufactured towed SAM [ 1 missile per launcher, Fan Song radar)
(“ Dvina” )

SA - 3 Goa Soviet-manufactured towed SAM [2 to 4 missiles per launcher, Low Blow

(" Neva " ) radar)

SA - 6 Gainful Soviet-manufactured vehicle -mounted SAM [ tracked carrier, 3 missiles per

(“Kub ” ) launcher, Straight Flush radar ]

SA - 7 Grai 1
Soviet-manufactured Manpad SAM [S - 2M is the Yugoslav -manufactured
(“ Strela - 2M ” ) variant ]

SA - 9 Gaskin Soviet -manufactured vehicle -mounted SAM 4 x 4 BRDM - 2 carrier,

(“ ZRK -BD Strela - 1 " / 4 missiles per vehicle, IR seeker)
9M31)

S - 10 Croatian -produced copy ofthe SA - 13 (Strela - 10 ) [6 x 6 wheeled carrier]

xxix
 Self-Propelled Antiaircraft Guns
BOV - 3 Antiaircraft version of the BOV 4 x 4 wheeled APC with 3 x 20 -mm cannon

M -53/59 “ Praga” Czech wheeled SP antiaircraft gun with 2 x 30 -mm cannon

ZSU - 57-2 Soviet-tracked SP antiaircraft gun with 2 x 57 -mm cannon

Towed Antiaircraft Guns

40 -mm / 1 L -70 / L -60 Bofors (Swedish ) -manufactured AA gun

20 -mm / 3 M55 Yugoslav -manufactured triple -barrel 20 -mm AA gun

(A2/A3/A4)

20 -mm / 1 M75 Yugoslav -manufactured single -barrel 20 -mm AA gun

XXX
-

-
-
-

-
 CONVIS

The Balkan Crises : Chronology of

Significant Events, 1991-1995

1991

28 March 1991 The presidents of Yugoslavia's six republics meet in Croatia to discuss the
country's future .

25 June Slovenia and Croatia declare independence. Fighting breaks out almost
immediately after these declarations when the Yugoslav People's Army
( JNA) moves to maintain control over Slovene border stations.

5 July With fighting continuing in Slovenia , the EC foreign ministers impose an

arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia until the situation normalizes.

7 July The EC troika of foreign ministers travels for its third visit to Yugoslavia
and arranges the Brioni accords. All Yugoslav parties agree to start negoti
ations on the country's future by 1 August to accept EC monitors , to lift the
blockades of Army facilities, to restrict the Army to its barracks, and to
deactivate the militias.

13-17 July The EC sends 50 monitors to Yugoslavia to begin work in Slovenia .

18 July The Yugoslav Federal Presidency orders the JNA to withdraw from Slove
nia within three months,marking de facto recognition of Slovenian inde
pendence and an end to the military conflict. Army shifts focus to fighting
in Croatia .

29 July EC foreign ministers propose a new cease - fire in Slovenia, more monitors ,
and joint patrols by the JNA and the local Serb forces .

4 August The Serbs and the JNA reject the efforts of another EC troika visit trying to
mediate a cease -fire, expand monitors to Croatia, and startnegotiations
among the Yugoslavs on a political settlement.

27-28 August French PresidentMitterrand hosts consecutive visits from Croatian Presi
dent Tudjman and Serbian PresidentMilosevic in an effort to bring the two
sides together.

Late Summer Serbian PresidentMilosevic steps up financial and armed support to Serbs
Early Fall in the Krajina and Slavonian regions of Croatia . Local Serb forces sup
ported by the JNA wrest most of the Serb -majority areas from Croatian
control.
1
1 September Dutch Foreign Minister van den Broek , on behalf of the EC , travels to
Belgrade. An agreement is reached on a new cease -fire , an expansion of the
monitor teams, and a conference to be held in The Hague .

7 September An EC conference on peace negotiations opens in The Hague under the

chairmanship of Lord Carrington .*

18 September Macedonia declares independence .

25 September The UN Security Council imposes an arms embargo on the former

Yugoslavia (Resolution 713).

1 October The EC agrees to extend its monitors into Bosnia -Hercegovina.

3 October Serbia and Montenegro seize control of Yugoslavia's Federal Presidency.

18 October At The Hague, the EC offers a detailed plan for a political settlement based
on a loose association of states: voluntary participation , protection for
minorities, limited common institutions ( a court for human rights , an eco
nomic council to manage a customs union , and a nonbinding council for
political and security cooperation ). Only Serbia does not accept the plan by
a deadline of 5 November, despite revisions offered in subsequent
negotiations.

8 November The EC imposes sanctions against all Yugoslav states but says it will
rescind them for republics that cooperate with the peace process .

25 November Yugoslav and Croatian Army leaders agree to a comprehensive cease - fire as
a prerequisite for a deployment of UN peacekeeping forces to Croatia.***

* On 4 October at The Hague , EC ministers reach an agreement with Serbian President

Milosevic and Croatian President Tudjman to negotiate a complete settlement for Yugosla
via . The EC proposes that at the end of the negotiations there will be recognition for those
republics that desire independence, there will be a loose association of the Yugoslav states,
minority rights will be protected , there will be no unilateral changes in borders, the Croat
ians will lift their blockades of the Armybarracks, and the Yugoslav Army will withdraw
from Croatia .When Serbia stalls on the 4 October agreement, EC foreign ministers on
6 October threaten to impose economic sanctions if there is not compliance by midnighton
7 October. They say that they will resume cooperative relations with those republics that
are working for peace and that they will seek a trade embargo through the UN for those that
are not.
** This follows UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar's announcementon 15 November
that he will send envoys Cyrus Vance and Philip Goulding to Yugoslavia to explore the fea
sibility of a UN peacekeeping operation . Authorized by UNSC Resolution 724 , an advance
party arrives in Yugoslavia on 15 December to explore a UN peacekeeping role. The Vance
Plan for deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in Croatia evolves out of this fact- finding
mission .

- - - - - - -
 ‫ܨܢܐܕܨܕܒܕܙܕ‬

2 December The EC ends economic sanctions against all Yugoslav republics except
Serbia and Montenegro .

16 December The EC Council of Ministers agrees to recognize within a month any repub
lic thatmeets EC criteria - protect human rights, support EC and UN peace
efforts, abide by CSCE standards,accept financial obligations — in talks that
had resumed on 8 December.

23 December Germany recognizes Slovenia and Croatia .

24 December Macedonia , Slovenia , Croatia , and Bosnia - Hercegovina apply to the EC for
recognition as sovereign states.

31 December UN envoy Cyrus Vance visits Belgrade on a peacekeeping mission as fierce

fighting continues in Croatia .

1992

2 January 1992 Croatian and Serbian military commanders and political leaders agree to a
UN plan to deploy peacekeeping forces. (Vance Plan ).

9 January The EC reconvenes the peace conference in Brussels.

10 January The EC lifts sanctions against Montenegro .

15 January EC member states and 15 other countries, including the United States,
recognize Croatia and Slovenia as independent states .

13 February An EC - sponsored conference on Bosnia opens in Lisbon .

21 February UNSC passes Resolution 743 establishing a peacekeeping force in Croatia.

27 February Bosnia holds a referendum on independence from Yugoslavia. Bosnian

1 March Serbs react violently to the vote in favor of independence. President
Izetbegovic tries to mollify and engage the Serbsby including them in
his government.

7 March An advance team of UN peacekeepers arrives in Yugoslavia .

9 March The EC peace conference reconvenes in Brussels .

10 March The United States and the EC agree to coordinate on recognition of former
Yugoslav states .

3
18 March During EC - sponsored talks in Sarajevo, Serb , Croat, and Muslim leaders
agree on a framework for establishing ethnic cantons (the Cutilheiro plan ).
The plan states that there will be no change in externalborders ; three can
tons based largely on ethnic criteria will be created ; and a weak central
government will handle economic , foreign , and defense affairs . All other
functions — including administration , social security, culture , environment,
housing, transport, and education — will be controlled by the cantonal
governments .

6 April The EC agrees to recognize Bosnia-Hercegovina; it delays a decision on

Macedonia . The Serbs move almost immediately to partition the republic .

27 April Serbia and Montenegro proclaim a new FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia and

declare it the successor state to Yugoslavia .

24 May Unofficial presidential and parliamentary elections in Kosovo result in a

landslide victory for the ethnic Albanian party and its leader Ibrahim
Rugova.

27 May The EC adjourns the Lisbon conference on Bosnia after the Muslims walk
out. ( The continuing siege of Sarajevo and Serbian military gains prompt
Izetbegovic to abandon the Cutilheiro plan .) The EC also reimposes
economic sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro, including stopping all trade ,
freezing export credits and scientific cooperation , and seeking an oil
embargo in the UN .

30 May The UNSC passes Resolution 757 imposing economic sanctions on Serbia
and Montenegro .

31 May Milosevic's Socialist Party wins local and federal assembly elections in “ the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (FRY).

4 June A NATO ministerialmeeting in Oslo goes beyond NATO's traditional

defensive role and proposes troops and equipment for peacekeeping opera
tions outside the area of its members.

15 June Dobrica Cosic is elected President of the new Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia .

27 June An EC summit acceptsmilitary operations under the UN to keep Sarajevo

airport open if necessary, agrees to recognize Macedonia only if it changes
its name, supports suspension of “ Yugoslavia ” from the CSCE, and agrees
to send observers to Kosovo .

- - - - - -
 CHONS

28 June Mitterrandmakes a quick trip to observe the situation at the Sarajevo airport
in preparation for a possible emergency airlift.

1 July Milan Panic becomes PrimeMinister of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia .

2 July Planes from EC countries join the airlift to the reopened Sarajevo airport.

2 August Croatian President Tudjman wins reelection and his Croatian Democratic
Union retains a majority in parliament.

13 August The UN passes Resolutions 770, which authorizes “ all necessary measures”
to facilitate delivery of relief supplies, and 771, which demands access to
detention camps .

14 August The CSCE decides to send “missions of long duration ” to the former
Yugoslav republics to monitor human rights.

26-28 August The EC /UN conference in London on former Yugoslavia — which includes
representatives of the Serbian , Croatian , and Bosnian parties - reaches
agreement to dismantle detention camps, lift sieges ofmajor cities and
allow UN supervision of heavy weapons, start continuous negotiations on
terms for a political settlement. It also supports “ substantial" withdrawal by
Bosnian Serbs, internationalmonitors of sanctions and human rights, a
tribunal to investigate human rights violations,more UN escorts for aid
convoys, talks on autonomy for Kosovo , permission for refugees to return ,
FRY recognition of Bosnia ,more humanitarian aid , and lifting of sanctions
and reconstruction aid to reward compliance . This conference sets up subse
quent talks in Geneva to discuss the crisis and minority rights.

3 September The Steering Committee of the International Conference on Former

Yugoslavia holds its firstmeeting in Geneva with envoys Vance and Owen
chairing themeeting.

29 September CSCE countries offer to provide personnel for sanctions assistance missions
to Balkan states neighboring the former Yugoslavia .

30 September At urging of internationalmediators Vance and Owen , Croatia and the FRY
agree to recognize existing internationalborders, allow refugees to return ,
and demilitarize the Prevlaka Peninsula .

6 October The UN Security Council (UNSC ) adopts Resolution 780 , which estab
lishes a commission of experts to examine evidence of war crimes in former
Yugoslavia.

5
7 October The EC announces the availability of $ 160 million in aid for refugees ;
this brings total aid to almost $ 400 million .

8 October NATO announces it will send 100 personnel to the UN headquarters in

Bosnia .

9 October UNSC adopts Resolution 781, which establishes a no-fly zone over Bosnia.

14 October NATO agrees to provide AWACS data to help to enforce the no -fly zone.

27 October Vance and Owen propose draft constitution as part of the Vance -Owen Plan
for Bosnia , which is to be organized into a decentralized federation of 10
autonomous provinces.

3 November FRY PrimeMinister Panic narrowly survives a confidence vote in the upper
house of the federal assembly .

16 November The UNSC adopts Resolution 787, which provides for naval interdiction of
ships trying to evade sanctions against Yugoslavia , tightens sanctions, and
calls for a study of safehavens.

22 November NATO and WEU naval forces begin patrolling the Adriatic to enforce
sanctions.

11 December UN Security Council resolution 795 approves sending 760 observers to

Macedonia .

12 December An EC summit in Edinburgh threatens further economic sanctions (“ total

isolation ” ) and agrees to an aid package for Macedonia .

20 December FRY holds republic and federal elections.Milosevic defeats Milan Panic for
the Serbian Presidency .Milosevic's Socialist Serbian Radicals dominate
parliamentary elections.

29 December FRY PrimeMinister Panic loses a vote of confidence in the national

assembly.

1993

2 January 1993 Vance and Owen present a new plan for 10 provinces that would carry out
most governmental functions in Bosnia. The boundaries are largely deter
mined by ethnicity, but geographical, historical, and economic factors are
taken into account. They also propose a framework for the constitution and
military arrangements, including a cease -fire. Bosnian Croats immediately

6
-
-

- --- - - - —
- -
 accept the whole plan ; Bosnian Serbs accept the constitutional principles
and the military accord ; the Bosnian Government accepts only the
constitution .

14 January NATO offers its command and control structure for enforcing the no-fly
zone over Bosnia .

30 January UN /EC -mediated Bosnian peace talks break down in Geneva .

22 February The UNSC adopts Resolution 808 initiating the formation of an interna
tional war crimes tribunal.

27 February Bosnian peace talks reopen in New York .

5 March The United States begins airdrops of humanitarian aid over eastern Bosnia .

8 March EC foreign ministers agree to implement stronger sanctions if the FRY fails
to push the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Vance -Owen Plan .

25 March Bosnian President Izetbegovic signs the Vance-Owen Plan , isolating the
Serbs as the only warring party not to sign it.

28-30 March German and then French aircraft join the US -led program of airdrops for
humanitarian relief over eastern Bosnia .

30 March UNSC Resolution 815 extends the mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia for
three months.

31March UNSC Resolution 816 authorizes the enforcement of the no -fly zone over
Bosnia .

5 April WEU offers to help enforce sanctions by patrolling the Danube .

7 April UNSC Resolution 817 accepts the “ Former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia ” as a UN member.

12 April NATO begins air patrols to enforce the no -fly zone over Bosnia .

17 April UNSC Resolution 820 imposes stiffer sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro .

It ends transshipments except for humanitarian needs, banspassage of
“ Yugoslav ” vessels, trains , aircraft, and trucks through territory of UN
members. It also authorizes impounding violators, freezes funds of
Yugoslav entities, and forbids shipping through Yugoslav waters.

7
29 April Envoys Vance and Owen convene talks between the Bosnian parties and the
leaders of the other former Yugoslav republics in Athens.

1-2 May The UN , the EC , Bosnian factional leaders, Serbian President Milosevic,
Federal President Cosic, and Croatian President Tudjman meet in Athens.
In return for concessions on access corridors between the provinces ,
Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic accepts the Vance -Owen Plan (the last
factional leader to do so ), conditional upon ratification by the Bosnian Serb
assembly

6 May The Bosnian serb assembly overwhelmingly (51 to 2 with 12 abstentions)

rejects the Vance -Owen Plan .

Secretary Christophermeets with the EC troika in Brussels. All agree on the

importance of unity and that no options are excluded .

UNSC Resolution 824 declares Sarajevo and five other Muslim enclaves in
Bosnia " safe areas” under UN protection .

7 May NATO authorizes planning for a peacekeeping force in Bosnia . Believes

60,000 troops would be needed.

10 May EC foreign ministers,meeting in Brussels , summarize their position : the

Vance -Owen Plan is the political goal; the EC will provide personnel to
hold Milosevic to his promise to stop aid to Bosnian Serbs; the United
States and Russia should provide troops to protect the “ safe areas” ; no
options are excluded , but any action will have to be under UN auspices; and
they express concern about continuing Croatian violence in Bosnia .

15-16 May A Bosnian Serb referendum confirms the Bosnian Serb assembly rejection
of the Vance -Owen Plan , despite support from Serbian PresidentMilosevic.

19 May WEU ministers in Rome back UN and EC efforts in the Balkans and agree
to study how WEU might assist, with focus on sanctions monitoring on the
Danube .

22 May The United States, Russia, France , the United Kingdom , and Spain ,meeting
in Washington , agree to a Joint Action Plan : continue humanitarian aid ,
rigorously enforce sanctions and no- fly zone, United States is to protect
UNPROFOR with airstrikes if it is attacked and requests help , offer to place
monitors on Bosnia's border with Serbia ,move quickly to set up war crimes
tribunal, view Vance -Owen process as a foundation for a political settle
ment, and not exclude tougher measures.

8
-

- - --
25 May UNSC Resolution 827 establishes an international tribunal to prosecute war
crimes in the former Yugoslavia .

2 June WEU - organized ships and personnel begin arriving in Romania to help
enforce sanctions. Later expanded to Bulgaria and Hungary.

4 June UNSC Resolution 836 authorizes troops for the safe areas in Bosnia and
permits them to use force , including airpower, to defend themselves.

8 June
EC foreign ministers, meeting in Luxembourg welcome the Joint Action
Plan and reaffirm their position stated in May . They urge others to contrib
ute troops to protect the safe areas.

9 June WEU personnel and boats begin patrolling the Danube to enforce sanctions.

10 June NAC meeting in Athens agrees to offer its airpower to protect UNPRO
FOR , if attacked . United States announces willingness to send a small force
to Macedonia .

16-17 June Croatian President Tudjman , Serbian PresidentMilosevic , and Bosnian

President Izetbegovic meet in Geneva with UN and EC envoys Stoltenberg
and Owen to discuss reworking the Vance -Owen Plan into an ethnic parti
tion of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

18 June Bosnian President Izetbegovic walks out of the Geneva talks after objecting
to proposals presented to partition Bosnia -Herzegovina.

UN Security Council resolution 842 authorizes the United States to

send troops to Macedonia . Resolution 844 authorizes reinforcement of
UNPROFOR to provide armed protection of the “ safe areas” with airpower.

19 June
Serbian President Milosevic presents his plan to partition Bosnia into three
ethnic republics at negotiations in Geneva .

19-20 June The Krajina Serbs overwhelmingly vote in favor of unification with other
Serb states in a referendum .

21-22 June EC summit in Copenhagen reaffirms its preference for keeping Bosnia
intact, unwillingness to recognize changes in borders made by force , and
desire to prosecute war criminals . It also calls for more humanitarian aid
and implementation of the UN “ safe areas." German Chancellor Kohl urges
lifting the arms embargo ,but the others are not interested .

9
21 June The Geneva negotiations are postponed to allow Bosnian President
Izetbegovic to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina to consult with his government
on Milosevic's proposal.

22 June Croatian Serb leader Hadzic announces that the Krajina referendum was
only a test of will and that the Krajina Serbs do not plan to unify rapidly
with the Bosnian Serbs .

23 June Geneva talks reopen with Bosnian Croatmember of the Bosnian Presidency
Franjo Boras heading the government delegation .

The first round of talks in two months between Croatian Government and
Croatian Serb officials opens in Geneva but ends after one day .

24 June Frenchman Lt. General Jean Cot replaces Sweden's Wahlgren as com
mander of UN forces in the former Yugoslavia .

25 June The Bosnian Presidency meets in Zagreb to discuss the latest proposal
tabled in Geneva outlining a confederal arrangement of nearly autonomous
states.

The “ Yugoslav” parliament elects Zoran Lilic — aMilosevic ally — to

replace ousted federal president Cosic .

28 June A joint Serb -Croat proposal for a confederal settlement is put forward in
Geneva. The Bosnian Presidency sends a delegation to the talks although
Izetbegovic does not attend .

29 June The Bosnian Presidency meets in a closed session in Sarajevo to discuss

the various proposals tabled in Geneva on ethnic division ofBosnia
Herzegovina.

30 June The UN Security Council adopts a resolution extending UNPROFOR’s

mandate in Croatia for three months .

6-8 July Talks between Croatian Government and Croatian Serb officials on the
Krajina reopen in Geneva but end without an agreement.

10 July A Bosnian Presidency delegation meeting with internationalmediators

Owen and Stoltenberg presents a counterproposal to Croat and Serb plans to
divide Bosnia -Herzegovina based on a federal arrangement.

10

- - - - -- - -- - - - -
 a CIONIS

28 July Peace talks reopen in Geneva after President Izetbegovic's boycott of the
negotiations over the ongoing Serb siege of Sarajevo . The Muslims discuss
a confederal settlement at this round , abandoning their federal plan .

30 July The Bosnian Government rejects the “ union” peace plan proposed by Owen
and Stoltenberg that was a combination of the Vance -Owen and Serbian
plans for a tripartite confederation .

2 August NAC meeting in Brussels agrees to study US proposal to use NATO air
power to lift the siege of Sarajevo and other cities.

3 August With President Izetbegovic again boycotting the talks because of a the
continuing Serb siege of Sarajevo , the Croat members of the Bosnian
Presidency withdraw from the Presidency's delegation and join the Croatian
delegation to protest Bosnian Government operations against Croats in
central Bosnia .

8 August Bosnian Serb Army commander General Mladic reaches a partial

agreement with the UN on a phased withdrawal from Serb positions on
mountains around Sarajevo .

9 August Follow -up NAC meeting in Brussels approves operational plans for air
strikes in Bosnia and agrees UN Secretary General will have to authorize
the first strike.

16 August The warring parties — meeting again in Geneva — agree “ in principle” to

turn Sarajevo into a demilitarized , UN -administered city for an interim
period after a settlement is reached .

18 August UN officials announce that NATO is ready to carry out airstrikes to support
UNPROFOR in Bosnia if the Secretary General asks for them .

20 August After presenting a draft settlement package including a proposed map for a
confederal partition of Bosnia -Herzegovina , internationalmediators Owen
and Stoltenberg adjourn the Geneva talks for 10 days. Owen asks the EC to
administer Mostar for two years as part of a peace settlement.

27 August President Izetbegovic tells the Bosnian Government Assembly that the UN /
EC peace proposal is unacceptable; the assembly decides to reject it and
push formore territory.

28 August The Bosnian Serb assembly unconditionally accepts the proposed peace
accord . The Bosnian Croat assembly endorses the plan but stipulates the

11
 Croats will have to be given more territory . The Bosnian Croat assembly
also declares a Bosnian Croat republic.

31 August Negotiations reopen for two days in Geneva. Once again , Izetbegovic walks
out over territorial issues.

1 September President Izetbegovic begins bilateral consultations with Bosnian Serb

leader Karadzic and Bosnian Croat leader Boban on territorial adjustments.

7 September WEU council authorizes planning for assistance in the administration of

Mostar.

9 September Croatian forces capture three Serb -controlled villages in the Krajina, spark
ing intense fighting.

10 September Bosnian Serb soldiers protesting war profiteering begin a mutiny in Banja
Luka.

12 September Informal meeting of EC foreign ministers accepts idea of administering

Mostar. EC will ask WEU to provide police .

13 September Peace talks resume in Geneva .

14 September Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic meet in Geneva in an effort to rebuild

trust between the Croats and the Muslims.

15 September Croatian Government and Croatian Serb leaders sign a cease -fire agree
ment. UN forces are deployed to implement it .

NAC meeting in Brussels authorizes planning to participate in implementa

tion of a peace plan in Bosnia .

16 September Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic and protesting soldiers negotiate an end to the
Banja Luka mutiny.

20 September Presidents Milosevic, Tudjman , and Izetbegovic meet with mediators Owen
and Stoltenberg on the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible in the Adriatic . The
Invincible Plan becomes the basic EC goal for the negotiations. Under the
plan , 49 percent of Bosnia goes to the Serbs, 33 percent to the Muslims, and
17.5 percent to the Croats, with a figurehead central government. The
Muslimswill have access to the Adriatic via a port on the Neretva River and
the right to use Ploce and Neum ; they will also have access to the Sava
River. A 3 -kilometer corridor will connect the Muslim enclaves in eastern

12

- - - -
-

- - - -- - -
 UOGNS

Bosnia . Sarajevo will not be divided and will be administered by the UN for
two years; there will be a similar arrangement under the EC in Mostar.

23 September Croatian Foreign Minister Granic tells Croatian assembly members that
Zagreb has initiated discussions with the Bosnian Government to unite
Croat and Muslim areas of Bosnia and to provide for the unified territory's
subsequent confederation with Croatia .

27 September The Bihac citizens' assembly declares independence for the Muslim
enclave under a proposal put forth by Bosnian Presidency member Abdic.

28 September Bosnian Muslim political, intellectual, and religious leaders — meeting in

Sarajevo — recommend that acceptance ofthe latest peace proposal be con
ditioned on the return of territory seized by force. The Bosnian Cabinet
accepts the plan unconditionally but calls for UN /NATO enforcement.

29 September The Bosnian assembly follows the recommendation of theMuslim leaders'

" assembly " and votes to accept the latest peace proposal with the condition
that territory seized by force be returned to the Bosnian Government.

1 October The Bosnian Croat assembly votes to withdraw territorial concessionsmade

to the Bosnian Muslims.

2 October The Bosnian Serb assembly votes to withdraw territorial concessions made
to the Bosnian Muslims.

4 October UN Security Council Resolution 871 extends UNPROFOR’s mandate in

Croatia for six months. The resolution makes a vague link between Serb
behavior in Croatia and any decision to lift sanctions against Serbia.

6 October NAC meeting in Brussels authorizes planning to extend NATO air cover to
UNPROFOR units in Croatia.

10 October The Krajina Serb assembly votes to hold legislative and presidential elec
tions on 21 November. The assembly subsequently postpones the elections
to 12 December.

16 October President Tudjman is reelected head of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ )

at ruling party's congress.

20 October President Milosevic dissolves the Serbian assembly after apparently con
cluding that the no -confidence motion against the government proposed by
the Serbian Radical Party was likely to pass. A new legislative election is
scheduled for 19 December.

13
 The Bosnian Presidency electsMuslim Nijaz Durakovic and Croats Stjepan
Kljujic and Ivo Komsic to fill vacancies created by the withdrawal of Croat
members and the dismissal of Bihac strongman Fikret Abdic .

22 October Fikret Abdic concludes peace agreementwith Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic
in Belgrade . President Milosevic and the Serbs recognize Abdic's “ Autono
mous Province of Western Bosnia” on the basis of the Geneva plan . Abdic
and Bosnian Croat leader Boban earlier signed an agreement ending their
confrontation in Bosnia and subordinating local Croat military forces in the
Cazinska Krajina to Abdic .

25 October Bosnian Presidency names Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic as new Prime
Minister.Muslims dominate new cabinet formed on 31 October ; only four
of 21 posts go to Serbs and Croats.

29 October At a special EC summit in Brussels , community leaders appeal for a return

to negotiations, promise more aid , and call for the establishment of corri
dors for relief convoys and reinforcement ofUNPROFOR . The leaders do
not adopt a French proposal to use force to open aid corridors or Owen's
plan for a “ global” negotiation that would put all issues on the table .

3 November Krajina Serbs pull out of “ secret” negotiations with Croatian Government in
Norway following announcement of Croatian President Tudjman's peace
initiative , which calls for restoration of Croatian sovereignty over the
Krajina.

10 November Bosnian Croat leader Boban names Jadranko Prlic as Prime Minister of
“ Herceg-Bosna.” The Bosnian Croat assembly approves a new government
on 19 November, but Prlic is criticized for including ministers who are not
members of Bosnia's HDZ party.

12 November Boban replaces Slobodan Praljak with General Ante Roso , a former
Croatian special forces commander, as the commander of the Bosnian Croat
Army (HVO ).

22 November European Union foreign ministers agree to offer gradual suspension of the
sanctions against Serbia /Montenegro if the Bosnian Serbs make territorial
concessions to theMuslims, a peace plan is implemented , and Belgrade
cooperates with a “modus vivendi” in the Krajina.

29 November EU foreign ministers present proposal to the leaders of the various Bosnian
factions along with Croatian President Tudjman and Serbian President
Milosevic .
14

- - - - - - - -
 ( IVONNIS

30 November Croatian President Tudjman and Serbian PresidentMilosevic leave Geneva

while the Bosnian warring parties continue negotiations mediated by Owen
and Stoltenberg .

30 November UN war crimes tribunal announces it will begin trials in April 1994 .

1 December UNPROFOR Commander Cot says that the UN cannot put up indefinitely
with disruptions of the relief convoys and threatens to reconsider the
humanitarian effort in the spring.

2 December Talks end in Geneva without an agreement, following discussions on the

government'smap and a Serb proposal to divide Sarajevo into " twin cities"
in which the Muslimswould retain the central city with the Serbs control
ling the southern and western suburbs. The faction leaders agree to
reconvene at an unspecified date .

12 December “ Republic of Serb Krajina ” parliamentary and presidential elections are

held . Knin mayor Milan Babic falls just short of the majority necessary to
avoid a second round of presidential elections scheduled for 23 January.

19 December French Defense Minister Leotard says that France will reassess its partici
pation in UNPROFOR in the spring of 1994 if no settlement is reached by
that time. The United Kingdom , Spain , Canada , and Belgium have similar
positions.

20-21 December Bilateralmeetings between the warring parties and Serbian President
Milosevic and Croatian President Tudjman are held in Geneva prior to
broader meetings in Brussels with EU foreign ministers.

22 December The foreign ministers of the EU meet with the Serb , Croat, and Muslim
leaders of Bosnia and urge them to accept the Invincible Plan . The parties
will reconvene in Geneva on 18 January.

1994

4 January 1994 French Foreign Minister Juppe calls on NATO to take firmer action in
Bosnia . Paris wants a NATO Summit to open supply routes for humanitar
ian aid , endorse the Invincible Plan , and renew its commitment to help
enforce a peace settlement.

5 January British General Malcolm Rose named to command UN forces in Bosnia

after Belgian General Briquemont asks to be relieved , citing insufficient
resources for his mission .

15
4-5 January Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic and Croatian Foreign Minister Granic fail
to reach agreement on territorial issues after two days of meetings in
Vienna.

9-10 January Croatian President Tudjman and Bosnian President Izetbegovicmeet in

Bonn with Tudjman claiming progress toward a cease-fire in central
Bosnia . Izetbegovic disagrees, calling themeetings a failure .

11 January NATO summit in Brussels states that there must be a political settlement
acceptable to all sides rather than continued attempts atmilitary victory,
commends EU /UN peace efforts, promises to help implement a peace
agreement, and reaffirmswillingness to use airstrikes to protect the UN safe
areas and make it possible for relief workers to do their jobs. France and the
United Kingdom call for airstrikes if the Bosnian Serbs hinder UN opera
tions at Srebrenica and Tuzla . Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic threaten to
rescind concessions to the Bosnian Government if NATO attacks.

Boutros-Ghali orders the rotation of UN troops in Srebrenica and the open

ing of the airport at Tuzla and gives Akashi authority to approve close air
support if troops performing those missions are attacked .

12 January Croatian President Tudjman announces that Bosnian Croat leader Boban
will no longer attend peace negotiations.

18-19 January Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serb negotiators at EU -sponsored

peace talks in Geneva fail to reach a settlement, accusing each other of
intransigence .

19 January Croatian Foreign Minister Granic and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Foreign Minister Jovanovic sign an agreement to begin normalization of
relations between Croatia and the FRY. They agree to exchange diplomatic
representatives in February .

21 January British Defense Minister Rifkind acknowledges London has been discuss
ing whether to withdraw its troops from UNPROFOR but says the United
Kingdom will not act unilaterally.

23 January Republic of Serbian Krajina InteriorMinisterMartic wins the Krajina pres

idential elections in the second round of voting. Knin Mayor Babic had
narrowly missed winning the election in the first round in December.

26 January French Army General Bertrand de Lapresele is named to replace French

General Cot as Commander of UN Peacekeeping Forces in the former
Yugoslavia. He is expected to report for duty in March .

16

- -- - - -
 NVIS
wanaHOA

6 February EU mediator Owen responds to the 5 February mortar attack on the

Sarajevo market by urging an acceleration of negotiations on demilitarizing
Sarajevo and turning the city over to the UN to administer. Boutros-Ghali
asks NATO if it is ready to attack artillery firing on civilians in Sarajevo .

7 February EU foreign ministers reiterate their call to use " all themeans necessary
including the use of airpower” to lift the siege of Sarajevo as a way to begin
implementation of the EU peace plan ( the Invincible Plan ).

8 February Bosnian Croat leader Boban announces his resignation in favor of a collec
tive presidency to be formed to govern the Bosnian Croat republic.

9 February NATO gives the Bosnian Serbs 10 days to pull heavy weapons 20 km back
from Sarajevo or put them under UN control; the Bosnian Government is
also to put their heavy weapons under UN control. If not, NATO will con
sider the weapons legitimate targets for airstrikes .

10-12 February The warring parties fail to overcome differences at peace talks in Geneva
supervised by EU negotiator Lord Owen .

12 February Zagreb and Belgrade announce details formalizing their agreement to open
representative offices in their respective capitals in late February or early
March . They also announce agreementto reopen the Zagreb -Belgrade
highway.

17 February The United Kingdom , France, Spain , and Sweden agree to redeploy some of
their troops in Bosnia to Sarajevo in response to UNPROFOR Commander
Rose's call for reinforcements .

19 February Croatian Foreign Minister Granic and Bosnian PrimeMinister Silajdzic

meet in Frankfurt to discuss a possible Croat-Muslim federation in Bosnia
and its eventual confederation with Croatia. They make little progress but
agree to continue expert level discussions in Zagreb the following week .

20 February 400 Russian troops redeploy from UN -protected areas in Croatia to

Sarajevo as part of an agreementnegotiated by Russian envoy Churkin to
ensure Serb compliance with NATO's ultimatum to withdraw heavy weap
ons from the 20 -km exclusion zone or place them under UN control. UN
and NATO officials determine that the Bosnian Serbs effectively complied
with the NATO ultimatum .

21 February The Bosnian Croat assembly elects former Bosnian Croat Justice Minister
Zubak to head an emergency presidential council to replace Mate Boban as
head of the government of the self-proclaimed Republic of Herceg -Bosna .

17
23 February Bosnian Government and Croat forces sign a cease-fire agreement to be
implemented on 25 February .

28 February In NATO's first-ever combatmission, US planes shoot down four Bosnian

Serb aircraft violating the no- fly zone.

1 March Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic, Croatian Foreign Minister Granic and
Bosnian Croat leader Zubak sign a framework agreement in Washington to
establish a Croat-Muslim federation in Bosnia . The parties agree to meet in
Vienna to negotiate details of the agreement.

Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic agrees to open Tuzla airport after Russia
offers to send observers.

12 March Negotiators meeting in Vienna reach agreement on a Croat-Muslim federa

tion in Bosnia and plan to sign a final accord in Washington later in the
week .

13 March Bosnian Government and Croatmilitary commanders agree at a meeting in

Split on guidelines for developing a jointmilitary .

17 March The Serbian assembly confirms the appointment ofMirko Marjanovic as

Prime Minister and approves his cabinet. Socialists control all key posts in
the new government with only token democratic opposition representation .
Businessmen also figure prominently in the new cabinet.

18 March Bosnian President Izetbegovic , Croatian President Tudjman and

Bosnian Croat leader Zubak sign the Croat-Muslim federation accord
in Washington .

22-23 March Russian -sponsored talks between the Croatian Government and the Krajina
Serbs adjourn without results . The parties agree to reconvene on 29 March .

23 March A UN - sponsored agreement to allow freedom of movement in and out

of Sarajevo signed between the Bosnian Government and the Serbs on
17 March takes effect. Key roads and a bridge linking Serb and Muslim
neighborhoods open .

24 March The Bosnian Serb “ parliament” rejects participation in the Croat-Muslim

federation and conditions participation in future peace talks on the lifting of
UN sanctions against the former Yugoslavia .

18
 CRONIS

27 March The assembly of the self-proclaimed Bosnian Croat republic of Herceg

Bosna votes to endorse the Croat-Muslim federation and send representa
tives to the Bosnian assembly for further debate on the constitution .

30 March A constituent assembly of Croats and the Bosnian assembly unanimously

adopts the constitution for the Croat-Muslim federation . The Bosnian
assembly approved the constitution before the constituent assembly was
called .

The Croatian Government and the Krajina Serbs sign a cease- fire agree
ment at the Russian Embassy in Zagreb .

31March UNSC extends UNPROFOR's mandate for six months, approves 3,700
additional personnel, and asks NATO to extend close air support to UN
troops in Croatia .

4 April The Croatian Government and the Krajina Serbs begin implementation of a
cease - fire agreement.

8-9 April The UN Commander in Bosnia , General Rose , shuttles between Bosnian
Serb Army Commander General Mladic and Bosnian Army General Com
mander Delic to negotiate a cease -fire in the Muslim enclave ofGorazde.
His mission is unsuccessful, however, and Serb artillery attacks against
Gorazde intensify .

10 April In NATO's first-ever airstrike against a ground target,US planes bomb Serb
positions attacking Gorazde. NATO conducts a second airstrike on 11 April
following continued Serb attacks against the town. Russia complains it was
not consulted . The Bosnian Serbs respond by detaining UN and NGO per
sonnel and threatening to shoot down US planes, but the fighting eases.

14 April Bosnian Government and Croat representative meeting in Sarajevo to

discuss the Croat-Muslim federation agree on procedures to nominate presi
dential and prime ministerial candidates and decide to call a constituent
assembly later in the month .

16 April A British jet is shot down over Gorazde, as the Bosnian Serb assault on the
enclave intensifies.

17 April UN envoy Akashinegotiates a cease - fire agreement for Gorazde with

Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic. The Serbs agree to release detained UN
personnel and withdraw forces from the enclave although no deadline is
specified . The Serbs reject the immediate deployment of UN troops to
Gorazde .

19
18 April UN Secretary General Boutros -Ghali asks NATO to launch airstrikes to pro
tect the six UN " safe areas" in Bosnia .

18-19 April EU foreign ministers call for cease-fire and demilitarized zone around
Gorazde , release of detained UN personnel and unimpeded access for relief
workers throughout Bosnia , and closer diplomatic cooperation between the
EU , the UN , the United States, and Russia . But they give no indication how
these goals are to be achieved .

21 April The Krajina Serb assembly approves a " government of national unity ”
under PrimeMinister Mikelic , President Martic's nominee .

22 April NATO orders Bosnian Serb forces to immediately halt attacks on Gorazde
and pull back 3 km from Gorazde by 2001 EDT on 23 April or face air
strikes within a 20 -km radius of the city. NATO also orders the Bosnian
Serbs to withdraw all heavy weapons from a 20 -km exclusion zone around
Gorazde by 2001 EDT on 26 April. NATO agrees to extend the threat of air
strikes to cover all of the UN safe areas. The UNSC passes a resolution
demanding the Bosnian Serbs pull back from Gorazde, implement an imme
diate cease -fire, and allow unimpeded freedom of movement for UN
personnel in Bosnia .

UN special envoy Akashi secures agreement from the Bosnian Serbs that
they will end hostilities in Gorazde , withdraw heavy weapons from a 20 -km
exclusion zone, and guarantee freedom ofmovement for UN and relief per
sonnel by 0600 EDT on 23 April .

23 April Bosnian Government and Croat representatives meeting in Sarajevo fail to

reach agreement on delineating cantons in the Croat-Muslim federation or
filling leadership positions. They also cancel a constituentassembly of both
sides scheduled for the end of the month .

26 April The ContactGroup — representatives ofRussia , the EU , the UN , and the

United States — meets for the first time in Sarajevo in an effort to bring the
warring parties back to negotiations and work toward a cease- fire in Bosnia.

27 April The UN authorizes 6,550 extra troops for the former Yugoslavia ,bringing
the approved total to 44,870 . There are 33,300 actually deployed, including
17,000 in Bosnia.

3 May Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic agrees to a UN proposal to post military

observers around Brcko and to a cease -fire in the area .

20
3-4 May UN Special Envoy Akashi negotiates an agreementwith Bosnian Serb
leader Karadzic to permit a British convoy to enter Gorazde and to allow
Serb tanks to transit the Sarajevo exclusion zone under UNPROFOR
control.

5 May The Contact Group resumes shuttle diplomacy between Sarajevo and Pale .

The UNSC passes a resolution warning all warring parties that offensive
action around Brcko would result in serious consequences and calling for a
cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia and a resumption of negotiations .

6 May French Foreign Minister Juppe revives France's threat to withdraw its
forces if there is no quick progress toward peace .

7-11 May Bosnian Government and Croat representatives meeting in Vienna reach
agreement on details of delineating cantons in the Croat-Muslim federation
and filling federation leadership positions .

13 May Ministers from the Contact Group countries meeting in Geneva agree on a
strategy to restart Bosnian peace negotiations. They call for a four-month
cease -fire , 51 percent of Bosnian territory for the Croat-Muslim federation ,
and continuation of current sanctions against Serbia with the prospect of an
easing if Belgrade cooperates with the peace process .

17 May France announces it will withdraw 2,500 of the 6,900 French soldiers
assigned to UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia over the next six months.

25-26 May Contact Group representatives hold bilateralmeetings with the Bosnian
Government and the Bosnian Serb parties in Talloires, France. The parties
do not reach an agreement but the negotiations are scheduled to reconvene
in 10 days.

30 May The Bosnian Constituent Assembly names Croat leader Kresimir Zubak as
President of the Croat-Muslim federation and current Bosnian Vice
President Ganic as its Vice President.

4 June The Contact Group holds bilateralmeetings with representatives of the

Croat-Muslim federation and the Bosnian Serbs in Geneva but fails to bring
them together.

8 June Bosnian Government and Serb leaders sign a renewable monthlong cease
fire agreement at talks mediated by UN envoy Akashi. The agreement is to
take effect on 10 June. The negotiations began only after the Bosnian Serbs

21
 complied with the Bosnian Government demand that they withdraw all
" police” forces from within the 3 -km exclusion zone around Gorazde.

14 June Croatian President Tudjman and Bosnian President Izetbegovic meet in

Sarajevo and pledge closer cooperation on economic issues, foreign rela
tions, and integrating the Croat-Muslim federation and building its relations
with Croatia .

16 June The Contact Groupmeets in London to discuss a map to divide Bosnia . The
warring parties are not represented at the meeting.

23 June The Bosnian parliament unanimously elects Bosnian PrimeMinister

Silajdzic to head a cabinet composed of 11 Muslims and six Croats. It will
run both the Bosnian and the Croat-Muslim federation governments until
parliamentary elections in the fall.

28 June The Contact Group , meeting in Paris, agrees on a map and a package of
incentives to use to convince the warring parties to reach a settlement.

5 July The foreign ministers ofthe Contact Groupmeet in Geneva and endorse the
group's proposal for a Bosnian settlement.

6 July The Contact Group presents its peace plan to the warring parties in Geneva
and gives them two weeks to respond to the proposal.

10 July The G - 7 and Russia endorse the ContactGroup plan and urge the warring
parties to accept it at a summitmeeting in Naples.

11 July The Bosnian Government agrees to extend by one month the Bosnian
cease -fire that expired on 10 July. The Bosnian Serbs had agreed to the
extension on 8 July .

NATO's North Atlantic Council reiterates its willingness to take part in

implementing the Contact Group proposal and directs its military authori
ties to work with UNPROFOR to update contingency planning for such a
role.

12-13 July French Foreign Minister Juppe and British Foreign Minister Hurd travel to
Bosnia to meetwith the warring parties in an effort to convince them to
accept the Contact Group peace plan .

18 July The Bosnian assembly approves the Contact Group peace plan .

22

- -
-

- - - - - -- -
 ONVIS
vanaH

18-19 July The Bosnian Serb parliament debates the Contact Group proposal but does
not reveal its final position .

20 July The Bosnian Serbs " conditionally" accept the Contact Group peace plan ,
which the group interprets as a rejection .

23 July The EU begins administration ofMostar.

25 July The ContactGroup meets in Moscow to discuss their response to the

Bosnian Serb rejection of the peace plan .

UN Secretary General Boutros -Ghali recommends the withdrawal of UN

troops from the Balkans and asks the Contact Group to organize an interna
tional task force to impose a peace plan .

27 July Bosnian Serbs cut off the main route into Sarajevo to all civilian and com
mercial traffic .

28 July Bosnian Serb assembly convenes to reconsider the Contact Group peace
plan and rejects it for a second time.

30 July The Contact Group ministers meet in Geneva and agree to tighten sanctions
on Serbia in response to the Bosnian Serb rejection of its peace plan .

3 August The Bosnian Serb assembly votes unanimously to hold a referendum on

27-28 August on the ContactGroup proposal.

4 August PresidentMilosevic announces an immediate political and economic

blockade against the Bosnian Serbs.

5 August NATO planes strike Bosnian Serb ground target after Serbs remove heavy
weapons from a UN -monitored collection point near Sarajevo .

5-6 August The Bosnian Serbs return the weapons to the UN depot to avert further
airstrikes.

Croatian and Krajina Serb officials resume stalled negotiations but no

progress reported .

8 August UN commander Rose proposes a demilitarized zone around Sarajevo .

11 August UN commander Rose threatens both Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Army
forces with airstrikes as fighting near Visoko spills into 20 -km exclusion
zone around Sarajevo .

23
13 August UN dispatches ICFY envoy Stoltenberg to Belgrade and Pale to meet with
Serbian and Bosnian Serb officials. Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic again
rejects the Contact Group plan .

NATO aircraft fly over a weapons collection point near Sarajevo on

Saturday preventing Bosnian Serb units from removing two tanks. Troops
on the ground block two other attempts to remove weapons from UN
monitored sites .

14 August Serbs and Muslims sign a UN -brokered agreement to halt sniping in

Sarajevo .

15 August UN announces weapons firings in Sarajevo over the weekend are the
highest in weeks with more than 1,400 incidents recorded .

Croatian refugees announced they will end their blockade of crossings into
the UN -protected areas.

17 August Abdic declares a unilateral cease - fire between rebelMuslim and

government forces in the Bihac enclave .

18 August Bosnian Serb assembly session elects a new government.

19 August Muslim rebel leader Abdic surrenders to Bosnian Government forces but
later refuses unconditional surrender and flees Bihac.

20 August Bosnian Serb and Krajina Serb leaders sign a joint declaration calling for a
unified Serb state .

20-21 August Asmany as 20,000 refugees flee the Bihac enclave into Krajina Serb
controlled territory . Croatian Government blocks their entry into Croatia .

22 August Bosnian Army forces capture Muslim separatist stronghold in the Bihac
enclave .

24 August Russian PrimeMinister Chernomyrdin pledges in meeting with Serbian

Prime Minister Marjanovic to back efforts to ease sanctions against Serbia
if Belgrade observes its commitment to break ties to the Bosnian Serbs.

Federation parties agree to establish a joint political commission to work

with the federation leadership to implement the federation agreement.

26 August Emergency session of the Serbian assembly adopts declaration supporting

the Contact Group's peace plan .

24
27 August Russian Foreign Minister meets with Serbian PresidentMilosevic in
Belgrade to discuss easing of sanctions against Serbia and border monitor
ing issues .

27-28 August Bosnian Serb referendum overwhelmingly rejects Contact Group plan.

30 August Bosnian and Bosnian Serb Army commanders sign an antisniping agree
ment for Gorazde.

2-10 September Approximately 3,500 Muslims and otherminorities are expelled from
northern Bosnia in the single most intensive week of Bosnian Serb ethnic
cleansing since the campaign intensified in mid -July.

3 September Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev says Russia will withdraw its troops
from Bosnia if NATO conducts airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs or if the
Bosnia arms embargo is lifted .

4 September UN mediators Owen and Stoltenberg meet with Milosevic to discuss

Belgrade's embargo on the Bosnian Serbs. Milosevic tells Stoltenberg that
he will accept a plan to place international monitors along the border.

6-7 September Contact group meets in Berlin to discussmonitoring proposal arranged by

EU mediator Owen and accepted by Milosevic . The group agrees to request
that the UN ease some sanctions against Serbia in exchange for Belgrade's
acceptance of bordermonitors .

8 September French Foreign Ministry announces Belgrade will accept an international

humanitarian mission along the federal border with Bosnia . The contact
group agrees to recommend the UN tighten sanctions against the Bosnian
Serbs and ease some sanctions against Belgrade.

9 September Asmany as 30,000 refugees from Velika Kladusa in the Bihac enclave
remain in the Krajina Serb -controlled area .

10-11 September EU foreign ministers approve in principle the contact group plan for easing
sanctions against Belgrade in exchange for Belgrade's acceptance of inter
national monitors along its border with Bosnia . The EU is prepared to send
135 monitors. The ministers also voice strong opposition to lifting the
Bosnian arms embargo .

14 September Bosnian President Izetbegovic and Croatian President Tudjman reach

agreement on the creation of a Bosnian Muslim -Croat military command
and of municipal and cantonal Federation authorities.

25
15 September Bosnian Serbs divert power from powerlines in Sarajevo to Pale, leaving
Sarajevo without electricity or water.

16 September An advance team of 19 international border observers arrives in Belgrade .

The mission, under the direction of Swedish general Bo Pellnas, will moni
tor the economic blockade imposed on the Bosnian Serbs by Belgrade to
verify whether it is being implemented .

18 September UN Commander Rose threatens both Bosnian Serbs and Muslims with
NATO airstrikes after fighting between Bosnian Army forces and the
Bosnian Serb Army results in the shelling of Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serbs.

22 September US and British NATO fighter planes hit a Bosnian Serb tank in the Sarajevo
exclusion zone after Bosnian Serbs attack a French armored personnel
carrier.

23 September The UNSC adopts a resolution to ease sanctions against Serbia once
UNSYG Boutros-Ghali verifies that Belgrade's blockade of the Bosnian
Serbs is effective. The Security Council also passes resolutions to tighten
sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs and condemn ethnic cleansing.

27 September Bosnian President Izetbegovic calls on the Security Council to lift the arms
embargo but delay implementation for six months .

28 September UN personnel make repairs to a damaged transformer restoring electric sup

plies and water to Sarajevo .

30 September The UN Security Council votes to extend UNPROFOR's mandate for six
months in Bosnia , Croatia , and Macedonia .

3 October UNSYG Boutros -Ghali sets in motion the process to suspend phase one
sanctions after receiving confirmation from ICFY chairmen Owen and
Stoltenberg that Belgrade is meeting its commitment to close the border.
The Belgrade airport will reopen and sporting and cultural exchanges will
resume for 100 days starting 5 October.

7 October NATO ambassadors urge UNSYG Boutos-Ghali to allow swifter airstrikes,

possibly without warning, on a wider choice oftargets if the Bosnian Serb
violate exclusion zones or attack UNPROFOR .

28 October USUN Ambassador Albright circulates a draft UNSC resolution calling for
the arms embargo in Bosnia to be lifted in six months unless the Bosnian
Serbs accept the contact group peace plan .

26
-

- - - -
 -

NATO and the UN reach agreement on the use of airstrikes in Bosnia . Air
strikes will be proportional to the violation , more timely, and without tacti
calwarning unless civilians are endangered . The UN retains the authority to
initiate and stop airstrikes.

3 November The UN General Assembly approves a nonbinding resolution to lift the

arms embargo against Bosnia in six months if the Bosnian Serbs do not
accept the contact group peace plan . UN Security Council members, who
have sole authority to lift the embargo, endorse the resolution with five in
favor and 10 abstentions.

9 November A single Krajina Serb jet aircraft takes off from Udbina airfield to attack
two targets in Bihac, violating the no -fly zone in Bosina. The jet's missiles
hit an ammunition dump and a parcel of open ground in the surrounding
area .

18 November Krajina Serb jets attack Bihac with missiles, napalm , and cluster bombs .
The UNSC issues a presidential statement condemning the attack and calls
for an end to actions that endanger UN peacekeepers . Croatian President
Tudjman gives the UNSC permission to allow NATO to fly over Croatian
territory

19 November The UNSC unanimously authorizes NATO planes to strike targets in

Croatia used by the Serbs to launch attacks on UN safe areas. The Krajina
Serb assembly rejects a proposal initiated by internationalmediators Owen
and Stoltenberg to restore economic links to the Croatian Government.

21 November NATO planes, at UN request, attack Serb -controlled Udbina airfield in

Croatia, rendering it temporarily inoperable. The strike is intended to stop
Serb attacks on the neighboring Bihac enclave in Bosnia.

23 November NATO planes attack Serb surface to -air-missile sites around Bosanska
Krupa and Otoka in northwest Bosnia and in the area of Dvor, in retaliation
for Serb attacks against British aircraft the previous day.

30 November
UNSYG Boutros-Ghali arrives in Sarajevo to negotiate a cease- fire
throughout Bosnia with Bosnian President Izetbegovic and Serb leader
Karadzic . Karadzic refuses to meet the UNSYG , insisting that the meeting
take place on Serb -controlled land.

2 December Croatia and the “ Republic of Serbian Krajina” (RSK ) sign an economic
agreement as a first step to restoration of utilities, reopening road links, and
reactivating an oil pipeline between Croat and Serb - controlled areas of
Croatia .

27
 Contact Group Foreign Ministers meet in Brussels to discuss new initiatives
designed to encourage the Bosnian Serbs to sign the Contact Group peace
plan .

4 December British Foreign Minister Hurd and French Foreign Minister Juppe travel to
Belgrade for talks with Serbian President Milosevic .Milosevic promises to
use his influence to press the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group
plan.

5 December A delegation of Bosnian Serb assembly members led by Bosnian Serb

Foreign Minister Buha urges other assembly members to consider accep
tance of the Contact Group plan , after a meeting in Belgrade with Serbian
PresidentMilosevic .

12 December Krajina Serb and/or rebel Muslim forces destroy a Bangladeshi UN

armored personnel carrier in Velika Kladusa with an antitank guided
missile. UNPROFOR Commander Rose and other UN officials in Sarajevo
deny Bangladeshi requests for NATO air presence .

14 December Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic publicly invites former US President Carter
to visit Bosnia as a mediator. Karadzic pledges to free all UN peacekeepers
and Muslim soldiers held prisoner who are under the age of 19 , guarantee
freedom ofmovement for UN convoys , accept an immediate cease -fire
around Sarajevo , and reopen Sarajevo airport.

18 December Former President Carter travels to Sarajevo for an hour-long meeting with
Bosnian President Izetbegovic . Carter recommends that the ContactGroup
plan serve as the basis for further negotiations .

19 December Former President Carter, after a meeting with Bosnian Serb leaders in Pale ,
announces a Serb proposal for an immediate four-month cease- fire and an
offer to continue talks based on the Contact Group plan . The points of the
unilateral cease -fire are outlined in a statement issued by Serb leaders.
Afterward , Karadzic denies he agreed to an immediate cease - fire but
expresses the need “ to explore the possibilities” of an immediate cease - fire .

19-20 December Military chiefs of NATO countries and countries with peacekeepers in
Bosnia meet in The Hague to discuss ways to improve the UNPROFOR
mission . The leaders call formore resources but do not discuss increasing
the number of UN troops or giving the mission authority for more robust
military action.

20 December Carter returns to Sarajevo where he obtains Bosnian President Izetbegovic's

agreement to a four-month cease-fire, and, after a second meeting in Pale,

28

- -- - -
 announces that Bosnian Serb leaders will accept a complete cease -fire
throughout Bosnia to be implemented on 23 December. Carter then travels
to Belgrade to hold talks with Serbian PresidentMilosevic before returning
to the United States.

21 December Croatia's Krajina Serbs allow the Zagreb -Belgrade highway to reopen as
part of their mediated economic agreement signed on 2 December.

22 December UN Special Envoy Akashi obtains commitments from Bosnian Muslim and
Serb officials to enact a cease -fire at noon on 23 December, after meetings
in Sarajevo and Pale.

23 December Bosnian President Izetbegovic and Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic sign sepa
rate texts agreeing to a cease- fire valid until 1 January, after which there
will be an anticipated four-month “ cessation of hostilities.”

24 December A seven -day cease-fire between Bosnian Muslims and Serbs starts at noon .

28 December
Rebel Muslim leader Abdic agrees “ in principle” to respect a cease-fire and
end ethnic cleansing in Serb - controlled areas of Bosnia .

29 December The Bosnian Serb assembly endorses the 19 December Carter agreement
and agrees to negotiations based on the existing Contact Group plan .Seven
Serb deputies, who have maintained ties to Milosevic, break away from
Karadzic's SDS party to form their own independent group .

31 December Bosnian Government and Serb officials sign separate texts, agreeing to a
four-month comprehensive cease - fire to take effect at noon on 1 January .
The agreement follows the temporary truce signed on 23 December and
calls for UN troops to be positioned between the combatant forces in some
areas. UNPROFOR will set up joint commissions to monitor the cease -fire.

1995

1 January 1995 The four -month cessation ofhostilities agreement between the Bosnian
Government and Bosnian Serbs takes effect at noon Sarajevo time.

2 January Bosnian Croat political and military officials, led by Federation President
Zubak , sign the four-month cease - fire agreement after a two-hourmeeting
in Mostar with UN Commander Rose . Zubak attaches a separate annex
affirming that plans presented by Milosevic and the Contact Group offer a
good basis for reopening peace negotiations. Karadzic insists ,however, that
land swaps and constitutional issues must be decided before formal accep
tance of the plan .

29
4 January A joint commission of Bosnian Muslim and Serb leaders fail to reach agree
ment on implementing key aspects of the cease -fire agreement. The meet
ing,held at Sarajevo airport, is suspended following Serb complaints over
the Bosnian Government's refusal to withdraw its troops from Mt. Igman .

6 January Bosnian Muslim and Serb leaders again fail to reach agreement on imple
menting the cease -fire. Serb leaders declare they will not reopen key supply
routes leading into Sarajevo until they are permitted to inspect the Mt.
Igman DMZ to verify the withdrawal of government troops .

9 January UN officials are unable to verify the Bosnian Government's withdrawal

from Mt. Igman after a government guide argues that snow conditions are
unsafe and refuses to lead UN officers to the last Bosnian hideout.

11 January Bosnian Government and Serb officials sign an agreement providing for the
withdrawal of governmentforces from Mt. Igman and the opening of sup
ply routes into Sarajevo by 14 January.

12 January Croatian President Tudjman informsUNSYG Boutros-Ghali by letter that

Zagreb will not renew UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia when it expires
on 31 March . Tudjman states thatUN headquarters can remain in Zagreb ,
but UN forces must withdraw before 30 June .

The UNSC votes to extend limited sanctions relief in Serbia for another 100
days. The vote also mandates border monitors to prohibit fuel shipments
from Serbia to Serb - held areas of Croatia .

13 January The Contact Group holds talks with Bosnian Serb leaders in Pale .

14 January Bosnian Serb soldiers block the opening of supply routes into Sarajevo,
charging that government officials are abusing the agreement signed on 11
January by seeking passage for commercial traffic as well as humanitarian
aid .

20 January Bosnian Government and Serb officials exchange 101 prisoners in Sara
jevo . The exchange is the first prisoner swap since October 1994 .

23 January Bosnian Serb leader Krajisnik and UN officialMuratovic sign an agreement

to open key supply routes into Sarajevo by 31 January . The agreement also
provides for freedom ofmovement for the population , exchange of POWS,
and evacuation of wounded from Gorazde.

24 January British Major General Rupert Smith replaces GeneralMichael Rose as

commander of UN forces in Bosnia .

30

- -- - - -
24-25 January The Contact Group begins two days of shuttle diplomacy between Pale and
Sarajevo to further the peace process . The group decides to suspend the
talks after the Serbs refuse to accept the Contact Group plan as the basis for
further negotiations.

26 January The Adria oil pipeline , extending from Croatia's Adriatic coast to central
Europe opens under the 2 December economic agreement between Zagreb
and the Krajina Serbs.

30 January The Zagreb Four (Z -4 ), the United States, EU , UN and Russia, presents its
plan for a political settlement in Croatia to President Tudjman and Krajina
Serb “ President” Martic . The plan reestablishes Croatian control over all
territory within its internationally recognized borders and gives consider
able autonomy to Serbs in areas where they form a majority .Martic refuses
to receive the plan , stating that Knin must first receive guarantees that
UNPROFOR will stay in Croatia,while Tudjman saysZagreb will study the
plan before further decision .

31 January Serbian President Milosevic refuses to meet with Z - 4 mediators and

declines to discuss their plan for a political settlement in Croatia .

1 February UN officials announce that Bosnian Serb leaders will allow the opening of a
key route into Sarajevo to humanitarian traffic . The road will most likely
remain closed to commercial traffic .

5 February Senior officials of theMuslim -Croat Federation meet in Munich , Germany ,

with US and ContactGroup representatives. They agree on a nine-point
plan to strength the Federation and to nominate an international mediator to
resolve disputed matters.

6 February UN officials announce the opening of key supply routes around Sarajevo
and across the airport to civilian traffic. Commercial traffic is still excluded .

8 February The Krajina Serb “ parliament” votes to suspend political talks and further
steps in implementing the 2 December economic agreement with Zagreb
until it reverses its decision to expel UN forces. The vote is accompanied by
a measure declaring a war alert, one step below declaring a full state of war.

13 February The Bosnian Serb assembly meets in Samac and again rejects the Contact
Group plan . The assembly decides to prohibit unauthorized contacts
between Bosnian Serb individuals or groups with the Contact Group in an
effort to rein in dissident deputies who favor the Contact Group plan .

31
14 February The five -nation Contact Group , at a meeting in Paris, agrees to a new initia
tive to lift sanctions against Belgrade in exchange for its recognition of
Croatia , Bosnia , Macedonia , and Slovenia. In addition , Serbian President
Milosevic must endorse the Z -4 plan providing for a political solution in
Croatia .

18-19 February Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev travels to Serbia for two days of talks
with Serbian President Milosevic concerning the new Contact Group initia
tive . Serbian officials refuse to consider the initiative until sanctions against
Belgrade are lifted .

20 February Krajina and Bosnian Serb officials form a joint defense council, headed by
Bosnian Serb President Karadzic and Krajina Serb PresidentMartic. They
agree to poolmilitary resources and pledge military cooperation if fighting
resumes.

23 February French , German , and British representatives of the Contact Group present
Serbian President Milosevic with the group's new plan offering sanctions
relief to Serbia in exchange for its recognition of the other former Yugoslav
states. No official statements follow themeeting, but press sources indicate
Milosevic has rejected the new offer.

6 March Military commanders from the Croatian , Bosnian , and Bosnian Croat
armies meet in Zagreb to sign an accord strengthening military cooperation .
The accord provides the framework for possible coordination ofMuslim
Croatmilitary actions against Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia .

8 March Deputies of the Krajina Serb Radical Party walk out of the Krajina Serb
assembly after their demand for a no -confidence vote in PrimeMinister
Mikelic is refused .

8-10 March Federation President Zubak and Vice President Ganic agree in Bonn ,
Germany, to take steps to strengthen the federation by 15 April.

10 March Bosnian CroatGeneral Santic , commander of Bosnian Croat forces in

Bihac, is reported missing. Bosnian Croat officials accuse the Bosnian
Government of detaining Santic, but Bosnian Army spokesmen deny
involvement.

12 March Croatian President Tudjman announces Zagreb's readiness to negotiate a

new mandate with the UN Security Council for an international force to
replace existing UN troops in Croatia . The new force would consist of
approximately 5,000 troops, with 500 soldiers stationed along Croatia's
borders with Bosnia and Serbia .

32

- --
15 March Bosnian Army Commander Delic announces that three government soldiers
are being detained in connection with the early March disappearance of
Bosnian CroatGeneral Santic . Delic states that the incidentwas a " settling
of personal scores” and notmotivated by political or military reasons.

20 March Croatian and Krajina Serb officials agree to open a section of the Belgrade
Zagreb railway bymid -April. Croatian officials agree to perform repairs to
the railway by 27 March .

24 March Bosnian PrimeMinister Silajdzic and Croatian Prime Minister Valentic sign
a federation agreement on economic and customscooperation , the return of
refugees, and the abolition of visas . The two officials also review an agree
ment that guarantees the federation access to the sea through Croatian terri
tory and Croatia access through federation territory.

26 March Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic orders the mobilization of the entire Bosnian
Serb population to counter the Bosnian Government offensive ,now in its
second week .

27 March The five-nation ContactGroup , meeting in London , urges Sarajevo and Pale
to extend the current cease -fire and pledges to continue its efforts to bring
about negotiations.

28 March The Croatian Parliament endorses a set of conclusions stating that any new
UN mandate for Croatia must explicitly refer to Croatia in its name, estab
lish effective control of Croatia's borders, and provide for operationalmea
sures leading to peace .

29 March The Bosnian Parliament endorses the 10 March Bonn Agreement to step up
implementation of the Muslim -Croat federation.

31 March The UNSC adopts three resolutions renewing the UN mandate in the former
Yugoslavia and dividing UN troops into three separate commands for
Croatia, Bosnia , and Macedonia . The new Croatian force, UNCRO (UN
Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia), will be reduced in number
and tasked to monitor Croatia's borders.

4 April Contact Group officials, meeting in London , agree to press Sarajevo to

extend the Bosnian cease - fire when it expires on 1 May. The group fails to
agree on a strategy to gain Serbian recognition of Bosnia and Croatia .

8 April Bosnian Serb and UN military generals sign an agreement pledging that
both sides will not interfere with the movement of people and traffic along
themain supply route between the airport and central Sarajevo. The agree
ment follows a tense standoff in which Bosnian Serbs blockaded French UN
troops behind mines on 7 April.

33
11 April Members of the five -nation Contact Group arrive in Belgrade for talks on
the peace process with Serbian PresidentMilosevic . No formal statement is
issued .

14 April A French UN peacekeeper is killed by an unidentified sniper in the Sarajevo

suburb of Dobrinja .

15 April A second French UN peacekeeper is killed by sniper fire in Sarajevo .

French Defense Minister Leotard goes to Sarajevo to discuss UN troop
security and calls for emergency UN consultations, threatening a French
withdraw from Bosnia if Paris ' conditions for the continuation of the UN
mission are not met.

15-16 April The Bosnian Serb assembly meets in SanskiMost to review the military and
political situation in Serb -held Bosnia.Military and political leaders blame
each other for recent military setbacks.

19 April The UNSC unanimously adopts a French resolution that calls on all warring
parties in Bosnia to refrain from violence againstUN forces , urges the
extension of the cease - fire, and requests the resumption of negotiations for a
peaceful settlement.

20-21 April UN Special Envoy Akashi talks in Sarajevo and Pale with Bosnian Govern
ment and Serb leaders on renewing the four-month cease -fire . Both Sara
jevo and Pale refuse to renew the cease-fire .

21 April The United States, United Kingdom , Russia, France, and Germany approve
a resolution to extend relaxation ofminor sanctions against Serbia , but with
stricter controls . The draft calls on Serbia to completely seal its borders with
Bosnia , cut off communications with Pale , and requires renewal every 75
days instead of 100 .

UNSYG Boutros -Ghali recommends a report to the UNSC reorganizing UN

forces in Croatia . The plan ,not yet approved by Zagreb or Knin , reduces the
number of troops in the force, provides formonitors on Croatia's borders
with Bosnia, but does not specify the number of troops on the border or how
many crossings will bemonitored .

21-22 April US and German Contact Group officials are forced to spend the night at
Sarajevo airport after Bosnian Serb officials refuse to ensure their safe pas
sage into Sarajevo for talks with the Bosnian Government,while Serb
leader Karadzic denounces the UN's limited easing of sanctions. The
envoys leave the airport for Zagreb on 22 April.
34

- --
24-25 April The Krajina Serb Army closes the Zagreb -Belgrade Highway for 24 hours
in reaction to alleged interference by the Croatian Government and
UNCRO officials with commercial traffic . The Krajina Serbs reopen the
highway on 25 April.

1 May The Cessation of Hostilities Agreement expires in Bosnia amid low -level
fighting

Croatian Army troops attack across UN lines into UN Sector West to take
control of the Zagreb -Belgrade highway following a weekend of Serb and
Croat killings along the road . Krajina Serbs respond by shelling nearby
Croatian towns and taking 122 UN personnel hostage .

2 May Krajina Serbs rocket downtown Zagreb and nearby Pleso Airport in retalia
tion for the Croatian offensive in UN Sector West. Five people are killed ,
and more than 100 are injured .

The Croatians continue their push into Sector West, seizing virtually all
strategic points. President Tudjman declares victory .

3 May US Special Envoy Akashi brokers a cease -fire between Croatia and the
Krajina Serbs following another Serb missile strike againstZagreb that hit a
children's hospital and the national theater - killing one person and wound
ing 40.

7 May Bosnian Serbs shell Sarajevo in the first major attack on the city since the
expiration of a four-month cease -fire on 1 May. Ten are killed and 40 are
injured , according to press accounts.

9 May The United Nations begins evacuating Serbs from Sector West to Bosnia
after Krajina Serb leaders threaten further rocketing of Zagreb if they are
not allowed to go .

10 May UN Commander General Rupert Smith requests airstrikes on Bosnian Serb

gunners in retaliation for the 7 May shelling of Sarajevo . He is overruled by
UN Special Envoy Akashiwho fears airstrikes will upset the recently
brokered cease - fire in Croatia . Afterward , frustrated UN officials in
Sarajevo call for a review of their role in Bosnia .

15 May GeneralMilan Celeketic , chief of the Krajina Serb Army, submits his resig
nation to RSK PresidentMartic. He blames not only the political leadership
for losses in Western Slovenia but also himself for notupholding his prom
ise to defend every " centimeter” of Serb territory .

35
 16 May UNSYG Boutros -Ghali, in a closed- door briefing of the Security Council,
suggests that UN troops in Bosnia be reduced and regrouped in light the
escalation of hostilities and threats to peacekeepers.

17 May The UNSC adopts a resolution demanding that Croatian and Krajina Serb
forces withdraw from UN separation zones in Croatia , including a warning
of unspecified actions if the two sides do not comply .

20 May The Krajina Serb assembly votes to unify with the Bosnian Serbs and calls
for a joint session of the Krajina and Bosnian Serb assemblies by the end of
May to formalize the unification .

24 May UN officials issue an ultimatum to the warring parties in Bosnia to cease

using heavy weapons around Sarajevo . They warn the Serbs to return four
big guns taken from UN depots by noon 25 May or face NATO airstrikes.

25 May NATO launches airstrikes against two ammunition bunkers near Pale after
Bosnian Serbs ignore the ultimatum issued on 24 May . The Bosnian Serbs
retaliate by shelling UN safe areas, taking UN troops hostage and killing 68
in Tuzla .

26 May NATO launches a second round of airstrikes against the Pale ammunition
depot at Jahorina Potok.

28 May Bosnian Foreign Minister Ljubijankic is killed when the helicopter carrying
him is shot down over the Bihac region . Krajina Serbs claim responsibility.

29 May Bosnian Serb leaders rescind all prior agreements with the United Nations.

31 May Lord David Owen announces his resignation as EU peace negotiator in the
former Yugoslavia.

Press reports indicate that Bosnian Serbs have taken a total of 372 peace
keepers hostage since the 25 and 26 May NATO airstrikes.

1 June UN Secretary General Boutros -Ghali presents options to the Security Coun
cil for the future of peacekeeping forces in Bosnia . His preference is a
reduction of UNPROFOR’smandate , consolidation ofUNPROFOR troops ,
and an eventual reduction of force .

2 June A US F - 16 is shot down by Bosnian Serbs over Banja Luka while policing
the Bosnian “ no -fly ” zone.

8 June US Marines rescue F - 16 pilot shot down on 2 June.

36

-
-

7-13 June Bosnian Serbs release 258 UN hostages. Twenty -six hostages remain in
Serb hands, and 92 UN peacekeepers are blocked in place by Serb forces .

15 June The Bosnian Serb “parliament” votes to unite with its Croatian Serb
counterpart.

Bosnian Army troops massing north of Sarajevo remove weapons from UN

depot at gunpoint. Shops, schools, and offices close in Sarajevo .

16 June Heavy fighting breaks out around Sarajevo as Bosnian Armybegins prob
ing attacks for an offensive to lift the siege of Sarajevo .

UN Security Council authorizes a British -French -Dutch rapid reaction force

(RRF ) to protect UN peacekeepers in Bosnia. Arrangements to pay for the
force are deferred .

18 June Bosnian Serbs release remaining 26 UN hostages in exchange for four Serb
soldiers detained by United Nations.

20 June EU envoy Carl Bildt arrives in Split for his first visit to former Yugoslavia
as internationalmediator .

28 June NATO gives provisional approval to a plan to send thousands of troops to

Bosnia to cover withdrawal ofUN peacekeepers if their mission collapses.

30 June German parliament approves cabinet's decision to send soldiers and fighter
aircraft to support the RRF in Bosnia, which could be Germany's first
foreign combatmission since World War II.

4 July US logistic troops arrive in Split to prepare the ground for the UN Rapid
Reaction Force .

5 July UN Security Council renews for another 75 days the easing of some
sanctions it imposed on the Yugoslav Republic in 1992 .

9 July Bosnian Serb tanks push to within 1,500 meters of the town limits of
Srebrenica . Bosnian Serbs detain seven UN Dutch peacekeepers during the
incursion and take them to the town of Bratunac in Serb -held territory.

11 July NATO jets attack Bosnian Serb tanks entering Srebrenica after UN troops
come under Serb fire .

37
 Bosnian Serb troops break through Dutch UN defenses and overrun
Srebrenica safe area , forcing thousands of Muslims to flee north to a
UN base at Potocari.

12 July UN Security Council demands Bosnian Serb forces withdraw from UN

declared safe area of Srebrenica. The European Union and NATO make
similar statements , and NATO demands the immediate and unconditional
release of Dutch peacekeepers held by Bosnian Serbs.

14 July Thorvald Stoltenberg is named special UN envoy to Bosnia.

Bosnian Government refuses to cooperate with either Akashi or

Stoltenberg , blaming the fall of Srebrenica on UN inaction .

Bosnian Serb forces launch a major attack on the UN -declared safe area of
Zepa.

18 July Bosnian Serb forces press attack on Zepa with tanks and artillery ,while
Bosnian Government troops disarm UN Ukrainian troops, hoping to use
them as hostages against the Serbs. Serb atrocities associated with their cap
ture ofZepa and Srebrenica eventually bring worldwide condemnation .

19 July Croatian Serb troops and their rebel Muslim allies open concerted attack on
Bosnian Government positions in the northwestern Bihac enclave . The
number of refugees arriving in Tuzla from eastern Bosnia reaches 29,000
with 13,000 still missing.

21 July Senior officials from ContactGroup and UN troop contributor nationsmeet

in London to try to save the UN mission in Bosnia .

22 July Croatian President Tudjman , Bosnian President Izetbegovic , and Federation

leader Zubak sign the Split Agreement for Croatia to provide Bosnia
Herzegovina urgentmilitary assistance against the Serb offensive in Bihac.

25 July Croatian Army and Bosnian Croat forces begin an offensive in the Livno
Valley of western Bosnia against the Bosnian Serbs.

Krajina Serb leader Martic, Bosnian Serb General Mladic, and Bosnian
Serb leader Karadzic are indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia .

26 July The US Senate votes to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian
Government.

38
-

- - -
4 August Bosnian Serb “ President” Radovan Karadzic replaces General Ratko
Mladic as Commander of the Bosnian Serb Army.

Croatian forces launch an attack against the Serb - occupied UN Sectors

North and South in Croatia.

5 August Croatian Army forces capture the Krajina Serb “ capital” of Knin .

7 August Croatian Defense Minister Susak announces that all military operations in
Sectors North and South are finished .

11 August Bosnian Serb “ President” Karadzic reinstates GeneralMladic as top mili

tary leader .

President Clinton vetoes Senate bill lifting arms embargo , orders new
exploratory mission.

14 August United States sends a delegation headed by US Assistant Secretary of State

Holbrooke on a tour of Balkan capitals .

Bosnian Serbs begin a new wave of mass expulsions of Croats and Muslims
from Banja Luka

15 August A delegation of envoys headed by Richard Holbrooke press new peace initi
atives at a meeting in Split, Croatia with Croatian Foreign Minister Granic
and Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey .

16 August Holbrooke and other envoys meet with Croatian President Tudjman to
discuss the US initiative . Tudjman says he will cooperate .

17 August US envoy Holbrookemeets with Serbian PresidentMilosevic to present the

US peace initiative .Milosevic supports the plan .

19 August The Security Council criticizes Croatia and Bosnia for blocking deployment
of the Rapid Reaction Force.

23 August Seventy -two Ukrainian UN peacekeepers withdraw from the eastern

Bosnian enclave ofGorazde .

A Bosnian Serb artillery round kills 37 civilians and wounds 85 others near
the Merkale market in Sarajevo .

NATO forces begin airstrikes against Bosnian Serb targets near Sarajevo ,
Mostar, Tuzla , Pale, and Gorazde .

39
30 August Bosnian Serbs reluctantly give Serbian PresidentMilosevic authority to
negotiate for them .

14 September NATO suspends bombing after Bosnian Serbs agree to move heavy weap
ons away from Sarajevo .

15 September Croatian offensive with Bosnian Army wins back 4,000 square kilometers
of territory ; tens of thousands of Serbs flee .

5 October President Clinton announces breakthrough in Holbrooke talks; prospect of

cease -fire spurs fighting for last-minute land grabs.

14 October Frontline meetings of military commanders end most cease -fire breaches in
northwest Bosnia .

12 November Presidents Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia , Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, and

Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia meet at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in
Dayton , Ohio , for open -ended peace talks.

40

- — -- -
--

Section I

Introduction

Slovenia 1990-1991

41
 --
- -
 Chapter 1 result of regional economic differences, had torn gaps
Loosed Anarchy : in the federal fabric, primarily between the northwest
The Origins of the Balkan Conflict ern Republics of Slovenia and Croatia and the federal
capital in Belgrade. As early as the 1960s, the Slov
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold enes and Croats began objecting to what they per
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world ceived as Serb domination of the federal
The blood -dimmed tide is loosed, and governmental system .? This resentment was aggra
everywhere vated by the fact that their comparatively prosperous
The ceremony of innocence is drowned republics were making disproportionately large contri
The best lack all conviction ,while the worst butions to the federal budget while receiving compar
Are full of passionate intensity ... atively little in return .

W. B. Yeats, The Second Coming In an effort to mollify the discontented republics while
still preserving the Yugoslav state , the 1974 Yugoslav
When a nation dies, its passing ought to be marked by Constitution — crafted while the Socialist Republic's
a signal event — the abdication of a monarch , the sign creator, Josip Broz Tito , was still alive — massively
ing of a treaty , at least the lowering of a flag . No such restructured the governmental system and devolved
ceremony signaled the end of the 45- year -old Socialist tremendous authority from the federal government to
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, though its death sen the republics. The new document created a federation
tence was pronounced in Slovenia's declaration of of six constituent republics (Slovenia , Croatia , Bosnia
independence in June 1991. By mid -July, all efforts to and Herzegovina, Serbia , Montenegro , and Mace
save the nation had failed ; but, long after the demise donia ), and two autonomous provinces, Kosovo and
of the Yugoslav Government, the country's death Vojvodina , which were semi-independent but never
spasms shook all of Croatia and later Bosnia with
theless integral parts of Serbia . Each republic and
more than four years of violence, cruelty, and blood province was represented by one person in an eight
shed .
member collective presidency. The 1974 Constitution
also specified a system whereby (after Tito's death )
The Yugoslav catastrophe that burst on the periphery the title of President would pass annually from one
of Europe during the summer of 1991 may have member of the collective presidency to the next in a
seemed a sudden occurrence, but it had been a long preset sequence .
time coming. A long powder train of ethnic differ
ences, economic inequities , and faltering political In the end, the rewired governmental system proved to
arrangements had been smoldering for years. Decades be no more than a pacemaker for the Yugoslav
of effort had forestalled the explosion , and, while nation — it could prolong its life but not stave off death
some sought desperately — at least at the end — to cool indefinitely . Indeed , many were surprised that the
the volatile elements that could blow Yugoslavia elaborate system actually worked at all after Tito's
apart, others were just as consciously stirring the very death in 1980. But the convoluted wiring harness of
ingredients that made the mix unstable and its
federal and confederal arrangements, with a total of
detonation certain . ' *
nine semicompeting governments, was blueprinted for
confusion and eventual deadlock . The 1974 Constitu
The Yugoslav political system had been redesigned tion had inked over differences amongst the various
and patched over for decades but was finally tearing
apart at the seams. Political strains, some of them the

Numbered endnotes follow each Section ,

43
republics and ethnicities, but in no way resolved their Communist Party chief, Slobodan Milosevic , paid a
fundamental differences . visit to Kosovo Polje (“ the Field of Blackbirds " ), the
battlefield site thatmarked the defeat of the medieval
The new constitutional system not only failed to cure Serbs by the Turks and the beginning of centuries of
the governmental ills of the 1960s but also came under Ottoman rule in the region . In a classic Balkan para
even greater stresses during the 1970s and 1980s. dox , by 1987 this most central of all Serb historical
Political differences among the republics continued to sites lay outside the modern Serbian heartland . No
widen , and economic difficulties further aggravated more than 10 percent of Kosovo Province's people
internal tensions . Each segment of the population were Serbs; the rest were ethnic Albanians, who
could be content enough during the expanding years endured not only the lowest average income of any
of the 1970s,when the economic pie was growing and Yugoslav ethnic group but also had suffered virtual
most were at least satisfied with the slice they had . disenfranchisement in a Serbian - run police state that
This changed in the 1980s as unemployment rose , pro grew increasingly harsh . As the Albanians' discontent
duction fell , foreign debts escalated , and inflation with this state of affairs increased , the resulting siege
became chronic . Interrepublic squabbling over each mentality among the dominant but vastly outnum
area's fair share of the tax burden and federal outlays bered Kosovo Serbs was tinder waiting for a spark .
grew increasingly acrimonious, and many individuals Milosevic struck it. In an apparently unscheduled
throughout Yugoslavia could easily be persuaded that address to an unruly mob of Kosovo Serbs, Milosevic
their own personal woes were the fault of another eth told them , “ No one should dare to beat you !" (" Niko
nic group's duplicity and unfair advantages. ne sme da vas bije! ” ) It was to become a rallying cry
for the entire Serb nation .
By the late 1980s, the failures within the Yugoslav
system were all too evident, and Communism was Two years later, on 28 June 1989 — the 600th anniver
rapidly losing credibility as a political and ideological sary to the day of the epic battle - a million Serbs
motivator. The shrewdest of the country's politi turned out upon that same battlefield to hear
cians — most significantly , Slobodan Milosevic in Ser Milosevic , by then the undisputed icon of the new
bia and Franjo Tudjman in Croatia — correctly foresaw Serb nationalism , speak . And speak he did :
in the corresponding rise of ethnic nationalism a new
political force that could replace it . Very calculatingly , Six centuries later, again we are in battles and
they set about harnessing this ill wind for their own quarrels. They are not armed battles, though
political gains. They knew well the potential hurricane such things should not be excluded yet."
force of the wind they were whistling up: ethnic
nationalism had been a forbidden topic in Yugoslavia Milosevic's words cannot strictly be described as pro
for four decades precisely because its very discussion phetic, for he was notmerely the herald of things to
threatened the cohesion of the Yugoslav state . When come but also their primary composer and arranger.
these individuals stirred their virulent strain of ethnic The chain of events set in motion in Kosovo in 1987
hypernationalism into the already volatile mix of eco and 1989 was to have consequences greater and far
nomic dissatisfaction and political unrest, they created ther ranging than probably even Milosevic imagined
a witches' brew that could not fail to boil over the Bal at the time. Within three years the rising tide of Serb
kan cauldron . Although there weremany forces capa nationalism was to spread from Kosovo Polje to the
ble of tearing the country apart,more than any other streets of Belgrade, to the self-proclaimed Serb auton
single factor was the rise of ethnic nationalism , and omous regions of Croatia , to the rings of artillery
specifically Serb nationalism , that brought about the pieces shelling the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo . It was
death of Yugoslavia . to prompt counterrhetoric and equally emotional
responses by Yugoslavia's other ethnic groups — most
The beginning of the end for Yugoslavia is as difficult
to pinpoint as its ultimate demise, but 24 April 1987 is
as good a date as any. On that day the young Serbian

44
-

-- - --
- -
-
notably, Tudjman's Croats — as each action begat an On 15 May 1991 the creakily rotating Federal Presi
equal and opposite reaction . When Slobodan dency system broke down completely when Serbia
Milosevic sowed the wind of Serb ethnic nationalism , blocked the scheduled rotation of Stipe Mesic (the
he unleashed a whirlwind of forces that would ulti Croatian representative ) to the Presidency .Not only
mately encompass Yugoslavia's destruction . did this create a fissure between the Croats and Serbs
and their respective republics, but it also effectively
Contributing to the highly charged setting of the pushed the Yugoslav state into political crisis without
1980s, debates intensified rapidly toward the end of an executive branch .Nor were the federal govern
the decade over whether to allow the individual Yugo- ment's problems confined to the executive. The legis
slav republics to hold multiparty elections , develop lative arm had effectively broken down in January
Western - style market economies, and assume 1990 when the Slovenian delegation walked out of the
increased political autonomy. On the one hand, 14th Extraordinary Congress, visibly and dramatically
Croatia and especially Slovenia grew increasingly marking the de facto death of the Communist Party in
independent and bold in their challenges to the federal Yugoslavia .? For its part, the judicial branch simply
government on these issues. On the other hand, the proved ineffective during a time of governmental cri
progressively more moribund and increasingly Serb sis . The Federal Constitutional Court had overturned
dominated federal institutions fought these separatist the Slovenian Assembly's declaration of autonomy on
trends with diminishing success. The federal govern 14 January 1991, but the pronouncement remained a
ment retained effective authority only within the dead letter because the court had no mechanism for
spheres of foreign policy , the economy, and defense . enforcing its ruling. So the independence -minded
Even these domains had begun to erode as someof the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia continued to move
individual republics undertook their own foreign and in the direction of autonomy, and Slovenia crystallized
economic policies independent of — and at times at the debate over the future of the Yugoslav state when
odds with — the federal government's. The time was it announced that it would make a formal declaration
fast approaching when the last central bastion of the if its secession from the Federation on 26 June 1991.
Federation , defense, would be challenged by Slove
nia's and Croatia's determination to establish their Because of the procedural convulsions racking the rest
own autonomous armed forces. of the Federation's central institutions, at mid - 1991
the Yugoslav military was the last fully functioning
While Croatia and Slovenia were attempting to engi federal institution. The Presidency was in crisis, the
neer their departure from the Yugoslav federal system , legislature paralytic , and the constitutional court had
the Serbian Governmentwas focused on co -opting the faded into irrelevance. The Army was the only instru
collective Federal Presidency, which it accomplished ment federal authorities had left to deal with the cen
by dictating the votes of Kosovo and Vojvodina and trifugal forces ripping the country apart. But the Army
securing the cooperation ofMontenegro . Constitu was a very blunt instrument, even for dealing with
tional amendments railroaded though the system in local armed insurrections; its leaders were even less
March 1989 all but eliminated the autonomy of Kos prepared to combat amorphous political forces of
ovo and Vojvodina , essentially giving Serbia two democratic reform , ethnic separatism , and popular
additional proxy votes in the Presidency. On all major sovereignty . For this and other reasons, the Yugoslav
issues, tiny Montenegro proved a loyal ally of Serbia , People's Army was ill prepared and ill suited for the
providing a unified bloc of half the votes in the eight complex challenges it was about to face .
member Federal Presidency. Atthe very least,
Milosevic could prevent the passage of any motion
that he did not approve . With the support of any addi
tionalmember of the Presidency , he could force a
decision in his favor. Yugoslavia was becoming
Serboslavia.

45
 Chapter 2 Because the Serbs controlled an even higher fraction
" Brotherhood and Unity : " of the command positions, with the other ethnic
The Yugoslav People's Army Within a Dying State groups relegated to the staff and support functions, the
real disparity was even more pronounced."
From the very beginning of Socialist Yugoslavia's his
tory , the Yugoslav People's Army ( Jugoslovenska Despite its imperfect ethnic balance, the Army never
Narodna Armija – JNA ) formed the cornerstone and theless considered itself a vital integrative factor in the
much of the binding mortar of the nation and state.8 Yugoslav state , and the onset of nationalism in Slove
The JNA viewed itself as both the protector and the nia and Croatia in particular and themustering of the
embodiment of the Socialist Federal Republic of JNA against Yugoslavia's own constituent republics
Yugoslavia (SFRY) with a special role in safeguarding would leave the Army leadership aghast. There would
the Yugoslav state and identity . As such , it was a be more and greater shocks to morale: non - Serb offic
nearly isolated subsociety within the larger Yugoslav ers turning against their own Army, a humiliating JNA
society .More than any other entity, the JNA actually defeat in Slovenia and the blockade of Armybarracks
sought to make the Titoist slogan of Bratstvo i Jedin in Croatia . Finally , the federally sanctioned secession
stvo (" Brotherhood and Unity " ) a reality. After Tito's of Slovenia from the SFRY — and the official admis
death the Yugoslav People's Army was in many ways sion that the state that for four decades had been the
the heart of a dying state and would be the last organ JNA's very raison d'etre was no more — would rip the
to fail. heart out of the force . By then the JNA could no
longermaintain even the self- delusion that it was
The JNA had an important voice in federal decision fighting for either Yugoslavia's territorial integrity or
making on defense -related issues, although it tradi its political system . Despite the senior leadership’s
tionally did not take sides in politics per se . It was also clinging belief in what remained of the " Yugoslav "
politically conservative , and the Army's senior leader ideal, by the time full-scale war broke out in Croatia ,
ship in particular clung to the ideal of Federal Yugo the JNA really did not know what it was fighting for.
slavia long after most others had pronounced it dead ."
Most notably, Yugoslavia's last Defense Minister,
Gen. Veljko Kadijevic — one of the tragic actors in the The Yugoslav People's Army as a Fighting
Yugoslav drama — would at the last be crusading virtu Force
ally alone to save the Yugoslav state , even as the polit
ical leadership he served was acting in ways that could The JNA was a capable, professional, and generally
only carve it apart. well-equipped military organization , and to some
extent it was isolated from the political and economic
By law the JNA was supposed to mirror the ethnic changes shaking the country. But it was still affected
composition of the country, but in practice the mirror by the turmoil of the 1980s, and by the beginning of
distorted reality. While Serbs comprised some 36 the 1990s the force was in something of a decline. Its
percent of the population of Yugoslavia andMontene budget had been declining steadily, although it still
grins less than 3 percent, Serbs and Montenegrins remained the largest federal expenditure by far.
together held almost 70 percent of the JNA's officer According to one estimate, the JNA's budget fell from
assignments. Conversely , Croats comprised some 20 70 percent of the federalbudget (7 percent of Yugo
percentof the Yugoslav population and Slovenes slav GNP ) to 50 percent of the federal budget (4 per
another 8 percent, but Croats and Slovenes combined cent of GNP) during the decade before the war. 12 The
held only 15 percent of the officer slots. Serbs and JNA's peacetimemanpower had also been reduced
Montenegrins held over 60 percent of the general over the years — from some 220,000 at the beginning
officer posts, while Croats and Slovenes combined of the 1980s to some 170,000 or so at the start of the
held only about 20 percent.Macedonians, Hungarians, 1990s — although it was still one of the largest armies
Muslims, and Albanians — who together totaled a in Europe.13
quarter of the country's population - held only 10 per
cent of the officer positions and general officer posts .

46

- - - -
--
Organizationally, the JNA's Ground Forces had been was intended to be the last bastion of resistance to an
restructured in the late 1980s into three military dis invader.
tricts and one combined military -maritime district
( going from six Soviet-style armies with boundaries Much of the Yugoslav military's arguably excessive
that matched the individual republics to the four heavy weapons inventory was either aging or outright
regional districts that crossed republic boundaries), all obsolete (for example, T -55 and even T - 34 tanks) and
subordinate to the Yugoslav General Staff in Belgrade. might have been knocked out in a straight-up fight
At the me time, it was transforming itself from a against a sophisticated Western military force , but it
division -based organization to a more flexible corps was to prove perfectly adequate in a civil war against
brigade structure. The JNA had almost, but not quite , identical equipment from the same inventories.
completed its reorganization by the onset of war in Indeed, the relative lack of sophistication of its equip
1991. At the outbreak of the conflict, the JNA had one ment frequently proved an advantage because it
mechanized division and 16 corps in three military employed a minimum of hard -to -maintain or unavail
districts and the military -maritime district, with more able components. This simple but effective equipment
than 40 armored ,mechanized ,motorized , and infantry proved to be maintainable by a nation under an arms
brigades; two additionalmountain brigades; and embargo . With limited spare parts, it could often be
numerous independent artillery , antitank , antiaircraft, fixed without rear-area repair and maintenance facili
and engineer regiments generally subordinated at ties and stood up in the field through four consecutive
corps echelon.14 years of combat.More advanced and more complex
equipment might have given out much earlier under
The JNA was adequately equipped in almost all cate similar circumstances. Moreover, even 40- or 50 - year
gories, and well outfitted in some, notably artillery. It old weapons such as T - 34 tanks and ZIS - 3 field guns
was armed with a mix of Soviet -pattern weapons, remained adequate for the roles they were used in
someWestern -manufactured items (including artillery (bunker busting, shelling from static positions,
and radars ), and domestically produced items of all assaults on infantry lacking antitank weapons), allow
types. In general, the Army's equipmentwas not the ing the more modern weapons in the inventory to be
mostmodern , but it was rugged , serviceable , and used elsewhere or for other tasks.
dependable .

Yugoslavia had developed a fairly robust domestic The Territorial Defense Concept
arms industry - part of Tito's legacy of political and
military self-sufficiency - capable of producing The “ Territorial Defense ” was intended to be the com
license -manufactured Soviet-pattern weapons and plement of the JNA within the bipartite Yugoslav
other weapons of indigenous design .Most of the national defense concept.15 The origins of Yugosla
JNA's major weapon systems— tanks, artillery , MiG via's Territorial Defense lay in the August 1968 Soviet
21 and MiG - 29 fighters , surface -to -air missiles and invasion of Czechoslovakia and Tito's subsequent
radars , naval surface combatants, and so on - were fears that a similar fate could befall his nation . Tito's
either direct Soviet imports or license -produced vari concerns led directly to a major restructuring of the
ants of Soviet designs. The Yugoslav defense industry, Yugoslav military and its underlying defense concept.
however, was able to both design and produce a wide Concerned that his standing military could be rapidly
variety of other weapons , including APCs and infantry crushed by the numerically superior Soviet forces,
fighting vehicles, light subsonic combat aircraft, mul Tito elected to establish a two- tier military structure
tiple rocket launchers , antitank rockets, antiaircraft that included both the JNA and a sustainable " all
guns, and assorted small arms. Yugoslavia's defense people's army” called the Territorial Defense
plants were scattered throughout the country, but a (Teritorijalna Odbrana — TO ).
disproportionately large fraction of the defense indus
tries was located in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which

47
Under the new Yugoslav defense philosophy, the JNA The JNA's Spring 1990 Efforts To Disable the
remained the national armed force: an active-duty , con Slovenian Territorial Defense
ventional military under centralized control from Bel
grade. It retained all of the armor,mechanized fighting The JNA's first efforts to disable Slovenia's defense
vehicles , and heavy artillery. Its mission was to chal by confiscating its republic -level weapons came on
lenge any invasion and delay the enemy advance long 17 May 1990. The Army had selected the date care
enough for the Territorial Defense to mobilize . The TO , fully. First, on 15 May the leadership of the Yugoslav
conversely, had a decentralized command structure that Presidency was due to shift from the Slovenian repre
could not be wiped out in a single blow and was essen sentative , Janez Drnovsek , to the Serbian one, Borisav
tially under the command of each republic's political Jovic , who took office on 16 May. Jovic may have
authorities . The territorial defense system (much like been the only member of the Presidency who was
that employed in Switzerland and Austria ) relied upon fully informed of the JNA's plans. Conveniently, the
countrywide military training for the entire male popu recently elected Slovenian republic government did
lation and massive stockpiles of small arms, caches of not take office until 17 May and had been seated for
lightweapons such as mortars, and vast quantities of only a few hours of its first day when the confiscations
ammunition . The TO's military mission was to mount a began .''
protracted , partisan -type war against any invasion force
even if much of the country was occupied . The real It is unclear to what extent the entire eight-member
objective of the TO , however, was to deter invasion in Federal Presidency approved the JNA operation to
the first place by making an invasion potentially so confiscate the TO inventories. Borisav Jovic's diary
costly that it would be deemed more expensive than it indicates that there was a Presidency meeting on 16
was worth.16 May to discuss the situation in the country " and that
the Presidency members adopted some sort of resolu
The TO was (in manpower terms) much larger than tions over Slovenian representative Drnovsek's objec
the standing Army and could theoretically call upon tions. The following day , Jovic states that, “ Formally ,
some 1.2 million soldiers Yugoslavia -wide.17 The TO this was done by the head of the General Staff, but it
inventories, however, were much smaller and much was actually under our order. Extreme reaction by the
cheaper, consisting almost entirely of small arms, gre Slovenians and Croatians, but they have no recourse."
nade and rocket launchers , and mortars . According to Jovic's diary entry from 21 May refers explicitly to
one estimate , the TO had a fully mobilized strength of Slovenian Republic PresidentMilan Kucan and
four to five times that of the regular Army but was Drnovsek meeting himself and Defense Minister
funded at only about one-twelfth of its annual Kadijevic . He says they met to discuss the completed
budget . 18 seizure of the Slovenian TO weapons, “based on the
Presidency decision that the weapons be seized from
Although the Territorial Defense was intended to all republican territorial defenses and placed under
serve alongside and reinforce the federal Army, it was JNA control.” 20 Drnovsek , on the other hand , later
becoming increasingly clear by the end of the 1980s maintained that he had been told nothing of the JNA
that TO units were now semiautonomousmilitary plan and that only Jovic knew about it. As Drnovsek
forces answering to the republics and were instead put it, “My term expired on 15 May. On 17 May this
becoming threats to the JNA. At this point, the Army disarmament was done. They had waited for my term
leadership secretly began drafting plans to neutralize to expire. Only Jovic was informed about it and , for
these potentially hostile, rival militaries (specifically , the Presidency, it was a fait accompli. They never
in Slovenia and Croatia ) lest they be used against the voted on it.” 21 The Federal Presidency probably
JNA in any future rebellion . In retrospect, the JNA's adopted some sort of resolution on 16 May, but Jovic
move to disable the Slovenian and Croatian territorial likely left it vaguely worded and probably intended to
defenses can be seen as a turning point - one of the
many markers pointing down the road to war.

48

- - -
- --
use it as an ex post facto justification for the confisca few minutes, which stated that I prohibited the
tions. Jovic and the JNA General Staff undoubtedly handing over of weapons and sent the telegram
assumed that Drnovsek would not have knowingly off to the municipalbodies. 23
supported the disarming of his own republic's Territo
rial Defense , and most likely kept both him and Thanks largely to the new leadership's prompt actions,
Croatian Presidency member StipeMesic in the dark the JNA managed to seize only about 60 percent of the
regarding the timing and nature of the JNA Slovenian Territorial Defense inventory. Jansa indi
confiscation plans. cates that the Slovenian TO managed to retain all of
its weapons from 12 municipal headquarters and part
Naturally enough , the new Slovenian republic leader of the inventory of a 13th , although he does not spec
ship in Ljubljana had not been informed at all of the ify the total number of municipal depots.24 The Slove
JNA's plans. Indeed , it first learned of the confisca nian TO refused to hand over any more weapons, and
tions not through military reports but from municipal President Kucan summoned additional police to guard
authorities across the republic , who began reporting the remaining weapons stores.2526 27 28
that Army soldiers had arrived and taken the TO
weapons away to unknown locations. Slovenian Presi- Through its efforts to seize Ljubljana's military
dent Milan Kucan claimed to have heard of the stocks, the JNA had damaged but by no means crip
impending confiscations only informally and began pled the Slovenian TO's ability to oppose the federal
investigating when he first got alarmed calls from military. It had at the same time galvanized the little
puzzled town mayors : republic and spurred its new leadership into earnest
preparations for the very resistance the JNA had
... I immediately tried to find General Hocevar, sought to prevent.
the commander of the Slovene TO . He said they
were replacing the WW II armswith new ones. I Chapter 3
was satisfied . I had no reason to disbelieve him . Slovenia : Background to War
But the next morning messages came in from
many municipalities that this was not at all what When, in January 1992, Slovenia was welcomed into
was happening — that all arms had to be handed the European Community (EC ) as an independent
in . I called General Hocevar again . He told me nation, it appeared to have sprung, like Athena from
that he had been ordered to move the arms from Zeus, full- grown from Yugoslavia . It was not so . The
the TO stores, that he had an order from groundwork for Slovenia's independence bid had been
Belgrade to conceal this from the Slovene laid months and years before , in a series of carefully
leadership.22 chosen political, economic , and military steps that
would culminate in a sharp struggle that was to last
Slovenian Defense Minister Jansa had a similar less than two weeks.
recounting of events that day:
Ofvital importance to Slovenia's independence prepa
During the meeting of the Assembly on 17 May rations and eventual secession effort was the fact that
1990, where we elected the new government, I it , unlike all the other Yugoslav republics, was ethni
received a telephone call from some municipal cally homogeneous. Of the little republic's population
ity mayors, who reported to me that the Army of just under 2 million , over 90 percentwere ethnic
was driving theweapons of the TO away from Slovenes. This meant that Slovenia could prepare for
the municipal storehouses to unknown locations independence without the rending internal problems
... I telephoned the Republic Secretariat for that confronted Croatia's and Bosnia's efforts to do
People's Defense (i.e. the Slovenian Defense the same. For instance, Croatia and Bosnia had ethni
Ministry ), where I had taken over not one hour cally mixed territorial defenses, intelligence services,
before, and got through to the former secretary,
Janko Kusar ....We composed a telegram in a

49
and police forces, all of which had divided loyalties . its annual levy of conscripts for their year of service in
Even more critical was the fact that both Croatia and the federal Army.31
Bosnia also had large, Serb -majority districts that
would be declaring autonomy from the republics at The issue of where Slovenian conscripts would
the same time thatZagreb and Sarajevo were working serve — in the JNA or the Slovenian To — had long
to break away from the Yugoslav central government. been a point of conflict between Ljubljana and
Slovenia had none of these problems. In addition , Belgrade and became a symbol of the entire sover
Slovenia's ethnic uniformity meant that the SFRY eignty debate. It had first become an issue a full year
could let the future Slovenian state go without the earlier in March 1990 , when the Slovenian parliament
political problem of leaving a residual Serb minority began trying to gain greater control over where its
in a newly foreign country. conscripts would serve and pressed the federal
government to allow a larger percentage of Slovenia's
Industrially, Slovenia was the most advanced of all the conscripts to remain stationed in the republic. The
Yugoslav republics . In 1991, just before the outbreak Slovenian leadership hoped to gradually increase the
of general war, the average per capita income in Slov percentage serving at home, until eventually all Slove
enia was $ 12,618 . By comparison, in Croatia — the nian recruits would serve within the republic . At this
nextmost advanced republic — it was $ 7,179 , and in point, however, Ljubljana had no firm legal founda
Serbia it was only $4,870 , well under half the average tion for its demands either under the federal Consti
income in Slovenia.29 With slightly under 10 percent tution or under the republic's own laws. The Yugoslav
of the population , Slovenia produced 20 percent of central government made some concessions during
Yugoslavia's Gross National Product.30 Westward the summer and fall of 1990 , agreeing to increase the
leaning, the Slovenes not only sought to get out from percentage serving in Slovenia first to 15 percent and
under Belgrade's thumb but also hoped for closer eco then 20 percent. Slovenia , in turn , sent part but not all
nomic and political ties to adjacent Austria and Italy . of its annual conscript levy to the Army during the
While still a Yugoslav republic, Slovenia was also year. The dispute remained unresolved .32
making overtures to the European Community at a
time when the tide of West European integration The debate advanced to a new level in October 1990
seemed to be at flood stage. when the Slovenian Government attempted to replace
Air and Air Defense Force Col. Gen. Ivan Hocevar,
Politically, Slovenia's drive for independence became the Belgrade loyalist who held overall command of
more or less explicit in April 1990 , when the six -party the Slovenian Territorial Defense. On the morning of
center- right DEMOS coalition defeated the former 4 October 1990 ,General Hocevar received a letter
Communists to win a parliamentary majority in the directing him to hand over all responsibilities to his
republic's firstmultiparty elections. DEMOS lost no Slovenian -designated successor, Janez Slapar, the fol
time in firing a political shot across Federal Yugosla lowing day. During the rest of the day both the JNA
via's bow , adopting a parliamentary declaration in and the Slovenian TO and police alerted some of their
July 1990 that asserted that republic laws would take units . On the morning of 5 October, the JNA sent a
precedence over the federal Constitution and that detachment of the 14th Military Police Battalion from
Ljubljana would form its own foreign and defense Sentvid barracks to the Slovenian Republic TO head
policies . From then onward , Slovenia'smove toward quarters on Prezihova street in Ljubljana. Forewarned
independence would only gather more momentum . In of the impending operation , though unable to prevent
September 1990 , Ljubljana asserted its control over or stop it, the Slovenians had removed all personnel,
the republic Territorial Defense . In December 1990 arms, and equipment from the facility beforehand .
the republic held a referendum on outright indepen Then once the JNA detachment had entered the build
dence in which an overwhelming majority of the pop ing, the Slovenians cut off electricity and telephone
ulation voted for an independent and sovereign
state ," and in March 1991 the republic refused to send

50

-- -- - - - -
service to the building and besieged the federal MPs supervision of its future opponent, the JNA, the Slove
inside the building. The Slovenians listened anxiously nian Territorial Defense was a force in being, and its
for any reports of Armymovements from their intelli roughly 60,000 troops constituted a reasonably effec
gence sources in the JNA's 14th and 31st Corps, for tive infantry force for limited combat roles. Jansa also
they were in no way ready for a serious confrontation had the nucleus of an officer corps , a body of both
if things had escalated any further. Fortunately for active -duty TerritorialDefense and retired Slovene ex
them , the Armymade no further moves, and both JNA officers that could serve as the brains and back
sides settled down for an extended waiting game that bone of his force.36 37
was to last six months. In the end, the JNA vacated the
building after removing everything of value.33 Most vital for Jansa , though , was the fact that, like
most of the Yugoslav TO's, the Slovenian TO's higher
As 1990 passed into 1991, relations between loyalties already lay with the local government, not
Ljubljana and Belgrade worsened. The Slovenian Belgrade.38 The Slovenian TO's particular advantage
authorities learned through their intelligence sources vis- a-vis the JNA was its ethnic homogeneity. Croatia
that the JNA was preparing to forcibly appropriate and especially Bosnia could not simply transform
their personnel records, which would have allowed the their republic TO's into national militaries, since eth
Army itself to call up Slovenian recruits . The republic nic Serbs in both Territorial Defenses actively
responded first by increasing security around the dis opposed the republic governments . Slovenia, on the
trict headquarters and later by hiding the records in other hand , started out with a standing military that
police headquarters and other locations kept secret was almost wholly loyal to the secessionist
from the federal authorities. The debate intensified government.
once again when the annual conscript levy again came
due in March 1991. This time Slovenia refused out The JNA's attempt to confiscate the Slovenian TO's
right to send conscripts to serve in the Yugoslav weapons had been a tip of Belgrade's hand and
Army.34 Ljubljana had thrown the gauntlet directly enabled Ljubljana to flush out all of the Territorial
into the lap of the federal government.35 Defense officers whose loyalties were with Belgrade.
The Yugoslav Army had intended to keep tabs on the
Slovenian TO through the approximately 40 active
Jansa's Army: The Emergence of the Slovenian duty JNA officers assigned to positions within the
Territorial Defense republic's military — many in key headquarters or
command positions. A smaller number of Yugoslav
As the debate over who would control the placement oriented officers served within the Slovenian TO and
of Slovenian conscripts was playing out on the politi the reserves . By forcing each TO officer to show his
cal level, Slovenian Defense Minster Janez Jansa was true colors — for or against the JNA confiscations
working tirelessly to build the Slovenian Territorial the May 1990 weapons seizures allowed Ljubljana to
Defense into an autonomousmilitary force capable of identify exactly who could and could not be trusted
challenging the JNA. Jansa — only 33 years old in during the secret process of planning for
1991 — was originally a reserve sergeant whom the independence .
JNA had accused of leaking documents and tried for
espionage in 1988. Despite ( or rather because of) this, After the spring weapons confiscations in 1990 ,
Jansa was named Slovenian Defense Minister by Jansa's objective was nothing less than to establish a
Prime Minister Lojze Peterle when DEMOS took " shadow ” command structure and, indeed , an entire
power in 1990. Almost immediately, Jansa set himself " shadow " army that left the normal organization of
to the task of taking over the existing Slovenian TO the Slovenian To operating as normal but that
and transforming it into the future Slovenian army. bypassed any officers loyal to Belgrade and instead
answered back to the Slovenian leadership . The plan
As Jansa took up this seemingly Herculean task , he at was essentially to establish a giant,hidden pyramid of
least had good startingmaterial to work with .
Although it had lost some of its weapons the previous
spring and was still subject to the administration and

51
underground cells, with each individual establishing coordination knew of the people only to the
contact with a network of trusted subordinates. The regional level. The regional chiefs mainly knew
mechanism by which this plan was carried out had the only of the municipal chiefs, and thereafter the
unlikely title of the “Maneuvering Structure of the selection was left to themselves. ... Themajority
NationalDefense " (Manevrska Struktura Narodne of key duties was accepted by officers of the per
Zascite — MSND ). manent composition of the TO, who had refused
to surrender their weapons... There were cases
The “Maneuvering Structure of the National Defense” where the whole municipal or regional head
was actually an odd and obscure Slovenian legal quarters of the TO were included , except for the
clause that allowed the republic to form an ad hoc commander, who was an active officer of the
defense structure if necessary by calling for detailees JNA and who suspected nothing.40
from the Territorial Defense , Civil Defense , police ,
and even civilians. It had never been taken very seri The speed and scope of the Slovenian accomplish
ously and was regarded as something of a historical ments are truly remarkable . As Interior Minister
anomaly - a sort of World War II Home Guard : Bavcar described it:

The Armyhad been quietly sneering at this Slov Wehad thought about it before the election . We
enian peculiarity all the time, as those that they knew when we came to the ministry thatwe
saw with this insignia truly did not arouse any would not know whom to trust and that we
respect with their ancientweapons and the eld would have to build a new kind of organization
erly structure of the recruits. Butthe legal foun thatwould be fully under our command. In three
dation was such that in case of necessity months we built an army of 20,000 armed
anybody could be called to perform tasks for people . And the JNA didn't know.41
national defense, regardless of their military sta
tus, and it is in these provisions thatwe found , Slovenian forces began to conduct increasing numbers
after precise scrutiny, the legal foundations for of exercises and drills, improving proficiency and
organizing the Maneuvering Structure of the identifying weaknesses. Although the troops were
National Defense ... 39 highly motivated , the exercises revealed a few serious
weaknesses in the Slovenian Territorial Defense .
Shortly after the mid -May 1990 weapons seizures, Command and control still needed improvement, and
Defense Minister Jansa and Interior Minister Igor antiarmor and air defense capabilities were extremely
Bavcar (with PresidentKucan's somewhat reluctant limited . Perhaps most serious was a lack ofmobility, a
support) began using the “Maneuvering Structure of direct consequence of the original territorial defense
the National Defense " as a legal mechanism by which concept. These locally raised , partisan -warfare forces
they could covertly build the Slovenian TO and the had never been intended for mobile warfare and had
Interior Ministry's special police into a secret army, been expected to remain in or near their hometowns.
rightunder the noses of the federal authorities . In a combat situation where the Slovenian TO was
Descending from the republic headquarters were 13 required to gain and keep the initiative this could pose
regional subcommands, each of whose leaders were a serious problem .“?
handpicked by the Slovenian leadership . These indi
viduals, in turn , selected local National Defense lead
ers in each major municipality, and so on from there : The Other Army: The Role of the Slovenian
Interior Ministry Police Forces
In a few weeks all of Slovenia had been covered
... We introduced strict security measures. All At the same time as the Slovenian Territorial Defense
documents and messages were carried person was building itself into an autonomous fighting force,
ally or directly passed on by word ofmouth ....
The conspiracy was complete. The republic

52

-- -
-
the Slovenian Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministar Arms and theMen : Slovenian ArmsProcurement
stvo Unutarnjih poslova — MUP) was also preparing Efforts
for war. TheMUP played a variety of roles in the Slo
venian bid for independence . Slovenian police author Between the Slovenian TO and its special police
ities collected intelligence before thewar, special forces, Ljubljana had available a body of capable ,
police troops actively participated in combat against motivated combatants . Defense Minister Jansa and
JNA forces, and the regular police played an impor Interior Minister Bavcar were working to prepare
tant role in establishing roadblocks and maintaining them with improved skills , organization , and tactics .
order. The Slovenian forces, however,were still seriously
lacking in one vital area : arms.
In the Yugoslav system , the MUP's “ special police”
were intended as specially trained , heavily armed Although the JNA confiscations had left the Slovenian
paramilitary forces tasked with VIP protection , coun TO short of weapons, it started off less badly than
terterrorism , and direct military combat roles. Because Croatia . Ljubljana managed to retain a substantial
of the Yugoslav state's tradition of professional inter fraction of its TO weapons inventories and had a far
nal security forces, the MUP troops were generally smaller force to equip than Zagreb. As a result, Slove
experienced and elite soldiers and could be used as nia appears to have needed a less substantial arms
assault infantry to spearhead combat operations in buying program than Croatia later did , trading for
combination with Army units. The municipal police , modest amounts of weapons on the internationalmar
by contrast, were much more numerous and less spe ket. Slovenian PresidentKucan was also hesitant to
cialized. They carried out largely routine law enforce support Jansa's covert weapons procurement program ,
ment functions in each city, town, or village, handling viewing it as expensive and risky. Kucan's opinion
traffic violations, robberies, acts of civil violence, and changed when the October 1990 confrontation with
the like . the JNA at the Slovenian TO headquarters in Ljubl
jana revealed both the potential for hostilities and the
As with the Slovenian Territorial Defense, the Interior comparative weakness of the Slovenian forces.
Ministry's preparations appear to have begun at least Shortly thereafter, Kucan approved Jansa's program
as early as July 1990 — almost a year before the show- knowledge of which was restricted to only five or six
down with Belgrade began . A secret document enti leadingmembers of the government.
tled simply “ 25 July ” outlined the Slovenian police's
contingency plans in the event the JNA attempted to Procurement began within Slovenia itself with sly
intervene in the republic . As circumstances changed, steps to recover individual small arms seized from the
this documentwas modified over the course of the fol TO inventories and stored in JNA garrisons in the
lowing year. By late November 1990 the Slovenian republic :
authorities had also covertly drafted a plan for
securing Slovenia's international borders with police .... in the first months, when TO was still per
units . 43 mitted entry into some storage sites in the Army
complexes, the TO drove away automatic rifles,
Besides drafting plans, the MUP began training and hand-held mortars, pistols, ammunition and, in
preparing its police forces for the most likely tasks in some cases, even rocket launchers, every day,
the event of war. The training tempo remained high under various guises. The rifles were wrapped in
right up to the outbreak of the war, and the entire spe sleeping bags, guardswere bribed, they used old
cial police force had just completed additional training friends in the barracks.... The commanders of
in the month before the conflict. In addition , the spe the Army ammunition stores usually hushed up
cial police's elite “ antiterrorist” unit was restructured the loss of weapons to their superiors, if they
and began training for new missions — which it was to
successfully carry out in the confrontation against the
44
JNA's own paratroops and special forces elements.4

53
 noticed it , thereby attempting to avoid responsi According to Jansa — whose figures appear low but
bility. In this way we succeeded in returning to still credible — even by the beginning of June 1991,
the TO a good 5,000 pieces of various infantry the Slovenian TO had only about 23,000 infantry
45 weapons (with limited ammunition ) and a little over
weapons in one year...
1,000 antitank weapons of all types.50 Assuming
Additional weapons were purchased abroad . These Jansa's previous figure of some 10,000 unconfiscated
included probably no more than a few thousand infan weapons is accurate , plus the 5,000 he later says were
try arms.46 Most noteworthy and significant was the recovered by theft from JNA garrisons, this implies
Slovenian acquisition of a number of Singaporean that Ljubljana must have covertly imported something
manufactured Armbrust antitank rocket launchers in like 8,000 small armsbetween May 1990 and June
December 1990. ( The size of the purchase is still 1991.
unknown butwas probably not very large.) These
weapons had both symbolic and military significance , The last, largest, and most important covert arms ship
as they gave the Slovenian forces a chance of counter ment (dubbed Operation BOR ) was not to arrive in
ing the JNA's otherwise practically invulnerable Slovenia until 21 June, only days before the outbreak
armored forces. The Armbrust rockets were initially ofwar. This consignment reportedly included 5,000
kept a secret, stored at the Kocevska Reka barracks, more automatic rifles and 5 million rounds of ammu
and issued to the newly formed Slovenian Special nition , another 1,000 antitank weapons (including a
Forces. Jansa and his deputy Jelko Kacin , however, few AT-4 antitank guided missiles ), and a few dozen
later opted to make a public , confidence -boosting SA - 7 antiaircraft missiles. Jansa regarded this final
show of defiance just before Slovenia's referendum on arms shipment — particularly the antiarmor weap
sovereignty at the end of December — visibly advertis ons — as critical in Slovenia's bid for independence :
ing Slovenia's capability and intent to resist the Yugo
slav Army if necessary . One could make a case that I still ask myself today if the Presidency of the
the first shots of the Yugoslav war were not really Republic could have proposed its decision on
fired on the battlefield , but rather on Slovenian televi armed resistance with a clear conscience on
sion in the final days of 1990 : 27 June, if we had not received those weapons,
which increased our capabilities for antitank
51
The republic , they decided , would openly combat bymore than 100 percent.
declare itself armed and ready to repel any
attempt by the JNA to interfere with its new If Jansa's figures are to be believed , the Slovenian
democracy. Kacin flew to Kocevska Reka in a forces had no more than 30,000 small arms and some
police helicopter. A Slovene television camera 2,000 antitank weapons of all types when the war
man was waiting for him . There, Slovene troops broke out.52 This appears to be inadequate to outfit
fired two or three Armbrustmissiles at an old even the generally accepted figure of about 37,000
and obsolete tank . The film was broadcast on Slovenian TO troops that were mobilized during the
Slovene television two days later. The Slovenes war. However, the apparent shortfall could be
were raising the stakes.47 accounted for by allowing for a number of possibly
unarmed troops used in noncombat roles and others
In addition to weapons, a secret delivery of secure armed with personally owned hunting weapons and
communications equipment (Operation KANAL ) the like. Even if Jansa's figures are low , it is clear that
arrived from an unknown Western country on 17 June the Slovenian TO would have been incapable of arm
1991. Working frenetically to set up the network , the ing its fully mobilized paper strength of 60,000 or
53
Slovenian leadership was able to use the gear for more had the conflict lasted longer than it did ."
secure communications with the municipal headquar
ters across the republic .Most field units, however,
still lacked secure radios.48 49

54
Behind the Curtain : The Intelligence War constitution held its own seat in the parliament.
Among other things, Aksentijevic passed KOS the
Since the inception of the Yugoslav state , the federal addresses of the delegates in the Republic Assembly,
intelligence apparatus had directed much — perhaps enabling the federal authorities to develop contin
most — of its attention against the activities of ethnic gency plans (in the end , never implemented ) for JNA
nationalist groups within Yugoslavia. By the end of military police to arrest all of the dissident Slovenian
the 1980s, the intelligence directors in Belgrade were members of parliament.59 60
receiving increasingly worrisome indications that
trouble was brewing in the northwestern corner of the The intelligence war heated up after 17 May 1990 ,
country. The threat at the time was not armed insurrec with both the seating of the new Slovenian leadership
tion but rather of creeping agitation formultiparty and the JNA's confiscation of Slovenian TO weapons.
democracy within Slovenia — in some ways a greater The extent of Belgrade's infiltration of Slovenian
threat to the Yugoslav state. The JNA Security Direc institutions and the fact that Ljubljana had been com
torate (Uprava Bezbednosti — UB ), which was better pletely blindsided by the move cameas a rude surprise
known by one of its Tito - era designators, the Counter to the new Slovenian cabinet members:
intelligence Service ( Kontraobavestajna Sluzba
KOS), assigned one of its very best officers, Col. Ale With its staffing policies the GHQ (General
ksander Vasiljevic54 (who had proved his abilities dur Headquarters of the JNA) tried , in any manner
ing the early 1980s in KOS operations against the it could , to replace all those officers in the Slov
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo ) to monitor and combat enian TO who, in the assessment of the military
these underground liberal political movements.55 intelligence service ,would give Slovenia prece
Before the start of the war, KOS reportedly had more dence over Yugoslavia ....It was clear during
than 130 officers and NCOs operating in Slovenia , the confiscations how far Belgrade had gone
with presumably an even larger number of informants with this ... The secret police or national secu
and sources.56 rity service passed its exam in loyalty - or rather
disloyalty - on this occasion . There was no
At first the battle for Slovenian independence was warning from it, although the almost one
waged in the editorial roomsand across the pages of thousand- strong apparatus, with its connections
the newspapers and magazines. Probably the most and sources within the JNA,most surely knew of
important among these was the influential weekly at least the last stage of the plan for disarming
magazine ,Mladina . The Yugoslav civilian intelli the Slovenian T0.61
gence organization , the State Security Service ( Sluzba
Drzavne Bezbednosti — SDB )57 was concerned enough The Sloveniansbegan to build up their intelligence
about “politically incorrect” writings against the fed infrastructure at the same time they began to build and
eral system that they reportedly recruited the publica arm their military and police forces. The core of their
tion's editor in chief as an operative. In addition , the organization appears to have been a comparatively
SDB bugged phones , recorded conversations, and small but reliable and capable group of intelligence
watched the activities of numerous journalists.58 At officers under Ivan Borstner.62 According to Jansa , this
the sametime the civilian intelligence organization group operated only partially in conjunction with Slo
was watching the “ subversive ” politicalmovements venia's normal republic -level intelligence organiza
and journalists, the KOS was watching for dissidents tion, the Security Intelligence Service (Varnostna
within the Army. Izvestajna Sluzba — VIS ). The latter appears to have
been ambiguous in its loyalties — at least until May
KOS also recruited at least one Slovenian political fig 1991, when Jansa states it began to actively report on
ure , Col.Milan Aksentijevic, a delegate to the Slove KOS activities in Slovenia. Despite Jansa's lukewarm
nian Assembly . At the time, Aksentijevic was both an
active - duty JNA officer and the assembly member
representing the Army, which under the Socialist

55
endorsement of the service, it appears to have been According to Jansa, by approximately the end of April
fairly successful at shutting down KOS operations 1991:
immediately before and during the conflict itself.63 64
We had the data and plans of the JNA and its
After May 1990 the Slovenians appear to have been counterintelligence service ( KOS) in our hands
much more active in the intelligence war, both defen for the rapid disarmament of the Slovenian TO
sively and offensively . Defensively , the Slovenes and police as well as the ‘neutralization ' of part
opposed the KOS with very careful security measures, ofthe republic leadership and the leaderships of
especially regarding the distribution and handling of somemunicipalities including the delegates of
themilitary planning documents that would have pro the republic parliament and presidents of some
vided a damning indictment of the Slovenian Govern parties.69
ment had they been captured and exposed . The most
extreme example of this security consciousness per The Slovenes appeared to be well informed of JNA
tained to Defense Minister Jansa's comprehensive capabilities by the immediate runup to the war. All of
defense plan , which he had titled the “ Possible Vari the collected information on unit locations,manning
ants of Dissociation from the Defense Aspect.” There equipment, and readiness was fed to a cadre of ana
never was a printed copy of this document, which lysts who evaluated it and formulated their conclu
listed Slovenia's timetables and planned responses to sions . The Slovenian analyses turned out to be
each potential JNA intervention contingency. Instead , remarkably prescient:
Jansa himself kept a single copy on an encrypted com
puter diskette and projected the text onto a screen In June 1991, as a result ofday- to -day analyses
when necessary during meetings.65 and our knowledge of conditions in Yugoslavia
and thanks to our good intelligence data , we
Offensively, the Slovenes began to turn many of the were almost convinced that the JNA Army would
Federal SDB's and KOS's own tactics against them . not be capable of carrying out an attack deploy
For at least a year before the war (and probably much ing a great enough number of forces during the
longer) the Slovenians actively collected intelligence declaration of independence of Slovenia and
against the federal authorities — at the time, still their Croatia and that itwould only be intervention
own national government and military.66 Slovenian and pressure on somekey points, which could be
police and intelligence organizations pored over the escalated later by introducing new units of JNA
documents of the Federal Secretariat for National reserve forces.
Defense, looking for relevant bits of information , and
monitored the activities of JNA units through both Jansa refers to at least one intelligence source within
clandestinemeans and analysis of the JNA's overtmil the JNA's own General Staff,who appears to have
itary journals such as Narodna Armija . By such means been able to complement the Slovenians' existing
the Slovenes noted increased federal activity related to knowledge of JNA capabilities by providing vital
the State Border and Customs posts, including the information about JNA intentions — specifically, the
arrival of additional personnel and stockpiles of food JNA's plan to have a single, republic -wide show of
and heavy weapons.67 force after Ljubljana's declaration of independence :

The Slovenian authorities also monitored the federal ... on the basis ofadditional information from
planning activities in the headquarters of their own our source in the GHQ of the JNA, it became
Territorial Defense : clear to us that the Armywas indeed not plan
ning any smaller skirmishes like the one at Pekre
In contrast to the intelligence held by the JNA before 26 June, but that it was planning to
about our activities ... we had regular “ solve all its problems in Slovenia in one go ." 71
intelligence reports on the activities at
[Belgrade - appointed Slovenian TO
Commander ) Hocevar's headquarters; this was
....invaluable in helping to act correctly .68

56
Perhaps most remarkable of all is an apparently com demanded that the Slovenian Government stop its TO
pletely successful series of double- agent operations training activities at the recently established centers at
the Slovenians ran against the federal government in Pekre and Ig . The Slovenians responded by deploying
1990 and 1991. Reminiscent of the British “ Double two " anticommando" companies for their defense. At
Cross " operation against the German Abwehr during the same time, Col. Gen. Blagoje Adzic , Chief of the
World War II, this double -agent program not only kept JNA General Staff, personally issued instructions to
the Slovenians informed of Belgrade's plans against Kolsek and the commanders of both JNA corps head
the republic but also allowed Ljubljana to plant vital quartered in Slovenia on how the two training centers
disinformation thatwas factored into those same would be closed down. JNA planning focused on the
plans: 710th Training Center at Pekre near Maribor
deemed the easier of the two targets — and incorpo
We knew that KOS had collaborators in some rated the use of some special JNA units brought in
republic bodies, the SDV, companies, and even from Varazdin and Zagreb . On 21May, Kolsek met
some editorial offices. Through this network it with Slovenian PrimeMinister Peterle to demand the
succeeded in finding out that something was republic's conscription records and the closure of both
going on, but luckily we planted a counteragent training centers. The Slovene delegation hoped to
on time, and the game rolled on . We planted delay confrontation until they were better prepared
information that special units of the TO were and proposed further discussion with a moratorium on
collecting in Kocevska Reka with new JNA intervention until 26 June. This was unacceptable
weapons.72 to the JNA , which two days later sent six APCs and
seven T- 55 tanks— probably from the 31stMilitary
The Slovenians had started out behind in the intelli Police Battalion and the the 195th Motorized Bri
gence game at the beginning in May 1990. Slightly gade — to the 710th Training Center to demand the
74
over a year later, by June 1991, the Slovenians had turnover of Slovenian recruits to the federal Army.?
trounced the federalmilitary and civilian intelligence
apparatus - game, set, and match . The situation escalated further on 24 May when the
JNA detained the regional Slovenian To commander
Chapter 4 and several others because of the dispute at the train
Slovenia : The 10 -Day War ing center. Adzic had expected to hold the Slovenians
hostage until the republic authorities agreed to close
the training centers and to resume sending recruits to
The Eve of Battle the JNA . Instead, the Slovenian Government
responded by cutting off electricity and telephone ser
Both sides had begun to gird for battle by the vice to JNA garrisons throughout the republic - a tac
beginning of May 1991. In particular, the JNA began tic it was to use again a month later when the war
attempting to improve the readiness of key units in the began in earnest. The kidnaped Slovenians were
Fifth Military District, especially in its border, released after 14 hours of negotiation and confronta
armored , and special operations units. The JNA's tion , but the disagreements were anything but
efforts to improve readiness were partially covered by settled .75 76
the actual exercise " OKOP" being conducted at the
time.73 Further afield , the JNA also began a large - scale In retrospect, the JNA may have erred by not forcing a
callup of Army reservists in Serbia in early May 1991. confrontation earlier than it did — either during the
October 1990 confrontation at the Slovenian To head
Visible tremors were shaking Slovenia by late May quarters in Ljubljana or during the May 1991 dispute
1991, as another standoff escalated into open confron over the training centers. On both occasions, the
tation between the Slovenian Territorial Defense and
the JNA. On 17 May 1991, Col. Gen. Konrad Kolsek,
the JNA's Fifth Military District commander,

57
Yugoslav Army limited its military actions, and the secure and occupy border posts and other key facili
Slovenians responded by cutting off the JNA's power ties, with the enhanced legitimacy of a parliamentary
and telephone service . But the JNA — and the political resolution behind the occupying Slovenian forces.
leadership directing it — were unwilling to escalate
beyond this level. As events later unfolded , the JNA Iwas constantly warning that the formal resolu
ended up having to make a major show of force any tions on the declaration of independence must
how , but against a much better armed and prepared be passed before 26 June, in a closed session ,
foe. Certainly in October 1990 , and even in May 1991, which would then allow us to gain a lead on pos
the Slovenian forces were not yet prepared for a direct sible responses of the Federation , especially
military confrontation with the JNA.77 Moreover, the military, and that we establish our sovereignty in
JNA would have had the initiative in military opera the key triangle , border- customs-air control
tions at either time. When the conflict eventually ... One can imagine what the replacement of
began in June 1991, it was the Slovenians who were signposts on the border or the seizure of the
able to select the time, locations, and terms of the Brnik flightcontrol tower would be like if, on 15
fighting — to their great advantage and the JNA's June, the Army placed a detachment ofmilitary
dismay. police or paratroopers armed to the teeth there
... despite just one day's difference between the
As the federal government raised the ante and pushed announced and the actual passing of the deci
closer to war, the Slovenes responded . A few days sion for independence, it was this one day that
after the Maribor barracks confrontation , the JNA and was of key importance. For, on 25 June, immedi
Federal Interior Ministry airlifted more units to Slove ately after the declaration of the laws, we took
nia . Ljubljana , in turn , canceled all leaves for police over the customs, border crossings, and air traf
and InteriorMinistry employees beginning on 20 June fic control without letting off one shot. In Bel
and fully mobilized its active and reserve police units grade they were convinced until virtually the last
several days before the conflict began . On 21 June, the second that the declaration of independence
JNA confiscated the Slovenian TO's lone squadron of would be on 26 June . . . For this reason they
combat aircraft, sending a group of pilots and military planned their intervention for the early hours of
police to fly the 10 antiquated Kraguj monoplanes 27 June, for the time, they thought, when the
from Brnik airport to Cerklje.78 Slovenian decision was still to have been on
paper29
By the last week of June, both sides had arrayed all
their pieces on the board. It was now up to Ljubljana Slovenia had prepared carefully for the hour of its
to play its opening gambit. independence and had its new departments of govern
ment not only established and ready but also well pre
pared for what to do immediately after the
First Shots : The Battle for the Border Posts , independence declaration .Most important, the Slove
Tuesday, 25 June- Friday , 28 June nian authorities were ready to seize control of previ
ously identified key facilities when the time came and
Having announced six months earlier that it intended in most cases did so within hours of the independence
to secede from the Yugoslav Federation on 26 June declaration . Control of the border posts was central to
1991, Slovenia actually passed its declaration of inde both the Slovenian and the Federal Yugoslav strate
pendence on 25 June — a day earlier than expected . gies for both practical and symbolic reasons. The bor
The seemingly trivial difference was in fact a critical der posts generated customs revenues — of which
and closely held element of the Slovenian plan for those along the Italian and Austrian borders were the
independence . The Slovenian objective was to gain most important - which went directly to the federal
surprise and timeby secretly advancing what the fed government and, indeed , represented some40 percent
eral authorities expected to be their timetable . By this
ruse they expected to preempt federal actions to

58
of the federal budget. 80 There was also the more the Federal Executive Council (SIV ) in Belgrade
important issue of whether Federal Yugoslav or Slove- transmitted a two -part ultimatum addressed to Milan
nian troops, flags , and signs would be seen at those Kucan at 1110 that morning.
border posts — a visible representation of the underly
ing sovereignty question . As Jansa explained it: Ominously, the JNA began showing signs that it was
coming to life within Slovenia during the day on
Since the plebiscite it had been clear to me that 26 June.Unusual activity was noted at the major JNA
the national borders were that concrete point barracks in the republic , and the first armored columns
upon which national sovereignty was decided in departed from their garrisons to find roadblocks bar
84
the final sense . That is why the replacing of bor ring the routes to their assigned border crossings.8
der signposts and flags after the declaration of Also on 26 June the Federal Yugoslav authorities
independence was not only a symbolic act but a effectively isolated Slovenia from all air traffic by
key step across the Rubicon . Thus a coordinated closing the twomajor civilian airports (Brnjik interna
takeover of the customs, border, and other func tional airport near Ljubljana, and Maribor airport).
tions which would at a specific moment become Yugoslav aircraft, loaded with weapons, flew low over
alive as functions of the independent state of a few locations in Slovenia in apparent attempts at
Slovenia had to be organized .8/ intimidation but took no other hostile actions at the
time. 85
Having seized the initiative , the Slovenians had at the
same timemaneuvered the JNA into a position where The following morning — Thursday, 27 June — armed
it had to move out of garrison and forcibly expel the action began in earnest between Slovenia's self
now -established Slovenian defenders. Not only was it proclaimed military forces and the Federal Yugoslav
militarily more difficult for the JNA to attack prepared troops sent to regain control over key border crossings
Slovenian defensive positions, but it accomplished the and facilities. The Yugoslav People's Army's actions
vital political objective of forcing the JNA to fire the were publicly justified in a communiqué read by JNA
first shots — thereby leaving the Slovenians as the Fifth Military District commander Kolsek . The brief
plucky defenders against Yugoslav aggression in statement was formally addressed to the Prime Minis
international eyes:
ter of the Slovenian parliament, Lojze Peterle , and
indicated the Army was acting to take control over all
due to our timely measures ... they (the border crossings and defend the SFRY. It ended with a
JNA ) could not implement things in such a way warning that “ All resistance will be crushed , and the
that in the eyes of the public we... appeared consequence will be borne by those who issued com
the first to use force.82 mands and executed them .” Federal aircraft dropped
leaflets over Slovenia with the same threat of vio
The last day of calm before the storm was 26 June lence. (Sending a somewhat contradictory mix of sig
1991 — a remarkably quiet day, under the circum nals , the JNA's leaflets concluded with statements that
stances. The first confrontation of the Slovenian war “We invite you to peace and cooperation !” and “ All
ended bloodlessly at the Lazaret border crossing near resistance will be crushed .” )86
the Adriatic port of Koper. At about 0600 on 26 June,
Slovenian construction workers assigned to erect the On 27 June the JNA began to move in earnest as three
new signposts proclaiming independence were chal armored columns set out from three bases. One col
lenged by Yugoslav Army soldiers, who threatened to umn (a battalion of 12 BOV- 3 self-propelled antiair
fire if they continued.83 The Slovenians withdrew , and craft guns from the 306th Light Air Defense Artillery
the situation did not escalate,> but similar confronta Regiment and 11 support vehicles ) left from Karlovac
tions occurred at several other border crossings during in Croatia heading for Ljubljana and the center of the
the day.Meanwhile , the Yugoslav political leadership
was laying the groundwork for more serious actions.
In what may be the first declaration of war sent by fax,

59
republic . Another column (the 1st Battalion of the 1st what was going on , Vidmar replied with the single
Armored Brigade, with possibly as many as 40 tanks word “ Brnik ." Armed with this knowledge, the Slov
and 20 armored vehicles) left from Vrhnika heading enianswere able to position troops and obstacles
along two routes toward Brnik airport. A third column between the tanks and their intended destination . As a
comprising a battle group from the 32nd Mechanized result, Brnik airportwas never occupied by the JNA.93
Brigade (30 APCs, possibly 10 tanks, and 300 sol
diers) headed north from the JNA base at Varazdin in The third JNA column, from the 32ndMechanized
Croatia toward the border crossings with Austria . By Brigade at Varazdin in Croatia , was blocked at a
the early morning these columns were already crush bridge near Ormoz on the Slovenian - Croatian border
ing automobiles and crashing through makeshiftbarri- by a barricade of tractor trailers and a large earth
cades, while the Slovenian TO frantically threw up mover. The JNA armored column was unable to break
more effective blockades throughout the republic.87 88 through the Slovenian obstacles, even after the tanks
tried using theirmain guns, although the bridge and
The first armed clash of the long, bloody Yugoslav the blocking vehicles were badly damaged.94
wars took place between one of the advancing JNA
columns and elements of the Slovenian TO.89 At0115 In addition to the three armored columns, the federal
hours on 27 June, the 12 antiaircraft guns of the JNA's government began bringing in elements of the elite
306th Light Air Defense Artillery Regiment crossed JNA 63rd Airborne Brigade to the military airfield at
from Croatia into Slovenia nearMetlika . At about Cerklje at about midday on 27 June as well as Federal
0400 , they were blocked and challenged by elements Secretariat of Internal Affairs (SSUP) and Federal
of the 2nd (Doljenska) RegionalCommand of the Slo Customs Administration personnel. The JNA para
venian Territorial Defense . After a brief exchange of troopers appear to have been assigned to secure the
fire and protracted negotiations, a slightly injured JNA airfield against capture , while the SSUP and customs
second lieutenant was evacuated to the hospital, and personnel were to be positioned to ensure federal sov
the column was allowed to advance. But not for long, ereignty over border crossings. The 461 SSUP and
as the Slovenians had by then established a second , 270 customspersonnel flew by transport aircraft into
stronger blocking position nearMedvedjek . Here the Cerklje military airport, then climbed directly into
JNA column was again attacked and stopped by the waiting helicopters and were ferried to their assigned
forces it had encountered earlier, now reinforced by locations along the Slovenian border.95 96
elements of the 52nd TO Brigade, the 174th TO
Antidiversionary Unit, and several squads of Given the federal forces' complete air superiority , the
Slovenian Special Forces.90 91 JNA's ability and willingness to fly over Slovenia
posed both a military and a political problem for the
The JNA's plans to capture the airport at Brnik ( home Slovenian leadership . If left unchallenged , the JNA
of the customs administration ) with elements of the could deploy forces almost at will, gaining the tactical
1st Armored Brigade might have succeeded but for advantage and undermining Slovenian morale.
the collaboration of some of its senior officers with (Despite a planning failure that left an inadequate
the enemy. Slovenian attempts to prevent the tanks number of JNA helicopters available in Slovenia ,
from leaving Vrhnika failed , and the news that armor control of the air allowed the Army to make up the
from one of themost powerful JNA units in Slovenia shortage with multiple flights over the short distances
was already on the road threw the Slovenian leader involved .) Unfortunately for Ljubljana, the Slovenian
ship into a panic. Defense Minister Jansa first called defenders had at best very modest antiaircraft capabil
the JNA's 14th (Ljubljana) Corps commander,Major ities — some 20 -mm antiaircraft guns and fewer than
General Pavlov, who understandably refused to give 30 SA - 7 shoulder- launched SAM's. Defense Minister
any explanation for the vehicle movements.92 Jansa Jansa himself phoned unit commanders demanding
then tried calling the former 14th Corps commander,
Maj.Gen.Marjan Vidmar — a Slovene — who appar
ently was also still at the headquarters. When asked

60

--
that they do something to stop or at least curtail JNA were able to block some JNA units advancing toward
helicopter operations. Shortly thereafter, Jansa the Austrian frontier.98 JNA casualties for the day
received word that Slovenian forces had shot down a were probably higher than expected , but stillmodest:
JNA Gazelle helicopter over Ljubljana, and several two officers and two enlisted soldiers killed , and four
other helicopters were damaged or downed . more officers and 16 soldiers wounded , according to
the Fifth Military District's public statements .
These helicopter losses made hardly a dent in the
JNA's total aircraft inventory, but the Slovenian suc Although Croatia and Slovenia had on 20 January
cesses in downing them had a psychological impact agreed to an alliance in the event of the two republics'
out of proportion to their military significance . They secession , in practical terms this was to amount to
helped reduce the defenders ' feeling of helplessness almost nothing once the shooting started . The Croat
against air attack and discouraged the JNA's pilots leaders knew that Slovenia's declaration of indepen
from further flights. As Jansa describes it : dence had irreversibly set them also on the path to
secession — and potential catastrophe. Even when first
.. the helicopter assaults of any significance Slovenia's and then Croatia's independence was pro
ended and were not resumed until the end of the claimed, the Croat leadership remained deeply riven
war. In only an hour's time the situation changed about what exactly Croatia should do during the Slov
drastically. This was the first reversal of the war enian war then unfolding. Leading one faction was
[ for the JNA ) and wasmuch more significant activist Defense Minister Martin Spegelj, who on the
than it appeared at first. The psychological bar opening day of the Slovenian war argued vigorously
rier was broken . From then on the aggressor that the moment had come for Zagreb to make its
had great trouble convincing its pilots to go on strike for freedom by surrounding JNA garrisons
flying missions ... 97 within its territory and arresting key JNA command
ers. Not only would Croatia gain the initiative in what
The helicopter lift of the SSUP and customs personnel Spegelj regarded as an inevitable conflict but it also
-originally intended as the second and occupational would be moving without the interference of the
phase of the operation — was actually premature, as JNA's embattled Fifth Military District in adjacent
isolated and somewhat confused confrontations con Slovenia . While most of President Franjo Tudjman's
tinued atmany of the border crossings and at a variety ministers seem to have sided with Spegelj on this cru
of other locations in Slovenia throughout the day on cial issue, Tudjman apparently was not yet ready for
27 June. Some were resolved through negotiation , war. He not only rejected Spegelj's call for action but,
others degenerated into armed standoffs, and still much to the Slovenians' chagrin , also did nothing to
others resulted in small but violent battles . hinder JNA units based in Croatia from deploying to
attack Slovenia. Spegelj, having made his case as
Casualties and confusion notwithstanding, the JNA powerfully as he knew how , resigned the following
had largely accomplished its mission of regaining day.99
control ofthe border crossings by nightfall on 27 June.
All crossings along the Italian border had been cap By the late morning of Friday, 28 June, the fighting
tured by midnight, although the Slovenes retained had escalated to the level of full - scale clashes across
control over at least three crossings along the Austrian Slovenia . While the JNA maneuvered to exploit its
border. The JNA also captured some of the newly advantages in armor and airpower to break Slovenian
established control points along the Slovenian -Croat morale , the Slovenians threw their forces into an all
ian border. In part, the JNA's mixed success reflected out effort to regain the initiative by simultaneously
the relative organization and readiness levels of the surrounding and engaging the JNA's forces through
JNA and Slovenian TO in each area. JNA forces out the country. Control of the border crossings see
advancing to the Italian border had begun moving the sawed as Slovenian reinforcements arrived and
previous day and succeeded , whereas Slovenian TO
forces displayed better organization elsewhere and

61
federal forces had to surrender several of the posts As the JNA's aerial campaign scoured the skies and
they had won the previous day.100 The JNA attempted dominated news bulletins, Slovenian Special Forces
to push its own reinforcements across the borders into scored one of their first victories — and a major morale
Slovenia and the republic to traverse the international boost — with an attack on a JNA armored column from
border crossings in the opposite direction. Slovenian the 253rd Motorized Brigade at Nova Gorica , knock
territorial defense and police forces obstructed and ing out three T-55 tanks and capturing three more
challenged all of these columns. intact. Four JNA soldiers were killed in the fighting ,
and almost 100 surrendered.103 A smaller JNA column
The JNA 32nd Mechanized Brigade's column of cameunder fire as itmoved to reinforce the JNA
about 30 tanks and vehicles from Varazdin continued forces hotly contesting the Sentilj border crossing . In
its advance from the previous day and eventually the same area a composite unit with two T-55 tanks
reached its objective , the Austrian border crossing at (almost certainly from the 195th Motorized Brigade)
Gornja Radgona. Once there , the 32nd Mech found accompanied by elements of the 31st Military Police
itself locked into one of the largest engagements of the Battalion and probably the 31st Reconnaissance Com
Slovenian conflict. The armored column ended up pany was advancing north . TO forces from the 7th
fighting for most of the day against Molotov cocktail (Vzhodnostajerska ) Regional Detachment disabled
wielding Slovenian local forces , and the border station both tanks with rocket-propelled grenades, and the
was all but demolished during the battle . rest of the column surrendered .

During the day on 28 June, the JNA made its first In one of the more important but barely noticed suc
attempt to use tactical airstrikes to unblock its stalled cesses of the war's beginning, Slovenian forces cap
armored columns. One column - elements of the tured the small JNA garrison at Borovnica with its
140th Mechanized Brigade from outsideZagrebwas more than 100 tons of guns , ammunition , explosives,
blocked near the town of Trebnje northwest of Novo and vehicles. These vital supplies were distributed to
Mesto . 101 JNA aircraft were called in , and a pair of TO units over the next few days. 104
MiG - 21's indiscriminately attacked military and
civilian targets along the road with cluster bombs . When fighting died down on the 28th , the issue still
JNA aircraft also bombed Slovenian positions at the hung in the balance — but Ljubljana's forces appeared
Sentilj border crossing , where a blockaded tank col to be gaining the advantage . The Slovenian To held
umn of the 195th Motorized Brigade had also called only seven of the border posts, but it had won some
for airstrikes to clear its advance. military victories and retained its high morale.105
Although the Yugoslav Army controlled most of the
More widespread were the tactical airstrikes against identified objectives and its forces still had clear supe
key transport and communications facilities in Slove riority in equipment, the JNA was already beginning
nia on the 28th . In the most notable air attack of the to show signs of the internalweaknesses that would
war, four JNA aircraft bombed Ljubljana airport in the plague it throughout the Slovenian and Croatian con
morning, damaging four Adria Airways airliners and flicts. After its initial successes on the 27th , the JNA
killing two people. Two more JNA aircraft bombed seemed to lack any plan to follow up or sustain opera
Maribor airport later that morning. JNA aircraft also tions beyond the first day. JNA units and personnel
attacked the Slovenian military headquarters at acted bewildered when military action continued after
Kocevska Reka, thinking (incorrectly ) that the Slove they had occupied the border crossings, and they
nian leadership had relocated there . On the same day appeared uncertain what to do next.
the Yugoslav Government launched an air campaign
targeted specifically against the Slovenian information It was already evident that the JNA's most serious
infrastructure , flying multiple sorties against radio and problemswere notmaterial or operational, but
television transmitters at Krim , Kum , Trdinov Vrh ,
and Nanos. 102

62

-
- --
psychological. Most of the JNA's soldiers were 18 as wounded , and the Slovenians claimed to have cap
year -old conscripts with only a few months' service . tured some 500 JNA soldiers and received 250 JNA
They had been told they were defending the country defectors.
against an invasion from Italy, but it quickly became
apparent this was not the case once they had occupied The JNA unit holding the border post at Vrtojba
their objectives.Morale plummeted when the rank and probably from the 253rd Motorized Brigade — turned
file realized they were battling their own countrymen, back and surrendered on the 29th , after negotiations
and most of the conscripts had no idea why they and without a single shot being fired . They gave up
should be doing it. The JNA's first desertions began at not only the post but also several highly prized tanks
the border crossings on the 28th where isolated , con to the Slovene forces. Late on 29 June, federal forces
fused, and demoralized soldiers gave up as soon as at the Kostanjeva crossing between Ljubljana and
surrounded . Some JNA officers and soldiers - prima Venice also surrendered , and Slovene forces took
rily ethnic Slovenians — went clear over to the Territo charge of the crossing and two busloads of
rial Defense or simply abandoned their units . 106 prisoners.109

An uneasy cease -fire was patched together near the On the afternoon of the 29th , the last JNA troops at
end of the day on 28 June . First came an announce the Austrian border crossing of Sentilj surrendered
ment by Yugoslav PrimeMinister Ante Markovic at after a running 32 -hour battle. Despite repeated
1600 hours local time that the Federal Executive attacks on Slovene positions at the border post, includ
Council (that is , the Yugoslav cabinet) had called for a ing two unsuccessful sorties by MiG - 21 jets , the
cease -fire to take effect no later than 1900 hours. JNA's T -55 tanks were unable to advance, and they
Ljubljana ignored the proposal. Later on , Slovene were eventually abandoned to the Slovenes.110111
President Kucan and Admiral Stane Brovet - Deputy
Secretary of National Defense - made contactby tele In one of the memorable small dramas of the Slove
phone and eventually agreed to a cease -fire commenc nian conflict, JNA Sergeant Dragomir Grujevic
ing at 9:00 pm local time, with a meeting scheduled under siege for two days with his unit at the Army fuel
for the following day to settle precise terms.107 depot at Mokronog ( east of Ljubljana)—threatened to
blow up the facility unless his unit got food and water.
The depot stored some 7,500 cubic meters - over a
The Cease -Fire That Wasn't: Saturday, 29 June quarter million cubic feet - of fuel. The Slovenes
Monday, 1 July complied ; Defense Secretary Kadijevic later promoted
Grujevic to Lieutenant. 112
The fragile arrangementagreed to the night of 28 June
was honored more in the breach than in practice - an Amidst the sporadic fighting, negotiations for a perma
unhappy precedent for the countless future cease- fires nent cease -fire sputtered along. On the morning of
that were to follow in the former Yugoslavia . As early 29 June, Lieutenant ColonelGeneral Andrija Raseta
as 0800 hours on 29 June, Yugoslav People's Army representing the JNA Fifth Military District — arrived
soldiers and Slovenian police were exchanging fire at in Ljubljana for a meeting with Slovenian Defense
the Skofije crossing on the Italian border; the firefight Minister Jansa and InteriorMinister Bavcar to finalize
ended with three JNA soldiers dead and the rest the terms of the cease-fire agreed to the previous
threatening to blow up the entire border post if the evening. Raseta advanced a 12 -point list of require
Slovenians did not surrender. JNA special forces ments, including one provision for the removal of bar
troops were ferried to the Italian border crossing at ricades that the Slovenians refused to accept. The JNA
Hrvatini along the Adriatic but were caught by Slove also threatened on 29 June to mobilize troops as neces
nian forces on landing, losing two killed and three sary and to take " decisive military action " if Slovenia
wounded.108 That samemorning the Slovenian Minis did not accede to the stated terms. A public statement
try of Defense claimed that 20 JNA soldiers, eight read by Assistant Federal Defense Secretary for
Slovenian TO and police, and 12 civilians had been Morale and Education Lt. Col. GeneralMarko
killed in the fighting up to that time. Some 50 JNA
troops and 35 Slovenian combatants were numbered
63
Negovanovic that evening presented a deadline of headed back toward the Croatian border. Most of the
0900 hours the following morning for acceptance of JNA units' Slovene soldiers by this time had deserted ,
the 12 conditions. The Slovenian parliamentmet and the remaining troops — mostly Serbs — were intent
through most of that night to consider its options, vot only on getting out of Slovenia with their lives and
ing early in themorning to reject the JNA ultimatum.'13 preferably their equipment. The column advanced
about60 kilometers along the Ljubljana -Zagreb high
Scattered fighting continued on 30 June as the JNA's way without incident, but then encountered a barri
unilateral deadline for acceptance of its cease- fire cade of trucks near a woodline outside the town of
terms came and went. Air raid warnings sent the popu Krsko. Surrounded in the Krakovski Gozd (Krakovski
lation of Ljubljana underground in the morning, but Forest) the unit refused to surrender, almost certainly
the planes were evidently recalled by Federal Prime hoping for help from a relief column .
Minister Markovic shortly after takeoff, and the alarm
ended soon after 1000 hours. While this was going on , Also on 1 July , Col. Gen. Konrad Kolsek (a Slovene)
Slovene forcesmortared the runway at the JNA -held was removed from command of the JNA Fifth Mili
Cerklje airfield in an effort to knock out the landing tary District. He was replaced by Col. Gen. Zivota
radar. Avramovic - a Serb who had previously commanded
the Third Military District in southern Yugoslavia and
Meanwhile, the surrounded JNA garrisons in their enjoyed a reputation as an uncompromising hardliner.
barracks and at the border crossings continued under
blockade , lacking electricity, running short on food,
and sometimes without guidance from above .Not sur The Debate Offstage — the JNA Considers Massive
prisingly , there were more surrenders and desertions Intervention
from the JNA forces over the weekend. The Slove
nians scored a major success when the entire garrison As the cease - fire talks sputtered on , the JNA — repre
of the Dravograd Border Guard Battalion surrendered , sented by Defense Minister Kadijevic — was lobbying
with 16 officers and over 400 troops .114 Slovenian unsuccessfully for an all-out assault with the three
forces also took control of the garrisons at Tolmin and fold - objective of subduing Slovenia , preserving the
Bovec (the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the JNA 345th territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and restoring the
Alpine Brigade, respectively ) gaining more much JNA's prestige. In a cabinetmeeting on 30 June ,
needed arms. Kadijevic expressed the judgment that the JNA's first
plan — a limited operation to secure Slovenia's border
Scattered fighting resumed on 1 July despite the crossings — had failed. It was therefore time to imple
ostensible cease-fire . The day began spectacularly ment the JNA's second plan : a full-scale invasion and
when a JNA ammunition depot caught fire and blew occupation of Slovenia . To Kadijevic's amazement,
up , destroying the Crni Vrh armsdepot and damaging the cabinet (then still headed by Serbia's Borisav
most of the town of that name.115 Through fighting or Jovic) decided otherwise. 117
negotiation , Slovenian forces regained control of the
Ratece, Korensko Sedlo , Ljubelj, and Karavanke tun General Adzic went public on 2 July to express his
nel border crossings. The Slovenians also inherited and the Army's frustration with the federal govern
some 70 truckloads of ammunition and explosives ment and its policies — directly criticizing the Yugo
from captured JNA depots at Pecovnik , Bukovzlak , slav political leadership :
and Zaloska Gorica.116
The federal organs continually hampered us,
That same day the column of 12 BOV- 3 self-propelled demanding negotiations while they ( the Slove
antiaircraft guns from the 306th Light Air Defense nians) were attacking us with allmeans.118
Artillery Regiment — which had been the first JNA
unit to cross the border from Croatia into Slovenia in
the early hours of 27 June — now turned around and
64
Even the Slovenians expected a larger JNA counter longer term . By all accounts the Slovenian military
stroke than eventually materialized . During the lull and people were prepared to carry on a partisan -style,
that preceded it , analysts of the Slovenian military hit-and-run military campaign against a JNA occupa
intelligence staff in Ljubljana produced an assessment tion force almost indefinitely. Under such circum
that the JNA would deploy twomain battle formations stances, probably the best that Belgrade could
in two phases whose final objective would be nothing realistically have hoped for was a short-term military
less than the occupation of the entire renegade repub success that would have allowed the federal govern
lic . In the first phase, the Slovenians expected six JNA ment to negotiate from a dominating position . Once
motorized or mountain brigades supported by two the situation had reached the level of war, and without
engineer regiments to advance to a line Maribor the political willingness to occupy Slovenia outright
Celje -Grosuplje -Vrhnika-Postojna-Sezana. Achieve and indefinitely , the best the JNA might have won for
ment of this phase would almost exactly bisect the its government would have been the possibility of dic
country along a diagonal line running southwest to tating the terms of Slovenia's eventual secession, but
northeast. In the second phase , the Slovenians no more than that.
expected three more brigades and two parachute bat
talions to spearhead a further attack , with two more
brigades and another engineer regiment held in The Battle Resumes : Tuesday, 2 July
reserve . This attack would most likely have com Thursday, 4 July
menced in the Ljubljana-Postojna area with the objec
tive of occupying the remainder of the republic.119 After the uneasy three - day lull from 29 June through
1 July, open warfare resumed on 2 July. That morning,
Whatmight have happened if the JNA had actually General Adzic formally opened the hostilities with a
mounted a campaign like the one postulated by the blunt statement delivered to and aimed at the rebel
Slovenian analysts ? Drawing only from units in and Slovenes:
adjacent to Slovenia , the JNA had almost five corps it
could have employed in such an enterprise. Two sta Wewill strike so that the war imposed on us is as
tioned in Slovenia were already engaged (the 14th in short as possible ...we will find even those who
Ljubljana and the 31st in Maribor). The JNA drew are now hiding in their holes ... wewill estab
some elements from the three other corps in the Fifth lish control and bring things to an end.121
Military District, but the total sent included only parts
of four brigades and one air defense regiment. 120 Full Severalmore JNA garrisons had surrendered to
mobilization of the 14th and 31st Corps, plus major Slovenian TO forces during the intermittent fighting
elements of the adjacent 10th , 13th , and 32nd Corps, between the morning of 29 June and nightfall on
would have given the JNA at least 60,000 troops to 1 July. By the time serious fighting resumed on 2 July ,
put into the field . However,mobilization of the the Slovenians had through negotiation or combat
reservists to fill out these corps probably would have regained control over a bit more than half the border
been impossible because of the unlikelihood that Slo crossings.122 123 When Slovenian forces energetically
venian and Croatian reservists would have responded resumed the offensive at all points on 2 July , it was too
to a callup, combined with the high level of desertions much for most of the exhausted , surrounded , block
from conscripts already in units . In any event, if the aded, and demoralized JNA outposts . In less than a
JNA were able to provide the personnel,man for man , day, the Slovenians captured all but a few of the
this would have given the JNA parity or only a slight remaining border posts.124 JNA garrisons in the sur
numerical advantage against the fully mobilized Slov rounded barracks were giving up as well. On 2 July
enian TO . But, in strictly military terms, the JNA's the JNA caserne at Skofja Loka (home of the 3rd Bat
vastly greater number of tanks, artillery, fighting vehi talion of the 345th Alpine Brigade, two other battal
cles, and aircraft would have made such a contest ions already having surrendered on 30 June ) turned
completely unequal. over the facility to forces of the 3rd (Gorenjska)
Regional Detachment.
Even had the JNA thrown five full corps into Slovenia
and occupied every key facility in the republic , it
probably could not have “won ” the conflict in the

65
One particularly violent clash continued at Ajsevica TO barricades approximately 2 km outside the town
near Nova Gorica (the site of a JNA ammo dump), of Brezice . The JNA forces were driving westward to
ending late in the day with the surrender of the Yugo rescue the retreating elements of the 306th Light Air
slav contingent. The long-contested Sentilj border Defense Artillery Regiment, which were still trapped
crossing finally went to the Slovenian forces after they in the KrakovskiGozd. One of the M -84 tanks was
turned the guns of captured JNA T -55 tanks on the blown apartby an antitank mine and two of the M -60
surrounded JNA contingent. The press reported con APCs were destroyed in minutes by Armbrust anti
tinued fighting near the Ferneticiborder crossing. tank rockets fired at close range . JNA air attacks were
called in but failed to break up the barricades or to dis
JNA combat aircraft went back into action on 2 July , lodge Slovenian To positions . The JNA advance was
targeting the radio and television transmitters at stopped cold , with dead and wounded soldiers littered
Nanos, Krvavec, Boc , Domazle, Ljubljana castle , and around the burning vehicles .
Pohorje and damaging several of them . Ljubljana air
field was again bombed , despite verbal assurances The object of the rescuers ambushed and routed near
from Federal PrimeMinisterMarkovic to Slovenian Brezice , the retreating column of the 306th Light
President Kucan on 29 June that there would be no Antiaircraft Regiment in the Krakovski Gozd , shortly
further air raids against Slovenia . Tactical airstrikes afterward found itself surrounded and attacked by
hit Slovenian -held barracks at Kocevska Reka and the elements of the Slovenian TO's 2nd (Doljenska)
barricades established at Catez, KrakovskiGozd , and Regional Detachment. The Slovenian forces opened
Dravograd . Despite the JNA's fairly vigorous applica fire on the blockaded vehicles with two 82-mm recoil
tion of airpower, it was only moderately successful in less rifles , Armbrust rocket launchers, and rifle gre
silencing Slovenian broadcasts and breaking down nades . One JNA BOV- 3 antiaircraft vehicle was
blockades. blown up by an Armbrust rocket, a rifle grenade dam
aged another, and a third caught fire. The JNA lost
Adzic's threatening public statementwas made hol four men — two killed and two wounded in the three
low by the simple fact that by 2 July most mobile JNA damaged vehicles . During the day, the JNA troops
orces within Slovenia were attempting to advance succeed in disarming a mine blocking the road but
east and extricate themselves from the country, while were unable to clear the barricade behind it. The con
JNA reinforcements from the 10th and 32nd Corps in voy commander called for air support from two MiG
Croatia were being mobilized and sent westward only 21's and two Jastreb aircraft, which attempted unsuc
to try to rescue them . The JNA's “ second offensive" cessfully to clear the road with rocket attacks. The
was really a half-measure whose purpose was hardly convoy advanced some distance into open country late
more than the rescue of JNA forces already committed in the day but was forced to stop for the night.
and trapped in Slovenia. By now the JNA victory orig
inally envisaged was almost beyond imagining. Yet another reinforcement column of 20 to 25 tanks
from the 32nd Mechanized Brigade departed Varazdin
In Croatia a large column of 80 tanks, infantry fight in Croatia on 2 July, arriving in Ljutomir en route to
ing vehicles (IFVs), and other vehicles 125 was seen join brigade forces at the Gornja Radgona border post.
leaving the Marshal Tito barracks in Zagreb (home of 126 127 Even as they moved , however, 13 tanks of the
the 140th Mechanized Brigade) and heading west on 32nd Mech - blockaded at the Ormoz bridge and
2 July . Toward the end of the day it crossed the border unable even to cross into Slovenia - gave up and
into Slovenia and camped for the night at Bregana. It turned around after blasting the area with their heavy
fired on the town of Gornja Vas the following morn guns.128 The third deployed element of the brigade
ing, but accomplished little else . the roughly 30 APCs that had set out on the first night
of the war - must have received an order to withdraw ,
Also on 2 July, another column of vehicles (from the and it abandoned the hard-contested post at Gornja
4th Armored Brigade) departed from Jastrebarsko .
The brigade's vehicles (M -84 and T -55 tanks,
accompanied by M -80 IFVs and M -60 armored per
sonnel carriers) attempted to advance past Slovenian

66

-- - -
Radgona.129 With themechanized unit already at the (ironically, the “ Brotherhood and Unity" highway )
border pulling out, further reinforcement from Varaz and appeared destined for the fighting.130 In the end ,
din became pointless. The day's fighting had cost the however, the JNA's giant armored fist — from the 1st
JNA 10 killed and 13 wounded , according to the GuardsMechanized Division — was actually part of
FederalDefense Ministry. the JNA preparations for the looming war in Croatia
and ended up parked along the Serbian -Croatian bor
Probably the most serious obstacle to JNA withdrawal der and did not participate in the Slovenian conflict at
throughout the conflict was Slovenian insistence that all. 131
JNA personnel leave the republic but that JNA equip
ment remain behind . In most cases , federal troops The Sturm und Drang of the huge JNA column depart
refused to surrender theirweapons. Slovenian Defense ing Belgrade actually rang down the curtain on its Slo
Minister Jansa maintained the official position on venian drama, for military operations had effectively
2 July that the troops must leave their weapons behind ceased . The battles at the Brezice crossing and in the
when vacating the republic and asserted that Ljubljana KrakovskiGozd — both conclusive defeats for the
would claim the equipment as “ war reparations” for JNA - proved to be the largest and bloodiest clashes
damages inflicted by the Army during the fighting. of the brief conflict . When the 32nd Mechanized Bri
gade's withdrew from the Gornja Radgona post, the
Slovenian To commander Janez Slapar and newly JNA had already surrendered control of the lastborder
appointed Fifth Military District commander crossing to the Slovenians. With the Slovenians in
Avramovic exchanged new cease- fire terms on the possession of all major objectives and the JNA with
afternoon of 2 July but could not come to agreement. drawing to its bases or over the border, the military
Slovenian PrimeMinister Peterle nevertheless contest was essentially decided . The war would go on
decided to announce a unilateral four-point cease -fire for another week , but it was to be contested at the
offer effective at 2100 hours local time by which the negotiating table and not on the battlefield .
JNA could withdraw unchallenged into barracks with
its weapons. Nothing came of the proposal, but the A tentative cease -fire took effect on the evening of
Slovenians scored a propaganda coup when the Army 3 July. The Yugoslav Collective Presidency called
ignored the offer. upon Slovenia to release all JNA units , prisoners , and
equipment, to withdraw Slovenian militia by noon on
Sometimeduring the night of 2-3 July ,Major Bosko the 4th , to lift all blockades by the 5th , and to relin
Prodanovic , the commander of the wandering convoy quish control over the border posts by the 7th . The
of BOV- 3's from the 306th Light Air Defense Artil Slovenes agreed only to release JNA prisoners and to
lery Regiment, heard by radio that the rescue column allow JNA garrison units to return to barracks with
from 4th Armored Brigade,which they were attempt their arms. On 4 July the terms of yet another cease
ing to link up with ,had been driven back .Major fire were arranged , and the JNA began withdrawing to
Prodanovic reluctantly concluded that further road its barracks. Debate continued at the highest levels of
movement was impossible , and his troops abandoned government, but the military situation on the ground
the 12 antiaircraft vehicles during the night with all had reached its dénouement.
their weapons and ammunition. The crews escaped the
immediate area on foot but were eventually captured
by Slovenian special police near Krsko . Negotiation , Internationalization , and Conclusion :
Friday, 5 July -Wednesday, 10 July
In the small hours of themorning on 3 July , a massive
armored column - approximately 150 vehicles of all Although tensions remained high in and around
types — began rolling through the streets of Belgrade Slovenia , open hostilities actually did cease from
itself, amidst cheers of support from the city's 4 July onward . From 5 July through 7 July interna
residents. The column departed the city headed north tional diplomats began mediating a debate of terms of
west on the main road from Belgrade to Zagreb
67
reference toward an agreement. Formal negotiations Chapter 5
began 7 July on the Adriatic island of Brioni. At the Goliath Defeated : WhatWent Wrong in the JNA ?
Brioni talks, representatives of the Yugoslav Federal
government, the Slovenians, and the Croatians met This intervention is the beginning of the end for
under the auspices of a team of European Community the Yugoslav Army.
foreign ministers making their third visit to Yugosla
via . After little more than three days of intense negoti Janez Jansa, June 1991133
ations - a very brief time, by the later standards of
Balkan peace talks — the BrioniAccord was signed on Jansa was right. When the JNA took on Slovenia , it
ended up tearing itself apart.
10 July 1991. In it all of the Yugoslav parties agreed to
start negotiations on the country's future by 1 August
1991, accept EC monitors, lift the blockades of Army In what looked like a David and Goliath confrontation
facilities, restrict the Army to its barracks, and deacti in Slovenia, David had clearly emerged victorious and
vate " militias." Within hours of the final cease - fire, Goliath had quit the field in disgrace. How and why
did the JNA fail? The question is not as simple as it
federal troops in Slovenia began helping to clear land
mines sown during the conflict. The Slovenians, how might seem , and there are a number of answers. The
ever,never did make good their pledge to return JNA went into the conflict because it was the only
equipment captured from the JNA. instrumentavailable for the task of bringing Slovenia
into line. But it was the wrong instrument: the JNA's
When all the bodies were counted , casualties in Slove- fundamental problem was that it had been directed to
nia were remarkably light - in contrast to the rivers of impose a military solution on what had become an
blood that would later flow in Croatia and Bosnia . intractable political problem . If anything, the

Forty -four JNA soldiers were killed during the con Slovenians arguably benefited by a limited JNA
flict, and 187 were wounded . Almost incredibly, only intervention , for Yugoslav military action instantly
eight Slovenian soldiers or policemen were killed in galvanized public support for Slovenia and interna
the fighting. Perhaps 15 civilians were killed as tionalized what had previously been an internal Yugo
well.132 slav political dispute . The conventional wisdom is that
the federal government declared war on the Slove
In many ways the war in Slovenia was not about Slov nians and was the first to apply force — which may be
enia at all. The real issue from the very start was not technically correct. But it is probably more accurate to
the independence of Yugoslavia's constituent repub say that the Slovenians had built and set a mousetrap
lics per se but rather what would happen to the Serbs for the JNA, then baited the Belgrade leadership until
of the large ethnic enclaves in Croatia and Bosnia if it sent the JNA walking into it.
those republics separated from the Serbian homeland .
Once Belgrade granted independence to the Slovenian Implicit in the conventional wisdom is the notion that
Republic with no alterations in its borders, the prece the JNA set outwith a superior force , intending or at
dent would be set for Croatia and Bosnia , whose bor least ready to wage an all-out war and to crush the
ders encompassed numerous Serb -majority regions . Slovenian opposition if that should be necessary; but
The failure to dealwith the underlying question of almost every aspect of this perception turns out to be
minority self-determination within the boundaries of incorrect in some way. The numbers do much to tell
seceding republics was to have horrifying conse the story. The JNA eventually had to withdraw some
quences only months later when Croatia and Bosnia- 22,000 to 24,000 troops from Slovenia, a figure that
their hands forced by Slovenia's declaration gives some idea of how much force Belgrade could
declared their own independence without any provi have employed if it had been absolutely determined .
sion for resolving the status of their Serb minorities . The JNA actually deployed ,however, no more than
Slovenia won its independence quickly and on the
cheap , but its neighbors would pay a steep price in
blood and treasure as a consequence of Slovenia's
actions.

68
-

- --- - -
3,000 of these troops into combat during the 10 -day The JNA's airpower was also largely ineffective in the
conflict. The Slovenians ,by contrast,mobilized and conflict. Had it chosen to , the Yugoslav military had
deployed more than 30,000 troops during the same enough aircraft and bombs to lay waste Slovenia's
period . In what appears at first glance to be a David cities ormilitary facilities . Widespread destruction of
and Goliath struggle, David actually had more than 10 civil targets would again have served no purpose, elic
times as many troops in the field as Goliath did . ited international outrage, and further rallied the popu
lation against the federal authorities. JNA aircraft had
Although the Yugoslav Armyhad an overwhelming some success in striking critical infrastructure targets,
advantage in heavy equipment — tanks, armored vehi primarily telecommunications towers. The JNA Air
cles, artillery, and aircraft — this was not the force it and Air Defense (RV i PVO ) Force proved almost
needed for the mission it was assigned. The JNA completely ineffective , however, when it attempted to
found itself fighting a type of warfare it was not support the JNA Ground Forces in tactical operations.
designed for against an opponent it had not expected It had neither the types ofmunitions nor the many
to fight. The JNA was intended to be a conventional, hours of training it would have required to effectively
armor-mechanized fighting force that would engage support advancing JNA troops engaged at close dis
similar opponents in open battle . Instead , it confronted tances against Slovenian light infantry forces fighting
the Slovenian Territorial Defense — a semiconven from covered positions. As often as not, the RV i PVO
tional, partisan -type force that could fightwhere it ended up striking nearby civilian targets or the JNA's
chose and avoid battle when it could not win . The own forces by accident.
JNA had been devised, built, and trained to fight a
mobile war involving holding actions against superior Given the Yugoslav military's almost unsolvable
conventional forces but with the support of the local dilemmas of available force versus assigned missions,
population . Instead , the JNA advanced against a the JNA further compounded its problemswith a
small, elusive force, fighting ambushes at locations of series of serious failures in both planning and
the enemy's choosing and perforce acting as an execution . These mistakes began long before the
occupying army surrounded by a hostile nation . conflict, with intelligence failures and fundamentally
flawed working assumptions. Poorly thought-out
With the number of troops made available to it, the operational planning led to units being surrounded and
JNA in Slovenia had no hope of isolating and destroy cut off without plans for escape or relief. Careless and
ing the TO's formations, which in practical terms left haphazard logistic planning left these surrounded
the JNA always on the defensive. The JNA failed to units in untenable positions when their equipment
anticipate that it would be surrounded and deprived of broke down and supplies ran out. When things began
mobility. Its armored columns became little more than to go wrong for the Yugoslav military, the simple fact
moving targets , usually with nothing for their heavy emerged that the JNA's heart was not in this war,
weapons to engage, since there were no comparable whereas the Slovenian TO had both discipline and
Slovenian forces to meet and destroy. When barri motivation .
caded in along the roads, the JNA's armored vehicles
frequently becamenotmerely useless but in fact lia In Slovenia - unlike Croatia later on — KOS failed
bilities, vulnerable to hand -held antitank rockets. JNA disastrously in its mission of providing timely and
armored forceshad the firepower to destroy whole accurate intelligence on opposition capabilities and
villages, but — as the US military eventually had plans. From mid - 1990 onward , the Slovenians were
discovered in Vietnam — such actions are ultimately one step ahead ofKOS both strategically and tacti
counterproductive. The few times the JNA attempted cally. Strategically , KOS assessed incorrectly that the
to apply massive firepower, it only infuriated the local
populace and made a political settlement even less
achievable .

69
Slovenians would not fight and that a show of force JNA notmade this cascade ofmistakes, it would have
would therefore be adequate to subdue them . Perhaps been far more difficult for the Slovenian forces to
most important, KOS erred in its judgments about the challenge and defeat their opponents . As Jansa
capabilities of the Slovenian TO's reservists — the himself concedes:
greatmajority of the troops and the foundation of the
force . Conversely, the Slovenians appear to have had a We were more than a match for the first armored
good idea of what the JNA would and could do in brigade at Vrhnika , most certainly when they did
response to the border post closures . Tactically, the not have complete crews and were demoralized
JNA appears to have had poor knowledge of Slove and while they were entirely dependent for their
nian force deployments, especially their capabilities. basic supplies on our goodwill. But the situation
The Slovenes, by contrast, had the advantage of good would have been completely different for us if
intelligence on federal Army plans and movements. they had dispatched their most modern tanks,
for example to Banja Luka, fitted them up into
Lacking good intelligence, the JNA went on to make perfect working order, filled them with complete,
poor assumptions that in turn contributed to seriously specially picked crews, provided them with the
flawed operational planning. Having concluded that necessary infantry and air support, and sent
the Slovenians would not fight, the JNA deployed for them to our borders. In that case the superiority
a show of force and not a true combatmission . The ofarmoured units would have been paramount,
JNA's implicit failure to anticipate actual combat led and we did not have enough supplies for an anti
to a lack of adequate logistic and material prepara armour battle over greater distances.134
tions. Mobilization shortfalls further impaired JNA
combat readiness. Despite efforts to improve readi Even if all of these errors had been avoided , could a
ness in the JNA Fifth Military District before the con well-planned , well-executed JNA campaign have won
flict, there were still serious failures that directly the war for Belgrade? Probably not. Better preparation
impacted combat operations . Tanks ran out of fuel, and execution could certainly have made Slovenia's
and many units went into the field without basic com war for independence much more costly for the break
bat loads. Soldiers used up their food and water in as away republic and could have prevented the operation
little as a day or two. When detachments were sur from becoming the humiliating debacle it was for the
rounded at border posts or vehicle columns were JNA. Nevertheless, it would have been all but impos
blockaded , there were no clear plans for how to sible for the JNA to force a recalcitrant Slovenia to
resupply or rescue them . remain within the SFRY once Ljubljana had made the
decision to stand and fight. The evidence suggests that
What finally lost the war for the JNA was not a lack of the Slovenians were prepared for -- and indeed
troops or firepower,nor a lack of ammunition or sup expected — another, larger JNA offensive along the
plies, but a lack of will. In the face of what must have lines of that advocated by General Adzic. The Slove
seemed like massive incompetence or lack of support nian leadership and military appear to have been pre
from above , it is no wonder that surrounded conscripts pared to conduct exactly the sort of protracted ,
in the field rapidly becamebewildered and demoral partisan war the Territorial Defense was designed to
ized . Because the rank and file within the JNA funda fight and would have done so if events had required it.
mentally did not have a clear sense of what they were The JNA could not have operated indefinitely under
fighting for (indeed , they had previously been told such circumstances - especially with an even larger
they were fighting an entirely different enemy), it was civil war brewing behind it in Croatia . With mounting
very hard for their officers to motivate them to soldier international pressure , virtually no popular support in
on at the risk of their lives. Slovenia , and threatened lines of communication
through Croatia , the JNA would almost certainly have
In sum , the JNA , faced with a host of political dilem had to quit the field eventually, if only to regroup and
mas ,made flawed planning assumptions that resulted
in inadequate military preparations and logistic fail
ures , ultimately producing a military debacle. Had the
70

-- -- -
better defend the boundaries of “Greater Serbia " or TheMouse That Roared : The Slovenian Victory
“ Little Yugoslavia” as the JNA appeared to eventually Analyzed
view it. Ironically - given the popular impression of
an invincible , Yugoslav mechanized monster taking Wewill offer resistance only when the balance of
on a heroic band of lightly armed Slovenian minute power is in our favor and the risk of human
men — the truth is that from the start the JNA was losses is low . But we will not give in .
almost set up to lose .
Janez Jansa , June 1991135
The JNA went into Slovenia intending to awe the pop
ulation with a convincing display ofmilitary might, In striking contrast to the JNA , the Slovenians man
and , in fact, itwas largely successful in accomplishing aged to combine careful planning, training , strategy ,
most of its initial military goals. The military objec motivation , and luck into a successful bid for military
tives — strictly defined — were generally met within and political independence . Planning and organization
the first 48 hours (for instance, occupation of the bor were the first Slovenian successes -a victory largely
der crossing points ), although the Slovenian defenders won before the first shots were even fired . The Slove
managed to retain control over the Ljubljana and nian intelligence services were already setting the
Maribor airports and to surround some isolated JNA stage for victory months in advance . Both military and
garrisons. The trouble was that this short-term , purely police forces were well organized in the year before
military success did absolutely nothing to further Bel the conflict.
grade's primary political goals. Regardless of the mili
tary success enjoyed by the JNA during the short Ljubljana's successful establishment and organization
campaign , the Army failed completely to achieve the of a fully fledged military was a remarkable achieve
over-all objective of cowing the Slovenian political ment. Fully mobilized , the Slovenian Territorial
leadership into submission . Instead , JNA actions Defense could theoretically have fielded (though not
inflamed the population all the more, as the Slovenian necessarily armed ) as many as 60,000 troops across
leaders undoubtedly hoped they would . the republic . As events actually unfolded, Slovenia
mobilized approximately 35,000 to 37,000 troops
Throughout the Slovenian conflict there was a wide during the span of the conflict.136 Territorial defense
spread and mistaken impression , in the press and training was also surprisingly effective , given the cir
amongmany Western decisionmakers, that the Yugo cumstances the Slovenian To had to operate under
slav Army had “ run amok ” and was operating unilat and the very compressed time frame in which the
erally and outside of political control. In fact, the Slovenian military had to get ready. Not realizing how
opposite was true. Consciously or unconsciously, much progress the TO was able to make in only a few
Western leaders conjured up images of Hungary in months, the JNA consistently underestimated the cali
1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. The reality , how ber of the Slovenian reservists and paid dearly for this
ever, was that the JNA had been directed by its politi error later.
cal masters into a domestic action for which it had
little enthusiasm . Once engaged — and losing — the Besides good organization and training, the Slovenian
JNA found itself denied the ability to crush the oppo TO had a sound doctrine and tactics thatmatched the
sition with a massive and decisive military interven capabilities ofthe available force . The Slovenian TO's
tion on the orders of the same political leadership that overarching strategy was to make maximum use of its
had sent the tanks into themorass in the first place . own advantages - surprise and strong popular sup
Thereafter, the best the JNA could hope for was to port — to prevent the JNA from effectively utilizing its
extract itself from an unwinnable situation with as
little loss of life, time, equipment, and prestige as
possible .
71
strengths in armor and artillery. Tactically, the units of the TO would shut off the path of the
Slovenes emphasized blockading, surrounding , and attackers behind , cut off their supplies, prevent
ambushing vulnerable columns, using shoulder- fired the arrival of reinforcements and surround it.
antiarmor weapons at close range to neutralize the They would find themselves in a vise . . . In many
JNA's armor advantage . cases during the war precisely such a situation
appeared and a number of detachments of the
Ljubljana also made effective use of its Interior Minis JNA surrendered after being surrounded .137
try police forces forboth combat and noncombat func
tions. The Slovene special police force served as an From the start, the Slovenians combined their military
important combat element during the conflict, and operations with a well-thought-out and effective pub
special police troops served alongside the Territorial lic relations campaign , directed at both domestic and
Defense forces assaulting the border posts and later Western public opinion . Within a week of the war's
manning the blockades. Regular police forces were outbreak , the Slovenians had established a fully outfit
also vital in performing less glamorous but equally ted press center featuring a 200 - seat auditorium , sepa
important tasks, such as establishing blockades and rate working and eating areas, and a continuous
roadblocks. As JNA units attempted to move out of stream of multiple -language news bulletins. A mea
their garrisons, Slovene police established barricades sure of the Slovenians' success was the fact that there
with vehicles, trees, and concrete cones. Some mili were some 800 Western and 350 domestic press per
tary convoys were trapped by double barricades ,with sonnel registered at the press center at this time. The
a second roadblock set up behind an already blocked professionalism of the Slovenians contrasted com
column. In addition, the regular police were to con pletely with the ham - fisted media efforts of the Bel
tinue their routine law enforcement responsibilities grade government, which came across as a backward
during the brief conflict, handling the not inconsider and unreformed Communist state . Bellicose state
able task of maintaining order during a wartime ments like General Adzic's 2 July threats may have
setting as well as processing the thousands of been intended to intimidate the Slovenian populace ,
surrendering and deserting federal troops. but instead rallied the opposition and made the JNA
look like heavyhanded oppressors. The JNA's use of
As he helped to formulate Slovenia's overall strategy, tanks - partly a function of a shortage of infantry ,
Defense Minister Jansa attempted to study relevant partly also an effort at intimidation — similarly back
historical examples of smallermilitary forces success fired , inevitably calling up images of Budapest in
fully resisting larger and more powerful opponents. In 1956 , Prague in 1968, and Tienanmen Square just two
his memoirs, he makes special note of Finland's resis years earlier.
tance against vastly superior Soviet forces during the
invasion of 1939-1940. Relevantly, Jansa noted how It was the successful combination of both military and
the Finns used their territory to maximum advantage, political strategy that really won the war for Ljubljana.
allowing the columns of Soviet tanks into the interior While the Slovenians' military successes were
and then blocking and destroying them . Jansa's TO undoubtedly significant, in many ways their crucial
was to successfully employ similar tactics against the victories were won not on the battlefield but on the
JNA in the few major, conventional engagements of television news and in the minds of Western decision
the Slovenian war. As he describes the TO's training makers. The Sloveniansmanaged to maneuver the
and subsequent use of this technique : JNA such that it was outflanked , literally and figura
tively, at every level of the conflict.
The acting out by the headquarters of events if
the units of the JNA really broke through to the
border crossings and surrounded members of
the border police proved to be particularly wel
come. In this example previously determined

72
1
Slovenian Endgame: The JNA Quits the Field tactics, and then Miran Bogatajwould normally
secure everything we planned . We acquired
The broken jug ... cannot be puttogether again . more than 200 tanks and other armored vehicles
and means of transport, which we so urgently
Milan Kucan , 2 July 1991138 needed ... We were very well acquainted with
the position of the supreme command , which due
The JNA units remaining in Slovenia after the Brioni to the unfavorable development of events in the
agreementwas signed on 10 July 1991 were effec Croatian battlefields had decided that its bottom
tively besieged in a hostile foreign country and line in negotiation was the withdrawal of the
trapped inside their own garrisons. Seeking to ratchet remaining troops and officers, and then anything
up the pressure , the Slovenians cut off electricity to else it could get. 142
the five major JNA garrisons on 17 July .
The Yugoslav Federal Presidency's order for the
The following day — 18 July 1991 — the Yugoslav Col- Yugoslav Army to withdraw from Slovenia marked
lective Presidency issued an order for the JNA to Belgrade's de facto acknowledgment of Slovenian
withdraw from Slovenia over a three -month period independence and an end to the military conflict
into other garrisons in Bosnia and Serbia. (According within Slovenia . The JNA's withdrawal, however,
to the provisions of the Yugoslav Presidency's original represented not only Slovenian independence but also
10- point decision , all elements of the JNA 31st Corps the final, undeniable death knell for Yugoslavia .
were to withdraw to Serbia, while the 14th Corps was
to withdraw to Bosnia . 139) Officially , the JNA with On 15 January 1992, Slovenia was formally recog
drawal was to be completed by 26 October 1991. nized as an independent country by the European
Effectively, the withdrawal was completed much Community and its member nations. By this time,
sooner - most troops and equipment left Slovenia by widespread fighting had begun in Croatia between the
the end of July , hardly more than a week after the end self- proclaimed Serb autonomous regions and the
of hostilities. Zagreb government, the JNA had demolished the
Croat-held city of Vukovar, and the first UN peace
Even after the last shots were fired , Slovenia's intelli keepers had arrived to implement the Vance Peace
gence capabilities continued to serve Ljubljana well. Plan in neighboring Croatia . The Yugoslav Republic
The Slovenians managed to retain and expand at the of Macedonia had declared its own independence . The
negotiating table the gainsmade by their victories on then Republic of Bosnia -Herzegovina was preparing
the battlefield . Successful intelligence work appears to for its own referendum on independence, which would
have given the Slovenian negotiators an inside edge at eventually plunge it over the precipice into armed
the talks. Jansa claims, believably, that: conflict. For Slovenia, the war was over — but for most
of the rest of Yugoslavia , it had only just begun .
Our technicians and counterintelligence agents
had cracked the JNA -coded communications
system and listened to conversations between
Zagreb and Belgrade or rather between Andrija
Raseta ,140 Stane Brovet,141 Sljivic , and other gen
erals and admirals. We knew precisely where we
had to apply pressure to make them yield . Before
each round of negotiations we worked out our
73
 Endnotes, Section I

10
Deep -seated differences notwithstanding, the popular assertions “ As regardsthe composition of the officer corps and the promo
that the Yugoslav conflictwas the inevitable product of centuries of tion to senior commanding and directing posts in the Yugoslav
ethnic hatreds are at best only partially true. For instance , it is People's Army, the principle of the most proportional representa
worth noting that, at the time of Yugoslavia's creation as a state in tion of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces shall be applied."
1918 , there had been no prior history of any Serb -Croat wars. Article 242, Federal Constitution of the Socialist FederalRepublic
( Indeed , one might also observe that France and Germany fought of Yugoslavia, 1974.
more major conflicts between 1870 and 1945 than did the Serbs " Gow , James, “ Deconstructing Yugoslavia ," IISS Survival, July/
and Croats .) There is no question that the Second World War was August 1991, pp . 291-311.
exceptionally brutal and divisive within Yugoslavia and thatas 12 Anton A.Bebler, “ The Yugoslav People's Army and the Frag
many as a million Yugoslavs died at the hands of other Yugoslavs mentation of a Nation ,” Military Review , August 1993, pp . 38-51.
between 1941 and 1945. But, Yugoslavia is by no means unique in 13 Ibid ., pp . 38-51.
having had a divided state , a Nazi client government, or a civil war 14 This tally does not include the numerous cadre- strength reserve
during this time frame. formations in the force,many of which were later activated by the
2 In this text the terms“ Slovene," " Croat,” “ Serb," and "Muslim " various warring factions or which served as the nucleus of other
will be used to denote ethnic/religious identities and not the repub fighting formations.
lic they reside in or nationality . “ Slovenian ,” “ Croatian,” “ Bos 15 Ironically as it turned out, since to a greater or lesser degree the
nian ,” and “ Serbian " will be used to denote personshailing from Territorial Defense in Slovenia, Croatia , and Bosnia ended up
each of the respective geographic areas. Thus, terms such as “ Bos becoming the opponent of the JNA.
nian Croat” or “ Croatian Serb ” would designate , first, the geo
1716 Bebler, pp. 38-51.
graphic area the individuals hail from and, second , their ethnic Belgrade Narodna Armija (supplement) 3 July 1986 ,“ Report on
background. The terms“Macedonian ” and “Montenegrin ” are gen Speech by Miodrag Ivanovic in the All-People's Defense and
erally used here for both the ethnic group and the republic/national Social Self-Protection Commission of the 13th LCY Congress in
ity. Conversely, the terms“ Albanian” and “Hungarian ” are used Belgrade on 26 June.” FBIS Vienna 221933Z July 1986 .
solely to indicate the ethnic affiliation unless otherwise indicated. 18 Bebler, pp. 38-51. This appears consistentwith the Yugoslav
3 Technically, in addition to the eight republic and provincialrepre press figures that are cited from Narodna Armija .
sentatives (who could serve as president of the SFRY ) there were 19 Silber and Little , p . 118 .
also two other members of the Federal Presidency: the President of 20 Borisav Jovic, The Last Days of the Socialist Federal Republic of
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the FederalMinister Yugoslavia , entry for 16 May 1990 .
of Defense. The collective presidency in turn selected the Federal 21 Silber and Little , p . 118.
Prime Minister. 22 Silber and Little , p . 106 .
4 Zametica, John The Yugoslav Conflict. IISS , Adelphi paper 270 , 23 Janez Jansa, The Making of the Slovenian State 1988-1992: The
P. 10 . Collapse of Yugoslavia , Ljubljana:Mladinska knjiga Publishing
s This was partly ,but not entirely, the result of the collapse of House , 1994. p . 44.
Soviet-Bloc Communism throughout Eastern Europe at the same 24 Jansa actually lists 16 municipalities thatwere able to retain their
time. To some extent, political change in Yugoslavia was spurred weapons, as follows: Brezice, Jesenice, Kranj (partly), Krsko ,
by the new politicalwinds sweeping through Eastern Europe. Litija ,Mozirje ,Murska Subota , Radlje ob Dravi, Radovljica, Slov
Yugoslavia had not been part of the Soviet Bloc since 1948, how enske Konjice , Smarje pre Jelsah , Skofja Loka, Trbovlje , Trzic ,
ever, and had charted its own political and economic course that Velenje, and Zalec. Jansa, p . 48.
left it substantially isolated from the politicaldevelopments behind 25 Estimates of the percentage seized range between 40 and 60 per
the Iron Curtain . cent. Jansa stated in his memoirs and is also cited in Silber and Lit
66 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia : Death of a Nation,
tle's Yugoslavia : Death of a Nation as claiming the Slovenian TO
Penguin , 1996 , p . 72. lost some70 percent of its stockpile and started with only 10,000
7 The legislative branch of the Yugoslav Government consisted of weapons. This latter figure of 10,000 weapons seems somewhat
the Federal Assembly , a two-chamber legislature with representa low , even allowing for arms smuggling between spring 1990 and
tives from the various republics and provinces. The Federal Jansa's later figure of 23,000 weapons available at thebeginning of
Assembly was responsible for passing the laws and the federal June . Most available estimates indicate that the Army captured
budget. about60 percent ofthe weapons for a force of 60,000 — presum
8 The Yugoslav People's Army included three services — the ably indicating that the JNA took something like 36,000 weapons
Ground Forces (KOV ), the Air and Air Defense Force (RV i PVO ), and the TO retained up to 24,000 small arms. It is most likely that
and the Navy (RM ). Of these, the Ground Forces was the largest the percentage of heavy weapons— mortars, antitank weapons, and
and most important. light artillery pieces- confiscated by the JNA was higher than it
' In 1991 - a year after multiparty elections had ousted the Com was for infantry arms.
munists in Slovenia and Croatia - over 95 percent of the JNA
officer corps were still Communist Party members. (Anton A.
Bebler, “ The Yugoslav People's Army and the Fragmentation of a
Nation,” Military Review , August 1993,pp. 38-51.)

74
 26 In Croatia, by contrast, the JNA was able to seize virtually all of 54
Vasiljevic later rose to the rank ofmajor general in the JNA and
the Territorial Defense arsenals — with obvious and far-reaching headed KOS for a time before being forced out of his position.
55
consequences when fighting did start there . Jansa, pp. 13-15
27 Jane's Intelligence Review , “ Slovenia — Territorial Defense a 56 Jansa, TheMaking of the Slovenian State 1988-1992 : The Col
Year On," July 1992, pp. 305-308. lapse of Yugoslavia , Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga Publishing
28 The Slovenian press reported that the JNA again demanded TO House , 1994. p . 130 .
weapons in late November 1990 , but there doesnot appear to be 57 After the breakup of Yugoslavia , the Serbian Republic State
any other evidence to substantiate this . Security Department (RDB ) emasculated the federal SDB , taking
29 over its building and archives in 1992.
Dragnich, Alex N. “ Yugoslavia in Historical Perspective." Medi
terranean Quarterly, Summer 1992. pp. 5-19. 58 Jansa , p . 16 .
30 Thompson,Mark, A Paper House : The Ending of Yugoslavia . 59 A firm believer in the Yugoslav ideal, Aksentijevic remained
New York : Pantheon Books, p . 9. with the JNA after Slovenia's secession and was eventually pro
31 Zametica, John The Yugoslav Conflict. IISS Adelphi Paper 270 , moted to MajorGeneral (one star ) and served as Assistant Com
P. 14 . mander for Moral Education and LegalAffairs in the Fifth Military
32 Jansa, pp.63-68. District. Dogged by misfortune wherever he went, he left his home
33 Ibid . in Slovenia after the 10 - day war to serve in Croatia during the out
A parliamentary resolution to this effectwas passed on 8 March break of war there , and after enduring the JNA's ordeal in that
1991, challenging whether the federal Constitution or republic laws republic he was reassigned yet again to serve in Bosnia when the
held precedence . According to the Slovenian resolution, military Fifth Military District Headquarters was moved to Sarajevo and
service in the JNA was no longermandatory for citizens of the redesignated the Second. In Bosnia at the beginning of 1992, he
Slovenian Republic from that date forward . Normally, about 3,000 witnessed a third republic his beloved Yugoslavia go up in
Slovenian conscripts were called up for service in the JNA each flames.
60
March. Between the lifting of the obligation on 8 March 1991 and Jansa , pp. 79-80 , 111.
the outbreak of war that June, there was reportedly only a single 61 Jansa, pp. 46-47.
Slovenian volunteer for service in the JNA. 62 Jansa , pp. 78-79.
35 Jansa, pp.63-68. 63 Ibid .
64
36 Jansa did not attempt to usemany active-duty JNA officers to During the conflict itself, VIS appears to have cooperated with
build hismilitary. Before the outbreak ofthe war,most active-duty MUP police forces to rapidly shut down Belgrade's intelligence
Slovene officers remained in the JNA, although many deserted dur effort. Even if the networks of informants were unknown , the Slov
ing or immediately after the conflict. enians were able to effectively blind the federal authorities by sim
37Gow , pp . 291-311. ply rounding up and arresting all identified KOS Federal SDB
38 One small illustration is the fact that unlike the JNA (which used operatives and detaining them for the duration of the war.
Serbo - Croatian exclusively ), each republic TO used the corre 65 Janez p . 112 .
sponding national language (for example, Slovenian ). 66 Atleast one item suggests the Slovenians also collected intelli
39 Jansa, p . 49. gence on US decisionmaking as well. In his memoirs, Jansa men
40 Jansa, p . 49-50 . tions that “ ... we received a report from the intelligence
41 Silber and Little, p . 106 . department, according to which [US Secretary of State ) Baker,
42 Gow , pp. 291-311. after being presented with the ratio of forces between the defense
43Ljubljana Neodvisni Dnevnik , “ The Army's Intervention Did Not capabilities of Slovenia and the units of the JNA,which was pre
Surprise Us," 17 August 1991. paring itself for intervention, convinced himself of the possibility
44 Ibid . that the federal bodies could put Slovenia in order in a little over
45 Jansa , p. 62 two hours.” Jansa, p . 93.
67
46 Silber and Little , pp. 106-107. Ljubljana NeodvisniDnevnik, op cit.
47 Silber and Little , p . 107 . 68 Jansa, pp. 60-61.
48 Jansa cites the lack of secure communications in battle as one of 69 Jansa, p . 111.
the force's major deficiencies. To some extent, the Slovenian mili 70 Jansa, p . 139.
tary appears to have overcome this shortcoming in combat by 71 Jansa , p . 140 .
cooperating with police units and routing critical communications 72 Jansa, p . 61.
through the InteriorMinistry's network. 73 Jansa, p . 114.
49 Jansa, pp. 140-141. 74 Jansa, pp. 116-124 .
50 The latter figure probably includes not only the more famous 75 Ibid .
Armbrust rockets but also Yugoslav-manufactured 90 -mm “ Osa" 76 Gow , pp. 291-311.
antitank rockets and 82 -mm recoilless rifles. 77For instance, the first class of Slovenian soldiers trained at the
51 Jansa, pp. 140-141. centers at Pekre and Ig did not graduate until 2 June 1991
52
A Western press report from the same time cites a figure of scarcely three weeks before the onset of hostilities. Janez Jansa ,
40,000 total light arms butlacks subsourcing and Jansa's level of The Making of the Slovenian State 1988-1992: The Collapse of
detail. The Economist, “ Slovenia's Self-Defense,” 6 July 1991. Yugoslavia , Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga Publishing House , 1994.
53 At least, not without capturing substantial stocks of weapons p78. 131 .
from its JNA opponents. As it happened , captured JNA weapons Jansa, p . 143.
stocks appear to have played an important role in even the brief 79 Jansa , pp. 146-147.
conflict that occurred . Among other things, the Slovenian forces
appear to have used up a large fraction of their antiarmor weapons
in the opening days of the fight, and thereafter relied on captured
stocks.

75
80 116 Susnik and Valentine, p . 72.
Thompson,Mark , A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia .
New York : Pantheon Books. p . 8 . 117 Silber and Little, pp. 106-107.
81 Jansa , p . 134. 118 Reuters, “ Yugoslav Army Says It Will Crush Slovenia in Short,
82 Jansa , p . 147. Sharp Blitz ,” 2 Jul 1991.
83
English translation by Dejan Susnik and Mark Valentine, The 119 Jansa , pp. 191-193.
120 Approximately one battalion each
Battle for Slovenia , Ljubljana: Cankarjeva Zalozba, p . 9. from the 13th Motorized Bri
84 Ibid . gade (13th Corps), 4th Armored Brigade ( 10th Corps), 140th
85 Ibid . Mechanized Brigade ( 10th Corps), and the 32nd Mechanized Bri
86 Susnik and Valentine, pp . 17-18 . gade (32nd Corps), aswell as the battalion (12 BOV-3 antiaircraft
87 Susnik and Valentine , p . 14 guns) from the 306th Light Air Defense Artillery Regiment.
88 121 Reuters, op cit.
Jansa, TheMaking of the Slovenian State 1988-1992: The Col
lapse of Yugoslavia , Ljubljana:Mladinska knjiga Publishing 122Sources differ on who controlled how many posts during the
House , 1994. p . 152. period 29 June- 2 July. The cited figures ( 16 held by the Slove
89More properly, the clash between the JNA and the Slovenian TO nians, 14 by the JNA) are taken from Janez Jansa'smemoirs, as the
nearMetlika was the first official battle, between regular armed most detailed listing from the most credible source . The Dejan Sus
forces, of the Yugoslav conflict. The first true armed clash was nik andMark Valentine book, The Battle for Slovenia , states that
almost threemonths earlier on 31March when Tudjman's Croatian the Slovenian police had control over all the international border
special police units battled Martic's rebel militia over Easter week crossings on 29 June (p .41), which appears plainly incorrect. The
end in the Plitvice National Park . Same Susnik /Valentine book states that the Slovenians had only
90
Jansa, pp. 152-153. captured 13 of the 15 Austrian crossings by the 30th (p . 58), and
91 Susnik and Valentine, p . 16 . even this latter figure seemshigh .
92 General Pavlov is one of the many ill-fated figures in the JNA 123 On 1 July, in a partial restoration of normalcy, six border cross
senior leadership . Hehad arrived in Ljubljana to take over his new ings between Slovenia and Austria reopened , although with huge
command only weeks before the war broke out and proved mani lines and delays.
festly unequal to the task when it did . As one joke put it after the 124 Jansa , p . 194.
JNA was defeated and forced to pull out of Slovenia , General Pav 125 Ascounted by a Western news cameraman .
lov was the most successful general in the Yugoslav Army, since he 126 Reuters, “ Fresh Columnsof Yugoslav Tanks Head for Slove
arrived in Ljubljana with only a briefcase but left after only one nia ,” 2 July 1991.
month with the entire Army. 127 Susnik and Valentine, p . 84.
93 Jansa , pp . 154-155. 128 Susnik and Valentine, p . 101.
94 129 Ibid .
Jansa, p . 160.
9 L.K." Osa Has Fallen,” Belgrade Nin 13 August 1998, p. 16 . 130 Reuters , “Huge Yugoslav Armored Column Heads for Troubled
FBIS Vienna AU0109085698 0108567 September 1998. This arti North ,” 2 July 1991.
cle claimsthat the detachment from the 63rd Airborne Brigade at 131 Susnik and Valentine, p . 92.
Cerklje comprised 18 personnel under the command of then appar 132 Most of these were foreign drivers whose trucks had been used
ently Captain Goran Ostojic . Ostojic, as a Major, was killed in in the Slovenian barricades. Since they were financially responsi
action in Kosovo during 1998 while serving as chief of staff of the ble for their vehicles and produce, they had refused to leave them
63rd . Susnik and Valentine, pp. 17-18; Belgrade Tanjug, 27 June even during the fighting .
1991, FBIS London 2800252 June 1991. 133Reuters, 30 June 1991.
96 One source claims that 252 Special Police troops — probably a 134 Jansa, pp. 239-240 .
reference to the SSUP - eventually surrendered, and 33 more 135 Reuters , 30 June 1991.
changed to civilian clothing and surrendered to Italian police near 136 Jane's Intelligence Review , “ Slovenia — Territorial Defense a
Fernetice . Year On," July 1992, pp . 305-308 .
97 Jansa, p . 164 . 137 Jansa, p . 113.
98 Susnik and Valentine, pp . 22-23 . 138 Reuters, “ Kucan calls for Military and Civil Observers for
99
Belgrade Tanjug, 13 February 1991 ,FBIS London Yugoslavia,” 2 July 1991.
LD1302120891; Silber and Little, pp. 165-166 , 169. 139 Presidency decision as cited in a State Departmentcable.
100 Susnik and Valentine, p . 34. 140 Lt. Col.General, Fifth Military District Deputy Commander and
101 Susnik and Valentine, p . 28. head of the JNA's negotiating team .
102 Susnik and Valentine, pp. 28-34. 141 Admiral, FederalDeputy Minister of Defense .
103 Multiple sources. 142 Jansa, p . 242.
104 Jansa, p . 178.
105 Jansa , p . 174.
106 Multiple sources.
107 Susnik and Valentine, p . 41.
108 Ibid .
109 Reuters, 30 June 1991 .
110 Susnik and Valentine, p . 41.
III Micheletti , Eric , The BalkansAtWar: Yugoslavia Divided 1991,
Hong Kong: Concord Publications Company, 1992.
112 Reuters , 30 June 1991.
113 Jansa, p . 181.
114 Susnik and Valentine, p . 57 .
115 The explosion left a crater 18 meters long and 6 meters deep.

76

- - -
 s an
rd
s de ti -9
5
a i ga e Croa my 91
Gu Br of th Ar : 19

ZD
SK

RU
N.

G
BORO
1.

E
D
A
G
I
SA

R
RD

B
IJ
SK
I

KA
JS BR
RDI IG
GA AD
A
4.GARDIJSKA
G
B
A
N.
NO

LI
IN HOCS
2.GARDIJSKA SIGNO
VINCES
BRIGADA
KUNE BRIGADA
B

ADA
H

KA BRIG
A

JS
N

RDI
R

1.GA
S
S

9.BRIGADA
PUMA
G
A
R

A
D

D
I

A
J

G
S

I
K

R
A

B
의

s
e
n

DIDesign Center/MPG 384095 04-02

77
Section II

Croatia 1990-1991

79
 Chapter 6 Turkish expansion . Granted political autonomy from
1990 : The Origins of the Croatian War* Croatia , for 500 years these Serbs and their descen
dants paid allegiance to and received direct support
Croatia's road to warfare and ultimate independence from the imperial capital in Vienna or, latterly , the
ran alongside Slovenia's path for part of the way , but Yugoslav federal capital in Belgrade .
the two secessionist republics' routes were to diverge
early and proceed in quite different directions. Indeed , Although Croat narrations of their history will extend
violence came earlier to Croatia than to Slovenia and back to the Middle Ages, most Serbs date their aware
would not end until years after the Slovenes had made ness of Croatia from the Second World War. When
their successful exit from Yugoslavia . Hitler's Wehrmacht rolled into Yugoslavia in April
1941, most Croats saw not an invasion force but an
The roots of Croatian nationalism and the Serb fears opportunity for independence from Serb -dominated
of a resurgence of that nationalism - lie in the distant Belgrade . Croat resistance was marginal, and most
past. Unlike its neighboring republics of Slovenia and Croats welcomed the Germans as the enemy of their
Bosnia -Herzegovina, Croatia could claim a long his enemy. Within days of the German invasion (even
tory of either independent statehood (beginning with before their military campaign had ended ), the Ger
the reign of King Tomislav in the early 900s) or con mans announced the establishmentof an “ Independent
stitutional semi- autonomy under the Hungarian , Hab State of Croatia" (Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska
sburg , and Austro -Hungarian monarchies. For this NDH ), headed by the puppet leader Ante Pavelic.'
reason , the Croatian national consciousness was well Within days, “ Poglavnik ” ( Fuhrer) Pavelic's political
developed , and the republic's perceived subsumation military movement, the Ustashe (Croatian Fascists )
to Serb interests rankled for generations. had taken over the government and had begun imple
menting anti-Jewish laws. Mass internments of the
Under the Austro -Hungarians, Croatia was a self Jewish population in Nazi- style concentration camps
governing province on the empire's embattled south followed over the next few months. In addition to the
eastern border with the Ottoman Turks. To defend the persecution of the relatively small ( perhaps 14,000 )
border, the Austrians, Hungarians, and the Croats Jewish minority in Croatia , the NDH began attempt
sought to recruit Serbs who had fled the Turkish occu ing to “ solve" the problem of the far larger ( some
pations of Serbia and Bosnia in the late 1300s and 1.9 million ) population of ethnic Serbs within the new
early 1400s. These displaced Serbs were a tough , state's borders.
hardy warrior people with a vicious hatred of the
Turks, and they proved ideal buffers between the Accurate figures will probably never be known , but it
Austro -Hungarian and Turkish empires when they is clear that Pavelic's Ustashemassacred huge num
were encouraged to settle along the border zone bers of Serbs wherever they could be found. Country
between Croatia and Turkish - occupied Bosnia. The wide, various estimates suggest that at least 200,000
result was the creation in the 15th century of the Serb and as many as 600,000 “ undesirables ” died at the
majority Krajina region within what is now Croatia . hands of the Ustashe . At the Jasenovac camp alone,
The Serb settlements eventually became known as the Croatian Fascists executed at least 120,000 Serbs,
Vojna Krajina , or "military frontier," with the Krajina Gypsies, Jews, and political prisoners .Many years
Serbs serving as a human barrier against further later, however, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman
* Many of the issues discussed in this history of the Croatian war in
1991 are dealt with in more detail in a series of supporting annexes
in Volume II, which also contain the full source material for the
sections in this study.

81
would make an early name for himself by publishing a Franjo Tudjman was a retired JNA general who had
revisionist book claiming that Serbs had vastly fought with the Partisans and had risen through the
inflated the numbers and that probably no more than Army ranks in postwar Yugoslavia . He had been jailed
60,000 people had been executed at Jasenovac.? twice — once in the 1970s and once in the 1980s — for
Croatian nationalist activities. After being released the
Reluctantly liberated from Hitler's hegemony and second time, Tudjman began cultivating emigre
reincorporated into Yugoslavia as part of Marshal Croatians (many of whom had fled after Tito's 1971
Tito's Socialist Federation , Croatians found them crackdown on the Maspok nationalist movement) and
selves once more under Belgrade's yoke, but still tapping them for the funds so crucial to a nascent
strove at least to loosen the bridle. As early as 1971 politicalmovement.
a Croatian nationalistmovement called Maspok3
developed within Croatia's ruling Communist party . Like Milosevic , Tudjman knew that ethnic national
Tito crushed themovement withouthesitation or delay ism would be the political engine of the coming
and purged or jailed anyone in any way associated decade, and he too had the rhetorical skills to rally his
with it. After the Maspok crackdown , federal authori people in the necessary manner.Milosevic had already
ties worked ruthlessly to quash any hint of Croatian reached into Krajina to raise the specter of Serbian
nationalism , and Croatian political agitators were nationalism in Croatia . Tudjman only needed to tap
either driven abroad or forced to operate deep under into the fears the Serb demonstrations had created in
ground. Federal internal security agents infiltrated Croatminds to create an equal and opposite reaction .
nationalistmovements and monitored anyone sus As one Croatian political leader noted ,
pected of contacts with Croatian groups abroad .
Thanks to their highly effective efforts, the first seri Milosevic's aggressive policy was the strongest
ous expressions of overt Croatian nationalism did not propaganda for Tudjman .Milosevic was send
appear until late 1989, well after Slobodan Milosevic ing his gangs to Croatia, where they were danc
had begun waving the banner of Serbdom and conven ing and singing: “ This is Serbia , ' which
ing mass nationalist rallies in Serbia . provoked and liberated the national pride and
the nationalist reaction of Croats and was effec
tively used by Tudjman."
The HDZ and Croatian Nationalism :
Croat Actions ... But the ardently nationalist Tudjman advocated more
than the full independence denied the then -Croatian
Twenty years of suppressed nationalist activity not Republic . Repeatedly he emphasized his desire (and
withstanding, Croatia's road to independence effec implicit right) to annex parts of adjacent Bosnia
tively began with the formation of the Croatian Herzegovina peopled by Croats.
Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajed
nica — HDZ ), led by Franjo Tudjman . The HDZ was Accepted as a legitimate political party in December
the first openly Croat politicalmovement to appear 1989 , Tudjman's HDZ quickly established itself as the
since the crushing of Maspok two decades earlier. The preeminent political organization in post-Communist
movement held its first public meeting on 28 February Croatia. By the end of February 1990, the first HDZ
1989 but was not constituted as a legal political party congress in Zagreb drew 2,500 delegates, including
until that December. As 1990 began , the HDZ was many of the all-important emigres, and the party
well positioned to take advantage of both the legaliza- claimed 200,000 members. Unlike the reformed Com
tion of non -Communist political parties and the power munists, who hedged on the key issue of the hour, the
vacuum created by the declining fortunes of the HDZ came out openly in favor of Croatian indepen
former Communist party . dence and campaigned strongly on this issue.

82
-
In the Croatian Republic's first multiparty elections in removed the prefix "Socialist" from the republic's
April-May 1990, the HDZ demonstrated its domi designation. At the same time, it “ derecognized " the
nance of the post-Communist political landscape. In Cyrillic alphabet within Croatia. In practical terms,
two rounds of voting, the HDZ captured 205 of the the legislation may have meant little : probably more
356 seats in the new Croatian Assembly . Themain than half of Croatia's Serbs used the same Latin alpha
opposition party , the reformed Communists , won 73, bet as their Croat compatriots, and the words them
and the remaining 78 seats went to eight smaller par selves (in whatever type font) were identical but for
ties. Because the electoral system favored large , well minor differences of dialect. In symbolic terms, how
organized political parties, the HDZ won almost 60 ever, the new law had enormous significance : it was
percent of the Assembly seats although it had actually regarded not only as a huge affrontby Croatia's ethnic
received less than half the total votes cast. When the Serbs but also as a deliberate attempt to erase their
new cabinet was formed , Franjo Tudjman was named 500 - year cultural heritage in the border regions and to
State President and another HDZ member, Lojze delegitimize their standing in the new Croatian
Peterle, became Prime Minister. society .

The new government of the CroatRepublic wasted lit A more serious issue than the alphabet was the
tle time in taking the first legislative steps to pave the makeup of the republic's new police force — which
way for Zagreb's secession from the SFRY and the was bound to be a contentious issue under the best of
formation of an independent Croatian state . But a circumstances . In a republic with no military of its
complete lack of sensitivity to non -Croat concerns own — the JNA and to a lesser degree the Territorial
amplified well- founded fears of looming discrimina Defense forces ( TO ) still functioned as federal institu
tion within Croatia's sizeable ethnic Serb minority of tions — the Croatian police were the closest thing to a
some 600,000 citizens — roughly 13 percent of the republic -wide armed force. Obviously, control of this
republic's population of 4.7 million . These legislative force by either ethnic group would be crucial to one
moves — discriminatory in their wording, ill - consid side and threatening to the other.
ered in their timing, and occasionally evocative of the
Fascist NDH state— were eventually to spark a coun The crux of the dispute centered on Croatian efforts to
tersecessionist backlash among the Serbs and move alter the size and character of the republic's police
both sides far along the path to civil war in Croatia . force by building additional Croat-majority police sta
tions and reducing the number of ethnic Serbs in the
The first misstep by Tudjman's new government was existing force. By bringing additional ethnic Croats
in the wording of the republic's Constitution . In a into the regular force, the Croatian Government
nation obsessed with the question of ethnic national clearly hoped to decrease the number of Serbs in the
ity , the Constitution nowhere mentioned the Croatian force in both absolute and percentage terms, as well as
Serbs. The documentproduced to move Croatian personnel into police stations in
Serb territory. But the Croats' heavyhanded efforts to
defined the state of Croatia as the sovereign dominate the police force poured salt on an open
state of the Croatian nation . It made no refer wound and enraged ethnic Serbs everywhere . There
ence to the Serbs. Under Communism they had was worse to come: the Croats adopted the
been a constituent nation of the Republic of sahovnica — the Croatian shield — as the emblem of
Croatia. Now they were dropped from the Con the new , post-Communist police uniform . The
stitution . Ethnic exclusivity was to be written sahovnica had indeed been (as Croats were quick to
into the basic law of the state.5 point out) the traditional coat of arms of the Croatian
nation for hundreds of years. But itwas also the sym
Movesby the new government that seemed merely bol adopted by Ante Pavelic's Fascist- collaborator
forward -looking were taken by Croatia's Serbs as por
tents of bigger and more serious things to come. On
25 July 1990 , for instance, the Croatian Assembly
83
state, which had systematically executed thousands election ofMilan Babic as president, the council
upon thousands of Serbs in World War II. Most Serb announced that it was scheduling " a referendum on
policemen refused outright to wear the new uniforms. the historic territories of the Serbs within the borders
of the Republic of Croatia which will take place from
19 August to 2 September" in the “ 11 districts of
Serbian Nationalism : Serb Reactions Croatia " where Serbs were in the majority . On
3 August the Croatian Ministry of Justice declared the
Ethnic nationalism had stirred Serbs in Croatia long referendum illegal, and on 17 August the Croatian
before the HDZ took power, so it would not be Special Police attempted to take over Knin ,moving on
entirely accurate to say that Tudjman's politicalmoves the town from Benkovac and Obrovac . Belgrade's
were what sparked the rise of Serbian nationalism chosen Serb military leader, local police inspector
there . Nevertheless, the HDZ's legislation - and, per Milan Martic , deployed his new Special Police unit,
haps more important, the overtly Croat nationalist however, and mobilized the Knin police reserves to
trappings it clothed itself in — served as a powerful fell trees across the routes into town ; he appeared
catalyst and propelled much of the Croatian Serb pop- ready to use force . The Croatians backed down
ulation into the armsof the radicalnationalists by fan- especially after the Yugoslav Air Force and Air
ning the Serbs' worst fears of a resurgent Ustashe Defense intercepted helicopter-borne Croatian rein
state . Milosevic personally and the Serbian Republic forcements." Martic's “ Log Revolution " enabled the
Government generally had already cultivated support referendum to proceed as scheduled on 19 August,
ers in the Serb communities of the Krajina region and and the results unsurprisingly and overwhelmingly
elsewhere and stood ready to exploit the Serb minor endorsed an “ independent status" for Croatia's
ity's opposition to Zagreb's growing nationalism . Serbs. 2 Following this victory, Babic moved rapidly
to consolidate his political control over all the Serb
The heart of the Croatian Serbs' own movement for majority municipalities of southern Krajina.13
autonomy lay in the extremely modest mountain town
of Knin , a railway junction in the southern arm of the
republic roughly 200 km south ofZagreb . With guid Yearend 1990 : Croatia Fractures Into Rival
ance from Belgrade, the Krajina Serb political leader Substates
ship - led by a provincial dentist named Milan Babic
and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)-marched By the closing days of 1990 , the Croatian republic
step by step through a series of declarations, referen government in Zagreb and the self- proclaimed Serb
dums, and “ legislative" moves to withdraw the bulk of government in Knin were marching in cadence in
the Croatian Serb population from Croatian Govern opposite directions. While Tudjman was arguing self
ment control. The Krajina Serbs first established an determination for Croatia as he sought to dislodge his
association of Serbian municipalities in May 1990.8 republic from the SFRY, he simultaneously main
When Serb citizens in and around Knin began orga tained the indivisibility of his republic -to -be and the
nizing themselves into " self -defense militias," with inviolability of its borders while refusing to grant the
Serbian Government weapons and leadership , the Croatian Serbs political or cultural autonomy. As the
evaporation of Zagreb's political and military control SFRY was slowly fracturing into its constituent repub
over the region began . lics , the Krajina Serb portion of Croatia was attempt
ing to affirm its political connections to the Federal
On 25 July, within hours of the Croatian Assembly's Republic even as the rest of Croatia spurned theirs. In
derecognition of the Cyrillic alphabet, representatives December 1990 , after somepreliminary half- steps, the
from a cluster of Serb -majority municipalities met in Krajina Serb leaders formally established the self
the town of Srb , just north of Knin , and pronounced a proclaimed Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina
declaration on the sovereignty and cultural autonomy
of the Serbian people in Croatia . This same group then
held the first session of the self-proclaimed “ Serbian
National Council" on 1 August in Knin . After the
84
( Srpska Autonomna Oblast Krajina — SAOK ) as a midlevel Knin police inspector, was the chosen instru
political entity within the Republic of Croatia but mentto command the breakaway Serb police, and the
independent of its government.Milan Babic was SDB appears to have spent some time preparing him
elected chairman of the SAOK executive council." to lead the uprising that became known as the “ Log
The new SAOK comprised the municipalities of Knin , Revolution" of August 1990. By January 1991,Martic
Benkovac , Gracac , Donji Lapac, Obrovac ,Korenica , and the SDB were operating a separate Krajina Secre
Vojnic , Glina, Dvor na Uni, Kostajnica, and later tariat for Internal Affairs covering the SAO Krajina.
Vrginmost.
The SDB also created an elite combat unit to give
Moving on a parallel timetable , on 21 December the Martic a reliable mobile force that could bemoved
Croatian Assembly proclaimed its “ sovereignty ” and quickly from sector to sector. This would complement
unilaterally claimed authority over its own defense the existing Serb police and the new police reserve
forces, diplomatic relations , and foreign policy. The units . The local militia , which had also received arms
declaration passed overwhelmingly, since the Serb from the SDB , would be rechristened the SAO Krajina
members (who could not have outvoted themeasure Territorial Defense ( TO ) and recruit the bulk of the
in any case ) had earlier boycotted the Assembly.15 Not manpower needed for the protection of the new auton
yet independent, the nascent Croatian state already omous region . Similar TO militia forces were then
comprised two near-warring entities. As 1991 began , organized for the SAOs of Western Slavonia and East
few in Croatia could think the portents for the new ern Slavonia - Baranja -Western Srem . Eastern Slavonia
year were anything butominous. also received its own elite force — the later infamous
Arkan's Tigers or Serbian Volunteer Guard . All of the
Chapter 7 TO units were to play a major role in the war that
1991: Extending Politics by OtherMeans broke out in the summer of 1991.

Secession Within Secession - Arming the Croatian Organizing and Arming the Croatian Government
Serbs * Forces, May 1990 to August 1991**

The Croatian Serbs' political preparations to withdraw The new Croatian Government under President Tudj
from the Croatian Republic would not have been pos man inaugurated on 30 May 1990 was also faced with
sible without an armed deterrent to keep Zagreb from the need to build up a military force , and without the
crushing the rebellion by force . Slobodan Milosevic's support of a patron state or sufficient weapons of its
Serbian Government, which was orchestrating the own. With more success than it had in Slovenia , the
Croatian Serbs' politicalmachinations, simulta JNA on 16-17 May moved in advance of Tudjman's
neously organized a police force and local village inauguration to seize the weapons stocks of the entire
guards in order to defend the new autonomous Republic Territorial Defense (TO ). 16 The Croatians
regions. Bypassing federal institutions, Milosevic had to turn to the only government institution in
used the State Security Service (SDB ) of his own Croatia that still had any arms— the Ministry of Inter
Ministry of Internal Affairs to implement these nal Affairs (MUP )—as its first step in organizing a
measures. national army. A year spent enlarging and training the

For amore detailed discussion of the organization of Croatia's

The SDB appears to have had a well-thought-out plan
armed forces, see Annex 2 : The Organization of the Croatian Gov
to develop these forces. The first step involved creat ernment Forces,May 1990 - April 1991; Annex 3: Croatia Creates
ing a reliable local leadership . Milan Martic, a An Army — The NationalGuard Corps,May-September 1991; and
Annex 4 : The Arming of the Croatian Government Forces, May
' For a more detailed discussion of Serbia's covert operation to arm 1990 -August 1991.
the Serbs, see Volume II, Annex 1 : The Organization and Arming
of the Croatian Serbs, 1988-91.
85
MUP while seeking foreign dealers willing to sell it were more impressive on paper than in reality , lacking
armswould give Croatia in the spring of 1991 a sufficient small arms to equip their members and
nascent army, the National Guard Corps (ZNG ), that being even more deficient in heavy weapons. The
would eventually grow into a true national army, the MUP, following the loss of practically all its “mili
Hrvatska Vojska (HV) . tary " units to the Ministry of Defense , set about creat
ing new regional Special Police units thatmay have
numbered 10,000 active and reserve personnel by
Expanding the Police August 1991.

Impervious to ethnic Serb reactions, when the Croat Although it might claim to have fielded within the
ian Republic Government first moved to expand the space of a year a respectable small army, Croatia's
MUP's regular police force , it dismissed many of the Ministry of Defense was going to have to go to war
Serb policemen while increasing the number of police without the robust command and control structure
stations throughout the country as a demonstration of necessary to direct combat operations in the field . In
Croatian sovereignty and to enforce Croatian rule , particular, the lack of strong regional commands to
particularly in Serb -populated areas. By January 1991 controlZagreb's often ill- disciplined and inadequately
the original force of 10,000 or so police had been trained troops, combined with poor coordination
expanded to close to 20,000 personnel. The center between the MUP and the ZNG , would dauntingly
piece of theMUP's efforts to develop a military force , hinder Croatia's defense during the desperate days of
however, was the expansion of its single antiterrorist summer 1991.
unit into a number of“ special police" battalions orga
nized along military lines. By January 1991 the pro
gram had produced 3,000 regular soldiers formed into Acquiring Arms
a dozen battalion -sized units . To back up these regular
forces , the MUP also began an expansion of its Croatia's success in organizing its defense forces was
regional reserve elements the fall of 1990. By June offset also by a lack of weapons to equip them .
1991 these reserve formations numbered an estimated Defense Minister Spegelj's urgent efforts to buy small
9,000 to 10,000 personnel organized in 16 battalion arms and antitank systems abroad were only moder
sized units and 10 company-sized units, although ately successful. His biggest deal was a contract for
many personnel probably did not have weapons. 30,000 AK -47 rifles from Hungary, butmost of the
promised shipment nevermade it to Croatia . By
August 1991, Zagreb had managed to procure fewer
Creating the NationalGuard Corps than 30,000 small arms from foreign sources to aug
ment the 15,000 weapons in its MUP stocks, which
In May 1991 the MUP's Special Police and reserve was clearly insufficient to equip the growing army.
formationswere transformed into the Croatian
NationalGuard Corps (Zbora narodne garde) and Chapter 8
subordinated to the burgeoning Ministry of Defense The JNA Fails To Halt Secession *
under General Martin Spegelj, a former JNA officer.
The Special Police battalions combined to form four Croatia's efforts to create its own armed forces, along
all- professional brigades, later dubbed “Guards Bri with its politicalmoves to separate from Yugoslavia ,
gades," which were to stiffen and spearhead Croatian were closely watched by the JNA , which saw itself as
military operations throughout the coming war. By the only federal institution still able and willing to
July 1991 these formations probably included some thwart Croatia's secessionist intentions. Led by Fed
8,000 soldiers and were the only units in the ZNG that eral Defense Secretary General Veljko Kadijevic, the
could be described as fully armed , at least with small Army diligently tracked Croatian political and,
arms. At about the same time, the MUP reserve units
For a more detailed discussion of JNA efforts to prevent Yugosla
had grown to some 19 regional ZNG reserve brigades
via's disintegration , see Annex 5 : Kadijevic Indecisive : The JNA
and perhaps 14 independent battalions totaling about Fails To Halt Secession .
40,000 personnel. Most of these reserve formations

86
especially,military developments through its Security indecisiveness — slowed planning for the operation .
Directorate (UB ), better known as the KOS. Kadijevic By early December,however, everything was ready.
was an avowed Tito - style federalist who made no All that Kadijevic needed was the approval of the Fed
secret of his opposition to nationalism of any kind nor eral Presidency. He never attempted to get it and
his determination to stamp out any rebellion against ordered KOS to postpone the operation on themorn
Belgrade's rule. Alarmed by KOS-derived intelligence ing it was to have been sprung. Kadijevic had gotten
assessments of the accession of the HDZ to power in cold feet.
spring 1990 , Kadijevic laid plans to confiscate not
only Croatia's republican Territorial Defense weapons Meanwhile , the Croatian Government knew some
but Slovenia's and Bosnia's as well. The JNA thing was up . Kadijevic's adversary , General Spegelj,
believed - rightfully, as events proved — that these was arguing for President Tudjman to order the Croat
weapons could be used by the new governments to ian MUP and the few MoD volunteer units to carry
form their own armies to oppose the JNA . Kadijevic out a preemptive strike and blockade the JNA's bar
coordinated his plans for the seizures with Serbia's racks throughout Croatia , cutting off water, electricity ,
member ofthe Federal Presidency, Borisav Jovic, who gas, and food . Spegeljbelieved that the predominantly
used his federal position to provide legal cover for the conscript JNA forces would disintegrate in such cir
move in the face of Croatian and Slovenian opposi cumstances and deliver an entire JNA military district
tion . When the JNA struck on 16-17 May, completely and its equipment into Croatian hands. Tudjman
disarming the Croatian TO , it would be Kadijevic's vetoed Spegelj's plan . He did not believe that Croatia
last decisive act in the Army's solo attempt to halt had the force necessary to take on the JNA, and he
Yugoslavia's disintegration . feared that Croatia would lose what support it had in
the West if it attacked the duly constituted government
of the federation .
Preparing To Act - October to December 1990

Having dealt with the potentialmilitary threat of the The Presidency Blocks the JNA January 1991
Croatian TO , the JNA turned its attention to the politi
cal threat, drafting plans to remove the Croatian (and The Federal Presidency finally met to consider
Slovenian ) Governments by late summer or early fall. Kadijevic's plan against Croatia and Slovenia on
The JNA leaders intended to allow Croatia and Slove 9 January . Despite detailed presentations from
nia to proceed with their announced steps toward Kadijevic on Croatian and Slovenian efforts to acquire
independence so that the JNA's planned military weapons and build " armies ," Borisav Jovic was
actions could be amply justified. By fall 1990, how unable to persuade a majority to back the operation .
ever, the JNA appears to have shifted its focus from Instead the Presidency settled for a watered -down
the political process back to Croatia's efforts to " grace period” during which Croatia would hand over
develop its own military forces, especially General its weapons to the JNA. The Croatians, asserting their
Spegelj's arms acquisition program . As described in right to maintain separate armed forces, refused to
Yugoslavia : Death of a Nation , KOS efforts to crack turn over the weapons. The Croatian forces and the
Croatian security received a major boost when Spegelj JNA went on heightened alert while charge and coun
asked a junior JNA officer — whom Spegeljhad raised tercharge reverberated between Belgrade and Zagreb
almost as his own son — to act as a Croatian agent and both prepared for war. On 25 January the Presi
against the JNA. The officer, Captain Vladimir Jager, dency met again , and again it voted down Kadijevic's
turned and became a double agent, informing on proposal. The Yugoslav general refused to actwithout
Spegelj for KOS. Based on Jager's information and the collective Presidency's legal blessing. Again the
other KOS intelligence reporting, the JNA developed Belgrade government had to compromise .
a plan called Operation " Shield " to disarm the Croat
ian military organization and putits leaders on trial. A
variety of procedural snags — and possibly Kadijevic's

87
What Is Yugoslavia ? - The JNA and Serbia politicians were abdicating their federal responsibili
Disagree ties while Yugoslavia disintegrated around them . The
disgusted Army leaders bluntly told Milosevic and
Serbian PresidentMilosevic and his key ally , Federal Jovic that they would now stage a coup and dissolve
President Jovic ,had already begun to back away from the Presidency and any republican government that
the goals that Kadijevic and the Army still believed opposed them . The Armywould then give all sides six
in — a Yugoslav federation firmly embracing Slovenia months to decide Yugoslavia's fate while it kept the
and Croatia. Milosevic and Jovic had no faith that the state together until a political settlementwas reached .
Army would ever be able to dislodge the governments Eager to oblige , Jovic and the other Milosevic
of the breakaway republics, given the popular support controlled members of the Presidency (from
their policies enjoyed . They were prepared to let the Vojvodina, Montenegro , and Kosovo) resigned their
two republics go their own way but without the Serb posts and waited for the JNA to act, reasoning that the
regions of Croatia, which the two believed should be Army legalists could argue that, without a functioning
allowed to stay in a rump Yugoslav federation if they presidency , the JNA would not be acting insubordi
so chose . (Milosevic and the SDB of course were pre nately when it took over the government.
pared to ensure they chose correctly.) This crucial dif
ference between the Serbian political leaders and the Even with this accommodation , however, Kadijevic
Army high command kept them divided even as they and the JNA could not bring themselves to follow
worked together and shared their separate plans. through . When they had analyzed the likely domestic
When war did come, their divergent vision would and international reactions to their plans, they con
bring near catastrophe to the Yugoslav cause . cluded that a military putsch would be a disaster both
internally and diplomatically. Confounded that the
Army could march into the valley of decision and out
The JNA Fails To Strike again in the space of a week , Jovic and Milosevic
turned their backs on the Army leaders and refused to
Jovic and Milosevic gave Kadijevic one last chance to trust them again . The JNA's last chance to halt Yugo
keep Yugoslavia together by force . Rebounding dog slavia's disintegration — whether it would have suc
gedly from the January compromise, the JNA readied ceeded or not — was gone.
a proposal for a state of national emergency in prepa
ration for removing the Croatian and Slovenian Gov
ernments .Milosevic's sly suggestion to Jovic that the Could a Strike Have Succeeded ?
military act on its own , without trying to get the Fed
eral Presidency's concurrence , however, fell on deaf JNA intervention to remove the Slovenian and Croat
ears; the JNA would not act without that legal cover. ian Governments or disarm their illegal " paramilitar
In mid -March , the JNA again presented its plan to the ies” would have been a difficult operation even if the
Presidency and asked for a declaration of emergency. Federal Presidency had approved it byMarch 1991. A
Four days of intense debate and negotiations produced JNA operation then probably would have failed less
neither approval nor a workable compromise , and the ingloriously than did its assault on Slovenia in June
Presidency again rejected the Army's proposals . 1991, but its success would have been partial at best.
The outcome would have depended heavily on the
This time Kadijevic and the JNA General Staff chief, interaction among the elements of time and surprise ,
General Adzic, let their anger with the civilian leader the unit discipline achieved by the JNA, and the
ship boil over. As they saw it, Janez Drnovsek and degree of military opposition mustered by the unpre
Stjepan (Stipe)Mesic, the Slovene and Croatian pared republics. An even earliermove within the
members of the Presidency,were helping their gov December 1990 – March 1991 time framewould have
ernments tie the hands of the federal government so
they could present it with a fait accompli; the other

88
had a host of benefits : the Croatians and Slovenes Federal Yugoslavia. Vasiljevic also claimed thatmost
would have had even less warning and time to prepare Army officers during the Slovene war - junior officers
themselves politically , Yugoslav national cohesion included — believed in a " radical solution " to the
probably would have been somewhat higher and the nationalist problems besetting the country , even
soldiers ' discipline and will to fight less eroded , and though he acknowledged that some officers took the
the Croatians and Slovenes would have had less time position that “ I cannot be against my own people.”
to field their military forces. In Croatia , in particular, Certainly by late 1991 a large percentage of non -Serb
most of the Special Police forces and the nascent or Montenegrin officers had deserted the JNA or no
MUP reserve units were only minimally combat ready longer supported its leaders. If Vasiljevic was speak
in December 1990. A quick decision in Belgrade ing of 1990 and early 1991 , however,his assessment
mighthave permitted the JNA to mount a lightning may have been correct.
strike against these forces .
The officer corps, however,was not themain problem .
Generally speaking, the JNA's assessments and opera During the Slovene operations and the war in Croatia ,
tional planning in December were probably more real the young conscripts and reservists who made up the
istic and effective than they proved to be in the bulk of the JNA manpower — and especially the non
eventual operation against the Slovenes. Army leaders Serbs — were clearly unwilling to fight against their
at that time appear to have realized that the removal of own countrymen or for a cause they did not believe in .
the governments or the disarming of the paramilitaries Spegelj's arguments from December 1990 that the
would require force , and JNA units probably would JNA conscripts would not fight to prevent Croatia's
have been better prepared both mentally and materi secession probably would have proved substantially
ally . In addition, KOS and military police antiterrorist correct.
units had done thorough planning for their parts in the
operation and probably would have been able to seize Chapter 9
most government facilities — other than the readily The Croatian Pot Boils Over *
distributed weapons in the armories — and many key
political personalities. As the decisionmaking crisis The inability of the senior politicians to achieve a
stretched on past December, the Croatian and Slove solution to the crisis and the unwillingness of the JNA
nian governments became better able to anticipate and to act ensured that the rising tensions within Croatia
resist a JNA move ,making even a well-planned , well would lead to fighting between armed Croatian Serbs
founded strike far more problematic . and Croatian Government forces. The brief clashes
that erupted at the town of Pakrac , the resort at
Probably the key factor inhibiting the success of any Plitvice Lakes, and the village of Borovo Selo during
JNA operation against the secessionist republics was February , March , and May were the first shots in the
the lack of cohesion and will to fight among JNA per war that was to consume Croatia for the rest of 1991.
sonnel; these would plague the JNA throughout the After these actions, both Serbs and Croatians realized
1991 fighting against the ethnically homogeneous that all- out war was likely, and emotions reached the
Slovene and Croatian troops, who were primed to boiling point. Their fights and threats drew the JNA's
defend their homelands against what by 1991 had Croatian garrisons into the role of peacekeepers, a role
become in their minds an occupying Army. Colonel that did not fully satisfy the Croatian Serbs — who
Vasiljevic," the senior KOS officer responsible for wanted the JNA to defend them — or the Croatians
Croatian operations, would claim in 1992 that the who believed that the JNA was explicitly or tacitly
multiethnic Army high command — including Slov backing the rebellious Serbs.
enes, Croats, and Muslims— firmly believed in the
* For a more detailed discussion of the clashes at Pakrac, Plitvice,
state of emergency declaration urged by the Army in
and Borovo Selo , see Annex 6 : Scene Setters for War - Pakrac,
1990. Vasiljevic's judgment seems plausible , and Plitvice Lakes, and Borovo Selo .
there is every indication from Jovic and other sources
that the Army leaders were devoted to preserving a

89
Pakrac and Plitvice : Zagreb Blocks Serb Moves unplanned , undirected , and incoherent, with Serbs in
one village firing at the neighboring one simply
Two incidents signaled the start of the Croatian Serb because it was Croat and vice versa . This inchoate
leadership's efforts - backed by the Serbian Govern violence would serve to mask strategic military
ment — to consolidate its control over designated Serb- actionsby the Croatian Serb leadership that, supported
populated regions throughout Croatia. Croatian MUP by Serbia , intended to expand its control over Serb
Special Police thwarted the Serbs ' February attempt to areas in Croatia. The Zagreb government was forced
take over the town of Pakrac in Western Slavonia, on the strategic defensive, but President Tudjman
although no one was injured in the exchange of gun resisted pressure from hardliners who wanted him to
fire when the MUP force retook the local police sta retaliate for Croatian Serb victories by attacking the
tion . The Federal Presidency ordered JNA forces to JNA, which they viewed as pro -Serb . Tudjman contin
occupy the area and halt the clashes. At Plitvice , the ued to look to the international community for action
removal of Croatian managers from a resort by SAO to halt the fighting.Meanwhile , the JNA , acting in the
Krajina Special Police and armed civilians sparked name of Yugoslavia but irresistibly biased toward
another Croatian counterattack . After some initial Serb interests, tried and failed to keep the peace .
miscues, the MUP Special Police succeeded in retak
ing the park , after which JNA troops again quickly
moved in to separate the two sides. Both , however, Serbian and Croatian Serb Planning
had suffered their first casualties, each losing one dead
and six wounded . It would get worse . Throughout 1991, Milosevic , Jovic , and the Serbian
Government proclaimed their vision of a rump Yugo
slavia that included the Serb regions of Croatia , but
Borovo Selo : Wake-Up Call for Croatia without the rest of Croatia or Slovenia. This clear
vision of Serbian national objectives and the Croatian
The death of at least 12 Croatian Special Policemen Serb military operations designed to implement part
and the wounding of 21 others in a Croatian Serb of them would drive events throughout Croatia during
ambush on 1 May at the village of Borovo Selo , in the summer of 1991. The Croatian Serb political and
Eastern Slavonia near the town of Vukovar, had a pro- military leadership - backed by Serbia — would move
found psychological effect on the Croatian Govern from the occasional use of armed force, as at Pakrac
ment and people. The Special Police had been and Plitvice, to full-scale military operations designed
attacked as they tried to enter the village to free two to bring Krajina and other Serb enclaves into a politi
comrades who had been wounded and captured the cal and territorial union . The leaders of the Krajina
previous day while sneaking into town on a lark to Serbian Autonomous Region , or SAO Krajina,
pull down a Yugoslav flag. The incident brought planned to dispatch military units to eject any official
secessionist Croatians face to face with the costs of Croatian Government presence from the localities
their ambitions; their outraged reaction pushed they claimed as their own, and Serb leaders in the
Croatia irrevocably toward an all-out war of indepen newly formed Eastern and Western Slavonia Autono
dence. The JNA's by now routine intervention to sepa mous Regions prepared for similar actions to consoli
rate local combatants could not halt the slide toward date their own holdings.18 Personnel from the Serbian
regionalwar. State Security Department and its Special Operations
Unit almost certainly helped plan many of these
military operations.19
Skirmishing - Serb Versus Croat, Summer 1991

After Borovo Selo , internecine clashes spread like a

plague . Many of the outbreaks appeared to be

90
Croatian Strategy a press conference to explain and justify his decision
not to go to war with the JNA:
Although Slovenia's headlong rush toward indepen
dence impelled Croatia to make a conditional declara Our defense forces ...because they do not have
tion of independence simultaneously on 25 June 1991, heavy weapons ... are inferior ... to the Yugo
Zagreb's declared political objective was to achieve a slav Army... this is one of the reasons why I
peaceful separation of a territorially intact Croatia ... declined to wage an open war
personally ..
from Federal Yugoslavia , and from June through against the Yugoslav Army and Serbia.22
gust President Tudjman clung tenaciously to this
policy . The Croatian Serbs, however, had long before Unremitting and increased Serb violence ,however
decided that they would exit Croatia whether it particularly in Eastern Slavonia — and Croatian con
declared its independence or not, and it was their overt victions that the JNA was siding with the Croatian
resort to military action during this period that would Serbs soon forced Tudjman to confront the issue head
determine the nature and timing of Croatia's separa on. On 22 August he issued an ultimatum to the Fed
tion . Serb military “ victories,” effectively consoli eralPresidency and Defense Secretariat, demanding
dated by JNA interventions to prevent further fighting, that JNA units in Croatia return to their barracks by
forced a divisive debate in Zagreb over the use of 31 August. If the JNA did not comply , the Croatian
force and would eventually push President Tudjman Government would
into a war that he did not want but had no choice but
to join . consider that the Yugoslav Presidency is directly
responsible for the aggression against the
President Tudjman's initial aim was to internationalize Republic of Croatia and the Yugoslav Army as
the conflict in Croatia, rather than fight back with mil an army of occupation, and we will accordingly
itary force , hoping that the European Community and take all necessary steps for the protection of our
23
the United States would recognize Croatian indepen territorial integrity and sovereignty
dence and put pressure on Belgrade to halt its “ aggres
sion " against Croatia. He rejected the advice of Itwas mounting losses to Serbian attacks and deepen
hardliners in his party , the HDZ, that Croatia should ing convictions that the JNA was involved in these
directly attack the JNA units that seemed to be work attacks that pushed Tudjman to the brink of adopting
ing hand- in - glove with the Croatian Serb military Spegelj's recommended strategy of attacking and iso
operations. Croatian troops would remain on the lating the JNA . Even after he had authorized military
defensive, he insisted , reacting only to defend Croat actions and warned publicly that he would do so , Tud
ian territory. As Croatia descended into real war dur jman would continue to cling to the hope that outside
ing July and the Croatian Serbs began racking up intervention would save Croatia from a military con
successive victories, the divisions in the Croatian test with the JNA that, in his opinion , it could not win .
leadership grew . Inspired by ZNG Commander Gen
eral Spegelj and Defense Minister Djodan , the hard
liners decried Tudjman's reliance on the international The Yugoslav People's Army: Biased Peacekeepers
community and called for a strategic offensive against
the JNA barracks, the plan that Spegelj had advocated During much of the summer fighting in Croatia , the
in late 1990 , early 1991, and during the Slovenian JNA was stuck in the middle , ordered to act as a buffer
Ten -Day War.20 The debate came to a head during a force (as it had at Pakrac , Plitvice, and Borovo Selo )
contentious Croatian national assembly meeting in yet distrusted by the Croatians and criticized by the
early August when HDZ rightists demandedmore local Serbs for nothelping them more. Firmly devoted
vociferously than ever that Tudjman authorize attacks to its ideal of a Federal Yugoslavia , the JNA by and
on the JNA.21 Tudjman again stood firm and reorga
For the full text of the ultimatum , see Annex 7: Croatian
nized his government to replace Djodan ; Spegelj Ultimatum to the Federal Presidency of Yugoslavia .
resigned on 3 August. Two days later Tudjman called
91
large did try to act as a neutral peacekeeping force Yugoslavia .” 24 Three days later he complained that
during this period , butthe fog ofwar and biases on all “ the military ... is intoxicated with the unity of a
three sides led to repeated misunderstandings among Yugoslavia that no longer exists." 25 Despite the Croat
the contenders. The Croatians were unable to appreci- ian perception that the JNA was siding with Croatian
ate the fine distinctions between the JNA's duty -bound Serb forces during July and August, the evidence
actions to keep peace within a united Federal Yugosla- available shows that the JNA was attempting - not
via, the Serbian leaders' willingness to let Croatia always successfully — to act impartially. Typically , the
secede minus its Serbian enclaves, and the Croatian JNA would move its armor-mechanized units to sepa
Serbs ' determination to separate themselves by force . rate Serb and Croat units and actively try to mediate a
Feeding the Croatians' suspicions of the JNA was the settlement between them . Anecdotal accounts from
fact that, although most JNA commanders appear to local press reporting suggest that the JNA intervened
have rigorously followed orders to act solely as peace in nearly every clash or action that occurred from June
keepers, their sympathies tended to be with the Serbs, until mid -September (when the JNA would begin act
and some unit commanders very likely did favor the ing consciously against the Croatians).
Serbs in their peacekeeping operations. Some com
manders even went so far as to provide weapons to While they staunchly guarded the JNA's impartially
Croatian Serb forces, although the vast majority of federal mission , whether Kadijevic and Adzic wanted
Serb weaponry was drawn directly from Serbian TO it or not, the Army became increasingly Serbianized
and MUP stocks. Finally , even when the JNA was after the eruption of the Slovenian Ten -Day War as
clearly hewing to itsmandate of restoring peace and conscripts began deserting and the other republics
acting as a buffer, after Serb forces had captured an refused to send their biannual intakes of conscripts to
area from the Croatians, the JNA's intervention to halt the JNA. The effect on JNA morale was profound.
the fighting usually left the Serb forces occupying Jovic asserted during a meeting with Kadijevic on
their objectives. The cumulative effect of such actions 5 July that
from July to September was to heighten Croatian per
ceptions of JNA support for Serb military actions. Army morale has hit rock bottom . The Serb
This was exacerbated when , after the war in Slovenia nation is losing faith in the JNA. The opposition
began , the JNA dispatched large numbers of troops to is seeking the formation of a Serbian army...
the border with Eastern Slavonia and elsewhere in The Serbian RenewalMovement is directly
Croatia to intimidate Zagreb into backing away from encouraging reservists to ignore their callup
secession. This essentially political action by the JNA orders, to desert ... The mothers of soldiers are
leadership, though viewed by them as independent of demonstrating - asking that their " children
their impartial peacekeeping actions within Croatia , return from the military. ” 26
could hardly enhance Croatian confidence in the
JNA's neutrality. As Silber and Little note , “ The Slovene experience
tore the heart out of the JNA .” 27 Admiral Branko
Whatever the appearances, it is clear from discussions Mamula,General Kadijevic's predecessor as Federal
between Serbian Federal Presidency member Jovic Defense Secretary and one of Kadijevic's closest
and JNA senior officers during the summer of 1991 informal advisers , told British reporterMisha Glenny
that the JNA conscientiously tried to remain an unbi in 1991 that Kadijevic's one big mistake was letting
ased federal force in Croatia . Its leaders consistently Slovenia go . “ After that ... wehad lost Yugoslavia.”
refused to accede to demands from Jovic and The loss of part of Yugoslavia made it very difficult
Milosevic that the JNA become in effect a Serbian for the multiethnic JNA officer corps to undertake any
army and pullback to defend only the Serb regions in operations in Croatia , especially the combat opera
Croatia . Jovic noted on 24 June 1991 that General tions that would be ordered against the Croatian
Adzic , JNA General Staff chief, “ characterized ...my
position on defending Serbs in Croatia as unreason
able, because the JNA must defend all the nations of

92
Government in the fall of 1991. The JNA leadership by Serbian fire, and, because the JNA was everywhere
could no longer realistically justify attacking Croatia in evidence , Croatian accusations of JNA complicity
to save Yugoslavia . The unity of the officer corps and direct involvementmounted . JNA units,officially
began to crumble, even though the senior leadership neutral but inevitably afflicted with Serb sympathies
still assured themselves that they were fighting for and resentment of Croatian nationalist sentiments ,
Yugoslavia.28 faced increasing Croatian hostility and even direct fire
as perceptions of JNA -Serbian collusion hardened.
This hostility would culminate in Croatian blockades
Combat Operations, June-September 1991* of the JNA barracks in Osijek , Vinkovci, and Vukovar
followed by direct fighting with JNA defenders in late
The primary element of Croatian Serb military strat August. With Tudjman's ultimatum to Belgrade com
egy in the SAO Krajina was a summer-long campaign ing in the midst of this fighting, the stage was set for
to seize control of the Krajina " borders” in the Banija the all-out attack on JNA barracks throughout Croatia ,
region , south of Zagreb ,by seizing all the Croatian which in September would put the JNA directly and
police stations in the region . In June armed Serbs tried openly at war with the Zagreb government.
and failed to take the initial objective in the campaign,
the key road junction town of Glina and its police Nomajor fighting occurred in neighboring Western
station . A second attack on 26 July , spearheaded by Slavonia until mid - August, when TO troops from the
Martic's Special Police from Knin , overcame strong Serbian Autonomous Region of Western Slavonia
resistance from Croatian ZNG and MUP forces, and attempted to push Croatian MUP personnel out of
two Croatian MUP substations southwest of the Una their newly proclaimed Serb region . Croatian ZNG
River town of Hrvatska Kostajnica were eliminated at and MUP forces, however, vigorously responded and
the same time. Kostajnica was now isolated deep contained TO troops around Okucani and Pakrac ,
within Serb -held territory, and Serb forces moved to while repelling efforts to seize the town of Daruvar.
take control of it. Local ZNG and MUP troops, bol Nevertheless , the fighting shut down the strategic
stered by reinforcements, managed to hold out against Belgrade-Zagreb highway that linked the Zagreb area
besieging Krajina TO units until mid -September, to Eastern Slavonia . In the midst of the fighting, the
when Serb troops, again spearheaded by Special JNA attempted to intervene and establish a buffer
Police , crushed Croatian resistance. The JNA failed in zone, but with the same lack of success it had suffered
its efforts to act as a buffer force during the fighting, elsewhere .
and the Croatians charged the Armywith helping the
Serbs, who in their turn upbraided the JNA for not Further south , in contrast to other regions, the driving
doing enough to help them . factor in the Knin -Northern Dalmatia area during
July -September was the JNA.29 Led by General Spiro
The largest Serb operation in Eastern Slavonia Nikovic and Colonel Ratko Mladic , the JNA 9th
Baranja was the successful campaign to seize control (Knin ) Corps , although at first acting in a peacekeep
of Baranja in late August. There were also clashes ing role as directed by the JNA high command, during
around the suburbs of Vukovar, Vinkovci, and Osijek August became more and more prone to initiating
in which each side attempted to expand its control. clashes with Croatian forces or defending Serb -held
Much of the fighting in the region during July and territory. This culminated in the capture - in
August, however, consisted of intense exchanges of cooperation with SAO Krajina troops — of the key
fire between Croatian and Serb villages without any Croatian -held village of Kijevo on 26 August and, on
attempts by either side to capture territory . There were 11 September, the seizure from Croatian forces of the
daily clashes, random mortar fire against towns and strategic Maslenica bridge linking the Dalmatian coast
villages, and outright battles that produced a flood of to northern Croatia . To some extent these operations
refugees into Osijek and other towns. To the Croatians around Kijevo may have stemmed from JNA percep
it seemed as if the whole region was being consumed tions that it was being attacked , blockaded , or threat
ened by Croatian troops. It nevertheless appears that
* For a more detailed discussion of the summer 1991 fighting, see
Annex 8 : Fighting Escalates, June- September 1991. For a descrip
tion of the military geography of Croatia, see Annex 9 : Military
Geography and Weather in Croatia.

93
the JNA General Staff did not authorize most of the military ) intervention. Therefore, when the Yugoslav
Knin Corps' actions, but rather ordered them halted Federal Presidency — including Mesic and
when they occurred. Drnovsek - voted on 1 September to accept European
Community proposals for a cease- fire , increased inter
national monitoring ,and a new peace conference,
Evaluation of Forces , June-September 1991 Tudjman was willing to postpone his deadline and
give the new conference a chance.30He noted on
During the summer fighting, the Serbs appear to have 6 September, a day before the start of the conference ,
performed more effectively overall than the Croatians, that even he saw this as the last chance for a
even thoughmost regular Croatian ZNG or MUP units negotiated settlement.31
were better organized and trained than the average TO
unit. The political and military leadership of the three
SAOs, almost certainly with strong support from the The EC Peace Conference and the Croatian
Serbian SDB and its Special Operations Unit, had a Decision for War
clearer understanding of their war aims and the strat
egy they intended to use to achieve their objectives. In Opening to what looked like general Balkan approval
addition , the SDB had thoroughly armed the TO on 7 September, the conference almost immediately
forces of all three autonomous regions, ensuring that, began drawing ominous signals from the Croatians.32
in general, Serb forces outmanned and outgunned Croatian federal representative Stipe Mesic , serving
their Croatian opponents. The Croatians suffered par his turn as President of the Federal Presidency , served
ticularly from poor leadership and command and con up the first of several warnings that very day with the
trol structures at the regional level and were unable to statement that he would soon order the JNA to return
coordinate their operations effectively. Shortages of to its barracks. At a meeting the next day , the Croatian
trained men in the Serb areas made it very difficult for Supreme State Council concluded that Croatia would
the Croatians to hold an area once the Serbs decided to have to “ maintain and enhance" the combat actions it
seize it. That said , the regular ZNG and MUP units was engaged in.33 The Croatians were rushing to the
that made up the bulk of the Croatian forces engaged conclusion that Belgrade wanted to drag the confer
proved to be well- trained and highly motivated forma ence out to allow Serb forces in Croatia to consolidate
tions that, one-on -one , could usually defeat any com their gains. On 11 September,Mesic provocatively
parable TO unit. Most of the TO forces had little decreed , in his capacity as President of the Federal
training, and some had none; they were little more Presidency, that the JNA must return to its barracks
than collections of well- armed civilians. The deploy within the next 48 hours. Although he pretended that
ment of the elite SDB -raised Special Police from Knin his order was intended to implement the EC cease - fire
(most likely aided by the SDB's Special Operations proposal which the Presidency had adopted on
Unit ) in key situations was critical to bolstering the 1 September,34Mesic's action clearly was designed to
quantitative superiority of the TO forces against regu give Zagreb a pretext for initiating its long-planned
lar Croatian troops . The Serb use in mid - 1991 of elite strategic offensive against the JNA barracks.35 The
mobile troops to back up low - quality territorially majority of the Federal Presidency — the JNA repre
raised forces proved to be a model that the Croatians, sentative, the Serbian and Serbian -controlled
and later all three armies in Bosnia , quickly adopted .
* The EC conference represented only one phase of international
efforts to establish a lasting cease - fire in Croatia, as well as an
Chapter 10 overall peace settlement.Most of these international attempts had
War: Croatia Attacks the JNA, September 1991 little impact on the actual combat operations, cease -fires were reg
ularly violated by one side or both sides almost as soon as they
wentinto effect. The EC's efforts to construct a peace settlement
Despite Tudjman's 31 Augustdeadline for the JNA to are briefly covered in the section dealing with the Vance Plan and
return to its barracks, he still believed that Croatia's the end of the war.

best hopes lay in international political (and hopefully

94
members of the Federal Presidency, as well as at least territory. The Croatian strategy was appropriate for the
one other member — rejected Mesic's order, claiming situation in which Zagreb found itself , and the bar
that the entire Presidency had to vote on the decree . racks blockade in particular was one of the key turn
This rejection apparently provided the Croatians with ing points in the war.40 Nevertheless, Croatian military
the justification they desired . According to then Croat power alone was insufficient to achieve all of
ian Defense Minister Luka Bebic , on 13 September, Zagreb's goals, although it did succeed in containing
the federal forces. President Tudjman continued
The Croatian Ministry of Defense issued an throughout the conflict to put his faith in international
order to all ZNG units and to all Crisis Head diplomatic , economic , and even military intervention
quarters according to which , on the basis of a for the fulfillment of Croatia's war aims.
decree from the President of the Republic and
the Supreme Command, the implementation of
appropriate measures was initiated. These The Battle of the Barracks *
included turning off allmunicipal services and
the supply of fuel to the Yugoslav Army, and the On 14 September, Croatian ZNG and MUP forces sur
passive blocking of barracks, storage depots, rounded and blockaded every JNA barracks or depot
and all routes used for movements of the enemy; in Croatian - held territory and shut off all utilities serv
commanders in the field were also to undertake ing them . Croatian troops also quickly overran many
appropriate actions if this became necessary. of the smaller,more isolated JNA posts, particularly
That is the basic order that was issued and for depots and border guard positions. By these rapid
warded on 13 September. 36 actions they were able to seize large amounts of heavy
weapons, including the armament of the entire 32nd
Thus, Croatia - convinced that it was already at war (Varazdin ) Corps, while recovering most of the Croat
with the Federal Army and the Croatian Serbs — chose ian TO weapons that the JNA had confiscated in 1990 .
to go on the offensive and attack the JNA.37 Many of the cutoff garrisons responded with direct
fire against the Croatian attackers or with artillery and
mortar fire , which the Croatians claimed was usually
Croatian Strategy - September to December 1991 directed against civilian targets. Surrendering JNA
units often sabotaged their equipment or called in air
Croatia's primary war aim was to preserve its territo strikes on the barracks after giving them up to deny
rial integrity. To do this, it needed at minimum a their equipment to the Croatians . After an initial flurry
bigger, better equipped army to oppose the JNA . The of successful seizures, the Croatians settled into a pro
offensive against the JNA barracks had the twin aims longed siege of the remaining barracks, interspersed
of capturing enough infantry and heavy weapons to with occasional assaults on key facilities. The Croat
furnish an army capable of defending the borderwhile ians eventually eased the restrictions around most of
reducing the JNA's striking power by neutralizing its the barracks, and , as part of the internationally negoti
Croatia -based units . Zagreb tailored its military ated Vance Plan , by late December they would
strategy to its Army's limited capabilities in a cam approve withdrawal agreements for the remaining
paign that can be divided into two phases. During the garrisons.
first, that ran from September through October, the
Croatians assumed the strategic defensive on the bat The blockade of the JNA facilities was one of the
tlefield , while going on the offensive against the decisive actions of the Croatian war. Without the
JNA's barracks.38 The second phase, in November and weapons that ZNG /HV and MUP forces were able to
December, saw the Croatians shifting to more attacks seize or negotiate for, the nascent Croatian Army
against the JNA in the field while holding defensively would never have armed enough troops to hold off the
elsewhere and continuing their barracks blockades.39
For a more detailed discussion of the “ Battle of the Barracks,"
Maintaining the strategic defensive and launching see Annex 10 : The Battles of the Barracks- Croatian Offensive
only counteroffensives obviously worked toward the Operations — September-October 1991.
goal of ensuring that Croatia retained all of its
95
JNA. The acquisition of JNA heavy weapons - espe working to create support formations to round out and
cially the Varazdin Corps equipment - provided a complete the Army. By January 1992, Tus claimed
quantum leap in the HV's capabilities, while the cap that the ZNG numbered some 200,000 troops, while
ture of thousands of small arms, including the former the MUP had over 40,000 personnel (including regu
TO stocks , allowed the HV to equip all its existing bri lar police ). This expansion - made possible only by
gades ,mobilize and arm enough personnel to field a the success of the barracks operations and the organi
large number of additional brigades, and expand most zation of true military staffs - gave Croatia the forces
if its independent battalions into brigades. it needed to defend itself. Still, while it had benefited
from the high motivation of a successful defensive
The barracks siege had a correspondingly disastrous war, the Army created and regularized in the heat of
effect on the JNA . The surprise success of the Croat battle was no more than a loosely organized, hastily
ian offensive sapped already low JNA morale and trained light infantry force, supported by limited num
eliminated , by capture or immobilization ,most of the bers of tanks and artillery, and so it remained through
Fifth Military District's combat forces , plus part of the out the 1991 fighting.
Military -MaritimeDistrict's formations. The JNA
effectively lost the use of eightmaneuver brigades, Chapter 11
including one armored and two mechanized brigades , The JNA , Serbia , and the Croatian War,
as well as three artillery regiments. Since much of Fall-Winter 1991
what was lost to the JNA was added to ZNG /HV, the
effects were doubled . In addition , the blockade forced Croatia's attack on the JNA barracks brought to a head
the JNA to add the barracks' relief to the objectives of the differences between the Serbian and JNA leaders
an already too ambitious strategic offensive that had over Belgrade's objectives but failed to resolve them .
been planned without provision for that contingency. Although the JNA consulted closely at this critical
momentwith Milosevic and Jovic — who by midsum
mer 1991 were the Army's de facto political overseers
The Croatian Army Rises: September -December in rump Yugoslavia — the JNA refused to accept their
1991 definition of Yugoslavia's war aims.** The JNA senior
leadership , in particular General Kadijevic, still
As battles between the JNA and Croatian forces balked at Milosevic's pragmatically limited political
erupted in the aftermath of the actions against the bar objective — the creation of a Serbian -controlled Yugo
racks, the ZNG deficiencies described earlier became slavia of the willing, including the Serb Autonomous
even more glaring. Zagreb acted to correct these in Regions in Croatia. The JNA generals still believed
late September, ordering the formation of a true gen that the defeat of the Croatian Government would
eral staff to plan and control its combat operations enable the preservation of some form of confederal
under the command of former Yugoslav Air and Air Yugoslavia . Kadijevic wavered through a series of
Defense Forces commander General Anton Tus. One meetings with Milosevic and Jovic during July and
of Tus's first priorities was the creation of the regional August, their frequency increasing as the JNA hemor
military headquarters whose lack had been so harmful rhaged all but its Serbian and Montenegrin personnel.
to the Croatians during the summer fighting. Equally Every timehe seemed to have agreed with Jovic and
pressing was the general staff's exertions to assimilate Milosevic on giving up the Federation , Kadijevic
the weapons and equipment gained from the barracks would come to the nextmeeting to argue for its
so that the ZNG could be expanded to more than twice
See Annex 12: National Command Authority in Yugoslavia, for
its size . By the end of October, Tus and his staff had
an explanation of the formal and informal chain of command in
formed an additional 25 brigades, another 10 in Belgrade during fall 1991.
November, and five to seven in December, while

* For amore detailed discussion of the development of the Croatian

Army during the fall, see Annex 11: The Croatian Army Rises
September-December 1991.

96
-

- -
-

-
preservation .“! Atmid -September, the JNA leaders ' implement a simpler strategy that included an
position remained basically the same, even as the state immediate withdrawal from its exposed positions
disintegrated around them . Jovic's comments on 12 throughout the Croatian Republic to defend only the
September 1991 illustrate what Kadijevic and the Serb regions, rather than launching a strategic offen
senior JNA were thinking just before the start of the sive to achieve a political objective he did not want
Croatian barracks blockade : and believed infeasible .

I once again raised the key question, for the The JNA's offensive plan consisted of five corps- level
umpteenth time, the question that constantly pre gns, for which mobilization and preparation
occupiesme: Is our goal to defend , with the mil would occur in two phases: a preliminary mobilization
itary, the new borders of the nationsthat want to and deployment (which occurred in July ), and a
remain in Yugoslavia , or is it to overthrow the follow -on mobilization (ordered in September).44 The
Croatian Government? ... Unfortunately there preliminary mobilization was meant to put increased
is notmuch understanding. The military is still pressure on the Croatians without actually launching
intoxicated with Yugoslavia , even though we any offensive actions. It also permitted the JNA to
have discussed the fact that it is no longer realis pre -position key formations in their staging areas in
tic a hundred times.42 case war actually followed. The follow -on mobiliza
tion was designed to complete the consolidation of
Instead ofmerely defending the Serb regions of forces identified as necessary to carry out the full plan .
Croatia, as Milosevic and Jovic wanted , Kadijevic and General Kadijevic states in his memoirs that the JNA
the JNA high command were set to embark on a full plan was designed to
scale strategic offensive to defeat Croatia militarily
and force its capitulation . Kadijevic would persevere -impose a full air and sea blockade on Croatia ;
with his objective and the offensive until, in October,
when failure of the JNA's strategic offensive became -link the attack routes of the main JNA forces
indisputable, he halfheartedly acquiesced in a Serbian as directly as possible in order to liberate the
dominated rump Yugoslavia. Even aftermaking this Serb regions in Croatia and the JNA garrisons
decision , however, Kadijevic would continue to raise deep inside Croatian territory. To that end,
the question of a restorative military offensive and the intersect Croatia along the lines Gradiska
generalmobilization required to sustain it,much to the Virovitica, Bihac-Karlovac-Zagreb, Knin -Zadar,
dismay and displeasure of Milosevic and Jovic. and Mostar-Split. Liberate Eastern Slavonia
using the strongest grouping of armored -mecha
nized forces, and then quickly continue opera
JNA War Planning* tions westward , hook up with forces in Western
Slavonia and continue on toward Zagreb and
Kadijevic and the JNA General Staff's strategic offen Varazdin , that is toward the Slovene border. At
sive plan — probably planned in the spring of 1991 and the same time, impose a land blockade on
actually launched in September - called for slicing up Dubrovnik with strong forces from the Herceg
Croatia and defeating it militarily to compel the sur Novi-Trebinje region and penetrate the Neretva
render of the Croatian political leadership and the valley, thus working together with the forces
renegotiation of a Yugoslav confederation.43 A key moving along the Mostar - Split line;
objective added in September was to relieve all the
JNA barracks blockaded by the Croatians. As noted -after achieving specific objectives, secure and
earlier, the aims of the strategic plan exceeded and hold the border of Serb Krajina in Croatia, with
conflicted with Milosevic's war aim of a rump draw the remaining parts of the JNA from Slove
45
Serbian -led Yugoslavia .Milosevic wanted the JNA to nia , and then withdraw the JNA from Croatia.4

* For a detailed breakdown of the individual campaign plans that

comprised the strategic offensive, plus JNA orders of battle, see
Annex 13: JNA Campaign Plans and Organization , July-September
1991.

97
 -mobilizing, preparing the mobilized or addi Mobilization and the Political-Military Conflict ,
tional units, and deploying them would take 10 September- December 1991"
to 15 days, depending on the units ' level of
combat readiness and their distance from the The failure of the mobilization process to support their
deployment positions. offensive plan against Croatia impelled the JNA
leaders to demand that the combined federal/Serbian
In the JNA's view , Croatia carved up in this way political leadership authorize a " generalmobiliza
" would be on the brink of capitulation ." 46 But tion ," which would have allowed them to call up
Kadijevic provided no timetable for the JNA'S whomever they needed to fill the empty spaces in their
achievement of these objectives nor any contingency campaign plans. The military leaders ' demand for
plans for a less -than -total offensive . In the event, the general mobilization became the issue on which the
plan would founder on the twin rocks of civilian continuing differences between Kadijevic and the Ser
opposition at the top and, at the bottom , a lack of bian leadership over war aimswould be played out for
enthusiasm for combat among Serbian conscripts and the rest of the war. Again and again Milosevic and
reservists . Jovic would emphatically reject Kadijevic's demands
to call up the men needed for the JNA war plans,
refusing to give the JNA the means to escalate a war
Mobilization and the Failure of the Strategic in pursuit of goals that they did not believe in or con
Offensive sider achievable . Only after the JNA offensive against
Croatia had failed did Kadijevic, on 9 October, for
Failing to intimidate the Croatians with their prelimi mally bow to the demands ofMilosevic and Jovic ,
nary callup in July, the JNA ordered the second phase accepting as the JNA's sole strategic objective the
ofmobilization for the strategic offensive on 15 Sep defense of the Serb regions. He and the JNA would
tember in response to the Croatian attacks against its continue to agitate for broadermobilization , plainly
barracks. But the wholesale refusal of many reservists showing their continued desire to coerce Croatia back
to respond , the desertion ofmany others, and a distinct into the Federation . Milosevic would finally quash the
lack of enthusiasm among the Serbs who did respond JNA's agitation for the complete defeat of the Croatian
would leave many of the formations earmarked for the forces after the capture of Vukovar, vetoing the JNA's
offensive without enough men to field them . The JNA plan to continue its offensive drive toward Zagreb . It
had carefully prepared campaign plans for each of five was the JNA's unwillingness to accept Milosevic's
operations areas predicated on a specific number of design from the start that embroiled the Army in a far
combat brigades arriving. The mobilization disaster more bitter, fruitless , and damaging war than would
severely undercut these plans, which would have to be otherwise have been the case.
launched without the required number of formations,
and some operationswould have to be abandoned .
Even in the vital sector of Eastern Slavonia , where the The JNA Offensive Against Croatia , September
JNA had planned its major effort, not nearly enough December 1991
infantry would arrive , crippling the entire offensive .
The lack of sufficient infantry formationswasmore When the Croatian Government launched its Septem
than a blow to the JNA's offensive plan ; their absence ber 14-15 offensive against the JNA's barracks in
represented a shattering of the JNA's will to fight, Croatia, the JNA General Staff activated the follow -on
which cascaded throughout the Army. The chaos mobilization for its strategic offensive and began
caused by the country's breakup, combined with the
colossal failure of their well- laid plans, ultimately * For a more detailed discussion of the impactof the mobilization
melted the confidence even of Kadijevic and the JNA failures and the political-military conflict, as well as the internal
high command. army debate over what its goals should have been , see Annex 15 :
Mobilization and the JNA -Serbian Political-Military Conflict, and
Annex 16 : What is the Goal?—JNA vs. JNA: The Army Debates
* For a detailed discussion of the mobilization problems and their its Role and Future.
impact on the Army, see Annex 14 :Mobilization and the Failure of
the Strategic Offensive, September-December 1991.

98
preparations for its execution , with the five main The Battle of Vukovar: Croatia Stymies the JNA *
campaigns kicking off as follows:
Initially, the JNA FirstMilitary District's objective in
• The Eastern Slavonia operation began on Eastern Slavonia- Baranja was to break through
20 September, under the command of the First Croatian forces on the Osijek - Vinkovci line and drive
Military District, about a week after mobilization . for Western Slavonia , where it would link up to the
Simultaneously with the start of the Croatian 5th (Banja Luka) Corps. In pursuit of this goal, the
offensive, however, the JNA had initiated a small plan appears to have called for the 12th (Novi Sad )
scale operation on 14 September to relieve the Corps to move between Osijek and Vinkovci,
Vukovar barracks. Unplanned and presumably unin probably toward Nasice, while the 1st Guards Mecha
tended by the JNA , this “ small-scale " attack became nized Division pushed south of Vinkovci. The 17th
its main effort and would consume it for the next (Tuzla ) Corps probably was to cross the Sava River in
two months. the Croatian rear between Bosanski Samac and
Bosanski/Slavonski Brod , link up to the Guards, and
• The 5th (Banja Luka) Corps' Western Slavonia then push west along the Belgrade-Zagreb highway.
operation appears to have begun between
23 September and 5 October, as reserve formations The campaign fell apart almost immediately as JNA
arrived from Bosnia . forces bogged down in their attempt to reduce the
Croatian -held town of Vukovar. The JNA initially
• The Kordun operation toward Karlovac never really attacked Vukovar to relieve the barracks there and dis
got under way, and operations by the JNA Fifth Mil pose of the threat the town's defenders would pose to
itary District and the Croatian Serb TO were limited the rear of the main JNA operation . As Vukovar
essentially to local actions to consolidate their con sucked in more and more JNA forces — including all
trol around Karlovac and the JNA barracks there . of the ill-suited armor-mechanized units previously
This included a campaign in October-November to earmarked for themain operation — the battle became
eliminate the large Croatian -held pocket near the a political symbol to both Belgrade and Zagreb of
town of Slunj. In addition, JNA forces undertook their determination to achieve military victory . The
local operations in Banija and Lika. JNA's failure to seize the town despite its overwhelm
ing force would be a dispiriting embarrassment to the
• JNA 9th (Knin ) Corps forces earmarked for the federal cause, while the Croatian forces' prolonged
Knin -Zadar operation were already fully mobilized resistance became an inspiration and rallying point for
and ready to move when the Croatians attacked the the troops and people of Croatia. When the JNA
JNA barracks, and so the JNA operation here began finally captured Vukovar in mid -November after two
on 16 September. months of intense fighting, theirs was a Pyrrhic vic
tory. The siege had completely disrupted the timetable
• JNA mobilization problems and difficulties in for the JNA's strategic offensive and dissipated the
Bosnia -Herzegovina paralyzed the Mostar-Split last of the JNA's prewar spirit , which had already
portion of the Mostar- Split/Dubrovnik operation ,
and it nevermaterialized . The Dubrovnik subopera
tion began on 1 October, following themobilization For a detailed accountof the Battle of Vukovar, see Annex 17:
ofMontenegrin -based JNA forces and the Eastern Slavonia -Baranja Operations — The Road to Vukovar. This
annex also discusses the JNA's use of volunteer troops, including
Montenegrin TO . the infamous Serbian Volunteer Guard , Arkan's Tigers .

99
suffered catastrophic damage in Slovenia and in the sort out the chaos that had paralyzed JNA operations
battles for the Croatian barracks. in the battle , establishing new headquarters and clari
fying responsibilities in an attempt to bring order and
In Vukovar, the Croatian ZNG and MUP, under the discipline to the chain of command. With the rein
leadership of Mile Dedakovic and his chief of staff, forcements , the JNA, including volunteer and local
Branko Borkovic , constructed an urban defense maze TO formations, now had more than 36,000 combat
that was able to confound the JNA for over two troops around Vukovar. This otherwise impressive
months. The arrival of these two commanders in late force , however, was ill suited for the operation at
August brought structure to a previously disorganized hand . The JNA's armor-mechanized units, designed
force , as they formed a single brigade from the local for high -speed open combat, could barely enter the
village guard forces . Even with reinforcements , town's narrow streets, and the ill- trained and poorly
Dedakovic and Borkovic (who took command in mid- motivated TO troops were no substitute for regular
October) had only 2,000 to 2,300 ZNG andMUP infantry .
troops with which to hold the city. They were able to
do this against the JNA's armor- heavy , infantry -poor The new attack , directed by the newly formed Opera
force through the creation of an integrated defense tionalGroup South , went in on 30 September and
system that featured large-scale mining of approach slowly gained ground against the Croatian defenders.
routes, roving antitank teams, ubiquitous snipers, and A Croatian counterattack hit the overextended JNA
heavily fortified defensive strongholds. Strong coun units on 3 October, driving them back almost to their
terattacks were usually able to throw back the JNA's start line . Notwithstanding this reverse, the supporting
often isolated spearheads after the Croatian defenses attack had all but severed the Croatians' resupply
had worn them down. route . OperationalGroup North’s follow -on attack
two weeks later against the key suburb of Borovo
There had already been clashes around the JNA's Vuk- Naselje on the northern side of Vukovar also pene
ovar barracks in late August, but the battle proper trated the Croatian defenses but bogged down against
began on 14 September when the JNA sent a small stiffening resistance.
force into the town to raise the blockade of the bar
racks. Troops from the 1stGuards Mechanized Divi It was during this second battle that the JNA intro
sion quickly broke through to the barracks, but efforts duced a new force into the war — volunteer units .
over the next two weeks to cut the Croatians ' narrow These were recruited to fill the gaps in the Army's
resupply corridor from Vinkovci and clear the city ranks that should have been occupied by trained
failed to gain much ground. reservists who had failed to appear for mobilization .
The men for these company- and battalion -sized
While this fighting was going on, newly mobilized detachments , recruited with the assistance of the
troops of the Guards Division began an attack to Serbian MUP, came primarily from Serbian nationalist
relieve the besieged barracks at Vinkovci, clearing political parties and clubs. It was an action that the
many of the villages south of Vukovar in the process . JNA, imbued as it was with Communist and federalist
These units would then be able to reinforce JNA ideals, would have considered unthinkable only weeks
troops engaged at Vukovar while providing a secure before . The untrained volunteers were often motivated
area from which one part of the main JNA effort to the by xenophobic zeal against the Croatians, but the
west could be launched . The Guards units quickly same qualities thatmade them savage fighters turned
reached Vinkovci, forcing the Croatians to permit the them into undisciplined looters of captured areas and
evacuation of its barracks on 25 September. Other the scourge ofCroatian civilians, who suffered numer
forces eventually seized the areas south of Vukovar, ous atrocities at their hands. Their use would become
although with more difficulty. an ugly, ineradicable stain on the JNA's escutcheon .

The arrival of additional reinforcements allowed the In addition to taking on the volunteers, the JNA had to
JNA forces around Vukovar to prepare a new opera face up to and deal with its own operational and tacti
tion to seize the town. They had a new leader — Lieu cal failings at Vukovar. The campaign to seize Vuko
tenant ColonelGeneral Zivota Panic — who had taken var was haphazardly coordinated at the operational
command of the First Military District. Panic tried to level during the first two phases of the battle and was

100
-

-- -
effectively orchestrated only during the last round . For proper. By 15 November, Borkovic's brigade had been
most of the campaign , federal forces were tactically chopped into disjointed bands. The remnants of the
inept at the vicious street fighting thattypified every force surrendered on 18 November ; a very few ,
attempted advance. Their lack of urban warfare train including Borkovic and some other officers and men ,
ing and the reservists ' general lack of any training at managed to burrow out of the town after it fell .
all compounded the difficulties caused by the JNA'S
inappropriate force mixture and by its poor coordina The Croatians' ZNG 204th Vukovar Brigade, together
tion of the several arms. The size of the federal force , with the MUP Special Police , lost over 60 percent of
particularly the large number of armored vehicles, had their strength in the vicious fighting. Almost 1,500 of
in fact inhibited JNA operations against the town. The the 2,000 to 2,300 defenders became casualties, and
confines of the city prevented the Army from deploy some 300 of the wounded were executed after the bat
ing its combat power effectively,while its lack of tle by units and individuals from the JNA , volunteer,
infantry was a basic flaw . As fighting continued , the and TO forces. Total deaths, including civilians, may
JNA's tactical doctrine evolved, and it brought in more have numbered as many as 4,000 to 5,000 persons.
infantry, including elite units , and gradually shifted
away from an armor-led advance to an infantry -led The loss of the town , and the apparently minimal
one. All its attacks, however, employed intense fire efforts by Croatian political and military authorities to
power that wreaked massive destruction throughout relieve the siege, raised bitter recriminations between
Vukovar. For its successful final phase in November, the town's commanders and President Tudjman's gov
the JNA at last integrated all its arms effectively , ernment. Only two relief operations had been
including the engineer support crucial to an advance attempted , one in mid -October and the other just
through a heavily damaged town littered with mines. before the town's fall, and they appear to have been
The Air Force hardly figured in the fighting, lacking halfhearted affairs that gained little ground. Neither
pilots trained and drilled in close -support tactics . attack appears to have had much effect on the JNA
Well-trained infantry and engineers, supported rather forces constricting Vukovar. Dedakovic, Borkovic ,
than led by armor and backed by strongmortar and and the town's civilian leader complained publicly
artillery fire, finally overcame the defenders and took before and after the loss of the town , railing at
the battered town . Zagreb's failures and refusals to provide more relief .
The protests brought Dedakovic and Borkovic arrest
It was General Panic and the First Military District by the military police as Tudjman and his government
staff who finally devised a plan , using the lessons the moved to contain the political fallout from the com
JNA had learned over the past month , that won the manders ' charges. The charges were perfectly valid
elusive victory of Vukovar. In the earlier attempts, but, in the larger context of Croatia's overall defense,
attacks had been disjointed , single -sector affairs that irrelevant. Vukovar's defenders wonderfully disrupted
had allowed Dedakovic , (and after mid -October , the JNA's main offensive, derailing its strategic plan
Borkovic ) to focus Croatian resources on each narrow to rapidly seize Eastern Slavonia and drive toward the
advance. This time, the JNA and the TO conducted capital at Zagreb . Ironically, their own success in
coordinated attacks in several key areas at once ,while diverting and holding back the JNA's main offensive
severing the link between Vukovar town and the ensured that Dedakovic and Borkovic would get only
stronghold at Borovo Naselje. Operational Group minimal reinforcement: the town was strategically
South's main drive , on the south side of town, kicked expendable , and its unexpectedly stout defense by its
off on 30-31 October, grinding its way through the own people spared General Tus the necessity of
streets. Fighting raged for possession of a key hilltop diverting his scarce regular units to slow down the
until 9 November,when JNA troops finally seized it. JNA .
Meanwhile , elite JNA troops on 3 November carried
out a surprise river crossing, linking up to “ Arkan's After Vukovar fell,General Panic moved his powerful
Tigers ” —the elite Serbian Volunteer Guard — and cut forces into position to continue the strategic offensive ,
ting off Borovo Naselje. Even so , OperationalGroup which Vukovar had delayed for two months. JNA 12th
North did not completely reduce the suburb until Corps troops, spearheaded by Arkan's Tigers, began
16 November. To the south , JNA, volunteer, and TO their effort to break through the key Osijek -Vinkovci
troops systematically cleared the center of Vukovar defense line defended by the Croatian 1st Osijek

101
Operational Zone on 20 November, seizing several The JNA's failures to achieve its campaign objectives
key villages and spreading dismay in Osijek . and the Croatian defensive successes and offensive
Although fighting would continue along the line until victories were a huge boost for Zagreb , militarily,
January , the JNA drive soon slowed to a halt. politically, and strategically.49 First, the victories dem
Milosevic had come to the end of his patience with the onstrated Zagreb's growing military prowess, particu
JNA, and now he forced the high command to call off larly in the aftermath of Vukovar; strengthened
General Panic. The Yugoslavia of the JNA was dead , President Tudjman's hand in his political battles with
and the Serbian President was not going to let the hardliners; and helped Croatia internationally in the
army escalate the war for stakes he considered ongoing peace talks.Most important, the destruction
unwinnable . 47 of the Serb -held salient, which had threatened the
lines of communication to Eastern Slavonia , greatly
improved Croatia's strategic position . Without its
Western Slavonia : Croatia Strikes Back * removal and with federal forces holding some 30 per
cent of the country, Eastern Slavonia - one of the
About a week after the initial JNA assault to relieve country's most populous and important regions
the Vukovar barracks, the JNA injected itself fully would have remained in peril.
into the Serb -Croat fighting in Western Slavonia ,
which had been sputtering since early August. The Looking past 1991, Croatia's recapture ofmost of the
JNA 5th (Banja Luka) Corps's mission was to aban Serbian Autonomous Region of Western Slavonia
don its nominal peacekeeping role and launch a drive took much of the steam out of the Serb separatist
north from the Sava River, through the towns of movement in the area , though the Serbs retained a
Daruvar and Pakrac, toward Virovitica on the toehold between Pakrac and the Sava River. Western
Croatian -Hungarian border to cut off Eastern Slavonia Slavonia was to prove the weakest portion , both polit
from the rest of Croatia.48 The corps would then await ically and militarily , of the emerging Republic of Serb
the arrival of First Military District forces driving Krajina (RSK ). Over the next four years, it would
west from Osijek -Vinkovci. After somemodest initial cause Zagreb less embarrassment than the other parts
gains in the operation, Croatian ZNG and MUP units of the RSK . The region would be ripe for the taking
were able to contain combined JNA and TO forces in when Zagreb moved militarily in 1995 to complete
the triangle Novska- Pakrac-Nova Gradiska. Fighting what it had started against the JNA in 1991.
degenerated into a succession of inconclusive clashes
around the three towns, with the struggle for Pakrac
and the villages around its approaches becoming par Battles Elsewhere: Consolidating Greater Serbia **
ticularly intense . Then , in late October, the Croatians
struck back . The 2nd Bjelovar Operational Zone In the Banija , Kordun , and Lika regions of Croatia ,
launched an offensive against TO positions, which only Karlovac had any importance for the JNA . The
were unsupported by regular JNA troops , near the fighting touched off by the JNA offensive allowed the
town of Podravska Slatina and the Bilogora moun Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina to consolidate
tains, well north of Pakrac near Virovitica . The attack the gains it had made in the region during the spring
drove some TO troops and a large number of Serb and summer of 1991 , paving the way for the creation
civiliansback toward federal forces around Pakrac. of the Republic of Serb Krajina. There were no major
After a period of back -and- forth fighting, a final battles like Vukovar,but TO formations backed by a
Croatian offensive in mid -December completely elim few JNA units managed to squeeze the remaining
inated the TO -held salient north of Pakrac and even Croatian forces out of an arc stretching from Petrinja
took some ground held by the JNA near the town . The
Croatian forces ,however, were too few to try to expel * For detailed accounts of the fighting in Banija -Lika-Kordun and
the Zadar - Northern Dalmatia regions, see Annex 19 : Banija
JNA troops entirely from the region . Kordun -Lika - Consolidating Greater Serbia and Annex 20:
Zadar -Northern Dalmatia Operations — The Knin Corps Attacks.
* For a detailed account of the fighting in Western Slavonia , see
Annex 18: Western Slavonia Operations — Croatia Strikes Back.

102
-
 -

to Gracac . The most significant event in these The Siege of Dubrovnik : History Under Fire *
operations was the capture of the town of Slunj in
November. This created a link between whatwas to be In the West, the JNA's siege of Dubrovnik , the farthest
the northern half of the RSK centered around Petrinja distant city in Croatia , was one of the war's most visi
Karlovac and the southern portion near Knin . Despite ble and inexplicable events.Why the JNA undertook
this Serb success , Croatian forces from the 3rd Zagreb the operation in the first place was difficult to discern ,
and 4th Karlovac Operational Zones managed to and the destruction of architecture and art of the his
establish and maintain a solid defensive line, but their toric city was impossible to justify. Of the two ques
counteroffensives from October through December tions, why did the JNA attack and why was the
achieved only minor successes. The only JNA cam Dubrovnik area subjected to looting and destruction ,
paign originally planned in the area (at Karlovac) as the answer to the first is the easier. The JNA's strategic
part of the Army's strategic offensive was stillborn plan to carve up Croatia called for one operation to
when mobilization failed to produce the combat bri sever Southern Dalmatia from the rest of Croatia and
gades earmarked for the operation . blockade the port of Dubrovnik at its tip . Objections
that the area had no Serb population miss the point
Further south , in Northern Dalmatia , JNA forces ful that the military purpose of the JNA offensive was the
filled their role in the strategic offensive , while defeat of Croatia; succoring the Croatian Serbs was a
expanding the SAO Krajina and consolidating its secondary and largely political objective . There is no
defenses . Already in an offensive mode, the JNA 9th satisfactory answer to the second question : Why did
(Knin ) Corps , with General Vladimir Vukovic now in TO and volunteer troops and the JNA itself indulge in
command butMladic still as his chief of staff, went such gross looting and shelling on the nonmilitary
over to the attack immediately after the start of the portions of the region ? As in earlier ages of warfare,
Croatian barracks blockade . Their main role in the when such acts were more common, blamecan be put
JNA strategic offensive was to finish cutting off Dal on the recruiting of volunteers from the dregs of soci
matia from northern Croatia while relieving besieged ety and on the greed and envy of the conquerors left
JNA barracks in Zadar and Sibenik . The 9th Corps unchecked by proper discipline. Whatever the rea
unauthorized capture of the Maslenica bridge , pre sons, international reaction to the military operation
empting the start of the barracks war, had already and its associated looting and destruction degraded the
achieved most of the corps's primary goal. The initial reputation of the Serb nation and deepened the politi
corps operations therefore focused on relief of the bar cal isolation of the Belgrade government.
racks, the accomplishment of which would also cut
the Dalmatian coastal road. Toward this end, in mid From a purely military viewpoint, it was a fairly
September JNA troops , supported by TO units, straightforward campaign .General Pavle Strugar's
quickly breached Croatian defenses around Zadar, and Operational Group 2 , composed almost exclusively of
by early October the Croatian authorities in Zadar had Montenegrin troops , had launched its offensive on
to let the JNA garrison leave the city with all of its 1 October. One arm , led by the 2nd ( Titograd) Corps ,
equipment. An operation to relieve Sibenik , however, swung through a corner of Bosnia and descended to
was halted by a last- ditch Croatian defense just short positions north of the city to cut it off from the rest of
of the city. After the opening round of JNA attacks Croatia. This attack faced strong resistance from rela
ended in early -to -middle October, the fighting sub tively well-organized ZNG troops whose strength
sided into infrequent and indecisive firefights , punctu increased over the next two months. The other axis,
ated by occasional JNA/ TO operations to gain key
local positions. Overall, the 9th Corps commanders For a detailed account of the Dubrovnik operation , see Annex
21: Dubrovnik - Southern Dalmatia Operations.
had demonstrated exceptional leadership , and Croat
ian forces had proved unable to stop the combination
of well-led units backed by strong armor and
artillery.50

103
commanded by the 9th (Boka Kotorska)Military The JNA had to acknowledge publicly that the looting
Maritime Sector (9th VPS ), advanced directly toward and destruction were beyond military justification .
the city from bases near Kotor Bay, some 35 kilome The 9th VPS commander, AdmiralMiodrag Jokic ,
ters to the south . By 27 October, Dubrovnik was at the attributed the excesses to volunteer units that had been
mercy of the JNA, whose troops had encircled the ill hastily organized and inadequately led . This acknowl
defended city and controlled most of the heights com edgment dodges the fact that the scale and scope of
manding it. Local Croatian ZNG and MUP units had the excesses were such that JNA regular and reserve
neither the numbers nor the firepower to halt the troops and some of their senior commanders had to
JNA's advance, and JNA artillery could shell the city have been involved as well.52
at will; nevertheless the Croatian Government rejected
a JNA proposal that it demilitarize the city in So why did the looting occur on such a scale ? Clearly ,
exchange for a guarantee that JNA troops would not the operational-level commanders in 9th VPS and
enter it. Willy -nilly, round after round of firefights and likely the 2nd Corps were unable or unwilling to
artillery barrages ensued as the JNA methodically enforce proper discipline on their subordinates,
advanced on the city and grabbed additional hills, although Admiral Jokic mentioned one instance in
until a cease -fire was agreed to on 7 December. which the JNA attempted to purge a formation of
problem personnel.53 The high percentage of reservist
No matter themilitary results, the JNA's campaign in and volunteer formations undoubtedly posed a corps
the Dubrovnik area will be remembered for the whole wide discipline problem , and the peasant Montenegrin
sale looting perpetrated by JNA reservists and the soldiers could hardly avoid envying their wealthier
shelling of Dubrovnik and its old town by JNA artil urban neighbors of the Dubrovnik beaches when they
lery . The outrage evoked in world public opinion by encountered them or their property . Faced with unfa
television coverage, photography, and journalist miliar wealth , poor soldiers of any army will be
reports reinforced the view , already prominent after tempted first to pilfer, then to steal, and finally to loot
Vukovar, that federal forces, and later the Serbs as a and destroy unless checked by their immediate superi
nation , were barbarians aggressively bent on subjugat ors. In Dubrovnik , junior officers took part in , encour
ing Croatia , destroying priceless treasures in the aged , and led the looting. Finally, centuries ofwarfare
process . This certainly played a major role in the inter and banditry would have imbued many of the peasant
national diplomatic and economic isolation imposed soldiers with the conviction that they were entitled to
on Belgrade. the possessions of their vanquished enemies .

The looting was exceptionally thorough . The Mon The JNA's shelling of Dubrovnik's clearly civilian
tenegrin reservists of the 9th VPS stripped the Konavli areas , and in particular its historic buildings, along
plateau and the resort hotels southeast of Dubrovnik with seemingly excessive destruction visited upon
bare. Misha Glenny writes : various nonstrategic targets ,require somewhatmore
complex explanations. Incidents like the systematic
From the minute we crossed into Croatia , the destruction of pleasure boats in the Dubrovnik marina
work ofthe Montenegrins became all too visible. by wire -guided antitank missiles were beyond any jus
They had plundered and burned every single tifiable level of violence.54 Fire directed against build
house . Each was pock -marked with bullets or ings and facilities not being used for military purposes
left with gaping holes from mortars or grenades falls in the samemalicious category, for the same rea
... There were no contents left in any of the sons as looting. Blame for the much - condemned shell
houses, everything had been taken by the ing of Dubrovnik's old town ,however, is not as easy
marauding reservists. This is what had moti
vated the Montenegrins ... Each village was a
shrine to the animal instincts of these young
51
men .

104
-
-
to fix . GeneralKadijevic has claimed that Croatian unable to fulfill the Croatian objective and unwilling
units misused the old town to shell JNA positions,55 to try . It would take three and a half years and another
and Misha Glenny, observing Croatian artillery and war before a resurgent Croatian Army would make
gun positions on Dubrovnik's city walls, concluded good Zagreb's claim to a reintegrated Croatia .
that the Croatians were “ cunningly exploiting interna
tional outrage for military purposes.” 56 Kadijevic still
absurdly claims the old town was not hit, but he and The EC /Carrington Negotiations Fail
AdmiralMiodrag Jokic have also cited some local
commanders of artillery and heavy weapons com Throughout the fighting, the EC -sponsored peace con
manders for exceeding their authority. Kadijevic in ference at The Hague, which began on 7 September,
fact claims that he had issued an “ explicit order” continued its efforts to compose a general political
establishing a stop line around Dubrovnik outside of settlement to end the fighting and restore peace.* The
mortar andmedium -range artillery beyond which JNA chairman of the conference , Lord Carrington, put
units were not to pass. Kadijevic states he did this together a peace plan focusing on the six republics as
because , if JNA units closed up toward the city , they the constituent elements of the former Yugoslavia
would either respond to fire from Croatian troops in not on the different nationalities, as the Serbian lead
Dubrovnik and be blamed , or not return fire and suffer ership wanted . Carrington's plan would have allowed
unnecessary losses. Nevertheless, Kadijevic notes each republic to choose different levels of cooperation
that, “ despite multiple warnings,” some units crossed in new , confederal institutions. 58 The Serbian leader
the line. The heavy 6 December shelling of ship formally rejected this plan in mid -October, prob
Dubrovnik , apparently in retaliation for a Croatian ably because it did not allow for all Serbs to live in
firing incident, illustrates Kadijevic's point. one state ,which Milosevic and Jovic had set as their
primary objective. In addition , it essentially dis
Chapter 12 solved the existing Federal Republic , preventing
Ending the War: The Vance Plan 57 Serbia and Montenegro from claiming that their feder
ation was the legitimate successor to the old one.60
The end to the Croatian war came in January 1992. Although the conference sputtered on , the Serbian
The Serbian Government's recognition that it had objections blocked all paths to a solution .
achieved its essential war aims, combined with a real
ization on both sides that any gains from continued Balked by Serbian substantive disagreements with the
fighting would come at an increasing price, allowed plan , Carrington had the rug pulled out from under the
UN mediator Cyrus Vance to orchestrate an armistice conference altogether with the EC's decision in
backed by a United Nations peacekeeping force. It December to recognize Croatia and Slovenia in Janu
was only the recognition that the agreement did not ary . What had principally kept Croatia and Slovenia
represent a final political settlement, however, that engaged in the negotiations was the prospect that they
overcame irreconcilable differences and allowed the would gain international recognition once a compre
UN troops to be deployed . Broad interpretations ofthe hensive settlement was agreed to . The unilateral EC
UN mission permitted both sides to claim victory, in decision to recognize the two states removed any
the belief that the terms of the agreement fulfilled incentive for them to continue serious talks and put
their own objectives while prohibiting those of their the final nail in The Hague Conference's coffin .
enemy. The Serbs claimed that the agreement allowed
for local governments — including their new statelet,
See Chapter 10 for a discussion ofthe start of the conference.
the Republic of Serbian Krajina — to continue as they
were until a final settlement. This would lock in Serb
gains while providing little incentive for the Serbs to
compromise in political negotiations . The Croatians
believed that the UN would restore Croatian sover
eignty in the Serb - held areas, but the UN proved

105
Serbia Moves To End the War neither Croatian nor JNA regular forces entered the
protected areas. In addition , all displaced persons
Real progress toward ending the fighting came only were to be allowed to return to their homes.66
after the Serbian political leaders concluded that their
war aims of achieving military control over Serb areas
in Croatia had been fulfilled. Uninterested in the The Deal Almost Comes Unstuck
JNA's aim of a defeated and subdued Croatia , they
were more willing than the JNA commanders to con Both Zagreb and the Croatian Serbs still had objec
sider moving to a negotiated solution once their own ions to the deal, however, and they nearly caused the
objectives had been attained . By early November, Vance Plan to come apart early in 1992 before UN
Milosevic and Jovic had concluded the time was ripe troops arrived . The Serbs , led by Krajina Serb Presi
to lock in the federal and Serb gains by requesting dent Babic , had objected , as soon as the potentialUN
deployment of UN peacekeeping troops to halt and deployment plan becamepublic in December, to the
prevent further fighting pending the achievement of a provision of UN peacekeepers in place of the JNA
general political settlement.62 troops in Croatia . From Babic's perspective , the
removal of the JNA meant de facto acceptance of
Croatian sovereignty over the newly formed Republic
The UN Moves Toward a Cease - Fire of Serbian Krajina (RSK ) and was unacceptable.67
Until the Serb objections were overcome, the UN
The UN's special envoy for Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance , refused to deploy its troops. Milosevic and the Fed
began shuttling the Yugoslav proposal between Bel eral/Serbian leadership used every means they could
grade and Zagreb during November and December, devise to pressure their erstwhile clients, the RSK
trying to gain agreement on an interim peace plan and Government, into acceptance. Theirmaneuvers culmi
the deployment of UN troops to oversee it.63 Vance nated in an all-Serb conference in Belgrade at the end
made gradual headway in his negotiations, and by of January at which the Krajina leaders were made to
1 January both sides had accepted what came to be feel the weight of the entire Serb nation , while
known as the “ Vance Plan ." 64 On 2 January, Croatian Milosevic and Jovic attempted to isolate the adamant
Defense Minister Gojko Susak and the JNA Fifth Mil Babic.68 After the conference, Belgrade tried to follow
itary District deputy commander, General Andrija up its “ victory " with votes in the RSK Assembly to
Raseta , signed a cease -fire in Sarajevo — the 15th so ratify the plan and sideline Babic . The parliamentary
far — to go into effect the next day.65 Unlike any of the maneuvers descended into farce as Milosevic and
previous 14 , this one held . Babic supporters paraded comically from one building
to another to stage counterassembly meetings atwhich
The Vance Plan was crafted to stop the fighting in one side and then the other proclaimed its legitimacy.
Croatia and allow negotiations for a comprehensive Babic was “ officially " replaced on 27 February by
peace agreement without the pressures of battlefield Goran Hadzic , the Serb leader in Eastern Slavonia .
events influencing the talks. The agreement did not Even while the rumblings continued , Milosevic some
presuppose any specific outcome to the negotiations. how managed to muzzle the Babic opposition and
The plan called initially for the deployment of some guarantee that the RSK would accept the UN troops
10,000 UN peacekeeping troops , designated the UN and comply with the peace plan .
Protection Force (UNPROFOR ) to establish three
(later four) UN Protected Areas (UNPA ) in the major The Croatian Governmentmeanwhile objected to the
conflict areas, providing a buffer zone between the role the RSK Government and its local officials would
Serb -controlled zones and Croatian -held territory , have under the plan . It took the position that the UN
while disarming local Serb Territorial Defense units. Protected Areas were sovereign Croatian territory in
The Serb weapons would either be stored under joint which leaders of a secessionist movement should have
UN -Serb control or withdrawn with the JNA. All JNA
units were to leave Croatia . TheUN was to ensure that

106
-

-- -
no authority. The Zagreb government rightly worried Mortgaging Croatia's Future *
that the UN zoneswould allow the RSK to consolidate
its power in occupied Croatia, leaving little or no Despite the UN deployment, and even because of it,
incentive for Belgrade and the Krajina Serbs to agree broader peace talks to settle the issues broached and
to a more comprehensive peace . The Croatians, left unresolved by the war would become a three-year
although they continued to proclaim their rejection of exercise in futility. As the Croatians feared, the UN
any local role for Serb leaders, eventually, as a tempo- troops effectively secured the existence of the RSK
rary measure ,made a de facto acknowledgment of the just as JNA peacekeeping troops had allowed Croatian
RSK Government situation , while refusing to negoti Serb separatists in the summer of 1991 to consolidate
ate on equal terms with any Croatian Serb representa their Serbian Autonomous Regions. Concerned that
tives. In their view , the only parties to the plan were the situation would continue indefinitely, Zagreb in
Zagreb , Belgrade, and the UN . 1993mounted a number of military probes to focus
international attention and seize important local objec
One final area of contention was never settled but tives . In reaction, the UNPAs' demilitarized condition
would delay and hinder the implementation of the evaporated as SVK troops retrieved their stored weap
plan seemingly in perpetuity . This was the status of ons and manned the old confrontation line. Negotia
several key frontline areas that remained outside the tions in the aftermath of these clashes partially
defined UNPA lines , and thus would nominally have restored the ground seized by Croatia , but no arrange
fallen under Croatian Government rule . The Krajina ment could be found that satisfied both sides ' require
Serb Army ( former TO , now Srpska vojske krajine ments for security and sovereignty . Over time, Zagreb
SVK ) and the JNA controlled these areas, later lost patience with the international negotiators and
dubbed " pink zones ," and the RSK refused to remove with the Serbs and resolved to settle the matter by
its forces from them out of concern for their Serb resi- force. As Babic had feared and argued , the departure
dents.69 The Croatians, however, refused to modify the of the JNA " peacekeepers ” left the Croatian Serbs
" borders” of any of the sectors. Despite persistent defenseless against a revitalized Croatian Army, and
worry that the issue would upset RSK compliance in the summer of 1995 the RSK would pass out of
with its demilitarization requirements, in the event existence.
there was no hindrance to the turnover of RSK
weaponry . The status of the " pink zones" remained Chapter 13
unresolved , however, and would bedevil the UN's Outcomes and Evaluation of the Forces
mission over the next year.

Results and Implications

UNPROFOR Arrives
The Croatian war finally brought down the tottering
With the most serious differences papered over and Yugoslav Federal Republic , finishing the job begun by
the truce holding,bar a few skirmishes , UN troops themicrowar in Slovenia. The military stalemate into
began to arrive in country and assume their duties. which the Croatian war congealed was shaped by the
The commander of UNPROFOR , Indian General balance between the strengths and weaknesses of the
Satish Nambiar, arrived to take command on
8 March.70 Over the next twomonths, UN troops
arrived , deployed, and began assuming control over
The military situation in Croatia from 1993 to 1995 and the
the UNPAs. Once its forces were in place, the UN by growth in the capabilities of the Croatian Army, including its sub
fits and starts began to disarm the Krajina Serb Army sequent defeatof the Krajina Serb Army, is discussed in Section
(SVK ).7 By January 1993,most, if notall, heavy VI,Croatia 1993-1994: Biding Its Time, Building Its Army; parts
of Section V ;and Sections VII and III, which cover both Opera
weapons and many of the small armshad been placed tions “ Bljesak” (Flash ) and “Oluja ” (Storm ) in 1995 and theHV's
in the dual-controlled UN /SVK weapon cantonments. operations in Bosnia in 1992.

107
two armies. A series of critical events — the “ Battle of mediation and a major military commitment of
the Barracks,” the JNA-Serbian political-military European troops to the UN peacekeeping force . Thus
conflict, the Battle of Vukovar, and the Siege of began a level of Western engagement in halting the
Dubrovnik - were the turning points that decided the fighting in the former Yugoslavia that would continue
outcome of the war. to deepen through UN deployments to Bosnia , culmi
nating in the Dayton peace agreement and the creation
Once full-scale fighting broke outbetween the of a NATO - led peacekeeping force .
Yugoslav People's Army and Croatian forces in
September 1991, there was no real possibility of put Militarily , the Croatian war had ended in a stalemate
ting Tito's Yugoslavia back together again . Without within months of its eruption , which was a key reason
Croatia, the remaining republics would soon fall away both sides were willing at the end of 1991 to accept a
because none of them were large enough to counter UN -brokered truce and an international peacekeeping
balance Serbia in a rump federation . This dilemma force. Atthat point, although gaining in strength , the
was to have a fatal impact on Croatia's neighboring Croatian forces still lacked the capability to eject the
republic , Bosnia and Herzegovina,held together in the JNA from their territory. Conversely, the JNA could
old federal republic only because of the Serbian notmuster the knockout blow against Zagreb envi
Croatian balance . sioned in its initial strategy without paying a price the
Belgrade leadership was completely unwilling to
Out of the ashes of the war came two new states: the accept. The withdrawal of the JNA and the growth and
internationally recognized Republic of Croatia and the improvements in the Croatian Army were to shift this
minute Republic of Serbian Krajina in the “ occupied balance decisively in Zagreb’s favor by 1995.
territory of the UN Protected Areas. Croatia , with a
large UN peacekeeping force stuck in themiddle ,
would remain one of the hotter spots in former Yugo Evaluation of Federal Forces
slavia over the next three and a half years because of
the Croatian Republic's demand , sounded over and The JNA's overall performance in the Croatian war
over again by President Tudjman , that it regain sover wasmediocre. The upheavals wracking the federation
eignty over the RSK . detracted from any motivation JNA conscripts and
reservists might have summoned to fight a war that
In the war's aftermath , Serbian PresidentMilosevic had no obvious stakes for them , and their dispirited
became the unchallenged leader in what was left of responseshad a domino effect on the Army's capabili
Yugoslavia . The formerly strong federal government ties. In particular, the refusal ofmany Serbian reserv
became a thin facade behind which Milosevic wielded ists to fightin Croatia undercutthe JNA's mobilization
true power.No republics other than tiny Montenegro effort so badly that the implementation of the Army's
remained even to debate him , and the JNA, once a strategic offensive was critically affected .Most of the
politically as well as a militarily potent force , stood men who did respond to the callup received little
humbled by its disgraceful performance in the war. training and less incentive to fight hard and die for the
Yugoslav/Serbian cause , and this further dulled the
As Yugoslavia descended deeper into authoritarian JNA's fighting edge . The JNA's mobilization and
ism , so too did the standing of the Serbian nation motivational problems impelled it to rely more
decline on the world stage. Outrageous conduct by heavily on the poorly trained , ill-disciplined local Serb
Serbian and Serbian -dominated JNA troops, amplified Territorial Defense forces and to form hordes of vol
by Croatian propaganda, created a lasting image of unteer units too often populated by socialmisfits ,
Serbia as an aggressor nation . Serb atrocities in criminals, and other dregs of society . The upper levels
Bosnia would need no magnification to darken the of the JNA splintered along with the country, leaving
deep -dyed image. an officer corps in chaos that, strained by political
military differences over war aims, led to uneven lead
The West, startled by the outbreak ofmilitary clashes ership at all levels of command. With their country
in Slovenia , was aghast when a full- scale Croatian
war, complete with large -scale atrocities, erupted in
Europe . Western horror led to the EC's attempts at

108
breaking up around them , JNA officers had to conduct facilities and arms, including heavy weapons, the
a large and complex strategic offensive with thou Croatians were unable to match their manpower with
sands of ill-trained and poorly motivated conscripts enough heavy firepower to push the JNA out of
and reservists while coping with an evolving political Croatia . The Croatian soldiers were hastily trained ,
situation that often bore heavily on themselves and and, lacking any significant standing military organi
their families. In these circumstances , it is not surpris zations or cadre , it was difficult to weld them quickly
ing that the JNA did not perform as well as had been into cohesive combat units. The individual soldier's
expected of the fourth -largest army in Europe. high motivation, however, helped make up for this
deficiency . Croatian staff work also was poor. This
Nevertheless , the JNA was able to conduct the multi shortcoming in particular kept the ZNG from attempt
corps combat operations of its strategic offensive plan ing many large - scale offensive actions that required a
with somemeasure of success. Sufficient numbers of high degree of skill in planning and execution . In con
the JNA's commanders and staff officers were present trast with the JNA, Croatia had little in the way of a
and available to use their professional skills to orga military logistic structure to start with and little time
nize and move JNA forces to their areas of responsi to develop one. Even after they had bought, found , or
bility and attack , although often only sluggishly . At seized additional arms and ammunition , distributing
.

middle and upper levels, the JNA was able to function the materiel was often haphazard .
almost as expected, though raggedly, because most of
the Serbian andMontenegrin professional officers,
along with some loyal officers from other ethnic Critical Events of the Croatian War
groups, retained enough of the JNA officer corps'
ethos and group cohesion . To compensate for its A succession of key military actions and political
weaknesses in training and personnel at the tactical military debates decisively shaped the course of the
level, the JNA made maximum use of its abundant war and its final denouement. The first of these
firepower, bludgeoning its way through Croatian posi- events , the Croatians ' strategic offensive against the
tions. It was able to support these resource- intensive JNA's military facilities ,began a new phase in the
tactics thanks to a logistic system operating in familiar armed Serbo -Croatian conflict and to a great extent
territory from nearby armories so that there was created a military balance between the forces. It was
always enough ammunition and other supplies coming not until the Croatians launched their barracks offen
forward . sive that the JNA came fully into the conflict against
Croatia , even if Zagreb believed at the time that the
JNA had already sided with the Croatian Serb separat
Evaluation of Croatian Forces ists. The offensive's key significance, however, lay in
the quantum leap in Croatian military capabilities
The key factor in the Croatian forces ' ability to hold resulting from the barracks' seizure . Before the offen
off the JNA during the war was their high morale and sive , the ZNG lacked even the small armsnecessary to
clarity of purpose, believing as they did that they were equip all its organized combat units, let alone any sig
defending their homes against the Serbian “ aggres nificant quantity of heavy weapons. But as the ZNG
sor.” In their own minds, at least, they knew exactly and MUP troops seized JNA depots and barracks in
why they were fighting. This factor, capitalized on by rapid succession , the ZNG acquired enough small
the newly formed Croatian Main Staff in its rapid arms not only to equip its existing formations but also
mobilization and organization of combat brigades, to form and field large numbers of new units. Most
allowed Zagreb's troops to contain , delay , and eventu important, it had obtained its first sizable stocks of
ally halt many of the JNA's individual offensives. armor, artillery, and mortars. Without these weapons,
the ZNG and MUP would have been helpless to with
The ZNG and MUP, however,had many limitations, stand the JNA offensive.
and the more professional and heavily armed JNA
took advantage of them . Despite their seizure of JNA

109
The federal/Serbian efforts to combat the expanding Danube River town turned into a three -month ,
Croatian forces were complicated by a longstanding life -or -death struggle that sucked in nearly all of the
difference between key members of the JNA high combat forces earmarked for the main operation , leav
command and the Serbian political leadership . The ing the offensive beached and gasping. The JNA'S
Serbian leadership - Milosevic and Jovic - believed unseemly inability to take the town quickly from a
in a far simpler set of political objectives or war aims scratch force of defenders damaged the Army's
that would have allowed Croatia to secede from Yugo- already sinking morale and prestige. Then the destruc
slavia without its Serb-populated regions, requiring tion of the town by the application of massed fire
the JNA to defend only those areas. The JNA, how power, the only way the JNA was able to seize it,
ever, dedicated to preventing Croatia from breaking made its belated capture a public relations disaster in
up the federation, ignored Milosevic's and Jovic's the West, further isolating Belgrade and making it
demands to withdraw from most of Croatia and to more difficult for Milosevic to achieve the objectives
hold only the Serb territories. The strategy deemed he cared about. Finally , the battle came to symbolize
necessary to achieve this, necessitating the total defeat the war itself, highlighting the Croatians' valiant
of Croatia's forces and the capitulation of its govern efforts to break away from Yugoslavia and the federa
ment,was far more complex than the essentially tion's determination to stop them by whatevermeans
defensive approach Milosevic and Jovic wanted . It necessary . With neither side willing to yield , the fight
required the JNA to implement a full-blown strategic ing took on a life of its own.
offensive with multicorps combat operations
crisscrossing Croatia to defeat its troops and threaten The Siege of Dubrovnik completed the destruction of
its capital. Despite the political opposition , and in the Belgrade's public image in the West, ensuring that
face of unlooked - for deficiencies in the troops needed Serbia/Yugoslavia would be demonized diplomati
to flesh out the operation , the JNA leaders put this cally and economically for years to come. While con
ponderously difficult offensive in motion as soon as ducting what was otherwise a legitimate military
the Croatians attacked their barracks. Although some campaign to cut off the Dubrovnik area and its port
individual operations succeeded , the offensive as a from the rest of Croatia, troops of the JNA, the
whole was a military , political, and public relations Montenegrin Territorial Defense, and volunteer units
disaster for the JNA . Their failure forced the JNA wantonly looted and burned their way up to the walls
leaders ultimately to accept the Serbian political war of the ancient city . Then the professional artillerists of
aims even while they dealt with the military conse the federal Army shelled it. The television footage and
quences of their failed offensive until the end of the newspaper photography of JNA shells hitting historic
conflict. buildings in cosmopolitan Dubrovnik , while JNA
troops looted the luxury hotels and homes along the
The Battle for Vukovar was the decisive factor in the coast, seared the consciousness of Western journalists,
disruption of the JNA's strategic offensive . The JNA's diplomats, politicians, and their constituencies, burn
plan had called for a massive armored drive from ing into their minds the image of an ignoble aggressor
northern Serbia , past Osijek , and across Slavonia state . The Serbs never recovered from this self
toward Zagreb and northeastern Croatia. Instead , the inflicted wound .
JNA's undertaking to free its barracks in the small

110
 Endnotes, Section II

"German -occupied Serbia was also placed under a puppet govern with Tudjman in an October 1991 interview although he did not
ment led by another Quisling figure,Gen.Milan Nedic , a former explicitly outline the July August chain of events.Mladen Maloca
Yugoslav Army officer who had been dismissed in 1940 for urging and Darko Pavicic , “ Croatia MustGo on the Offensive," Danas
that Yugoslavia join the Axis. Serbia did not, however, adopt Hit 15 October 1991, pp. 21-23.
ler's principles in the manner that Croatia did during its occupa 21 Tudjman was forced to rely on the opposition parties in forming
tion. a new government to help him hold off the rightwing of his own
2 The lower figure of 200,000 is from Glenny, Misha, The Fall of party. See interviews with Dr. Zdravko Tomac, Vice President of
Yugoslavia, p . 81. The higher figure of 600,000 was the “official” the Democratic Reform Party and the then new deputy Prime Min
Yugoslav number,cited as such in Silber and Little , p . 85. A variety ister in Marinko Culic, “Why I joined the Government,” Danas
of other estimates fall in between . 6 August 1991, pp. 13-14 and the then new PrimeMinister Dr.
3 From masovni pokret, or “massmovement." Franjo Greguric, Darko Pavicic, “ Success on the Third Try,"
* Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia : Death of a Nation. Danas 6 August 1991 pp . 16-17 for a discussion of the contentious
Penguin USA . p. 84. assembly meeting.
Silber and Little p . 97 . 22 NewsConference, President Tudjman , Zagreb Radio 5 August
6 Silber and Little p . 95 . 1991.
? Belgrade Tanjug 14 August 1990 ; See also Silber and Little , 23 President Tudjman interview , Zagreb Radio 22 August 1991.
p . 146 , footnote 4 . 24 Borisav Jovic, The Last Days of the SFRY: Daily Notes from the
8 Silber and Little, p . 97. Period 15 May 1989 to 8 July 1992. Belgrade: Politika, 1995, entry
' Belgrade Borba 2 August 1990 p . 8 . for 24 June 1991.
1° Belgrade Domestic Service 3 August 1990 ; Belgrade Tanjug 25 Jovic entry for 27 June 1991.
17 August 1990 . 26 Jovic entry for 5 July 1991.
"I Belgrade Tanjug 17 August 1990. Silber and Little, p . 101. 27 Silber and Little , p . 167 .
12
Although there is no question that autonomy enjoyed strong Serb 28Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia : The Third Balkan War,
support, it is worth noting that the referendum was organized by London : Penguin Books, 1992, p . 97.
29
the SDS, that only Serbs were allowed to vote , and that there was Relatively little fighting occurred between Croatian and Serb
no residency requirement(that is, former Krajina Serbs residing in forces in the Knin - Northern Dalmatia areas during June and July
Serbia or Bosnia could vote as well). 1991;most of it was "border" skirmishes around villages north of
13 By August, Babic controlled atleast the municipalities of Knin , the port city of Sibenik .
Benkovac, Gracac, Donji Lapac, Obrovac, and Korenica, all in 30 The EC peace conference came about as a result of an EC deci
southern Krajina. Belgrade Domestic Service 3 August 1990 . sion on 27 August to send an “ultimatum ” —as Serbian Federal
14 Belgrade Tanjug 13 December 1990; Belgrade Tanjug Presidency member Jovic called it — to Serbia threatening unspeci
19 December 1990; Belgrade Tanjug 5 January 1991. fied action unless it halted JNA and Croatian Serb military action
15 Croatia's ethnic Serbs, with some 12.5 percent of the population, in Croatia. The EC announcement stated that a peace conference
were able to win only five Serbian Democratic Party seats of the would be held with all those in support of the EC arbitration and
356 in the parliament. Effectively, Croatia's Serbs had no represen cease -fire plans. Reuters 27-28 August 1991. The EC cease-fire
tation. Rather than participate to no end, the five Serb deputies proposal stated that,
boycotted
16 the NationalAssembly. all paramilitary forces (except police forces) and irregular units
Belgrade Tanjug 17 May 1990. shall be disarmed and disbanded ;
17Vasiljevic was promoted to Major General (one star) in December • the reserve structure of the Croatian National Guard shall be
1990 . demobilized, and the JNA shall return to its barracks, ...
18 The Serb leadership in Eastern Slavonia -Baranja took longer to Jovic entry for 28 August 1991.
form an autonomous region than Krajina, although it had estab Because the Netherlandswas head of the EC Presidency at the
lished a Serb National Council for Eastern Slavonia , Baranja, and time, Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek went to Bel
Western Srem by March 1991. D. Dragicevic , “ The Time to Leave grade to present the EC declaration and proposal to the Serbs, the
Croatia Has Come,” Politika 19 March 1991, p . 9. The council Federal Presidency,and government. Despite distaste forwhat they
declared itself the government of an autonomous region in July both viewed as anti -Serb rhetoric , Serbian PresidentMilosevic was
1991.Belgrade Tanjug 11 July 1991. Pakrac and areas in Western able to convince Jovic that it was in the Serbs' best interest to
Slavonia attempted to join the SAO Krajina in February 1991, but accept the EC decision . Otherwise, the Serbs would be excluded
the intervention of Croatian Special Police partially thwarted this from the peace conference and have no influence and would most
move until August 1991,bywhich point the Western Slavonia Serb likely be subjected to EC sanctions. After rancorous debate in the
leadership created its own autonomous region . Federal Presidency, the EC measure was accepted. Jovic noted that
19 The SDB , the State Security Service ( Sluzba Drzavne Bezbed he believed thatMesic and Drnovsek probably had hoped that the
nosti), was redesignated RDB, Department for State Security Serbs and their supporters on the Federal Presidency would have
(Resor Drzavne Bezbednosti), in 1991. vote against the proposal, allowing the Croatians and Slovenes to
20 The Croatians had signed a joint defense agreementwith the attend the conference by themselves and gain an even larger mea
Slovenes in April, which Zagreb refused to honor during the Ten sure of international support. Jovic entries for 28 August,
Day War, despite Spegelj's entreaties to Tudjman . See Silber and 29 August, 1 September 1991.
Little , pp. 149-150, 169. Spegelj alluded to many of his differences 3'Belgrade Tanjug 6 September 1991.

111
32 Tudjman stated on 7 September that, “Wewere satisfied with the and MUP did nothave the forces, training , or firepower to force the
generalatmosphere during the conference.” Belgrade Tanjug 7 JNA from Croatia militarily, as became evident during the ZNG's
September 1991. limited offensives. This almost certainly is why President Tudjman
33 Belgrade Tanjug 7-8 September 1991. continued to try to internationalize the war, hoping to get the West
34
Zagreb Radio 11 September 1991. This provides a detailed ern nations to intervene against the JNA and force it to withdraw
explanation of Mesic's public justification for the decision . from his republic.
35 Jovic clearly saw Mesic's order in this light aswell , stating , 41 Jovic noted on 8 August 1991 that, “ It is amazing that Veljko
We regard this as an attempt to create reasons for an attack (Kadijevic) is one minute for a generalattack to overthrow the
against themilitary in Croatia . If themilitary does not ‘obey, ' it Croatian authorities, and the nextminute against that.” Jovic entry
will be declared outlaw and an occupying force in Croatia. The for 8 August 1991.
purpose is to provide an easier explanation and justification for 42 Jovic entry for 12 September 1991.
43
Croatian aggression against the military. In fact, it is preparing ArmyGeneral Veljko Kadijevic ,Moje Vidjenje Raspada,
to declare war againstthe military. Belgrade: 1993, p . 134 .
Jovic entry for 12 September 1991. 44 The General Staff was to coordinate the offensive through the
36 Darko Pavicic , “Why I Resigned,” Zagreb Danas 8 October First, Fifth , and Military -Maritime Districts. The First Military
1991, pp. 14-15. An interview with former Croatian Defense Min District, under the command of Colonel-General Aleksandar
ister Luka Bebic. The order implementing the already signed deci Spirokovski, was to control the Eastern Slavonia -Baranja Opera
sion went into effect late on 13 September for implementation on tion; the Fifth Military District,under the command of Colonel
14 September General Zivota Avramovic , was to control the Western Slavonia
37 Despite the shift to the offensive against the barracks, the ZNG and Karlovac Operations; and the Military -Maritime District,
and MUP remained on the strategic defensive along the frontline under Vice AdmiralMile Kandic,was to command the Knin -Zadar
with the Serb autonomous regions. Croatian forces would not and Dubrovnik Operations. (For a detailed breakdown of the JNA
move to conduct any offensives on the battlefield until late October order of battle , see Appendix C and Annex 13.)
and November. 45
Kadijevic, pp . 134-135. Kadijevic's statements in his memoirs
38 Asdescribed earlier, Tudjman made the decision to go to war that he intended to withdraw from Croatia , or at least from all of
with the JNA in mid -September, launching a strategic offensive to Croatia except the Krajina, clearly do not track with Borisav
neutralize and capture the JNA's facilities throughout Croatia Jovic's understanding of Kadijevic's thinking in 1991. There are
beginning on 14 September. This simply added a dimension to the two possibilities. Either Kadijevic modified his memoirs in order
defensive military strategy Croatia had pursued throughout the to reflecta more pro -Serbian line rather than the pro - Yugoslav line
fighting with local Serb forces during the summer.Zagreb intended in which he believed in 1991, or the 1991 planning did include
to continue on the defensive at the frontwhile attacking the JNA in options to pull out of Croatia butKadijevic's presentation or beliefs
the rear, although the certain introduction of large-scale JNA forces were so muddled at the time that it was notclear to Jovic or anyone
into battle after the Croatian attack on the barracks would obvi else. Jovic's description of the above planning based on a 20 Sep
ously increase Croatian military difficulties. The barracks assault tember JNA presentation tracks exactly with Kadijevic's descrip
was the key element in the Croatian efforts to expand the National tion, except for Kadijevic's discussion of a withdrawal from
Guard Corps and create a real armyto defend its borders, which it Croatia. Anotherpossibility is that the plan did notinitially call for
would have been unable to do without the weapons stored in the a withdrawal from Croatia but, that after the agreementto with
JNA and Croatian TO barracks. draw from Slovenia , a withdrawal from Croatia was added to the
39 The newly formed Main Staff organized the expansion of the plan withoutmodifying any of the planned campaigns. Either way,
ZNG during October with the captured weapons, while orchestrat the JNA high command clearly appears to have been suffering
ing the defense against the JNA's campaigns. As ZNG andMUP from political-strategic schizophrenia in 1991. They often were not
forceswere able to contain federal troops, field units began to urge sure what they were trying to achieve at any particular time. Jovic
the Main Staff to authorize counteroffensives, while the Croatian entry for 20 September 1991.
Assembly, particularly hardline HDZ members, continued to press 46 Ibid .
the governmentto be more aggressive . The new offensives, how 47 The forces available to the First Military District probably could
ever,were to have only mixed success. Beginning in late October, have broken the ZNG defense line, albeit at considerable cost. It is
Croatian forces in Western Slavonia went on the attack ; the rela unlikely, however, that the JNA could have driven to Zagreb .
tively successful operations continued until the end of the conflict Nevertheless, the Croatian Government almost certainly would
in January . The Croatians also attempted two unsuccessful opera have been forced to acceptworse terms than the Vance Plan if
tions to relieve the siege of Vukovar in October and November. Osijek had been placed at the JNA'smercy. For a more detailed
Attacks in the Banija area, near Sisak and Petrinja , were only analysis , see Annex 17 .
partially successful. These limited attacks were the only Croatian 48 General Kadijevic stated that the campaign in Western Slavonia
offensive actions; elsewhere they remained on the defensive, while was designed to , “ ... along the Gradiska-Pakrac -Virovitica line
maintaining their blockades of the barracks. The barracks remained ... cut off the Croatia forces' retreat from eastern and central
surrounded until agreements were reached with the JNA for the Slavonia and permit a faster penetration toward Zagreb and Varaz
withdrawal of their garrisons in December 1991 as part of the din .” Army General Veljko Kadijevic ,Moje Vidjenje Raspada, Bel
negotiations that led to the “ Vance Plan .” grade: 1993, p . 138.
49
40 The Croatian dual-track strategy of defending on the battlefield Zagreb Velebit 7 February 1997, pp . 16-17.
while hitting the barracks was the best available . They did not ini 50 Mladic and a number of his brigade commanders were rewarded
tially have sufficient forces to go on the offensive directly against with promotions for their efforts.
51
JNA and TO forces, but attacking the barracks allowed them to Glenny, p . 133.
acquire themeans to build and arm formations that could eventu
ally challenge the federal units. Even with the acquisition ofweap
ons from the barracks and the creation ofmany new units, the ZNG

112
52 An August 1997 Nasa Borba article lists charges that senior JNA 61Milosevic and Jovic had discussed their willingness to achieve a
officers and Montenegrin officials had profited greatly from the negotiated solution on 6 October, with Jovic stating that, “ We can
plunder around Dubrovnik . Vladimir Jovanovic , “ TheMost not employ the war option to an extent that is not necessary and
SuccessfulMobilization With the Gusle,” Belgrade Nasa Borba perish for something that we can achieve through negotiation .”
12, 13 August 1997 (Internet version ). Jovic entry for 6 October 1991. See also the earlier section, “Mobi
53 Jokic also claimed that he established specialcommands to col lization and the Political-Military Conflict, September-December
lect looted property for distribution to Serbian refugee groups, 1991” for a discussion of Serbian /federal war aimsand political
although he notes that the Federal Secretariat for National Defense military differences over the course ofthe war.
did not set up the formal administration to carry this outuntil 15 62 Jovic noted that the Serbs controlled most of the territory
December. By then,much of the booty from Konavli probably had except parts of Western Slavonia - in which they were a “ major
already disappeared into theMontenegrin black or peoples' ity,” while greater Croatian mobilization and armament was lead
homes . Dragan Todorovic, “Miodrag Jokic , Retired Vice Admiral, ing to a larger commitment of the JNA and increasing JNA calls
On Charges ThatHeWas A War Profiteer and Poor Commander: I for fullmobilization . Jovic indicated that an intensification of the
Prevented Looting On The Battlefield ,” Belgrade Borba 2 June fighting was “ completely counterproductive to our policy.” Jovic
1993, p . 14. entry for 2 November 1991.
54 Silber and Little, p . 184. 63 Vance,US Secretary of State under President Carter, was
55 ArmyGeneral Veljko Kadijevic ,Moje Vidjenje Raspada, Bel appointed the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General
grade: 1993, p . 140. on 8 October. Reuters 8 October 1991.
56
Glenny, p . 136. 64 Belgrade Tanjug 31 December 1991;Reuters 1 January 1992.
57 The following account drawsheavily on Silber and Little's chap 65 Belgrade Tanjug 2 January 1992. European Community Moni
ter on the peace negotiations, “ Yugoslavia a la Carte,” and Borisav toring Mission personnel had negotiated most of the previous
Jovic's notes on the meetings of the Federal, Serbian, and Mon cease -fires, which had not been linked to a peace plan.Most of
tenegrin leadership . truces broke down almost immediately.
66these
58 Silber and Little, pp. 190-193. A Belgrade Tanjug report from 2 January 1992 has a full readout
59 Jovic noted that on 18 October the Serbian leadership had ana of the plan .
lyzed Carrington's plan and found it unacceptable and “ must be 67 The RSK had been formed on 19 December with Babic as Presi
rejected” because it broke up Yugoslavia and split Serbs into sev dent through themerger of the three Serbian autonomous regions
eral states. Jovic entry for 23 October 1991. in Eastern Slavonia -Baranja -Western Srem , Western Slavonia, and
60 Serbian opposition to the Carrington Plan was nearly upsetwhen Krajina.
Montenegro seemed ready to accept it .Montenegrin President 68 See Jovic entry for 2 and 7 February 1992 and Silber and Little,
Momir Bulatovic stated openly at the conference thathe supported pp. 202-204.
the plan . After extremely strong pressure from the Serbian leader 69 See Jovic discussion with Cedric Thornberry, UNPROFOR civil
ship to reverse their position , the Montenegrins joined the Serbians affairs chief, in late March 1992. Jovic entry for 24 March 1992.
in submitting an amendment to the conference on 30 October, stat 70 Reuters 8 March 1992.
ing that the Federal Republic would continue to exist for those who 71 The RSK TerritorialDefense was redesignated the Krajina Serb
wished to remain in a single state , thus undermining the Carrington Army (SVK ) on 19 March 1992.Reuters 19 March 1992.Upon the
Plan . The Montenegrins appear to have initially gone against the withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia and the formation of the
Serbian position because of anger that, from their perspective, the Bosnian Serb Army, the remaining JNA units in UNPAs North and
Serbian Governmentwas not fully prosecuting the war and that South also becamepart of the SVK .
Montenegro was carrying more ofthe war burden proportionally
than Serbia was. The Montenegrins apparently believed that the
SFRY should either declare full mobilization and destroy the
Croatian Government or accept the peace deal. See Jovic entry for
23, 28 , and 30 October 1991 and Silber and Little , pp. 194-196 .
Silber and Little also believe that Italian offers of aid money influ
enced the Montenegrin decision to support the plan .

113
 Croatia 1990-91

Eastern Slavonia , near Vinkovci, November 1991. Yugoslav People's Army ( JNA ) officers,
reservists, and volunteers possibly from the 3rd GuardsMechanized Brigade or the 130th
Motorized Brigade .

JNA regular officer with reservists. JNA reservists.

Group of JNA officers.

Two JNA volunteer soldiers from the Serbian Radical Party

( SRS). An M -83 BOV -1 armored vehicle equipped with AT-3
antitank missiles is in the background.

DIDesign Center/MPG 3826371D 04-02

114
 Croatia 1990-91

Wartime damage to Vukovar, as seen in 1992.

Dubrovnik and the Dalmatian coast, as seen in 1993.

Zeljko Raznjatovic “ Arkan," commander of the Serbian

Volunteer Guard, “ Tigers," late 1991.

DIDesign Center/MPG 3826371D 04-02

115
 .

Section III

Bosnia 1991-1992: Yugoslavia's TimeBomb

117
 Chapter 14 then under the Austro -Hungarians — with a unique
Bosnia : Yugoslavia's Time Bomb cultural identity, but not a fully independent history .
Croat-dominated Herzegovina ,by contrast,has had a
Why should I be a minority in your state when distinct history from most of Bosnia and thus retains a
you can be a minority in mine ? different population and attitude.

Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov! After the Congress of Berlin in 1878, administrative
control over Bosnia was transferred to the Austro
Hungarians, although the province technically
The Historical and Political Landscape remained part of the Ottoman Empire . This awkward
decision was to prove problematic for everyone
As fighting flared first in Slovenia , then raged across involved . The transfer was pushed through over the
neighboring Croatia , Yugoslavia's central republic of objections of the Ottomans, who had just been
Bosnia looked on nervously and waited for the worst. defeated by the Russians and were forced to accept a
de facto ceding of their territory. The Austro -Hungari
The civil war that tore Bosnia apart in the spring of ans notonly gained control over a strategic territory
1992 cannot be explained without an understanding of but also over roughly a million new Slavic subjects
the historical events in the region up to that date. This who were by no means overjoyed about rule by the
is not to say that the war and the atrocities it spawned Dual Monarchy. (When the Austrians occupied the
were the inevitable product of centuries of pent-up country in 1878 , the Bosnian population mounted a
hatreds or that its participants were merely fated to act brief but violent revolt that lasted three months and
out roles dictated to them by history . Rather, it is to claimed several thousand lives.) In particular, the eth
highlight the fact that the events that followed could nic Serbs of the region were infuriated by the “ loss ” of
not have taken place as they did ( or at least not with Bosnian territory to the Austro -Hungarians,especially
the rapidity they did ) without the historical back after the formal transfer of the territory in 1909. This
ground that led up to them . Before discussing the fire outrage was rapidly translated into the formation of
it is necessary to look at the flammables and the kin two underground societies dedicated to pan - Serb uni
dling: the Bosnian setting that placed a variety of fication : the “ National Defense " (Narodna Odbrana )
nationalities within a single border and the catalog of and the more famous “Unification or Death ,” better
real or imagined grievances each group had against known as “ The Black Hand” (Ujedinjenje ili Smrt or
the other. Crna Ruka , respectively ). By the summer of 1914 ,
relations between Austria -Hungary and Serbia had
Bosnia -Herzegovina , as the name implies, consists of grown especially strained , and Serb separatists within
two contiguous regions. “ Bosnia” comprises roughly Bosnia had been pinioned by a series of harsh legal
four- fifths of the modern nation of Bosnia -Herzegov measures .
ina, excluding roughly the southernmost 20 percent of
the country . “Herzegovina" is the remainder.2 Bosnia It was at this crucialmoment that the Archduke Franz
had a brief period of independent nationhood in the Ferdinand - heir to the Habsburg throne and Inspector
middle ages, stretching, with some interruptions, from General of the Armed Forces ofthe Austro -Hungarian
the reign of Ban Kulin in 1180 up through the con empire — made a decision that would change the
quest of the country by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II
in 1463. Bosnia spentmost of its modern history as an
occupied province — first under the Ottoman Empire ,

119
course of history . In a display of truly phenomenalbad shifting alliances, interfactional rivalries, and military
judgment, he decided to visit the Bosnian capital of campaigns began . On the one side were German and
Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 — the anniversary of the Italian military forces, supported by their Croatian and
Serb defeat at the epic Battle of Kosovo Polje in Bosnian auxiliaries. On the other side were the two
1389 — and to publish the itinerary of his vehicle con main resistance movements, the “ Chetniks” (headed
voy in the newspaper the day before . No fewer than by a former Yugoslav Army Colonel, Draza
six Serb assassins lurked in the crowds, but only one Mihailovic) and the “Partisans" (headed by the leader
acted , throwing a bomb that bounced off the Arch of the previously outlawed Yugoslav Communist
duke's car and wounded passengers in the vehicle Party, Josip Broz Tito ). Though both resistance
behind. Franz Ferdinand then diverted from the pub groups sought a united , independent Yugoslavia , they
lished convoy route in order to visit the injured offic had mutually exclusive political objectives.
ers in the hospital, and , with singularly bad luck , as Mihailovic's Chetniks were Royalist and favored the
his car reversed direction , it pulled in front of yet prewar political order, while Tito's Partisans were
another Serb nationalist assassin , Gavrilo Princip . Soviet-leaning Communists who wanted to assume
Princip took aim and fired the first shots of World control of an entirely new political structure after the
War I, killing both the Archduke and his wife, the Germans were expelled from Yugoslavia .
Duchess of Hohenberg . Austria -Hungary issued an
ultimatum to Serbia , and exactly a month later the two Chetnik and Partisan forces at first maintained a loose
states went to war. Within days the rest of Europe had alliance against the Nazi occupiers , but this soon
lined up behind the adversaries, and the First World broke up into open warfare between the two factions.
War had begun . In their campaigns against each other, both Chetniks
and Partisans (the Chetniks more frequently ) made
Although the imperial Austro -Hungarian Army local alliances or accommodations at different times
expected a quick victory, the ill-equipped Serbian with the Germans and Italians. The situation was fur
forces put up a heroic resistance — twice repulsing ther muddied after the Italians capitulated in Septem
Austrian attacks in 1914 before conducting a legend ber 1943, leaving most of their equipment to be
ary winter retreat in 1915. Both sides suffered massive captured by Tito's Partisans. The British and
casualties. The Serbs eventually joined with the Americans — through the British Special Operations
advancing forces of the Allied armies thatmoved Executive (SOE) and the American Office of Strategic
north from Salonica , emerging on the winning side at Services (OSS ) -initially backed Mihailovic's
the war's end . Bosnia , where the war had started , was Chetniks with armsand supplies but later switched
amalgamated into the “ Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats , their support to the Partisans in mid -1943. Brigadier
and Slovenes,” which was carved out of part of the Fitzroy Maclean , the British SOE representative at
Austro -Hungarian empire and most of prewar Serbia Tito's headquarters, explained Churchill's decision to
and Montenegro . (Later the name was simplified and support Tito's Partisans despite Tito's leftist political
shortened to Yugoslavia, “ Land of the South Slavs." ) orientation and the likelihood of his leading a
But the ill- fated country's independence was to prove Communist postwar Yugoslavia :
short lived . Hitler's Wehrmacht invaded on 6 April
1941, assisted by Italian , Hungarian , and Bulgarian " Do you intend," he (Churchill) asked, " to
forces approaching from all directions. Resistance make Yugoslavia your home after the war? ”
crumpled as the Yugoslav Army dissolved , and the
German Army captured the entire country in 11 days " No, sir," I replied.
with the astonishingly low casualty list of 151 fatali
ties.345 " Neither do I,” he said . “ And, that being so , the
less you and I worry aboutthe form of govern
During the Second World War, Bosnia was to become ment they set up, the better. That is for them to
the ugliest and bloodiest battleground of a very ugly, decide. What interests me is, which of them
bloody, and multisided war within Yugoslavia . As [ Partisans or Chetniks) is doing most harm to
resistance to the German Italian occupation degener the Germans ? " ?
ated into a Yugoslav CivilWar, a bewildering series of

120
The casualties in Bosnia reflected the violence of an Although the Bosnian Serb population was in general
internecine and most uncivil war. An estimated 1.7 agreement regarding national aims and objectives ,
million Yugoslavs were killed during the conflict they were not a completely uniform population either
about 1 million of these by other Yugoslavs. These culturally or philosophically. Bosnia's Serb population
deaths represented no less than 11 percent of the pre did share a common Orthodox religion and a historical
war population , giving Yugoslavia the second-highest legacy of persecution under first the Ottomans and
mortality rate ( after Poland ) of any country in World then the Nazi-allied Croatian Ustashe, which in large
War II. Although the Bosnian Muslims suffered , by a measure gave the Bosnian Serbs a collective “martyr
slightmargin , the highest percentage casualties of any complex." There was a cultural divide,however,
Yugoslav ethnic group in Bosnia (8.1 percent killed ), between the mostly rural Serbs and their rarer urban
the Bosnian Serbs also suffered egregiously at the cousins — the latter exemplified by the cosmopolitan
hands of the German and Croat occupying forces Serbs of Sarajevo . The Serbs of west Bosnia and those
( some 7.3 percent). Many Serb civilians were massa of east Bosnia also frequently varied in their political
cred in reprisals for operations by the Serbian Chet views and objectives.10
niks and Serb -led Partisans (indeed , reprisals were an
aim of many of Tito's Partisan operations, in order to The Bosnian Croat population was no longer homoge
inflame the population and producemore supporters neous. Most notably, there was a difference in charac
for the revolution ). These wartime pogroms left the ter and political attitudes between the Croats of
Serbs a minority population in postwar Bosnia. ( A western Herzegovina and those scattered across the
contributing factor was that the Muslimshad the high rest of Bosnia. The Herzgovinian Croats were histori
est birthrate of the ethnic groups in Bosnia .) cally more rural and usually more extremein their
political views. As one Serb saying put it, “nothing
When at last the world war and the civil war ended , grows in western Herzegovina except rocks, snakes,
Bosnia -Herzegovina became one of the six constituent and Ustashe.”'ll By contrast, the Croats of northern
republics of Tito's new Socialist Federal Republic of and central Bosnia — more numerous, though occupy
Yugoslavia (SFRY), with essentially the same borders ing less land area than the Herzegovinian Croats
it had as a province of the Ottoman Empire . tended to be more politically moderate and multiethni
cally inclined. Themore outspoken Herzegovinian
Bosnia's checkered history produced a similarly Croats, however, played a disproportionately large
checkered ethnic distribution across the republic . At role in Bosnian and even Croatian politics, and they
the outset of the war, Bosnia was an ethnic collage usually held the tiller as the Bosnian Croat community
within Yugoslavia's larger collage. Scattered ,mixed , decided which direction it would move in .
and intermingled within its borders were three ethnic
groups - Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Republic -wide, In contrast to the other two ethnic groups, the Bosnian
Muslimswere a plurality but not a majority , with Muslimswere a “ nationality ” with no nation . This was
approximately 43 percent of the population . Bosnian their central, underlying dilemma. The ethnic Croats
Serbs were the second-most -numerous ethnic group , had their “homeland " republic of Croatia . The ethnic
with about 32 percent, while the ethnic Croats made Serbs had the literal republic of Serbia and the con
up the remainder, with some 17 percent of the popula- ceptual homeland of “Greater Serbia .” Though more
tion . The Serbs, who tended to be rural, occupied a numerous , the Muslims of Bosnia lacked a similar
somewhat disproportionate percentage of the land geographic or culturalcenter of gravity. Indeed , the
area of Bosnia . One of the three ethnic groups usually Muslims were defined more by what they were not
predominated in any given area ,but in most places neither Croat nor Serb , not Catholic or Orthodox
there was at least some ethnic commingling at some than by what they were. Visually indistinguishable
level of dispersion . Before the war there were places from the Serbs and Croats , the Muslims lacked even
in Bosnia where one could , for instance, find a Serb
majority street within a Croat-majority town in a
Muslim -majority opstina (county or municipality).

121
an ethnic term to distinguish themselves. By default, Akcije - SDA ) came first, on 26 May 1990. Alija
" Muslim ” became their cultural descriptor rather than Izetbegovic ( a soft-spoken intellectual who had been
a religious one . By the 20th century the greatmajority jailed after a highly publicized trial in 1983 for alleg
of Bosnian “Muslims” had become secular:most edly conspiring to overthrow the Socialist government
drank alcohol and had a limited knowledge of the and establish a Muslim state in Bosnia ) became the
Koran and its principles. The dilemma of Muslim SDA's first party leader. The Bosnian Serbs formed
identity - was it a religious, ethnic , or cultural their own Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska
descriptor?—was reflected in the debate over whether Demokratska Stranka - SDS)—technically and actu
the Muslimswere an ethnic “nation ” within the Yugo- ally an offshoot of the Krajina Serb SDS party in
slav system . As a result, the term "Muslim , in the Knin — two months later on 12 July 1990. The Croat
sense of a nation," did not appear on the Yugoslav ian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajed
census form until 1971 — and only after years of nica - HDZ), a self-professed branch of Franjo
debate . 12 The 1974 Constitution finally granted the Tudjman's ethnically based party of the samename in
Muslims (the third -largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia , Croatia, followed suit shortly thereafter on 18 August
after the Serbs and Croats ) the status of a separate 1990 .
nationality, equivalent to the Serbs and Croats .
The first free multiparty elections in Bosnia were held
In Bosnia the three ethnic groups had coexisted for in November 1990 , confirming the political dimension
decades, and city dwellers frequently intermarried . of the ethnic fault lines dividing the republic . Nearly
Yet even here the SFRY's high -minded and politically 90 percent of the parliamentary seats went to represen
desirable policies of multiracial national unity had tatives of the three ethnic nationalist parties , with the
failed to eliminate ethnic differences or competing distribution of seats closely mirroring the republic's
interests among the three Bosnian groups. These dif ethnic percentages. The Muslim -based SDA won 86 of
ferences alone, however, were hardly deep or sharp the 240 seats in the National Assembly, the Serb SDS
enough to spontaneously ignite a civil war lasting sev party won 71 seats, and the Bosnian Croat HDZ won
eral years and costing perhaps 200,000 lives. As was 44 seats. In a smaller version of the Yugoslav
the case in Yugoslavia as a whole, it took a combina presidency, the newly elected Bosnian parliament
tion of ambitious political leaders, extremist ethnic established a coalition government with power
chauvinists, and carefully constructed media cam sharing arrangements among a mix of representatives
paigns aimed at generating popular hysteria to finally from each ethnic group.!4 Alija Izetbegovic , one of the
set neighbor against neighbor. Here again it was the SDA candidates, became Presidentofthe Republic .15 16
post-Communist rise of ethnic nationalism that rup The Bosnian Serb ,Momcilo Krajisnik ,was appointed
tured the delicate relations within Bosnia and set the Assembly Speaker. A Bosnian Croat, Jure Pelivan , was
stage for war. named Prime Minister.

Chapter 15 At the time, the three parties agreed to accept a con

Political Developments Along the Road to War, sensus system whereby all must agree to a legislative
1990-1992 change before it could pass; any one of the three eth
nic groups could block a proposed item of legislation ,
A house divided against itself cannot stand. with the views of each “nation " counting equally
regardless of its relative population. If or when this
-Abraham Lincoln , 1858 13
system failed , not only the republic's government but
the republic itself would break down . Unfortunately,
If a Bosnia populated by three increasingly nationalis 1990 and 1991 were not years in which broadminded ,
tic ethnic groups was a powder keg , it was the forma consensus -oriented ethnic leaders thrived , and the
tion of ethnically based political parties that provided coalition would last barely a year.17
a slow fuse. The organization of the Muslim -based
Party for Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske

122
 The three main political parties were at this point Federal Yugoslavia . The Bosnian SAO's presented
explicitly looking out for the interests of their own their proclamations to the republic assembly as estab
ethnic groups rather than the interests of Bosnia lished facts and vowed to secede if the republic
Herzegovina as a whole .Moreover, each group refused to recognize their autonomy.
believed its interests were threatened by — and directly
at odds with — the other ethnic groups. The Bosnian In mid -October 1991 the Bosnian Serbs found the
Croats — especially those of western Herzegovina occasion to pull the rug out from under the three -party
had little interest in Bosnia per se and instead aspired coalition , which had held together only since the pre
to a political and economic merger with Croatia . The vious November. On 14 October the Muslim SDA and
Bosnian Serbs likewise wanted affiliation with neigh the Croat HDZ jointly proposed a parliamentary reso
boring Serbia or at most an autonomous status within lution in favor of sovereignty for the republic . The
Bosnia as part of a rump Yugoslavia .Most Bosnian debate became supercharged and ran late into the
Serbs genuinely and rightfully feared any political night. SDS leader Karadzic reacted with rhetoric that
change that would leave them outvoted by a Muslim may have seemed exaggerated at the time but in the
Croat coalition and subjected to a tyranny of the end proved no more than prophetic . Addressing the
majority. assembly , he threatened the Muslims in the starkest
terms yet heard :

The Bosnian Serbs Move Toward Autonomy You want to take Bosnia -Herzegovina down the
same highway of hell and suffering that Slovenia
While the Republic of Bosnia -Herzegovina moved and Croatia are travelling. Do not think that you
slowly away from Federal Yugoslavia, the ethnic will not lead Bosnia -Herzegovina into hell, and
Serbs within Bosnia were moving, perhaps a little do not think that you will not perhaps make the
faster, to leave the Republic of Bosnia -Herzegovina. Muslim people disappear, because the Muslims
By the latter half of 1991 the independence-minded cannot defend themselves if there is war ... 19
Bosnian Serbs were beginning to play out their hand
in the samemanner as their Croatian kin . Radovan At two o'clock in the morning of 15 October 1991,
Karadzic's SDS leadership began by declaring Serb Assembly Speaker Krajisnik led his ethnic Serb mem
majority chunks of Bosnia as “ Serb Autonomous bers out of the hall. The remainder of the parliament
Regions” exactly analogous to the SAO's over the now virtually all SDA and HDZ members — was thus
border in Croatia. By late September 1991 , there were able to adopt the motion on sovereignty, more as an
four of these self-proclaimed regions in Bosnia : the expression of intention than an act of policy . On
“ Serbian Autonomous Region East and Old Herze 24 October the Bosnian Serbs separately announced
govina” (declared on 12 September); the “Autono the formation within Bosnia of a “ Serbian Republic of
mous Region [Bosnian ] Krajina ” (declared on Bosnia -Herzegovina" that would have its own consti
16 September ); the " Serbian Autonomous Region tution and parliamentary assembly,whose laws would
Romanija " (declared on 17 September); and the take precedence over those of the Bosnian Republic.
“ Serbian Autonomous Region Northeast Bosnia." Then , on 9-10 November, the Bosnian Serbs held a
(declared on 19 September).18 referendum of their own, in which they chose to
remain within Federal Yugoslavia.20 21
These four regions together included almost one -third
of Bosnia -Herzegovina's municipalities, with some 20 On 9 January 1992, SDS leader Radovan Karadzic
percent of its total population and about 45 percent of went further and publicly proclaimed a fully indepen
its ethnic Serbs. All of the “ autonomous regions" dent“ Republic of the Serbian People in Bosnia
asserted that they were constituents of a Federal Herzegovina,” which quickly became known by the
Yugoslavia first and members of a “ federalized "
Bosnia -Herzegovina only second — so long as the
republic remained a nonsovereign constituent of

123
earlier title of “ Serbian Republic of Bosnia -Herzegov- Croatia and Serbia . As he put it, choosing between
ina” (SRBH ). The previously proclaimed Serbian Tudjman and Milosevic was like choosing between
autonomous regions in Bosnia were incorporated into leukemia and a brain tumor.22 In October 1991,
the new entity and specifically excluded from the Izetbegovic had publicly declared Bosnia's neutrality
authority of the Bosnian Government and President regarding the conflict in neighboring Croatia, a fence
Izetbegovic. The Serbs underwrote their proclamation sitting statementthat accomplished nothing other than
with the adoption of a constitution drafted unilaterally antagonizing the radical Serbs within Bosnia.23 After
and without reference to the Republic of Bosnia two months of fruitless temporizing, on 24 December
Herzegovina Constitution . the Bosnian Presidency followed the republic govern
ments of Slovenia , Croatia, and Macedonia in for
With less than one -third of their parent republic's pop- mally requesting diplomatic recognition from the
ulation Bosnia's Serbs nevertheless claimed almost European Community.24 The Badinter Commission
two- thirds of Bosnia's territory, including “ historically duly concluded that Bosnia met the criterion for EC
Serb ” areas where they were in the minority. They recognition provided it held a republic-wide referen
also declared that all taxes and customsrevenues col dum on independence to confirm that a majority of its
lected within their self- proclaimed republic would be people favored secession from Yugoslavia .
withheld from Bosnia's central government. Bosnia
not yet independent itself - was already riven by The referendum process, and the explicit debate on
secession . sovereignty it generated , burned away the last fragile
bonds of Bosnia's coalition government and touched
off the process that would set the republic aflame. In
The Republic-Wide Sovereignty Referendum February 1992 the Croat-Muslim parliamentary coali
tion voted for independence with a solid majority ; the
If Bosnia was a figurative powder keg and ethnically Serb assembly representatives simply refused to vote
based political representation was the fuse , then it was rather than participate in a process in which they knew
the European Community -sponsored referendum on they would be the losers .
independence that actually lit the fuse. In October
1991, at The Hague peace conference on Yugoslavia , The republic-wide referendum on independence
the EC representatives had made a simultaneous but demanded by the EC's Badinter Commission followed
conditional offer of recognition to all of the Yugoslav on 29 February - 1 March . The results were unambigu
republics, stating that any republic desiring recogni ous, both in what was recorded and what was not.
tion as an independent country would have to apply Among Bosnia's Muslims and Croats — some64 per
formally by December 1991. This was promptly mod cent of the population - an overwhelming majority
ified in January 1992 by the Badinter Arbitration (99.7 percent) voted for independence. Bosnia's
Commission associated with the peace conference, Serbs , the remainder of the population ,acted in almost
which offered recognition only if each republic had complete unison to observe the boycott initiated by
first ratified its independence with a popular the SDS. Virtually no Serbs voted, and those who did
referendum . resided mostly in the cities.25

When the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia accepted When the referendum results were announced on
the EC conditions , first holding popular referendums 3 March, the Serb reaction was immediate and pre
and then issuing declarations of independence , they dictable. Radovan Karadzic , still only the Serbian
crowded Bosnia into a trap that was sprung by the Democratic Party leader and at the timeholding no
EC's formal recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as public office , announced categorically, “We are not
fully independent states. If Bosnia now remained part going to accept an independent state of Bosnia
of the dissolving Yugoslavia , it would become even Herzegovina ."
more overwhelmingly dominated by Serbs; but if it
declared its own independence, it would step over a
cliff and into almost certain civil war. Izetbegovic was
trapped both politically and physically between

124
Within a day of the referendum announcement, the should be invaded . Belgrade looked again to the
first barricades began to go up in Sarajevo — an omi mountain republic as the first and last redoubt of a
nous precursor of the battlelines that would later snake defensive guerrilla war, and the JNA not only built up
through the republic's capital. On the cold night of an elaborate military infrastructure within Bosnia but
3 March , small gangs of armed Serbs began to travel also moved key portions of the Yugoslav arms indus
about the city , threatening violence if the referendum try to the republic.27
should actually be implemented. With preternatural
organization they began blockading streets with The JNA forces in Bosnia initially played little role in
trucks, buses, and cars and barricading all routes out the sovereignty debates that raged between the Fed
of the city center. The Muslims responded with armed eral Government and Serbia on the one hand and
groups of their own that set up counterbarricades from Croatia and Slovenia on the other. The JNA's primary
within the city. Occasional clashes between the two concern in Bosnia , as in the other two republics, was
groups left four dead by morning. to deter separatist activities from becoming military
insurrections. In May 1990 , simultaneously with the
For a brief moment it looked as if open warfare was seizure of the weapons in Slovenia and Croatia , the
about to begin . The following day , however, the pre JNA impounded or confiscated the arms allotted to the
dominantly Muslim Sarajevo police force began to Bosnian Republic's Territorial Defense ( TO ) forces.
dismantle the barricades , and within a few days order
had been restored. Why the Serbs backed off from What shaped and molded the JNA's view of Bosnia
their anti-independence ultimatums remains unclear. was the war in Croatia . As clashes escalated in Croatia
Izetbegovic had the shortest, simplest explanation . “ It during the summer of 1991, the JNA becamemore
seems," he said later, that they were not quite ready deeply involved in “peacekeeping" operations to sepa
for war." 26 rate Serbs and Croats. Most Croatians and other non
Serbs throughout Yugoslavia , however, saw these
War had not come, but after the referendum and the actions by the JNA asmore and more directly backing
Sarajevo barricades it became almost unavoidably the Croatian Serb separatists.Muslim and Croat mem
clear that war would come sooner or later. It was in bers of the Bosnian Government, including President,
this environment of fear, dread, and mutual suspicion Izetbegovic, feared that the JNA's Bosnian conscripts
that neighbor began arming against neighbor. Civil would be used to fire on fellow Yugoslavs in pursuit
war was all but inevitable — a question not of whether of pro -Serb policies. These objections prompted many
war would start, but when and how . Bosnian Muslims and Croats to ignore their callup
orders during the first phase of the JNA'smobilization
for its strategic offensive in the summer of 1991. As
The Shaping of the JNA's View of Bosnia the fighting in Croatia grew more intense and one
Herzegovina sided , in late August the Bosnian Government
announced its refusal to send any new conscripts to
The histories of Bosnia - Herzegovina and the the Army.28
Yugoslav People's Army (JNA ) were inextricably
intertwined , from the JNA's formation in Bosnia dur The JNA's mobilization to implement its strategic
ing the Second World War until the Army's demise in offensive in Croatia in response to the Croatians '
1991 and 1992 , when Bosnia seceded and Yugoslavia attack on the JNA barracks in September 1991 was the
fell apart. The JNA had been forged in the cauldron of key event that began the final split between the
World War II Bosnia , where the JNA's lineal predeces- Bosnian Government — particularly the Muslims
sors, Tito's Partisans, fought their most vicious battles
with German , Italian, and Croatian forces. After the
war, Yugoslavia reshaped its national defense doctrine
into a formula for a new partisan war if the country

125
from the JNA.* The strategic offensive forced the Bos- against the Serbs or even the JNA.Meanwhile , Bos
nians to choose sides: the Bosnian Serbs sided with nian Croats were crossing the border to serve in the
Belgrade and the JNA, believing that the Army was nascent Croatian armed forces then battling the JNA ,
protecting fellow Serbs and would protect them too if playing a prominentrole in many elite Croatian
necessary, whereas Bosnia's Muslims and Croats units.31 (See following chapters for details on the
sided with Zagreb . arming of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats ).

The JNA attack required two things from Bosnia : the With the Muslims and Croats refusing to respond to
use of its territory as a base of operations and the the JNA mobilization order in Bosnia , while the Bos
mobilization of its reservists to fill out formations nian Serbs were working hand - in -glove with the
required for key aspects of the attack. Both of these Army, disputes over the future of Bosnia and its
were anathema to Izetbegovic and theMuslim and adherence to Yugoslavia grew hotter. The Bosnian
Croat leaders . They believed in what they perceived to Serbs were almost devout in their allegiance to a Fed
be Serb - dominated efforts to forcibly keep republics eral Yugoslavia that fully and firmly incorporated
in Yugoslavia was morally objectionable, as well as their own republic. They viewed the JNA's defense of
detrimental to Bosnia's own interest in loosening its the Serb population within Croatia as a moral obliga
ties to the federal state . Muslim and Croat leaders tion that also served their own interests in preserving
therefore encouraged reservists to refuse to respond to their position within a Federal Yugoslavia.32 The Bos
the mobilization , andmost of these reservists followed nian Serbs regarded Muslim and Croat refusals to sup
their guidance . The leadership formally protested to port the offensive against Croatian secession as
Belgrade the deployment to Herzegovina of thousands another clear indicator of their own intentions to
ofMontenegrin reservists, who they thoughtwere secede, and the Serb leaders stepped up their prepara
being used to intimidate Muslims and Croats and sup tions to leave Bosnia if that occurred .
port Bosnian Serb separatism.29 The Montenegrins
had actually been moved to Bosnia to position them Bosnian opposition to the JNA's war in Croatia, and
selves for an offensive into southern Croatia , but their particularly the refusal of Muslims and Croats to take
obstreperous behavior frightened many Bosnian Mus their assigned places in JNA units, caused real prob
lims and Croats. The Bosnian Governmenthad little lems for the Army and affected the thinking ofmost
legal justification and less power to stop the JNA from Serb and Montenegrin officers in negative ways. First,
using Bosnian territory for its military operations the limited response to mobilization among Bosnian
against Croatia , but the JNA buildup in Bosnia during Muslims and Croats badly undercut the strategic
the fall of 1991, as units redeployed from Croatia or offensive . Two full JNA corps in Tuzla and Sarajevo
new units arrived from Serbia , inspired new fears that were unable to take part in the offensive because there
Belgrade would use the JNA to forcibly keep Bosnia were not enough reservists to fill out their formations.
in the Yugoslav Federation . Concern over antiwar sentiment in the area near
Mostar — especially among Croats - prompted the
Bosnia's Muslims and Croats also began to covertly retention of almost an entire Serbian JNA corps in the
devise ways to form and arm military units that could Mostar region to guard JNA facilities. When some
defend the republic against Serb separatists or federal formations of the corps in Banja Luka were forced to
actions to thwart their desires for sovereignty.30 The deploy at half strength,33 the corps commander there
JNA attack on Croatia spurred both groups, usually illegally ordered themobilization of the Banja Luka
acting separately rather than in harmony, to develop TerritorialDefense District over Izetbegovic's express
formations that could combine with the existing Min disapproval.34 More ominously , the JNA , as it had
istry of Internal Affairs (MUP) and Republican Terri elsewhere ,was recruiting almost exclusively Serb vol
torial Defense forces to put up some kind of defense unteer units - often organized by local SDS party

* For a detailed discussion of the war in Croatia, including the JNA

strategic offensive planning ,mobilization problems, and the use of
volunteer units, see the previous section , “ Croatia 1990-1991."

126
leaders — to expand its manpower. By these actions it Bosnian conflict as it began to bubble . Not only did
armed some of the most radical elements in the the Army supply arms to nascent separatist Bosnian
Bosnian Serb population . Serb police and military structures but it also directly
assumed the role of Serb protector throughout Bosnia .
Psychologically, the Army viewed Muslim and Croat More subtly, on orders from Serbian President
refusals to cooperate (as well as their creation of Milosevic the JNA proceeded to alter the ethnic bal
" paramilitary ” forces and service by some against the ance of its forces in Bosnia so that they could be con
JNA in Croatia ) as yet another act of betrayal, pushing verted rapidly into a Bosnian Serb army in the event
the Serb and Montenegrin members of the officer of international recognition of an independent Bos
corps even closer to the Serb nationalists. At the same nian republic — which the Bosnian Serbs regarded as a
time, the JNA's multiethnic character was diminishing casus belli. As a result, when recognition actually
as non -Serbs deserted or refused to mobilize ,making came in April 1992, the Bosnian Serbs and their JNA
the Army more and more a Serbian force. The adjust allies were prepared to strike at anyonewho stood in
ments this forced on the JNA commanders made them the way of Bosnian Serb secession from the prewar
more susceptible to the demands of Milosevic and his Bosnian Republic. It was a position Milosevic had
allies that the Army give up all efforts to preserve its been working toward for at leasttwo years.
vision of a Yugoslav state.35

The failure of the JNA's strategic offensive in Croatia Serbia Assists the Bosnian Serbs, 1990-1992
and the Army's final acceptance of Serbian President
Milosevic's war aims in November were the final As the Serbian Government under President
steps in the JNA's diminution to a force that would Milosevic undertook its program to assist the Croatian
fight almost exclusively for Serbs rather than a multi Serb leadership politically and militarily during the
ethnic Yugoslavia. By November-December 1991, the late 1980s and into 1990 , it conducted a parallel pro
Army believed that Croatia and the Bosnian Muslims gram to cultivate and support Bosnian Serb
* political
and Croats were not only opposed to the JNA butthat leaders and provide them with weapons. The same
moves toward independence in Croatia and Bosnia key political and intelligence personalities and institu
threatened the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs ' political tions that ran the Croatian Serb operation , led by the
future and represented a physical threat to the Serb Serbian State Security Service of the Serbian MUP,
population's existence.36 Under Milosevic's influence , served as the overseers and conduits for the aid to the
the Serbianized JNA now viewed itself as the only Bosnian Serbs. It is worth repeating part of Radmilo
guarantor of the safety of Serbs everywhere.37 The Bogdanovic's statement - mentioned earlier in con
results for Bosnia were to be dire indeed . junction with Croatia - in which the former Serbian
Internal Affairs Minister indicates that the SDB pro
Chapter 16 vided assistance to both the Croatian and the Bosnian
Serbia , the JNA, and the Bosnian Serbs: Serbs:
January 1990 - April 1992
We extended help to enable them to ... begin
Simultaneously with its program to organize and arm from nothing. Itwas the same way when people
the Croatian Serbs, the Serbian State Security Service from the present day Serbian Republic, the then
(Sluzba Drzavne Bezbednosti — SDB ) also undertook a Bosnia -Herzegovina, turned to us ... We did our
less ambitious project of providing arms and assis
tance to the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in For a detailed accountof Serbia's covert operation to support the
Croatian Serbs, see the previous Croatian War section, and particu
Bosnia.38 By the beginning of 1992 the JNA super larly Annex 1 in Volume II.
seded the SDB as the primary weapons supplier to the
Bosnian Serbs. As had happened elsewhere , the JNA
was being sucked into the witches' brew of the

127
 utmost to carry out, follow up, and ensure secu from the old Yugoslav Communist state to a new
rity for ( the help ) they sought and for that which Serb -dominated Yugoslavia . In such a state , the Army
Serbia and the Serbian people offered . There , believed , its primary mission was the defense of
that is what the Service did . 39 Serbs, not the preservation of multiethnicity. As a
result, from January through April 1992, the JNA in
Details of the Serbian assistance are few , but it Bosnia had two priorities. The first was to work with
appears to have consisted of a combination of organi and support a peaceful settlement of the political dif
zational support (and probably funds) for the SDS and ferences among the three ethnic groups. The second ,
someweapons for select SDS supporters. Politically, and more important, was to see that the Bosnian Serbs
the senior Serbian leadership , includingMilosevic , and their position in the republic were secure.
were conferring with Karadzic at least as early as mid
1991, and support to or organization of the SDS prob The Army's first step to ensure that the Bosnian Serbs
ably dates to 1990 or earlier.40 The SDB appears to would be protected in the event of Bosnia's breakup
have distributed weapons to small, select groups came in late 1991 at the behest of the Serbian leader
almost certainly SDS supporters — beginning in 1990 ship . Serbian PresidentMilosevic and Serbian Federal
and continuing into possibly September 1991. For Presidency member Borisav Jovic concluded early in
example , the Bosnian Government acquired documen December 1991 that international recognition of Bos
tation showing the distribution of M -48 bolt action nia would follow soon after that of Croatia and Slove
World War II - era rifles, as well as other weapons, to nia , placing unbearable pressure on Belgrade to
35 Serbs in the Foca area. These weapons almost cer withdraw the JNA from the republic . As Jovic notes :
tainly were provided by the SDB from Serbian MUP
or Serbian TO stocks.41 The SDB probably distributed When Bosnia and Herzegovina are recognized
no more than 3,000 such weapons in platoon -sized internationally, the JNA will be declared a for
batches of 30 or so to groups likely centered on the eign army and its withdrawal will be demanded ,
local SDS municipality board in most of Bosnia's which is impossible to avoid . In that situation,
municipalities.42 There may have been a surge in these the Serb populace ... will be left defenseless ...
SDB deliveries late in 1991, but they would soon be Sloba feels thatwe mustwithdraw all citizens of
eclipsed by shipments from the JNA . Serbia and Montenegro from the JNA in Bosnia
and Herzegovina in a timely fashion and trans
In addition to its support for the SDS , the SDB fer citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the
covertly worked inside Bosnia — as it did in Croatia , JNA there in order to avoid generalmilitary
to link Serb members of the MUP so that one day they chaos upon international recognition ...That
could rapidly form a separate Bosnian Serb police will also create the possibility for the Serb lead
force . Given clear indications that then SDB Deputy ership in Bosnia and Herzegovina to assume
Chief Jovica Stanisic and his subordinates helped cre command over the Serb part of the JNA.44
ate the Bosnian Serb MUP when it came into being in
the spring of 1992 and the rapidity with which the Shortly thereafter,Milosevic began secretly engineer
changeover took place, the SDB almost certainly had ing the transfer of Bosnian - born JNA officers, the
laid plans for such a move at least as early as 1991.* 43 majority of whom were ethnic Serbs , back to their
home republic.45 Federal Defense Secretary General
Kadijevic — who two months earlier probably would
The JNA : Defender of Serbs have turned down such a request — accepted Jovic's
order and reported on 25 December that it had been
As the Croatian war dragged to a finish during carried out. This was a naked attempt to position the
November and December 1991, the JNA had become JNA to serve as an ethnic Serb military force within
more and more committed to shifting its loyalties Bosnia if and when independence came. It was also a
direct contradiction of the JNA's policy on the distri
See Annex 22 for a detailed description of the Bosnian Serb bution of soldiers from a given republic - one of the
MUP's formation .

128
central issues over which Slovenia had gone to war in Meanwhile , by late March, as the situation in Bosnia
June 1991. As Jovic explains it: continued to degenerate , the JNA concluded that it
needed to hasten the redistribution of its forces from
Milosevic and I were talking about it.Wedid not Muslim and Croat areas within Bosnia to “ safe," Serb
talk to anybody else. We instructed the General controlled territory. On 3 April, just before the out
Staff to redeploy troops and transfer all those break of hostilities , Acting Federal Defense Secretary
born in Bosnia to Bosnia and withdraw those General Adzic issued an order to General Kukanjac
born in Serbia and Montenegro to Serbia and and the Second Military District (as well as presum
Montenegro ... [By the time of recognition ) out ably Fourth Military District elements in Herzegov
of 90,000 troops in Bosnia, I think , 85 percent of ina) to " hasten the withdrawal." Moreover, the JNA
them were from Bosnia .46 47 was not only pulling out its units but was also with
drawing all Bosnian TO weapons,military -industrial
By this time, too , the JNA had begun to fully articu facilities, and , in some ways more important, all
late its dual-track policy for Bosnia of working for ammunition and fuel stocks.50
peace between all three ethnic groups but preparing
for war in support of the Serbs. A 20 March assess
ment of the Bosnian situation from Genera Kukanjac , Organization of JNA and Serb Military and Police
the senior JNA commander in the republic , to the JNA Forces, April 1992
General Staff clearly outlines his command's distaste
for an interethnic war but notes that “ the Serb people As a result of the SDB and JNA preparations, at the
is objectively in danger, and we are therefore protect outbreak of fighting in April 1992, federal and Serb
ing their interests." 48 forces in Bosnia consisted of four types of armed for
mations : the regular Yugoslav People's Army, volun
The JNA had already begun , however, to make thor teer units raised by the JNA ,municipal Bosnian Serb
ough preparations for a war to “ defend” the Serbs. The Territorial Defense ( TO ) detachments , and Bosnian
Army took a liberal view of the formation of Serb vol Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs police forces .
unteer units within the JNA and the provision of
weapons to Bosnian Serb Territorial Defense and With the conclusion of the Slovenian war and the
police formations,while working to relocate JNA agreed-upon withdrawal of all JNA forces from
units, depots, and military industries away from pre Croatia , a tremendous amount of military equipment
dominantly Muslim and Croat areas. JNA actions to had been withdrawn into Bosnia -Herzegovina by the
support local and regional Bosnian Serb police and beginning of 1992. ( This was, of course, in addition to
military elements appear to date from 30 December the disproportionate fraction of Yugoslav military
1991 when the JNA General Staff issued an order, units and defense industries that were already concen
which , in context, appears to have authorized JNA trated in the nation's central republic .) As a result, the
military assistance to such authorities. Muslim republic was a veritable arsenal on the eve of war.
researcher Dr. Smail Cekic notes that , After giving up the war in Croatia , the JNA had reor
ganized its forces in western Croatia and Bosnia,
In conformity with the orders of the General redistributing units and equipmentwithdrawn into
Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, in partic Bosnia from Slovenia and Croatia and revamping its
ular the order of 30 December 1991, and regional command structure. JNA forces in all of
instructions of the Federal Secretariat of
See Annex 22, Organization of Bosnian Serb and Yugoslav Peo
National Defense (especially those of 21 Febru ple's Army Forces, April 1992, for a detailed description of the
ary ... ), JNA supplied arms and equipment for various Serb and federalarmed forces.
Serb armed units of the Territorial Defense and
Police, as well as for other Serb " volunteer ”
49
units ...

129
Bosnia — most of the new Second Military District, With Izetbegovic's approval, on 10 June 1991 the
which covered the bulk of Bosnia and Croatia, SDA convened a meeting in Sarajevo of the most
together with elements of theMontenegrin -based prominent Muslim leaders,53 who proceeded to estab
Fourth Military District - by early April numbered lish a “ Council for the National Defense of the Mus
some 100,000 to 110,000 troops.51 These forces were lim Nation ." Its purpose was to oversee military
equipped with an estimated 500 tanks, 400 field artil preparations — to be executed through the Patriotic
lery pieces over 100 mm , 48 multiple rocket launch League — for armed defense in the event of Bosnian
ers , and 350 120 -mm mortars. The JNA also had some independence .54 As Hasan Cengic later explained it:
120 fighter-bombers, some40 light attack /observation
helicopters, and 30 transport helicopters based in the We decided to form the (Patriotic League) orga
republic. nization through the structure of the (SDA )
party because that was the only structure we
At the same time, the JNA -armed and SDS-controlled could rely on ... We decided to form a military
Bosnian Serb Territorial Defense units — formed from organization with a very broad basis - the patri
Serb -dominated Bosnian Republic TO headquarters otic (basis ), for the defense of the constitutional
together with volunteer units that were melded into order in Bosnia -Herzegovina , if needed , of
TO formations, had almost 60,000 loosely organized democracy,market economy, human rights and
personnel. These units operated primarily under the pluralism . The main idea was simple : we should
control of the localmunicipal officials, although JNA have an organization of a military nature which
regionalheadquarters exercised command authority would , in the case of a serious military attack ,
when nearby. Finally, the newly formed Bosnian Serb be the spine of the total national and patriotic
MUP, which came into existence on 1 April, had an gathering. We did not think about weapons
estimated 15,000 police — active, reserve , and special. much . At thatmoment, we concentrated on
The MUP police usually worked under the authority organizing people.55
of the local municipality in conjunction with TO and
volunteer troops . The Patriotic League's stated purpose was to defend a
" united " Bosnia -Herzegovina, although what this
Chapter 17 meant was left somewhat unclear. Overwhelmingly
The Bosnian Muslims in 1992 : Muslim in its membership , the Patriotic League
The “ Patriotic League” —Bosnia's Muslims Begin included some Croats and even a small number of
To Organize Serbs.

In early February 1991, leaders of the Muslim -based According to Maj. Gen. Aleksandar Vasiljevic — the
SDA party met in the small town ofMehurici outside KOS officer assigned to monitor developments in Slo
Travnik to consider alternatives should the Slovenian venia and Croatia , and who later became chief of the
and Croatian Republics carry out their stated plans to JNA Security Directorate — KOS had two agents at the
declare independence in June. Shortly after this SDA very top of the SDA leadership who were able to
Executive Board meeting, Hasan Cengic (later Bos inform the federal authorities of any actions by the
nian Defense Minister) met with Rusmir Mahmutce nascent Muslim paramilitary underground .KOS also
hajic (at that time Deputy PrimeMinister in the stepped up its surveillance of all previously identified
Bosnian Republic Government) to propose the forma Muslim nationalists within the JNA officer ranks.56
tion of a paramilitary organization as an adjunct of the Vasiljevic later maintained that JNA counterintelli
SDA political party. The subject was broached with gence repeatedly warned the JNA General Staff and
then Republic President Izetbegovic in early March the Yugoslav Presidency that the SDA was organizing
1991 , and early preparations proceeded with his a military arm but that KOS's warnings were disre
approval. Thus was born the " Patriotic League of garded by a preoccupied and indecisive Belgrade
Peoples," generally known simply as the " Patriotic
League." 52

130
leadership that was unable to putKOS's findings to representatives of all three nations support this
any good use: campaign . Izetbegovic, Karadzic, and Kljuic did
not do this, so that the whole thing fell through
We had documents, conversations recorded by 57

tape recorders and cameras. We got hold of the

entire organizational structure of the Muslim
armed forces. We used cameras to record illegal Arming the Bosnian Muslims
meetings by military personnel. We knew that a
republican command had been formed and that On 25 September 1991 the UN Security Counc
it consisted of two parts: the military and the adopted Resolution 713 , which called for an immedi
political crisis commands. There are nine ate end to hostilities within the former Yugoslavia ,
regional commands in the territory of B - H and UN -sponsored mediation in the conflict, and — most
one each in Kosmet and Sandzak [in Serbia ) ... important— a complete embargo on all weapons ship
ments to the former Yugoslavia. Even after Slovenia ,
The “ Patriotic League of Nations” (PLN ) was Croatia, Macedonia , and Bosnia were recognized by
made up ofmobile units, units with a regional the UN as independent countries, the UN continued to
structure for protecting inhabited places and apply the arms embargo to them . The Security Coun
territories, and special-purpose units - for spe cil's objective was to minimize the number of weap
cial tasks of a sovereign - territorial character. ons in circulation in the former Yugoslavia and, by
They are known by the public as “Green extension , to reduce the potential for bloodshed . The
Berets. " practical consequence of UN Resolution 713 was to
lock in the weapons advantage of one side— the
As always, we (KOS) gathered detailed informa Bosnian Serbs — and to close off the other side's abil
tion and sent it to the appropriate place [ i.e. the ity to achieve parity.58
Federal Presidency) ... Thus, they knew in time
that there existed a secretMuslim military orga With the republic placed under an arms embargo and
nization (the PLN ), which comprised about denied the weapons sources of the Bosnian Serbs—
50,000 more than well-organized people, nearly the JNA and the Serbian MUP - Bosnian Muslimsnot
half of which were already armed even at the already in the Territorial Defense looked to the Patri
very outset. Thus, well organized but poorly otic League as their only effective mechanism for
armed ... arming themselves. Unfortunately for them , the Patri
otic League failed miserably to acquire and distribute
The voluminous and secret information thatwe weapons. Shortages of time and money were com
sent to the State Presidency on the creation and pounded by some officials who misappropriated the
organization of Muslim paramilitary forces funds given them to buy arms and by an inflationary
included a blank page at the end on which the spiral that drove prices up as all sides scrambled to
members of the Presidency could write down arm themselves. The Patriotic League managed to
their remarks. They did not do this either. They acquire covertly some weapons from the Bosnian
simply did not know what they wanted ... MUP and procured some others through Croatia. The
number ofweapons it was able to stockpile before the
Then we worked up an exact plan on what had to war, however, fell far short of its requirements.
be done. We formed a command for coordinating
this activity and appointed mixed units for seiz So, how many armed units did the Patriotic League
ing weapons. It was necessary that the Republi actually have at the outset of the war ? Subsequent tes
can MUP of B - H , the Federal SUP (Secretary timony suggests that the Patriotic League had at most
for Internal Affairs), and the Army take part in
that disarming campaign . In the end, we
concluded that we would not do anything until

131
40,000 armed personnel and a fairly evolved organiza- Izetbegovic further elaborated on the history and role
tional structure . By the start of the war, it had estab of the Patriotic League in a speech in 1997. His long
lished nine regional commands (reportedly located in narration is worth examining both for the chronology
Sarajevo , Doboj, Cazin , Prijedor, Livno , Mostar , he provides and for illustration of the credit Izetbe
Visegrad , Tuzla , and the Sandzak in Serbia)59 further govic gives to the Patriotic League as the organiza
subdivided into 103 municipal headquarters. These tional and philosophical forerunner of the future
formation varied widely in size , ranging from platoons Bosnian army:
to small brigades.61
In June 1991 the SDA Council for National
Significantly , the JNA and the Bosnian Serbs most Defense was formed . This meeting was attended
likely believed the Patriotic League was both larger by about 400 representatives of Bosnians from
and better organized than it actually was. The JNA's the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia , pri
official journal, Narodna Armija , claimed in March marily from Bosnia - Herzegovina .
1992 that the Patriotic League had a membership of
over 50,000 organized into a republic -level staff and In July 1991 the first military experts ( e.g. ex
nine regional political-military headquarters.62 A week JNA officers ) joined the Patriotic League and
later, a colonel from the JNA's Second Military Dis provided the first directives for the defense of
trict publicly claimed that the Muslim paramilitary Bosnia -Herzegovina .
units (“ Patriotic League" and " Green Berets" )
together had 60,000 men under arms.63 A post- JNA The first truckload ofweaponry arrived in
Yugoslav military journal, Vojska , claimed in July August 1991.
1992 that the Patriotic League had about 50,000 men
organized into “ four divisions, three regiments, 55 The firstmilitary training began in September
units of battalion - detachment strength , 62 units of
company-platoon strength , and several dozen special The first units were formed in October
units.":64 Such numbers and details, whether they had
any basis in fact, were bandied about for some time In November a long- range radio transmitter was
and were widely believed by at least the Bosnian Serb acquired to cover all of Bosnia -Herzegovina,
citizenry , who grew neurotically afraid of an under and the training of communications operators
ground Muslim armywith armed shadow units in their began .
midst. Worries like these readied them for the idea of
ethnic cleansing when the opportunity presented itself. In December the organizing of personnel and
the arming of reserve police units of the Bosnia
Izetbegovic would later state that the Patriotic League Herzegovina MUP (Ministry of Internal Affairs )
had between 30,000 and 40,000 armed personnel at began at the initiative and under the leadership
the outset of the war.65 The Sarajevo regional head of the Patriotic League.
quarters alone reportedly had 10,000 armed personnel
out of a totalmembership of some 30,000.66 67 As In January 1992 the first unit of the Patriotic
Izegetbegovic narrated it: League with military training was created , and
the distribution of TO arms began at the initia
... in the second half of 1991, the League of tive of the Patriotic League, an action thatwas
Patriots (" Patriotska Liga ') was formed in an carried out through the highest organs of
attempt to arm the people and to be, to a certain Bosnia -Herzegovina .
extent, ready for any possible attack . I can say
that the main headquarters of the League of
Patriotswas formed immediately before the war.
Nine regions and municipal headquarters were
also formed ; in some places better, in somemore
poorly organized ... according to our counts,
the League had approximately 30,000 to 40,000
68
armed people when we were attacked.

132
 In February 1992 at a conference in Mehurici, party - affiliated Croatian Defense Council (HVO ).
orders for the staff of the Patriotic League of Both were offshoots of larger, already established par
Bosnia -Herzegovina were defined and issued , ent organizations in Croatia . Despite the similar
and political directives on the principles of nomenclature and ostensibly similar goals, the two
defense ofBosnia -Herzegovina were set out. The organizations were political,military, and philosophi
political goals were: defense of the territory, cal rivals, and they initially competed for influence
democracy, a multiethnic community, and within the Bosnian Croat ministate. As events
human rights. unfolded , the HOS rapidly lost out to the HVO , which
had the full and explicit backing of Franjo Tudjman's
In April 1992, after the decision by the Bosnia HDZ party and the Croatian Army itself .
Herzegovina Presidency that the Territorial
Defense of Bosnia -Herzegovina was the state
defense structure, the three high -ranking Terri The Croatian Defense Force
torial Defense officers who were appointed then
joined the command of the Patriotic League of In late 1991 the extreme rightwing Croatian Party of
Bosnia -Herzegovina and began commanding Rights (Hrvatska Stranka Prava – HSP) within
the existing structure of the Patriotic League .. Croatia proper began to establish a paramilitary pres
ence in Croat-majority Bosnia . This armed wing of the
At the beginning of the war the Patriotic League HSP political party was named (in both Croatia and
of Bosnia - Herzegovina had around 30,000 Bosnia ) the Croatian Armed Force (Hrvatske Oruzane
armed volunteers arranged in units, with an Snage — HOS).
established corps area and commander.
The leader of the HSP in Croatia , an extreme Croat
Prior to the war, the Patriotic League had a nationalistnamed Dobroslav Paraga, appointed Blaz
well-developed logistical system . That system Kraljevic to head the HOS paramilitary forces in Bos
remained the backbone of logistics for the Army nia . Paraga established a “main headquarters for
of Bosnia -Herzegovina until the end of the war, Herzegovina" in Ljubuski on 3 January 1992 , but
thanks to SDA state policy and the solidarity of overall direction appears to have come from the HSP
friendly countries in the Islamic world ... leadership in Zagreb.71 72 Mile Dedakovic ( a.k.a. “ Jas
treb ,” or “Hawk” ) was named Commander of the
If it were not for the Patriotic League of Bosnia HOS with his headquarters in Ljubuski. Dedakovic
Herzegovina , the defense of Bosnia -Herzegov had helped lead the unsuccessful Croatian Army
ina would not have been possible. It was the first defense of Vukovar and had then been imprisoned
army of our defense. From it emerged the Army briefly in Croatia early in 1992. ByMarch 1992 he
69
of the Republic of Bosnia -Herzegovina ... had become the leader of the HSP's military wing.73 74
In total the HOS had perhaps 5,000 active fighters at
Chapter 18 any given time.75
The Bosnian CroatMilitaries: HOS and HVO
Oddly enough , despite the HOS's affiliation with the
This is a war between Serbs and Croats that will Croat-nationalist HSP party , it wasmore willing to
be fought down to the last Muslim . accept Muslimsinto its ranks than the HVO . The HOS
was also more acceptable to Muslims than the HVO ,
A Bosnian Army commander in since the latter openly advocated a territorial partition
Mostar, August 1992.70 of Bosnia , which was squarely against the objectives
ofmost Muslims.?
As 1992 opened , the Bosnian Croats had two main
political/military organizations, the HSP party
affiliated Croatian Armed Force (HOS) and the HDZ

133
With the outbreak of the war, the HVO and the HOS directed by HV General Janko Bobetko through
would compete for power and influence within the former HV officers reassigned to the HVO.78 The HV
nascent Bosnian Croat state , and , by the close of the HVO relationship went well beyond the deployment
first year of fighting, the HOS as an independent fight- of allied HV units fighting alongside HVO forces in
ing force would cease to exist and play no role of sig Bosnia. Not only were HV and HVO forces operating
nificance in the remainder of the war. Although the under a joint command but the HVO Main Staff was
HOS may have started with some organizational itself an HV forward command post, established on 16
advantages, it was not explicitly backed by Zagreb in April in Grude at Tudjman's direction .?' Bobetko per
the way the HVO was, and it was always fated to be sonally selected the first HVO commander, former
the junior force among the Bosnian Croatmilitaries. Croatian Army Colonel Milivoj Petkovic , and Petk
The HOS lost out when the HVO -HOS rivalry ovic's newly established HVO headquarters was
descended into open confrontation in the late summer. simultaneously also an HV command post both offi
of 1992, and its influence plummeted thereafter. The cially and in practice.80 During the entire Bosnian
demise of the HOS became all but complete after the war — but especially during the first several months—
HVO's assassination of HOS commander Blaz the HVO's chain of command, both political and mili
Kraljevic and eight of his staff on 9 August.77 tary, would run all the way back to Tudjman's desk in
Zagreb .

The Croatian Defense Council When war began the HVO probably had some 15,000
and perhaps as many as 20,000 troops under arms.
The Croatian Defense Council (Hrvatska Vijece These were initially formed as “ Croatian Defense
Odbrane - HVO )—frequently just called the Bosnian Councils" for each Croat-controlled municipality ( for
Croat Army - was formally established in early Janu example , the " Kiseljak Croatian Defense Council" )
ary 1992, although the Croat-based HDZ political but would later be organized into battalions and bri
party had begun organizing paramilitary units in Bos gades. The Bosnian Croat forces were on average bet
nia late in the summer of 1991. With Zagreb's exten ter organized and equipped than their Bosnian Army
sive assistance — and with the example of the 1991 counterparts but still lacked the professionalism and
Croatian war to motivate local populations to organize expertise of their JNA and Bosnian Serb Army oppo
and arm themselves — the HVO appears to have made nents and had little armor and artillery. These limita
considerable headway toward establishing itself tions were to constrain the HVO's performance for the
before fighting began. Fully formed HVO units would remainder of the war, preventing it from ever becom
surface within days of the Bosnian war's beginning, ing a robust, fully independent fighting force .
complete with officers, staffs, organizations, and
weapons. Chapter 19
The War Begins: The Bosnian War in 1992
The HVO leadership was almost exclusively Bosnian
Croat, although the ethnic composition of HVO units By March 1992 , Bosnia was clearly drifting toward
varied significantly by region. A few Muslims were civil war. Barricades sprang up along roads and out
accepted into HVO formations in central Bosnia and side towns as villagers armed themselves against the
Herzegovina, while a significant percentage were inhabitants of the next town over — or elsewhere
accepted into some of the “MHVO ” brigades in north within the same town. On 18 March 1992, in a last
ern Bosnia where Croat-Muslim relations were much ditch , admittedly stopgap effort to avert war, the EC
better. persuaded all three ethnic leaders to sign the “ Sara
jevo agreement” to divide the republic into ethnically
Organized and directed from Zagreb , the HVO in
1992 was for all practical purposes a subordinate com
mand of the Croatian Army (Hrvatska Vojska ),

134
based cantons. On 25 March , however, Bosnian Presi next day Serb TO and volunteer troops surrounded
dent Izetbegovic announced one of the policy rever and flooded the town , routing scattered members of
sals for which he would soon become known . He the Bosnian Muslim Patriotic League and police and
repudiated his statement of the previous week executingMuslim leaders in the streets. They were led
claiming he had been pressured into signing by the EC by the already infamous Arkan's Tigers, the Serbian
representatives — and called for all Bosnian citizens to Volunteer Guard that had fought around Vukovar the
reject the terms of the Sarajevo agreement on the previous summer. Their reign of terror continued even
grounds that it effectively divided the republic along after JNA troops moved in to “ keep the peace" on
ethnic lines. Instead , Izetbegovic renewed his call for 3 April, and by 4 April the Serbs had full control of
a governmental system founded on the principle of a the town. The town's Muslim residents either cowered
unitary,multiethnic Bosnian state . in their homes or fled for their lives.83 The operation
had been a setpiece recreation of the summer 1991
Izetbegovic's call, though perhaps well intentioned , fighting in Croatia.84 85
was far too late, and the fragile structure of the inef
fective republic central governmentwas in no position The Bosnian Serb takeover in Bijeljina set in motion a
to do anything to back it up . The centrifugal forces chain of events that would leave all the military play
driving the country apart were far greater than the ers — the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Republic TO ,
weak forces binding the country together and which and the JNA - armed and ready for war when the
might have given hope to the idea of a multiethnic republic declared its independence only a few days
Bosnia . later. Angered by the JNA's failure to contain the vio
lence the Serbs had staged in Bijeljina, the Bosnian
If “ April is the cruelest month ," then April 1992 in Presidency voted to mobilize the republican Territo
Bosnia was to prove cruel indeed . As the month rialDefense , reserve MUP forces, and civil defense
began , the EC foreign ministers flew in to Luxem elements. On 4 April, Izetbegovic issued the order for
bourg to debate whether to extend diplomatic recogni- generalmobilization to, as he put it, “ ...enable peo
"786
tion to Bosnia ,while at the same time a similar debate ple to defend themselves ... from future Bijeljinas.""
went on in Washington. As Europe's ministers met yet The Serb members of the Bosnian Presidency, Kol
again to discuss the future of Bosnia , the Bosnian pop jevic and Plavsic , promptly declared the mobilization
ulation was already taking up armsand settling mat illegal and resigned from the Presidency that same
ters for themselves on the ground . day.87 The JNA meanwhile refused the Presidency
request for the return of the TO's weaponry, which the
All the catalysts that had broughtwar to Slovenia and Army had confiscated in 1990.88 Bosnia's Muslims
Croatia - paranoia , ethnic referendums, covert arm and Croats had by this point left the JNA, and Serb
ing, the formation of paramilitaries, and “ ethnic members of the TO ignored the mobilization order.
cleansing" -finally came together in the first week of Now there were two legally constituted armies in Bos
April in the Bosnian town of Bijeljina . An ethnically nia — the JNA and the Bosnian TO — and they were
divided town of about 36,000 people in the very north- already at odds.
east corner of Bosnia , Bijeljina sat less than 15 kilo
meters from the Serbian border at the junction of two The SDS and the Bosnian Serbshad been making
important roads.81 The town was key to the Serb their final preparations for the establishment of the
proclaimed “ Semberija and Majevica Autonomous Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" in
Region ,” and the SDS had made substantial efforts March. The last step , taken as fighting flared in Bijel
during 1991 and early 1992 to “ Serbianize" its police jina, was the creation of an independent Serb police
force and ensure Serb political control of the town.82 force , the MUP, on 1 April. SRBH President Karadzic
On 31March, in an apparent attempt to provoke an and the rest of the Serb leadership now were ready for
armed Muslim response that would justify a Serb
takeover of Bijeljina, local Serbs attacked a Muslim
frequented coffee shop . The provocation worked . The

135
a pretext to declare independence. The Bosnian Presi Serb Assembly was declaring its secession from the
dency's decision to mobilize the TO on 4 April gave new nation and claiming most of its land area. Politi
them that pretext. The Serbs immediately rejected the cally appointed SRBH police officers quickly moved
mobilization order and activated theirMunicipal to establish control in those Serb - coveted areas where
Crisis Headquarters, reserve police units , and TO Serb officials had not already achieved quasi- indepen
forces.89 The next provocation in the escalating crisis dent status. When supporters of the Bosnian Republic
soon came as Serb TO troops and Serb members of contested this power grab in severalkey towns, shoot
the Bosnian Republic MUP antiterrorist unit seized ing erupted , the fighting spread , and rival govern
the Republican Police Academy on a key hill over ments declared their opponents outlaws. The
looking central Sarajevo , apparently in preparation for international community had performed the diplo
a Serb attempt to partition the city by force. Armed matic equivalent of adopting a stillborn child .
clashes soon spread to other parts of Sarajevo.90
Cease -fire negotiations and the deployment of small
JNA " peacekeeping" units failed to halt the fighting.91 Yugoslav People's Army Objectives, Strategy , and
Operations in April -May 1992 *

Open Warfare : April 1992 As war erupted in April, the JNA continued to follow
its schizophrenic , two-track policy of attempting to
Declared or not, the Bosnian civil war began on defuse hostilities and arrange negotiations among the
6 April 1992 in reaction to the Republic's formal dec three ethnic groups while continuing to provide practi
laration of independence from the SFRY.92 93 This is cal support to the Bosnian Serbs. As the fighting esca
not to say that no blood had been shed in Bosnia lated , the Army's objectives and actions veered
before then . During March 1992 , Croat and JNA/Serb between the two poles, and its exact role in some
forces clashed in Bosanski Brod along the Republic's events remains obscure. What is clear is that the JNA ,
northern Sava River border. By 1 April organized vio already atwar with the Croatian Army, came to
lence had begun with the interethnic fighting in Bijel believe that Croatian forces had intervened in Bosnia
jina . Serb forces had begun positioning themselves on to threaten Bosnian Serbs in Kupres, Bosanski Brod ,
Vraca hill south of Sarajevo on 4 April, and shooting and southern Herzegovina. The JNA responded to this
broke out in Sarajevo on 5 April. It was on 6 April, perceived threat with direct military action , joining
however, that fighting ceased to be local and sporadic forces with Bosnian Serb Territorial Defense troops.
and flared into a country -wide conflict. After that day, Elsewhere , however, JNA commanders appear to have
the entire population Serb , Croat, and Muslim ;man , tried to fulfill their peacekeeping mission of providing
woman and child ; near or far from the frontlines a buffer between the republican and Bosnian Serb TO
found themselves in a country undeniably at war. forces. In practice , however, these actions were ren
There was no longer any way to avoid choosing sides . dered almost completely ineffective by the JNA's
overt sympathy toward the Serbs, who were never
That sameday — as the Bosnian Serbs prepared to take attacked or punished . In many incidents — including
full and overt control throughout their new republic the capture of Zvornik — the JNA would provide direct
the European Community formally recognized support in a Serb attack or occupation of a town.
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a fully sovereign , independent
country. The United States followed suit the next day. The overriding priority for the JNA, however,
remained the security of its barracks and depots
Radovan Karadzic had earlier stated that, if Bosnia
For a detailed account of JNA objectives and strategy see Annex
should ever be recognized as in independent nation, it
23: Yugoslav People's Army Objectives, Strategy, and Operations,
would not survive a single day. Hewas as good as his April-May 1992.
word . At virtually the samemoment the Europeans
and Americans were recognizing Bosnia as a sover
eign nation within its republic boundaries, the Bosnian

136
particularly in light of its experience in Croatia — and (RDB ) special operations unit , and JNA regular
it reacted fiercely any time these were threatened . troops, all supported by JNA artillery fire from Serbia .
When Bosnian Republic TO troops blockaded JNA The Muslim forces inside the town apparently were
barracks beginning 1 May and attacked evacuees from mostly Patriotic League defenders led by an individ
the JNA Second Military District Headquarters in ual named “ Captain Almir” 96 whose real namewas
Sarajevo , the JNA gave its full support to the Bosnian Samir Nistovic.97 All available evidence indicates that
Serb military and police forces . JNA units helped Captain Almir's Muslim forces were few in number or
organize the siege of Sarajevo and assisted in the cap poorly organized and probably both .
ture of a number of Serb objectives . The JNA's days in
Bosnia , though , were already numbered. Bowing to The first fighting broke out in and around Zvornik on
the fact of Bosnian ( and Macedonian ) independence , 8 April, and at the same timeJNA artillery blatantly
on 27 April the SFRY Presidency had proclaimed a began shelling Zvornik from inside Serbia on the far
new Federal Republic consisting of Serbia and Mon side of the river.98 The now -notorious " Arkan " arrived
tenegro , and had ordered that all federal personnel of on the scene that evening and delivered an ultimatum ,
these nationalities be withdrawn from Bosnia . By ordering the Muslims of the Zvornik municipality to
20 May this had been generally accomplished, and the hand over their arms by the following morning or
JNA's headquarters staffs and formations stationed in " experience the fate of Bijeljina." 99 Serb forces sur
Bosnia, drained of Serbians and Montenegrins (as rounded the town while the Muslimsmanned hastily
well as Croats and Muslims), became the nucleus of thrown-together barricades on the outskirts and waited
the new Bosnian Serb Army. anxiously through the night.100 Minutes after the ulti
matum expired the nextmorning, the Serb forces
Chapter 20 began their attack . Within hours they had occupied the
Nort heas tern Bosn ia , April 1992: The Axe Falls * town, and Muslim resistance within the town effec
tively ceased by nightfall.

Zvornik The Yugoslav People's Army actively supported the

Serb forces assaulting Zvornik , something it had not
Atthe beginning of April 1992 , Zvornik was a town done in Bijeljina .101 Indeed , the JNA made no effort to
of about 15,000 people (60 percent of them Muslims) conceal its involvement at Zvornik , and an official
nestled on the west bank of the Drina River. A two JNA statement from 10 April announced that follow
lane bridge connected it with the even smaller town of ing Croat-Muslim “ provocations” in the area,
Mali Zvornik on the opposite bank of the river in Ser
bia. Interethnic violence came to the region on the JNA and Territorial Defense units ... entered
winds of the republic -wide turbulence that followed Zvornik, pushed the paramilitary formations out
the independence referendum results announced on of town , established order, and restored commu
2 March ; two weeks later, Zvornik's Serbs proclaimed nications.102
their own independent“ Serbian Municipality of
Zvornik ." 94 At the end ofMarch , the Zvornik police It was the RDB's elite special operations unit that
force split into two rival bands.95 By the republic's would be identified as the decisive force in the brief
declaration of independence on 6 April, emotions had battle for Zvornik . The Serb extremist Vojislav Seselj
reached fever pitch . later bragged :

The Serb forces that rose to attack the Zvornik area The Bosnian Serb forces took part in it. But the
were a hodgepodge of professional and ultranational special units and the best combat units came
ist troops, including elements of the Zvornik TO , from this side (Serbia ). These were police
possibly some local police, Arkan's unit , Serbian units — the so - called Red Berets — special units of
ultranationalist leader Seselj's “ Serbian Chetnik the Serbian Interior Ministry of Belgrade. The
Movement," the Serbian State Security Department

* For a detailed account of the fighting in northeastern Bosnia in

April 1992, see Annex 26 : Northeastern Bosnia, April 1992: The
Axe Falls .

137
 army engaged itself to a small degree - it gave members of the Patriotic League. Atmost, there may
artillery support where it was needed . The oper have been 250 armed Muslims in the Visegrad area ,
ation had been prepared for a long time... not necessarily all answering to any single authority.
Everything was well organized and
implemented.103 Details of the contest in Visegrad are very hazy. The
heaviest fighting appears to have occurred 8 April
The capture of Zvornik typifies how the well around the police station and as Serb forces made an
organized Serb forces (created , supplied , and backed organized drive to clear Muslim forces from the left
by the State Security Department of the Serbian Inter bank of the Drina during the day." Panic gripped the
nal AffairsMinistry ), the Serbian RDB's own forces , population as rumors circulated of Arkan's imminent
and the JNA could collaborate to rapidly demolish a approach (which were false ); by the next morning the
stunned , ill -equipped , and disorganized Muslim entire Muslim population had fled Visegrad and its
resistance. environs. 112

Pockets of armed Muslim resistance seem to have sur

Visegrad vived for a few days after the fall of Visegrad itself.
As the town was being overrun , Bosnian Serb forces
South of Zvornik lay the east Bosnian town of Viseg appear to have wiped out a detachment of “Green
rad , once a Turkish stronghold in Bosnia . In 1571 the Berets” manning a roadblock near the town of Rudo
Ottoman Vizier of Bosnia commissioned the empire's on the Bosnian -Serbian border.113 Serb forces also
greatest architect, Sinan , to design and build a 180 snuffed out local Muslim resistance in the nearby vil
yard , 11- arched bridge over the Drina there. This lages over the next few days."14 115 Minor skirmishing
jewel of Turkish architecture was to provide the inspi may have continued for as much as a week after the
ration for the acclaimed book The Bridge on the Drina 7 April attack , but the Bosnian Serbs had effectively
by Yugoslavia's only Nobel Prize -winning author, Ivo established control over the area within 48 hours. 116
Andric .104 Andric's bridge imagery notwithstanding,
the Visegrad municipality had been fracturing since
January 1992, when its Serbs voted to join two of the Foca
self-proclaimed “ Serb Autonomous Regions, while
the town's Muslims remained loyal to the Sarajevo The ethnically split town of Foca (52 percentMuslim ,
government.105 The same disputes over municipal 45 percent Serb ), about 20 km southwest of Gorazde,
authority and the composition of the police force that sat along a north - south road running alongside the
had been seen in Zvornik led to tension , barricades, Drina River. As elsewhere in the Drina valley, there
and low -level violence in Visegrad as well.106 107 108 109 had been trouble in Foca for weeks before April
110
1992.117 118 On 23 March , following a series of inter
ethnic confrontations, the local SDS Crisis Center
Open warfare erupted on 7 April when Bosnian Serb declared a “ state of readiness" because of the " threat
Territorial Defense forces moved to seize control of ened security of the minority Serb population in
the town. The localSerb TO probably numbered some Gorazde” and stated that, if peace were not restored
1,000 irregular troops backed by roughly 100 to 200 that same day, the party would call on the Serbs of
municipal police , and these would most likely be Foca to arm themselves.119
assisted by some soldiers of the JNA 37th (Uzice )
Corps. Against this array Visegrad's Bosnian Muslim Organized Serb forces in the area consisted primarily
forces were clearly overmatched in numbers, organi of the Foca Territorial Defense, numbering probably
zation, and weapons. TheMuslimsprobably still had a about 1,000 troops . Elements of other Territorial
few of the local police and reserve police forces
perhaps 100 or so men — and perhaps several dozen

138
Defense units from nearby towns (at the very least, the further Serb advances while holding out in a few other
Cajnice TO ) probably assisted ,120 and as many as 200 areas. Serb units proceeded to mop up captured areas,
localMUP forces were probably also involved . At repeating their demands for the surrender ofMuslim
least in the later stages of the operation , the Bosnian forces in the remaining villages.131 132 When Serb
Serbs were also reinforced by volunteers from Seselj's forces had finally crushed all Muslim resistance in the
Serbian Chetnik Movement.121 Finally, the JNA's 37th Foca area itself, the focus of the Muslim defense
(Uzice ) Corps may have provided limited support. On shifted to the defensive ring around Gorazde.
the Muslim side , the Foca SDA appears to have been
exceptionally well organized , and the several hundred
defenders were probably the best armed and best orga The Battle for Weapons: Capturing the JNA
nized in eastern Bosnia . Their comparatively high Barracks
level of organization and armament gave the Foca
Muslims a fighting chance : whereas Muslim forces in Given Sarajevo's desperate need for weapons and the
Bijelina, Zvornik , and Visegrad had been all but virtual impossibility of importing any from abroad in
wiped out within a day or two , those in and around the near term , it was imperative that the government
Foca were able to resist for almost three weeks. forces capture asmuch materiel as possible from JNA
stores in Bosnia at the outset of the war. Surrounded
When Bosnia formally declared its independence on JNA garrisons and munitions factories becameprime
6 April, the Foca Serbs took over themunicipal insti targets .
tutions, including the police, and declared themselves
loyal to the SRBH and independent of the Sarajevo The Bosnian Army was plagued from the start by
government.122 Sporadic fighting by the evening of acquisition and allocation problems, for even the little
8 April focused on a contest for control of the hydro equipment it possessed or captured often proved use
electric plant near the town.123 In the pattern estab less. For instance, the Bosnian Army's Sarajevo -based
lished at Zvornik , the Serbs on 9 April formally First Corps appears to have captured a relatively large
declared that the localMuslims could either surrender amount of field artillery — but the Army was unable to
their arms or face retribution . When the deadline find ammunition for these pieces, and most of these
passed later that day , Serb forces began a mortar bar weapons lay idle during the war. When the Patriotic
rage against the Muslim -majority Donje Polje and League successfully stormed the Pretis factory in Vog
Sukovac neighborhoods.124 The next few days saw the osca in mid -April 1992, they captured some 800
most intense Muslim resistance in the Drina valley of “ Osa” 90 -mm antitank rockets, but no rocket launch
April 1992.125 126Most of the town became a no -man's ers. It is an indication of how desperate the Bosnians
land by day and a looter's paradise by night.127 By were in the early days of the war that they directed
14 April, the Serbs — frustrated with their inability to then Colonel Sulejman Vranj to fly at great risk from
dislodge the stubborn Muslim defenders from the Sarajevo to Visoko and back just to bring a single
Donje Polje district - battered the neighborhood with shoulder- fired rocket launcher into the city so the cap
concentrated mortar fire and eventually pried the tured rockets could be utilized. The precious weapon
Muslim defenders out of a high -rise building that had was driven from place to place and used atcritical
given snipers a dominating position overlooking the points throughout the city for weeks afterward .133
town.128 After this, the overall Muslim defensive posi
tion became untenable , and mostMuslimshad fled the An agreement on the evacuation of JNA forces was
Foca area by 17 April.129 130 finally signed on 18 May 1992 (in conjunction with a
very short-lived country -wide cease -fire ). In general,
The fall of the town did not end Muslim resistance , the JNA was allowed to withdraw its personnel from
which continued in the area almost until the end of surrounded barracks along with all JNA-owned heavy
April.Muslim forces appear to have rallied in the weapons and soldiers ' small arms. Bosnian Territorial
Ustikolina area (site of a JNA arms warehouse )
between Foca and Gorazde and attempted to block

139
Defense weapons - confiscated from the republic in restraining influence of the federal hierarchy, the Bos
1990 and stored in JNA facilities since then - were to nian Serbs believed that Muslims and Croats would
be turned over to the besieging government forces.134 dominate such a state to the detriment of the Serbs.
Later in 1992 the Bosnian Serb Assembly formally
In some cases, the evacuation of JNA forces and the codified its war aims, explicitly spelling out the objec
handover of TO weapons proceeded smoothly and tives and future borders of the of the Serbian Republic
without incident. Travnik Barracks had already been of Bosnia -Herzegovina — soon redesignated the
transferred to Muslim -Croat forces on 6 May under a “ Republika Srpska" :
locally negotiated arrangement.135Muslim Patriotic
League fighters seized Visoko's “ Ahmet Fetahagic ” Separate the Bosnian Serbs from Bosnia because
Barracks on 26-27 April, allowing the JNA troops to " outside Yugoslavia we do not have a future in
depart with their personal arms only. Zenica's “ Josip someone else's country.”
Jovanovic " barracks complex was blockaded on
8 May , and at least the TO equipment inside had been • Create a corridor linking western Bosnia (the
handed over to the Bosnian Army by 18 May.136 137 Bosanska Krajina) to Serbia through the Posavina,
Tuzla's "Husinska Buna" Barracks was turned over placing the border of the Serb Republic on the Sava
around 16 May.138 In western Bosnia , the JNA surren River.
dered control of two barracks outside Bihac on
19 May.139 140 141 ... the Drina River is not a border," and the
Bosnian Serb Republic should be allowed to unite
In other cases, however, the facilities had already been with the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia .
taken by storm , the evacuations were delayed , or the
retreating JNA forces were attacked . HV and HVO • The border of the Serb Republic with theMuslim
forces had attacked Capljina's “Milo Popara ” Bar and Croat section of Bosnia should run along the
racks even before the war began . The JNA evacuated Neretva and Una Rivers, in addition to the Sava.
the large military school at Pazaric uneventfully , but
not until 30 May. It was the JNA barracks in Sarajevo , • The Serb Republic should receive part of the city of
however, that were to prove the most contentious and Sarajevo .
require the most difficult negotiations. Evacuations of
the major JNA installations in the city — the " Marshal • The Serb Republic should have access to the sea.145
Tito " Barracks along sniper alley , and the “ Viktor
Bubanj," " Jusuf Dzonlic," and " Jajce" Barracks else In other words, the Bosnian Serbs wanted to create an
where around the city — were originally to have begun independent, territorially contiguous republic that
on 19 May but were delayed repeatedly. The Viktor could eventually rejoin the Federal Republic.
Bubanj Barracks was evacuated on 24 May, although (Although they never formally said so , the Serb lead
it is unclear whether any Territorial Defense weapons ers were probably still willing to accept a single state
were left behind.142 The JNA unilaterally abandoned organized into a loose confederation divided into three
the Jusuf Dzonlic Barracks in Nedzarici on 28 May, ethnic " cantons," a concept they had argued for before
leaving behind mortars and other equipment as the the war erupted.) Unstated but essential to the Serbs'
troops escaped overnight to Serb -held Ilidza.143 The physical achievement of their geopolitical goals and
Marshal Tito Barracks — largest of the JNA casernes the ending of the war would be the acquiescence of
in Sarajevo - was not evacuated until 5 June.144 the Muslim and Croat leadership in these objectives .
In the event, the Serbs would find creating their repub
Chapter 21 lic far easier than ending the war on their terms. A fur
Bosnian Serb War Aims and Military Strategy, ther, unstated war aim also appears to have been that
1992 the population ofthe new state , Republika Srpska,
must be almost purely Serb . Although little evidence
The Bosnian Serb political leadership , led by Radovan exists that the most senior of the SDS leaders, such as
Karadzic , formed their own entity and went to war in Karadzic and Krajisnik , officially approved such a
April 1992 because they did not wish to be part of an war aim , the systematic way in which the Bosnian
independent, unitary Bosnian state . Without the

140
Serbs, particularly local SDS organizations, carried most reviled armies in the world . The Vojske Repub
out their ethnic cleansing operations makes it almost like Srpske (VRS - Army of the Serb Republic ), was
certain that they had high -level direction . formed through the melding of two distinct forces ,
superimposing the structure of the JNA's Second Mili
To achieve the Serbs ' primary war aim of a contigu tary District over the disorganized , SDS-controlled
ous state within its proposed "borders ," Bosnian Serb Bosnian Serb Territorial Defense . The melding was
military strategy during 1992 called for Serb forces to not an altogether happy one. Differences between the
take the strategic offensive . Through a series of large VRS's ex -JNA ( and ex - Communist) senior command
scale campaigns and smaller operations, the Bosnian ers and the Serbian nationalists of the SDS over war
Serb Army (VRS) hoped to seize key territorial and aims, military strategy, and the SDS role in the Army
economic objectives. The most important of these was were to lead to political-military conflicts throughout
the establishment of a northern supply corridor the war. These conflicts were exacerbated by the well
stretching across the Posavina region through the river founded belief within the SDS that the VRS often
town of Brcko to link western Bosnia to eastern Bos answered more directly to Serbian President
nia and northern Serbia . Without this “ Posavina corri Milosevic and Belgrade than it did to the Bosnian
dor” the nascent Serb state would have been a Serb Presidency.
bifurcated one. The VRS therefore launched a large
operation lasting over six months to open and secure a The VRS was initially organized into a Main Staff and
corridor from Doboj to Brcko. The second significant five regional corps ( later joined by a sixth ) with some
VRS operation was the campaign to capture the town 80 maneuver brigades and regiments, plus a full com
of Jajce and the territory around it , including two plement of support formations, by the end of 1992.
hydroelectric plants vital to the economic viability of The force initially comprised over 250,000 troops
Serb -controlled western Bosnia . Earlier, the VRS had falling to 155,000 troops by war's end - equipped
conducted a series of smaller actions in western Bos with 500 to 550 tanks, about 250 armored personnel
nia to secure the area against a Muslim -Croatmilitary carriers or infantry fighting vehicles, some 500 to 600
threat that existed only in Serb propaganda, while field artillery pieces, and 400 to 500 heavy mortars .
expelling most of theMuslim -Croat population . The The VRS's Air and Air Defense Force had some 20
VRS sustained and extended the siege of Sarajevo to fighter-bombers , 15 light attack and observation heli
seize parts of the city for a Bosnian Serb capital and, copters , and 15 transport helicopters.** One of the
more important,maintain pressure on the Bosnian Army's first priorities was to convert the mob of TO
Government to meet Serb terms. Smaller operations personnel into properly organized , well- led light
swept the length of the Drina valley against strong infantry brigades , while simultaneously reining in
Bosnian Government resistance , often alternating many of the virtually autonomous volunteer units .
between the defensive and offensive . The VRS also
unsuccessfully attempted to secure one of the " bor Despite the JNA's recentwar in Croatia, relatively few
ders " of Republika Srpska along the Una River near of the JNA corps or maneuver brigades inherited by
Bihac in western Bosnia . Only in southern Herzegov the VRS had combat experience , although most of the
ina did the VRS operate in a purely defensive mode, Army's senior and midlevel commanders and staff
defending the “ borders ” against HV /HVO operations officers had seen service during the fighting in neigh
around Mostar and Trebinje . boring republics. The brain of the VRS, the Main Staff
(Glavni Stab ), was formed from the remnants of the
Second Military District headquarters and infused
Mladic's Own : The Bosnian Serb Army146 with new life through the introduction of such veteran
officers as Mladic and the Chief of the Main Staff,
Created from the ashes of the JNA, the Bosnian Serb Manojlo Milovanovic . The professionalism of the
Army under General Ratko Mladic was to become one
of themost proficientmilitary forces in the Balkans For a description of the role which the VRS Air and Air Defense
Force played in 1992 , see Annex 33: The Role ofthe Bosnian Serb
during the 1992 to 1995 war, as well as one of the Air and Air Defense Force in 1992.

* For a detailed discussion of the Bosnian Serb Army's ethos,

organization , and methods, see Annex 24: “Mladic's Own : The
Bosnian Serb Army."

141
Main Staff was to be one of the VRS's key advantages Chapter 22
throughout the war. The most experienced corps com Bosnian Government War Aims
mand was the 1st Krajina Corps (formerly the JNA and Military Strategy
5th Banja Luka Corps), which formed the Army's
backbone during the conflict. From the outset of the war the Bosnian Government
found itself behind the curve of events, leaving it with
The heart and soul of the VRS was Ratko Mladic . His one fundamentalwar aim : simple survival. After the
charisma, combined with an aggressive, no -compro first few battles in Bijelina, Zvornik , and Foca, it rap
mise attitude and a frontline leadership style ,made idly became apparent that the Bosnian Serbs were
him a hero among Serb soldiers and civilians alike. fighting a war for ethnic purity and territorial gains.
Mladic molded and shaped the Army into a ruthless The Bosnian Government's basic objective was there
and efficientmachine that made the most of his own fore to retain control over as much of Bosnia's terri
fiery offensive style , cool, calculating JNA staff work , tory as possible. Besides being vital for military and
and the army's inherited firepower. The VRS was domestic political reasons, itwas also critical that the
Mladic's army. His defiance of Bosnian Serb Presi Sarajevo government convince the international com
dent Karadzic on many key issues throughout the war , munity that Bosnia was a viable state thatmerited
culminating in Karadzic's failed attempt to relieve international attention and involvement.
him in late 1995, demonstrated that the Army
answered to oneman , Ratko Mladic ; and the only man The Bosnian Army enjoyed a modicum of central
Mladic was willing to answer to was Slobodan organization from the start, and its coordination of
Milosevic. forces improved somewhat over the first few months.
Bosnian Government objectives and military strategy
Despite the VRS's impressive military capability, a tended to be locally focused , however, and not coordi
strategic reality afflicted it throughout the war — the nated across regions. Forces in the Drina valley or
lack of sufficient troop reserves, ensuring that the Herzegovina, for instance , operated almost com
Armywould never have the ability to deliver a knock pletely independently of those in , say, the Posavina or
out blow to its enemies or adequately hold a frontline western Bosnia . Regional commands did occasionally
of more than 1,000 kilometers. Even during 1992, the support each other, as when forces from the Herze
VRS was repeatedly forced to shuttle units across the govina area worked to help those in Sarajevo by oper
country from battle to battle. This shortage of reserves ating on Mt. Igman , but this was the exception rather
required the VRS to concentrate on holding down than the rule. A tenuous supply train passed a trickle
casualties and rely heavily on concentrated firepower of weapons and ammunition up from Croatia through
in its operations. Despite good doctrine, however, Herzegovina and on to central and northern Bosnia ,
inadequate training hampered tactical efficiency in but in general the supply system was also locally
VRS units and kept casualties high. Substantial assis based. For the first year of the war, both the govern
tance provided by the Yugoslav Army (VJ)—the ment as a whole and each government-held region
JNA's successor in Serbia and Montenegro - through essentially fought its own battle for survival.
out the war helped make up shortfalls in officer and
NCO cadres, logistics, and maintenance, but the VJ
never deployed large combat formations into Bosnia . The Bosnian Territorial Defense
The VJ, Serbian State Security Department (RDB),
and the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs sent only While the Bosnian Serbs inherited much of the infra
token combat units into the country during the fight structure and equipment of the JNA in Bosnia , the
ing and probably never had more than 2,000 men in Bosnian Muslims and Croats started the war in control
Bosnia at a single time. The usual figure was almost of virtually no Army installations and could hope to
certainly far lower.

142
surround only a comparative handful of JNA garrisons With war already underway, it was imperative that the
(for example, Sarajevo , Tuzla, Mostar, Bihac ) in the Bosnian Government establish some form of central
hope of collecting their weapons. ized direction over the fragmented , competing com
mands and the haphazard mix of regular and volunteer
Bosnia'smultiethnic character had prevented Sarajevo units loyal to it. Fortunately, the Patriotic League— no
from consciously transforming its Territorial longer an underground militia — agreed to merge its
Defense — much of which was drawn from Serb volunteer units with the government-held fraction of
majority areas— into an independent force to counter the Territorial Defense . On 10 April the Patriotic
the Bosnian Serbs. The Slovenians had had an ethni League announced that it was effectively disbanding
cally homogeneous force committed to independence, and “ ... placing itself at the disposal of and ...
but the Bosnian Government could not use its republic de facto joining the structure of the Territorial Defense
TO to establish or train a secret army without Bel ” 148 At least in theory, the largest paramilitary
grade instantly learning about it. The SDA had organization and the closest thing to a regular Bosnian
attempted the next best thing, using the organization military unit had merged at the outset of the conflict.
of the political party to conceal a paramilitary organi
zation . The Patriotic League (less than a year old and On 15 April 1992 , when the Bosnian Government in
with no formal training or heavy weapons) was no Sarajevo declared the establishment of a military force
match , however, for the VRS , already a regular, com based on the former republic Territorial Defense, the
bined -arms army. Therefore, when Bosnia fractured Bosnian Army consisted of little more than the text of
three ways in the opening days of the war, the republi- the announcement. All across the country , Bosnian
can Territorial Defense did so as well. In a country Muslimsand Bosnian Croats were gathering up arms
wide race for arms, weapons stocks were seized by wherever they could be found and using whatever
whichever ethnic group could get there first with the structure happened to exist locally — Territorial
most people. Defense, Patriotic League, police forces, criminal
gangs , or hodgepodge volunteer units — to organize
By the eve of the war JNA headquarters in Belgrade themselves for defense. For all practical purposes, the
had gone a long way toward its goal of reducing the Bosnian Governmenthad found itself at war without
potential threat of the Bosnian Territorial Defense to an army. The price for this unreadiness would prove
the JNA . As of 1992 the Bosnian To had been shrunk steep indeed , and the Bosnian nation would pay it in
from its all-time high of over 300,000 troops in the blood .
mid - 1980s down to a theoreticalmobilized strength of
only 86,000 troops. Almost all of the TO's weaponry By late April the Bosnian Government had reorga
had long since been moved to JNA- controlled storage nized the republic's Territorial Defense - omitting the
sites. On paper the Bosnian TO may have had nine Serb -held areas of Bosnia from its organization and
regional subcommands and tens of thousands of incorporating the Patriotic League's volunteers - into
troops and weapons, but the reality was that the terri seven regional districts and 75 municipal headquar
tory, the manpower , and the TO inventories would all ters.149 In total, the Bosnian Government probably
be divided ( quite unequally) among Bosnia's Serbs, started the war with more than 100,000 men but prob
Muslims, and Croats. The JNA passed the lion's share ably only 40,000 to 50,000 small arms and virtually
of the TO weaponry to the Bosnian Serbs, with the no heavy weapons. Later itwould surround a few JNA
Croat-dominated HVO and HOS obtaining most of garrisons and confiscate their weapons, adding proba
what could be seized in Croat-majority areas. The bly several thousand more small arms, limited
forces directed by the Sarajevo government - by this amounts of ammunition and explosives, and atmost a
time a shaky de facto alliance of armed ethnic Mus few dozen tanks and artillery pieces. The Bosnian
lims and ethnic Croat militias — inherited what little Croat militias, the HOS and HVO , had a combined
remained .147

143
 strength of as many as 25,000 adequately armed offensive operations to hold and expand Croat terri
troops with a handful of heavy weapons — and, of tory while cutting the Bosnian Serbs 'most strategic
course , Croatian Army support. Their Bosnian Serb supply line in northern Bosnia.
adversaries could , however, if fully mobilized , field
more than 200,000 troops already established in doz Croatia's later efforts to retake the southern Dalmatian
ens of well- organized brigades and support forma coast and relieve the siege of Dubrovnik were part of
tions, with hundreds of tanks and APCs and hundreds its war of independence , but they were also directly
more field artillery pieces. The war began as a very related to military events occurring in southern Herze
uneven contest weighted heavily in the Serbs ' favor. govina. The Croatians would deploy troops into
Herzegovina both to exploit terrain advantages and
Chapter 23 together with the Zagreb -controlled HVO - broaden
Croatian Political Objectives and Military Strategy the front faced by Bosnian Serb Army and JNA forces
in Bosnia , 1991-1992 * so that the Serbs' resourcesmight be stretched to the
breaking point.**
As it prepared for its own independence, Zagreb's pri
mary political objective in Bosnia was to secure the Chapter 24
position of the Bosnian Croat population , developing Ethnic Cleansing as a Military Operation :
at least a measure of political autonomy in the near Prijedor, SanskiMost, and Kljuc,
term , and working toward either a partition of Bosnia May - July 1992150 ***
with the Serbs or a confederal state with full Bosnian
Croat autonomy. The first overt steps toward Bosnian Houses and whole villages reduced to ashes,
Croat political autonomy came in November 1991 unarmed and innocent populationsmassacred
with the formation of the “ Croatian Community of en masse, incredible acts of violence , pillage
Herceg -Bosna" (Hrvatska Zajednica Herceg -Bosna and brutality of every kind - such were the
HZHB ), and soon after the “ Croatian Community of meanswhich were employed by the Serbo -Mon
Bosanska Posavina.” President Tudjman's efforts to tenegrin soldiery, with a view to the entire trans
promote an agreement with Milosevic and the Bos formation of the ethnic character of regions.151
nian Serb leadership on the possible partition of the
Report on the International Commission
country had begun early that year, however, and
to Inquire Into the Causes and Conduct
Zagreb officials met several times with Bosnian
of the Balkan Wars, Carnegie Endow
Croats in early 1992 to try to harmonize their objec ment for International Peace , 1914
tives. Western outrage over these doubledealings
The Chetniks started picking up civilians, and
forced Zagreb to backtrack and promote instead pub
asked about refugees from Rogatica. They had
lic support for an intact Bosnian Republic while tac
itly approving Bosnian Croatmoves toward caught them and killed them all. I did not see
autonomy. The military strategy that Zagreb pursued them torture the civilians, but they boasted in my
presence how manyMuslims each had killed and
in support of these goals consisted of a two -track plan
to organize and arm indigenous Bosnian Croat mili I saw with my own eyes the bridge covered in
blood, and in the water under the bridge ,
tary units — begun in 1991 by Croatian Army “ volun
corpses... I do notknow how many people were
teers ” under Zagreb's control — while deploying
killed in Foca, but I heard Captain Sergije
regular Croatian Army (HV) and MUP troops to the
republic in 1992 when Croat communities came under For a detailed account of these operations, see Chapter 30 and
direct threat. The primary theaters in which HV forces Annex 32, The Battles for Herzegovina and the Relief of
operated were Herzegovina and Posavina. HV forces Dubrovnik , 1992.
For a detailed description see Annex 27: Ethnic Cleansing as a
in these regions, in conjunction with the Bosnian Military Operation: Prijedor - SanskiMost-Kljuc,May -July 1992 .
Croat Army (HVO ), carried out both defensive and

For a more detailed discussion see Annex 25: Croatian Political

Objectives and Military Strategy in Bosnia, 1991-1992.

144
 Mihailovic saying, 'We have got rid of the to physically eliminate those who had refused to relin
enemy. We have killed 5,000 Muslims in quish their arms. The VRS meanwhile joined other
Gorazde and Foca. 152 Serb authorities to accelerate the removal of the entire
Muslim and Croat populations. In reaction a small
Dragutin Ocko, a Serb prisoner of war band ofMuslimsand Croats launched a suicidal coun
interrogated by Ustashe on 29 January
terattack on 30 May, seizing part of Prijedor city
1942
before Serb troops overwhelmed them . Throughout
The war crimes committed againstMuslims and June these Serb forces unobtrusively swept the area of
Croats in the Prijedor -SanskiMost- Kljuc areas of non -Serb citizens while redeploying some units for
western Bosnia during the late spring and summer of operations elsewhere . The final VRS operation in the
1992 were someof the worst atrocities to occur during area began in late July , apparently aimed at a forested
the Bosnian war. The scope, scale, and programming mountain area where poorly equipped Muslim mili
with which these actions were carried out would have tary bands were still holding out, to mop up the last of
been impossible had they notbeen conducted as mili the Muslim hamlets and neighborhoods . This opera
tary operations by units of the Bosnian Serb Army's tion appears to have satisfied the VRS that it had
1st Krajina Corps. Although the Serbian Democratic eliminated the primary " threat," and it continued to
transfer its combat units to more active sectors .
Party and the Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal
Affairs also played key roles in the violence , the VRS
was the primary actor in the assaults and occupation Chapter 25
ofMuslim and Croat villages throughout the region . The Battle for the Corridor :
Operations in the Posavina153*
Themain objective of VRS operations in this area was
to eliminate the so -called threat posed byMuslim and During 1992 some of the largest battles of the Bosnian
Croat residents to Serb control over a key section of war - engaging more than 50,000 troops on both
western Bosnia . Some elements of the Muslim and sides - occurred in the most strategic area of the coun
Croat population were armed and put up resistance to try , the Posavina region of northern Bosnia . One of the
the Serb takeover of the area , but never on a scale that first clashes of the conflict enveloped the Sava River
threatened the Bosnian Serbs' control in the region . In town of Bosanski Brod in early March , when mixed
Croatand Muslim HVO forces used weapons pro
addition, the VRS'smethods of eliminating this
" threat" involved the wanton killing of civilians, the vided by the Croatian Army to stop a Serb takeover of
complete removal of the civilian population from their themunicipality.154 During April and May , asHV
homes, barbaric treatment in detention camps, and troops reinforced the HVO , their combined formations

finally their ejection from Serb territory. Concurrently, pushed JNA and Serb TO troops completely out of
the “ cleansing” of the region helped achieve a key Bosanski Brod , overran the towns ofModrica and
Bosnian Serb war aim — the creation of an ethnically Derventa , and temporarily severed the east-west route
pure Serb state . running between the Serb -controlled Bosanska Kra
jina region (and the Republic of Serbian Krajina) and
Military actions in the Prijedor - SanskiMost - Kljuc the rest of the Serb Republic , as well as the Yugoslav
region began in April, when JNA formations sup Federal Republic.No supplies could reach these areas,
ported SDS actions to take over the political adminis and the nascent Serb Republic was cleft in two. Miti
tration , seizing government offices, police facilities, gating the effects of this dramatic penetration ,
utilities, and other key infrastructure . The formation Bosnian Serb and JNA unitsmanaged to take and hold
of the Bosnian Serb Armyprompted the VRS to order key towns on its flanks at Doboj, Bosanski
all Muslims and Croats living in the area to turn over
* For a detailed account, see Annex 28: The Battle for the Corridor:
their weapons to the Serb police . The Army enforced Operations in the Posavina March 1992 to January 1993.
this order and, beginning 23May, invaded several vil
lages and towns near Prijedor, SanskiMost, and Kljuc

145
Samac-Pelagicevo , and Brcko. Holding these posi secret agreement by Croatian President Tudjman to
tions allowed the newly created VRS to move rein trade the enclave for the JNA -held Prevlaka peninsula
forcements from its 1st Krajina Corps and East in southern Croatia. There is no direct evidence to
Bosnian Corps to these areas and prepare for a major support this theory but, whatever the truth , the HVI
counteroffensive . HVO defenses cracked during the final offensive only
after the VRS unexpectedly shifted the direction of its
In early June the VRS 1st Krajina Corps , under Gen attack to avoid the stiff resistance it had met during
eralMomir Talic, began a series of preliminary opera the initial push . Given the sudden execution of the
tions to open up some breathing space between Doboj Serb maneuver, the Croats' success in withdrawing
and Derventa and move forces into position to reopen theirmen and equipment in good order looks suspi
the vital supply corridor. By 20 June the fall of Kotor ciously like a prepared or planned withdrawal, either
sko and Johovac , north of Doboj, left the path clear. because Zagreb had already concluded the enclave
On 24 June the 1st Krajina Corps launched the first was untenable or as part of a deal. It seems unlikely
phase of Operation " Corridor 92 ," attempting to break that Bosanski Brod would have fallen as soon or as
through to East Bosnian Corps troops northeast of neatly as it did without these coincidental actions.
Gradacac . Two days ofheavy fighting enabled the
units to link up and cut the connection between The VRS was now able to turn its attention to the east
enemy-held Modrica and Gradacac .Modrica itself fell ern end of the corridor, where HV /HVO forces in their
on 28 June. Although this main effort was successful, remaining enclave at Orasje and joint Bosnian Army
supporting attacks on the flanks and near Derventa HVO units near Brcko town remained in position to
Bosanski Brod achieved little gain against strong HV/ threaten the RS supply route. In mid -September, while
HVO resistance. the VRS was still focused to the west, HVO and Bos
nian Army troops had even cut the link south of
The 1st Krajina Corps prepared its nextmajor strike Orasje . VRS troops were able to reopen the route but
for early July to seize Odzak and Derventa -Bosanski lost it again for a time in mid -October.155 While the 1st
Brod . On 4 July a three - pronged attack kicked off Krajina Corps was preparing anothermajor offensive
toward Derventa , Bosanski Brod , Odzak , and the Sava for November to clear the Orasje pocket and secure
River. Over the next 10 days , VRS troops drove HV/ the route permanently, HVO units again cut the road
HVO forces out of strong positions near Odzak , seiz in early November. After a promising start, the VRS
ing the town on 12 July, and reached the Sava on November offensive failed , and HV/HVO forces
14 July . Other units pushed to within 10 kilometers of drove the Serb attack units back in heavy fighting and
Bosanski Brod after an advance of 10 to 15 kilome terrible weather. Itwould be May of 1995 before the
ters. Meanwhile , formations further to the west retook VRS would attempt another assault on Orasje.
Derventa on 4-5 July. The VRS had driven HV /HVO Instead , VRS planners turned their gaze to the threat
forces outof all the territory between Bosanski Brod on the south side of the corridor. In middle and late
and Bosanski Samac, while forcing their troops into a December, 1st Krajina and East Bosnian Corps units
now constricted bridgehead around Bosanski Brod attacked Bosnian Army 2nd Corps and HVO troops
itself . west of Brcko, driving them back about 2 to 3 kilome
ters, giving the Serbs a bit more room . Still, the corri
After a series of attacks around Bosanski Brod during dor remained a bare 3 kilometers wide at its narrowest
August and September achieved only limited success , point, southwest of Brcko town. Widening this portion
the 1st Krajina Corps prepared to launch a decisive of the vital route would have to wait until 1993.
assault on the Croat bridgehead . On 27 September,
VRS troops began their attack , again making only Despite these lingering problems, in 1992 the VRS
small initial gains . On 4 October, however, after shift had achieved one of its most strategic victories of the
ing the attack sector, VRS troops broke through HVI
HVO lines and captured the town on 6 October.Many
have argued that the Serbs owed their victory to a

146

-
war, creating whatmany Bosnian Serb military arti 100 mm , while again demonstrating a distinct superi
cles call the " corridor of life." The victory unified the ority in command and control and organization. Bal
Republika Srpska politically, and it physically linked anced against the VRS strengths were some very
its western wing and the Krajina with the rest of the difficult terrain and strong fortifications defended by
Serb republic and the rump Yugoslav federation . The over 5,500 highly motivated HVO and Bosnian Terri
VRS was able to achieve this victory over experienced torial Defense (TO ) troops. The lack of a unified Croat
and numerically superior Croatian , Bosnian Croat, and Muslim command structure and squabbles among
and Bosnian Army forces thanks to its typical mixture the two groups over the shape of their alliance would
of professional leadership , organization, and fire weaken these strong defenses.
power, enhanced in these operations by the commit
ment of most of the VRS's battle -tested former JNA The VRS campaign plan may have called for thrusts
units. to cut the supply artery between Travnik and Jajce
prior to reducing the pocket. Preliminary operations in
In coming years, the strategic importance of the corri July , however, failed to gain significant ground and
dor would loom large in the background of battles in the VRS switched instead to a straightforward attack
the rest of the country. None of the subsequent clashes toward Jajce itself.156 The plan , in keeping with VRS
in the area would be on the scale of the 1992 cam doctrine, called for careful, step-by-step advances
paign ,but the perpetual threat that Bosnian Army and along three separate axes to deal thoroughly with the
Bosnian Croat Army forces might retake the corridor defenses and minimize losses.
and the implications for Republika Srpska if it were
cut forced the VRS to station a sizable portion of the This slow campaign began in earnest in mid -August
troop reserves from its best corps to safeguard it. when the VRS launched its first major attack , biting
Occasionally the VRS was able to draw on small off a chunk of territory along the western approaches
increments of these reserves for other operations,but and advancing to within 2 kilometers of the town. The
for themost part they had to remain untouched . Only second step came in early /mid -September when the
when a combined HV /HVO and Bosnian Army offen VRS seized another piece of ground to the southwest,
sive in 1995 threatened to overrun western Republika pushing to within a kilometer of Jajce from that direc
Srpska would the VRS be forced to draw down these tion . A simultaneous joint HVO - TO attack north of
reserves because the loss of the western portion of the Bugojno and Novi Travnik to divert this Serb drive
state would have rendered the corridor they were failed to gain any ground or affect the VRS assault.
defending meaningless . Perhaps it was this failure that induced the Bosnian
Croats to sign a separate cease- fire with the Serbs on
Chapter 26 9 October in exchange for a pledge to provide electric
The VRS Assault on Jajce, July -November 1992 * ity from the power plants. The Muslims, however,
took no part in the discussions, and their relations with
While operations in the Posavina continued , the VRS the Croats were frayed by a number of contentious
began preparations during June and July to eliminate issues. On 21 October, Croat and Muslim units hold
the large Croat-Muslim salient at Jajce , northwest of ing the main supply route to Jajce opened fire on each
Travnik . The troops in the salient threatened Bosnian other. The VRS took advantage of the discord and
Serb lines of communications in the area and con launched a final push to seize the enclave on 25 Octo
trolled two hydroelectric dams vital to Serb -controlled ber, attacking hard along all three axes. Despite their
western Bosnia . The VRS was able to deploy some differences , the HVO and TO troops foughtwell,
7,000 to 8,000 of its troops from the 30th Infantry yielding only after four days of heavy fighting. VRS
Division of the 1st Krajina Corps. VRS forces had a troops entered the center of town on 29 October while
clear advantage in heavy weaponry, fielding 20 to 30 a bedraggled column of disheartened soldiers and
tanks and 30 to 50 field artillery tubes larger than

* For a detailed account, see Annex 29: Operation ‘Vrbas 92': The
VRS Assault on Jajce, July -November 1992.

147
some 40,000 panicked civiliansmade their way out of Kladusa. A lesser road ran west from Cazin through
the enclave to Travnik . The Serbs had again won their the small town of Coralici and on to the Croatian bor
victory through superior organization , firepower, and der. Another major road ran east from Bihac along the
planning . Although the disagreements between the south side of the Una River to Bosanska Krupa and
Croats and Muslimscertainly contributed to their Bosanski Novi. The region's most importantmeans of
defeat, there is no evidence to suggest that Jajce's fall transport was not a highway, however, but rather a
involved a deal between the Croat and Serb leaders. segment of the railway line that stretched all the way
The defenders were simply beaten in a straight fight. from Belgrade through north Bosnia to Bihac and ulti
mately to Serb -held Knin , the self- proclaimed capital
Chapter 27 of the Krajina Serbs. All three Serb communities
The Bihac Pocket, 1992 Serbian , Bosnian Serb , and Krajina Serb — thus had a
stake in the recapture of Bihac city and the southern
The Bihac region in the northwestern corner of Bosnia half of the Muslim -held pocket.
was ethnically a fairly homogeneous area , with a sub
stantialMuslim majority in all of the region's four Partly because of the region's significant Muslim
opstinas.157 Nearly 90 percent of the region's approxi majority, Bosnian forces in the Bihac region were able
mately 250,000 residents wereMuslims, with 25,000 to organize much more quickly and effectively than
or so Serbs living mostly on the southern edge of the elsewhere in the country.160 The foundation of the
pocket (for example , in Bihac and Bosanska Krupa ) Bihac region's defense structure was the existing Ter
and a small Croat community of about6,000 living in ritorial Defense headquarters . (As early as 16 April,
the Bihac suburbs .158 The large Muslim presence in Bihac had been established as one of the seven territo
the area — a demographic oddity — was the result of a rial districts — okrug - subordinate to the Bosnian
conscious Ottoman effort dating back several centu Republic's reorganized Territorial Defense Staff.)161
ries to encourage Bosnian Muslims to settle in the The Bihac area Territorial Defense provided the
westernmost corner of the Ottoman Empire, the per region's Muslimswith both a preestablished organiza
manent tidemark between it and the Austro-Hungarian tion and the nucleus of a command staff. This military
empire.159 The resettled Muslims of the Bihac region structure was at first called the “Una -Sanska Opera
became the counterweights to the Serbs of the Croat tionalGroup,” but in the fall it was renamed the
ian Krajina, who had been resettled on the opposite ARBiH 5th Corps — destined to become one of the
side of the border by the Habsburgs to form a buffer most distinguished fighting formations in the Bosnian
against the Ottomans. Centuries later, the descendants military .
of these resettled Serbs and Muslimswould do battle
along a cultural fault line whose original purpose had As elsewhere in Bosnia , frictions had heated the atmo
vanished into history . sphere of the Bihac area for months before the out
break of actual conflict. Roadblocks mushroomed
What would later becomeknown as the “ Bihac after the proclamation of the ethnic referendum , and
pocket” had as its core area about 2,000 square kilo someone fired shots at a JNA facility near Bihac twice
meters of territory (roughly 4 percent of Bosnia's land in March.162 163 While most of the rest of Bosnia went
area) bounded by the Una River and the Bosnian up in flames within days of the Republic's indepen
Croatian border. Most of the region's terrain is hilly dence declaration , violence does not appear to have
but not truly mountainous. (The most significant ter come to the Bihac area for almost two weeks. 164
rain feature, the high hills of the Grabez plateau over
looking Bihac proper, are immediately south and east When it did come, it was Bosanska Krupa, a medium
of Bihac city .) The few primary roads traversing the sized town of 15,000 residents on the south side of the
area tended to channelmajor military operationsalong Una River , that suffered first. The town had started to
a few axes. One main highway ran north -south
through the entire pocket, from Bihac through Cazin
and on to the northwestern tip of Bosnia at Velika

148
split in July 1991 when Serb leaders established their Fighting approached the Bihac area itself in June after
own assembly in the town and began passing their clashes broke out southeast of the city at the end of
own resolutions. Then , with only 27 percentof the May;181 the city and some of its suburbs were first hit
population butwith better organization and more arms with small arms and mortar fire on 12 June.182 There
than their Muslim neighbors , the Bosnian Serbs pro after, Bihac would huddle under periodic mortar and
posed a map whereby they would take over 60 percent artillery fire for the rest of the war, VRS forces from
of the town; they also made it clear they would the 2nd Krajina Corps (the former JNA 10th Bihac
enforce their demands with violence.165 Their threats Corps) having established themselves on the Grabez
were realized late in the day on 21 April when Bos plateau near the town of Tihotina, some 10 km south
nian Serb Territorials from the Grmec area crossed the east of Bihac . From positions here their artillery and
Una River and clashed with Bosnian Republic TO mortars could fire into the city with virtual impu
forces within Bosanska Krupa.166 ( The JNA's 10th nity.183 For years Serb and Muslim forces would
Bihac Corps denied any involvement in the fighting, expend much of their resources and energy vying for
although at least a battalion of the6th Partisan Bri control of this strategic plateau . As Bihac was coming
gade of the JNA's 5th Banja Luka Corps was almost under attack , fighting also began west of Cazin — a
certainly engaged .) The following morning , Serb town in the center of the developing pocket.184 Clashes
forces surrounded Bosanska Krupa, and most of the also spread north to Buzim , northeast of Bihac, where
Muslim citizens evacuated the town under a rain of fighting was reported in mid -July.18.
mortar rounds.167 By 23 April, Serb Territorials and
the JNA battalion had occupied most of Bosanska Trying to clearMuslim forces from the Grabez plateau
Krupa, although some Muslims continued to resist in south of Bihac , the Bosnian Serbs pressed a wider
the western half of the town for several more days.168 offensive, directing increased shelling, scattered
169 170 171 The Bosnian Serbs now occupied the entire infantry probes and even some air attacks against the
city on the eastern bank of the Una and most of the defenders. VRS 2nd Krajina Corps forces first
town's smaller half on the western bank ;Muslim attempted to break through Muslim defenses at the
forces retained control of the hills overlooking Bosan town of Golubic on the Una River on 13 September.186
ska Krupa and some suburbs as close as 1 km from the 187 After three days of unsuccessful attacks there, they
edge of town. tried attacking along a broader front south of Bihac
and at Bosanska Krupa and Buzim . 188 Bosnian Army
An uneasy lull settled over the Bihac region after the forces from Cazin responded by advancing south of
fall of Bosanska Krupa, during which the evacuation the Una, capturing two towns at the foot of the
of federal armed forces began in earnest, and Air Grmusa mountains.189 The VRS tried to press the
Force and Army personnel began flying back to Ser Muslim defenders along the entire front through the
bia around 8 May.172 173 On 16 May 1992 , the last of rest of September and into the middle of November.190
the withdrawing JNA forces demolished Bihac's 191 192 The Bosnian Army counterattacked where it
Zeljava airfield — one of the most modern military could in early and mid -October, gaining some strate
facilities in the former Yugoslavia — by detonating gic ground northeast of Bihac ,193 east of Buzim ,194 and
explosives under the runways and in the 5 kilometers in the Velika Kladusa area in the extremenorthwest of
of underground tunnels.174 175 JNA units surrendered the Bihac enclave .195
control of the two main barracks near Bihac on
19 May but do not appear to have left any significant The VRS occasionally bombed the Bihac area in the
military equipment behind. 176 177 178 fall of 1992, but with few aircraft and to little effect.
Two aircraft hit Cazin on 28 August,196 and both Bihac
Shooting started again on 12 May, this time in Bosan and Cazin were bombed on 9 and 14 September.197 198
ski Novi, a town along the Una River on the Bosnian 199 Bosnian Government forces claim to have downed
side of the Bosnian - Croatian border. Rifle fire and three VRS aircraft on 22 September.200 201
mortar shelling began suddenly after the JNA claimed
that Muslims had attacked a military police patrol.179
Serb forces responded by taking control of the town
within 24 hours. 180

149
On 20 October 1992 , the Bosnian Army formally courage and imagination , they lacked weapons and
established its 5th Corps under the command of strategic depth . Completely surrounded and cut off
Ramiz Drekovic , a former JNA officer from the from the distant resources ofGovernment-held Bos
Muslim -majority Sandzak region of Serbia.202 The nia , the 5th Corps would be entirely dependent on the
corps was formed by simply reflagging the TO -based nearer anchor of Zagreb for the supply lifeline that
“ Una-Sanska OperationalGroup," which had been would keep it in the war.Meanwhile, the Bosnian and
directing the area's defense up to that point,and under Krajina Serb forces had problems of their own .
its new designation the corps would direct ARBiH Although Serb forces completely encircled Bihac's
operations in the pocket for the remainder of the war. Bosnian defenders, most of their frontage opposite the
The new command had nominalresponsibility as well Bihac enclave was held by the 2nd Krajina Corps , the
for BosanskiNovi, Prijedor, SanskiMost, Kljuc , and weakest and most overstretched ofthe Serb corps . The
Mrkonjic Grad , but 5th Corps troops would see none Krajina Serb units also had to deal with enemies in
of those other cities for over three years and would both front and rear. Forced to maintain a defense
never set foot in most of them .203 against the Croatian Army — their most dangerous
foe - before them and the Bosnian Army 5th Corps
The VRS 2nd Krajina Corps - possibly supported by behind them , the Krajina Serb military commanders
the Krajina Serb Army's 15th Lika Corps - mounted could spare only limited reserves for offensive actions
its last operation of the year in November. This more against the Muslims, lest an overambitious campaign
ambitious operation— “ Una 92 ” —sought to clear the leave them vulnerable to Croatian attack .
Grabez plateau and seize the entire southern bank of
the Una River.204 The operation began on 14 Novem This improbable combination of opposing forces ,
ber,205 but a week of fighting failed to dislodge the 5th capabilities, and geography created a dynamic imbal
Corps from its positions.206 After a short pause the ance in which each side could at times gain a local
attack resumed about 12 December, only to sputter out advantage but neither could wholly defeat the other.
less than a week later with few gains. The VRS would The Serbs started with the upper hand , since they had
become quite familiar with such results on the Grabez superior organization, equipment, and geographic
plateau in the years to come. position. From the outset, the Bosnian 5th Corps'
bottom -line goal was simply to stay in the fight. It is a
At the end of the year the Bihac enclave saw perhaps testament to the Bosnian Muslims' organization ,dedi
7,000 to 10,000 defenders organized into six Muslim cation, and resourcefulness that they were able to do
brigades and one battalion - sized Bosnian Croat unit, SO .
holding their own in a small triangular pocket com
pletely surrounded by Serb forces.207 Opposing VRS Chapter 28
forces comprised 6,000 to 7,500 troops of Colonel Battles on the Drina , Round One:
(later Major General) Grujo Boric's 2nd Krajina April to December 1992
Corps — five lightinfantry brigades — reinforced in the
northeast by a light infantry brigade from 1st Krajina Some of the most brutal fighting and atrocities of the
Corps numbering possibly another 2,000 to 3,000 Bosnian conflict occurred in the Drina valley. During
troops.208 A battalion of armor, plus one or two field 1992, Bosnian Serb efforts to control the strategic
artillery battalions, backed up the Serb infantry . mountain valley bordering Serbia were repeatedly
thwarted by stalwart Muslim resistance based on the
By the end of 1992 the Bihac enclave fighting had numerous Muslim vns and farmsdotting the valley .
assumed the general outlines — both figurative and A seesaw series of vicious little battles - usually
literal— that would remain almost until the very end of involving no more than a brigade on either side
the war in October 1995. The resilient Bosnian Army raged up and down the valley during 1992. Overcom
had already built a tough and resourceful fighting ing great and persistent difficulties, the VRS managed
force — the 5th Corps — that was capable of holding its to open a tenuous road corridor from the key border
own against the forces of both Bosnian Serbs (to the
For a detailed account see Annex 30: Battles on the Drina, Round
south and east) and Krajina Serbs (to the north and
One: April to December 1992.
west). While the Bosnian defenders of Bihac had

150

-
-

- -
-

- - -
town ofZvornik to Serb - controlled areas around Sara- terrorize VRS troops — and the local Serb popula
jevo . Bosnian TO /Army troops, however,were also tion — for the rest of the year, launching repeated raids
able to keep control over great swathes of territory on Serb villages and steadily widening government
around Srebrenica -Zepa and Visegrad -Gorazde - Foca , control in the area.209 The successful late December
even opening a thread -like supply link to centralBos offensive that Oric carried out toward Bratunac and
nia through the town of Trnovo , some 30 kilometers Skelani, combined with his foolhardy shelling of Ser
south of Sarajevo . From their valley bases , Bosnian bia proper, finally forced the VRS Main Staff — and
Army troops were able to regularly threaten or cut the Belgrade— to deal with the Drina valley.
slender route from Zvornik to Pale. A successful Bos
nian Army yearend offensive from Srebrenica against As in the Zvornik -Srebrenica area, operations in the
Serb -held Bratunac and Skelaniwas the last straw for southern region were seesaw affairs in which the Bos
the VRS, which decided to make the capture of the nian Serbs initially attempted to seize control over the
Drina valley its strategic focus for 1993.* Gorazde region . Bosnian TO /Army ripostes to open a
supply route into the enclave soon followed , while the
The Drina valley theater can be divided into two Muslims pushed to expand the territory under govern
major sectors: a northern one around Zvornik ment control. The fighting around Gorazde -Foca
Srebrenica and a southern one around Foca-Gorazde Visegrad sorted into three sectors : clashes between
Visegrad .** In the Zvornik -Srebrenica area , the fight Cajnice and Gorazde town in the southeast, the fight
ing was further subdivided into VRS efforts to create a ing for the Gorazde supply corridor between Foca
road corridor from Zvornik to Sekoviciand on to Pale , Trnovo,and battles in the northeast between Rogatica ,
and Bosnian TO /Armymoves to expand government Visegrad , and Gorazde. The Serbs ' initial efforts to
control around Srebrenica. After the capture of capture the town in May, primarily from the direction
Zvornik on 9-10 April, Bosnian Serb TO troops — with of Cajnice in the southeast, came to naught, although
some support from the JNA - moved to expand the battles for hilltops and passes in this area sputtered on
Serb -held bridgehead around Zvornik , pushing gov until July. To the west, after the Serbs captured Foca
ernment forces back toward Kalesija. By mid -May, in April and mopped up the rest of the municipality ,
Serb forces had opened the road to Serb -held fighting shifted to the southern edge of the Jahorina
Sekovici, but they spent the rest of the year blocking Mountainsbetween the town of Trnovo and the
repeated Muslim attempts to sever this route , which enclave's western frontline. It was from this rugged
succeeded at least three or four times . Simultaneously , area that the Bosnian TO /Army would successfully
VRS troops had to stop the same Bosnian Army supply its forces in the enclave . After some early spar
troops — those holding the Cerska- Kamenica enclave ring, the government troops launched a major offen
about 4 kilometers south of Zvornik — in their efforts sive in late July, seizing the passage to Gorazde and
to link up to Bosnian Army forces southeast of Tuzla. pushing VRS troops out of Trnovo . It then held the
This Muslim -held enclave near Zvornik also lacked a route open against VRS efforts to cut it in mid
territorial link to that around Srebrenica. Serb TO November, which achieved only rare and temporary
troops had initially seized Srebrenica , but on successes. Bosnian Army forces also won substantial
8-10 May local Muslim forces, led by the charismatic victories in the northeast. Although Serb forces won
Naser Oric , drove out the Serbs . Oric's forces were to the first round of fighting, seizing most of Rogatica
municipality and positions southeast of Visegrad, a
* The Bosnian Army offensive in late December 1992 -January
1993 and the VRS counteroffensive, which began in February series of Bosnian Army attacks from late August to
1993 , will be dealt with in Chapter 36 , “ Battles on the Drina, November retook key territory around Visegrad . This
Round Two : December 1992 to August 1993." offensive placed ARBiH troops less than 3 kilometers
** The terrain in the Drina River valley is typically Bosnian , with from a key hydroelectric dam on the Drina River and
heavily forested mountains and hills (a few rising to almost 2,000
meters in height) interspersed with small rivers and streams. In the within the same distance of the town itself.
main combat theater between the towns of Zvornik in thenorth and
Foca in the south the geography varies so little that there is little
benefit from a detailed discussion of the terrain in each sector.
Instead, terrain will be discussed as appropriate in each section .

151
 The Bosnian Armyhad scored a number of notable cease-fire was agreed to late in the day.214 215 216 217 The
victories against the VRS in the valley during 1992— following day (the sixth of April, the anniversary of
victories that were to make the Drina the primary stra the city's liberation from the Nazi occupation in 1945 )
tegic target for the VRS in 1993. Outgunned by its any illusion of normalcy in Sarajevo broke down com
opponents , the Bosnian Army made better use of the pletely. Bosnian Serb gunmen fired indiscriminately
highly motivated natives of the region. Though they from upper floors of the Holiday Inn into the court
lacked formal training, these born mountain fighters yard of the Bosnian Parliament building across the
were natural light infantrymen whose small, nimble street, killing several people who were demonstrating
units exploited their familiarity with the terrain to for peace and injuring numerous others . Bosnian Gov
defeat the better armed VRS. VRS forces in the valley ernment Special Police eventually stormed the hotel
were also more vulnerable to these methods than Serb and captured six Serb snipers.218 219
units in other theaters, who generally commanded
more firepower and benefited from a higher propor The second ofMay 1992 was to be one of the most
tion of former JNA units and personnel. The VRS crucial days in the three-year siege of the city. Partly
would rectify this situation in 1993, bringing in better by accident, a series of interrelated events irrevocably
units and more firepower to conduct its next strategic changed the JNA's involvement in the siege and dra
offensive. matically escalated the level of violence. It began after
President Izetbegovic's plane returned from three days
Chapter 29 of unproductive international negotiations in Lisbon
Sarajevo , 1992: The Siege Begins * and landed at JNA -controlled Sarajevo airport.220 The
UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia , Canadian Brig .
From the very outset of the Bosnian war the primary Gen. Lewis MacKenzie, had sent a Swedish armored
focus of the world's attention was Sarajevo : the politi- personnel carrier to escort Izetbegovic back to the
cal and emotional heart of the nation . Well before the Bosnian Presidency under UN auspices, but the APC
war began , the 1984 Olympics had made Sarajevo the left when the Swedes learned that the flight was
outside world's most familiar image of Yugoslavia . delayed . ** So instead it was 30 JNA soldiers who met
When that image was shattered by artillery fire and Izetbegovic and escorted him to the JNA barracks at
replaced with glimpses of street fighting in the former Lukavica. JNA General Djurdjevac (commander of
Olympic village, the Kosevo and Zetra stadiums in the 4th Sarajevo Corps) told Izetbegovic he was being
ruins, and rows of new graves dug alongside the soc detained “ for his own safety," but the inescapable fact
cer field , the plight of besieged Sarajevo permitted was that the Bosnian Presidentwas now a prisoner.221
most Western viewers to relate the carnage to some
thing familiar and commanded media attention in a At the same time the Army was taking the Bosnian
way that the often inaccessible and unfamiliar hinter Presidenthostage , the JNA itself was becoming a cap
land could not. tive in most of Sarajevo. (Indeed , the JNA's capture of
Izetbegovic may have been a direct response to the
It was ironic and tragic that the cosmopolitan , peace developing blockade of its forces.) Government police
ably multiethnic residents of Sarajevo were the last and Muslim volunteer forces ostentatiously sur
Bosnians to accept that war would indeed come to the rounded several JNA barracks in the city — apparently
republic. The shooting in Sarajevo began on 5 April, on orders from someone other than Izetbegovic — and
the day before Bosnia's formal declaration of indepen demanded the surrender of the troops inside. When the
dence and the onset of fighting elsewhere in the coun JNA troops refused , the Bosnian Government forces
try. On that day , well -equipped Serb police , TO , and tightened their cordons and laid siege to the buildings .
volunteer units surrounded and then attacked the Bos The Army responded with a bombardment of
nian MUP's large police academy complex atop Vrace
hill on the south side of the city .?210 211 212 213 The build *** For an account of the UN'smilitary role in Bosnia during 1992,
see Annex 34: The Charge of the Light Blue Brigade: UNPROFOR
ing was contested for several hours, with about a First Deploys Fall-Winter 1992.
dozen defenders wounded , before an EC -brokered

* See Annex 31: Sarajevo 1992: The Siege Begins for a more
detailed account.

152
Sarajevo's medieval center by field artillery from into a single force — the Sarajevo -Romanija Corps .
positions outside the city , a shocking escalation of the This formation , using the structure of the 4th Corps,
familiarmortar fire that the Serb TO had sporadically controlled three former JNA brigades (including
used to pepper the city.222 enough equipment for five armor-mechanized battal
ions), six new light infantry brigades ( raised from the
An even more dramatic escalation was the JNA's next TO ), a mixed artillery regiment, an antitank regiment,
action — although the sequence of events is far from and an air defense regiment.227 All told , the force com
clear — against the Bosnian capital. From garrisons prised about 15,000 men , as many as 80 tanks, some
outside the city , the JNA sent two armored columns 72 field artillery pieces , and 12 multiple rocket
into the streets of Sarajevo in a maneuver that proba launchers , plus several hundred 60 -mm , 82-mm , and
bly was aimed at relieving the besieged barracks and 120 -mm mortars . Initially ,Major General Tomislav
could have cut the government's defense of the city in Sipcic commanded the corps, but Colonel (later Major
half. One armored column advanced from the west General) Stanislav Galic replaced Sipcic at the end of
near the airport but was stopped by makeshift govern the summer.
ment defenses in the far-western neighborhood of
Stup. Another JNA column advanced north from the Sarajevo's defenders — initially numbering perhaps
Lukavica barracks south of the city center into the 10,000 to 15,000 armed personnel of all types , with
government-held heart of the city.Muslim Patriotic only a few heavy weapons and very limited ammuni
League volunteers and Territorial Defense troops tion — were a motley lot.228 They included much of the
stopped the second Serb armored advance (within a former Sarajevo Territorial Defense headquarters and
hundred meters of the Bosnian Presidency building ) units from the Muslim -majority municipalities ; some
with Molotov cocktails, rifle grenades, and a home Muslim deserters from the JNA barracks in the city ;
made artillery piece fashioned from a drainpipe. probably several thousand Patriotic League members
Caught at a disadvantage in the close-in fighting, four ( at least organized , if not fully armed ); and a few con
Serb tanks were destroyed and therest withdrew south spicuous, outright criminal gangs. These gangster
with no ground gained . Disaster for the government bands — led by flamboyant outlaw chieftains like Juka
had been narrowly averted , and Sarajevo's belea Prazina, Musan “ Caco” Topalovic , and Ramiz “ Celo "
guered defenders scored a major psychological Delalic - provided some of the city's best armed and
victory.223 224 bravest defenders , but they also brazenly extorted the
citizens they were defending and for a time became a
By the evening of 2 May , the President's capture had law unto themselves.
become public knowledge , and the Bosnian Govern
ment, the JNA , and the EC began a marathon negotia After a series of inconclusive skirmishes, the Bosnian
tion of terms for a cease - fire and the President's Government attempted its first major offensive opera
release.225 By an agreement reached the nextmorning, tion from within the city on 8 June. Bosnian Army
the President would be exchanged for JNA General forcesmounted several simultaneous attacks aiming
Kukanjac and his staff officers, who by then had been to capture four critical hilltop positions overlooking
surrounded in the city's SecondMilitary District head the city center:Mojmilo ridge to the southwest, Vrace
quarters. The Bosnian Government promised a safe hill and Vidikovac to the southeast, and the imposing
conduct for the JNA convoy leaving the barracks, Mt. Zuc to the northwest. With little more than sur
but — to Izetbegovic's fury - Muslim units opened fire prise and determination , Sarajevo's defenders rolled
on the withdrawing JNA vehicles , killing at least six back the besieging Serbs, but their ill-equipped troops
federal troops and capturing the rear third of the were unable to hold on to much of their gains in the
226
convoy.2 face of Serb counterattacks and artillery fire.229 230 231
In the end , the Bosnian Army was able to retain
As the JNA completed its withdrawal from the city in
late May , the new VRS absorbed the JNA 4th Corps
and Serb TO forces around the city and molded them

153
control of only Mojmilo ridge, which at least removed As 1992 drew to a close, Sarajevo's citizens could
the sniper threat to southwestern parts of the city. take somemeasure of pride and of hope from their
handful of military victories: the halting of the JNA's
Desultory shooting and shelling continued for several surprise armored thrusts on 2 May , the capture of
months while armed bands wrestled for control of Mojmilo ridge in June , and the successful occupation
individual Sarajevo neighborhoods, affecting the con of vitalMt. Zuc in December. The defense of Sarajevo
frontation lines hardly at all. The next round of serious at this time, however, was more a saga of disasters
fighting opened in December with an offensive push averted than of gains achieved . In a military situation
by the VRS directed against the Otes and Stup suburbs where neither side could force a quick win , the stage
of western Sarajevo , which were jointly held by HVO was set for a protracted and bloody contest of wills.
and Bosnian Army forces.232 233 By 6 December, the
hard - pressed defenders had begun to fall back.234 The Chapter 30
next day the Bosnian Government countered with The Battles for Herzegovina , 1992
another operation against the Serb -held peaks over
looking the city, attacking Zuc hill in the northwest The JNA's attacks in Herzegovina and its campaigns
and the edge of Mt. Trebevic in the southeast for sev along Croatia's southern Dalmatian coast directly
eral days. The Bosnians again pushed back their intertwined the Bosnian and Croatian wars for the first
besiegers , taking most of Zuc hill and seizing the key time, as they would again more dramatically in 1994
Vidikovac peak on Mt. Trebevic.235 Vidikovac was 1995. The JNA began offensive operations in April
lost to a Serb counterattack , but by 10 December the 1992 against Croatian and Bosnian Croat forces in
Bosnian Government triumphantly claimed control of western Herzegovina, near Kupres, and in southeast
the summit ofMt. Zuc — a crucial victory that largely ern Herzegovina near Stolac in order to achieve rela
secured the northern part of urban Sarajevo from Serb tively limited objectives inside Bosnia . Forces from
attacks.236 The city's Bosnian defenders had paid a GeneralKukanjac's JNA Second Military District
high price in blood and effort,but they managed to drawn from the 5th (Banja Luka) and 9th (Knin )
close out 1992 with an important victory. Corps - recaptured Kupres from a combined HVI
HVO force on 7 April and threatened Croat-held
Perhaps more than anywhere else in Bosnia , the siege Tomislavgrad and Livno to the southwest. The 13th
of Sarajevo highlighted the contrasts between a Bos ( Bileca ) Corps and 2nd (Podgorica ) Corps from Gen
nian Army with numerous determined but ill eral Strugar's JNA Fourth Military District drove local
equipped infantry forces and a Bosnian Serb military Bosnian Croat troops out of Stolac in mid -April and
machine with far more heavy equipment but inade captured nearly all of Herzegovina south ofMostar up
quate infantry reserves that had to be carefully hus to the Neretva . In May , after cease - fire talks collapsed ,
banded . Most important, Sarajevo's defenders had no the JNA took control over much ofMostar, including
comparable weapons to counter the Serb artillery part of the city on the western bank of the Neretva
pieces that shelled the city with impunity from miles River. These operations were designed to defend
away. Unable to engage the guns directly, the Bosnian " Serb ” territory and pre -empt what the JNA perceived
infantry had to assault directly the well -defended hills to be the threat of Croatian " aggression ." Croatian
the Bosnian Serbs used as firing and spotting loca political and military officials, however, saw in these
tions. Conversely , the several hundred artillery pieces, attacks the first phase of a JNA strategic offensive to
tanks, and mortars with which the Serbs ringed the threaten and invade southern Croatia . They expected
city could inflict civilian and military casualties, the JNA to drive through western Herzegovina while
spread material destruction , and sometimes put politi also attacking from Stolac across the Neretva toward
cal pressure on the Bosnian Presidency , but they could the Croatian port of Ploce , permanently severing
not seize ground, and in the end artillery bombard southern Dalmatia (and Dubrovnik ) and possibly
ment would prove unable to force the surrender of
either the people or their leaders .

154
threatening Split. This misperception initially drove completed , a garrison of bridge protectors, or “ mos
Croatian strategic thinking, and, to meet the antici tari" was assigned to guard the bridge at all times .
pated threat, the Croatian Army deployed additional Their name eventually passed to include all of the
combat troops into Bosnia and set out to reorganize city's residents .
and command the nascent Bosnian Croat military
organizations and the Croatian Defense Council Mostar had been a trouble spot before the war began ,
(HVO ). With these forces the Croatian Government and relations between the JNA and the local citizenry
hoped to halt the expected JNA offensive , after which were probably the worst of any place in Bosnia . After
the HV would launch a counterstrike . the JNA's participation in the war in Croatia , JNA
units were widely regarded by the Croat population of
Corps General Janko Bobetko, a long-retired Croatian Mostar as an occupation force and a provocation .
JNA general, led and organized the HV and HVO Even when the JNA attempted to be impartial and
forces of the newly activated " Southern Front." 237 unobtrusive , it was still universally perceived as a
Bobetko launched his first offensive (or counteroffen force friendly to the Serbs and hostile to the Muslims
sive ) in late May, attacking with units from inside and Croats , and JNA soldiers and reservists were
Bosnia and from positions near Ston in Croatia to clearly unwelcome in most of western Herzegovina.
push JNA and Bosnian Serb Army forces from their On 1 February a JNA officer was severely wounded in
positions northwest of Dubrovnik . Bobetko's attacks a battle between an Armypatrol and Croat police
conveniently coincided with the JNA withdrawal from reservists.238 239 Three days later, hundreds of mostly
Bosnia and the pullback of the JNA/VRS units in the Croat citizens blockaded the roads from Mostar to Cit
area to positions inside Bosnia or near the Dubrovnik luk and Siroki Brijeg in protest over the behavior of
airport. This withdrawal greatly facilitated the Croat JNA reservists in the area. Two days later, the local
ian advance , and HV troops in previously surrounded Serbs responded by blockading the Mostar-Sarajevo
Dubrovnik linked up to Bobetko's forces by the road.240 Mostar citizens traded gunshots with the
beginning of June. garrison of the JNA's Mostar Bataljon barracks on
14 March ,241 and barricades went up once again the
Meanwhile , in Herzegovina to the north , Bobetko's following day asMostar citizens demanded the with
HV /HVO forces were preparing operations to eject drawal of JNA reservists from the city.242 Blockades
the VRS from Mostar and the Stolac area . This offen partitioned the city into its ethnic neighborhoods for
sive would guard the HV flank for further attacks to the next three days, and interethnic gunfire was
clear the Dubrovnik hinterland while simultaneously exchanged in someoutlying neighborhoods.243 244 Even
" liberating" large areas of Herzegovina populated by more serious fighting occurred on 1 April, with skir
many Croats and Muslims. mishes between JNA soldiers and Croat paramilitaries
in several villages and mortar fire in the southern sub
urb of Jasenica.245 Finally, on 3 April 1992 — only days
Mostar: The Runup to Operation “ Cagalj ” before the outbreak of country -wide hostilities — a
remote -controlled bomb was used to detonate an oil
The city ofMostar was historically the capital of truck outside the JNA's Mostarski Barracks, killing
Herzegovina, and the heart of the region . The city's one and injuring 40.246 Mostar had practically become
name derives from the Serbo -Croatian word “most," a war zone, even before the start of the actual war.
meaning " bridge," and Mostar has for centuries been
most famous for the StariMost (“ old bridge " ), a After the war did begin on 6 April , clashes between
single -span bridge of local white limestone spanning the JNA and primarily Croat forces began at several
the Neretva river. The bridge was constructed at the locations in Herzegovina. The town of Siroki
direction of the Ottoman Sultan Suleyman the Mag Brijeg,247 west of Mostar,was hit by JNA air attacks
nificent and was completed in 1566.When it was first

155
on 7 and 8 April.248 249 JNA artillery began shelling Operation “ Jackal” : The Liberation ofMostar,
someMostar suburbs and shelled the city periodically June 1992
thereafter.250 251 Croat forces unsuccessfully tried to
gain control of Mostar's JNA-held military airfield on Almost from the outset of the war, the HV /HVO com
9 April.252 Serb territorials seized control of two mand been making preparations for the complete cap
hydroelectric power stations on the Neretva two days ture of Mostar itself, requiring the occupation of both
later.253 JNA forces ejected the Croats from Stolac on the west and east banks of the Neretva river, followed
11 April, capturing the town with little or no resis by the capture of Blagaj and Stolac to the south . While
tance.254 Capljina , a Neretva river crossing some 25 the relief of Mostar was itself a critical objective, HV
km south of Mostar, was attacked repeatedly by JNA General Bobetko was also focused on the longer term
aircraft and artillery from early April onward . goal of relieving Serb pressure on Dubrovnik . To
these ends , the combined HV-HVO command devised
In early May, Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban met a plan for a campaign to first retake much of eastern
with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic in Graz , Herzegovina and then to relieve Mostar from outside
Austria to discuss cease -fire terms and a possible the city, rather than breaking out from within . This
political arrangement. They issued a formal statement plan was codenamed Operation (Cagalj) “ Jackal" and
on 7 May, agreeing to a cease- fire but indicating that was set for early summer of 1992.258
disagreement on the division ofMostar and its envi
rons had prevented agreement on a draft “ delineation Bobetko's preparationswere extensive. He first
map ." The Bosnian Serbsmaintained that the Neretva shored up weak HVO antitank capabilities by bringing
River was the dividing line between Serb and Croat in an HV unit from Sisak . He then worked to establish
claims and that the portion of Mostar on the eastern several small (platoon -sized ) reconnaissance and sab
river bank should be Serb . The Bosnian Croats main otage units, each intended to locate and attack a spe
tained that all ofMostar and the surrounding areas cific objective and disrupt Serb forces at the very
should belong to the Croats . The Bosnian Muslims outset of the HV /HVO offensive. The main effort
the largest percentage of Mostar's population - were would be assisted by Croatian Army artillery fire ,
neither consulted nor even mentioned in the official which was intended to knock out the Serb command
statement.255 post in Aladinovici and to pin down Serb forces while
the Croats executed a flankingmaneuver through
The cease -fire was to prove short lived , for the follow- Klepci.259
ing day JNA and Bosnian Serb forces mounted a con
certed attack against the Croat-held portion of the At the end of May, the Bosnian Croats began a series
eastern river bank.256 Atthis point,Mostar's defenders of attacks aimed at progressively improving their tac
were in serious trouble . The Bosnian Croats hung onto tical position around Mostar and relieving Serb pres
a narrow band on the eastern bank and the Bijelo Polje sure on the city . These began with the capture ofMt.
neighborhood to the northeast. JNA and Bosnian Serb Hum to the south on 23 May.260 The next Croat
forces occupied positions on three sides of the city : advances were on 11 June, when HVO forces pushed
the high hills overlooking the city from the east,Mt. significantly further, taking Mt. Orlovac and the towns
Hum and some of the suburbs to the south , and some of Varda, Cule , and Krusevo to the southwest and Jas
of the high ground to the north . The highway west enica and Slipcici to the south.261262 By 12 June , the
toward Siroki Brijeg (some 15 km away) was still free
but subject to JNA shelling 257

156

--
Bosnian Croats had cleared the Serbs from the west The completion of Operation “ Cagalj” was a major
ern bank of the Neretva.263 As an admission of defeat, success for the combined HV and HVO forces.
the Serbs destroyed two of Mostar's other bridges on (Croat-Muslim relations were already strained in
13 June, leaving only the largely undamaged Stari Mostar by this time, and the Bosnian Armywas not
Most connecting the two river banks.264 included in any of the planning for Operation
“ Cagalj.” 273 274 ARBiH troops appear to have played
Atthe same timeHVO troops were clearing Serb units atmost a secondary role in the attacks eastward out of
from western Mostar and pushing them across the Mostar itself.) Although the Serb -held lines still ran
Neretva around the city , the main Croat attack , Opera- dangerously close to Mostar, enough of the eastern
tion Cagalj,was launched on 7 June. HV and HVO bank of the Neretva (most important, the high ground
troops struck eastwards from Capljina, 25 km south of directly overlooking the city ) had been cleared of Serb
Mostar on the west side of the Neretva river, toward forces. Strategically , the operation had also accom
the twin objectives of Mostar to the north and Stolac plished Zagreb's intermediate objective: establish
to the east. The first important step was the capture of ment of a position from which Croatian forces could
Tasovici, east of Capljina on opposite side of the mount a subsequent operation to relieve the siege of
Neretva, on 8 June.265 The Serbs ' thin Herzegovina Dubrovnik .
Corps lines collapsed , and rapid advances north and
east followed . On 13 June, Capljina HVO forces cap
tured the road junction at Recice and the towns of Biv- Operation " Tiger ” : The Croatian Relief of
olje Brdo and Lovke , then made a lightning advance Dubrovnik and the Prevlaka Peninsula Agreement
east up to the outskirts of Stolac ,266 The advance north
along the east bank of the Neretva made similar At Dubrovnik , in early June , Bobetko had conducted a
progress, moving from Bivolje Brdo through Pijesci hastily organized attack to clear the VRS from key
and Gubavica to reach the Mostar suburb of Buna by heights commanding the city from inside Bosnia. The
14 June 267 By 15 June the Capljina HVO was consoli attack failed . Bobetko took some time to develop a
dating its hold on Stolac and captured the nearby Serb more thorough attack plan while building up his
stronghold of Hodovo . 268 forces around the city. The new attack , Operation
" Tiger," began on 4 July , and HV Southern Front
The final element of the operation was an advance troops were able to seize many of the important hill
northwest toward Mostar itself. One of Bobetko's col positions from the VRS by 10 July . After this, how
umns struck north through Buna and Blagaj, reaching ever, Colonel Radovan Grubac's Herzegovina Corps
Mostar airport from the south . At the same time, troops stiffened their defenses southwest of the Serb
another column consisting of troops from the 4th held town of Trebinje . Repeated HV efforts to gain
Guards Brigade and the Mostar HVO forces pushed additional ground from July through September made
south through Jasenica . The two Croat columns were only minor gains, despite the Croatians' superiority in
able to effect a linkup at the Mostar-Soko airfield on manpower, thanks to the difficult terrain and a tena
17 June 269 With this major objective accomplished , cious Serb defense backed by strong artillery support.
the Bosnian Croats turned their attention to mopping
up the Bijelo Polje neighborhood in the northeast and At the end of July , HV, VRS, and JNA commanders
270
advancing into the foothills of Mt. Velez to the east.27 began talks mediated by UN and EU military officers
By 21 June, follow - up attacks in Mostar and from the on the withdrawal of JNA forces from their positions
units advancing along the Neretva from the south had around Dubrovnik airport and the Konavli Plateau.275
pushed the VRS completely out ofMostar, leaving the Belgrade — and in particular the JNA General Staff
city more or less secure from Serb attack.271 Although had insisted on maintaining control over the area after
battles continued on and around Mt. Velez, between its formalwithdrawal from Bosnia because of the stra
Mostar and Serb -held Nevesinje , through the rest of tegic importance of the Prevlaka peninsula , which lies
the summer and again in early November,neither side
was able to make significant additional advances.272

157
at the southern end of Konavli. If Croatian forces con Chapter 31
trolled the peninsula , they could look directly into Dress Rehearsal for a New War:
Kotor Bay , where the entire Yugoslav Navy was sta The 1992 Croat-Muslim Clashes
tioned following the loss of all its other naval bases
along the Croatian coast. The military officers deputed As Bosnia's government fought for its political and
to the talks,however, had no authority to decide what military survival against its Bosnian Serb opponents,
essentially was a political matter. Instead , Lord Owen it soon became apparent that the Muslim -Croat Bos
and Cyrus Vance, the EU and UN heads of the Interna nian entity was a ship with two rudders — and ,more
tional Conference on the Former Yugoslavia — the ominously, two captains . On the one hand, Alija
international negotiation forum — brought President Izetbegovic was the nominal head of state of a newly
Tudjman and Federal Yugoslav President Dobrica independent country, most of whose land area was in
Cosic together to work out a deal on Prevlaka. In late rebellion , who was still working frantically to orga
September agreement was reached for the JNA to nize even the citizenry that remained loyal to him . On
withdraw from the area by 20 October in exchange for the other hand, Bosnian Croat political leaderMate
a UN -monitored demilitarization of the peninsula . Boban (a former supermarket manager from the
Herzegovinian town of Grude) had rapidly risen
As the date neared , both the HV and the VRS began through the workings of Tudjman's visible hand to
planning to fill the vacuum that would be left by the achieve political dominance over the self-proclaimed
JNA withdrawal. The VRS realized that the JNA pull “ Croatian Community of Herceg -Bosna" -an all
out would uncover the flank of its Trebinje defenses , Croat, HDZ -dominated , one-party state with its own
which the JNA positions in Konavlihad guarded . The armed forces , schools, local governments , and cur
HV obviously wanted to forestall any VRS move into rency. Izetbegovic was profoundly opposed to this de
Konavli while “ liberating" Croatian territory. On facto sovereign statelet within what was left of Bos
20 October the HV enveloped the port of Cavtat with nia ,but - engaged in a life -and-death struggle with the
a well-executed landing from the sea and advanced to Bosnian Serbs and dependent on Croatia for a precari
the hills along the border. Over the next six days, HV ous and vital supply line — he was in no position to do
troops, in conjunction with units already in position anything about it.
north of Dubrovnik , pushed back the VRS troops that
had attempted to occupy the hill positions. Key terrain The capture of the JNA barracks and the divvying up
that the HV had been unable to take earlier now fell as of their weapons was the first occasion for open con
the VRS defenses came unhinged . The door to flict between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats . The first
Trebinje lay wide open until President Tudjman confrontations occurred in May 1992 as several JNA
bowed to international pressure to stop the fighting barracks and munitions production facilities surren
and ordered the operation halted. By 1 November, rel dered in jointMuslim - Croatheld territory. Disputes
ative calm descended on the Dubrovnik front. over control of the facilities and the division of the
spoils within began immediately. Muslimsand Croats
The Croatians' skilled combination of military opera first clashed over control over the Kaonik Barracks at
tions and negotiations brought them strategic success . Busovaca,276 then at the Novi Travnik “ Bratstvo " arms
Zagreb had regained controlover all of southern Dal factory ,277 and over the contents of the Ljuta Territorial
matia and lifted the siege of Dubrovnik while joint Defense depot.278 In July the disputes escalated and
HV /HVO forces had been able to defend and recap confrontations spread to Vares279 and Vitez , where
ture key portions ofHerzegovina , includingMostar, control of the evacuated explosives factory was con
from the Serbs.Militarily , the HV had gained valuable tested,280 and HVO forces seized JNA facilities from
experience in conducting large -scale offensive opera Muslims in Kiseljak.281
tions. The Dubrovnik campaign was the first in a long
series of steps leading eventually to the Croatian vic
tories of 1995. Events had also shown that dug- in Serb
troops backed by ex -JNA artillery could still take the
measure of Croatian forces and frustrate Croatia's
larger designs.

158
In mid -August the Muslim -Croat divisions that were town of Prozor quickly and briefly became a tiny Stal
to plague the defense of Sarajevo throughout the war ingrad as both armies intervened on behalf of their
came to the surface as Serb forces pressed hard on the ethnic populations and street battles raged . HVO
western Sarajevo suburb of Otes with artillery fire and forces brought up from Tomislavgrad shelled the
infantry advances. A notorious gang of Muslim fight Muslim sections of the town with artillery fire over
ers led by Juka Prazina, one of Sarajevo's flamboyant night. By the following morning, Prozor's roughly
local warlords, showed up to defend the town but 5,000 Muslimshad fled southward and much of the
immediately antagonized the local HVO . ( The Sara town was reduced to a burnt-out wasteland.291
jevo HVO also objected to Muslim forces launching
uncoordinated attacks from Croat-held areas that pro Tensions came close to the breaking point in many of
voked retaliatory Serb artillery fire into Croat neigh the nearby towns ofmixed ethnicity - Konjic , Jablan
borhoods.)282 The unpleasantness was eventually ica , Bugojno, and Gornji Vakuf — but did not erupt
smoothed over, but Bosnian Army-HVO relations in into open violence as they had in Novi Travnik , Vitez ,
Sarajevo remained strained. and Prozor. Mostar perhaps came closest to igniting,
as Croat commanders occupied government buildings,
The level of Croat-Muslim violence escalated signifi raided the local SDA party headquarters, disarmed
cantly in late October 1992. Outright fighting between Muslim soldiers, and pressured Muslim citizens to
the nominal allies appears to have begun first in Novi leave the city.292 293 Had the Bosnian leadership
Travnik on 19 October and then in Vitez the following decided to retaliate against the HVO after the events
day. A truce was arranged in Vitez on 22 October, but in Prozor, the Croat-Muslim civil war could easily
Croat forces continued to shellNovi Travnik from the have begun in 1992 rather than 1993. (Bosnian Army
hills outside the town , causing serious damage .Mean commander Sefer Halilovic reportedly argued for a
while, the Serb troops outside the city watched in forceful military response against the Bosnian Croats
delight as their opponents battled each other. but was overruled by Izetbegovic and the senior Bos
UNPROFOR finally arranged a cease - fire around nian Government leaders after a closely contested
Novi Travnik on 23 October, and the brushfire crisis vote .)294 Instead , Izetbegovic opted to send a pleading
appeared to have been stamped out. It would flare letter to Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban begging
again.283 284 285 286 287 him to end the “ systematic destruction ” ofthe republic
and met with Croatian President Tudjman on
Just as UNPROFOR was dousing the last of the 1 November to discuss improvements in Croat
embers in Novi Travnik , a conflagration was about to Muslim cooperation.295 296 297
begin in Prozor, some 40 km directly to the south . Pro
zor was an unassuming town of about 15,000 Croats The confrontations of October 1992 were clearly a
and Muslims, far from the frontlines and noteworthy precursor to the Croat -Muslim civil war thatwould
only because it had the fortune or misfortune to sit erupt the following spring. Even the short, nasty con
astride the main north -south highway in Bosnia, run flict of October 1992 was costly enough : at least doz
ning from the sea at Ploce to Mostar and Jablanica, ens and possibly as many as 300 people were killed
through Prozor to Gornji Vakuf, and on to Jajce and (most of them Muslims) over four or five days , and
western Bosnia. One version of the story is that the many more were wounded.298 299 In 1992 both sides
violence began in Prozor on 23 October as a gangland backed away from the brink and restored the uneasy
dispute over which mafia organization would receive Croat-Muslim working relationship common to most
a delivery of black -market gasoline.288 Another ver of Bosnia. In 1993, however, the two sides would not
sion is that the Bosnian Army objected when the HVO turn back , and another war within Bosnia's existing
refused to allow passage for a military supply con war would be the bloody result.
voy.289 Yet another version is that Bosnian Army
troops in Prozor refused to allow HVO special forces
to reinforce the Bosnian Croats fighting the Muslims
in Novi Travnik.290 Whatever the reason , the little

159
 Chapter 32 The Muslims' lack ofmilitary preparedness for the
Conclusions consequences of the Bosnian Government's drive for
independence had catastrophic consequences for
The war in Bosnia was not an inevitable result of war thousands of Muslim citizens. Many paid for their
like peoples ' desire to fight, but instead cameabout leaders' lack of foresight with their livelihoods and
through the conflict of vital political interests among their lives as the Serbs burned their villages and killed
Serbs, Muslims, and Croats. Ethnic chauvinism and or drove off the inhabitants. Even so , with little mili
historical grievances, combined with the brutalities tary experience to go on , through the Republican Ter
inherent in a civil war, ensured that the Bosnian con ritorial Defense and paramilitary Patriotic League the
flict would be a bloody affair. As 1992 ended , the Muslimswere able to build a framework from which
unfinished business of the year would provide the to defend their new country. With even these primitive
main battlegrounds for 1993. During the new year, the formations ,when animated by the Muslim soldier's
Serbs would move to end the Muslims' military con typicalmotivation born of desperation, the central
trol over key parts of the Drina valley and thereby government was able to hold most of Sarajevo and
achieve one of the primary Serb war aims.Mean key regions in central and northern Bosnia while
while , the Croats and Muslimswould resort to war to strongly challenging the Serbs elsewhere .
settle their differences over the political shape of
Bosnia , while the Serbs stood on the sidelines and The Bosnian Croats and their patrons in Zagreb were
laughed . the wild card in 1992 and would remain so throughout
the Bosnian War. There were times when they joined
The side that started the war — the Serbs — was able to with theMuslims to raise a stoutmilitary opposition
achievemost of its war aims during 1992, including to the Bosnian Serbs, particularly through the deploy
the creation of a territorially contiguous Bosnian Serb ment of thousands of Croatian Army forces into the
state. They were able to do this primarily because of country. Indeed , the introduction of HV troops to pre
their extensive prewar preparations for secession from occupy the VRS was one of the key obstacles to an
Bosnia, including the development of armed units. early, total Serb victory. Zagreb and the Bosnian
The backing given the Serbs by the Yugoslav People's Croats had a different vision of an independent Bos
Army in early 1992 , together with the transformation nia , however, than did the Muslims, one in which the
of JNA units into a Bosnian Serb Army, however, was Croats did not answer to a government in Sarajevo .
by far themost important factor in the Serbs ' ability to Muslim -Croat conflicts erupted briefly at different
fight and win . This new army, the VRS , was able to places and over different local circumstances through
win key victories, such as those in the Posavina corri out the year, but all essentially were rooted in the
dor, through its application of professional military divergences over what the nature of Bosnia would be.
expertise and firepower. The Serbs owed their failure
to completely defeat their enemies to the cumulative As 1992 drew to a close, the Bosnian stage had been
effects of the ambitious war aims of the Serb political set and the actors introduced. It remained to be seen
leadership and the rapid expansion — at the cost of how events would play out over the coming years.
necessary training and discipline — ofmajor portions
of the VRS. As a result, when it took on a highly moti
vated enemy, as it did in the Drina valley, the Serb
army suffered a bloody nose .

160
 Endnotes , Section III

Woodward, Susan L. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution 16 For reasonswhich have never become entirely clear, Izetbegovic
After the Cold War. Washington, DC : The Brookings Institution , got the office of president even though his political rival, Fikret
1995. Quoted before the introduction . Also mentioned as a popular Abdic ,had won roughly 15 percent more votes. In a mysterious
saying in Reiff, David , Slaughterhouse : Bosnia and the Failure of deal, Abdic traded his position as President of the Presidency in
the West. New York: Touchstone (Simon & Schuster) 1995. p .65, exchange for the selection of Alija Delimustafic as Interior Minis
but not attributed to Gligorov. ter. Abdic would later not only break with the Bosnian Government
2 For the remainder of this document, “ Bosnia” will generally be but declare his own autonomous province north of Bihac and raise
used for the sake of brevity to refer to either the republic or the his own military (with Krajina Serb support) to defend it against
independent nation of “ Bosnia and Herzegovina," unless specifi Bosnian Army forces.
cally stated otherwise . The term “Herzegovina" will continue to 17 Silber and Little, pp . 210-211.
refer to the region of Bosnia and Herzegovina described above. 18 Gow , James, Triumph of the Lack of Will : International Diplo
3 TotalGerman casualties, including wounded and missing, macy and the Yugoslav War,New York : Columbia University
amounted to 558. Yugoslav civil and military casualties, by con Press, 1997, p . 34.
trast,may have amounted to asmany as 100,000. Roughly 345,000 19 Silber and Little , p . 215 .
Yugoslav Army troops surrendered at the campaign's end. 20 Reuters, “ Dubrovnik Bombardment Causes 'Irreparable Dam
* The degree of collapse within the Yugoslav military is evidenced age'" By Richard Meares, 12 November 1991.
by the fact that the entire city of Belgrade surrendered to 11men 21 Belgrade Radio , 11 November 1991. FBIS Vienna
from the SS “ Das Reich ” Motorized Infantry Division on 12 April. AU1111152691, 111526Z November 1991.
The unit had been blocked by a blown bridge, but the 11-man 22 Malcom , Noel, p . 228
detachment simply convinced Belgrade'sMayor that amuch larger 23 Predictably, the SDA and HDZ eventually declared their support
force was following immediately behind them . It was several hours for the Croatian cause , whereas the SDS declared its support of the
before any additional reinforcements arrived, but Klingenberg's breakaway Krajina rebels.
bluff worked and he received the Knight's Cross for his daring act. 24 Reuters, “ Four Yugoslav Republics Apply For EC Recognition ,"
S 24 December 1991.
Antal,Maj. John F. “Operation 25 : Yugoslavia Disintegrates,"
Army,May 1993. pp. 28-35. 25 Technically,one could argue that the Bosnian referendum did not
• His original namewas Josip Brozovich. meet the criterion laid out by the Badinter Committee, since the
?Maclean , Fitzroy, Eastern Approaches. Bosnian Serbs refused to participate and the vote was thusnot rep
8 Yugoslavia , A Country Study, p . 42. Belarus, with comparable resentative ofthe population as a whole . The specific language
casualty rates, could compete for this dubious distinction but was stated that a “ referendum vote in which all of the citizens of Bosnia
not an independent country at the time. and Herzegovina would participate ” could “ possibly” establish the
9 The remaining 8 percent consistsmostly ofmixed-ethnicity indi will of the Bosnia -Herzegovina populations to constitute Bosnia
viduals who declared themselves as “ Yugoslavs” in the prewar cen and Herzegovina as a sovereign and independent state. (European
sus. Zametica , John, The Yugoslav Conflict. International Institute Community Arbitration Committee Opinion No. 4 — The Recogni
for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper # 270 , p . 36 . tion of Bosnia -Herzegovina, reprinted in Yugoslav Survey, No. 1,
10 Both the urban- rural and western-eastern divides — as exempli 1992. p . 125.)
fied by the rivalry between Banja Luka and Pale for primacy within 26 Silber and Little , p . 206 .
Republika Srpska - were to assume greater importance later on , 27 The postwar Federal Yugoslav Government also imported or cre
but internaldivisions within the Bosnian Serb community always ated many of the armsfactories in Bosnia in order to help industri
remained secondary whenever the Serbs believed they were threat alize the previously backward republic .
ened by an outside actor: for example ,NATO , the Croats, or the 28 On 25 August 1991, during an address in Foca marking the one
Bosnian Muslims. year anniversary of the formation of the SDA , Izetbegovic stated
" Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia : Death of a Nation . that “ they” (presumably the JNA and Serbia) were trying to draw
Penguin USA , p . 212. Bosnia into the war in Croatia, stated “ This is not our conflict.” .
12Malcom ,Noel, Bosnia : A Short History, 2nd Edition. Papermac, Izetbegovic went on to claim thatmore Muslim JNA generals
1996 , p. 199. should be given command in Bosnia and stated that “Our boys will
13 Referencing Mark 3:25, “ If a house be divided against itself, that notbe getting killed and will not be cannon fodder. They will not
house cannot stand ." be commanded by others.” (Sarajevo Radio, 25 August 1991.)
14 The Bosnian Presidency system had a total of seven seats, with On 27 August, a large group of parents of Bosnian conscripts serv
two each reserved for Muslims, Serbs, and Croats , and one seat for ing in the JNA invaded the Bosnian Assembly, demanding that the
a “ Yugoslav.” The two Muslim seats in the 1990 elections went to JNA reassign their children to JNA units stationed in Bosnia and
Alija Izetbegovic and Fikret Abdic. Biljana Plavsic — later to that in the future no recruits be allowed to serve outside the repub
becomePresident of Republika Srpska — and Nikola Koljevic took lic. (Sarajevo Radio, 27 August 1991.) The sameday, Bosnian
the two Serb seats. Stjepan Kljuic and Franjo Boras won the Croat Defense Minister Jerko Doko announced that the republican gov
seats. Ejup Ganic (a Muslim ) won the “ Yugoslav” seat. ernment would postpone the dispatch of the September conscripts
15 Of the six republic presidents who took office after the first mul to the JNA and refuse to turn over conscription records to the Army
tiparty popular elections in Yugoslavia, Izetbegovic was the only
one who was not a former Communist.

161
so that Bosnia could call up the draftees by itself. Belgrade Tanjug Radmilo Bogdanovic quoted in Paul Williams and Norman Cigar,
(27 August 1991.) (In the SFRY, the republican ministries of A Prima Facie Case for the Indictment of Slobodan Milosevic ,
defense and local subordinate defense secretariats were responsible London : Alliance to Defend Bosnia -Herzegovina, 1996 , p. 35 .
formaintaining conscription and reservist records and conducting 40 On 11 June 1991, before a meetingbetween Milosevic , Tudjman ,
actual callups for the JNA, as well as the republican territorial and Izetbegovic ,Milosevic , Borisav Jovic (the Serbian member on
defense.) the Federal Presidency ), Dobrica Cosic (a famous Serbian national
29 Belgrade Tanjug 20 , 24, 26 , 27 September 1991, Belgrade Radio ist thinker and future post-Croatian war Yugoslav president), and
27 September 1991. The JNA and the Bosnian Ministry of Internal Karadzic metto discuss Serbian strategy for the meeting. Jovic
Affairs did reach an agreement for JNA reserve formations entry for 11 June 1991.
deployed in the area to be garrisoned in existing JNA facilities 41 The information is drawn from Dr. Smail Cekic, The Aggression
rather than quartered in local towns and villages. Belgrade Tanjug on Bosnia and Genocide Against Bosniacs, 1991-1993 translated
26 September 1991. In at least one incident, JNA forces clashed by Haris Mesinovic, Kadira Hadzic, and Ferica Ducic. Sarajevo:
with civilians (probably Croats ) near the town of Stolac. Institute for the Research of Crimes Against Humanity and Interna
30Many Herzegovinian Croats were in fact more radical than their tionalLaw , 1995, pp.66 , 385, which includes summaries and cita
ethnic brothers in Croatia. Herzegovina had been one of the breed tions for a large collection of JNA and SDS documents that the
ing grounds for the Croatian World War II Fascists, the Ustashe. Bosnian Government captured during the war. The document cited
31 For example , the Croatian military newspaper, Zagreb Velebit in this case did not say who issued theweapons, and the author
noted that the HV's elite 4th Guards Brigade included many Herze assumes the JNA rather than the Serbian SDB (later RDB ) pro
govinian volunteers upon its formation in spring 1991. See Zeljko vided them . However, it seemsclear that the JNA did not begin
Stipanovic, “Unit That Won All Its Battles," Zagreb Velebit 2 May issuing weapons to Serbs (at least on an official, large -scale level)
1997, pp. 16-17. until the JNA became fully involved in the Croatian war during the
In addition , many prominent Croatian leaders were born in Herze fall of 1991. When the JNA began issuing these weapons to per
govina, in particular many of the Croatian emigres who returned sonnel officially registered as “ volunteers," it appears thatitusu
home in 1989/1990 when the HDZ was formed . These included ally provided them documentation and receipts for the weapons
Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak andmany of the ex -French that identified them as JNA, in contrast to the absence of a record
Foreign Legion personnel, such as Colonel Ante Roso ( later HVO for the 1990 document. In addition , the type ofweapons distributed
commander),who played prominent roles inside the Croatian and the way they appear to have been issued are consistentwith
Army. what is known about the SDB's provision of weapons to the Croat
32 See interview with SDS member Momcilo Krajisnik, then Presi ian Serbs.
dent of the Bosnian Assembly in Degan Jovic, “ Yugoslavia or 42 Additional supply shipments found by the Bosnian MUP include
War !" Zagreb Danas 6 August 1991, pp. 29-31. one stopped on 24 May 1991. The truck , traveling between Niksic ,
33 See Z. Ecim , “WeKnow OurGoal,” Kozarski Vjesnik 20 May Montenegro and Bileca, was carrying 80 Russian submachineguns
1994 and “ The Brigade of a Long and Honorable Warpath ," Kozar and 16,000 rounds of ammunition . Cekic, p .45. The description of
ski Vjesnik 29 July 1994, issue 984 for discussion ofmobilization the weapons as “Russian submachineguns" sounds like the Soviet
problems in one JNA and one Bosnian TO brigade, both ofwhich World War II PPSh submachinegun, which given its age almost
were mobilized in the Prijedor area . certainly came from Serbian TO stocks rather than the JNA. See
34 Zagreb Radio , 29 September 1991; Sarajevo Radio , 29 Septem also Cekic ,pp. 76-79,for additional descriptionsofweapons distri
ber 1991 ; Belgrade Tanjug , 30 September 1991. bution to SDS local boards. Again , these appear to have been SDB
35 Nevertheless,many Muslim JNA officers continued to serve in provided weapons, vice JNA. The list of submachineguns and
the Army throughout the Croatian war,much to the chagrin of their machine pistols given to the senior SDS leadership during June
future Croat “ allies" in the Bosnian conflict. These include such 1991, and described in Cekic, pp . 86-87, also probably came from
prominent figures as Rasim Delic, who was to become the Bosnian the SDB, although Cekic asserts it was the JNA . Cekic , however,
Armycommander, and Enver Hadzhihasanovic , who was a brigade does not say whether the documentation explicitly states that the
commander in Sarajevo, later commanded the Bosnian Army 3rd SDS received the weapons from the JNA.
Corps, and became the Chief of the Bosnian General Staff, 43 Stanisic and key subordinate “ Frenki" Simatovic both attended
36although neither ofthem took part in combat. the four-year anniversary of the Bosnian Serb MUP's Special
Although there is no evidence to substantiate Serb claims that Police Brigade in April 1996. A Nasa Borba reporter who attended
either the Muslims or the Croats intended to launch military opera the gathering stated that “ it was explained to us that the Serbian DB
tions to expel the Serbs or at least eliminate their political leader [State Security ) was actively involved in the creation and training
ship,many Serbs believed that they were threatened by such of this brigade, and that is the reason for the visit by high -ranking
actions. Serbian MUP officials.” D. P, “ Who Are Special Agents of Repub
37 Although the JNA clearly saw its role as the defender of the lika Srpska: ' Second Echelon ' ofKaradzic's Security,” Belgrade
Serbsby the end of the Croatian war in 1991, thatdoes notmean Nasa Borba 13 August 1997 (Internet Version). The first Bosnian
that the JNA desired to start a new war in Bosnia . During late 1991 Serb Internal Affairs Minister was Mico Stanisic, who apparently
and early 1992 , the JNA appears to have stillbeen working for a is a close relative - possibly a cousin — of Jovica Stanisic.
peaceful solution to the republic's crisis, although ready and will 44 Jovic entry for 5 December 1991.
45
ing to use force to defend the Serbs in the eventit came to war. This was concurrent with but entirely independent of the callup
38 The SDB was later redesignated the RDB ( Rezor Drzavne of Serb reservists in Serb -majority Bosnia .
Bezbednosti - Department for State Security ). 46 Silber and Little , p . 218 .
39 Bogdanovic also stated that
“ [Bosnian Serb SDS leader
Karadzic ] was working patriotically, and sought out our help in
organizing the Serbs, and we looked favorably on that. Hewas
often in my office.” “ The Logistics ofService for the People's
Will," Belgrade Duga 7-20 January 1995, p . 21.

162
47 By early the following year, 85 to 90 percentof the JNA forces in 53 Cengic refers to probably the samemeeting at the “ Dom
Bosnia were Bosnian citizens. See Jovic entry for 25 December Milicije ” in Sarajevo , although he states themeeting was notuntil
1991. July 1991. According to Cengic, this was when the name “ Patriotic
48 A full translation of this assessmentwas included in Cekic , as League” was adopted , the “ Council for National Safety " ofMus
Supplement XII, pp. 304-321 . limswas established, and preparations began for an organized mil
49 Cekic, p. 92. A number of examples, based on captured docu itary underground. Sarajevo Ljiljan 13-20 November 1996 ,
ments, are provided on pp. 92-94, 97. For example, on 18 February Interview with Hasan Cengic, “ The Crisis of the Dayton Agree
1992, the “ illegal” (from theMuslim -Croat standpoint) Serb ment Will Not be Solved by My Removal,” FBIS Vienna
Regional TO headquarters for Bihac requested from the JNA 405th AU1811194496 , 181944Z November 1996 .
54
RearBase — a logistic unit — 2,000 infantry weapons, uniforms, and Luckin , S , “ Committed to Democracy and the Idea of Freedom ,"
other supplies from the JNA in order to form a “ Serb unit.” In for Sarajevo Oslobodjenje 13-20 July 1995, FBIS Vienna AU
warding the request to its higher headquarters, the 405th noted that AU1807090095, 180900Z July 1995 .
this request should be considered in light of the 30 December Gen 55 Sarajevo Ljiljan 13-20 November 1996 , Interview with Hasan
eral Staff directive. Note that someof the examples given on pp . Cengic, “ The Crisis of the Dayton Agreement Will Not be Solved
94-97 involve Krajina Serb TO formations — 6th Lika Division — as by My Removal,” FBIS Vienna AU1811194496 , 181944Z Novem
well as a regular JNA formation ( 10th Partisan Division), and thus ber 1996 .
56
for the JNA's purposes did not come under thenascent Bosnian Vasiljevic also claimed thatKOS established contactwith Alija
Serb TO and police. Delimustafic (then Bosnian Republic Interior Minister ) and per
In addition to the 30 December General Staff directive, the SSNO suaded him to block efforts to establish a state of emergency in the
appears to have issued a similar order on 21 February. See Cekic , republic. Belgrade Nin , 12 June 1992, pp. 30-33. FBIS Reston VA
p . 104 , for a description of a JNA 10th Corps request to provide 92BA1147A , 0914567 July 1992.
weapons and supplies to TO units in Bosanska Krupa during late 57
Belgrade Nin , 12 June 1992, pp. 30-33. FBIS Reston VA
April that uses the 21 February SSNO order as justification . 92BA1147A , 0914567 July 1992.
50 On 25 March, the chief of the First (Operations) Directorate/JNA 58 The armsembargo applied most significantly to heavy weapons,
General Staff, Lieutenant ColonelGeneral Dragoljub Simonovic, the Bosnian Muslims' critical deficiency. Although all sides would
informed Adzic : undoubtedly have welcomed more small armsduring the conflict,
about the situation and capabilities of JNA units on the terri there were in fact a very substantial number of handguns, semiau
tory ofBosnia and Herzegovina, the problem of deployment tomatic rifles, and automatic weapons in Bosnia even before the
and withdrawal of war material reserves from depots and of TO stocks were distributed and covert arms imports began. Basi
endangered JNA communication , command, control, and cally, prewar Bosnia was a well-armed society : according to police
logistics facilities on the territory of BiH . reports from June 1991, 92,500 Muslim citizens owned 110,400
As a result of this briefing, Adzic issued an order on 3 April to the registered firearms, 131,900 Serbs owned 157,200 registered fire
Second Military District (and, as noted, although Cekic did not cite arms, and 43,000 Croatian citizens owned 51,800 registered fire
a similar order, presumably also to the Fourth Military District for arms. Belgrade Politika, 21 June 1993 p . 7.
59
its units in Herzegovina) calling on the JNA to : Mijalkovski,Milan, “ Terrorist Conspiracy Against the State,"
Hasten the withdrawal of warmaterial reserves, especially Belgrade Vojska , 28 October 1993, pp . 12-14 , FBIS Vienna AU
ofmodern and valuable combat equipment...Unit reserves AU1311192493, 131924Z November 93 .
to be handled within the removal and relocation of units. 60 Lazanski,Miroslav, “ One Plane and 80,000 Men,” Belgrade
The Second Military District also was to prepare , Politika 21 June 1993 p . 7 , FBIS Vienna AU0107093893 010938Z
... a map analysis of the area which will clearly show : July 93.
what is situated in secure areas; what can be successfully 61 Halilovic , Sefer, Lukava Strategija (“ Clever Strategy” ) , Chapter
defended , with adequate reinforcements, until the condi 17 .
tions for evacuation are created (exactly specify quantities 62 Belgrade Narodna Armija , Commentary by Ivan Matovic, “ The
to be defended and to be evacuated) ; what can be evacuated Leopard's Skin is Getting Tighter.” FBIS Vienna, 1913297 March
through threats and force by creating the corridors for with 1992.
drawal (on maps of 1:25,000 scale detailed plans are to be 63 The officer also claimed at the same time that there were 30,000
made) , with the alternative ofdemolition/destruction (plan troops in the Bosnian Serb “White Eagles" and 15,000 in the Bos
in detail what can be extracted by surprise ofmost impor nian Croat HOS and ZNG combined. Belgrade Tanjug, 20 March
tant technical assets and what can be distributed to the pop 1992. FBIS London 201416Z March 1992 .
ulation for safekeeping .) 64
Mijalkovski,Milan , “ The Guilty Are StillGoing Unpunished ,"
Adzic gave the Second Military District a deadline of 10 April for Belgrade Vojska , 23 July 1992 , p . 42. FBIS Reston VA
the completion ofthese plans. Cekic , pp. 115-116 , which give the 92BA12746 , 1113307 August 1992 .
65
specific citation of Adzic's order - Federal Secretariat for National Sarajevo Radio , Izetbegovic 13 February 1993 Speech , FBIS
Defense, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SFRY, First London , 1410277 February 1993.
Department, Top Secret No. 585-2, 03 April 1992 — Att . Com 66 This appears consistentwith a press report stating that there were
mander or Chief of Staff of HQ Second Military District. 5,000 Patriotic League members registered in Sarajevo's Novi
See Cekic, pp . 115-123 for a description of the JNA withdrawal Grad district alone, which were to become the nucleus of four Bos
51 This number is an estimate based on totals after the early April nian Army Brigades (the 1st Motorized, 2nd Motorized , 102nd
JNA mobilization in key areasof Bosnia . See Annex 22 and the Mountain , and 5th Dobrinja Brigades.) Mehicevic , Alisa, “ I Will
next section for more details. Not Evict a Single Person Despite All the Pressures," Sarajevo
52 Sarajevo Ljiljan 13-20 November 1996 , Interview with Hasan Ljiljan 8 January 1997 pp . 30-31. FBIS Reston VA 97E17030,
Cengic, “ The Crisis of the Dayton Agreement Will Not be Solved 110242Z February 1997 .
byMy Removal,” FBIS Vienna AU 1811194496 , 1819442
November 1996 .

163
67 Sefko Hodzic, “ Foundations of the Bosnian Miracle," Sarajevo 86 Sarajevo Radio , 4 April 1992.
Oslobodjenje 3 January 1996 , FBIS Reston 0900142 April 1996 87 Koljevic's and Plavsic's gesture was largely irrelevant, since the
68 Sarajevo Radio , Izetbegovic 13 February 1993 interview , FBIS entire SDS contingenthad already walked out of the parliament.
London LD1402125793, 1412572 February 1993. 88 General Kukanjac ordered the JNA Second Military District sub
69 Izetbegovic speech to the Second Congress of the Party of Dem ordinates not to hand over any weapons to the TO withoutwritten
ocratic Action ,reprinted in Sarajevo Dnevni Avaz, 9 September permission from the District commander. See Cekic, p . 91.
1997 . 89
Sarajevo Radio , 4 April 1992.
70 Gjelten, Tom , Sarajevo Daily: A City and Its Newspaper Under 90 Sarajevo Radio , 4-6 April 1992; Belgrade Radio , 4-6 April 1992,
Siege.New York , HarperCollins, 1995. p . 34. Belgrade Tanjug, 4-6 April 1992 ; Silber and Little, pp . 226-227.
71
Vego, Dr.Milan, “ The Croatian Forces in Bosnia and Herzegov 91 On the night of 5 April the JNA seized control of Sarajevo air
ina,” Jane's Intelligence Review ,March 1993, pp. 99-103. port .
72
Sarajevo Radio 2000 GMT, 19 Jul 1992, FBIS London 1922142 92 The date 6 April was by coincidence a historically charged one.
July 1992. On 6 April 1941, Hitler's Wehrmacht began its lightning invasion
73 Z.Zanko Report: " Croatian Party OfRights Will Not Leave of Yugoslavia , and Luftwaffe bombers devastated Belgrade.
Starcevic House” Zagreb Vecernji List, 12May 1992 , p. 9. Appropriately, it was on 6 April 1945 that Sarajevo was liberated
74 Dedakovic returned to Croatia in October 1992 , whereafter he from the German occupation.
was accused of stealing some 300,000 DM intended for Vukovar's 93 Also by coincidence, the UN Security Council formally voted
defenders and imprisoned . He faced a military court butwas even that same day to recommend full deployment of UNPROFOR
tually acquitted . peacekeepers in Croatia.
75 Malcom , p . 228 94 Belgrade Tanjug, 15 March 1992 , FBIS London LD1503154992,
76 Vego, Dr.Milan, “ The Croatian Forces in Bosnia and Herzegov 151549Z March 1992.
ina,” Jane's Intelligence Review ,March 1993, pp. 99-103. 95 Belgrade Radio , 28 March 1992, FBIS Vienna AU2803162092,
77 Zagreb Radio , 9 August 1992, FBIS London LD0908 190692. 281620Z March 1992 .
78 See particularly Bobetko pp . 212-216 , 220-221, 224, 229 for 96 Sarajevo Radio , 10 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU 1004180392,
photographs of Bobetko orders to HV officers organizing HVO 1018032 April 1992.
defenses in key areas of Herzegovina. 97 Travnik Bosnjak, Interview With Senahid Hadzic , Commander
79 A photographic copy of Tudjman's order authorizing Bobetko to of the 9th Muslim Liberation Brigade, “ Crucial Test,” 21 Novem
assumecommand ofall Croatian forces from Split to Dubrovnik is ber 1995. FBIS Reston VA , 96BA0040A .
98
reproduced in Janko Bobetko, Sve Moje Bitke (All My Battles ), Sarajevo Radio , 8 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0804181592,
Zagreb : Vlastita Naklada, 1996. p . 202. 0818152 April 1992.
80 See Bobetko pp. 206-208 for photographs of the orders establish 99 Sarajevo Radio , 8 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0804224092,
ing this forward command post with Petkovic as its chief when 082240Z April 1992.
Bobetko was not present. 100
Gjelten , Tom , Sarajevo Daily : A City and its Newspaper Under
81
Bijeljinamunicipality had about 96,000 people in 1991, compris Siege. New York : HarperCollins, 1995. pp. 89-91.
ing 59 percent Serbs and 31 percentMuslims, with a smattering of 101 JNA elements within Bosnia itself included part of the 336th
Croats. Although an ethnic breakdown for the town itself is not Motorized Brigade, while JNA artillery from the FirstMilitary
available, it probably was more heavily Muslim , while many of the District was deployed on the Serbian side of the Drina River. Bel
surrounding villages were predominantly Serb . Population data grade Tanjug Domestic Service, 2 March 1992 ,FBIS London
taken from The Miroslav Krleza Lexicographical Institute , A Con LDO203222792, refers to members of a JNA mechanized -armored
cise Atlas of the Republic of Croatia & of the Republic of Bosnia unit from Jastrebarsko deploying to the Zvornik area in late Febru
and Hercegovina, Zagreb: 1993. ary -early March . This was the former 4th Armored Brigade, for
82 See Abdulah Sahinpasic , “ Every Beginning is Hard ,” Sarajevo merly headquartered at Jastrebarsko and redesignated the 336th
Slobodna Bosna, 5 April 1996 , pp . 12-15 . Although a Muslim Motorized .
account, it appears to provide themost accurate details of the 102 Belgrade Tanjug, 10 April 1992, FBIS London LD1004224892,
events surrounding the capture of Bijeljina, including preliminary 102248Z April 1992.
Serb political and bureaucratic moves preceding the actual seizure . 103 Silber and Little, p . 224 .
83 Abdulah Sahinpasic, “Every Beginning is Hard,” Sarajevo Slo 104 Andric won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1961. His book
bodna Bosna , 5 April 1996 , pp. 12-15; Sarajevo Radio 4 April details the life of the town and of the Orthodox , Muslim , Catho
1992; Belgrade Radio 4 April 1992. lic, and Jewish communities that comprised it — through four cen
84 Sarajevo Radio 3 April 1992. JNA troops in Bijeljina did not turies after the bridge's construction. Andric (a Croatwho wrote in
intervene during the fighting, either to halt the Serb attacks or to the Serb dialect) also refers directly to the interethnic tensions in
directly support them . JNA troops, however, did shelter both Serb then -Yugoslavia and the potential for violence beneath the commu
and Muslim refugees in the JNA's Bijeljina area barracks. See Sejo nity's surface.
IOS
Omeragic, “ Tracking Down Crime: The Bloody Bijeljina Bayram ,” Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service, 13 January 1992, FBIS Lon
Sarajevo Slobodna Bosna, 5 April 1996 , pp. 12-15 . don LD1301140392, 131403Z January 1992.
85 In one of the Bosnian Presidency's last official acts before the 106 Belgrade Tanjug, 4 March 1992, FBIS London LD0403233392 ,
government collapsed , Izetbegovic sent a joint delegation (includ 042333Z March 1992.
ing Fikret Abdic , a Muslim ; Jerko Doko, a Croat; and Biljana 107 Sarajevo Oslobodjenje , Interview with Momcilo Mandic , Assis
Plavsic , a Serb) to investigate what had happened in Bijeljina . Pre tantMinister of Internal Affairs of Bosnia-Hercegovina, “ They
dictably, the inquiry went nowhere . The mostmemorable aspect of Want the Personnel Officer to Be Replaced !” 6 March 1992, p. 2 .
the“ investigation” occurred when the future presidentof the
Republika Srpska, Biljana Plavsic, first encountered Arkan after
the Bijeljina takeover. She greeted him with a kiss .

164
 108 Belgrade Tanjug, 23 March 92, FBIS London LD2303114292 , is indicative of both the destruction and the chaos of the very first
231142Z March 1992 . days of the Bosnian war,before the various sides had regularized
109
Belgrade RTV, 24 March 1992, FBIS Vienna AU2403194292, their forces and imposed greater discipline on the troops:
241942Z March 1992. Gangs of gun -toting Serbs rule Foca, turning the once quiet
110 Belgrade Tanjug , 24 March 1992 , FBIS London Bosnian town into a nightmare landscape of shattered
LD2403234392, 242343Z March 1992. streets and burning houses. Themotley assortmentof fierce
Sarajevo Radio , 8 April 1992 , FBIS Vienna AU804151492, lookingbearded men carry Kalashnikovs and bandoliers or
0815142 August 1992. have handguns tucked into their belts. Some are members of
112 Zagreb Radio , 9 April 1992, FBIS London LD0904120792, paramilitary groups from Serbia, others are wild -eyed local
0912072 April 1992. men ,hostile toward strangers and happy to have driven out
113 Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service, 9 April 1992, FBIS London their Moslem neighbours.No one seemsto be in command
LD0904215792, 0921572 April 1992 . and ill-disciplined and bad tempered gunmen stop and
114 detain people at will.
Sarajevo Radio, 10 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU 1004203092,
1020302 April 1992. TheMoslems, who made up half the town's population of
115 Belgrade RTB Television Network , 9 April 1992, FBIS Vienna 10,000 people, have fled or are in jail.Many of their houses
AU0904191892, 0919182 April 1992. have been destroyed or are in flames. Entire streets have
116 As the fighting around Visegrad drew to a close , there was a been destroyed , restaurants reduced to cinders and twisted
bizarre epilogue involving a Bosnian Muslim , Murad Sabanovic , metal, apartment blocks charred, the hospital hit by mortar
who took control of the hydroelectric dam above the city and fire . The Serbs say that despite the damage, only seven or
threatened to blow it up with explosives, which would have eightof their own men and about twenty Moslems were
flooded Visegrad and much of the surrounding area. After negotia killed in the fighting.
tions by radio failed , the JNA stormed the position and discovered Glenny,Misha, The Fall of Yugoslavia . Penguin , 1992. p . 166 .
131
that Sabanovic had no explosives. The small amount of water Sarajevo Radio , 28 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU2804192492 ,
released did little damage . Glenny,Misha, The Fall of Yugoslavia . 2819242 April 1992.
Penguin , 1992. pp. 165-166 . 132 Belgrade Radio , 30 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU3004161292,
117 Belgrade Radio 1 March 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0103210892,
301612Z April 1992.
0121087 March 1992 . 133 Interview with General Sulejman Vranjby Fahira Fejzic , “ They
118 Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service, 2 March Didn't Believe That I Would Get to Sarajevo Alive, So They Only
1992, FBIS Lon
don LDO203160192, 0216012 March 1992. Entrusted One Launcher to Me,” Sarajevo Ljiljan, 15 May 1996
119 Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service , 23 March 1992, FBIS Lon pp . 20-21.
don LD2303132592, 2313257 March 1992. 134
Sarajevo Radio , 18 May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU 1805141792.
120 Miro Stanic, Commander of the Foca War Headquarters, left on 135 Sarajevo Radio 6 May
1992, FBIS Vienna AU0605161392,
30 April 1992 to meet in Cajnice with the “ Army Minister of the 061613Z May 1992 .
136 Sarajevo Radio , 12 May 1992,
Serbian Autonomous Region of Hercegovina" in order to coordi FBIS Vienna AU1305122492.
137 Sarajevo Radio , 18 May
nate further operations in the area. (Belgrade Radio 30 April 1992, 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1805141792.
FBIS Vienna AU3004161292, 3016122 April 1992 ) Cajnice was 138 Bosnian MUP and Territorial Defense forces had already seized
also the closest sizable town with its own TO headquarters . the arms, ammunition, and equipmentof the former Regional
121
Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service, 15 May 1992, FBIS London Headquarters of the Tuzla Territorial Defense stored at Tuzla, Sre
LD1505135392 , 151353Z May 1992. brenik, and Lukavac at the very outset of the fighting (15 April).
122 Belgrade Radio 8 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0804114792, (From the chronology in a 1993 Bosnian Army soldier's hand
0811472 April 1992. book .)
123 Zagreb Radio 9 April
1992, FBIS London LD0904101192, 139 These were the “ 27 July ” and “Grmec ” Barracks. "Grabez" Bar
0910117 April 1992. racks, somewhat further away, remained in the hands of Serb Terri
124 Sarajevo Radio , 9 April 92, FBIS Vienna AU0904190792, torials.
140 Sarajevo Radio , 19 May 1992 , FBIS
091907Z April 1992. Vienna AU1905092892.
125 Sarajevo Radio , 11 April 1992, FBIS
Vienna AU1104213792, 141Sarajevo Radio , 19 May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1905174892.
142
1121372 April 1992. Sarajevo Radio , 24 May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU2405163792.
143
126 Zagreb Radio, 13 April 1992, FBIS London LD1304080792, Sarajevo Radio , 28 May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU2805125792.
1308077 April 1992. Sarajevo Radio , 5 June 1992, FBIS Vienna AU506111792.
145
127 Belgrade Radio , 13 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1304173292, These war aims are based on a speech and an interview that Bos
131732Z April 1992. nian Serb PresidentRadovan Karadzic gave in 1995. See Banja
128 Belgrade Radio , 14 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU 1404161692 , Luka Srpska Televizija 12 September 1995 for a long interview
1416162 April 1992. with Karadzic in which he outlines the military and diplomatic sit
129 Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service , 17 April 1992, FBIS Lon uations in 1995 and relates them to war aims that the Bosnian Serb
don LD1704152792, 1715272 April 1992. Assembly approved in 1992. Karadzic's speech to officials in East
130 Following the Serb capture of Foca in mid -April, a particularly ern Herzegovina on 25 August 1995 on Banja Luka Srpska
bad example of“ ethnic cleansing" ensued.Muslim -owned houses Televizija is a more propagandistic , less straightforward discussion
were looted or torched,mosques were burned down, and the small of the sameaims, again in the context of the political-military situ
Muslim population that remained behind was terrorized. A Reuters ation in 1995 .
correspondentmanaged to get into Foca shortly after the townwas
captured by Serb forces and described the scene he saw . The report

165
146 This section is derived largely from this author's experience 156 It is also likely that the VRS chose to leave a route out of the
analyzing the Bosnian Serb Army on a daily basis for more than pocket open to encourage the population to evacuate the enclave
five years . when it fell, thus removing the need for VRS personnel to eject the
147 Drawn from the testimony ofdefense expert witness Brigadier Croats and Muslims themselves.
Muhamed Zejzagic during the ICTY War Crimes Tribunal 157 Bihac, Bosanska Krupa, Cazin , and Velika Kladusa .
" Celebici" trial of Zejnil Delalic, et. al. 158 Figures are approximate and are taken from the 1991 Yugoslav
148 census data.
Sarajevo Radio , 10 April 1992, FBIS Vienna 102132Z Apr 92 ,
AU1004213292 . 159 Unlike the rest of Bosnia — most of which was conquered in
149 Lazanski,Miroslav, “ One Plane and 80,000 men.” Belgrade 1463 — the Bihac region remained in Croat-Hungarian hands
Politika 21 June 1993 p. 7. FBIS Vienna AU0107093893 010938Z through most of the 16th century. Indeed, the Habsburg fortress in
July 1993. the city was not captured by the Turks until 1592.
150 This section will look almost exclusively at the ethnic cleansing 160 The Muslimswere also somewhat better armed at the outset,
in western Bosnia through the actions of the Bosnian Serb Army. It since the Patriotic League had managed to intercept a significant
will not examine the detention camp system and is not intended to fraction of the former Territorial Defense weapons that the JNA
be a full examination of the war crimes issue. It also will not focus had intended to distribute to the area's Serbs. Halilovic, Sefer,
on the often exaggerated actions of so -called “ paramilitary ” units Lukava Strategija (“ Clever Strategy ” ), chapter 17 .
(more accurately designated volunteers); these cutthroats served as 161 Sarajevo Radio , 16 April 1992 , FBIS Vienna AU1704094892 .
auxiliaries to VRS regular formations.Much of the reporting , 162 Belgrade Tanjug, 1 March 1992, FBIS London LD0103120292.
unless otherwise cited , is drawn from a series of debriefings of ref 163 Belgrade Tanjug, 31March 1992, FBIS London
ugees expelled by the Bosnian Serbs during their operations. This LD3103090492.
reporting has been judged to be highly accurate in most cases. 164 As late as the second week ofMay, JNA 10th Bihac Corps com
Crosschecks between reports, together with other sources that cor mander Lt. Col. General Spiro Ninkovic cited the Bihac area as an
roborate these debriefings, have allowed us to develop a detailed area of relative stability and an example for the rest of Bosnia. As
picture of the VRS operations. Ninkovic put it — with the exception of the town of Bosanska
isi As cited in Reiff, David , Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Fail Krupa ,which had already been taken over by Serb forces — Bihac
ure ofthe West. New York: Touchstone, 1994. pp . 76-77. was an area where “ sanity prevails and interparty antagonisms are
152 Vulliamy, Ed, Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War. not as they are in the broader areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina.” (Bel
New York: St.Martin's Press, 1994. p . 66 . grade Tanjug , 8 May 1992 , FBIS London LD0805121592 ) Given
153 The following narrative and analysis has a Serbo- centric focus the bizarre and tragic free- for-all which was to ensue — with Mus
because of the strategic importance of the Posavina corridor to the lims, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Krajina Serbs, and separatist
creation and survival of Republika Srpska. In addition, the Bosnian Abdic forces all fighting in the area — Ninkovic's words appear in
Serb Army has published a substantialamountof information on retrospect to be ironically far off the mark .
its operations in the corridor,making it far easier to tell the Serb 165 O'Shea, Brendan, Crisis at Bihac: Bosnia's Bloody Battlefield .,
side of the military story than that of the Croatians,who, for obvi UK : Sutton Publishing, 1998. p . 3 .
ous reasons (they lost), have provided far less public information 166 Sarajevo Radio , 21 April
1992, FBIS Vienna AU2104182292.
on their version of events . Thus, for example, the Bosnian Serb 167 Sarajevo Radio , 22 April 1992, FBIS London LD2204124792 .
military journals, Krajiski Vojnik and Srpska vojska havemany 168 Sarajevo Radio , 22 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU2204210992 .
detailed articles on the corridor,describing unit dispositions, the 169 Zagreb Radio, 30 April 1992, FBIS London LD3004083192.
battles,and commanders . The comparable Croatian military publi 170 Belgrade Tanjug, 24 April 1992, FBIS London LD2504002192.
cations, Hrvatski Vojnik and Velebit, usually mention in passing 171 Nikola Zoric, “ 11th Krupa Light Infantry Brigade: Order on
that a unit fought in the " Sava Basin ” in 1992, or more rarely, will Krajina Chests," Srpska Vojska 15 July 1993, pp. 8-9 ,describes the
admit to having been in “ Bosanska Posavina” ; beyond general fighting around Krupa from the perspective of the Serb Krupa
locational statements, however,no narrative detail is provided on TO — later the VRS 11th Krupa Light Infantry Brigade.
combat operations. In addition, unlike the Croatian Army com 172 Belgrade Tanjug, 8 May 1992, FBIS London LD0805220392.
mander in Herzegovina and the Dalmatian coast,General Bobetko, 173 Belgrade Tanjug, 9 May 1992, FBIS London LD0905224792.
General Stipetic — the lastHV commander in Posavina — is still an 174 Theremay have been a shortage of pilots anyhow . Zagreb Radio
active-duty officer and has not published his memoirs . claimed that 32 Air Force pilots from the Bihac garrison had
154 This section will discuss events from March 1992 to January declared their allegiance to the Bosnian Republic Government
1993 in a single narrative because there was no clear separation shortly after the outbreak of hostilities . Zagreb Radio , 10 April
dividing operations in March from those in June. One set came 1992 , FBIS London LD1004095792 .
right after the other and need to be discussed in context. 175 Sarajevo Radio , 16 May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU605143592.
155 As Bosnian Army 2nd Corps Commander Hasim Sadic was to 176 These were the “ 27 July ” and “ Grmec " Barracks . The “ Grabez"
say two years later : Barracks, somewhat further away, remained in the hands of Serb
You know that we fought a battle for the corridor once Territorials .
before, in cooperation with the 4th OperationalHVO Zone 177 Sarajevo Radio , 19 May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU190592892 .
of Orasje. The HVO progressed till Vucilovac , and we then 178 Sarajevo Radio, 19May 1992 , FBIS Vienna AU1905174892.
took the position of Gorica -Krepsic and got as close as 1.5 179 Belgrad Radio , 12 May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1205140592.
km , but we did not manage to hold out. While theHVO bri 180 Zagreb Radio , 12 May 1992, FBIS London LD1205153192.
gades remained at the positions, we had to withdraw more 181 Belgrade Radio , 31May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU3105165292.
to the south . 182 Sarajevo
Radio , 12 June 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1206074192 .
Zeljko Garmaz and Sasa Buric, “ The Offensive Aimed at Cutting
the Corridor and Lifting the Blockade of Sarajevo Has Started !”
Zagreb Globus, 12 August 1994. FBIS Vienna AU , 171056Z
August 1994 .

166
183 Zagreb Radio ,27 September 1992 , FBIS London were subsequently added to the 5th Corps order of battle, but these
LD2709151292. were the original units .
184 Sarajevo Radio , 13 June 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1306163192. 208 The 2nd Krajina Corps brigades— 11th Krupa, 1st Drvar, 3rd
185 Belgrade Radio , 14 July 1992 , FBIS Vienna AU 1407163292. Petrovac , 17th Kljuc, and 15th Bihac — were deployed between
186 Zagreb Radio 13 September 1992, FBIS London Bosanska Krupa and Bihac city, including the Grabez area. The 1st
LD1309141792 The 15th Bihac Light Infantry Brigade carried out Novigrad Light Infantry Brigade from 1st Krajina Corps defended
the attack on Golubic . the area northeast of Krupa up to the Croatian border.
187 Zagreb Radio , 16 September 1992, FBIS London 209 This does notmean that the Muslimswere the only ones com
LD1609113492. mitting atrocities in the Drina valley fighting . On the contrary , the
188 Sarajevo Radio , 18 September 1992, FBIS Vienna Serbs ethnically cleansed theMuslim population from all the areas
AU1809134092. that they captured . The atrocities committed by Oric's men have
189 The Bosnian Army's 1st Cazin (later 503rd) Brigade took the been highlighted in part because they appear to have been an
towns of Novakovci and Trnjak. Sarajevo Radio , 16 September exception to the conduct of Bosnian Government troops toward
1992, FBIS London LD1609215792 . Serb civilians. Elsewhere, other than in isolated incidents, Bosnian
190 Zagreb Radio , 23 September 1992, FBIS London Army units appear to have generally treated the Serb population
LD2309100992. appropriately, on the express orders of the Bosnian Government.
191 Sarajevo Radio , 25 September, FBIS Vienna AU2509124392 . 210 The head of the MUP school reportedly stated there were 840
192 Zagreb Radio , 7 November 1992 , FBIS London students and teachers in the school compound at the time.Most of
LD0711235692 . these were teenagers. Zagreb Radio , 5 April 1992, FBIS London
193 Zagreb Radio , 10 October 1992, FBIS London LD1010121192. LD0504160392 .
211
194 The Bosnian Army's 105th (later 505th ) Buzim Brigade By an unfortunate coincidence, the gun battles around the sur
advanced several kilometers east toward Bosanski Novi, capturing rounded police academy were taking place at the same exact
Banjani and Basta but was unable to completely force the Serbs out moment as a march by a largemultiethnic crowd of thousands of
of the area north of Otoka. Zagreb Radio , 13 October 1992, FBIS unaffiliated Sarajevans calling for peaceful coexistence among all
London LD1310163492 . the factions. The crowd had first gathered near thenational assem
195 Bosnian Army forces captured the Bosanska Bojna area 16 bly building to protest the fighting and the breakup of the country.
October 1992.Zagreb Radio , 16 October 1992, FBIS London Unaware of the attack , the crowd then crossed the Miljacka River
LD1610115792. southward over the Vrbanja bridge in the city's Grbavica neighbor
196 Zagreb Radio, 28 August 1992, FBIS London LD2808100192. hood. Unwittingly, they began to march straight toward the police
197 Zagreb Radio , 9 September 1992, FBIS London academy grounds, where Serb forces were then attacking Vraca
LD0909195792. hill. The Serbs opened fire on the group, causing the crowd to
198 Zagreb Radio , 14 September 1992, FBIS London panic and disperse. One man was injured, and then a 21-year-old
LD1409121492 . Muslim medical student, Suada Dilberovic — a refugee from
199 Sarajevo Radio , 14 September 1992, FBIS Vienna Dubrovnik , Croatia — was shot through the chest. She died within
AU1409123392 . minutes,and the Sarajevo marchers' dream of a united Bosnia died
200 Zagreb Radio , 22 September 1992, FBIS London with her. She is sometimes counted as the firstcasualty of the Bos
LD2209113392 . nian civil war, although that dubious distinction could perhapsbet
201 Sarajevo Radio , 22 September, FBIS Vienna AU2209180192. ter be awarded to the Muslim victimsof Arkan's occupation of
202 Ramiz Drekovic was the 5th Corps ' first commander. Bijelina four days earlier on 1 April. See Silber and Little, p. 227.
203 Zagreb Radio , 20 October 1992, FBIS London LD2010132392. 212 Silber and Little , pp. 226-227.
204 The 2nd Krajina Corps's initial objective were a series ofmuch 213 In the end , the several hundred surrounded police cadets were
disputed hills running from just south of Bihac north across the pla exchanged for the six Serb gunmen who had fired into the crowd
teau to the Una. See Brendan O'Shea, Crisis at Bihac: Bosnia's from the Holiday Inn on 6 April 1992.Gjelten , Tom , Sarajevo
Bloody Battlefield , Gloucestershire , Sutton Publishing Limited , Daily: A City and its Newspaper Under Siege. New York : Harper
1998 , pp .8-9. Nikola Zoric, “ 11th Krupa Light Infantry Brigade: Collins, 1995. pp . 41-42.
214
Order on Krajina Chests,” Srpska Vojska 15 July 1993, pp. 8-9. For Sarajevo Radio , 5 April 1992 , FBIS Vienna AU0504200892 .
day-to -day reporting on the fighting, see Paris AFP 1 December 215 Less intense fighting occurred elsewhere in the city on 5 April.
1992 , Zagreb Radio 1 December 1992 , 15 December 1992; Bel Muslim forces seized control of the Novo Sarajevo police station
grade Radio 5 December 1992; Sarajevo Radio 6 December 1992, (Sarajevo Radio , 5 April 1992 , FBIS Vienna AU0504134292 ), and
Sarajevo Radio 11 December 1992, 14 December 1992. shooting and grenade fire were reported in the Dobrinja and Bas
205 The 2nd Krajina Corps employed the bulk of the 1st Drvar, 15th carsija neighborhoods. (Sarajevo Radio , 5 April 1992, FBIS
Bihac, and 17th Kljuc Light Infantry brigades, plus the 3rd Battal Vienna AU0504224292.)
216
ion/ 11th Krupa Light Infantry Brigade and an engineer (pioneer) Zagreb Radio , 5 April 1992, FBIS London LD0504230692.
217
battalion , used as infantry . Predrag Malic , “ Pioneer Battalion of Zagreb Radio , 5 April 1992, FBIS London LD0604000892 .
Laniste - Future Overflow Chamber of the Klenovac-Laniste Pipe 218 Few Sarajevans had any doubts that Radovan Karadzic had
line,” Mladi Inzinjerac February 1993, p . 4 . ordered the shootings — the rooms from which the shots were fired
206 The 5th Corps appears to have employed the 1st and 2nd Bihac had been rented to the Serbian Democratic Party ,and one of the six
Brigades,the 1st Cazin Brigade, and possibly elements of the 111th arrested Serbs turned out to be a Karadzic bodyguard — but his role
Bosanska Krupa Brigade. was never actually proved .
219
207 These were the 1st Bihac (later 501st) Brigade, 2nd Bihac (later Gjelten , pp. 2-3, 22-24.
502nd) Brigade, 1st Cazin (later 503rd) Brigade, 105th Buzim
(later 505th ) Brigade, 1st Velika Kladusa (later 521st) Brigade,
111th Bosanska Krupa (later 511th ) Brigade, and the 101st HVO
Brigade (later 101st Home Defense Regiment). Other brigades

167
220 Silber and Little , p . 231. 239 Zagreb Radio , 1 February 1992, FBIS London LD0102172192.
221 Silber and A Little, p . 232, 235 . 240 Belgrade Tanjug, 6 February 1992, FBIS London
222 Gjelten , pp. 98-99. LD060294192.
223 Ibid . 241 Belgrade Tanjug , 14 March 1992 , FBIS London
224 Silber and Little , p . 233. LD1403202192 .
225 Sarajevo Radio , 2 May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0205191992. 242 Belgrade Tanjug, 15 March 1992,FBIS London
226 Gjelten , p . 99. LD1503214192 .
227 The order ofbattle of the Sarajevo -Romanija Corps in 1992 was 243 Belgrade Tanjug, 17 March 1992 , FBIS Vienna AU1703161492.
as follows: 244
Belgrade Tanjug, 18 March 1992, FBIS Vienna AU 1803161992.
Headquarters, Sarajevo-Romanija Corps— Lukavica 245 Belgrade Radio , 1 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0104155992.
1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade* --Grbavica/Stari Grad 246 Belgrade Tanjug , 3 April 1992, FBIS London LD0304221192.
2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade* -Dobrinja/Vitkovici 247 Also known as Listica .
1st Romanija Infantry Brigade* _Hresa 248 Belgrade Tanjug, 7 April 1992, FBIS London LD0704184192.
Vogosca Light Infantry Brigade — Vogosca 249 Belgrade Tanjug, 8 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0804195992 .
Kosevo Light Infantry Brigade — Kosevo 250 Zagreb Radio, 8 April 1992, FBIS London LD0804133993 .
251
Rajlovac Light Infantry Brigade — Rajlovac Sarajevo Radio , 22 April 1992, FBIS Vienna AU2204201592 .
Ilidza Light Infantry Brigade- Ilidza/Nedzarici/Airport 252 Belgrade Tanjug, 9 April 1992, FBIS London LD0904201192 .
Igman Light Infantry Brigade— Hadzici/Kiseljak 253 Belgrade Tanjug, 11 April 1992, FBIS London LD1104133292.
Ilijas Light Infantry Brigade — Ilijas/Visoko 254 Belgrade Tanjug , 11 April 1992 , FBIS London LD1204151392 .
255
4th “White Wolves" Reconnaissance-Sabotage Detachment Zagreb Radio , 7 May 1992, FBIS London LD0705163192.
4th Mixed Artillery Regiment 256
Zagreb Radio, 8 May 1992 , FBIS London LD0805110692 .
4th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment 257 Sarajevo Radio , 10 May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1005213292.
4th Light Air Defense Artillery Regiment 258 Janko Bobetko, Sve Moje Bitke ( All MyBattles ), Zagreb :
* Ex- JNA brigade Vlastita Naklada, 1996. pp . 200-270.
Four infantry battalions of the corps — the Trnovo , Pale, Praca , and 259 Ibid .
Jahorina Battalions — appear to have been assigned to the 2nd Sara 260 Sarajevo Radio , 23May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU2305213192.
jevo Light Infantry ( Trnovo) and 1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade 261 Zagreb Radio , 11 June 1992, FBIS London LD1106113292.
262
(the other three). These battalions, however, were not stationed Sarajevo Radio , 11 June 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1106201092.
around Sarajevo, but deployed 20 to 25 kilometers southeast of the 263 Zagreb Radio , 12 June 1992, FBIS London LD1206183292.
264
city as part of VRS operations to contain Bosnian Army forces Zagreb Radio , 13 June 1992, FBIS London LD1306221192.
around Gorazde in the Drina valley. In addition, the 2nd Romanija 265 Zagreb Radio , 8 June 1992, FBIS London LD0806141692.
266
Motorized Brigade ,while assigned to the corps,was never Zagreb Radio , 13 June 1992, FBIS London LD1306215492.
267
deployed around Sarajevo and fought in the Olovo -Kladanj, Zagreb Radio , 14 June 1992, FBIS London LD1406115392.
268
Rogatica -Gorazde, and Han Pijesak-Zepa areas. These operations Zagreb Radio , 15 June 1992, FBIS London LD1506114892.
also probably drew off some of the corps' artillery and armor 269 Zagreb Radio , 17 June 1992, FBIS London LD1706204792.
270
strength from the siege of the city . Zagreb Radio , 18 June 1992, FBIS London LD1806200592 .
228 A senior Bosnian Armyofficial told a Reuters correspondent 271
Zagreb Radio , 21 June 1992, FBIS London LD2106163892.
that Sarajevo's defenders had begun the war with about 4,000 272 Zagreb Radio , 8 November 1992, FBIS London
police weapons and about 3,000 weapons of all other types. (Reu LD0811145492 .
273
ters, “ Bosnia's Moslem Army Predicts Long Conflict,” by Gilles Sarajevo Radio , 19 September 1992, FBIS London
Trequesser, 1 December 1992 ) Other figures based on Patriotic LD1909195892.
League membership suggest that the actual number ofweapons 274 A high-level, joint Croat-Muslim commission met in Mostar on
was probably somewhat, though not much, higher. 26 October 1992 in wake of the Novi Travnik , Vitez , and Prozor
229 Sarajevo Radio , 8 June 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0806181392 . fighting, but there was little perceptible improvement in relations
230 Sarajevo Radio , 9 June 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0906074492 . thereafter. Zagreb Radio , 26 October 1992, FBIS London
231 Sarajevo Radio , 8 June 1992, FBIS London LD0906015192. LD2610233792 .
232 Sarajevo Radio , 1 December 1992, FBIS London
275 The successor to the JNA was the Yugoslav Army ( Vojske Jugo
LD0212000992. slavije - VJ).
233 Sarajevo Radio , 2 December 1992, FBIS Vienna 276 Belgrade Tanjug,
10 May 1992, FBIS London LD1005222292.
AU0212122092. 277Novi Sad TV 24 May 1992, FBIS Vienna AU2405200392 ,
234 Sarajevo Radio , 6 December 1992, 242003Z May 1992.
FBIS London
LD0612172092. 278 Belgrade Tanjug, 16 September 1992. FBIS London
235 LD1609172592, 1617252 September 1995.
Sarajevo Radio , 7 December 1992, FBIS Vienna
AU0712161592 . 279
Sarajevo Radio 5 July 1992, FBIS Vienna AU0607122792,
236 Sarajevo Radio , 10 December 1992, FBIS Vienna 0612277 July 1992.
AU1012121192. 280
Sarajevo Radio , 13 July 1992, FBIS Vienna AU1307203192,
237 Bobetko was a partisan veteran of World War II and had served 1320312 July 1992.
281
in the postwar JNA, reaching general officer rank and serving on Sarajevo Radio 6 July 1992, FBIS London LD0607210692,
the staff of the Fifth Military District. Bobetko was drummed out 0621062 July 1992.
of the Army in 1971 for pro -Croatian sympathies during Tito's
crackdown on the “ Croatian Spring" at the same time as Franjo
Tudjman and future HV Main Staff chief Zvonimir Cervenko .
238 Belgrade Tanjug, 1 February
1992, FBIS London
LD0102223992 .

168
282 Sarajevo Radio , 13 September 1992, FBIS London 292 Reuters, “ Serbs say Planes Could Join Clashes With Croats,” by
LD1309191392. Kurt Schork, 25 October 1992 .
283 Reuters, “ Croat-Muslim Clash Stops U.N.Convoys,” 19 Octo 293 Vulliamy, pp. 229-234.
ber 1992. 294 Reuters, “ Serbs Advance on Jajce as Moslem -Croat Alliance
284 Reuters , “ U.N. Staff Evacuated from Bosnian Town,” by Kurt Breaks," by Kurt Schork, 27 October 1992.
Schork , 21 October 1992 . 295 Reuters, “Moslem Leader Urges Croats Not to Destroy Bosnia,”
285 Reuters, “ EC Tells Serbia to Halt Raids, Ethnic Cleansing," by by Kurt Schork , 29 October 1992.
Kurt Schork , 21 October 1992 296 At this same time,Mate Boban angrily denied claimsby West
286 Reuters, “ Bosnian President Calls for Talks to End Clashes,” by ern correspondents that they had seen destroyed houses in Prozor
Kurt Schork , 22 October 1992. and thousands ofMuslimsfleeing toward Gornji Vakuf. Boban
287 Reuters, “Military Talks in Sarajevo are Small Step for Peace," insisted that the Croats had documents proving the attacks had
by Kurt Schork, 23 October 1992 been instigated by Muslim ex -JNA officers who had committed
288 Silber and Little , Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, p . 294. war crimes in Croatia, thatno houseshad been destroyed in Prozor,
289 The latter version of the story appears to be corroborated by and that no residents had fled the town. Reuters, " Bosnian Croat
local newsmedia at the time. According to Croatian radio , the Chief Accuses Moslems of Assaults,” 29 October 1992.
Muslim Territorial Defense commander in nearby Jablanica threat 297 Reuters, “Moslem , Croat leaders Vow to Stop Fighting,"
ened to surround all Croat inhabitants of the town unless the HVO 1 November 1992 .
298 Belgrade Tanjug , 24 October 1992, FBIS London
stopped blocking a five-truck convoy. ( Zagreb Radio , 23 October
1992, FBIS London LD2310164492) Of course, both versions LD2410133692.
could be true — theheavily armed localmafias mostlikely had 299 Reuters, “ Rival Bosnian Gunmen Fight on as Commanders
competing claimson the contents of the supply convoy whether it Meet,” by Kurt Schork , 26 October 1992.
wasmilitary or not.
290 Reuters , “ Croats Drive Muslims from Bosnian Town of Prozor,"
by AndrejGustinic, 27 October 1992.
291 Vulliamy, Ed , Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War.
New York : St.Martin's Press , 1994. pp . 221-227 .

169
Bosnia 1992 and 1993

A mountain road near

Kiseljak, central Bosnia ,
as seen in early 1993.

Mountains in north
central Bosnia , as seen
in early 1993.

The town of Gorazde, as

seen in 1992.

DIDesign Center/MPG 3826381D 04-02

170
 Bosnia 1992 and 1993

Mountains east of Sarajevo , on the road toward the Drina Valley, as seen in 1996.

Bosnian Government soldiers from the Gorazde Territorial Defense , as seen in 1992.

DI Design Center/MPG 3826381D 04-02

171
Bosnia 1992 and 1993

A Bosnian Army
(ARBiH ) soldier,May
1993.

Reuters

A Bosnian Croat
Defense Council (HVO )
soldier in Mostar,May
1993.

© Reuters

Bosnian CroatDefense
Council (HVO ) soldiers
in Citluk, near Mostar,
rest outside their
trench, June 1993 .

© Reuters

DI Design Center/MPG 3826381D 04-02

172
 Bosnia 1992 and 1993

© Reuters

Bosnian Army ( ARBiH ) soldiers on a hill in Sarajevo direct

Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) soldiers through a minefield to
recover VRS dead, June 1993.

A Bosnian Serb Army

(VRS) soldier near
Brcko fires an 82 -mm Reuters
mortar, August 1993.

Reuters

A Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) soldier, probably from the 1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade or 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade, looks
down on Sarajevo from Mount Trebevic , south of the city, August 1993.

DI Design Center/MPG 3826381D 04-02

173
 Select Unit Insignia of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS)

СРПСКЕ
ВОСКО

1.К
ГАРДА BPC

бу
ур
са S
P
A
J Т Р
16 A
N М Б

Оe26e

1st Guards Motorized Brigade 2nd Armored Brigade 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade

Б
Р
A Н
CK Г
EH А АТ
OSP А
Д

s
i
l UPHOLDIN6P
i
S
BPG

43rd PrijedorMotorized Brigade Ist Ozren Light Infantry Brigade Ist Krnjin Light Infantry Brigade

БРАТУНИЧКИ
специална
гарда

БРИГАА .
BPC
Пантери
орига

Ist Bijeljina Light Infantry Brigade 2nd Romanija Motorized Brigade Ist Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade
(Serbian Guard-Panthers)
DIDesign Center/MPG 384329 04-02

174
 Select Unit Insignia of the Bosnian Army ( ARBill)

PL BiH
ARMIJ
REPUBLIKE A
ARMIJA BOSNE IHERCEGOVINE
BOS I HER
NE CEG
OVI
1.KO NE
RP
US

*
*
*
I.lard PVO
5. MOTORIZOVANA
BRIGADA DOBRINJA

120th Liberation Brigade Ist Light Air Defense 5th Dobrinja Motorized Brigade
“ Black Swans" Artillery -Rocket Battalion ( later 155th )

ARMIJ
A
BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE
MO

10
A
GAD

SMILE
TO
RI

BRI
ZO
N

SARAJEVO
KORPUS

101st Motorized Brigade 2nd Corps 224th DobojMountain Brigade

(later 101st Mountain )

ARMIJA
E 902.b.by
AK
SL
MO
RECI
KORFU TO A
41
RI AN
Z ! V9
DUBIOUS
BRIGADA

7
muslimanska
viteska
oslobodilačka
brigada

7th Muslim Liberation Brigade 41st Motorized Brigade (later 441st) 502nd Mountain Brigade

DIDesign Center/MPG 384330 04-02

175
 Bosnian Croat Defense Council (HVO )

GARDIJSKA 2. BAGADA HVO

BRICADA

PO

E
ST

EN
RO

MJ
JB

NA
A
A IĆ LOVA
N
T Š ALCOVIG !) (PA
E BU
BNE
BRUNO POSE

" Ludvig Pavlovic " Special Purpose

Ist Guards Brigade (1994-95 ) 2nd Guards Brigade (1994-95 ) Unit (60th Guards Airborne
Battalion , 1994-95)

I BOJNA
KNEZ DOMAGOT
HVO

VP
LAKOJURISNA
BRIGADA

50 HVO IJA
.
VN
PUKO
VP

Military Police Light Ist Military Police Battalion ( 1994-95) 50th Home Defense Regiment
Assault Brigade (1993 ) “ Knez Domagoj” (1994-95)
P
U
K
O

BRIGADA
U

KNEZ BRANIMIR
5

B
R
I
G
A
D
E
80
5 .
LIVNO

80th Home Defense 5th Brigade " Knez Branimir " (1992-93) 5th Brigade " Posusje " (1992-93)
Regiment (1994-95)
DIDesign Center/MPG 384331 04-02

176
Section IV

Bosnia 1993:

Neighbor Versus Neighbor Versus Neighbor

177
 Chapter 33 Bosnian Serb Military Strategy,
The Bosnian War in 1993 : January -October 1993
Neighbor Versus Neighbor Versus Neighbor
The Bosnian Serbs ' military strategy during the first
The second year of the Bosnian War expanded the 10 months of 1993 focused on achieving those war
Muslim -Serb war, while the conflict between Serbs aims that had eluded them in 1992,making the Drina
and Croats wound down. As the year opened, the valley their principal theater.* Bosnian Army gains in
Bosnian Army continued its attacks on the Bosnian the Drina region during 1992 and early 1993 threat
Serbs in the Drina valley, prompting the Serbs to ened to undermine Serb territorial claims in the area
respond with a major counteroffensive. The Serbs and thwart the larger war aim of extending the Serb
VRS forces nearly conquered Srebrenica, threatened lands to the Drina and the Serbian border. After
Zepa , contracted the Gorazde enclave and eliminated absorbing the last ARBiH offensive toward Bratunac
its supply lines to central Bosnia, and then cut and Skelani on the Serbian border in early January, the
Sarajevo's last lifeline at Mount Igman . NATO threats VRS embarked on a strategic offensive to clear most
forced the Serbs to withdraw from Igman , but the rest ofthe Drina valley. This offensive , comprising a series
of their strategic gains in the Drina remained intact. of individual operations to reduce the Muslim
enclaves of Srebrenica , Zepa, and Gorazde,would last
The Muslim -Serb war, however, was to be overshad until August .
owed by the start of a new conflict - Muslims versus
Croats . In 1992 the two sides had come to blowswhen Elsewhere , most of the actions conducted by the VRS
the frictions of local issues ignited a larger contest until November 1993 ( see footnote) were local opera
over the underlying nature of the Bosnian state. In tions to seize key terrain , towns, or roads. An excep
1993 the dispute boiled over into all -out war, devastat tion was the July 1993 operation undertaken to widen
ingmuch of central Bosnia and setting in motion new the vital Posavina corridor at Brcko and free up an
waves of refugees. The Bosnian Croats threw the first important power line route to Bosanska Krajina. The
punch in mid -April, with their brutal Lasva Valley VRS also continued its siege of Sarajevo in the belief
offensive . The Bosnian Army rallied and scored some that this pressure might force the Bosnian Govern
important victories against the Croats, seizing control ment to capitulate .
of most of central Bosnia and leaving the Croats with
a few isolated enclaves. By the fall, though , the fight With the onset of the Croat-Muslim war in late spring
ing had settled down into vicious trench warfare . of 1993 ,however, Serb military strategy took on an
added dimension . Clearly it was in the interest of the
Throughout the year, the Bosnian Serbs played their Serb republic that its two enemies, the Croats and the
rivals off against each other, seeking to debilitate both Muslims, continue to fight each other as long as possi
by a prolonged conflict. All-out war between its two ble . The Bosnian Serbs therefore consciously set out
opponents was the best possible circumstance the
* Bosnian Serb strategy during the period November 1993-March
already tiring Bosnian Serb Army could have hoped 1994 is covered in Section V of this study. Serb war aimsand mili
for. Content to remain on the sidelines for most of tary strategy were in flux during this period , as the Serb political
1993, the VRS watched the Croats and Muslims kill and military leadership soughtmeans to end the war on their terms.
VRS offensive operations responded to these political-military
each other and concentrated on retaining the battle considerations.
field gains that Serb forces had already won .

179
to provide military support to both sides, depending lack for manpower. It did lack virtually everything
upon the military balance in a given sector, while else, however, required of an army: training,
increasing the flow of propaganda designed to inflame command expertise , adequate firepower, and true
the Croats and Muslims against one another. VRS mil offensive capability .?
itary assistance usually took the form of artillery or
occasionally armored support for an individual HVO Halilovic was not ignorant of the problems his Army
or ARBiH operation , most often to the side that was in faced. Indeed, he correctly identified most of the
the weaker military position , thus prolonging the ARBiH's critical needs and had taken the first halting
fighting and increasing the costs to both sides. In at steps toward correcting them before he was replaced
least two areas— Zepce and Konjic — VRS and HVO as operational commander. In late August 1993
units fought side by side against Bosnian Army (shortly after his replacement) Halilovic pointed the
troops . direction the Bosnian Army mustmove:

... in frontal clashes - whether in attack or

The Bosnian Army in 1993 defense — we cannot achieve more significant
success. This leads to the conclusion that we
There is a new testiness on the part of the must quickly find new forms of combat action
Bosnians... They are not being pansies. ... by rapidly creating a large number ofmobile
and reconnaissance -sabotage units and con
-Lt. Col. Bill Aikman , UNPROFOR ducting massive reconnaissance - sabotage
spokesman in Sarajevo , December 19931 actions in the enemy's rear ... For a start, each
corps must form one such brigade, which should
In 1993 the Bosnian Army was to be forged in fire . In be given a new name: for example, " Bosnian
a desperate ,make -or- break situation , the ARBiH man or “ Liberation.” In that way . we shall use
aged not only to defend the nation but even to take the our strong weapon : The numerical superiority
offensive in some areas. The appointment of Rasim and quality of our troops.
Delic as Army commander on 8 June 1993 was a cru
cial event; under Delic , the ARBiH made its initial
The question ofmilitary discipline is the ques
transformation from a band of armed civilians into a
tion ofour survival... Of course , it is urgently
true army necessary to organize courses in the brigades
for squad commanders, courses at the corps
During the first year of the war, Delic's predecessor, level for Army and company commanders, and a
Sefer Halilovic , had assembled a Bosnian military military officers ' school at the main staff level
with a basic organizational structure and a very large for schooling junior officers and officer cadres,
number of personnel. As early as August 1992 the and all this for the purpose of strengthening
ARBiH was able to field some 170,000 fighting men military discipline, and therefore combat
organized into 28 brigades, 16 independent battalions, discipline.4
138 miscellaneous detachments, two artillery regi
ments , and one armored battalion .? By early 1993 the Rasim Delic's first critical move as the new Army
ARBiH had reached its peak strength of 261,500 commander would be to begin the disciplining and
troops. The great majority of these served in local professionalization of the force . A crackdown in Octo
defense units, but some were organized into special ber against the mafiosi leaders of the 9th and 10th
ized maneuver, reconnaissance , and sabotage forces. Mountain Brigades in Sarajevo was intended as a visi
(These manpower figures would slowly decline in ble message to everyone inside and outside) Bosnia :
1994 and 1995 due to combat losses, work defer henceforth the ARBiH was going to be an army that
ments, and other causes.) With over a quarter of a mil would respond to orders at all echelons, even at the
lion men in the field - over 90 percent of them
volunteers — it was clear that Sarajevo's army did not

180
expense of jailing some of its own people. The shoot- and western Herzegovina— far from the confrontation
ing or arrest of two gang leaders did not by itself lines with the Serbs — contributed forces for cam
transform the Bosnian Army into a trained and disci paigns elsewhere in Bosnia but had little to do in their
plined fighting force , but it did signal to all that the hometowns other than keep a watchful eye on the
transformation had begun . Muslims who also lived there. The Bosnian Croats
had been expelled from most of their formerly
Equally critical was Delic's decision to take the offen extensive holdings north of the Posavina corridor
sive . At the time, this may have seemed a questionable Derventa ,Modrica , Odzak , and Bosanski Samac
or even unwise decision : Bosnian Army forces were and were now confined to the defensive in the small
virtually surrounded , cut off from supplies, and out pocket remaining around Orasje .
gunned . A sound argument could have been made that
the smart thing to do was to adopt the strategic defen In April and May 1993, however, the HVO took the
sive , forcing its enemies to expend resources against war in an entirely different direction , opening a new
the ARBiH's prepared defenses while the Bosnian conflict against the Bosnian Muslims. In doing so , the
Army built up its own forces. But Delic's calculations HVO took on a new type of opponent, less capable
went beyond the typicalmilitary “ school solution” : he than the Bosnian Serbs butmuch more numerous.
recognized the vital human dimension and concluded Moreover, the scale of the conflict escalated dramati
that his Armyneeded to win in order to sustain itself. cally for the HVO once it took on the Bosnian Army.
Without morale -boosting victories to convince the Previously, the HVO had maintained a relatively short
Army and its supporting population that Sarajevo's frontage against the VRS (especially considering that
cause was not lost, Delic knew he would have no mil the HV had taken over the southernmost area near
itary to fight with and the war would be over. Dubrovnik ) and required a comparatively small com
mitment to man static positions with generally little
Delic's decision to come outofthe corner fighting had activity. Once the Croat-Muslim war began , though ,
paid visible dividendsby the end of 1993. Bosnian HVO units found themselves fighting literally in their
Army forces had captured - and, more important, own backyards as entire towns went to war, some
held — at least six major towns during the year's fight times in areas far from the confrontation lines . Over
ing: Travnik , Bugojno,Gornji Vakuf,Fojnica, Kakanj, night the Bosnian Croats ' requirements formilitary
and Vares . The Bosnian Army had been forced into manpower soared . For the smallest of the three com
the smaller, eastern half of Mostar, but retaining even batant forces, this represented a serious problem
that much of the city and mounting occasional coun indeed .
terattacks against the HVO represented a significant
accomplishment. The Zepce -Zavidovici-Maglaj area The HVO's shortage of fighting troops, combined
had become a minitheater of its own, with the Bosnian with the strategic vulnerability of the central Bosnian
Army pressing the Bosnian Croats (the latter subse enclaves and the sheer desperation of the Bosnian
quently assisted by the Bosnian Serbs)while the tena Muslims, had put the HVO in real trouble by late sum
cious town ofMaglaj held out as a Muslim island mer. The Bosnian Croats had suffered a series ofmili
within the besieged Bosnian Croat enclave. tary reverses in June and early July, and morale was
falling fast. While it was unlikely that the Muslims
could or would push on into the exclusively Croat
The Bosnian Croat Army in 1993 heartland of eastern Herzegovina, there was a very
real danger that the remaining enclaves of Vitez and
The Bosnian Croat Army began 1993 largely as a de Kiseljak might fall and the Croats would be forced out
facto adjunct of the Croatian Army. It had fought suc of border areas like Prozor.
cessfully alongside the HV the previous year, espe
cially during the July 1992 Operation “ Jackal”
campaign in Herzegovina , but the HV was the primary
driver of events . HVO forces raised in central Bosnia

181
At this point the HVO looked in two directions for more than 20 percent ofthe 65 to 70 percent of Bosnia
allies . One choice was obvious: appeal directly to that the Serbs then controlled , leaving them only 43
Zagreb for military assistance. After some delibera percent of the country .Moreover, the plan would have
tion , Tudjman did direct the HV to step into Bosnia, broken up their single , contiguous state — a key Serb
providing both military and moral support to the war aim . The Bosnian Muslim leaders also rejected
embattled HVO . The other choice seemed incongru the plan because of their emotional attachment to the
ous butmade sense in the Kafkaesque world of the concept of a strong unitary state and because it ratified
Bosnian conflict. The HVO in some of the enclaves Serb ethnic cleansing. President Izetbegovic was
turned to their Bosnian Serb opponents for assistance finally pressured into signing in March by interna
against the Muslims— and got it. Surrounded on three tional opinion and the Croats and in the belief that the
sides by Muslim adversaries, the HVO garrisons in Serbs would not sign anyhow .
Konjic, Kiseljak , and Zepce would secure help from
the VRS .Necessity havingmade for strange bedfel Meanwhile, the Bosnian Serbs were still holding out.
lows, the HVO was at least able to stabilize its mili Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance, squeezing Serbian Pres
tary position and even take somemodest initiatives ident Milosevic with continued international strictures
toward the end of the year. and new financial sanctions, persuaded him to back
the plan and pressure Bosnian Serb President
Chapter 34 Karadzic and his deputies to accept it. Milosevic was
Searching for Peace : willing to swallow the unpalatable details of the plan
The Vance -Owen and " Invincible" Plans, 19936 as a way to get a cease - fire that would lock in recogni
tion of Serb autonomy and a de facto Serb state. Even
In January 1993, the chief negotiators for the joint though the administrative boundaries spelled out in
UN- EU International Conference on the Former “ Vance -Owen ” differed from his own concepts, he did
Yugoslavia put forth a comprehensive peace settle not think they would ever be implemented on the
ment — the Vance -Owen Plan . The plan took its name ground. The Bosnian Serbs thought otherwise.
from the two diplomats, former US Secretary of State Karadzic rebuffed Milosevic's personal overtures, and
Cyrus Vance and former British Foreign Secretary the Bosnian Serb Assembly rejected a letter signed by
Lord David Owen . The two had worked for more than Federal President Cosic , Milosevic , and Montenegrin
four months to craft a proposal they thought all three President Bulatovic in late April. In a scheme to bully
sides could accept and that would keep Bosnia in Karadzic and his deputies, Vice President Koljevic
existence as a single state . As Silber and Little write, and Assembly President Krajisnik, into accepting the
plan , a conference sponsored by Greek Prime Minister
It recognized Bosnia within its existing frontiers Mitsotakis convened at the beginning of May. There
but granted substantially devolved powers to Milosevic subjected Karadzic to nonstop haranguing
each of the ten provinces which were defined , behind closed doors. Karadzic finally signed the plan
primarily on ethnic grounds: three of the prov for himself but insisted on ratification by the Bosnian
inces would have a Serb majority, two a Croat Serb Assembly
majority, three a Muslim , and one mixed Croat
Muslim . The tenth province — Sarajevo - would The Assembly , which everyone knew was opposed to
retain power- sharing between all three ethnic the terms of Vance -Owen ,met on 5 May in the pres
groups. The republics would retain a central ence of the entire senior Federal Yugoslav leadership
government, but its powers would be minimal.? and Prime Minister Mitsotakis. Milosevic and Cosic's
opening arguments were rejected , but they persisted ,
The Bosnian Croats immediately accepted the plan and the debate raged on into the night. The decisive
because it gave them autonomy, territorial compact speaker was VRS commander GeneralMladic , who
ness , and direct access to the Croatian border. The
leaders of the Bosnian Serbs rejected the plan because
it would have required the Serbs to withdraw from

182
was no friend of Karadzic and usually deferred to The VRS fought back with two attacks to widen the
Milosevic. The military man knew the plan would be a corridor, succeeding on the second try. The seesaw
strategic disaster for the Bosnian Serbs , and his pun fighting around Brcko persisted into early in 1993,
gent rhetoric and an array of dramatic maps showing achieving nothing butcasualties. On 2 January, HVO
the territory the Serbs would lose swayed much of his and ARBiH troops again attacked and cut the corridor
audience. Eventually , they voted 51 to 2 , not in oppo northwest of Brcko. VRS 1st Krajina Corps and East
sition to the plan but in favor of a popular referendum Bosnian Corps forces fought back against local HVO
they knew would reject it — and promptly did . and ARBiH 2nd Corps troops for over 10 days along
this line before the VRS completely restored its
The next international effort, dubbed the " Invincible " positions.
plan after the British aircraft carrier where the talks
were held , began during the summer of 1993 after the The battle lines congealed into a profitless exchange
Croat-Muslim war had erupted in full force . Implicitly of vicious shelling and small-arms fire thatmade
recognizing the failure of the Vance-Owen Plan and Brcko one of themost dangerous sectors in Bosnia ,
the dissolution of the Croat-Muslim alliance , the even when it was the most stagnant. The arrival of
Invincible proposition offered a thinly veiled partition spring in mid -May brought another attack by the VRS
of the country into three ethnic minirepublics with a East Bosnian Corps directed at widening the corridor
nominal central government. All three sides, even the just southwest of Brcko . Again the Serbs managed to
Muslims, seemed ready to negotiate — the latter only penetrate Muslim -Croat defenses, but over the next
because they saw themselves abandoned by the week ARBiH and HVO units clawed back what they
United States, isolated in themiddle of Bosnia , and at had lost. Repeated Serb attempts to pierce the
war with the Croats. As Izetbegovic stated, Muslim -Croat positions all failed .

This division will give Muslims a Bosnian state. VRS determination to widen the corridor produced
For the moment the idea of a multiethnic Bosnia preparations in July for Operation " Sadejstvo " (Joint
is dead. Future generations can hope for such a Action ) 93.13 The Serbs needed the space not just to
state . But only after they have sobered up from safeguard traffic in the corridor but to lay and protect
9
their state of drunkenness. an electrical line to provide needed power to the Kra
jina region . Major General Novica Simic's East Bos
Izetbegovic was famous for his about-faces. In Sep nian Corps, reinforced by two 1st Krajina Corps
tember, under pressure from virtually his entire con brigades and an armored battalion , began the opera
stituency to reject an agreement he was unenthusiastic tion on 20 July. Serb troops broke through ARBiH
about in any case, he turned his back on the plan . The defenses southwest of Brcko town on 23 July , pushing
peace brokers wentback to the drawing board again as Muslim forces back into their reserve positions. By
all the deals for territorialboundaries and access the end of 24 July , the village of Brod had fallen ,
routes came unraveled . 10 unhingingMuslim defenses to the west and opening
the way for VRS units to continue the advance . By
Chapter 35 26 July they had seized some additional territory ,
Widening the Serb Corridor: including the village of Donja Brka , but Muslim
Brcko, January -July 1993*11 defenses elsewhere stiffened and blunted the attack .
Nevertheless , the VRS had finally achieved its main
Toward the end of 1992 , the focus of the fighting in objective, widening the corridor by 5 kilometers and
the Posavina corridor had shifted to its narrowest sec securing the route of the powerline.
tor at Brcko.12 ARBiH and HVO forces, including
units from Orasje , had launched several attacks that
temporarily severed the corridor northwest of Brcko.

See Annex 35: Widening the Corridor: Brcko Operations,

January-July 1993, for a more detailed accountof the fighting.

183
 The VRS success demonstrated Serb capabilities to Zvornik . Oric's troops thrust along the Drina River to
attack and capture some of the strongest ARBiH posi where it touches Serbia to the northeast and almost
tions through the professional application of thorough captured the Serbian border village of Skelani, some
organization and preparation and expert use of supe 25 kilometers to the southeast of Srebrenica . For good
rior firepower. But the Muslim and Croat forces measure, Oric's men fired mortar rounds into Serbia
showed that the elemental tactics of strong trench and itself .
bunker defenses could slow and eventually halt a
strong Serb attack . As the war progressed , the Serbs’ This push toward the Serbian border and the mortar
ability to penetrate , seize , and hold such positions incidents sparked a response from the Yugoslav Army
would decline . (VJ), which quickly dispatched more units to reinforce
the border, along with artillery, and sent some of its
Chapter 36 own troops across into Skelani to reinforce the VRS.
Battles on the Drina, Round Two, The VRS Main Staff also got down to business and
December 1992 to August 1993 * sent reinforcements to the Bratunac area — via Ser
bia — to hold the town and initiate some local counter
The 1992 war in the Drina valley spilled over into Jan attacks while it planned a major operation , Operation
uary 1993 when the Bosnian Army's offensive around " Cerska 93," to reduce and eliminate the Srebrenica
Srebrenica began in late December. Coming on top of Cerska enclave.
extensive victories throughout the valley in 1992, the
offensive impelled the Bosnian Serbs to plan for 1993 The VRS launched the firstmove in its counterstrike
a strategic offensive to secure the Drina valley up to in mid -February , lopping off half of the enclave's
the border with Serbia . If successful, the campaign Cerska -Kamenica section . Two weeks later VRS
would fulfill the Serb republic's war aim of joining its troops stormed the rest of the Cerska area , overrun
border with that of Serbia proper. The strategic offen ning it even as US air transports dropped food to the
sive plan laid out a series of individual operations beleaguered residents . After a pause while UN repre
against the three main enclaves , culminating in an sentatives tried to negotiate a halt to the Serb offen
operation to cut the supply line to Gorazde and link sive and rescue refugees from Cerska, the VRS
Serb -held Herzegovina directly to the rest of the Serb advance resumed in mid -March .With the backing of a
republic.14 The campaign expanded into an effort to regular Yugoslav Army armored battalion, the VRS
sever the Muslims' only supply route into Sarajevo broke through Bosnian Army defenses east of Cerska
across Mount Igman. This last attack proved toomuch at Konjevic Polje and reopened the road to Bratunac.
for the international community, and the threat of
NATO airstrikes forced the Bosnian Serb political The VRS Main Staff then shifted the focus of its oper
leadership to order General Mladic to remove his ation to the southeast, near Skelani, where it sent
forces from the mountain . crack units reinforced with VJ paratroopers and
Serbian RDB special operations troops. General
For Naser Oric — commander of Bosnian Army forces Mladic himself led the Serb forces that in three days
in the Srebrenica enclave — his December 1992 offen of intense fighting punched through ARBiH lines
sive was the climax of a successful year of operations almost 15 kilometers to the industrial zone of Zeleni
that had played havoc with the Bosnian Serb Drina Jadar at the gates of Srebrenica town. Oric's men
Corps and the Serb -populated villages throughout the launched a desperate counterattack , blunting the thin
Srebrenica area . His last successful attack cut the ten Serb spearhead and forcing it back almost 5 kilome
uous road connection between Serb -held Bratunac and ters. Both sides then yielded to a UN -negotiated a
the Zvornik area while linking his own forces to the cease - fire.
Muslim -held Cerska Kamenica pocket south of

See Annex 36 : Battles on the Drina, Round Two: December 1992

to August 1993, for a more detailed account of the fighting.

184
 The VRS, however,wanted nothing less than a Serbia late in the month , but Yugoslav Army troops
Muslim surrender, and when this was refused it closed in and eliminated it. The VRS defenses held ,
quickly restarted its attack, opening what would however, and the Serbsmounted strong counter
become the final phase of the operation on 3-4 April. attacks. In April local VRS units pressed a stronger
Over the next 12 days , VRS troops bludgeoned their attack to eliminate the Muslim salient pointed at
way toward the town from the northeast and southeast, Visegrad and the hydroelectric dam there but were
seizing key hilltops and villages. ARBiH troops on repulsed . The VRS Drina Corps attacked again late in
7 February managed to push VRS units out of Zeleni May and crushed Muslim forces in the salient, driving
Jadar, source of Srebrenica's water supply, three days them back some 15 kilometers to the Praca River and
after the Serbs had seized it. By 15-16 April, however, eliminating the threat to Visegrad. Follow -on attacks
the VRS had fought back into the village while other from Cajnice in the southeast toward Gorazde itself,
units closed in on the rest of the town from the north however, gained little ground .
east. Serb troops now stood only 2 or 3 kilometers
from Srebrenica and controlled nearly all the key posi Throughout June the VRS Herzegovina Corps and
tions overlooking the town. As the media and relief ARBiH 6th Corps clashed along the Muslim supply
workers publicized the desperate plight of the encir corridor running between Trnovo and Gorazde. Small
cled refugee population, on 16 April the UN Security units of Muslim troops scored a few temporary suc
Council vainly tried to protect Srebrenica by declaring cesses in attacks to widen portions of the corridor, but
it a “UN safe area ." Oric had realized two days earlier, the VRS Main Staff was planning something bigger.
however, that his troops were finished , and he had On 4 July, reinforced by an elite brigade, the Herze
smuggled out an appeal for a UN -supervised halt to govina Corps attacked 6th Corps positions south of
the fighting. On 17 April the two sides agreed to a Trnovo . A week of fighting broke through Muslim
cease -fire in place. The Serbs were to halt their offen defenses , and the VRS seized the town , finally linking
sive while the Muslim forces in the enclave turned Herzegovina to the rest of the Serb republic and sever
over their arms to Canadian UN soldiers , the collec ing the Bosnian logistics line to Gorazde at its base .
tion to be supervised by Serb officers. The Canadian Serb troops then rolled up to the foot of the Muslim
UN troops quickly arrived, but Oric and his men strongholds ofMounts Igman and Bjelasnica, across
somehow kept their small armswhile a trickle of their which ran the only Muslim supply route into Sara
most badly wounded found safe passage out on UN jevo — through a tunnel under the airport. After incon
helicopters. Protected only by a paper declaration , the clusive clashes near the mountains and a diversionary
Srebrenica safe area also proved illusory : two years attack near Sarajevo , Mladic led a surprise attack on
later Serb troops would overrun it and slaughter its Igman and Bjelasnica thatmay have included a heli
male population ." copter assault and captured the 2,000-meter summit of
Bjelasnica on 1 August. Over the next three days , the
Less than a month after its Srebrenica operation neu surprise offensive also seized and held key positions
tralized the armed Muslim enclave there , VRS troops on Mount Igman .
attacked the nearby Muslim -held Zepa enclave . Three
days of fighting penetrated the Bosnian Army Mladic's successful operation against Igman violently
defenses without gaining much useful ground , and the shifted the focus away from the Drina valley , the pri
VRS halted its offensive on 8 May to allow peace mary focus of the 1993 strategic offensive , and onto
keeping troops and UN observers to be stationed in Sarajevo. For the rest of the war, the Western world
Gorazde and Zepa. The Serbs appear to have decided and its ubiquitous media would devote most of their
that taking Zepa was not worth the effort — yet. attention to the Serb siege of the former Olympic city .
Fears that the VRS advances would collapse the city's
Bosnian Army forces in the Gorazde enclave had defenses or at least starve its population energized the
followed up their 1992 successes with new attacks UN , andmore important NATO , to apply sustained
toward Visegrad and Rudo during January. One
Muslim sabotage unit even wormed its way into

See Annex 37: UN Peacekeeping Operations in 1993 for details.

185
pressure on Bosnian Serb President Karadzic — then business areas of the city, exacting a steady toll of
attending fruitless peace talks in Geneva - to order civilian casualties that kept Sarajevo in the world
Serb forces off the mountains. With hints of airstrikes headlines day after day. The biggestmilitary event of
looming, the Serbs agreed on 5 August to pull out the siege , noted earlier, occurred in August to the
their troops if UN forces would take over their posi south of the city when the VRS had captured Mount
tions and prevent Bosnian Army units from occupying Igman and cut the city's last supply line. The prospect
the vacated terrain . To keep the Serbs honest, NATO of a modern European city starving under a medieval
on 9 August agreed on a program of phased airstrikes siege generated international pressure that eventually
to guard the UN “ safe areas” and force the Serbs to forced the Serbs to vacate the mountaintop.
withdraw from Igman if they should cheat on the
agreement. By 19 August, virtually all the VRS troops There were other important clashes in 1993, including
had pulled back to their 30-31 July positions. A few battles for the suburbs of Azici and Stup in February
remained on the mountain , probably for observation and March , which continued the successful operation
and reconnaissance. the VRS had launched in December against Otes to
further isolate Sarajevo . Had the Serbs seized these
The Bosnian Serbs had nevertheless achieved most of suburbs, and particularly if they then captured
their 1993 objectives in the Drina valley. The Mus Dobrinja , they would have left Bosnian Army troops
lims' 1992 territorial gains had been drastically even farther from the UN - controlled airport and the
thinned , Serb towns secured , Herzegovina directly ARBiH troops in Hrasnica-Butmir-Mount Igman and
linked to the rest of the republic , and theMuslim sup made useless the new supply tunnel the ARBiH was
ply route to Gorazde eliminated . The VRS was able to digging under the airport to Hrasnica . The Bosnian
achieve these victories despite strong Muslim resis Army's victory at Stup, even after it had lost Azici,
tance because of the Main Staff's effective planning thwarted this plan . Otherminor battles during the year
and coordination of the strategic offensive followed included failed VRS attempts in July and December to
by professional execution at the operational and tacti recapture the prominent Zuc Hill, which the Serbs had
cal levels. The VRS's superiority in firepower and lost in December 1992. ARBiH units and VRS forces
especially at Srebrenica — its employment of elite spe also regularly clashed in the Grbavica district - the
cial operations troops from the Yugoslav Army and only Serb - held section of central Sarajevo - particu
the Serbian State Security Department,as well as larly around the Vrbanja bridge and the Jewish ceme
several imported armored and artillery units , made a tery . The year ended with a spate of bloody shelling
critical difference in equalizing the traditional advan incidents in the city center that killed a number of
tages of a strong defense . This timeMuslim bravery civilians.is
alone was not enough to prevail against the stronger,
better organized and better led Serb troops. The Bosnian Army took on a battle inside Sarajevo
itself when , in late October 1993, it cracked down on
Chapter 37 two of its own units that had gotten out of hand. These
The Siege Continues , Sarajevo 1993 * were “ Celo " Delalic's 9th and " Caco ” Topalovic's
10th Mountain Brigades, which had begun the war as
By 1993 the Bosnian Army and the Bosnian Serb armed criminal gangs who proved ready and able to
Army forces around Sarajevo had settled deep into the defend the city with their own illegal guns. These
grim routine of trench warfare . Intermittent but persis- patriotic criminals soon became a problem them
tent shelling and exchanges of small-arms fire , punc selves, extortingmoney and coercing labor from the
tuated by the occasional battle for a key suburb , neighborhoods they were supposed to defend. In mid
terrain feature , or defensive position , becamethe daily October, Topalovic's 10th Brigade overstepped the
routine for the soldiers of both sides. The better armed line when it publicly embarrassed the government by
VRS used its artillery to harass residential and
See Annex 38 : Sarajevo 1993: The Siege Continues, for a more
detailed account.

186
 stealing two UN armored personnel carriers. The aside to allow Izetbegovic — the SDA's second -biggest
authorities responded by mounting Operation votegetter — to assume the office . Abdic's political
“ Trebevic- 1" on 26 October, a joint Army/police self-sacrifice has never been adequately explained.19
action to round up and arrest Caco, Celo , and their
most notorious associates. The operation turned nasty As Izetbegovic's grasp of power appeared to wane in
when Caco took several MUP special policemen hos 1993, Fikret Abdic reemerged as a major challenger.
tage, torturing them to death before government forces The first public signs of division within theMuslim
could capture him . Celo had meanwhile kidnapped camp appeared on 21 June in the runup to another
25 civilian hostages but eventually released them and round of EC -sponsored peace talks in Geneva , when
gave himself up . About 20 people , including six civil Izetbegovic indicated he would not attend the meet
ians, were killed in shootouts during the operation . Of ing. He termed the new peace plan “ genocidal,”
more than local importance , the “ Trebevic - 1" opera charging that it codified the gains of Serb ethnic
tion was the first and most dramatic step in Bosnian cleansing and amounted to the de facto partition of the
Army commander Delic's campaign to regularize and country into Serb-, Croat-, and Muslim -controlled
professionalize the Bosnian Army.16 areas.20 Abdic publicly criticized Izetbegovic's refusal
to attend , prompting turmoil within Bosnia's nine
Chapter 38 member collective Presidency.21 One day later, the
“ TheMan Who Would Be King” : Fikret Abdic Presidency announced that it had met without Izetbe
and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia govic and voted to participate in the peace talks with
or without the President.22 Many saw in this a signal
Within a strange and complex civil war, the rise and that Abdic was seeking to displace Izetbegovic,
fall of Fikret Abdic and his self-proclaimed “ Autono although he denied the claims.23 Nevertheless, Abdic
mous Province ofWestern Bosnia ” (APWB) was one appeared to be a serious contender for the future lead
of the strangest and most complex interludes. ership of Bosnia .

Fikret Abdic had gained attention as one of Yugosla Only days later, however, the story took another turn .
via'smost charismatic and controversial figures even The Bosnian InteriorMinistry announced on 26 June
before the breakup of the country. In the twilight days that Abdic was wanted by the Austrian Government
of socialist Yugoslavia's massive state - owned indus on charges of defrauding Bosnians resident in Austria
tries, Abdic was the director of the " Agrokomerc" who had contributed refugee reliefmoney funneled
food -processing consortium — the Bihac area's through the Agrokomerc company's Vienna -based
single -largest employer. In 1987 it emerged that subsidiary.24 Despite the charges, Abdic remained the
Abdic's company had essentially been printing its Bosnian Presidency's Muslim representative at the
own money by issuing roughly half a billion dollars in Owen -Stoltenberg peace negotiations in Geneva .
unbacked promissory notes . The ensuing scandal
rocked the entire Yugoslav Government and its bank By mid -September, Abdic was openly defying not
ing system . Abdic was found guilty of fraud and only Izetbegovic but the Presidency itself , calling a
17 18
briefly imprisoned ." parliamentary assembly to meet in his home city of
Velika Kladusa to vote on the creation of an “ autono
Surviving the scandal and conviction , Abdic by 1990 mous province" within Bosnia -Herzegovina . Abdic
had become one of the most prominentMuslim politi- stopped short of declaring that this would mean the
cal leaders in Bosnia and , campaigning for the SDA in secession of all or part of the Bihac region, but the dis
the first multiparty elections, won the most votes of tinction seemed purely academic . Even before the
any Muslim candidate . Although this entitled him to assembly vote on 27 September proclaimed him the
become the first president of Bosnia, Abdic stepped head of the “Autonomous Province of Western

* For a more detailed account, see Annex 39: TheMan Who Would
Be King: Fikret Abdic and the Autonomous Province of Western
Bosnia in 1993 .

187
Bosnia,” Abdic had already established a privately Bosnian Army forces initially confined the Abdic sup
raised military force and used hismoney and influ porters to the extreme northern area around Velika
ence to create a mini-nation in the northwestern corner Kladusa, but Drekovic's overtaxed 5th Corps lacked
ofthe country.25 Sarajevo responded by ejecting Abdic the troop reserves to guard against both the Bosnian
from the Bosnian collective Presidency on 2 October. and Krajina Serb armies while simultaneously putting
down the Abdic rebellion . On 15 October, Abdic's
With now two rival claimants for control of the forces made a comeback and regained control over
besieged Bihac enclave — Fikret Abdic and his APWB Cazin without a firing a shot, but the following day
" army," versus the Bosnian Army's 5th Corps then Bosnian Army troops pulled from the surrounding
under Ramiz Drekovic — it remained to be seen where area drove them back out.29 30 (Government sources
loyalties lay and who would controlwhich territory . claimed - credibly — that the Bosnian Serbs assisted
Abdic urged 5th Corps brigades to defect to his new the Abdic rebels by mounting simultaneous attacks in
flag ,while Izetbegovic called for the Army to remain several areas to tie down ARBiH forces during the
loyal and stamp out this new insurrection . Abdic rap APWB capture of Cazin .) The Bosnian Army
idly established his authority in Velika Kladusa , a mounted a counterattack on 18 October, shelling
municipality that had long been his power base. Abdic Velika Kladusa , but was unable to eliminate the
loyalists initially declared their control in the Bihac APWB as a military threat.31
enclave's central town of Cazin , but a flying column
of 500 Bosnian Army troops from Bihac (ironically , With the Bihac situation still hanging in the balance ,
driving in “Agrokomerc " vehicles ) arrived in Cazin the Belgrademedia announced that Abdic had met
on 20 September and eventually secured it for the with Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic and Serbian Presi
ARBiH 5th Corps.26 27 Abdic's support was weakest dentMilosevic on 22 October.32 Ever the consummate
in Bihac itself, which generally sided with the opportunist, Abdic had thrown in his lot with his
Izetbegovic government. former Serb opponents to gain backers for his break
away empire. A public statement followed to the
When the decision was forced, two Bosnian Army effect that the Abdic forces and the Serbs had signed a
brigades — the 521st and 527th , both from the Velika peace agreement, while Karadzic's Republika Srpska
Kladusa area - defected virtually wholesale to the (itself unrecognized ) announced it was recognizing
Abdic camp. (These were to be redesignated as the the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia as a
APWB's 1st and 2nd Brigades.) Much of the 504th separate entity 33
and part of the 503rd Brigade in Cazin also changed
sides. The 517th Brigade from the small town Abdic's forces regained the initiative when fighting
of Pjanici remained loyal to the government but lost resumed in November, after Krajina Serb forces
many of its personnel to defections. These units were allowed his troops to travel through Serb -held terri
to provide the equivalentmanpower of three to four tory in Croatia to mount a flanking attack from the
brigades to the rebel forces. western side of the Bihac pocket. Advancing from this
unexpected direction , a tidy force of APWB troops
Open violence between the rival forces began in the (perhaps 1,000 to 1,500 ) gained significant ground in
early days of October, as for the first time Muslims the western Bihac enclave, occupying a strip of terri
foughtnot only Serbs and Croats but other Muslims. tory several kilometers deep along the Croatian border
UNPROFOR attempted to negotiate a truce between and advancing as close as 10 km outside Cazin itself.
the two Muslim factions before the violence escalated At the same time, Abdic forces in the north succeeded
out of control, but the Abdic representatives refused to in capturing Johovica and Skokovi, two hotly con
attend the talks.28 Meanwhile, the Bosnian Serbs wel tested towns several kilometers south of Velika
comed the opportunity to stand down and let their Kladusa. UN observers confirmed that, in addition to
Muslim opponents beat each other up .

188
-

-
allowing the rebel forces to transit their territory, the ideal. This group was still represented by Alija
Serbs supported the APWB attack with artillery and Izetbegovic , but it was beginning to dwindle in the
tank fire.34 35 36 37 face of ethnic cleansing and the seeming impossibility
of multiethnic coexistence . This group also advocated
As 1993 drew to a close , Abdic's APWB empire a continuation of the war until all (or at least more ) of
remained a very tiny one — roughly the northwestern Bosnia had been brought under the control of the cen
third of the surrounded Bihac enclave — but still too tral government. On the other hand were those who
powerful for the Bosnian Army 5th Corps to eliminate favored the de facto or de jure partition of the country
or even reduce . Abdic had built himself a small army into Serb , Croat, and Muslim regions, delimited by
of six brigades — perhaps 5,000 to 10,000 fighters map boundaries and giving one ethnic group clear
out of his own supporters and major elements of the authority over a particular section of the country . This
two defecting Bosnian Army brigades. The Bosnian group generally advocated a rapid conclusion to the
Serbs , and Milosevic back in Belgrade, welcomed the war so that the calculated division of the country
Muslim renegades as a proxy force for diverting 5th could proceed . In early 1993 this group , perhaps best
Corps fighters, and they made sure that Abdic's forces exemplified by Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban , had
were adequately outfitted with small arms and mortars the dominant hand.
but prevented from obtaining heavy artillery or
armor.38 When actively supported by the Krajina or Perhaps the greatest tragedy of the Croat-Muslim civil
Bosnian Serbs — as they were in November and war is that it was in large measure sparked by an inter
December — the APWB army could advance and take national peace proposal that was intended to end the
territory but lacked an independent offensive poten interethnic bloodshed — the Vance -Owen -Stoltenberg
tial. At least for the time, Abdic's rebel forces and the plan . When the outlines of the proposed ethnically
Bosnian Army had reached a standoff . based cantons were published , it was obvious to all
which ethnic faction would be accorded majority rule
Chapter 39 over each section of the country . This was not a seri
Neighbor Fighting Neighbor: ous problem where the map awarded control to the
The Croat-Muslim Descent Into War faction that was already in control of a given area,
such as the Muslim -majority Bihac enclave or the eth
A variety of factors contributed to the strains and fric nically cleansed Serb -majority areas of western
tions in the Croat-Muslim relationship that had now Bosnia . It was bound to provoke trouble , however, in
flared into open warfare , all stemming in some way areas that were to be turned over to a different
from competing interests and mutually exclusive con faction or in areas where there was no single domi
cepts of the future of the Bosnian state . Who exercised nant ethnic group . It was in this crucial detail that the
control on the ground in each canton and municipality tragedy of the mixed Croat-Muslim areas would be
was the proximate source of hostility , but the larger played out.
underlying issue was the philosophical one of what
sort of state postwar Bosnia -Herzegovina would be. In much of ethnically mixed northern Herzegovina
From these differences followed different conclusions and central Bosnia , either Croats orMuslims might
about Croat -Muslim war aims and what sort of peace predominate in a given city or region , but the majority
should be agreed to how quickly. On the one hand, the was rarely overwhelming, and power was usually
advocates of a unitary Bosnian state (mostly, but not shared (or, more accurately, competed over) by the
exclusively ,Muslims)were trying to keep alive the two ethnic groups. Both factions had military forces
idea of a single undivided nation with all three ethnic collocated in many of the major urban areas — Mostar
groups living together in a multiethnic, pluralistic most famous among them — tenuously allied , but
society . This was the original concept behind the free responding to different chains of command and only
multiparty elections held in the Bosnian Republic in
1990 , but even then the rise of the ethnically based
political parties had all but fatally undermined this

189
sometimes supporting each other in combat. When the ethnic balance in a given area. The patterns and pas
Vance-Owen map was published , it appeared to the sions of interethnic conflict began to gather like thun
ethnic factions to clearly delineate which ethnic group derclouds over central Bosnia at the beginning of
would be in control in each town on each side of each 1993.
cantonal border. The intricately crafted nuances of the
proposed power-sharing arrangements and multiethnic The new year opened inauspiciously for the strained
cantonal administrations were lost to the competing Croat-Muslim alliance . After a week of rising inter
politicaland military leaders on the ground in Bosnia. ethnic tensions across the entire central Bosnian area ,
In particular, the map emboldened local Bosnian the two ostensible allies clashed openly on 12 January
Croat leaders who wished to assert their undisputed 1993 in Gornji Vakuf - a predominantly Muslim town
authority over areas of central Bosnia and Herzegov in what had been designated a Croat-majority canton .
ina that had been designated as Croat-majority can HVO forces firing from commanding positions in the
tons. In effect, the peace plan offered the semblance of hills to the southeast began a drive to force the
an international imprimatur to naked power grabs. A Muslim defenders out ofmost of the town.39 40 41
tenuous alliance based on a common enemy had
turned into a direct competition for title to the same On 15 January , three days after the opening shots were
land.
fired in Gornji Vakuf, the HVO publicly and formally
demanded the submission to HVO authority of the
It would be grossly unfair to imply that the Vance Muslim units in the three cantons designated as Croat
Owen peace plan caused the Croat-Muslim war of majority under the proposed peace plan ; Bosnian
1993-94 . While the plan set the parameters for discus- Army units that did not accept the HVO's conditions
sion , the underlying issue of ethnic control of territory were to be disarmed or disbanded.42 Izetbegovic
predated and would outlast the peace negotiations. rejected the Croat demands, objecting partially to the
Nevertheless , the Vance- Owen Plan and its associated resubordination of Bosnian Army units but more fun
maps brought the issues of ethnic territorial control to damentally to the concept of ethnic partition of the
the fore and in large measure served as the catalysts country that the Croat demand implied . Bosnian Army
for the war to come. commander Halilovic also rejected the HVO's orders ,
instructing the Army units in the disputed cantons to
Given the supercharged interethnic atmosphere of respond only to the ARBiH command. His orders
central Bosnia in 1993, a sudden influx of tens of were countermanded , however, when Bosnian
thousands of refugees into the area was just about the Defense Minister Bozo Rajic (a Croat) acceded to the
worst thing that could possibly happen — and happen it HVO's demands on 17 January.43
did . From the very beginnings of the war, the conflict
had created — indeed, in many ways had been intended Fighting nevertheless continued unabated in Gornji
to create — massive waves of displaced civilians, the Vakuf, despite the country -wide military agreement, a
detritus of their ethnically cleansed hometowns and 20 January truce brokered by the Vance -Owen team
regions. Entire communities ofMuslims, Croats, and just in advance of the peace talks in Geneva, and a
Serbs — though mostly Muslims— had been driven out series of local cease -fires arranged by the UN British
of different areas by the advancing armies. Forced battalion . The Bosnian Croats demanded the uncondi
from their homes at gunpoint, Muslim and Croat refu tional surrender of all Muslim forces in the town and
gees streamed into central Bosnia from places like the began using their heavy weapons advantage to sys
Krajina and the Drina valley. Central Bosnia's small tematically demolish surrounding Muslim -majority
Serb population was in turn pushed out, but the hous towns like Bistrica. In Gornji Vakuf itself,HVO tanks
ing they vacated was not nearly enough for the hordes advanced up the road from the south , destroying
of displaced citizens. Relations between Croats and houses one at a time. Gornji Vakuf's Muslim
Muslims worsened in each municipality as both
groups competed for limited resources — a competi
tion sharpened when the refugee influx altered the

190
defenders had no heavy weapons and only a few mor manifold . In the end, it was the lethal combination of
tars but nonetheless managed to hang on in the town. the Vance -Owen peace plan , refugee - fueled ethnic
HVO forces pressed their attacks repeatedly until an tensions, and disputes on the ground over who had
order from Bosnian Croat PresidentMate Boban military suzerainty that was to produce yet another
finally brought the offensive to a halt.44 45 civil war and some of the most vicious battles of the
entire Bosnian conflict.
No sooner had the situation calmed in Gornji Vakuf,
than violence flared in Busovaca , along the road In the unstable environment of central Bosnia , a bad
southeast of Vitez . Bosnian Army forces ambushed situation was made worse by the Muslim defeat at
and killed two HVO soldiers outside the town on Srebrenica in early April. With the Muslim defenders
24 January, and the Bosnian Croats responded on on the verge ofbeing overrun and forced out of the
27 January by blocking all traffic along the roads into besieged enclave , the rumor spread that the tens of
central Bosnia , cutting off the flow ofweapons to the thousands of Muslim refugees thronging Srebrenica
Muslims.46 Intense fighting began in and around would be evacuated and resettled in mixed -ethnic
Busovaca immediately after the Croat blockade was regions of central Bosnia. Behind the clouds of rumor
announced . Yet another truce was signed on the UN actually arranged a face - saving halt to the
30 January in which both sides agreed to separate Serb assault and declared the town a " safe area.”
their combatant forces and reopen the roads.47 48 49 Hardly any Srebrenica refugees actually left for cen
tral Bosnia or anywhere else , but by that point fact had
Sporadic Croat-Muslim fighting spluttered on into lost out to fear. With central Bosnia already on edge ,
mid - February, 50 and another crisis had to be defused tensions had gone up yet another notch .
when the Bosnian Croats again closed the supply
routes into central Bosnia on 28 February 51 After this, The thin ties of the Croat-Muslim alliance finally
relative calm descended in March . It was to prove the snapped under the force of the Croats ' 15 April ulti
last calm before the storm . matum to the Bosnian Army. Reiterating its earlier
demand , the HVO insisted that all Bosnian Army
In what would soon prove to be one of the more troops in Croat-majority areasmust either give up
ironic twists of the war's history , Bosnian President their arms or leave for a Muslim -majority canton . Pre
Izetbegovic and Croatian President Tudjman dictably, the Muslimsagain refused , and many on
announced on 28 March their agreement to the estab both sides began girding themselves for a fight as the
lishment of a joint Croat-Muslim military in Bosnia . deadline set the stage for ethnic violence . The day
After months of wrangling and debate, the Bosnian after the HVO's ultimatum expired, the Croat-Muslim
Army and the HVO finally were to be placed under a war began .
single joint command , although the exact terms of the
arrangement were left unstated.52 It hardly mattered . In north - central Bosnia , problems first spiraled out of
Within three weeks the newly allied armies of the control in the Zenica area . Whether in response to the
Croat-Muslim joint command would be at each HVO’s ultimatum to disarm or simply by coincidence ,
others ' throats in a full- scale , no -holds-barred war. an unknown but very expert group of kidnappers
abducted Zivko Totic — the senior HVO commander
Chapter 40 in Muslim -majority Zenica — on 15 April. The abduc
Central Bosnia Afire : tors ambushed Totic's car in broad daylight and shot
The HVO's Lasva Valley Offensive, April 1993 three of his bodyguards dead . The Bosnian Croats
immediately and logically accused the Bosnian
Having twice come to the brink of war - after Prozor Muslims of the outrage. The Bosnian Army denied all
in October 1992 and Gornji Vakuf in January 1993— responsibility but was unable to produce either Totic
the Croats and Muslims finally plunged over the edge
in mid -April . The Croat-Muslim showdown had been
a long time coming, and the reasons behind it were

191
or a credible suspect.53 By the next morning inflamed private driveways , and livestock lay dead in the streets
tempers crossed over into violence, and shooting and gardens. An entire family of seven was found
broke out between Zenica's Croats and Muslims. Seri dead in one house , including at least two young chil
ously outnumbered , the HVO’s understrength “ Jure dren who had almost certainly burned to death . The
Francetic” Brigade was forced out of the city almost images from this small central Bosnian town — the
immediately . The HVO made a fighting retreat a few Guernica of the Bosnian conflict - would shock and
kilometers west to the village of Cajdras, butmost of outrage the world.55 56 57
the brigade surrendered later in the day.54
Investigations by the UN and others indicate that the
The HVO had long ago planned an offensive to secure village was taken by surprise early in the morning,
control of the Lasva Valley, and, as Croat-Muslim shortly after 0500 hours, by simultaneous attacks from
fighting flared across most of Bosnia on 16 April, it the north and south. Mortar rounds and sniper fire cut
put the drive in motion . The Lasva is a very small down anyone who tried to escape across the open
river running west to east from Travnik through Vitez ground. Within the town, squads of soldiers moved
until it feeds into the larger Bosna river northeast of methodically from house to house ,killing the occu
Busovaca . The river is paralleled by a primary road pants with close -range gunfire. When everyone in the
one of the most important in Bosnia - connecting town was dead ,many of the bodies were dragged into
Travnik with Vitez, Busovaca, Kiseljak and ultimately their former homes, and the buildings were set aflame
Sarajevo . In planning its campaign , the HVO counted with gasoline — probably in an effort to conceal or
on ejecting the non -Croat population from the valley destroy as much evidence as possible.58 5960 All told , at
and assumed that this cleansing would be a relatively least 103 people (including 33 women and children )
simple task . If successful, the campaign would not were killed at Ahmici, according to the UN , and the
only improve the HVO's military position by securing actual number could be considerably higher. In all,
control of Bosnia'smain east-west highway but also some 176 buildings including two mosques were
would create an exclusively Croat corridor across cen destroyed.6162 63 6465 66 67
tral Bosnia . Because its military force was small rela
tive to the sizable Muslim population in the area , the All the evidence suggests that the Ahmici operation
HVO's objective was to terrorize the Muslim civilians was preplanned and executed by a picked assault
into evacuating the Lasva Valley of their own volition group. ( There have been persistent but unsubstantiated
and thereby possibly even avoid having to fight at all rumors that a group of senior Bosnian Croat leaders
for the cities and towns . met on 15 April, the night before the attack, to make
the final decision on the operation , allegedly dubbing
it " 48 hours of blood and ashes. *68 ) The Ahmici attack
The AhmiciMassacre was not a military offensive, but rather a deliberate
massacre of unarmed , unwarned civilians: the Bosnian
The horrific centerpiece of the HVO's ethnic cleans Croats systematically set out to find and execute the
ing strategy for the Lasva Valley was the “ Ahmici entire population , positioning the HVO troops so they
massacre" of 16 April 1993. When British UN peace could catch anyone who tried to flee the town in preset
keepers arrived in the village on 19 April to investi fields of fire . Once they had killed everybody, they
gate Bosnian charges of a massacre , they found that immediately set about disguising what they had done
the entire village had been systematically destroyed. in a coverup operation that a purely military operation
The main mosque had been burned and its minaret would hardly have required .
felled by explosives detonated at the base . The major
ity of the houses had also been put to the torch , their Ahmiciremains the most famous victim of the HVO's
roofs collapsed by the flames. Only Croat-owned infamous Lasva Valley offensive , but it was only one
buildings remained intact. Burned -out cars blackened of the towns attacked in a coordinated HVO strike

* For a more detailed account,see Annex 40 : The AhmiciMassacre

of 16 April 1993: A Military Analysis.

192
 -

against the valley's residentMuslims. While Ahmici destroying parts of Svinjarevo , Gomionica, and Rotilj
burned , troops of the HVO's Central Bosnia after forcing their residents to flee.73 Muslim civilians
Operational Zone were also attacking the numerous in Kiseljak proper were rounded up and either
Muslim -majority villages surrounding the detained or forced to leave the town.74 Battles contin
Croat-majority towns of Vitez and Kiseljak . ued for an arc of villages several kilometers west of
Kiseljak until the HVO gained effective control over
Svinjarevo , Jehovac , Gromiljak, Visnjica , and Rotilj
The Vitez Region * by the end of April.75 76 77

During the HVO's Lasva Valley offensive, the Vitez Heavy fighting resumed north and west of Kiseljak at
area was to see some of the bloodiest and most violent the very end ofMay around the villages of Lisovo and
Croat-Muslim clashes of the war. The harbinger of Kazagici.78 On 1 June , according to UN observers , the
violence in the area was the detonation of a huge truck HVO launched a preemptive attack against a Muslim
bomb outside a mosque in Stari Vitez on 16 April (the held ridge overlooking the road running northwest
same day as the Ahmici massacre). The bomb killed from Kiseljak.79 The fighting sputtered out the follow
or injured dozens of people and completely devastated ing week when Bosnian Army commander Delic and
most of the old town's Muslim center.69 HVO commander Petkovic met in Kiseljak and agreed
to a country -wide truce on 10 June.80
The HVO's lightning offensive in the Lasva Valley
allowed the Bosnian Croats to capture or destroy
many of the villages in the immediate area around The Bugojno to Jablanica Road
Vitez in a couple of days . After these initial gains,
though , limited resources kept the HVO Central Bos Although the Lasva Valley corridor was the HVO’s
nian Operation Zone from pressing its attack strongly most significant offensive objective in central Bosnia ,
after the first several days of fighting. The command the Bosnian Croats launched simultaneous attacks in
appears to have tried to link the Vitez enclave to the other mixed Croat-Muslim areas. In several areas
HVO -held Kiseljak area some 10 km to the east with south of the Lasva Valley — including Gornji Vakuf,
an attack along themain highway on 25 April, but it Prozor, and Jablanica - HVO forces attempted to rap
was blocked by significantly superior Bosnian Army idly stake out exclusively Croat areas and then consol
forces, leaving the two Croat-held areas still sepa idate their gains.81 There was heavy fighting outside
rate.70 The advantage of a surprise attack against neg Busovaca as HVO forces expelled Muslims from sev
ligible or disorganized opposition had enabled the eral nearby villages.82 A few kilometers away ,Muslim
Bosnian Croats to seize territory easily, but when they forces advanced against the HVO east of Prozor.83
came up against determined Muslim opposition they
were stymied. After a Croat-Muslim cease- fire was
signed in late April, and observed with only occa Aftermath : The End of April
sional breaches , the HVO assumed a largely defensive
posture while the ARBiH 3rd Corps took the opportu Themid -April round of Croat-Muslim fighting burned
71 72
nity to build its forces for a counterstroke.? itself out over a week or so , leaving hundreds of sol
diers and civilians dead on each side. The HVO alone
counted 145 soldiers and 270 civilianskilled in
The Kiseljak Area ** combat by 24 April,84 and Muslim casualties were
probably at least as high.
Full-scale war came to the Kiseljak area when the
HVO struck first northwest of the town on 18 April, Bosnian Army Commander Halilovic and HVO Com
shelling the Muslim -majority town of Bilalovac and mander Petkovic attempted to patch up interethnic
military relations at the end of April, signing a
See Annex 41: The Croat-Held Vitez Enclave: Vitez, Busovaca,
and Novi Travnik , June-December 1993, for a more detailed
account.
See Annex 42: The Kiseljak Enclave in 1993: The Battle for
Kiseljak, Kresevo , and Fojnica, for a more detailed account.

193
cease -fire agreement (at a time when the international be released , and free mobility of civilians would be
community was strongly pressuring the Bosnian Serbs guaranteed .92 The cease - fire had little visible effect on
to accept the Vance -Owen peace settlement) and the ground, and battles in the city continued . 93 Then
promising to activate the ARBiH -HVO Joint theMostar HVO — reinforced by units brought in from
Command to enforce the truce.85 A week of relative Ljubuski, Citluk, and Capljina — on 16 May made a
peace ensued, but the agreement was not to last. determined and successful attack to seize the small
strip of territory still held by theMuslimson the right
Chapter 41 bank of the Neretva .94 Calm of a sort finally came on
The Alliance Shattered : 21 May , though both sides remained deployed along
The Mostar and Herzegovina Battles,May 1993 the confrontation line that had sawed Mostar city in
half 95 96
After the Lasva Valley fighting subsided in late April,
the nexus of conflict shifted for a time to the Mostar Chapter 42
area, where a delicate balance had been maintained in The Bosnian Army Fights Back :
the ethnically mixed region . The Croat-Muslim vio The Lasva Valley Counteroffensive,
lence touched off by the HVO in mid -April produced June- July 1993
several deaths from sniper fire in Mostar, but the city
was spared the widespread violence that left hundreds For they have sown the wind, and they shall
dead in central Bosnia . On 24 April a shaky truce was reap the whirlwind.
arranged for the Mostar area, and the two forces
returned uneasily to their former alliance.86 The agree -Hosea 8 : 7
ment seems not to have dissuaded the HVO from
repeating its demand that Bosnian Army troops in the In early June 1993, the Bosnian Army literally had no
city hand over their weapons in exchange for safety place to go . With their former HVO allies now adver
guarantees. Again the greatmajority ofMuslims saries, the government forces were surrounded, cut off
refused to give up their weapons. A collision was from all military supplies, and fighting the Bosnian
inevitable and imminent. Serbs and the Bosnian Croats simultaneously . At this
point in time— from Sarajevo's standpoint, probably
On 8 May, Muslim -held military and civilian concen the darkest hour of the Bosnian conflict — the Army
trations throughoutMostar came under what received a new commander,General Rasim Delic,
UNPROFOR commander Lt.Gen. Wahlgren con who set out immediately to make changes in the com
firmed was “ a major Croat attack .” Bosnian Croat position and the strategy of his forces. First and fore
forces set fire to the Bosnian Army headquarters and a most, the Bosnian Army began to hit back .
uster of important buildings at the very outset of the
attack , after which HVO troops rounded up Muslim The opening salvo of the Bosnian Army's counter
civilians en masse and evicted over 1,300 of them offensive was to come at Travnik , almost exactly in
from two formerly Muslim -majority sections of the the geographic and demographic center of Bosnia
city . The defending Bosnian Army forces of the city's Herzegovina. With a prewar population of over
41st “Mostar” Brigade responded by attacking the 70,000 (45 percentMuslim , 37 percent Croat, 11 per
HVO -held Tihomir Misic army barracks on the east cent Serb ) it was ( after Zenica ) the second-largest
side of the river. Fierce house -to -house street battles town in central Bosnia . It was also the location of the
raged throughout the city for the next few days.87 88 89 90 Pucarevo “ Bratsvo ” Weapons Plant, which had manu
At the same time,HVO forces launched attacks in the factured , assembled, and repaired artillery pieces for
Jablanica and Dreznica areas.91 the Yugoslav Army.97 A few kilometers south of
Travnik was the smaller town of Novi Travnik , with
As they had in the Lasva Valley the month before, some 30,000 residents and a slightly higher percent
ARBiH and HVO commanders Halilovic and age of Croats than Muslims.
Petkovic signed a cease -fire agreement covering
Mostar on 13 May stipulating that soldiers of both
sides would return to their barracks, prisoners would

194
- --

The home of central Bosnia's largest Muslim popula Enver Hadzhihasanovic and Mehmed Alagic , respec
tion , the Travnik -Zenica urban area was also becom tively. The core would be the 17th Krajina Brigade,
ing the center of a new , more assertive Bosnian commanded by Fikret Cuskic and headquartered in
Muslim identity. More radical and much more reli Travnik itself.100 In addition to the 17th Krajina, the
gious than the Bosnian Muslim population as a whole , ARBiH could call upon the 306th Mountain Bri
the " new " Travnik Muslimswere starting to attract a gade,101 headquartered in the nearby Travnik suburb of
dedicated following. The new ,hardline attitude was Han Bila , and if necessary the 7th Muslimski, 303rd ,
most visible in the large refugee population that had and 314th Brigades from Zenica . When the Bosnian
been expelled from Jajce , Donji Vakuf, and large Muslims launched their attack , they probably had the
swaths of western Bosnia. Their radicalization had equivalent of at least four full brigades to commit to
begun with the atrocities they suffered at Serb hands the fight.102
during the ethnic cleansing of 1992 , and attitudes
became all the more extreme after Bosnia's Muslims HVO forces in the area comprised most of the Central
were attacked by the Croats in April-May 1993 . Bosnian Operation Zone's First OperationalGroup.
Two HVO brigades were from Travnik , the
From a military standpoint, there were two visible “ Travnika” Brigade and the “ Frankopan” Brigade.103
products of the hardening Bosnian attitude in the Another, the “ Stjepan Tomasevic” Brigade, had a bat
Travnik area : the 7th Muslimski and 17th Krajina talion in nearby Novi Travnik . Although the First
Brigades. Destined to become two of the most feared , OperationalGroup's (OG's ) other assets the
famous, and accomplished units in the Bosnian Army, “ Vitez" Brigade, the other battalion of the “ Stjepan
the 7th Muslimski Brigade from Zenica and 17th Tomasevic" Brigade, and the remnants ofthe defeated
Krajina Brigade from Travnik were zealous shock “ Jure Francetic" Brigade , all located in Vitez — could
troops of Bosnia's displaced Muslims. Composed in theory have reinforced the Travnik HVO , as events
largely ofMuslims “ cleansed” out of other parts of unfolded the HVO's other resources proved too far
Bosnia - young men with no place to go — the soldiers away and too preoccupied with events in the Vitez
of these brigades made up in fierceness and enthusi area to be of any assistance. The HVO, therefore, had
asm what they lacked in training and discipline. The roughly two brigades available for the defense of
Bosnian Army did not quite know how it felt about Travnik .
them or the increasing number of foreign Islamic vol
unteerswho came to join their ranks. On the one hand , The Croat -Muslim frontline with the Bosnian Serbs
they could be unruly and problematic, harassing local ran 2 or 3 kilometers to the northwest of Travnik . The
Bosnian Croats and even insufficiently religious Serbs were in an excellent geographical position, hav
Bosnian Muslims.98 On the other hand, there was no ing occupied the massive Mt. Vlasic feature situated
question that these troops were highly motivated and just north of Travnik and overlooking the entire town
effective fighters. Sorely in need of willing and able and its environs. During the Croat-Muslim conflict in
assault troops , the Bosnian Army began in June 1993 this area , however, the Serbs were content to watch
to use these units as spearheads for its attacks. 99 their opponents fight it out and did not involve them
selves beyond occasional shelling.
At the outset, both the Bosnian Government and the
Bosnian Croats had substantial forces available for The Bosnian Muslims kicked off their attack on
combat in the Travnik -Novi Travnik area . Although 4 June with fierce infantry clashes inside Travnik
the Croats may have had a slight edge in terms of town. Street battles were accompanied by mortar and
organization and equipment, the two forces were on artillery fire, while leveled antiaircraft guns were used
the whole comparably armed . Other factors being to clear out houses .104 By 5 June the HVO had largely
about equal, the Bosnian Army's local advantage in vacated Travnik itself but continued to shell the area
manpower was to prove decisive. from Croat-held villages in the suburbs overlooking
the town center.105 Two cease-fire agreements were
All of the Bosnian Government's forces in the area announced on 5 and 6 June, but fighting continued
belonged to the ARBiH 3rd Corps and its Bosanska unabated .106 107
Krajina OperationalGroup under the command of

195
By the end of the day on 6 June , the Bosnian Croats Bjelavici and Obrovici, 3 kilometers to the south
were unquestionably on the run . Bosnian Serb military east.120 The following day fighting had advanced to
spokesmen stated on 7 June that about 5,000 Bosnian Catici, 2 kilometers south of the town. After several
Croats — including over 1,000 HVO troops — had sur more days of fighting in the surrounding villages ,
rendered to Bosnian Serb forces west of Travnik to Bosnian Croat residents began to flee Kakanj on
escape the Croat-Muslim fighting of the previous few 13 June, and soon thousands of them were headed east
days.108 109 The Bosnian Croats initially dismissed the toward Vares, some 20 km away.121 HVO forces
claim as propaganda but later admitted that the HVO apparently established a blocking position at
troops had indeed disobeyed orders to fighttheir way Kraljevska Sutjeska along the road to Vares on
through to other Croat-held positions and had instead 14 June, probably trying to keep the escape route
given themselves up to the Serbs.110 Thousandsmore open.122 The besieged villages of Catici and
Bosnian Croat civilians fled up the slopes of Serb -held Kraljevska Sutjeska surrendered the following day ,
Mt. Vlasic ( in dreadfulweather) to surrender to the along with major elements of the HVO's defending
Serbs over the next few days, after Muslim forces cut “ Kotromanic” Brigade ,123 leaving the way clear for the
off all other escape routes.111112 113 114 Bosnian Army's occupation of Kakanj itself on the
16th 124 125 - a triumph quickly marred by rampant
A barely perceptible lull occurred 8 June when the looting.126 127
Bosnian Army's new commander in chief, Gen.
Rasim Delic , called for a halt in the fighting and With the consecutive defeats at Travnik and Kakanj,
accepted a Croat-Muslim cease -fire agreement effec Bosnian Croat losses in men and territory were
tive for thewhole country.115 Having gained the initia becoming acute, and the Herceg-Bosna leadership's
tive, however, the Bosnian Army pressed its concerns deepened as June wore on . The military tide
advantage as far as it could in all directions and on 8 had already turned far enough as early as 9 June for
and 9 June continued its offensive to the southeast, Bosnian Croat leaderMate Boban to appeal publicly
attacking the nearby village of Senkovci and pushing to Croatian President Tudjman for help .128 On 18 June,
the remaining HVO forces south and east toward Boban's deputy, Dario Kordic, admitted that the
Croat-held Novi Travnik and Vitez.116 Government Bosnian Croats had lostmore than 2,000 killed and
forces also made important gains to the west, seizing wounded in the Bosnian Army offensive and that a
the key road junction at Turbe.117 Lastly , the ARBiH further 60,000 had been driven from their homes dur
opened a new offensive axis to the east, successfully ing the fighting. (UN authorities could not confirm
clearing a government-controlled corridor all the way Kordic's figures but agreed that they appeared credi
from Travnik to Zenica , some 20 km away."18 ble.)129 By 30 June the outnumbered HVO was clearly
hard pressed , especially in central Bosnia, prompting
The capture of Travnik and its successful linkage to its political head , Jadranko Prlic , to issue an “ appeal
nearby Zenica was a military victory ofmajor signifi and order” for all Bosnian Croats between 18 and
cance. Travnik's wider and more lasting importance 60 to report for military service under a general
was psychological rather than tactical or strategic, mobilization .
however. At a desperate moment in the fighting the
Bosnian Armyhad not only held its own but had Chapter 43
achieved a clear victory . The significance for morale The Three - Sided War :
was incalculable . Zepce, Zavidovici, and Maglaj, June July 1993

The ARBiH lost no time in following up its success in For months, Zepce had been an island of Croat
Travnik and on 16 June won the second major victory Muslim coexistence , a town of about 20,000 residents
of its two -week - old offensive by capturing the large almost equally divided between Croats and Muslims.
Muslim -majority town of Kakanj east of Vitez and
north of Kiseljak.119 The battle had begun several days
earlier on 9 June with an attack on the towns of

196

-
An unnatural peace had been maintained in Zepce by Bosnian Croats had secured almost complete control
an eerie form of ethnic apartheid : two parallel govern of Zepce, blocking any possible Bosnian Army rein
ments — one Croat, one Muslim - operated simulta forcements from Zenica. Not only was Maglaj itself
neously in the same town . Croat children would attend surrounded , but the entire " Maglaj finger" to the
the central school in the morning;Muslim children north — the Muslim -held area around Tesanj, south of
would have classes in the samebuilding in the after Doboj and west of the Serb -held Ozren mountains ,
noon . The local Bosnian Army and HVO headquar was also cut off from resupply . Bosnian forces had
ters, a kilometer apart, directed brigades fighting the secure control over only Zavidovici at this point. 138 139
Bosnian Serbs along adjacent frontages. It was a deli
cate balance, but it kept the peace for a time.130 By the end of the summer, the Zepce-Maglaj- Tesanj
area had turned into a crazy quilt world of sieges
This fragile arrangement broke down on 24 June. The within sieges and allies joining with enemies to fight
Croats claim the Bosnian Army first attacked several allies. In the Zepce-Zavidovici area , the VRS had
Croat-majority villages outside Zepce and touched off stepped in to assist the HVO against the Muslims. To
street fighting in the ethnically mixed town itself.131 the north , Muslim -held Maglaj was surrounded by
Bosnian Army commander Delic maintained that it Croats on three sides and Serbs on one . Just north of
was the Croats and Serbs who began the fighting with that, the Muslim -held Tesanj area had become an
a joint attack on Zavidovici in violation of the most island with its link through Maglaj cut off. Within that
recent cease -fire.132 Whoever started it, by the follow Tesanj area , Bosnian Croat soldiers of the HVO's
ing day the Croat-Muslim fighting had engulfed not 110th Brigade were fighting side by side with the
only Zepce but also adjacent Zavidovici and the larger Bosnian Muslims against the Bosnian Serbs — no
town ofMaglaj to the north.133 The outnumbered HVO more than 20 km from other HVO troops of the 111th
forces chose to withdraw most of the Bosnian Croat Brigade who were accompanied by VRS armor in
civilians from the three towns on 25 June and began a assaults against the ARBiH . In this three - cornered
very heavy bombardment of the urban centers the fol war, it seemed , all things were possible.
lowing day, causing numerous casualties and exten
sive material damage . 134 Muslim forces claimed some Chapter 44
gains by 27 June, capturing Zavidovici and holding a Zagreb Intervenes To Stem the Tide, July 1993
small foothold in the southern end ofZepce despite
the heavy HVO shelling.135 Bymid - July 1993, the leadership in Zagreb was
deeply concerned , not only over the HVO's battlefield
The Zepce-Zavidovici area saw an undisguised Croat reverses but also about the military prospects for
Serb alliance against the Bosnian Muslims.UN offi Herceg -Bosna as a whole. Tudjman and his advisers,
cials confirmed in late June that Bosnian Serb tanks however, had a delicate game to play . Convinced that
were actively assisting HVO forces during the fight they had to intervene directly to shore up their
ing:136 Bosnian Serb Army assistance from Colonel Bosnian Croat allies and prevent the further loss of
Slavko Lisica's “ Doboj” OperationalGroup was to territory to the Muslims, they also had to somehow
frequently prove decisive , as at the fiercely contested mask the visibility of the HV's involvement to mini
Maglaj suburb of Novi Seher. Bosnian Serb armor mize international criticism and the risk of sanctions.
finally overran the town after HVO artillery and infan
try efforts had failed to dislodge the Muslim defend In May, Tudjman — under a near-ultimatum from the
ers . 137 EC to rein in the Bosnian Croats or face possible sanc
tions — had made a public plea to the Bosnian Croats
Largely as a result of the Bosnian Serb assistance , the to break off their offensive ,which could only help
HVO began to get the upper hand in the fighting by their common enemy, the Serbs. The Croat leaders in
early July . UN military officials confirmed that Mag
laj had been completely surrounded by 2 July, and its
defenders were clearly in trouble. Even worse , the

197
Bosnia were just as public in their rejection of Tudj The ARBiH Captures Bugojno , 18-25 July *
man's argument, claiming that they had to defend their
right to live in Bosnia against Muslims who “ want to Bugojno's strategic location and its damaged but still
expel all other peoples and create an Islamic , 100 functioning “ Slavko Rodic " munitions factory made it
percent Moslem state." 140 Herceg - Bosna leader Mate one of the most heavily contested towns during the
Boban's will prevailed , and the war had continued summer 1993 fighting between Croat and Muslim
through July — only to put the HVO on the losing end forces in central Bosnia. Before the war, Bugojno was
of the conflict. a large town of about 46,000 residents with a Muslim
plurality (42 percent) and substantial minorities of
The competing factors of international pressure and Croats ( 34 percent) and Serbs (about 20 percent). The
Croat national interests hung in the balance for a time, ethnic balance in the town quickly changed after the
but eventually Tudjman ordered his own army into war began ,however.Most of Bugojno's Serbs left
Bosnia . On 22 July, UN spokesman Barry Frewer almost immediately for Serb -controlled areas, while
reported that UN military observers had observed Bosnian Croat and Muslim refugees streamed in from
" heavy movements" ofHV soldiers in Bosnia near Jajce and other areas lost to the Bosnian Serb Army.
Ljubuski and Mostar.141 With the commitment of Although the town's total population remained
weapons and special units to the Croat-Muslim con roughly the same, the refugee influx had probably
flict, the HV essentially assumed responsibility for the increased the proportion of Bosnian Muslimsby mid
entire southern Herzegovina confrontation line with 1993. Until then , the town was jointly defended from
the Bosnian Serbs, freeing the Bosnian HVO to con the Bosnian Serbs by the HVO’s “Eugen Kvaternik ”
centrate its full attention on the conflict with the Mus Brigade and the Bosnian Army's 307th “ Bugojno"
lims.142 Direct and indirect assistance was to prove Mountain Brigade. Interethnic relations remained rel
crucial to the survival of the Bosnian Croats' hard atively good until the first Croat-Muslim fighting in
pressed Herceg - Bosna statelet in the latter half of Gornji Vakuf in January 1993, after which they
1993. became extremely tense .

Chapter 45 In theory, theHVO's Eugen Kvaternik Brigade had a

The Contest for the Southern Road : strength of perhaps 1,000 to 1,200 troops, in three bat
Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf, and Prozor, talions, a military police company, and a small mixed
July - December 1993 artillery battery . The force was not as strong as it
looked , however. A substantial number of mostly
Just as the Croatian Army was intervening to stiffen Muslim soldiers deserted before or during the July
the HVO's defense, the Bosnian Army began its sec fighting, and most of the brigade's troops were on
ond major offensive. Having reduced — though not leave or deployed outside the town when the ARBiH
eliminated — the HVO presence in the Lasva Valley attacked. The Croat brigade's effective fighting
through its capture of Travnik and Kakanj in June, the strength was probably only 200 to 400 at the time and
ARBiH turned its attention along the road to the place of the Bosnian Army attack .
south . This highway — one of Bosnia's major arter
ies — ran from Serb -held Jajce and Donji Vakuf The ARBiH's own brigade from Bugojno — the 307th
through disputed Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf to Croat Brigade of the 3rd Corps ' " OperationalGroup
held Prozor, reached Muslim -held Jablanica , and con West” -spearheaded the government attack .143 144Like
tinued south to Mostar. Control of this road , which most Bosnian Army brigades, the 307th had many
would also define the border between Croat-held troops but relatively few weapons: at the time, the
Herzegovina and Muslim - controlled central Bosnia, * For a more detailed account, see Annex 43 : The Bosnian Army
drew the primary attention of the Muslims and Croats Capture ofBugojno, July 1993.
for the remainder of their war in Bosnia .

198
307th Brigade could probably field 3,000 to 3,500 the area late in July before launching the offensive on
troops when fully mobilized , with as many as three to 1 August. When the time came, the ARBiH's local
four dozen mortars but no field artillery or armor. 317th “Gornji Vakuf? Mountain Brigade , commanded
by Fahrudin “ Pajo " Agic ( probably supported by a
The Bosnian Army forces began their assault on battalion of the elite 7th Muslimski Brigade) launched
Bugojno early in the morning on 18 July 1993, and attacks on the town from the northwest, north , and
streetbattles continued in and around the town for the east.148 The HVO's defending “ Dr. Ante Starcevic"
next several days as the numerically superior Muslims Brigade was in for a hard fight.
progressively forced the Croats back . After particu
larly heavy fighting in the town center on 21 July , the Battling throughout the night, government forces had
Bosnian Army took control ofmost of the key facili won control overmost of the town by the following
ties — including the Eugen Kvaternik Brigade's bar day. UN peacekeepers and Western press correspon
racks — the following day.145 The last large pocket of dents confirmed that the Bosnian Muslims had
Bosnian Croat resistance — the surrounded military secured control over “ 95 percent” ofGornji Vakuf,
police company - surrendered on 25 July 146 The last with a small number of disorganized Croats maintain
fighting in the area, in which Croat and Muslim forces ing a toehold in the Croat-majority neighborhood in
contested severalMuslim villages on the road to the the southwest. (The Bosnian Croats changed the name
southeast, was over by about 29 July . The intense of their section of the Turkish -named Gornji Vakuf to
fighting produced high casualties on both sides. Each Uskoplje .) The HVO troops there were badly shaken
brigade lost at least dozens killed , and probably about by the assault, but did not collapse entirely.149 150 With
350 Bosnian Croat soldiers were captured .147 most of the town in hand , the Bosnian Army proved
unable or unwilling to consolidate it fully by wiping
The battle for Bugojno was one of the few in the Bos out the remaining Croat pockets . (Apparently, the
nian war in which the advantages lay with the Bosnian ARBiH was unable to send substantial reinforcements
Army. The 307th Brigade probably had at least three to the area at this time, and the 317th Brigade, only
times as many troops as its HVO opponent and was slightly augmented , was forced to slug it out one-on
comparably or better equipped . The HVO's Eugen one with its HVO opponent.) A small Croat enclave
Kvaternik Brigade had no apparent advantage in lead remained to the north in the little area of Trnovaca.
ership , and its officers were consistently described as More important, the HVO retained the Podovi Ridge
inexperienced and disorganized . The Bosnian Army's just southwest of the town, from which they could
advantages were further magnified by the factor of direct artillery and machinegun fire into the town cen
surprise : the HVO troops were caught stunned , under ter. 151 After pulling themselves together, the Bosnian
manned , and ill -positioned. With its forces separated , Croats attempted to counterattack from these positions
the HVO in Bugojno effectively fought three separate on 5 Augustwith mortar rounds and small- arms
battalion -sized battles rather than one brigade- sized fire .152 The HVO was similarly unable to dislodge its
one. Outnumbered and surrounded, the battalions opponents from the town, and it failed to advance.
were defeated in detail. Although battling against an
opponent that may have been unimpressive , the HVO reinforcements — including tanks and heavy
Bosnian Army was at least beginning to display some artillery — were brought in to support another attack
professional proficiency . on Gornji Vakuf on 15-16 September, but this attack
was likewise unsuccessful. The Bosnian Croats
shelled the town intensely at intervals — on 21 October
The Contest for Gornji Vakuf: 1 August and 15 November in particular — but, although the
shelling caused extensive destruction , it won no
While it executed its successful attack on Bugojno , the ground . A stalemate had been reached in Gornji
Bosnian Armywas contemplating an assault on Vakuf, with the confrontation line running through the
Gornji Vakuf (some 20 km to the southeast) as the town itself. 153 154 155
next step in its offensive campaign,massing forces in

199
By late September, the frontlines had pretty well been On 30 June, the Bosnian Army achieved a sweeping,
established north of Herzegovina and would remain crucial victory, capturing the Croat-held Tihomir
essentially unchanged for the rest of the war. At the Misic Barracks on the east bank ofthe Neretva, one of
sametime the lines around Prozor were being drawn, the hydroelectric dams on the river, and the main
however, similar battles were deciding Croat-Muslim northern approaches to the city. Muslim forces also
areas of control within Herzegovina itself. captured the Vrapcici neighborhood in northeastern
Mostar and were contesting the adjacent Bijelo Polje
Chapter 46 district.160 The capture of the HVO military base
The Croat -Muslim War in Herzegovina , essentially secured the entire eastern half of the city
June- July 1993 for the government.161 Further gains north of the city
on the next day raised serious HVO concerns that the
What we are witnessing in Mostar right now is Bosnian Army would eventually link up to Muslim
only the semi-final. We are still awaiting the forces from Jablanica , 30 km to the north.162 163
winner.
-A senior Bosnian Serb Army com Government forces mounted another major drive to
mander, on the HVO -ARBiH duel for the south beginning on 13 July - possibly aiming to
Mostar156 cut the Croat-held road from Capljina to Stolac — and
captured the towns of Buna and Blagaj about 10 km
By the late summer of 1993, Mostar had become the
south of the city.164 165 The offensive widened on
most divided city in divided Bosnia -Herzegovina. 15 July , and fighting raged across a long front for con
Before the war the greater Mostar metropolitan area's trol of the city's northern and southern approaches.
population of some 120,000 citizens showed a very
Shooting extended as far south as Capljina — 20 km
marginalMuslim plurality : 35 percent Muslims, 34 south of Mostar — as well as across the city itself,
percent Croats, and 19 percent Serbs . Within urban
according to UNPROFOR spokesmen.166
Mostar itself, there was a higher fraction ofMus
lims — 52 percent. When the ethnic violence cut
It was at this stage that the UN started reporting signs
through the city center,Mostar's roughly 55,000 Mus
that the Croatian Armyhad been brought in to back
lim townspeople found themselves squeezed into the stop the faltering HVO.167 At the same time, UNPRO
smaller and besieged East Mostar section , forced off FOR confirmed that HVO counterattacks against
the western bank of the river and with only a medieval
Buna and Blagaj had been supported by Bosnian Serb
footbridge , the famed Stari Most, still linking the two artillery.168 The HVO recaptured Buna after a fierce
halves of the city.157
counterattack , although the Bosnian Army retained its
hold on nearby Blagaj. The ARBiH's advance south of
East Mostar was by now the headquarters of the Mostar had been blunted. 169 170 171
ARBiH's 4th Corps , under the direction of Arif
Pasalic , a former JNA colonel charged with the
By late 1993 the only link left between the Croat
defense of what remained of Muslim -held Herzegov
controlled western part of Mostar and the Muslim
ina. Although Pasalic could direct units as far north as
held eastern section was the city's namesake: the
Konjic and as far south as Blagaj, the forces he could centuries - old StariMost. All of the modern bridges
actually reach personally were limited to the city's
connecting the city's two halves had been destroyed ,
defending hometown unit, the 41st “Mostar” Brigade largely to isolate the tiny,Muslim -held foothold that
and another brigade nearby in Blagaj.158 All other still clung tenaciously alongside the river in
forces had to be directed by radio from the surrounded
Croat-majority western Mostar. Snipers, mortars, and
Muslim corps headquarters. 159 These limitations not artillery all targeted the bridge the Ottomans had built ,
withstanding, Pasalic undertook a series of operations
that would leave the Croats in peril of losing their
entire strategic position in the area.

200
but those brave and cautious enough could dash across Miljacka River.172 At the end of September, the Bos
from one side of the city to the other to get water, nian Army ordered the brigade to turn over its weap
food , or ammunition. Holes had been blasted in the ons, return to barracks, and subordinate itself to the
sides , a ramshackle wooden roof covered most of the ARBiH 1st Corps. When the brigade's commander,
bridge , and automobile tires and sandbags had been Salko Zelic , refused , President Izetbegovic intervened
piled alongside in a forlorn effort to shield the struc and rescinded the order.173 A month later, however, the
ture from shelling. Underneath it all , the single stone Bosnian Army followed up its crackdown on renegade
arch was still as graceful as ever, and the battered ARBiH units in Sarajevo (Operation “ Trebevic - 1" )
walkway remained both a physical and a symbolic with a less extensive operation to bring the King
link holding together the war -shattered halves of the Tvrtko Brigade under its authority (Operation
city and its population . “ Trebevic - 2 " ) . The HVO military leaders in Sarajevo
were rounded up and detained , and their brigade was
It was not to last. As four and a quarter centuries had disbanded and reconstituted under a new commander,
come and gone, the Stari Most had borne the feet of Nedeljko Veraja. On 6 November, the Bosnian Army
Ottomans and Austrians, Serbs and Croats, Albanians, command announced that the King Tvrtko Brigade
Montenegrins, Jews, Bogomils, and Muslims. The would retain its name but would henceforth serve
bridge had seen empires rise and fall, and it had sur under the ARBiH 1st Corps. The " Croatian King
.

vived earthquakes, floods, and two world wars. In the Tvrtko Brigade" remained a Bosnian Army unit for
end, Mostar's own citizenry destroyed what invaders the remainder of the war174 but with less than half its
and the forces of nature had spared . The Bosnian original personnel.175
Croat leaders in WestMostar, self-proclaimed capital
of the self-proclaimed state of Herceg-Bosna , wanted In the Bihac area, the tiny Bosnian Croat community
to ensure that their portion of Herzegovina was set officially had its own separate “ Bihac Regional Com
completely apart from that ofMostar's Muslims — and mand” consisting of the 101stHVO Brigade. In prac
also to destroy what many viewed as a visible tice, this consisted of a semiautonomous, battalion
reminder of the city's Ottoman past. On themorning sized unit functioning as partofthe ARBiH 5th Corps.
of 9 November 1993, HVO T -55 tanks blasted the With a few hundred Bosnian Croats dependent on the
ancient stone bridge with high - explosive shells, and Bosnian 5th Corps and the entire Bihac enclave look
the Stari Most crumbled into the Neretva river. ing to Croatia for its survival,mutual self-interest — if
nothing else — kept Croat-Muslim relations in the
Chapter 47 Bihac area reasonably good throughout the war.
The Conflict That Wasn't : The Croat-Muslim
Alliance Holds in Parts of Bosnia Three HVO brigades in the southern Posavina co
dor (the 107th “Gradacac," 108th “ Brcko" and 115th
A notable feature of the Croat-Muslim conflict in Bos “ Zrinski” Brigades) functioned for all practical pur
nia is that it was widespread but not universal. While poses as Bosnian Army units throughout 1992 and
most of Bosnia was seared with emotional and actual 1993. They were nominally assigned to the HVO's 4th
flames, there were some areas in which Croat-Muslim (Orasje) Operational Zone but had no physical and lit
relations stretched taut but never broke into violence , tle administrative connection to the rest of Croat-held
and even a few where Croat-Muslim relations Bosnia . All three brigades were raised from the multi
remained good and the two factions continued to fight ethnic , cosmopolitan Tuzla metropolitan area
side by side against the Serbs. as distinct from the hardline Croat strongholds of
Herzegovina and central Bosnia — and generally
In Sarajevo , the HVO’s “ King Tvtrko” Brigade chron maintained good relations with the Bosnian Army
icled a long and rocky relationship with the Bosnian throughout the Croat-Muslim conflict.176 177 Like the
Army. The HVO contributed about 1,500 troops to the three HVO brigades in the nearby southern
defense of Sarajevo ,manning a 2 -kilometer strip of
the confrontation line along the north bank of the

201
Posavina — but unlike the 111th HVO brigade in The Bosnian Army Strikes : 14 September 1993*
Zepce just to the south — the 110th “Usora ” HVO Bri
gade in the Tesanj area remained loyal to the Bosnian After the Bosnian Army's capture ofmost ofGornji
Government and effectively functioned as part of the Vakuf in August 1993 , the ARBiH again took a break
ARBiH 2nd Corps' Operational Group “ 7 -South ,” to consolidate its gains and plan its next effort. The
which later became the 37th Division .178 next obvious objective was Prozor - not just for the
town itself,but in order to gain control of the road
Chapter 48 linking newly captured Gornji Vakuf to Muslim
Seesaw and Stasis : majority Jablanica . After most of the Muslim popula
The Croat-Muslim War, August- December 1993 tion fled Prozor itself, local Croat and Muslim forces
had spent the May - July months battling over villages
As the Bosnian Army's second offensive began to a few kilometers west of the town, destroying a num
wind down around Bugojno and Gornji Vakuf, the ber of these villages in the process.182 183 184
Croat-Muslim war settled into a largely static
confrontation in which little ground changed hands. Beginning in August, the emphasis of fighting shifted
Sometimes intense battles would be fought for small to the north , where Muslim and Croat forces vied for
towns or key facilities around the various enclaves, control of the commanding heights of Crni Vrh . A
but, as summer stretched into autumn, there would be rocky mass over 1,300 meters high at points, Crni Vrh
few noteworthy victories. was just north of the equally high Makljen Ridge ,
which in turn looked straight down over Prozor town
In the Kiseljak area , the HVO held three sizable just 2 kilometers south . Both sides occupied portions
towns: Kiseljak itself and the smaller towns of Fojnica of the Crni Vrh heights,but neither had firm control,
and Kresevo to the west and south . After unsuccess so August and September were punctuated with bat
fully pressing the southern edge of the Kiseljak tles along the hills and ridges.
enclave during the latter half of June, the Bosnian
Army shifted its emphasis to the west, attacking On 14 September 1993, the Bosnian Government
Fojnica — a quiet lumber town of some 15,000 resi again took up the offensive ,mounting Operation
dents in the mountains west of Kiseljak — at the " Neretva 93," one of the largest military campaigns of
beginning of July.179 Bosnian Army heavy weapons the year.185 In its most complex effort to date , the
units, apparently brought up from the south after the ARBiH launched coordinated attacks against the
failed attacks on Kresevo , supported the infantry with Croat-held enclaves of the Lasva Valley, as well as the
a rare barrage of artillery and mortar fire for two days. entire confrontation line running south from Gornji
In a series ofbattles through the streets of Fojnica , the Vakuf around Prozor to Jablanica, through Vrdi and
Bosnian Army took control of the town on 3 July , Mostar and as far south as Buna. Even by the later
removing one point of the Fojnica -Kiseljak -Kresevo standards of the war, the ARBiH's September 1993
triangle that had previously defined the Croat-held effort was a sizable operation .
enclave. 180
Government attacks on several towns around Vitez
Around Vitez, the Bosnian Army forces had pressed were a centerpiece of the broader offensive . Bosnian
the Bosnian Croats into an irregular area extending Army forces attacked the Vitez area simultaneously
from just east of Novi Travnik to justwest of Buso from the north and south , pinching the enclave near its
vaca , all along the main highway adjacent to the Lasva narrowest point east of Vitez . Bosnian Army troops
river. But at the same time the Muslims were sur broke through HVO lines at one point and reached up
rounding the Vitez enclave , the Croats were laying
siege to the neighborhood of Stari Vitez within the * For more details, see Annex 44 : Northern Herzegovina: Konjic ,
Jablanica, and Vrdi in 1993.
city itself, where about 1,300 Muslims defended a tiny
enclave of perhaps a kilometer on each side.181

202
to the edge of Vitez itself but were ultimately forced unsuccessfully on themorning of 19 September, while
back with no net gains. The Bosnian Army also also trying to seize nearby Medvjed hill and Mt. Cab
attacked from the southwest in the direction of the ulja to the west.193 Shortly after the failed attack ,UN
Croat-held explosives factory, whereupon the Croats observers reported seeing government reinforcements
threatened to blow up the factory rather than let the being brought in from the north.194 A second Bosnian
Muslims capture it. The “doomsday bomb” threat Army attempt on 4 October was more successful: the
apparently had the desired effect, for theMuslims ARBiH entered the town the following day, although
186 187
never took the factory . Vrdi was to remain on the confrontation line for the
remainder of the war. 195 196
At the same time Vitez was being pressed in central
Bosnia , fighting was raging at points all along a nearly The situation between Vrdi and Mostar was violently
200 -km -long front that tore diagonally from Gornji but chaotically contested . For a time there simply was
Vakuf all the way to south of Mostar. Just outside no fixed frontline, as units from both sides roamed up
Gornji Vakuf, ARBiH and HVO forces battled for and down the hills and battles erupted wherever the
control of strategic Karaulica Hill. 188 two armies met. 197 Still further to the south , the Bos
nian Army tried again to break the siege of east
Mostar beginning on 17 September. ARBiH and HVO
The UzdolMassacre troops grappled in Mostar city and its Bijelo Polje and
Rastani suburbs,198 199 while ARBiH forces attacking
After months of bloody but inconclusive fighting, the outward from the city in three directions made some
Bosnian Armymounted a sizable offensive east of limited gains.200 The HVO responded by blocking aid
Prozor on 14 September. It was during this effort that convoys into eastMostar and leveling an intense artil
the "Uzdolmassacre" occurred in the Croat-held vil lery barrage against the city on 23 September, fol
lage of Uzdol, 7 kilometers east ofProzor. The out lowed by an ineffective infantry counterattack the next
rage appears to have evolved from a successful day.201202 Artillery duels further smashed the already
military operation , in which a company- sized unit of battered city,but neither side was able to make signif
70 to 100 ARBiH military police infiltrated past Croat icant headway on the ground. (However, government
defense lines and wiped out an HVO command post in “ recon -diversionary ” forces appear to have caused
the village. The Bosnian troops then went on a killing considerable confusion south of the city, operating
spree, murdering the civilians of Uzdol and adjacent behind HVO lines and conducting ambushes and sab
Kriz with firearms, knives, and axes and burning otage operations.203) After several days of negotia
down some of the houses. UNPROFOR observers and tions, fighting wound down and yet another Mostar
Western reporters corroborated Croat claimsthat the cease - fire took effect on 3 October.204
Muslims had killed 34 civilians during a three -hour
rampage.189 190 When the Bosnian Army offensive petered out with
the last push into Vrdi, ARBiH commanders could
Between Prozor and Jablanica, the ARBiH 44th still be justly satisfied with a moderately successful
" Neretva ” Brigade pushed the confrontation line execution of a very ambitious plan. The strategic con
slightly to the west and , after several days of fighting, cept had been very sound: utilize the ARBiH's man
had advanced south from Jablanica and Dresnica power advantage to mount simultaneous attacks, in
toward Mostar, capturing a band of territory along a the hopes of overtaxing the HVO and gaining control
20-km segment of the highway.191 192 over the entire road segmentbetween Gornji Vakuf
and Mostar. In the event, the Army was not yet up to
A focus of the government attack was Vrdi, a small such a task , and the HVO — backstopped by key
town on the Neretva River halfway between Jablanica Croatian Army reinforcements — was able to retain
and Mostar to the south . After an artillery
bombardment, Bosnian infantry attacked the town

203
control over the area around Prozor. The ARBiH did Vares itself.208 The Bosnian Croats, with more people
secure a large swath of ground between Jablanica and than housing, responded by forcing the Muslim
Vrdi, however, and managed to take tenuous control residents out of three villages outside Kakanj on
over the highway from Grabovica through Potoci and 23 June 209 The Croats also demanded that the
Vrapcici into northeastMostar. Muslims in several nearby villages — including Stupni
Do — turn over their arms to the HVO , although this
ultimatum appears to have been ignored .210
The Vares Enclave and the StupniDo Massacre :
October -November 1993 * While the residents of Vares were coping with a refu
gee influx that substantially altered their ethnic bal
The Nordic battalion found that all 52 houses in ance , theMuslim and the Croatmilitary commanders
the village had been burned to the ground . At were trying to sort out overall military control in the
last report, UNPROFOR soldiers had searched region . The Bosnian Croats exerted military authority
half the houses and found the bodies of 15 per over the Vares area itself, with the locally raised
sons who had either been shot or burned to “ Bobovac" Brigade occupying the town and guarding
death . against Bosnian Serb forces to the east. The Bosnian
-UNPROFOR public statement, Army's 2nd ( Tuzla ) Corps, however, began pressuring
27 October 1993 the Vares Croats to resubordinate themselves from the
HVO's Central Bosnia Operational Zone to the
It seems there was a massacre committed in ARBiH 2nd Corps (as, for instance, the HVO's 108th
Stupni Do, but not of the size it was reported and 110th Brigades had already done further north ). In
earlier.
effect, the Bosnian Muslimswere asking the local
-HVO spokesman Veso Vegar, 27 HVO's, regardless of their ethnic composition , to
October 1993, after repeated Bosnian
acknowledge Sarajevo's political and military author
Croat denials that there had been a
ity over the region . The Vares Croats tried hard to
massacre in the village205 balance their relations with the Bosnian Muslimswho
surrounded them with the demands of the Bosnian
Vares is a small mining town that at the outset of the
war registered a slight Croat majority among its popu Croatministate ofwhich they were also part, but the

lation of about 12,000 residents. It lies roughly 50 km odds were against them , and their efforts proved
futile. 211
northwest of Sarajevo at the end of a primary road
running north from the capital through Breza, and
connected thereafter by secondary roads to Tuzla.206 At this delicate juncture in mid -October 1993, the sit
uation in the Vares enclave changed dramatically with
The Vares area had been more or less free of intereth
the arrival of Ivica Rajic212 — commander of the HVO
nic tensions even through the summer of 1993, despite
the Croat-Muslim violence that had ripped through Central Bosnian Operational Zone's Second Opera
tionalGroup, hailing from the hardline Bosnian Croat
central Bosnia only 20 or 30 km away. The leaders of
Kiseljak enclave to the south.213 In what could best be
the Croat and Muslim communities preserved much of
described as a local coup, Rajic and a group of armed
their prewarmoderation and their people continued to
coexist while the rest of Bosnia collapsed around Croat extremists took political control of the Vares
enclave on 23 October,ousting and jailing the mayor
them.207
and police chief and replacing them with supporters
from outside. Rajic put Kresimir Bozic , one of his
Problems first began to surface in Vares after the Bos
nian Army's mid - June counteroffensive forced the allies from Kiseljak , in charge of the HVO's local
Bosnian Croat population out of the Kakanj area about Bobovac Brigade. Spared until now the fate of
minorities elsewhere, the Vares enclave's substantial
20 km to the west. Some 12,000 to 15,000 Croat
refugees streamed into Vares from Kakanj and its sur Muslim population was harassed, robbed, and system
atically dispossessed . Within days most of the
rounding villages, roughly doubling the population of

* See Annex 45: The Vares Enclave and the Stupni Do Massacre :
October-November 1993, for a more detailed account.

204
enclave's Muslims had fled to the village of Dabrav When UN peacekeepers approached Stupni Do to
ina well to the south.214 215 investigate the Bosnian Government's claims of Croat
atrocities there, the Croat commanders barred them
At roughly the same time that Ivica Rajic arrived to from entering the village . Swedish peacekeepers
impose his hardline Bosnian Croat government on finally gained access to the destroyed village late on
Vares, the Bosnian Army was massing its forces to 26 October, three days after the attack . While it was
attack the enclave. Which event precipitated which clear that the Bosnian Croats had used the intervening
or, indeed , if the two are even linked — remains time to clean up the town and remove or destroy evi
uncertain . Whether or not Rajic's arrival spurred the dence , enough remained to verify the essentials of the
ARBiH into action , by late October, the Bosnian attack , if not its details and magnitude. An investiga
Government had transferred all or part of at least three tion conducted by UNPROFOR military police found
brigades into the area and was poised to attack . that an absolute minimum of 23 residents were con
firmed killed , with another 13 unaccounted for, but the
Although the Bosnian Croats may have instigated the actual figure is probably higher.220 It was clear that
violence that shattered the peace of Vares when they dozens had been killed , butmost of the bodies were
drove the Muslims from their homes, it was the Bos never found , and an exact count of the dead may never
nian Army that began military operations in the area . be possible . All 52 houses in the village had been
The earliest ARBiH attack appears to have struck the burnt to the ground.221 222
town of Ratanj, halfway between Kakanj and Vares,
on 19 October.Government forces went on capture The UNPROFOR Chief of Staff, Brig . Angus Ram
the Croat-majority village of Kopjari — 10 km south say, took the unusual step of publicly assigning blame
west of Vares - on 21 October, killing three HVO sol for the massacre to a particular unit and individual,
diers and forcing the town's population to flee. This stating on 27 October that “ This was done by the
latter attack apparently infuriated Rajic and evidently Bobovac Brigade, whose commander is Kresimir
incited him to look for a Muslim village to hit in Bozic ... But his soldiers are not soldiers, they are
response . Possibly Rajic and the Vares Croats had scum , if they do this sort of thing."??223 It is not that cer
already concluded that the Croat enclave was indefen tain , however, that the Vares-based Bobovac Brigade
sible and were planning to evacuate their people to was in fact themain unit responsible or, indeed , if it
Serb -held territory to the east. If so , the HVO may even participated in themassacre 224 There is circum
have concluded that it had to clear the tiny town of stantial but persuasive evidence that the attack was at
Stupni Do to secure the escape , since it lay along the least spearheaded and perhaps executed entirely by
road to the south . For whatever reason, Rajic visited the "Maturice," an entirely different unit brought in by
his anger on the 260 -odd Muslim villagers clinging to Ivica Rajic from outside the Vares pocket shortly
one side of a mountain about 4 km south of Vares before the attack . 225226 227
itself.216 217
Starting in the last week of October,anarchy bred pan
HVO infantry attacked Stupni Do early in themorning demonium in Vares — now cleansed of allMuslims
of 23 October, probably supported with mortars and except for 110 terrified civilians clustered for safety
some artillery.218 Unlike Ahmici, Stupni Do had some around the Swedish UN contingent's vehicles while
defenders: 39 Bosnian Army soldiers quartered in the former Croat neighbors looted the abandoned Muslim
town with their small arms. Their resistance was virtu homes and businesses. Suddenly word came that the
ally nil; in all likelihood the few armed Muslim resi Bosnian Army was on its way . In the dark early hours
dents of Stupni Do were asleep , scattered, and taken of 3 November, the town's remaining Croat residents
by surprise before they could organize . In a few hours gathered their own possessions and their loot and fled
the attacking HVO soldiers had completely destroyed the town.228 229 Then , at dawn, coming from two direc
the town , leveling every single building with direct tions, ARBiH units entered Vares without firing a shot
fire or dynamite and killing every resident unable to
flee in time.219

205
to find it an eerily silent ghost town. The 3rd Corps' counterattack of late 1993.HVO forces from the
7th MuslimskiBrigade occupied Vares from the west, enclave punched outward in the Citonje -Bakovici area
while 2nd Corps forces entered from the north.230 231 several kilometers due west of Kiseljak . The HVO
(Elements of the ARBiH 6th Corps were apparently drive - visibly backed by Bosnian Serb armor and
also involved .)232 For several days thereafter, drunk artillery support - pushed Bosnian Government forces
and disorderly Muslim soldiers roamed the streets of back about 5 km on 12 and 13 November.234 235HVO
Vares, carrying off whatever the Bosnian Croats had troops reached right up to the edge of Fojnica , but
left behind. Eventually , order was restored , and Vares' failed to occupy it.236Government forces appeared
ejected Muslims returned to their violated homes.233 ready to yield Fojnica — which would have returned
the Croat-held enclave to its original borders — but
Most of the thousands of Bosnian Croats who had managed to reoccupy their commanding positions in
once coexisted in Vares fled for Kiseljak , leaving a the town when the HVO offensive stalled.237 238
minuscule Croat- controlled island — barely 2 square
km — around the little town of Dastansko 4 km south On 15 November the HVO expanded its offensive ,
east of Vares . Within a few weeks, Vares itself had assaulting government positions in Gornji Vakuf with
gone from a thriving, ethnically mixed town to an artillery and rocket fire from the Makljen ridge to the
exclusively Croat one and then to a majority Muslim south , supported by probably a platoon of armor. The
one. When Ivica Rajic began expelling Muslimsfrom HVO seemed unwilling or unable to commit any
their homes in late October, his intention was to force infantry forces to the assault on the town . With the
the Muslims out and claim the entire Vares region for HVO unable to take any ground with firepower alone
the Bosnian Croats. Less than a month later, his initia and the Bosnian Army spent after its massive
tive had produced exactly the opposite result. September October offensive , the two sides were set
239 240 241 242
for an impasse as winter began to set in .

The HVO Counterstrike, 12 November 1993

Stalemate : December 1993
As the advent of Rasim Delic in June had marked a
milestone in the ARBiH's development, so was the Although the Muslim -Croat confrontation lines had
performance ofthe HVO to be improved by the arrival essentially stabilized by late September, serious fight
of a new commander, Ante Roso , on 9 November ing continued in the Prozor-Gornji Vakuf area through
1993 — the sameday that HVO tank fire knocked the the end of November, highlighted by a series of con
Stari Most into the Neretva . Zagreb , it seems, had tests for secondary locations along the road , including
been unhappy with the lackluster performance of the Pidris in the direction of Gornji Vakuf and Slatina
previous two HVO commanders: the HVO's first toward Jablanica.243 The Bosnian Army could shell
head, Brigadier Milivoj Petkovic, was superseded on Prozor from the heights to the north , but the HVO
24 July after the ARBiH's successful June offensive retained control of the town itself. The Muslimsheld
(although he remained as chief of staff); and its sec the highway north ofGornji Vakuf, anchored to the
ond commander, Maj.Gen. Slobodan Praljak , was northwest by Muslim -held Bugojno. The Bosnian
replaced after less than four months in command . Croats controlled the road south of Gornji Vakuf,
Roso , the HVO's third commander in chief,was through Prozor and southwest to HVO -held Doljani,
Zagreb's next attempt to find someone who could turn slightly northwest ofMuslim -held Jablanica . Each
the military situation around and , ideally, allow the faction could travel relatively safely along its respec
Croatian HV units sent in to backstop the HVO to be tive section of the road , as the Bosnian Government
withdrawn . Within a week , Roso set out to regain the held territory south of its section of the highway and
initiative for the Croatians in central Bosnia. the Bosnian Croats controlled a strip several kilome
ters to the north .
Roso's opening shot came on 12 November, as the
Bosnian Army effort against nearby Vitez was
grinding to a halt, with the HVO's most substantial

206
Having stabilized the situation around Fojnica after By contrast, in 1993 the Bosnian Croat Army had
the HVO’s November counterstrike, the Bosnian clearly taken on more than it could handle . The HVO
Army went on to mass more forces there in prepara launched its military and ethnic- cleansing campaign
tion for one last winter counterattack . The elite 7th in the spring without anticipating the fierce resistance
Muslimski Brigade — having just helped to capture the Bosnian Muslimswould putup. Having begun the
Vares — was brought into the Fojnica area as a rein conflict, theHVO rapidly found itself on the defensive
forcement, supported by at least two other brigades. on almost every front and would have been in even
Western military observers estimated that the Bosnian worse shape had it not been for the direct and indirect
Armyhad brought in 3,000 to 4,000 additional troops assistance of the Croatian Army. A measure of how
by the beginning of December and speculated that the bad things were for the Croats was the open letter
Kiseljak enclave might be the next target after Mate Boban sent to the UN after the failure of his
Vares.244 When the blow came, though , it would fall offensive, in which he protested the Muslim " aggres
elsewhere. sion .” By Boban's own account the HVO had lost in
the seven weeks since the beginning of June the towns
Moving just ahead of a Christmas -New Year truce of Konjic , Jablanica, Fojnica , Travnik , Kakanj, Zen
between the Croats and Muslims, the Bosnian Army ica , and Bugojno, as well as over 150 smaller villages.
launched a well-coordinated offensive against the The total loss was stated at about 3,700 square km
Lasva Valley on 22 December. Government forces about 7 percent of Bosnia's land area and over a quar
attacked the Croat-held valley from six directions , ter of the Bosnian Croats' territorial holdings at the
capturing the village of Krizancevo outside Vitez . start of the summer.246 By the end of 1993 , the HVO
Forces attacking east of Travnik advanced some 300 with significant direct assistance from Zagreb and
meters and took important high ground overlooking under the leadership of a new commander — had at
the road running west out of the city.245 As 1993 least stabilized its military position, and managed to
turned to 1994 , a Croat-Muslim peace still seemed regain some ground during the mid -November coun
distant. terattacks. Disaster had been averted , but the HVO
was still worse off than it had been at the beginning of
Chapter 49 the year .
Conclusion : The End of 1993
The VRS had achieved most of the objectives it had
The Bosnian Army at the close of 1993 had not yet set for itself during 1993, securing most of the Drina
become a mature fighting force , but it had achieved a valley and eliminating the Muslim military threat to
renewed sense of confidence despite a situation that the Serb position along the Bosnian - Serbian border.
could fairly be called desperate. The force still showed The Serb political and military leaders in Bosnia were
serious deficiencies in equipment and skills , lacking further encouraged by the Muslim -Croat war and did
both armor and artillery and , in some units, even basic whatever they could to exacerbate it. They failed ,
infantry weapons and ammunition. It had improved its however, to fully exploit the situation with a direct
fighting skills — both individually and as an organiza attempt to destroy the Bosnian Army. The VRS
tion — but it was still learning staff work , tactics, and ignored opportunities to crush the Tuzla and Zenica
logistics through the painful and expensive school of areas — the heart of Muslim -held Bosnia - with the
trial and error. Nonetheless, most Bosnian Army sol major operations needed , and the operations the VRS
diers felt that the darkest days had passed . Already launched late in the year (see the 1994 section ) failed
battling the VRS, the ARBiH had taken on a second to achieve their objectives. The Serbs in 1993 had had
opponent, the HVO , and more often than not emerged a last chance to win the war for Bosnia outright, and
victorious. Bosnian soldiers and civilians could see they failed to take advantage of it.
that their path to ultimate victory would unquestion
ably be long and arduous, but at least they were confi
dent that it was leading in that direction .

207
 Endnotes , Section IV

" Reuters, “ Purges Renew Morale in Bosnian Army" by Maggie 13“ Sadejstvo" is also translated as “ Cooperation ."
Fox, 12 December 1993. 14 Mladic has stated that,
2Halilovic, Sefer, Lukava Strategija (“ Clever Strategy” ), chapter ... we were forced to carry out a complex operation , so that
17 . we could protect the people in Podrinje ... we planned a
3Halilovic , chapter 17. series of operations in Podrinje ... I would mention the bat
* Halilovic, reprinted document from an address by Halilovic to a tles around Srebrenica and for Srebrenica, as well as the bat
military conference in Zenica, 21-22 August 1993. tle around Gorazde, the battles for Trnovo ... and formany
Delic's predecessor Halilovic later claimed that he had wanted to other places.
discipline renegade commanders but lacked the legal basis to do Jovan Janjic , SrpskiGeneral Ratko Mladic,
so, as the Bosnian Government had not yet passed a law on Novi Sad :Matica Srpska Press, 1996 , chapter
defense. Halilovic , Sefer, chapter 18 . 10 .
6 This account is drawn almost exclusively from Silber and Little, Each operation had a different cover name, although only two of
chapters 21-23. For a personalaccount and analysis of the negotia the names Mladic lists below have been positively identified with
tions, see David Owen , Balkan Odyssey. New York : Harcourt an attack in a given area:
Brace & Jovanovich , 1995. Cerska 93 was the beginning of all operations, of which
7 Silber and Little, p . 276. For a more comprehensive listing of the there were several, in continuity, such as Mac 1 (Sword 1 ),
plan's main points, see David Owen , Balkan Odyssey, pp. 89-90 . Mac 2 , Podrinje, and so on. Lukavac 93 was the finale of all
Bosnian Croat enthusiasm for the plan contributed to the growing operations. . . . All these operationswere the fruit of a very
bad temper between the Croats and the Muslims and helped spark thorough analysis by theMain Staff and its first level of
the Croat-Muslim war,when the Croats demanded that the Bosnian leadership and command ...
Army turn over its weapons orwithdraw from the Travnik area in Jovan Janjic, chapter 11.
15
April 1993. Oddly, Travnik was not in one of the Croat-dominated Reuters , 2 January 1994.
Vance-Owen provinces ,but in what would have been the mixed 16 Musan “ Caco” Topalovic was killed (under highly suspicious cir
Croat-Muslim one. cumstances) while allegedly trying to escape. Ramiz “ Celo " Dela
9 Silber and Little , p . 304. lic was arrested and sentenced but subsequently freed with a
10 See David Owen , Balkan Odyssey, pp. 219-222 , for a discussion reduced sentence . He eventually became a restaurantowner in
of the circumstances surrounding Izetbegovic's rejection ofthe Sarajevo, with rumored ties to organized crime.
17
agreement. Vulliamy, Ed , Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War,
" In addition to their operations around Brcko, the VRS carried out New York , St.Martin's Press, 1994. pp. 301-302.
an operation southwest of Dobojin an effort to seize the Doboj 18Malcom , Noel, Bosnia : A Short History (2nd Edition ). Mac
Tesanj-Teslic road during March 1993. The “ Doboj” Operational millan (Papermac), 1996. p . 209.
Group, under the command of Colonel Slavko Lisica, began the 1° Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation .
attack on 19 March 1993, led by elements of the 2nd Armored Bri Penguin USA . pp. 210-211.
gade, together with major elements of the OG’s many infantry/light 20 Reuters, “ Izetbegovic Says NotGoing to Geneva Talks” by
infantry brigades. The VRS, however, was only able to penetrate Steve Pagani, 22 June 1993.
about 1 kilometer against stiff resistance from the 203rd Motorized 21Reuters, “ Bosnian Presidency Meets Without Izetbegovic" by
Brigade/Operational Group 7 "South .” During four days of fight Steve Pagani, 21 June 1993.
ing, the 203rd , reinforced with additional units from OG -7 and the 22 Reuters, “ Bosnians To Attend Peace Talks Without Izetbegovic "
HVO 110th Brigade, drove VRS forces back to their start line. For by Giles Ellwood, 22 June 1993.
a detailed account of the battle from the ARBiH perspective , see 23 Reuters, “ Bosnian Moslem Leader Denies Presidency Ambi
“ Battle in the Karuse,” Prva Linija,March/April 1998, pp . 43-45. tions," 22 June 1993
12 The Belgrade magazine Nin described the corridor in a 22 Janu 24 Reuters, “Bosnia's Abdic Wanted in Austria on Fraud Charges,"
ary 1993 article, 26 June 1993 .
The Muslim lines are 1.5 km from the center (of Brcko ), 25 Reuters “Moslems Declare Autonomous Province in Maverick
away from the Sava, in the suburb known as Suljagica Enclave," 27 September 1993.
Sokak . Thus, the corridor linking Serbia and Bosanska Kra 26 Reuters, “ Bosnian Troops Swoop on RebelMoslem Town” by
jina, the largest territory of the Serbian Republic in B - H , is Paul Holmes, 30 September 1993.
less than 2 km wide in the very center of Brcko . 27 Bosnian Government security forces sprayed the ground in front
... This strip of territory, about 200 km long and often very of a crowd of Adbic supporters in Cazin with gunfire but do not
narrow ,which on the map is so twisted that it reminds one appear to have killed or injured anyone while dispersing the crowd.
of an umbilical cord, looks still stranger in the field . Reuters, “ Bosnian Enclave's 'Father ' Tries To Do It Alone" by
Lengthydetours connectcountry roads to the highways, Paul Holmes, 1 October 1993.
muddy and broad paths cut recently through the forest lead 28 Reuters, “ UN Fails to Stop Intra -Muslim Battles in Bosnia" by
straight to pontoon bridges. However, this does not stop the PaulHolmes, 5 October 1993.
numerous trucks in both directions from continuing on their
way ...
Dragan Cicic, “ Do Not Lean Out the Window ,"
Belgrade Nin 22 January 1993, p . 15 .

208
 29 Reuters, “ RebelMoslems Seize Bosnian Town" by Giles Elgood, 62 White Warrior, pp. 57-60.
15 October 1993 . 63 According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
30 Reuters, “ Bosnian Army Takes Back Town From Rebel Mos Yugoslavia (ICTY) indictment, Ahmici had a population of 356
lems," 16 October 1993 . Muslimsoutof a totalpopulation of 466. The town's population on
31 Reuters “Moslem Rebels Say Bosnian Troops Launch Attack," the morning of the attack may have been as high as 800, however,
18 October 1993 . because of an influx of refugees from Jajce, Foca, and Visegrad.
32 Reuters, “ Bosnian Moslem DissidentMeets Karadzic , ( The figures of 800 residents during the attack and 500 before the
Milosevic,” 22 October 1993. war are taken from UNHCR estimates.) Of those who survived ,
33Reuters, “ Rebel Moslems Sign Peace Deal With Bosnian Serbs,” perhaps half escaped into the hills and eventually made their way
22 October 1993. to Muslim -held territory. The remainder were taken prisoner by the
34 Reuters, “Rebel Forces Say They Advance in Bosnia Pocket,” HVO butwere not otherwise harmed - possibly as a result of UN
11 November 1993. intervention and international attention after the massacre's discov
35Reuters, “RebelMoslemsGain Ground Against Bosnian Army" ery. British peacekeepers, seeing HVO soldiers escorting least 150
by Maggie Fox, 6 December 1993. Muslim prisoners away from Ahmici after the assault,demanded to
36 Reuters, “ RebelMoslemsGet Serb Help for Assault on Bosnian know whatwas going on , whereupon the HVO captors changed
Army" by Maggie Fox, 6 December 1993. direction and eventually released the prisoners to the UNHCR . The
37Reuters, “ Serbs Shell Bosnians To Support Rebel Moslems," prisoners, at least, firmly believe they were about to be executed
15 December 1993. and that UNPROFOR's intervention saved their lives. Stewart,
38 Reuters, “ Bosnian Army at Standoff With RebelMoslem pp . 278-299.
Enclave" by Maggie Fox, 8 November 1993. 64Reuters, “UN Tribunal Turns Attention to Croat War Crimes" by
39
Gornji Vakuf,with a population of about 20,000 to 25,000 , had Andrew Kelley, 9 May 1995
about 50 percentMuslims, 45 percent Croats, and a small number 65White Warrior, pp. 57-60.
of Serbs and others. 66 Reuters, “ Croatian Was Crime Suspects Surrender to UN " by
40 Reuters, “Moslem , Croat Allies Fight in Central Bosnia " by Andrew Kelley, 6 October 1997.
Mark Heinrich, 12 January 1993. 67 The figure of 176 destroyed buildings of all types is from the
41Stewart, Col. Robert, Broken Lives: A Personal View of the ICTY's “ Kupreskic et al.” indictment, apparently derived from the
Bosnian Conflict. London: Harper Collins, 1994. pp. 200-211. Bosnian authorities' preliminary investigation by a Zenica court.
42
42 Atthe same time, the HVO made a corresponding statement 68 Split Feral Tribune, interview with Ivan Santic, Former President
about Bosnian Croat units in the three proposed Muslim -majority of Vitez Opcina, “ There are 200 Who Are Worse !" 20 November
cantons. Reuters , “ Bosnian Croats Demand Control ofMoslem 1995 .
Units,” 15 January 1993 . 69 Reuters, “ UN Tries To End Moslem -Croat Clashes in Bosnia " by
43Reuters “ Bosnian Minister Orders Army Units Under Croat Steve Pagani, 20 April 1993.
Control" by Kurt Schork , 17 January 1993. 70Zagreb Radio , 25 April 1993. FBIS London LD2504122693,
44 Reuters, “ Croats Report Taking Key Town From Moslem Allies ” 251226Z April 1993.
by Mark Heinrich, 19 January 1993. 7 Paris AFP, 28 April 1993. FBIS Vienna AU2804110393,
45 Stewart, pp. 200-211 281103Z April 1993.
46 Reuters , “ Croats Seal Bosnian Roads After Fighting With Mos 72 Zagreb HTV, 12 May 1993. FBIS London LD1205180493,
lems" by Mark Heinrich, 27 January 1993. 121804Z May 1993.
47Zagreb HTV, 1 February 1993. FBIS London LD0102202393 , 73 Sarajevo Radio , 19 April 1993. FBIS Vienna AU 1904124493,
012023Z February 1993. 1912442 April 1993.
48 The Bosnian Croats claimed that Muslim forces attacked Travnik 74 Sarajevo Radio , 21 April 1993. FBIS Vienna AU2104161893,
on 30 January, but UN peacekeepers in the town called the story a 211618Z April 1993.
complete fabrication. 75Zagreb Radio , 24 April 1993. FBIS London LD2404161993,
49Reuters, “Moslems and Croats Sign Cease - Fire Accord in Cen 2416192 April 1993.
tral Bosnia ,” 30 January 1993. 76 UNPROFOR spokesmen reported on 30 April that the villages of
50 Reuters, “ Bosnian Rivals Fight on Despite Peace Talks” by Mark Hercazi, Ulsnjica, and Gomionica had been damaged or (in the
Heinrich , 6 February 1993. case ofGomionica) destroyed outright but did notspecify which
51 Reuters , “MoslemsDenounce Border Blockade by Croats" by side had been responsible for the destruction. Paris AFP, 20 April
Mark Heinrich, 28 February 1993. 1993. FBIS Vienna AU3004114393, 301143Z April 1993.
52 Reuters, “ Bosnia , Croatia Agree Plan for Joint Bosnian Army" 77 The Bosnian Government charged the HVO on 25 May 1993
by Steve Pagani, 28 March 1993. with violence against the civilian populations of a number of vil
53 Stewart, Broken Lives , pp. 278-299 . lages during the April-May fighting in the Kiseljak area, including
54 The few remaining members of the Jure Francetic Brigade even the burning down of between 450 and 500 houses. Specifically , the
tually retreated to Vitez, where they later formed the 44th “ Jure War Presidency of the Kiseljak Municipality accused the Bosnian
Francetic ” Independent Home Guard Battalion . Croats of war crimes and/or property in Rotilj, Visnjica, Svin
55Stewart, pp. 278-299. jarevo , Komionica,Gromiljak , Mihovac,MehriciMahala , Rudnik ,
56 White Warrior: The Cheshires in Bosnia , 1st Battalion the 22nd and Kazagici. Sarajevo Radio , 25 May 1993. FBIS London
(Cheshire )Regiment,RegimentalHQ, Chester, 1994. pp. 57-60 . LD2505211093, 252110Z May 1993 .
57 Bell, Martin , In Harm's Way: Reflections of a War-Zone Thug. 78 Zagreb HTV, 30 May 1993. FBIS London LD3005221693,
London : Penguin Books, 1996.pp. 152-155. 3022162 May 1993.
58 Stewart, pp. 278-299. 79 Reuters, “ Bosnia's Black Market Town Braces for War” by John
59 White Warrior, pp. 57-60. Fullerton , 3 June 1993.
60 Bell, pp. 152-155.
61Stewart, pp . 278-299.

209
80 Sarajevo Radio, 10 June 1993. FBIS Vienna AU1006120793 , 109Here , as elsewhere in Bosnia during this period , the HVO
1012077 June 1993 . appears to have actively supported the forced emigration of its own
81Sarajevo Radio , 18 April 1993. FBIS London LD1804122493 Bosnian Croat population out of a government-captured area. The
1812242 April 1993. Bosnian authorities in Travnik pleaded with Croats and Serbs not
82Reuters, “Gunfire Traps British Troops on Bosnia Atrocity Hunt" to vacate their homes and indicated they would cooperate with the
by Douglas Hamilton, 28 April 1993. UN in order to guarantee their safety and property. The HVO , how
83 Reuters, “ British UN Troops CollectMassacre Victims" by ever, was spreading the word that anyone who remained behind
Douglas Hamilton , 27 April 1993. would be in danger and strongly encouraged amass exodus. Virtu
84 Reuters, “ Croat Commander Promises Inquiry Into Family's ally the entire Bosnian Croat population voted with its feet, elect
Death " by Corinne Dufka, 24 April 1993. ing to surrender to the Serbs rather than remain in their homes
85Reuters, “ Croats andMoslemsActivate Joint Command To Keep under Muslim -majority rule . Sarajevo Radio , 7 June 1993. FBIS
Peace" by Mark Heinrich, 30 April 1993. London LD0706215193 , 0721512 June 1993.
86 Reuters, " Shaken Croat-Moslem Alliance Restored in Mostar " 110 Asone HVO soldier put it, “ Wecould have tried a breakthrough
by Douglas Hamilton , 24 April 1993. to Vitez but the terrain was difficult and we were outnumbered. We
87 Reuters , “ Bosnia's Croats and MuslimsBattle in Mostar " by didn't have a choice (but to surrender ].” Reuters, “ Bosnian Croat
Mark Heinrich, 9 May 1993.
88 Reuters, Refugees From Moslem Offensive Reach Croatia " by Davor Huic ,
" Croats and Moslems Battle as New Bosnia Truce 10 June 1993 .
Declared” by Kurt Schork , 9 May 1993. in Reuters , “ Bosnian Serbs Claim 1,000 Croat Soldiers Surrender,"
89Reuters, “ Croat Troops Detain 1,300 Moslem Civilians in Camp" 7 June 1993.
by Mark Heinrich, 12 May 1993. 112 Reuters, “ Fighting in Travnik Prompts Croat Refugee Exodus"
90 Sarajevo Prva Linija “ Bridges of Defense and Friendship " by by John Fullerton, 8 June 1993.
Edin Logo , June 1997 pp. 37-38 . 113 Reuters, “ Thousands of Croats Stuck on Rain -Lashed Serb
91
Reuters, “UN Council Tells Moslems and Croats To Stop Fight Mountain " by Adian Hartley, 8 June 1993.
ing" by Evelyn Leopold , 10 May 1993. 114 The Bosnian Croat refugee exodus appears to have continued
92 Reuters, “Mostar Fighting Rages On, French Helicopter Hit" by beyond 7 June. On 16 June the Serbs claimed that another 2,000
Kurt Schork, 13 May 1993. Bosnian Croat civilians and some 400 more HVO soldiers had
93 Reuters, “Moslems and Croats Fight On Despite Mostar Truce" crossed over to surrender to the Serbs west of Novi Travnik .
by Kurt Schork, 13 May 1993. Another HVO unit was reportedly remaining behind to screen the
94 Reuters, “ Croats Keep Attacking, Displacing Moslem Civil mass exodus . Reuters, “ Serbs Claim New Croat Refugee Influx,”
ians — UN ” by Laura Pitter, 16 May 1993. 16 June 1993.
99 Reuters, “ Snipers Active in Mostar Despite Cease -Fire Pact" by 119 Reuters , “Moslems, Croats Ready for Another Battle " by John
Laura Pitter, 20 May 1993 . Fullerton , 10 June 1993 .
96 Reuters, “ Croat-Moslem Panel Breaks Up in Mostar" by Laura 116 Reuters, “Moslem -Croat Fighting Grows in Central Bosnia " by
Pitter, 24 May 1993. John Fullerton , 9 June 1993.
97 The plant had been damaged by Serb shelling but was mostly 117 Paris AFP, 9 June 1993. FBIS Vienna AU0906134793, 091347Z
operational at the time of the Muslim counteroffensive in June June 1993 .
1993. Subsequent Bosnian Serb air attacks in late August 1993 and 118 Paris AFP, 9 June 1993. FBIS Vienna AU0906134793, 091347Z
late February 1994 severely damaged portions of the factory, but it June 1993 .
was nevertheless able to remain at leastpartially operational for the 119 According to the 1991 census, Kakanj had a population of about
duration of the war. 59,000, slightly over half of which wereMuslims. About a quarter
98 Reuters, “Music School a Place of Fear for Zenica Croats" by were Bosnian Croats, and about 10 percent were Bosnian Serbs.
John Fullerton, 31 May 1993 . 120 Sarajevo Radio , 10 June 1993.FBIS London LD1006085593,
99London Al-hayah, “Central Bosnia'sMuslim Military Com 1008557 June 1993 .
manders Reject Partition Option That Is Imposed on Them " by 121 Zagreb HTV Television , 13 June 1993. FBIS London
As'ad Taha, 28 August 1993. LD1306220593, 1322052 June 1993.
100 Reuters, “ Croats, Muslims Eyeball to Eyeball in Travnik " by 122 Zagreb HTV Television, 14 June 1993. FBIS London
John Fullerton , 30 May 1993. LD1406183493, 141834Z June 1993.
101 Later redesignated the 706th Mountain Brigade. 123 Paris AFP, 16 June 1993. FBIS Vienna AU1606162393,
102 Zagreb Radio , 24 April 1993. FBIS London LD24004222093, 161623Z June 1993 .
242220Z April 1993. 124 Sarajevo Radio , 15 June 1993. FBIS Vienna AU1506153993,
103 The two brigades were later combined to form the 91st Home 151539Z June 1993 .
Defense Regiment. 125 Zagreb Radio , 15 June 1993. FBIS London LD1506180593,
104 Reuters , “ Bosnian Croats ,Moslems Call Truce in Travnik ” by 1518052 June 1993.
John Fullerton , 5 June 1993. 126 Sarajevo Radio , 10 June 1993. FBIS Vienna AU 1006120793,
105 Sarajevo Radio , 5 June 1993. FBIS London LD0506211993, 1012077 June 1993.
0521197 June 1993. 127 Reuters, “MoslemsSaid To Capture Key Central Town " by
106 Reuters , “ Bosnian Croats,Moslems Call Truce in Travnik " by Mark Heinrich , 16 June 1993.
John Fullerton , 5 June 1993. 128 Reuters , “ Bosnian Croats Ask Croatia for Protection Against
107Zagreb Radio , 6 June 1993. FBIS London LD0606194093, Muslims" by Mark Heinrich, 9 June 1993.
061940Z June 1993.
108 Belgrade Tanjug, 7 June 1993. FBIS London LD0706171893,
0717182 June 1993.

210
--

- -
129
Reuters, “ Croats Say 2,000 Dead ,Wounded in Moslem Offen 159 Husum , Soren Bo, At War WithoutWeapons: A Peace-Keeper in
sive" by Mark Heinrich , 18 June 1993. the Bosnian Conflict. UK : Airlife Publishing, 1998, p . 39.
130 Reuters, “Moslems, Croats Govern Separately in Bosnian 160 Reuters, “ Bosnian Moslem Seize Croat Barracks in Mostar,"
Town" by John Fullerton , 3 June 1993 . 30 June 1993 .
131 Reuters, “ Bosnian Croats and MoslemsFight for New Town" by
161Reuters, “ Fierce Fighting Erupts in Mostar" by Giles Ellgood,
Giles Ellgood, 24 June 1993. 20 June 1993 .
132 Reuters , “ Moslem Commander Warns Over Central Bosnia
162 Reuters, “Fierce Fighting in Mostar, Aid in Jeopardy ” by Giles
Fighting,” 27 June 1993. Ellgood, 30 June 1993.
133Reuters, “ Croats, Moslems Fight on New Bosnian Battlefront” 163 Reuters, “ Bosnian Moslems Advance on Croats Around
by Gilles Trequesser, 25 June 1993. Mostar," 1 July 1993.
134 Reuters, “ Fierce Fighting in Northern Tip of Central Bosnia,” 164 Reuters , “ Bosnian Croats Report Big Moslem Offensive,”
26 June 1993 . 13 July 1993.
135 Reuters , “ Serbs, Croats, Close in on Moslem Town" by Gilles 165Reuters , “ Bosnian Serbs Said To BeMoving Towards Bosnian
Trequesser, 27 June 1993. Capita " by Mark Heinrich , 26 July 1993.
136 Reuters, “Croats Mobilize as Central Bosnia Fighting Rages" by 166 Reuters, “MoslemsReported To Launch All-Out Attack on
Giles Ellgood, 30 June 1993. Mostar," 15 July 1993.
137 Ibid . 167 Ibid.
138 Reuters, “ Fighting Rages in Central Bosnia,” 2 July 1993. 168 Reuters , “ Bosnian Serbs Said To Be Moving Towards Bosnian
139 Reuters, “ Serb and Croat Forces Slice Moslem Salient” by Capital” by Mark Heinrich , 26 July 1993.
Gilles Trequesser, 2 July 1993. 169 Paris AFP , 15 July 1993. FBIS Vienna AU1507094093,
140 150940Z July 93.
Reuters, “ Bosnian Moslemsand Croats Continue Fighting After
Truce" byMark Heinrich, 10 May 1993. 170 Reuters , “ Fighting in Mostar, Still No Aid for Trapped Mos
141Reuters, “ UN Says Croatian Troops Pouring Into Bosnia” lems” by Giles Ellgood, 20 August 1993.
22 July 1993. 171Zagreb Radio , 25 October 1993. FBIS London LD2510173393 ,
142 Reuters, “ Bosnian CroatCommander Prefers Fighting to Talks" 251733Z October 1993 .
by Pedja Kojovic, 18 November 1993. 172 Split Slobodna Dalmacija, Interview with Slavko Zelic, Com
143
43 Like other Bosnian Army OperationalGroups, OG West was a mander of the King Tvrtko ' brigade of the Croatian Defense
semipermanent, division -level headquarters established to coordi Council from Sarajevo ,by Zeljko Garmaz, “ Croats Sacrificed
nate the operations of several brigades. Because ofZuc," FBIS Reston 93BA0928D , 0423462 May 1993 .
144 The unit may have been reinforced for the attack by elements of 173 Paris AFP, 25 September 1993. FBIS Vienna AU2509130293,
the 17th Krajina Brigade from Travnik or the 7th Muslimski Bri 2513022 September 1993.
gade from Zenica, butthere is no substantial confirmation of this . 174
Eventually redesignated the 124th Brigade of the ARBiH 1st
145Sarajevo Radio , 21 July 1993, FBIS Vienna AU2107191193. Corps' 12th Division .
146 Sarajevo Radio , 25 July 1993, FBIS London LD2507151293. 175 Paris AFP, 6 November 1993. FBIS Vienna AU0652493,
147 The Eugen Kvaternik Brigade was effectively destroyed in this 061524Z November 1993.
operation. Its remnants were regrouped into a single battalion and 176 Zagreb Radio , 18 January 1993. FBIS London LD1801150593 ,
eventually combined with two other destroyed shattered and exiled 1815052 January 1993.
HVO units — the former “ Kupres" and " Jajce” brigades — to form 177 The 107th “Gradacac” and 108th “ Brcko ” Brigades fell under
the 55th Home Defense Regiment. the operational control of the ARBiH 2nd Corps' 1st Operational
148 The previous day, 30 July 1993, another UNPROFOR -brokered Group (later the 21st Division ). The HVO's 115th “ Zrinski” Bri
country -wide cease -fire had been signed by Bosnian Army com gade, raised from Tuzla's Bosnian Croat community , functioned
mander Delic and HVO commander Petkovic . Obviously, the smoothly as part of the ARBiH 2nd Corps' 5th OperationalGroup
agreement failed to hold .Reuters, “ Text of Latest Bosnia General (later the 25th Division ) through all of 1992 and 1993. In early
Cease -Fire Accords,” 30 July 1993. January 1994 , however, the local Tuzla Bosnian Croat leadership
149Reuters, “Moslems Said To Have Won Strategic Bosnian Town" ordered the 115th Brigade to disband - over the objections ofmost
by Kurt Schork , 2 August 1993. of the unit's soldiers - rather than continue serving under Muslim
150 Reuters, “ British Commander ConfirmsMoslemsHave Gornji command. Split Nedjeljna Dalmacija , 14 April 1993. FBIS Vienna
Vakuf,” 2 August 1993. AU2404094095 , 240940Z April 1995 .
151 Reuters, “ Croats Counter- Attack in Central Bosnia " by Kurt 178 The 110th Usora Brigade functioned as part of the 2nd Corps'
Schork , 5 August 1993. Operational Group “Seven South ” (later the 3rd Corps 37th Divi
152 Ibid . sion ) for the war's duration .
153 Reuters , “ Fighting Erupts in Central Bosnia " by Kurt Schork, 179 Fojnica was one of the last places where Croat-Muslim violence
16 September 1993. would erupt. Indeed , UNPROFOR Bosnia CommanderMorrillon
154 Reuters , “UN Reports Bosnian Croat Attack on Moslems" by had cited the ethnically mixed town as an “ island of peace” only
Kurt Schork , 21 October 1993 . days before it was to become yet another central Bosnian battle
155 Reuters , “ Croats Pound Central Bosnian Town ” by John Fuller ground .
ton , 15 November 1993. 180
Reuters , “ Bosnian Town's Dream of Peace Blown to Pieces” by
156 Husum , Soren Bo , At War Without Weapons: A Peace-Keeper in Gilles Trequesser, 3 July 1993.
the Bosnian Conflict.UK : Airlife Publishing, 1998. p . 44 181Reuters, “ Siege Within a Siege Strands Bosnian Moslems” by
157 Reuters , “ Croats Keep Attacking, Displacing Moslem Civil Kurt Schork, 16 July 1993 .
ians — UN ” by Laura Pitter, 16 May 1993.
158 At least until the formation of the Konjic -based ARBiH 6th
Corps temporarily removed someof themore northern forces from
Fourth Corps command in June 1993.

211
 182Sarajevo Javnost, “NATO in Ambush” by Dragoljub Jeknic , 213 The Second OperationalGroup (OG ) was amore or less perma
22 May 1993. FBIS Vienna AU2605100493. nent subcommand under the Central Bosnia Operational Zone
183 Zagreb Radio , 20 June 1993. FBIS London LD2006191593 (OZ). The Second OG was established in 1992 and remained in
2019152 June 1993. existence through the end of the war in 1995. It was one of three
184 Zagreb Radio , 3 July 1993. FBIS London LD0307142493, (initially four) groupings of brigades under the Central Bosnia OZ.
0314242 July 1993. The Second OG , headquartered in Kiseljak, had responsibility for
185 Zagreb Radio , 14 September 1993. FBIS London the HVO's defense of the Kiseljak-Kakanj-Busovaca-Vares area .
LD1409141793 1414172 September 1993. Under its command fell the “ Nikola Subic Zrinski” Brigade (later
186 Reuters , “No-Surrender Croats Say Moslems Plan New Attack " the 93rd “ Nikola Subic Zrinksi” Home Defense Regiment, trans
by Kurt Schork , 20 September 1993. ferred to the First OG ) headquartered in Busovaca ; the “ Ban Josip
187 Reuters, “ Croats Left With No Escape in Central Bosnia " by Jelacic Brigade " (later split into the 94th “ Ban Josip Jelacic” and
Kurt Schork , 21 September 1993. 95th “Marinko Bosnjak ” HomeDefense Regiments)headquartered
188 Zagreb Radio , 18 September 1993. FBIS London in Kiseljak; the previously mentioned “ Bobovac” Brigade, (later
LD1809152293 , 1815222 September 1993 . the 96th “ Bobovac" Home Defense Regiment) headquartered in
189 Reuters , “ Croats Say Civilians Massacred in Central Bosnia " by Vares ; and the “ Kotromanic” Brigade headquartered in Kakanj.
Kurt Schork, 15 September 1993. ( The “ Kotromanic” Brigade was disbanded and incorporated into
190 Reuters , “ UN Urges Punishment After Village Massacred,” the “ Ban Josip Jelacic Brigade” after the fall of Kakanj in June
16 September 1993 . 1993.) In addition , the Second OG may have had nominal authority
191 Sarajevo Radio
, 18 September 1993.FBIS London over the HVO’s “ Kralj Tvrtko” Brigade in Sarajevo ,but by the fall
LD1909023793, 1902372 September 1993. of 1993 the Bosnian Croats in this unit had been disarmed or resub
192 Sarajevo Radio , 20 September 1993. FBIS Vienna ordinated to the ARBiH 1st Corps. Ivica Rajic appears to have
AU2009161893, 201618Z September 1993. been the Second OG's commander from its creation through all of
193 Zagreb Radio , 19 September 1993. FBIS London the events of the Vares and Stupni Do fighting.
LD1909123793, 1912372 September 1993. 214 Sarajevo Radio , 26 October 1993. FBIS Vienna AU2610095593
194 Paris AFP, 21 September 1993. FBIS Vienna AU2109105993, 260955Z October 1993.
2111027 September 1993 . 215 Silber and Little , pp. 300-302.
195 Sarajevo Radio , 4 October 1993. FBIS London LD0410225493, 216 There is , however, another road to the north and east of Stupni
0422542 October 1993. Do that the Vares Croats could probably have used instead ,under
196 Reuters, “ Overnight Fighting Reported in Bosnia,” 5 October mining this theory.
1993. 217Reuters, "New Showdown Looms Between Croats and Muslims
197 Paris AFP, 21 September 1993. FBIS Vienna AU2109105993, in Bosnia " by Kurt Schork , 30 October 1993.
2110597 September 1993. 218UN peacekeepers reported hearing mortars and artillery fired in
198 Zagreb Radio , 17 September 1993. FBIS London the area into the night of 23 October but saw little evidence of shell
LD1709134693, 171346Z September 1993. impacts ormortar fragments when they gained entry into the town
199Zagreb Radio , 20 September 1993. FBIS London on 26 October. It seems likely that the HVO removed any evidence
LD2009073593, 200735Z September 1993. of shelling — as it did with spent small -arms cartridges — but it is
200 Reuters, “Mostar Moslems Launch Three -Pronged Attack on difficult to prove this, especially after the town's structures were
Croats,” 20 September 1993. subsequently burned . Reuters, “ Charred Bodies, Smouldering
201 Reuters, “ Croats Shell Moslem City of Mostar” 23 September Ruins in Bosnian Hamlet” by Kurt Schork , 26 October 1993.
1993.
219 Reuters, “ Evidence Mounts ofMassacre in Central Bosnia" by
202 Reuters, “ Croat andMoslem Fighters Battle in Mostar” by Giles Kurt Schork, 25 October 1993.
Ellgood, 24 September 1993. 220 The Bosnians claimed at the time that the HVO had killed 60 of
203 Paris AFP, 21 September 1993. FBIS Vienna AU2109105993, the village's 260 residents. Reuters, “UN Aid Convoys Caught in
2110597 September 1993 . Bosnian Crossfire" by Mark Heinrich , 24 October 1993.
204Reuters, “UN Confirms Сease-Fire in South Bosnian Town," 221 Reuters, “ Charred Bodies, Smouldering Ruins in Bosnian Ham
3 October 1993.
let" by Kurt Schork , 27 October 1993.
205 At one point, theHVO issued an officialcommunique claiming 222Reuters, “ UN Identifies Croat Extremists as Massacre Suspects "
that the massacre victimswere in fact Serbs from the town that the by Anthony Goodman , 14 February 1994.
Muslimshad used ashuman shields during a Bosnian attack on the 223Reuters , “ Croat Attack in Bosnia a War Crime- UN Official" by
HVO defense lines. Paris AFP, 31 October 1993. FBIS Vienna Sean
AU3110153193, 3115317 October 1993. 224 Maguire , 27 October 1993.
It is true that Bobovac Brigade elements in Vares consistently
206 Reuters, “ Huge New Refugee Problem in Central Bosnia" by obstructed UNPROFOR efforts in the area before and after the
Gilles Trequesser, 23 June 1993. Stupni Do attack (for example, troops from the brigade were
207 Silber and Little, pp. 300-302. almost certainly responsible for firing on a Swedish APC attempt
208 Reuters, “MoslemsSaid To Capture Key Central Town ” by ing to check on Muslim prisoners at a schoolhouse in Vares on
Mark Heinrich , 16 June 1993 . 26 October). There is no conclusive evidence , however, that the
209 Reuters, “ New Wave of Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia" by Giles Bobovac Brigade was necessarily involved, the strongest evidence
Ellgood, 23 June 1993. being the numerous reports of heavy weapons use during the day
210 Paris AFP, 18 June 1993. FBIS Vienna AU 1806082693 on 23 October. Ifmortars and especially artillery were used , they
180826Z June 1993. most likely came from the Bobovac Brigade, the only mortar or
211 Sarajevo Radio, 1 September 1993. FBIS Vienna artillery -equipped unit within the Croat-held enclave.
AU0109202093 0120202 September 1993.
212Also known as Viktor Andric .

212
225 Ivica Rajic reportedly founded theMaturice specialforces unit 236 The UN at this timewas chiefly concerned aboutthe safety of
with troops from the Kiseljak area in early 1993. The unit reput some570 patients at two hospitals in Fojnica and Bakovici.
edly was composed of extreme Croatian nationalists and may have UNPROFOR troops eventually posted guards around the facilities
included a substantial percentage of Bosnian Croat refugees. The and looked after the patients when the hospital staffs fled. Reuters ,
Maturice reputedly were used for “specialmissions," including the “ UN Troops Guard Front-Line Hospitals in Central Bosnia " by
secret executions of Muslims in the Kiseljak area. (TheMaturice Kurt Schork, 14 November 1993.
237
also most likely indulged in war profiteering - Kiseljak being the Reuters, “ Croats, Moslems Step Up Peace Talks" by Mark
gateway to besieged Sarajevo and the capital of the black -market Heinrich , 12 November 1993 .
trade .) 238 Reuters, “Moslemsand Croats Fight, Leaders Call for Truce" by
226 Rijeka Novi List, “ Officer Ivica Rajic Arrested forMassacre of Mark Heinrich , 12 November 1993.
Muslims,” 12 July 1995 . 239 Reuters, “ Croats Launch Attack in Central Bosnia" by Kurt
227Sarajevo Ljiljan , “ The Croatian List of Bosnian Officers To Be Schork , 15 November 1993.
Killed ” by Aziz Handzic, 6-13 March 1996. FBIS Vienna 240 Reuters, "Croats Launch Tank Attack ,Moslems Back in
AU1203091296 . Fojnica" by Kurt Schork, 15 November 1993.
228 Silber and Little , pp. 300-302. 241 Reuters, “ Croats Pound Central Bosnian Town" by John Fuller
229 Reuters, “Moslems Tell of Rape ,Murder in Central Bosnia " by ton , 15 November 1993 .
Kurt Schork , 2 November 1993 . 242 Paris AFP, 15 November 1993.FBIS Vienna AU1511113893,
230 Reuters, “ Izetbegovic Says Bosnian Forces Entering Croat Bas 151138Z November 1993
tion ," 4 November 1993. 2433Zagreb Radio , 19 September
1993. FBIS London LD19091593
231 Reuters, “ Looting Continues in Moslem -Captures Bosnian 1909157 September 1993.
Town " by Kurt Schork , 5 November 1993. 244 Paris AFP, 3 December 1993. FBIS Vienna AU0312134493 ,
232 Reuters, “ Looting Continues in Moslem -Captured Bosnian 0313442 December 1993.
Town" by Kurt Schork , 5 November 1993. 245 Reuters, "Moslems Attack Croats in Central Bosnia ,"
233 Formerly Croat residences were occupied by thousands of Mus 22 December 1993 .
limscleansed out of other areas ofBosnia during the Croat-Muslim 246 Zagreb Radio , Text of a Letter from Croatian Community of
war. Reuters, "Looting Continues in Moslem -Captures Bosnian Herzeg-Bosna President Mate Boban to the UN Security Council,
Town ” by Kurt Schork, 5 November 1993. 26 July 1993 FBIS London LD2607131093.
234 Reuters, “Moslems Attack UN Headquarters Town in Bosnia"
by Mark Heinrich , 12 November 1993.
235
Reuters , “ Bosnian Leaders Press for Truce but Troops Fight On"
byMark Heinrich, 13 November 1993.

213
 Bosnia 1993 (continued )

Reuters

A Canadian UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) M -113 Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) troops from the 1st Bijeljina
armored personnel carrier in Srebrenica, early 1993. Light Infantry Brigade— “ Panthers " -withdraw from Mount
Igman, August 1993.

Route
Bosnian Army (ARBiH ) troops and civilians in Mostar, A Bosnian Croat Defense Council (HVO ) soldier with make
spring 1993 shift 120 -mm rocket launcher in the Vitez enclave, central
Bosnia , September 1993.

British UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) troops with A Bosnian Army (ARBiH ) soldier in the Sarajevo suburbs,
a Scimitar- armored reconaissance vehicle in north -central June 1993.
Bosnia , spring 1993.

DIDesign Center/MPG 3826391D 04-02

214
 Bosnia 1993 ( continued )

The Jewish Cemetery (left and above )

in central Sarajevo, as seen in 1996 .

Mostar and the Old Bridge, spring 1993.

DIDesign Center/MPG 3826391D 04-02

215
 Bosnia 1993 ( continued )

Q Reuters

A Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) T-55 tank, probably from the 2nd Armored Brigade, near Doboj,
June 1993.

UN

O Reuters

British UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR ) soldiers recover Muslim bodies from a destroyed house,
April 1993.

DIDesign Center/MPG 3826391D 04-02

216

- -
Section V

Bosnia 1994 : The Turning Point

217
 Chapter 50 capitulation of the Bosnian Government. The
The Bosnian War in 1994 : The Turning Point ARBiH's staunch defense stopped this offensive in its
tracks, and then its new - found brazenness pushed the
The Bosnian Serb Army's failure to exploit the Serbs onto the defensive to such an extent that they
Muslim -Croat war and knock out the Bosnian Army would never regain the strategic initiative . The politi
in 1993 would haunt the Serbs for the remainder of the cal and military leaders of the Bosnian Serbs were
war. As 1994 dawned , the Croat-Muslim war slowed, never able to reach agreement on how to end the war
and US negotiators tacked together a framework successfully , and the growing Muslim military capa
peace accord between the two sides — the Washington bility widened the splits between the two groups.
Agreement, which would be the basis for diplomatic These splits would in time cause a more profound dis
efforts to patch up the division of Bosnia-Herzegov agreement between Serbian PresidentMilosevic and
ina. The strategic implication of a newly improved Bosnian Serb President Karadzic over acceptance of
Bosnian Army able to focus its undivided attention on the Western " Contact Group " peace plan , culminating
the Bosnian Serbs was to make 1994 the turning point in the imposition of political and economic sanctions
in the three -and- a -half- year war, however. The on the Republika Srpska by Federal Yugoslavia .
ARBiH's victories during the Croat-Muslim conflict
had given the force a new sense of confidence , bol While these political divisions widened , the military
stered by the experience many officers and men had capability ofthe VRS began to wane. Its bold strategic
gained in conducting small- scale offensive operations. offensive in January -March 1994 failed to secure any
The Muslimshad also developed more sophisticated permanent gains, for two years of war had begun to
infantry tactics, and the Muslim - Croat rapprochement wear on the VRS, and Delic's offensives would
allowed the reopening of the arms pipeline through degrade it further. Of the offensives launched by the
Croatia to the ARBiH . Bosnian Army commander VRS in 1994, only the attack on Gorazdemet with
Delic exploited these improvements to devise a new more than temporary success. Attacking Bosnian
strategy that would carry the war to the Serbs. Delic Army trenches and bunkers would at last prove too
placed his hopes on a war of attrition across the coun costly for the manpower -poor VRS.
try that would employ small to medium - sized attacks
in an effort to wear down the Serbs and gain back key Nevertheless , for most of the year the VRS retained its
bits of territory . He believed his bigger army could ability to strike successfully against isolated ARBiH
absorb more easily than the VRS themanpower losses enclaves, such as Gorazde, or against overextended
this strategy would require. When he put it into effect, ARBiH units conducting offensive operations. In its
the tempo of fighting reached new levels, surpassing defensive operations at Ozren , Treskavica , and Bihac ,
those of 1992, as battle after battle raged day after day the VRS was still able to orchestrate professionally a
for obscure villages,mountains, and roads throughout large -scale operation ,move hundreds or thousands of
Bosnia . troops into position , and then counterattack, skillfully
employing its superior weaponry and elite units to
Delic's hold -and -hit strategy appears to have surprised regain lost positions. By the end of the year, however,
the Serbs. The VRS began the year with a strategic when the VRS was relying on defensive successes to
offensive plan designed to knock out the Bosnian punish the Muslims in hopes of ending the conflict,
Army through a series of operations to seize key por they simply could not afford the heavy manpower
tions of territory that would consolidate the " borders."
of the Republika Srpska, sever the Tuzla region from
central Bosnia , and perhaps even force the

219
losses that the ARBiH operations were causing, even newly created Federation and one of which would go
if each attack was defeated . It was clear by then that to the Bosnian Serbs. The ContactGroup plan
the Serbs were beginning to lose the war. replaced the cantonally based Vance -Owen Plan , a
concept that had been effectively dead for months. A
The year ended with even more ominous harbingers central concept of the Contact Group's proposal was
for the Serbs. In themidst of their successful counter the allocation of 51 percent of Bosnia's land area to
offensive at Bihac in December 1994, they found the Federation and the remaining 49 percent to the
themselves once again facing Croatian Army troops as Republika Srpska. The hard part, of course , was get
the Zagreb government ordered its forces into the ting the parties to agree not only to the plan itself but
Livno Valley ( Livanjsko Polje ), ostensibly to help the also to the map . Exactly which 51 percent or 49 per
ARBiH at Bihac, but more directly to outflank the cent each side got was a hugely contentious issue, as
Krajina Serb Army's defenses around Knin in Croatia. some of Bosnia's land area was far more valuable than
It was the VRS , however, that had to come up with others . The bargaining sessions over the postwar map
most of the troops to hold this vulnerable cross -border were conducted by diplomats in Geneva, but all sides
sector, troops which the strained VRS had difficulty knew that in the end the map would be decided on the
finding. The deployment of Zagreb's elite Guards battlefield by force of arms.
Brigades and the victories they began to rack up fore
shadowed the decisive turn of events that would come Chapter 51
in 1995 . Bosn ian Serb War Aims, Military Strategy , and
Political-Military Relations, 1994

The Bosnian Political Landscape in 1994 The Bosnian Serbs were remarkably steadfast through
1993 and into 1994 in their pursuit of the war aims laid
By the beginning of 1994 , what had been the single down in late 1992 and early 1993. They had achieved
state of Yugoslavia was now fragmented into a bewil virtually all of their territorial objectives at acceptable
dering jigsaw of states, substates, and self -proclaimed costs . This very success posed a problem within the
ministates . With the signing of the Washington Agree- leadership , however, for the political leaders generally
ment in March , there were no fewer than 12 “ presi spoke and acted as if the war was over, and they seemed
dents ” of one kind or another on the territory of the reluctant to deal with their generals ' conviction that the
former Yugoslavia — five of these within Bosnia conflict had to be brought to a decisive close with a sig .
alone. It seemed at times as if Yugoslavia was suffer nalmilitary victory over theMuslims. Undeterred,
ing from a multiple -personality disorder, with each of General Mladic and the VRS moved forward with mili
its successor states representing different characteris tary planning to achieve such a victory, ignoring the
tics and attitudes. apparent reluctance of Karadzic and the SDS, who con
tinued — with Milosevic's backing — to look for Serb
Two years into the war, and with all of the combatants advantages in the Owen - Stoltenberg process that
battered and weary, everyone hoped that peace was sought a negotiated settlement.
just around the corner — but nobody could seem to
find the corner. Peace hopes at this time centered on The VRS strategic offensive — initially codenamed
the diplomatic efforts of the five-nation " Contact “ Drina 93 ” —was conceived as a series of separate but
Group " formed in April 1994 by the United States, coordinated operations running from Bihac to Olovo .
Great Britain , France , Germany, and Russia . The biggest operation of this series occurred during
November 1993- January 1994 around Olovo where
The signing of the Washington Agreement and the VRS troops attempted to sever the lines of communi
creation of the Croat-Muslim Federation made possi cation between Tuzla and Zenica. Follow -on
ble the Contact Group's new proposal,which was
essentially a territorial division of Bosnia -Herzegov
ina into two halves, one of which would go to the

220
operations would then destroy ARBiH 2nd Corps Sarajevo , and against the Mostar -Sarajevo highway
forces around Tuzla . The Main Staff apparently concurrently with the second Nisici attack in October.
believed that the destruction of a major ARBiH for The biggest VRS effort during this period ,however,
mation and the loss of such a key region would force was Operation “ Breza 94,” a joint offensive with the
Sarajevo to surrender.Most of the other operations Krajina Serb Army (SVK ) against the Bihac enclave
were designed to seize key territory and nail down the to punish and pin down the Bosnian Army 5th Corps.
"borders ” of the Republika Serpska. This included an All of these attacks made someheadway , but each
operation in November December 1993 at Teocak to time the Bosnians held their ground and drove the
sever the Sapna salient and seize a key hydroelectric Serbs back while the ARBiH's own operations contin
dam , and at Maglaj to capture important lines of com ued unabated .
munication . The VRS launched additional attacks dur
ing February March 1994 at Bihac and Maglaj-Tesanj Even when the Main Staff was not conducting its own
to secure key terrain and road /rail networks. (NATO's offensive operations, it sought to use the Muslims'
ultimatum to the Serbs at Sarajevo in February, after attacks to the Serbs ' advantage . The VRS became
the "marketplace massacre,” that forced them to adept as the year went on in “ punishing" the Bosnian
remove VRS heavy weapons from around the city , Army for its attacks, inflicting maximum casualties ,
appears to have had little impact on VRS strategy any- turning initial victories into defeats , and feeding the
where else.) These attacks were initially successful, Serbs' superiority complex . Their spectacular defeat
but - ominously — the VRS failed to hold any of its of the near- victorious Muslimsin the Ozren was a big
battlefield gains against the Bosnian Army. boost to VRS pride, but their biggest andmost surpris
ing counteroffensive victory in 1994 came at Bihac in
In March , after the Washington Agreement ended the November -December. For a time the rapid advance of
Croat-Muslim war, the Bosnian Army began its new the ARBiH 5th Corps and the collapse of the VRS 2nd
attrition strategy against the Serbs, launching attacks Krajina Corps forces shocked even the Serbs and drew
all across the country . Fearing they would lose the predictions from the international community of the
strategic initiative, the Bosnian Serb Supreme Com VRS's imminent demise . TheMain Staff snapped
mand and the VRS launched their own offensive back ,however, and engineered the recapture of all the
against the isolated Gorazde enclave in April 1994. By lost territory , handing the 5th Corps a near -total
this move they hoped to pressure Sarajevo into sign defeat. It was a valuable tonic for the Serbs in a year
ing a nationwide cease -fire that would lock in Serb beset with strategic downers .
territorial gains in exchange for halting the Gorazde
offensive. If this failed , the VRS could proceed to Karadzic's order to halt the operation against Bihac,
destroy the enclave , almost completely finishing the when , rightly or wrongly , the VRS believed it was on
work it had started in the Drina valley in 1993. In the the verge ofeliminating the 5th Corps, had exacer
event, when the Bosnian Government refused to take bated the fraying of the political-military triangle con
the Gorazde bait, the VRS bore down on the enclave necting Karadzic, Mladic , and Milosevic . The pulling
with considerable success before punitive NATO air and hauling between political and military leaders
strikes and strong pressure from Milosevic forced spun out a long skein of problems dating back to the
them to call off the offensive . end of 1993.

Having finessed the Serbs'Gorazde operation , the Karadzic appears to have been the least bold of the
Bosnian Army continued its strategic offensive across three, supporting negotiations throughout the war and
the country with repeated small and medium - sized always willing to sacrifice what Mladic would per
attacks that keptthe VRS everywhere on the defen ceive as military necessities in order to score a politi
sive . Still struggling to regain the initiative and extend cal point in the West. He and the SDS also opposed
the boundaries of their republic , the VRS Main Staff
ordered attacks against the Nisici Plateau in May and
October to secure a key road route northwest of

221
the idea of a “ war-winning offensive,” believing that stop him from continuing to argue for offensive action
the Serbs had already achieved their war aims. Never against the Bosnian Army: when Karadzic ordered the
theless, Karadzic regularly held fast on key negotiat VRS to halt its offensive against Bihac and then
ing points ,making it impossible compose a settlement accepted a cease - fire in late 1994 , Mladic blamed
palatable to the Muslims. Karadzic , and their disagreement became permanent,
ready to burst wide open in the spring of 1995 .
When Karadzic and the SDS rejected the Contact
Group peace plan in August, following Milosevic's
grudging acceptance of it,Milosevic coldly applied The Bosnian Serb Army in 1994 — The Weary
political and economic sanctions against the leaders Giant*
and territories of the Republika Srpska.Milosevic was
more pragmatic and decisive than Karadzic and , seek The Bosnian Serb Army during 1994 went from the
ing relief from the sanctions imposed on Federal victorious force that had achieved major victories in
Yugoslavia , he was willing to compromise over the the previous year to a skilled but tired army that was
nature and borders of whatever Serb entity was to still able to hold on to most of the Serbs' territorial
exist in Bosnia as long as key Serb interests remained claims. These defensive successes, however, came at a
intact. By exempting the VRS from any of the sanc price in manpower and resources that the VRS was
tions applied to the republic ,Milosevic made plain his less and less able to sustain . As the Serbs' own failed
support for and reliance on the future of the Bosnian offensive operations and the Bosnian Army's attacks
Serb Republic . took their toll, the wear and tear on the VRS began to
show . Ammunition and fuel expenditures began to
The most enigmatic of this triumvirate was General drain the VRS depots ; the always critical manpower
Mladic ,whose mixed motivationsmade him an unpre situation worsened with increasing casualties and
dictable wild card .Mladic had tirelessly insisted dur desertions, forcing the VRS to rely even more on
ing 1993 and 1994 that he be allowed to " win the war " overage reservists and undertrained conscripts. Offic
by decisively defeating the Bosnian Army, complain ers and NCOs from the Yugoslav Army,and VJ logis
ing that the politicians were hindering military opera tic and maintenance support (which continued despite
tions with what he called their “ Stop-Go” strategy . the inter-Serb sanctions imposed in August), helped
(Whether the VRS could actually have won such a stiffen and sustain the faltering VRS, while VJ and
decisive victory is an open question .) Mladic also Serbian RDB special operations units joined with
stubbornly opposed returning territory to the Muslims VRS combat forces during fighting at Bihac late in the
or Croats, particularly areas he thought were strategi year. These troops probably numbered no more than
cally vital to the RS. This would seem to have put him 500 to 1,000 men and could hardly substitute for VRS
at odds with Milosevic , who was more than willing to formations stretched along the 1,000- kilometer front
compromise on the map, and more in line with line.? Allied Krajina Serb Army formations and Fikret
Karadzic and hardline elements of the SDS. The Abdic's Serb -armed Muslim separatist troops were
general was ideologically close to Milosevic , the ex also welcome additions to VRS operations, but only in
Communist, however, and he despised Karadzic and actions around Bihac.4**
the SDS as unfit and corrupt rulers who siphoned off
money and supplies to fill their own pockets instead of The VRS was able to adapt its combat doctrine to
helping the army fight. Nor could the general openly counter increasingly effective Bosnian Army attacks
defy Belgrade , on which he depended for money and as the year progressed. Faced with a long frontage and
logistic support to prosecute the war; he knew as well a manpower shortage, the Main Staff's objective in
as anyone that the Bosnian Serbs could not afford a
schism with Serbia . So, despite Mladic's dislike of the See Chapter 21, “ Mladic's Own: The Bosnian Serb Army," for a
general survey of the VRS throughout the war.
ContactGroup plan, he tacitly backed Milosevic in the See Annex 46 : On the Ropes: An Analysis of VRS Resilience ,
dispute and blamed Karadzic for promoting another for a more in -depth discussion of VRS problems during 1994.
“ Chetnik -Partisan ” split among the Serbs. This did not

222
formulating defensive doctrine was to artificially beginning of 1994, Sarajevo had an Army that was
create a layered defense in depth ." The outer layer capable of doing this, although not in the most effi
consisted of a thick carpet of mines, followed by an cient or desirable manner.
outpost line, then a main defensive line of interlocking
bunkers and trenches. Brigade-level reserves were Army commander Delic was the architect of the coun
then stationed behind the main line. The interaction of try -wide attrition strategy thatwas the foundation of
these elements, with supporting artillery, should have the Army's plans . Putsimply, the numerically superior
the desired effect. The VRS appears to have assumed ARBiH would bleed its opponentwith many wounds
that, given the frontage a brigade mighthold — often by attacking everywhere , winning the war even if it
20 kilometers ormore — the ARBiH would be able to lostmost of the battles. The Army's new doctrine fit
infiltrate and storm at least someportion of the VRS with this strategy: it would seek to achieve a continual
line. The minefields, combined with a rain ofmortar series of limited gains sustainable without artillery
and artillery fire , were designed to slow this penetra support ormotorized transport and roll the frontline
tion and thin the Muslim infantry as they passed back a kilometer at a time if need be.
through the Serb front. The line infantry holding the
main defensive line would add their own attrition From the Presidency in Sarajevo all the way to the
effect, but these older troops would withdraw rather infantry platoon advancing toward a local ridge line,
than try to stand and be overrun . When , hopefully the Bosnian Government had a coherent political
depleted of a considerable portion of their strength , military strategy whose goals and meansmatched. It
the Muslim troops gradually slowed to a stop, the Serb was hardly an ideal strategy — no army in the world
reserves , picked men formed into elite " intervention " has ever been enthusiastic about wars of attrition — but
units, would then counterattack and drive the weak it was one that offered a realistic prospect of victory
ened ARBiH units out of the Serb defenses. Corps on the horizon, distant though that horizon might be.
level intervention forces provided the vital stiffening
for the local units in such counterattacks. To make up
for the overall manpower shortages , these few mobile The Bosnian Army in 1994: Fighting the War of
reserve formations were repeatedly shifted across the Attrition
country, from battle to battle.5
Thanks to the vision and dogged determination gener
Chapter 52 ated by the chaotic first days of the war, the Bosnian
Bosnian Government Objectives and Military Armyhad by the beginning of 1994 evolved into an
Strategy in 1994 effective light infantry force able to defend govern
ment- held territory againstmost Bosnian Serb Army
As 1994 began , the Bosnian Government's first prior attacks and to conductmodest offensive operations .
ity was to end the Croat-Muslim conflict — by sword Steady improvements in training, leadership , and
or pen . Happily for the Bosnian Army, that conflict equipment had all worked to raise the capabilities of
was ended by treaty a few weeks into the year, allow Sarajevo's fighting forces. Morale had been boosted
ing the Army to concentrate on its primary adver by battlefield successes against the HVO , and the
sary — the VRS — and its primary objective — the signing of a federation agreement between the Bos
recapture of lost Muslim -majority territories. To do nian Muslims and Croats gave the ARBiH the final lift
this, however, the ARBiH would have to go over to it needed to shift to the strategic offensive against the
the strategic offensive, with all that it implied . The Serbs.
government's military leaders needed an overall
offensive strategy, a doctrine and tactics that fit this Organizationally, the force wasmuch the same as the
strategy but could still be carried out with the Army's one launched early in 1992. The ARBiH was divided
limited resources , and a training program that would into five corps headquartered at Sarajevo , Tuzla ,
produce a force disciplined and proficient enough to
execute the maneuvers required by the strategy. By the

223
Zenica, Travnik , and Bihac . ( The former 6th Corps training. In all of these areas, the ARBiH had pro
headquartered at Konjic was deactivated early in the gressed beyond its initial focus on basic survival and
year, at the same timethe new 7th Corps was estab was slowly mastering themuch more difficult chal
lished at Travnik .)Most of these corps were further lenges of conducting large-scale operations. The
subdivided into " Operational Groups," semiperma ARBiH had by this point established officer and
nent groupings of several brigades that provided an soldier training schools to help establish uniform
intermediate , division - level of command . The brigade standards and improve skills across the board . Of
remained the primary maneuver unit, usually com necessity , most of the lessons of warfare were still
prised of 1,500 to 2,000 troops but sometimes ranging being learned the hard way in the more demanding
in size from several hundred to over 3,000 . Some and less forgiving academy of the battlefield .
important changes were under way , however, as the
Armybegan to differentiate its units and establish the Increasingly sophisticated tactics emerged that played
elite, all-volunteer assault formations usually desig to the Army's strengths as an infantry force and were
nated either " liberation brigade" or " light brigade" intended to strike at the Bosnian Serbs ' advantages.
that would make its offensive strategy possible. * Elite “ recon -sabotage” units would scout the battle
field before attacks and identify weaknesses in the
In material terms the Bosnian Army still lagged glar enemy lines . These sameunits would conduct sabo
ingly behind its Bosnian Serb opponent. An elaborate tage operations early in the battle to disrupt VRS com
network of overseas fundraising operations had mand and control links, destroy artillery observation
helped bring in substantial sums of money from the posts, and knock out key strongpoints, softening the
Bosnian diaspora : between April 1992 and the end of enemy for the main attack . Handpicked assault units
1993, the Bosnian Army received some $ 24 million would spearhead the main infantry assault, followed
from overseas contributions and was able to use this by the territorially based regular infantry.
money to purchase infantry weapons, ammunition ,
uniforms, and other military supplies. These acquisi During 1994 these cumulative improvements in Bos
tions still left the Bosnian military terribly deficient in nian Army organization , equipment, and training were
the crucial area ofheavy weapons— and , just as signif- to produce increasingly proficient forces that proved
icantly, in terms of ammunition for the few artillery able — at least on occasion — to mount coordinated
pieces, tanks, and mortars the ARBiH had seized or attacks involving multiple brigades . The Army still
captured . The Army's logistic system was still rudi lacked the equipment and logistic infrastructure nec
mentary but workable and dealt adequately with essary for sophisticated and sustained combined- arms
recurring problems of standardization , supply, and operations, but it had developed a war-fighting
distribution . Its greatest shortcoming was lack of method commensurate with the material and human
mobility: it had too few APCs or even trucks to allow resources available to it. Although still not capable of
its infantry to exploit breakthroughs effectively, and defeating the VRS in set- piece battles or of retaking
its brigades could not adequately support or reinforce and holding large tracts of Serb -held territory , the
each other. Withoutthe force multiplier ofmobility, Bosnian Army was prepared to try fighting its way out
the manpower advantage that the planners relied on of the corner.
could not be fully exploited because not enough rifle
men could be brought together at critical times and Chapter 53
places . Bosnian Croat War Aims and
Military Strategy in 1994
None of the gains the Army had made in organization ,
size, or even weaponry were as important as its Atthe beginning of 1994 , the overriding Bosnian
improvements in strategy, doctrine , tactics, and Croat political objective was simply to get out of the
Croat-Muslim conflict it had started the previous year.
A liberation brigade was usually organized into three or four
battalions with a total of 1,000 to 2,000 troops and (relatively) The HVO had little prospect of additional gains;
robust fire support. A light brigade was usually organized into six would in all likelihood eventually lose the surrounded
or seven companies with a total of less than 1,000 troops. These
distinctions sometimes blurred, and there were many amountain "
brigades that were elite assault units.

224

-
enclaves around Vitez, Kiseljak , and perhaps Zepce ; Ante Roso's job was to improve and professionalize
and was faced with a serious problem of limited man the HVO into a compact, effective fighting force. At
power andmounting casualties. Having tried to ride the very least, he had to deal with the HVO's most
the tiger, the Bosnian Croats were looking for a way to unruly and unreliable elements. Under Rasim Delic ,
dismount. The international community - led by the the Bosnian Army had cracked down on its renegade
diplomatic efforts of the United States — and the units in Sarajevo the previous year. The HVO had yet
Croatian Government offered the Bosnian Croats that to deal with its own ill-disciplined criminal elements,
escape . The Washington Agreement was a political especially in places like Kiseljak and Mostar.?Most
and military about-face that made the former adver HVO troops were draftees or reservists, and when
saries into overnight allies — but it got the Bosnian they were not defending their home areas their fight
Croats outof a bloody and destructive conflict that ing spirit tended to wane.
they were losing and allowed them to redirect their
resources and attention in another direction . Roso's solution to the problem was to develop a cadre
of all- volunteer, fully professionalHVO units — the
That direction was to be toward southwest Bosnia . In four HVO Guards Brigades and the HVO's Special
tenuous alliance with the Bosnian Army on its right Operations Command — which could be employed
flank , and substantially assisted by major elements of throughout Croat-held Bosnia and provide an offen
the Croatian Army from across the border, the HVO sive punch that the lightly armed and ill-motivated
began to drive west first through Kupres and then on Home Defense Regiments, which Roso formed (from
through Livno and Glamoc . The combined HV /HVO the HVO's locally raised brigades ) could not. Almost
offensive concluded the year with significant territo all of the HVO's heavy equipment (tanks, APCs, and
rial gains and set the stage for continued operations heavy artillery pieces ) were concentrated in the
the following year that would eventually do much to Guards Brigades and the corps -level artillery units .
conclude the war. This concentration of force into a handful of units was
only possible after the conclusion of the Croat
Muslim war allowed the HVO to demobilize most of
The HVO in 1994 : Caught in the Slow Lane its troops and after the cascade of ARBiH offensives
tied down the VRS and allowed the HVO to assume a
The HVO are pretty feeble fighters but they have more relaxed defensive posture in most areas facing
very strong artillery. the Bosnian Serbs.

-Emir , a Bosnian Army soldier The formation of theHVO Guards Brigades improved
outside Donji Vakuf,November 1994 the force's offensive capabilities, butorganizational
changes alone could not address the HVO's funda
When Ante Roso took charge of the HVO in Novem mental personnel problems. Despite Roso's best
ber 1993, he found himself playing organizational efforts, the HVO still suffered from too many politi
catch -up ball against his Serb and Muslim opponents. cally connected but less than talented officers and a
Backed by Zagreb and established as early as 1991, shortage of competent junior-grade officers and NCOs
the HVO was in organizational second place at the who could maintain discipline and train the troops.
war's outbreak in April 1992 — lacking the fully Indeed , the establishment of the Guards Brigades in
formed military infrastructure of the VRS but far someways aggravated the HVO’s problemsby draw
ahead of the virtually nonexistent Bosnian Army. The ing off the most talented and best motivated soldiers
HVO had in large measure failed to evolve since the and leaving the Home Defense Regiments even
war's beginning, however, while at least one of its weaker than before .
adversaries — the ARBiH - had.

225
 Chapter 54 have decided to simply contain the pocket, either for
My Enemy, My Ally — The End of the Croat military reasons or political ones . Perhaps the Bosnian
Muslim War and the Washington Agreement, Army leadership concluded that containment of the
January -March 1994 Croat-held enclave would be adequate — especially in
view of the Croat threats to demolish the Vitez muni
By early 1994 , developments borne of necessity had tions plant rather than allow it to fall into Muslim
put the ARBiH at least on a parmilitarily with the hands — and they could have decided that their mili
HVO . The HVO was still probably better organized tary resources were better directed elsewhere . It is also
on the unit level and had on average more and better possible that at this delicate juncture — with Croat
equipment. The Bosnian Army had ,however,made Muslim peace talks under way and the international
major advances in organization, discipline, and coor community's attention focused on the Bosnian Gov
dination of larger military operations. It was a fairly ernment -- the Sarajevo leaders concluded that the
even fight, and — even with the Croatian Army's inter political fallout after a bloody crushing of the enclave
vention in support of Herceg -Bosna — the Bosnian would have outweighed the military gains. Whatever
Army had the weight of numbers on its side. the reason, the Bosnian Army failed to press home the
advantage at a crucial moment. The Bosnian Croats
The new year's fighting commenced on 9 January counterattacked and regained a little breathing space,
1994 with a Bosnian Army attack on the Vitez and the Vitez-Busovaca enclave remained in Croat
enclave — just hours before peace talks began between hands.13 14
Croat and Muslim representatives in Germany. Gov
ernment 3rd Corps troops surprised the defenders of While the Vitez battles raged and the fiercestbattles of
the HVO Vitez Corps District with a predawn attack the 1994 Croat-Muslim war flared in the central Bos
and attempted to cut the Vitez-Busovaca enclave in nian Lasva Valley , the other towns along the Croat
two at its narrowest point. Infantry battles raged in Muslim faultlines were by no means peaceful.
the Vitez suburbs on 9 and 10 January, supported by Muslim -held east Mostar suffered an unrelenting
the liberal use of heavy weapons fire on both sides. artillery bombardment from the HVO Mostar Corps
Another Bosnian Army drive from the south against District that devastated the eastern half of the city.
Croat-held Kruscica further squeezed the HVO posi Southeast ofMostar, Muslim -held Blagaj was also
tions to the point where the Croats held only a few shelled frequently from adjacent Croat-held Buna.
hundred meters on either side of the road . The desper Even though the Serbs were the primary foe of the
ate HVO defenders hung on doggedly as the two sides Muslim defenders of Maglaj, there were also
battled each other in house - to -house and hand -to -hand exchanges ofmortar fire and occasional infantry
fighting over shattered buildings that changed hands clashes between the ARBiH 7th Operational Group
each day . At times reduced to a little less than a and the HVO 111th Brigade forces along the northern
kilometer-wide isthmus, they still managed to retain edge of the Zepce enclave.15 Bosnian Croat forces
control of the vital east- west road link , but their south of Konjic and west of Jablanica also periodi
traffic was always vulnerable to Bosnian Army cally shelled Muslim -held positions and villages. The
gunfire .9 10 11 12 Bosnian Army continued to occupy most of Gornji
Vakuf, but the Croats had the preponderance of artil
Suddenly — roughly the third week of January — the lery in the area and frequently shelled theMuslim
government forces let up on their offensive on the held parts of the town. The Kiseljak enclave was not
Vitez enclave for reasons that remain unclear. The pressed nearly as hard as nearby Vitez , but sporadic
Bosnian Army offensive may simply have run out of fighting and shelling occurred in that area as well . In
steam , with its exhausted troops daunted by the pros none of these varied areas was either side able to make
pect of infantry assaults across level ground, for that is any significant gains, however, and the outlines of a
what probably would have been necessary to overrun potentialmilitary stalemate were becoming visible to
the Croat positions, or the Bosnian Governmentmay both sides .

See Annex 47 , bearing the same title , formore details.

226
With both the Bosnian Army and HVO offensive step backward in terms of its sovereignty . Its leaders
efforts stymied at the beginning of February, it fell to knew , however, that to maintain the support of the
Zagreb — with the strong prodding of the international international community they had to be seen to agree
community — to formally broach the subjectof a peace to something. Much more important, the Croat-Mus
arrangement. The Croatian Government had been lim peace offered the ARBiH an escape from its des
feeling more than the usual heat as UN Secretary Gen perate two- front war and allowed it to concentrate on
eral Boutros -Ghali publicly accused the Croatian its crucial operations against its Bosnian Serb foes.
Army of sending units into Bosnia , and Italy threat The Bosnian Croats were probably even less enthusi
ened to call for European Union sanctions against astic about the political arrangements of the Bosnian
Croatia . Determined to avoid economic sanctions like Federation , but, by early 1994, they were even more
those that were hurting Milosevic in Serbia , Tudjman anxious than theMuslimsto get out of a losing mili
ordered his Foreign Minister Mate Granic to meet tary struggle . Having narrowly avoided international
with Bosnian President Izetbegovic in Geneva and censure and sanctions for their military intervention in
issue a joint statement calling for Bosnian Govern Bosnia , the Bosnian Croats now came out of the war
ment-Bosnian Croat talks to explore the possibilities as peace brokers . Zagreb's improved standing with the
for a cease- fire. ARBiH commander Delic duly met international community helped it secure a much
with HVO commander Roso in Kiseljak 10 days later needed $ 125 million loan from the World Bank
to open the talks.16 17 18 19 20 shortly thereafter25 and allowed the Croatian military
to disengage from Bosnia and devote its energies
At only their second meeting in Zagreb on 23 Febru toward Croatia's core concern — the reconquest of
ary, the two Army commanders signed a cease - fire Serb -held Krajina.
and mutual withdrawal agreement— to the surprise of
many.21 Even more surprising, the cease - fire agree A temporary convergence of three self-interests, codi
ment that took effect at noon on 25 February generally fied in a treaty essentially imposed from outside , was
held , though not without several days of lingering vio not a very auspicious genesis for the Bosnian Federa
lence. At the beginning of March the two sides began tion . At the time, however , it was the best arrangement
exchanging prisoners, and tensions very gradually available, and in such desperate circumstances even
began to subside overmost of Bosnia . Both sides cau an imperfect peace and an uneasy alliance was a vast
tiously drew their heavy weapons back from the con improvement over what had gone before. Bosnia's
22 23
frontation lines, and a tenuous peace descended.22 Croats and Muslimsmight still keep one eye cocked
toward the other, but at least they could both start
The Croat-Muslim peace was formalized by the Wash- looking toward their common Serb enemy.
ington Agreement signed in the US capital 1March
1994. Under its terms the military adversaries of the Within days of the signing of the draft Croat-Muslim
Bosnian Army and the HVO would be transformed Federation agreementon 1 March 1994, UNPROFOR
into a “ Federation Army” consisting of two separate adopted a new role as cease - fire monitors, juxtaposing
but cooperating armed forces. This military arrange UN peacekeepers between the two formerly warring
ment was further elaborated in the “ Split Agreement” parties as the combatants withdrew from the confron
signed by the two army commanders in that Croatian tation lines and the full terms of their new alliance
city on 12 March.24 As if lifted from George Orwell's were worked out. UN peacekeepers were quickly dis
“ 1984,” two former warring factions overnight patched to take over former ARBiH and HVO check
became allies against a third opponent. points in and around Mostar, Vitez , Gornji Vakuf,
Prozor, Konjic , and Jablanica 26 Following an arrange
Although none of the parties had a fundamental stake ment similar to that agreed to for the Sarajevo heavy
in the long-term success of the newborn Bosnian Fed
eration , each had valid reasons for signing. The
Sarajevo-based Bosnian Government arguably took a

227
weapons exclusion zone — and that would later be The VRS Main Staff's strategic offensive — which at
copied in the Dayton Agreement — the two sides least initially appears to have been designated “ Drina
agreed to withdraw their heavy weapons a set distance 93" —involved four separate campaigns or operations
from the former confrontation lines ( 10 km formor during this period :
tars , 20 km for tanks and artillery ) or to place them
into five UN -monitored collection points.27 28 29 30 • The primary campaign against the Olovo area and
Tuzla-Zenica road links during November 1993–
UNPROFOR's role in facilitating the Croat-Muslim January 1994.
peace was a largely unrecognized UN success in Bos
nia . This is in spite of the fact thatmany — if not • An operation to eliminate the Teocak -Sapna salient
most — of the heavy weapons were never withdrawn east of Tuzla during November-December 1993
or turned in as agreed and that numerous cease -fire (which was coordinated with the Olovo operation ).
violations and interethnic disputes occurred long after
the agreementwas signed . The bottom line was that • An operation against the Maglaj- Tesanj salient dur
the pointless , debilitating Croat-Muslim conflict had ing December 1993-March 1994 (also coordinated
ended , and it was UNPROFOR that in somemeasure with the Olovo operation ).
had helped make this possible . This illustrated a cru
cial fact about peacekeeping operations in the Bal • An operation to seize the Grabez plateau and road/
kans:UN forces could and did play an important role rail links along the Una River near Bihac city in
in monitoring and facilitating agreements that served February 1994 .
the genuine interests of the parties involved . Sadly ,
such circumstances were all too rare in the Bosnian None of these campaigns succeeded in achieving their
war. objectives .

Chapter 55 The Battle of Olovo began in early November 1993 ,

Operation “ Drina 93 ” : soon after ARBiH troops had taken the neighboring
The Bosnian Serb " End the War" Offensive, HVO -held town of Vares . Olovo lay on themain road
November 1993 to March 1994 between Tuzla and Sarajevo — already largely con
trolled by the VRS — and secondary routes between
As discussed earlier, Bosnian Serb military strategy Tuzla and Zenica. TheMain Staff's objective was to
during late 1993 and early 1994 focused on inflicting capture the town and then drive some distance north ,
a decisive military defeat on a significant portion of cutting these roads and probably consolidating its
the Bosnian Army to force the Bosnian Government gains.32 If this was successful, the VRS forces — up to
to accept a peace settlement on Serb terms. The pri 10,000 troops drawn from at least three different VRS
mary operation undertaken to achieve this objective , corps — could then renew the attack and push toward
around Olovo , sought to physically sever Tuzla and the VRS-controlled Ozren salient, some 35 kilometers
northeastern Bosnia from Zenica and central Bosnia. from Olovo.33
The Serbs apparently hoped that, if this occurred,
either Sarajevo would surrender or they could cut a The VRS advance on 8 November — under the com
separate peace agreement with themore independent mand of the Main Staff and the Drina Corps
minded Muslim mayor, Selim Beslagic, as they had attempted to encircle the town from east and west.34
with Fikret Abdic.31 If neither of these options panned Only the western prong had any success, seizing sev
out, the VRS would then eliminate the 2nd Corps in ral villages before running into strong resistance
the giantMuslim -held pocket around Tuzla. As the from Bosnian Army 2nd Corps troops along a line of
VRS was to find, however, its ability to defeat hills. Repeated attacks during the rest of the month
entrenched Bosnian Army units had weakened consid
erably since the start of the war.

228
and through the end of December achieved little gain , or HVO lines even though they pushed the operation
particularly after 2nd Corps committed many of its into mid -March.45 With the signing of the Washington
troop reserves together with elements of the 3rd and Agreement and the lifting of the HVO blockade of
6th Corps.35 Maglaj on 19 March , the VRS broke off the offensive
for good.46
The VRS renewed the advance during mid -January
after Herzegovina Corps reinforcements rotated into In western Bosnia the VRS 2nd Krajina Corps , under
the line.36 On 12-13 January, the Herzegovinian units Major GeneralGrujo Boric, attacked on 6 February to
broke through the ARBiH front, pushing to within seize the Una River line to secure the Serb republic's
3 kilometers of Olovo . Again , however, ARBiH " border” and capture the rail line along the river.47 The
reserve units from 1st, 2nd , and 3rd Corps were able battle turned into a seesaw fight with Brigadier Atif
to stop the advance . The Main Staff broke off the Dudakovic's ARBiH 5th Corps, as first the VRS
offensive by the end of January.37 would seize key hills overlooking the river, and Mus
lim troops would take them back. The last surge
The near-simultaneous attack against the northern half occurred during the lastweek of February , and the bat
of the Sapna -Teocak salient to capture the dam for the tle ended with the 5th Corps still in control of itsmain
Serb -held Ugljevik power plant — designated Opera line.48
tion “ Kladanj 93” —also failed to achieve its goals.38
The VRS East Bosnian and Drina Corps began their
assault on 20 November 1993, attempting to sever the February 1994: The First Sarajevo Marketplace
top half of the salient via converging attacks from the Shelling and the International Response *
direction of Zvornik and Priboj.39 Although the VRS
made some gains, counterattacks by 2nd Corps forces The Sarajevo area had been relatively quiet during the
recaptured all lost territory. VRS attempts to renew the early part of 1994 except for the usual Serb siege tac
advance persisted until late December, when the tics of sniping and sporadic shelling and occasional
operation was called off.40 standup clashes along the frontline. On 5 February
1994, however, a 120 -mm mortar round sailed into the
At the beginning of December, 1st Krajina Corps crowded Markale marketplace in downtown Sarajevo ,
troops under the command of Colonel Vladimir Arsic , killing 68 people and wounding approximately 200
in conjunction with localHVO troops , assaulted 2nd more.49 It was one of the worst shelling incidents in
Corps elements under Mustafa Ceravac around the Bosnian war.
Maglaj- Tesanj.41 The final objective of the operation
remains unclear, but the VRS probably hoped to break International outrage over the grisly attack prompted a
up the enclave , securing the Serb -held Doboj and UN call for a cease -fire and a NATO intervention
Ozren areas, as well as capturing lines of communica threat on 9 February.50 The new UN commander,
tion .42 VRS /HVO forces were quickly able to cut the GeneralMichael Rose , set out a four-part cease -fire
main road link between Tesanj and Maglaj. Continued proposal that included the creation of a 20 - kilometer.
attacks during the rest of December, however, gained zone around the city from which all heavy weapons
only minimal ground , pushing closer to Maglaj city would be excluded , and the NATO ultimatum backed it
but achieving no breakthroughs. The VRS halted the up. The deadline for Serb compliance was 20 February .
attack by 1 January.43
At first the Bosnian Serb political and military leaders
The VRS renewed the operation two weeks later, but refused to comply, fearing that without their heavy
this time shifted themain attack to the northwest weapons the VRS forces would be overrun by the
against road links in the Usora area while making sup
See Annex 48 : Sarajevo , 1994: The Guns Are Silenced, But the
porting assaults around Maglaj city from the south and
Siege Continues, formore details.
the east (in Ozren ).44 The Serbs failed to make more
than minor gains and were unable to break the ARBiH

229
Bosnian Army infantry.52 The 17 February Russian On the other hand, the NATO ultimatum did take the
offer to send a battalion of paratroopers to help moni international community another step toward direct
tor the agreementbroke the ice and won Serb compli- involvement in former Yugoslavia. As it had with its
ance . The VRS immediately undertook to pull out the Mount Igman ultimatum in 1993, NATO had success
majority of its heavy weapons, placing the rest under fully forced the Serbs (with Russian help ) to comply
what was regarded as UN control.53 By the deadline, with a Western demand. Nevertheless , Western self
the VRS had more or less completed the withdrawal, congratulation for this apparent success ignored its
leaving about half its heavy weapons (anything minimal impact on the larger war and again reaffirmed
20 mm and over) in UN -monitored storage sites and the West's sentimentally shortsighted focus on
redeploying the other half. Sarajevans could now Sarajevo rather than on the actualities of the broader
move around the city in relatively safety for the first conflict.
time in almost two years.
Chapter 56
Superficially , the strong Western response had a major The Bosnian Army's " Spring Offensive"
impact. The shelling stopped , people were no longer Commences, March 1994
dying, and citizens could walk freely around the city.
The city's tram cars started up again , and food was In March the Bosnian Army kicked off its long
allowed in more regularly . Nevertheless , the frontlines anticipated “ spring offensive.” With the conclusion of
were still manned , and sporadic clashes between the the Croat-Muslim conflict the previous year, the Army
two forces continued . The VRS could very easily for the first time could go on the strategic offensive
resume a full- scale siege if its masters chose to defy against the Bosnian Serbs. There had been local offen
the NATO threat. Essentially , the city remained under sives during 1993, but the war with the Croats had
siege without the shooting. As Silber and Little note , made any comprehensive operations out of the ques
tion .Now , in the spring of 1994 , the Bosnian Army
Even as the Serb guns finally fell silent, it was ready to flex its muscles, intending to employ its
became clear that the siege would remain as numerical superiority in multiple , simultaneous
tight as ever. The interpositioning of UN troops attacks in the hopes that the Serbs would not have the
along the frontline, particularly in the city cen reserves to counter them all.
ter, brought the eventual partition of Sarajevo
a key Serb war aim — a step closer.54 The Serbs appear to have been surprised when the
spring offensive began with a strike toward the long
The Serbs had clearly made the best of a difficult situ sought prize of Donji Vakuf on 16 March , beginning
ation , complying with the letter of the agreement with the capture of the peak at Mala Suljaga and the
while yielding nothing vital to Serb interests. cutoff of the water supply from Bugojno to Donji
Vakuf.56 57 ARBiH 7th Corps elements (the 370th
The strategic impact was minimal. The ultimatum had “ Donji Vakuf” Mountain Brigade , probably supported
no effect on any Serb military operations going on at by at least the 307th “ Bugojno” Mountain Brigade and
the time of the incident, such as those at Maglaj elements of the 7th Corps' elite assault brigades ) con
Tesanj and Bihac ,55 and it had little or no deterrent tinued to advance against the VRS 30th Infantry Divi
effect on VRS (or ARBiH ) planning for the rest of the sion/ 1st Krajina Corps, capturing onetank and a
year. It did not influence the ARBiH decision to substantial amount of other equipment.58 Although the
assume the strategic offensive in March, nor did it attack was to fall short of the town itself, the Bosnian
stop the Serbs from attacking Gorazde in response Army advanced to within heavy mortar range and had
during April . The only effect was to decrease the certainly progressed far enough to alarm the town's
Serbs ' ability to pressure the Bosnian Government for Serb population .59 60 A VRS counterattack on
a capitulation by threatening and punishing its capital.

230
—

22 March recouped some of the Bosnian Serb losses, leaders looked for an important territorial holding of
and the two armies battled it out for the next week or the Bosnian Government that they could put in jeop
so.61 62 When the government offensive halted around ardy." The chosen target for the operation was the
29 March , the Bosnian Army had advanced the front Gorazde enclave . If Sarajevo refused to accept the
lines about 5 kilometers to the west.6364 Serb terms, the VRS was prepared to eliminate the
enclave, which would also consolidate another Serb
At the very end ofMarch , the Bosnian Army mounted war aim — the occupation of the Drina valley .
the first of its many assaults on the Mt. Vlasic
feature — a huge, Serb -held mountain overlooking Preparations for Operation “ Zvezda (Star ) 94 " began
Muslim - held Travnik — apparently as a secondary in late March . GeneralMladic and the VRS Main
effort in support of the ongoing attack toward Donji Staff began shifting reinforcements to the Gorazde
Vakuf. The efforts againstMt. Vlasic were to continue area, increasing VRS troop numbers from 7,500
well into April. After weeks of uneventful skirmish troops to 13,000 to 14,000 men , plus additional armor
ing, elements of the ARBiH's newly formed 7th Corps and artillery. Major General Radovan Grubac's Herze
finally broke through the lines of the “ Vlasic” Opera govina Corps assumed command over the entire force
tionalGroup/1st Krajina Corps on 28 April and made drawn from the Sarajevo -Romanija , Drina, and Herze
some importanttactical gains.65 The VRS , however, govina Corps. The Bosnian Army's Gorazde-based
contained the advance the following day and recap East Bosnian Operational Group , under Colonel Ferid
tured some of the lost territory over the next two Buljubasic , had been cut off from central Bosnia in
weeks.6667 1993 and could receive only minimal help infiltrated
through Serb lines. Buljubasic had an estimated 8,000
In the Tesanj area north ofMaglaj, the Muslim coun troops to defend the enclave , not all of them equipped
teroffensive came only days after a local cease -fire with even small arms and with negligible artillery and
between the HVO and the ARBiH was arranged on no armor.
19 March. On 23March , the ARBiH's displaced
204th “ Teslic ” Mountain Brigade spearheaded a drive Artillery preparation for the offensive began on
toward its original hometown, now in Serb hands a 28 March . The ground assault started the next day
few kilometers to the west.68 69 The first attacks were along three axes, with the main advance coming from
quite successful, and by 26 March the ARBiH had the southeast. It took until 5 April, however, for the
made gains of 1 to 2 kilometers deep along a Serb troops to break through Muslim forces in the
6 -kilometer front against VRS “ Doboj" Operational south . Over the next five days, the VRS closed in on
Group 9 forces.70 The advance looked promising, and the town, seizing most of the southern (right) bank of
hopes were high that Teslic itself might be reached in the Drina. Stubbornly , the Bosnian Government
the near future , but it was not to be. Infantry battles rejected as blackmail the Serb demands for a universal
and exchanges of shelling continued into early April, and permanent cease - fire in exchange for the halting
but the government advance was halted 5 or 6 kilome their nutcracker drive on Gorazde . As shells began
ters east of Teslic . dropping around and into the town, UN and Western
leaders expressed concern about the fate of UN and
international personnel stationed there and about the
VRS Counterstroke : The Assault on Gorazde, town itself. To warn the Serbs off, two NATO air
April 1994 * strikes — the first in its history — were flown against
VRS targets on 10 and 11 April. The Serbs reacted by
For the Bosnian Serb political and military leadership seizing and locking up a score of UN personnel in
the onset of theMuslim “ spring offensive ” looked Serb territory and holding them until after the crisis
ominously like the beginning of a protracted war of had ended. Nevertheless , the pinprick NATO attacks
attrition . In hopes of forcing the Bosnian Government
to accept Serb terms for a permanent, country -wide
cease- fire that would effectively end the war, the Serb

See Annex 49 for a more detailed account.

231
seemed to have had the desired effect of forcing the The VRS Fails to Widen the Corridor at Brcko ,
VRS to break off its offensive . April 1994 72

The Serbs had only paused , however, and on 15 April As the VRS was driving on Gorazde and its embattled
the VRS redoubled its efforts . Serb troops quickly Muslim garrison , Major GeneralNovica Simic's VRS
smashed ARBiH defenses along all three axes and East Bosnian Corps also launched its planned attempt
drove to the outskirts of town. The ARBiH lost the to widen the Posavina corridor. The attack was similar
entire southern bank , except for parts of the town to the successful operation undertaken the previous
itself, while Serb troops fanned around the northern July . Simic hoped his troops , reinforced with elements
and eastern sides and almost completely encircled the of the Main Staff's 65th Protection Motorized gi
town. Gorazde was at the mercy of the VRS . Individu ment, could widen the corridor by about 2 kilometers ,
ally and through the UN , Western leaders again tried biting off the northernmost part of a Muslim salient
to get the Serbs to agree to a cease -fire and demanded pointed at Brcko town.73 The Serb assault against the
a withdrawal from a 3 -kilometer zone around Gorazde ARBiH 1st Operational Group / 2nd Corps (and the
town , plus the establishment of a 20 -kilometer zone HVO 108th Brigade) began on 13 April.74 After trying
free of heavy weapons. Though Radovan Karadzic to break into ARBiH /HVO positions for the better part
came to an agreement with the UN on 18 April, fight of a week, the East Bosnian Corps had to give up with
ing continued , and on 20 April the VRS tried to cap no gains in any territory and broke off the attack by
ture a Muslim -held ammunition factory. A NATO 20 April.
ultimatum on 22 April directed the Serbs to comply
with the agreement or face large-scale airstrikes, and Chapter 57
the Bosnian Serb leadership at last suffered the plan to The ARBiH Spring Offensive Continues,
take effect. Despite sporadic clashes over the next few April- June 1994
days, the VRS withdrawal and the arrival of new UN
troops to monitor the agreementwere reasonably While the ARBiH in isolated Gorazde hung on the
smooth . edge of complete defeat, the Bosnian Army in the core
government-held area of central Bosnia was continu
The Bosnian Serb offensive had drastically shrunk the ing to attack the Bosnian Serbs in all directions. The
size of the Gorazde enclave, but it failed to achieve the ARBiH not only resumed its March offensives in the
objective of ending the war. The Bosnian Government Donji Vakuf,Mt. Vlasic, and Tesanj- Teslic areas but
refused to accept Serb demands for a nationwide also launched a whole series of concurrent attacks:
cease -fire that everyone could see would lock in the against Brgule near Vares, against Mt. Stolice in the
Serbs ' territorial gains. Instead , the Bosnian Army Majevica hills east of Tuzla and Mt. Vijenac in the
stepped up its offensive operations in west-central Ozren mountains near Banovici, and east of Kladanj.
Bosnia even as the VRS was grinding against
Gorazde, and the Bosnian Government almost cer
tainly would have letGorazde be crushed and occu Donji Vakuf, April 1994 *
pied without yielding to the Serb demands. In the
event, the international community did intervene At the very beginning of April the Bosnian Army 7th
through NATO to save the core of Gorazde with some Corps again attempted to advance the remaining dis
minatory airstrikes and 12 days later the threat of tance toward Donji Vakufagainst the VRS 30th Infan
more substantial ones . It would appear that, having try Division.75 Hopes were high after the initial attack
debated the pluses and minuses among themselves ,
Karadzic and the other Serb leaders (under pressure See Annex 50 : Donji Vakuf, 1994 for a more detailed account.
from Milosevic ) concluded that the retaliation they
might suffer outweighed the gains anticipated . Over
riding their earlier calculations, the Serbs gave up both
their hope of a nationwide victory and their fallback
objective of completely eliminating the enclave.

232
on 2 April, which placed the most advanced 7th Corps 27 May , again charging up the Stolice mountain and
units about 5 kilometers southeast of Donji Vakuf.76 Banj Brdo.85 86 The Serbs counterattacked and drove
ARBiH forces continued to press the attack from two south several kilometers from Stolice , retaking much
directions, advancing from Prusac to the south and of the ground they had lost to government forces ear
Bugojno to the east.77 The attack was again halted by lier in the month.87When the June cease- fire took
tough Serb defenses , however, and the offensive had effect, the Bosnian Army had very little to show for its
wound down by 6 April.78 Fighting slowed substan effort, having been pushed back out of most of its
tially during the rest of April and May, while the Bos recently won territory .
nian Army spent the time building up its forces in the
area for yet another attempt.
Kladanj, May 1994 **

Mt. Stolice , April 1994 * During the latter half of April and the first week of
May, UN observers noted a steady buildup of govern
The Majevica region around the " Sapna thumb" east ment forces — including the spearhead 7th Muslimski
of Tuzla had been relatively quiet thus far, with only Brigade— and military supplies in the Kladanj area ,
occasional Serb shelling and intermittent infantry north of Sarajevo and south of Tuzla. 88 The govern
fighting . But this calm was not to last. There was a ment also began restricting the movements of UN mil
crucial prize in theMajevica hills — the Stolice radio itary observers south of Tuzla — an almost certain sign
tower, atop 916 -meter Mt.Majevica itself. This tower of an impending offensive.89 The UN — and the Bos
was a vital communications node , serving as a relay nian Serbs — watched and waited for the blow to fall.
for radio, television, and telephone communications. It was not long in coming. The expected offensive
Both sides wanted control of the summit and the trans rolled eastward from Kladanj against the VRS Drina
mitter, and 1994 was to see a prolonged struggle on Corps in the second week of May - concurrent with
the slopes of the mountain . the other 2nd Corps attacks atMt. Stolice and Mt.
Vijenac in the Ozren mountains — moving in the gen
The Bosnian Army began massing its forces in the eral direction of Vlasenica, Sekovici, and Han Pijesak .
area in April, and government forces first assaulted By 15 May the UN was reporting substantial Bosnian
the mountain on 11 May.79 The ARBiH 2nd Corps Army gains in the area. 90 The really significant break
mounted repeated attacks against the VRS Tactical through came on 16 May when the Bosnian Army
Group “Majevica ” /East Bosnian Corps deployed on advanced to a line connecting the Sokolina and Bijela
Mt. Majevica and a secondary elevation on adjacent Stijena peaks and captured some 32 square kilome
Banj Brdo.80 At least two full ARBiH brigades were ters.91 92 The VRS responded with several days of very
93
committed to the fiercest of the government assaults heavy shelling and a short counterattack on 21May.
on 14 and 15 May . The Serbs replied with heavy shell 94 The Bosnian Army nibbled away at the Serb
ing of Bosnian towns and with infantry counterattacks defenses, advancing a kilometer at a time in the hilly
on 15 and 16 May.8182 During the attack , Bosnian and wooded terrain , but subsided in early June to
Army forces got close enough to shell and damage the record an advance of some 15 km at its furthest
Stolice relay — temporarily shutting down Serb TV point.96 The Bosnian Army's gains in this area were
and telephone links in the region — but could not cap more importantmorally than militarily , but that was
ture and occupy the summit.83 Fighting tapered off accomplishment enough.
around 20 May, as the offensive subsided and the Bos
See Annex 52: Kladanj, 1994 for a more detailed account.
nian Armypaused to regroup and reinforce.84 Appar
ently undaunted , the ARBiH resumed the attack on

See Annex 51: A Contest of Wills: The Struggle for Mt. Majevica
and the Stolice Transmitter, 1994 for a more detailed account.

233
The Bosnian Serbs on the Attack - Cemerska Mt. Vlasic ,May 1994
Planina ,May 1994
After a short lull, government forces resumed their
As the Bosnian Armywas ending its successful opera- attacks against Mt. Vlasic on 24 May, launching a
tion near Kladanj, the VRS was preparing both its major assault along the Vlasic frontline in an effort to
counterattack there and a new attack some 35 kilome encircle the mountain . Although the 7th Corps was
ters to the southwest in the Cemerska Planina-Nisici able to press the Serb -held flanks back and gain con
Plateau area . The objective of the new attack was to trol of much of the Vlasic feature's perimeter, it was
further secure the road between the Serb -held western unable to complete the encirclement, and the VRS
Sarajevo suburbs and the Pale-Romanija area through “ Vlasic " OperationalGroup could still resupply their
the capture of the ARBiH -controlled Cemerska Plan forces on the mountain . It was , however, a close -run
ina and possibly the town of Breza. After receiving thing: Bosnian Serb reserves were all but exhausted ,
reinforcements from the 1st Krajina Corps and assem and the VRS was just barely able to maintain the line.
bling his own elite assault units for the operation ,
Major General Stanislav Galic's VRS Sarajevo
Romanija Corps began its attack on 18 May.More The Spring Offensive Draws to a Close
than a week of fighting failed to dislodge Brigadier
Vahid Karavelic's ARBiH 1st Corps forces from their As in March , the Bosnian Armyhad failed to reach its
hill positions overlooking the road. The battle ended objectives at Donji Vakuf, Teslic, and Mt. Vlasic or
on 27/28 May with little or no Serb gains.97 gain control of the peak at Mt. Stolice , although it had
had reasonable success east of Kladanj. These set
backs left the force undaunted , however, and in all of
Tesanj- Teslic ,May -June 1994 the contested areas — Donji Vakuf, Tesanj-Teslic , Vla
sic , and Stolice — the ARBiH continued to regroup and
After a pause of several weeks , the Bosnian Army reinforce , preparing for bigger and better attempts
again attempted to advance in the Tesanj- Teslic area later in the year. Neither the battles nor the war were
around 22 May — this time with the more limited over by any means, and the ARBiH attacks continued
objective of capturing several intermediate elevations. to inflict casualties on the VRS that it could ill afford .
The HVO's 111th “ Zepce” Brigade — Operational
Group 7 -South's former foes — appears to have con
tributed at least two tanks to the fight.98 99 100 Even The June 1994 Cease -Fire: Just Long Enough To
these more modest objectives proved to be unattain Reload
able , however, and the ARBiH was unable to push the
confrontation lines very far against determined resis After one of the many meetings in Geneva, one of the
tance by the VRS 1st Krajina Corps' Doboj” Opera Bosnian war's many cease- fires was signed on 8 June
tionalGroup 9.101 While the Bosnian Army did gain 1994. The agreement,which included all three ethnic
control over a line of peaks between 5 and 15 kilome factions, was originally proposed for fourmonths but
ters southeast of Teslic , it was unable to push the last was reduced to four weeks at the last minute after the
few kilometers to the west to reach the Veliki Usora Bosnian Serbs rejected the original duration .104 As it
river valley , the adjacent north -south road into Teslic , turned out, the truce never entirely took hold . As the
or the town of Teslic itself. Despite OG 7 -South's best Bosnian Army went ahead with a planned offensive
efforts, it was unable to achieve the hoped - for territo against Vozuca at the southern tip of the Ozren salient,
rial gains before the country-wide cease -fire took the agreement unraveled a little more each day and
effect on 10 June.102 103 had broken down completely within three weeks.105

* See Annex 53: Tesanj and Teslic , 1994 for more details.

234
 Chapter 58 casualties were heavy , and the shock of the action per
The Battle of Vozuca, Ozren Mountains , mitted the VRS reinforcements to counterattack and
June- July 1994 drive both 2nd and 3rd Corps forces back to their start
lines by 4-5 July.
The Bosnian Army's confidence in its ability to take
the war to the Serbs was growing, and the ARBiH The Battle of Vozuca was an eye -opening experience
General Staff prepared plans for a much more ambi for both the ARBiH and the VRS. The Bosnian Army
tious offensive in the Ozren mountains. Its aim was to had satisfied itself that it could penetrate Serb
cut off and capture the southern end of the Serb -held defenses and almost defeat a major VRS force. It also
Ozren salient around Vozuca, thus freeing up an had a number of weaknesses and vulnerabilities that
important road route — the UN's so -called “Route the VRS could exploit. As the ARBiH General Staff
Duck ” —connecting the cities of Tuzla and Zenica. would find throughout the year, their units often
The operation would be the largest yet conducted and tended to overextend themselves during an advance,
would involve a coordinated attack by major elements leaving their flanks open to Serb counterattacks. They
of the 2nd and 3rd Corps — up to 14,000 assault learned also that command and control during offen
troops - directly under General Delic's supervision . sive operations was farmore difficult than on the
defense, particularly for an army with such limited
In a preliminary move , elements of the 2nd Corps tactical communications. The Muslimsneeded tools
seized an important hilltop— Vijenac — from VRS 1st and tactics to deal with the Serbs' extensive mine
Krajina Corps troops in May. The capture of the hill fields and devastating artillery fire. The VRS , too , dis
gave the ARBiH an excellent observation point over covered severalweaknesses that needed to be dealt
the Krivaja River valley and Vozuca while shielding with ,notably the inadequate training and discipline of
nearby Muslim -held towns . The defeat was a severe many of its frontline infantry units, who tended to
psychological blow to the Serbs, who lost an entire panic when ARBiH sabotage units appeared in their
company of troops killed or captured . rear. Overall, the thinness of VRS frontline defenses
and the ease with which the Muslimsusually pene
The main operation began on 18 June , breaking the trated them was troubling. VRS strengths in senior
10 -day -old UN -sponsored cease- fire . The ARBiH command leadership , communications, firepower, and
plan called for a pincer movement with 2nd Corps mobility, however,allowed the Serbs to counter the
troops attacking from the east and 3rd Corps troops more lightly armed Muslim infantry and drive them
from the west to link up in themiddle of the 10 back out. Nevertheless, as the VRS was to find repeat
kilometer-wide salient. The initial advance took the edly over the next year, winning battles against the
VRS Ozren Tactical Group of “ Doboj” Operational Muslimswas becoming a near-run thing.
Group 9 by surprise and quickly penetrated Serb lines .
Over the next week ,Muslim troops continued the Chapter 59
attack , gradually pushing through VRS defenses . By The Northeast Bosnia Battles,
26 June, ARBiH 2nd and 3rd Corps units were within August-November 1994
3 kilometers of linking up .

The VRS,however, was preparing a bold counter Brka, 3 August 1994

strike, having shifted elite 1st Krajina and East Bos
nian Corps units into the salient. By 1 July an initial In early August, the Bosnian Army mounted a small
counterattack had drawn ARBiH 3rd Corps elements attack on the southern side of the Posavina corridor,
away from theirmain axis . As the Muslim troops attacking from the tiny town of Gornja Brka, 8 kilo
maneuvered to block the Serb thrust, the VRS allowed meters southwest of Brcko . (Immediately to the north
them to walk into an uncharted minefield upon which
it had previously targeted artillery . The ARBiH

* For more details, see Annex 54: The Battle of Vozuca, Ozren
Mountains, June-July 1994 .

235
of Muslim -held Gornja Brka was the Serb -held village The operation began on 15 October with a new Opera
of Donja Brka.106) Paired in a relatively flat and strate tionalGroup 2 /2nd Corps attack toward the Skipovac
gically important area , the Brka towns were logical area, north of Vis Hill, that quickly took another 20
targets for an attack by either side. On 3 August, the square kilometers of territory.116 Two days later, the
Bosnian Army commenced with artillery and mortar 2nd Corps attacked at Gradacac and Doboj, and
fire in the early morning, followed by an infantry ARBiH troops penetrated 4 kilometers into the front
assault on Donja Brka.107 In what appears to have been line defenses of VRS Tactical Group 4 units northeast
a very limited , surprise attack , the Bosnian Army's of Gradacac.117 VRS reinforcements allowed the Serbs
2nd Corps grabbed about 4 square kilometers from to contain the Muslim advance over the next week ,
Tactical Group “ Posavina ” /East Bosnian Corps and although the ARBiH held onto most of its initial
then halted to secure their gains.108 The Bosnian Serbs gains.118 In their attack toward Doboj, however,
shelled the lost territory heavily and counterattacked ARBiH forces failed to dent Serb defenses in a week
several times during the remainder of August and into of fighting. 119 A renewed attack on 8-10 November
September,but at the end of the day the Bosnian Gov also went nowhere. 120
ernment still held both Gornja and Donja Brka.109 110 111

Tesanj- Teslic : The Bosnian Army's Third Try,

The Battle of Vis, 8-12 August 1994 112 October-November 1994

August also saw a small- scale government operation The Bosnian Army's most ambitious effort of the year
to seize important high ground around Vis Hill, in the in the Teslic area began on 3 October and would con
Trebava region , north of the town ofGracanica. On tinue for nearly two months. The ARBiH's October
8 August elements of the ARBiH 212th Liberation November offensive was to be significantly larger and
Brigade , reinforcing OperationalGroup 2 /2nd Corps, more complex than its previous efforts in the area,
attacked and seized 14 square kilometers of territory consisting of major efforts by both Operational Group
from VRS “ Doboj” Operational Group 9 units . 113 7 -South east of Teslic and by the 3rd Corps' Opera
Muslim troops held on to most of their gains, although tions Group 3 -North well to the south of Teslic. Each
the Serbsmay have regained some territory over the of the two operations groups contributed three rein
next three days . forced brigades to the attack , for a total of perhaps
14,000 to 16,000 men , one of the biggest troop com
mitments of the year in Bosnia .
The 2nd Corps Attacks at Doboj-Gradacac,
October -November 1994 114 The battle was to extend over a period of weeks and
achieve another partial success for the Bosnian Army,
Following its successful operation in Augustnear with substantial advances in the south but only mar
Gracanica, the ARBiH 2nd Corps scheduled for Octo- ginal progress in the north near Teslic itself. The first
ber a much larger one against VRS “Doboj" Opera day's attacks in the southern area - spearheaded by
tionalGroup 9 forces in the Doboj-Gradacac sector. the 7th Muslimski Brigade and the “ ElMujahid "
The new attack ,which brought together all of 2nd Detachment of foreign Islamic volunteers and fol
Corps's new elite liberation and light brigades , called lowed up by the 319th Mountain and 330th Light
for thrusts along three axes : toward Doboj,Modrica , Brigades — caught the Serb defenders off guard , and
and Obudovac-Pelagicevo.'s Unfortunately , the axes , approximately 20 square kilometers were captured in
while in the same region , do not appear to have been a matter of hours.121 A similar drive west of Teslic
mutually supporting or to have had a single objective. with the 202nd Mountain Brigade taking the lead
The offensive made some good tactical gains, but the
2nd Corps was unable to move beyond its capture of For more details, see Annex 53: Tesanj and Teslic, 1994.
the VRS front defenses.

236

--- -
suffered badly.122 Bosnian Serb forces of the 1st Kra defensive , and over 100 square kilometers of territory
jina Corps ' "Doboj" Operational Group 9 halted the were captured — a significant gain by the standards of
ARBiH after only modest advances, and probably the Bosnian war. The Bosnian Army had fallen short
reinforced counterattacked on 10 and 11 October 123 of its goals, but the effort had brought its own
124 VRS artillery also retaliated with heavy shelling of rewards.
Muslim - held villages in the area. The government
forces advanced as far as the Teslic suburb of Banja Chapter 60
Vrucica but could go no further.125 126 Last Man Standing — The ARBiH - VRS Battles in
Central Bosnia , August-November 1994
While the Bosnian Government advance wasbeing
stopped cold in the north , the 3rd Corps attack in the
south was continuing to make steady gains . As The Bosnian Army Capture of Brgule ,
OG 7 -South drew limited Serb reserves into the August 1994
defense of Teslic , OG 3 -North was able to make fur
ther advances, pushing north and west to take another In July, the ARBiH 1st Corps began preparations for
50 square kilometers or so in a series of short an operation to seize control of a Serb salient jutting
advances of 2 to 3 kilometers a day along a 10 into Muslim lines toward Vares and centered on the
kilometer- wide front.127 village of Brgule.131 The elimination of the salient
would further threaten the Serb -held road to the Serbs '
By late October it began to look like the two - front western Sarajevo suburbs and put the ARBiH in a bet
attack might succeed . OperationalGroup 7 -South was ter position for future operations toward Sarajevo.132
still fighting in Banja Vrucica , close enough to Teslic The offensive began on 1 August. The 1st Corps
to worry the Serb defenders.Meanwhile , OG 3 -North troops attacked from either side of the HVO -held
was advancing slowly butseemingly inexorably. Bos Dastansko pocket, quickly seizing Brgule, and then
nian Serb forces made several counterattacks around pushing south . Within a week , ARBiH forces had
Teslic, retaking some territory, but the ARBiH 3rd secured most of the salient.133 By 11 August, the VRS
Corps countered with yet another assault by OG 3 Sarajevo -Romanija Corps controlled a much reduced
North on 8 November. Once again , the crack 7th Mus- fragment of territory in the area.134
limski Brigade led the way in an advance that seized
30 more square kilometers over the next 10 days.128 129
130
September : The ARBiH at Sarajevo /Sedrenik

The ARBiH 3rd Corps advance from 8 to 17 Novem Since the 5 February marketplace shelling and the
ber was to mark the lastmajor success in the Tesanj establishment of the 20 -km heavy weapons exclusion
Teslic area , as winter set in and the ARBiH 3rd Corps' zone, Sarajevo had been largely quiet for most of
elite units were redirected toward the Kupres and 1994. " Quiet" was a relative term , as sporadic sniper
Donji Vakuf fronts. In the end, VRS troops from and small-arms fire continued to terrorize the civilian
“ Doboj” OG were able to hold on , pushing govern population of the city. The artillery and mortar fire
ment forces back a short distance from the Teslic sub that had caused most of the casualties and devastated
urbs and digging in along a new confrontation line portions of the city had essentially been halted ,how
opposite OG 3 -North . Even though the objective of ever, by the exclusion zone.
Teslic was never reached , the ARBiH October
November offensive can be considered a substantial The one noteworthy break in the calm came in
success. The Bosnian Army's 3rd Corps had demon September, when the Bosnian Army launched a very
strated its ability to effectively mount sizable ,coordi small attack to capture part of the Sedrenik
nated operationswithin its area of responsibility . VRS
Doboj OperationalGroup forces,which had begun the
year on the offensive , were forced to end it on the

237
neighborhood in the northeastern part of the city north seizing key hilltops in the first two days of the opera
of Sarajevo's old quarter. ARBiH 1st Corps forces tion and pushing Muslim troops back over the next
from the Muslim - held Grdonj neighborhood launched week for an advance of as much as 2 kilometers in
a surprise attack against VRS Sarajevo -Romanija some locations.139
Corps-held Sedrenik beginning on 18 September. 135
The Bosnian Army gained territory on the first day, The ARBiH 1st Corps commander, BrigadierGeneral
and fierce clashes continued as the Serbs counterat Vahid Karavelic , was then able to shift reinforcements
tacked the following day. After a two -day fight, UN to Cemerska from his OperationalGroup 3 and the
spokesmen reported the VRS had recaptured some of Sarajevo OperationalGroup, denying the Serbs any
the initially ceded area . The isolated fighting event further gains. By 14 October the ARBiH was begin
concluded with minor ARBiH gains. ning to counterattack and on 15 October recaptured
the importantMosevacko hill. Fighting continued
over the next two days , but again the two sides were
Mt. Vlasic , September 1994 stalemated.140

At the beginning of September, the Bosnian Army 7th After the battle ended the ARBiH 1st Corps began
Corps launched what appears to have been one last planning to recapture all of the lost ground from the
attempt for the year against theMt. Vlasic feature near VRS Sarajevo -Romanija Corps while simultaneously
Travnik , and the VRS “ Vlasic " OperationalGroup eliminating the rest of the Serb -held salient south of
responded with another limited counterattack in the Brgule near Nisici.141 On 6 November the ARBiH
Vlasic - Turbe area on 6 September.136 The Bosnian struck , seizing the remaining VRS-controlled hills in
Army units succeeded in capturing some additional Cemerska Planina while crushing the salientnorth of
ridge lines, but again failed to gain control of the Nisici. Despite the VRS's best efforts, the Bosnian
mountain . With winter approaching, the government Army had held its ground and had taken even more
reluctantly abandoned the idea of occupying Vlasic in Serb territory.
1994 , and the ARBiH redirected some of its forces on
Vlasic southwest to support its October-November
offensives in the Donji Vakuf and Kupres areas. Stolice ... Again , November 1994**
Meanwhile , the Bosnian Serbs relied primarily on
artillery fire for the remainder of the year, continuing In early November the Bosnian Army 2nd Corps
to shell Travnik and its environs and occasionally again made a serious attempt to capture the Stolice
sending small infantry probes in the direction of radio relay in the Majevica hills. Preliminary probes
Turbe. appear to have begun as early asmid -October when
“ recon -sabotage ” groups scouted the area looking for
weaknesses in the VRS East Bosnia Corps' lines.142 143
To and Fro : Nisici Plateau and Cemerska Planina, The Bosnian Army's main offensive effort — directed ,
October-November 1994 once again , at the Stolice transmitter - began on
9 November.144 By 13 November the attackers
At the beginning of October, the VRS finished plans claimed the capture of several important hills
for a renewed effort - Operation “ Brgule 94 " —to including nearby Velika and Mala Jelika — but not
achieve its unfulfilled objective in the Cemerska Plan Stolice itself.145 146 Once again fighting raged around
ina area , securing the road route to the Serb -held west the Stolice transmitter and again damaged it, but the
ern Sarajevo suburbs.137Major General Dragomir Bosnian Army still failed to gain control of the Mt.
Milosevic's Sarajevo -Romanija Corps received rein Majevica summit .147 148
forcements for the assault from the Drina and Herze
govina Corps, plus the Main Staff.138 The 4 October For a more detailed account, see Annex 51: A Contest of Wills:
attack quickly penetrated ARBiH 1st Corps lines, The Struggle for Mt. Majevica and the Stolice Transmitter, 1994 .

For more details, see Annex 55 : Mt. Vlasic , 1994 .

238
As 1994 drew to a close, the situation in the Majevica announcement caused substantial consternation in the
hills was not far different from what had prevailed Federation camp. ARBiH and HVO officials met in
when the year had begun . Small infantry clashes Sarajevo on 15 September to resolve their differences
generally begun by Bosnian Army forces - erupted while playing down the rift in their public statements.
occasionally on the slopes below the Stolice transmit US diplomatic pressure helped to avert a crisis within
ter, but the confrontation lines advanced marginally , if the nascent Federation , and the HVO eventually
at all. The VRS shelled Tuzla and the smaller towns of reversed position again and agreed to cancel plans to
the " Sapna thumb" regularly , causing substantial withdraw from the fight.161 162 163
destruction but accomplishing little from a military
standpoint. Casualties piled up on both sides of the Meanwhile, the Bosnian Army pressed on with its
confrontation line, but for little visible gain . successful offensive south , advancing the frontline up
to 10 km on 15 and 16 September and capturing a total
Chapter 61 of 30 to 40 square kilometers. 164 165 166 167 Steady fight
Bosnian Army Operations in Southeast Bosnia , ing continued through the following week , but with
September -November 1994 * smaller Bosnian Army advances.168 There was a brief
lull, followed by a renewed Bosnian Army effort
along the Borci-Glavaticevo line southeast of Konjic
Konjic, September 1994 beginning 23 September.169 At the beginning of Octo
ber, the Bosnians extended their advance slightly fur
The Muslim -held town of Konjic - 40 km southwest ther, taking the important Kiser hill south of Konjic
of Sarajevo — was shelled regularly (though not espe and continuing on to the south.170 These gains, how
cially heavily ) during most of 1994 , but, on the whole , ever, concluded the advance . Back and forth fighting
the area was a secondary theater and infantry clashes continued through the rest of the year — in which the
were minor and infrequent. Beginning in late August, VRS reclaimed some of their lost land — but the front
though , the pace of fighting began to escalate - possi lines had generally stabilized.171
bly as both sides sent out infantry probes to determine
weaknesses in each other's lines.149 150 151 152 153 Bosnian At the conclusion of the battle, the Bosnian Army had
Serb shelling of Konjic also increased .154 On 11-12 captured almost 100 square kilometers . In termsof net
September, the ARBiH 4th Corps commenced its gains, the Konjic - area offensive was to be one of the
main operation against the VRS Hezegovina Corps , ARBiH's most successfuloperations of the year.
launching infantry assaults on three Serb -held sub
urbs: Bijela , Borci, and Glavaticevo.155 The Bosnian
Armymade steady advances over the next few days , October 1994 : TheMt. Bjelasnica Controversy
systematically eliminating VRS bunkers and strong
points and occupying Bijela — a sizable village south At 2,067 meters, Mt. Bjelasnica - slightly south and
east of Konjic - on 15 September.156 157 158 west of Mt. Igman — was one of the highest peaks in
Bosnia . Its towering height had added value as the site
Up through the capture of Bijela , the HVO's 56th of a huge radio and television transmitter - one of
“ Herceg Stjepan ” Home Defense Regiment — the local Sarajevo's more recognizable landmarks. Both Igman
unit in the area — participated in the offensive , occupy and Bjelasnica had been captured by the Bosnian
ing its section of the confrontation line and supporting Serbs in mid - 1993 but were placed under UN control
the Bosnian Army with mortar fire.159 On 15 Septem after the threat of NATO airstrikes compelled the VRS
ber, however, the HVO reversed its position and indi to withdraw from the mountains. Since the 14 August
cated it was pulling out of the line.160 This

* For more details, see Annex 56 : The Battles for Herzegovina,

1994 and Annex 57 :“ Twin Peaks” : The Battles for Mts.Bjelasnica
and Treskavica, 1994 .

239
1993 UN -imposed demilitarization agreement, the UN the Bosnian Serbs hotly threatened retaliation , imply
held control of the peaks with the understanding that ing that they would resume shelling Sarajevo in defi
UN peacekeepers would keep the DMZ free of com ance of the heavy weapons exclusion zone.180 181 The
batants or equipment from any of the factions. 172 UN took immediate action , hoping to forestall a gen
Despite the ostensible demilitarization, however, the eral VRS offensive by forcing theMuslims off the
Bosnian Army kept troops on both peaks, and proba mountains themselves. French UN peacekeepers
bly as many as 1,500 to 2,000 ARBiH troops occupied swept over the Igman and Bjelasnica areas on 7 Octo
the “ UN controlled” mountains at any given time. In ber, forcing Bosnian Army soldiers out of their posi
addition, Bosnian Army forces worked on prepared tions - occasionally with the additional persuasion of
defenses, bunkers, and trenchlines within the demilita French warning shots — and destroying their bunkers
rized zone .UN peacekeepers had tried but failed to with antitank rockets .182
sweep the government forces off the mountains in late
1993. At this point, a clearer picture began to emerge of
what had taken place during the attack that night.
Around the end of September, the Bosnian Army First, the UN retracted its charge that the Bosnian
began massing its forces on and aroundMt. Bjelasnica Army had mutilated the enemy corpses. Instead , it
for a substantial offensive through the demilitarized turned out that four sentries had their throats slit in a
zone and against Serb positions on the mountain's far commando-style operation . Others had been shot at
side.173 The first of October marked the commence close range but apparently during combat. What had
ment of a major ARBiH offensive operation in the happened began to look less and less like a massacre.
Bjelasnica - Treskavica area against the VRS Sarajevo Under closer scrutiny , the evidence pointed instead to
Romanija and Herzegovina Corps. The attack was a sophisticated , swiftly executed sabotage operation
kicked off by probably two full 1st Corps brigades, as against the command post of the VRS Trnovo battal
well as elements of at least three other brigades, fur ion.183 An indignant Bosnian Government demanded a
ther supported by the Interior Ministry's elite “ Lasta ” formal apology for UN Special Envoy Akashi's earlier
(Swallows) Special Police battalion.174 The offensive assertions that the Bosnian Army had executed its
was first directed against the village of Rakitnica on prisoners. The UN lamely countered with the charge
the slopes of Mt. Bjelasnica and soon expanded to that the Bosnian Army was not supposed to be operat
include fighting along the entire Bjelasnica - Treskav ing in the demilitarized zone in the first place. 184
ica frontline.175 The town of Trnovo itself cameunder
Bosnian Army artillery fire the following day.176 (Still Meanwhile , UN forces continued to force government
further to the south , the ARBiH 4th Corps also took troops off the mountains , both to preserve UN credi
the offensive from Konjic toward Kalinovik .) French bility and to forestall VRS retaliation against Sarajevo
UN peacekeepers blocked some 300 Bosnian Army city.185 186 On 9 October, the Bosnian Serbs , Bosnian
troops transiting the mountain on 3 October, but oth Government, and the United Nations agreed to form a
ers were clearly getting through.177 178 jointcommission to inspect the demilitarized zone and
187
verify that it had been cleared of government forces.
Controversy erupted the following week , on 6 Octo The dispute dragged on , however, as the Bosnian
ber, when the Bosnian Serbs charged that a Bosnian Government kept putting off the joint inspection of
Army sabotage unit had massacred and then mutilated the mountains . Worse yet, the Bosnian Army mounted
20 Serb troops — including four female nurses — at a a second attack through the Igman DMZ to ambush a
VRS battalion headquarters location near Mount VRS unit just outside the demilitarized area. The Bos
Bjelasnica. The UN initially appeared to corroborate nian Serbs retaliated with heavy weapons fire from
the Bosnian Serb reports, and UN Special Envoy within the exclusion zone .
Yasushi Akashi told reporters that in many cases the
Serb bodies had been “ mutilated or burned and disfig
ured."'179 What exactly had happened atop the snow
covered mountain , however, remained obscure , and

240
-

---
On 13 October, VRS Chief of Staff Gen. Milovanovic the south side of Bjelasnica with heavy artillery and
issued a one-week ultimatum , asserting that, if the UN captured the town.197
did not evict the Bosnian Army from Igman and
Bjelasnica , the Bosnian Serbs would reoccupy and The Bosnian Army's 1st Corps continued its advance
scour the peaks by force.188 Talks broke down on in early November, attacking further to the east after
18 October when the Bosnian Government refused to taking Javorak and moving onto the Hojta ridge line
withdraw the 500 or so troops remaining on the two connecting the flanks of Mounts Bjelasnica and
mountains - insisting that any withdrawal be linked to Treskavica.198 In a successful push over the next few
UN assurances that UNPROFOR would safeguard days , the Bosnian Army advanced the frontlines sev
traffic over the Mt. Igman road into Sarajevo . The UN eral kilometers to the east and took three towns along
refused , and Bosnian Serb retaliation looked immi the smaller north -south road that ran several kilome
nent. 189 190 The 20 October deadline came and went ters west of Trnovo.199 The VRS Herzegovina Corps,
without incident, however, leaving the standoff however - hastily reinforced by elements of the
unresolved . Sarajevo -Romanija Corps - halted the ARBiH
advance around 6 November, with the frontline still
The UN went after the remaining Bosnian Govern several kilometers west of the main highway.200 201 On
ment troops in the DMZ on 24 October, whereupon 14-15 December, the Bosnian Armymade its last push
the Bosnian Army troops opened fire on a group of of the year in the direction of the Trnovo road . Again
French peacekeepers . The French responded in kind, the ARBiH advanced , claiming gains of 20 square
and a sharp firefight ensued before tempers cooled kilometers — but still failed to secure the road.202
and the two forces disengaged . An apologetic Bosnian
Government, apparently recognizing that it had gone At the end of the year, the Bosnian Army had taken a
too far, ordered its remaining troops off the mountain . total of some 100 square kilometers on Mts . Bjelas
The three -way standoff - Bosnian Government, Bos nica and Treskavica and had captured at least five
nian Serbs, and United Nations — had finally been highly prized tanks, several small artillery pieces and
resolved , for a time, at least. As October drew to a mortars , and sizable munitions stores.203 204 205 Never
close , the focus of activity and attention was to move theless, although the Bosnian Government gains were
from Mt. Bjelasnica to Mt. Treskavica , its neighbor to substantial, they still fell short of their primary goal of
the south .191 192 193 interdicting or capturing the Trnovo road. Despite a
valian — and partially successful- effort, Trnovo still
lay out of reach .
November: The Treskavica Offensive

The beginning of November marked the transition to a Nevesinje in November

new phase of the ARBiH offensive , one directed fur
ther south toward Mt. Treskavica — another peak Serb -held Nevesinje was about 20 km due east of
southeast ofMt. Bjelasnica and of equally imposing Muslim -held Blagaj and Croat-held Buna. The con
dimensions ( 2,088 meters)—and the Sarajevo - Trnovo frontation line was well west of the town, and Neves
road segment. The shift began on 29 October — just as inje had been more or less untouched by the war. The
the Igman - Bjelasnica withdrawal was to be com Bosnian Army and sometimes the HVO would occa
pleted — when Bosnian Government troops again sionally shell some of the intervening Serb -held vil
advanced south through the Mt. Bjelasnica demilita lages, but, on the whole , it was a quiet section of the
rized zone to attack two Serb -held villages at the foot front.
of the mountain.194 Bosnian Army forces also shelled
a nearby UN observation post with an artillery piece
from within the exclusion zone.195 196 The following
day , the Bosnian Army shelled Serb -held Javorak on

241
 The first serious action in the Nevesinje sector began Croatian Army. The VRS proved able to slow ,but not
shortly after the 15 September Bosnian Army 4th stop, these advances and ended the year with its larg
Corps offensive from Konjic ,well to the north . On est territorial loss to date and a military problem that
19 September, the Bosnian Army shifted its emphasis would only grow worse the following year.
to theMostar-Nevesinje axis, while continuing its
attacks around Konjic . These efforts continued
through 26 September, but with no apparent gains.206 The HVO -ARBiH Capture of Kupres,
207 208 209 210 211 212 The Bosnian Army made another November 1994
offensive push in the Mostar-Nevesinje area against
the VRS Herzegovina Corps a month later, this time The combined Croat-Muslim offensive began with the
launching infantry attacks eastward from Blagaj capture of Kupres, an objective of interest to both fac
beginning on 12 October. This effort also halted after tions . Kupres had been a prize long sought
a few days without visible gains 213 214 215 especially by the Bosnian Croats — ever since the
town's fall to the then JNA in the first days of the war.
The Bosnian Army's main offensive effort came the Besides wanting to avenge a humiliating Croat defeat
following month when the ARBiH 4th Corps and recapture a municipality that had a sizable prewar
attempted to cut the road to Nevesinje. The 4th Corps Croat population , the HVO also wanted control of the
began its preparations the night before themain road junction from Tomislavgrad toward Bugojno and
assault, with elite “ recon -sabotage " elements — most Sipovo.224 The Bosnian Muslimshad less historical
likely from the General Staff's crack “ Black Swans" attachment to Kupres itself but held nearby Bugojno
unit — infiltrating Serb lines northwest of Nevesinje. and wanted to control the lines of communication
The conventional assault began with the Bosnian from Kupres to the real Muslim objective in the
Army shelling Serb positions on the morning of area - Donji Vakuf, 20 kilometers to the northeast.
11 November, followed by an infantry attack from
Blagaj.216 217 218 The conventional assaults had only The Bosnian Army fired the first shots of the cam
limited success , but the infiltration teams appear to paign with a unilateral offensive effort against Kupres
have caused considerable disruption in Serb rear beginning on 20 October, launching infantry attacks
areas.219 Some of the infiltration teams, however, had against the VRS 30th Infantry Division Donji Vakuf
to fightit outwith the Herzegovina Corps, and most along a roughly 14 -km front northeast of the town.225
likely took heavy casualties on the way out. The Bos 226 By 23 October, the ARBiH had advanced close
nian Armyoffensive halted around 20 November with enough to Kupres to directmortar fire into the town.227
apparently heavy casualties on both sides.220 221 222 223 The Bosnian Army's 7th Corps continued to make
slow advances in the difficult, mountainous terrain ,
Chapter 62 capturing one peak at a timebut never able to achieve
Combined Croat-Muslim Operations in a decisive breakthrough . Nevertheless, by 27 October
West-Central Bosnia , October -November 1994 * UN observers were reporting VRS forces in retreat
and Serb civilians fleeing the town.228 229
The year was to close with a major offensive opera
tion in west- central Bosnia , which began with the cap Yet the Bosnian Army failed to press on all the way
ture of Kupres and then continued northeast and west into Kupres. This could have been for a variety or a
from there . Presaging the much larger combined combination of reasons. The advance had been slowed
offensive that would end the war the following year, by fog , rain , and the need to consolidate gains. Even
this series of attacks was to include simultaneous against the thinly stretched Serb defenders, advances
actions by the Bosnian Army, the HVO , and the in the rugged mountains northeast of the town had
been a costly and wearing process. The 7th Corps
* For more details, see Annex 50 : Donji Vakuf, 1994 and Annex
58 : "With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies ?” The HVO
Bosnian Army Capture of Kupres, November 1994.

242
-

- ---
 ---

leadership may simply have concluded that a pause in too late for the Bosnian Government, however , the
the offensive would be prudent and that the ARBiH Croats were already announcing that special police
by now just a few kilometers outside the town — could and HVO special forces detachments had entered
make the final push whenever it cared to ; or there may Kupres a little after midday.235 236
have been a prior agreement with the Croats that
would explain the holdup. Whatever the cause , the Exactly what the Croats and Muslims had agreed to
Bosnian Army's delay - of just a few days — was to before the offensive remains unclear.237 It seemsmost
prove crucial. By the first of November, the ARBiH likely that the two factions had discussed their inten
7th Corps had driven to the front gates of Kupres. It tions to the extent of agreeing on a simultaneous
was to be the Bosnian Croats , however, who would attack in the direction of Kupresbut without divulging
race into the town through the other, unguarded gate . actual operational plans to each other. Probably the
Bosnian Army did not have its heart set on capturing
Through the end of October, the HVO had remained Kupres — before the war the large Croat population
on the sidelines of the Kupres battle, massing its had dominated the town — but it had paid the town's
forces and waiting for themost opportune moment to ransom in blood slogging through the hills to the
step in . HVO commander Ante Roso's newly estab north . Its troops were undoubtedly less than pleased to
lished HVO Guards Brigades had been collecting in discover that the Croats had meanwhile raced in from
the area for days and would serve as the backbone of the south to occupy the town. Regardless, the Bosnian
the operation. Three of the four HVO Guards Brigades Government leadership evidently arrived at the prag
were to contribute to the operation , further supported matic decision that Croatmilitary cooperation was
by the elite 60th “Ludvig Pavlovic” Guards Airborne more important than ownership of traditionally Croat
Battalion, Bosnian CroatMUP special police troops, Kupres, recognizing that a battle for the town could
and HVO corps -level artillery . (In addition , although well reignite the Croat-Muslim war that had already
Zagreb vociferously denied any participation in the proved so destructive to both sides.
battle , Croatian Army forces almost certainly took
part in at least the planning and probably the actual For all its flaws in planning and execution, the Croat
execution of the attack .) 230 Muslim capture of Kupres was nevertheless a step in
the right direction — militarily, politically, and geo
With the Bosnian Army on the verge of taking the graphically — and a step closer to both factions' ulti
town — and tying down the Serb defenders — the time mate objective of Jajce . Itwas still not clear whether
had come to launch Operation “ Cincar," the Croat the ARBiH and the HVO were marching down the
capture of Kupres. Having chosen its moment care road in cadence or racing each other toward the desti
fully , the HVO pushed a two -pronged offensive from nation , however.
the south against the thinly stretched 7th Kupres
Sipovo Motorized Brigade/ 2nd Krajina Corps begin
ning on 1 November. One spearhead drove north from The Year's Last Drive on Donji Vakuf,
Sujica along the main road into Kupres. This western November 1994
axis captured the town of DonjiMalovan on 1 Nov
ember and continued several kilometers further to take After the Bosnian Croat capture of Kupres, the Bos
smaller Gornji Malovan on 2 November.231 A second nian Army could advance no further south and once
spearhead advanced in parallel to the east,moving again redirected its main efforts toward Donji Vakuf
from Ravno to the Serb -held village of Rilic on to the north . On 4 November the Serb -held hamlets of
2 November 232 233 Kupres — by this point an aban Koscani (about 7 km southwest of Donji Vakuf),
doned ghost town — fell to the lightning Croat advance Kopcici, and Urije fell to determined infantry
on 3 November. The ARBiH had meanwhile contin attacks.238 After further probing assaults, equipment
ued itsmethodical advance and announced the capture
of the heights at Kupreska Vrata — a mere 3 km from
the center of town — that sameday.234 It was even now

243
shifts, and extensive preparations in the area, the Bos Chapter 63
nian Army 7th Corps launched a major assault toward The Western Theater
Donji Vakuf - about 16 km away — from the south
west on 7 November.239 Bosnian Croat artillery
though not troops — supported the attack on VRS 30th The Bihac Battles of 1994 *
Division defense lines between Kupres and Donji
Vakuf.240 241 A day of heavy shelling failed to pave the While the Croat-Muslim war burned itself out and
way past Prusac , 7 km south of Donji Vakuf.Muslim then concluded and the series of ARBiH offensives
and Serb troops tried to push each other off the strate sprawled across the rest of Bosnia in the spring and
gic high ground over the next few days , but neither summer of 1994 , the isolated Bihac pocket remained a
could dislodge the other.242 The Bosnian Armymade theater unto itself. The hardy but still isolated ARBiH
another hard drive on 16-20 November, shelling and 5th Corps ( supported by a tiny contingent of allied
assaulting Serb -held Koscani, which sat atop high HVO fighters ) continued to battle no less than three
ground overlooking Donji Vakuf.243 244 245 The end of separate opponents : the Bosnian Serbs, the Krajina
November and December saw weeks of bitter, incon Serbs from Croatia , and Fikret Abdic'sMuslim rebels
clusive , uphill- and -downhill fighting along the ridge of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia
lines surrounding the town . As November turned into (APWB). On the separate stage of the Bihac enclave ,
December, both sides abandoned the offensive and these actors would play out a bloody and complicated
settled in for a dug - in winter facing each other across series of battles during the course of the year.
the trench lines running up and down the pine- forested
ridges. At least until the following spring, the war of
maneuver was over. The Demise of Fikret Abdic's Empire ,
January -August, 1994
Cooperation between the Bosnian Army and the
Croats was surprisingly good during the last stages of It's absolutely crazy here. There's a joke going
the attack on Donji Vakuf, even if the Croats did take around. Three people die on the Abdic side, and
control of Kupres without fully signaling their inten then three people die on theGovernment side.
tion to do so . Relations remained good enough even Who wins ? The Serbs, 6-0 .
after the fall of Kupres that the Bosnian Croats were
supplying the Bosnian Army with weapons during its -A UN official in Bihac, June 1995 249
attacks on Donji Vakuf.246 HVO guns and rocket
launchers actively supported Bosnian Army units in In mid -January the Bosnian Government threw the
early November, with a mixed team of Croat and first punch in the continuing, back -and -forth war
Muslim artillery spotters directing fire for both between the Bosnian Army and Abdic's rebels.
armies. 247 ARBiH 5th Corps forces pressed along a broad front,
advancing about 2 kilometers and capturing the town
As 1994 drew to a close , the Bosnian Armyhad come of Skokovi.250 251252 The fighting paused at the end of
frustratingly close to Donji Vakuf, but success the month , as the opposing Muslim factions signed a
remained out of reach . Alagic's 7th Corps soldiers cease- fire and exchanged bodies of those killed in
could see — but not yet enter - Donji Vakuf from the action.253 Beginning on 16 February ,however, the
hills to the south and southwest. The VRS 30th Infan tables turned , as the Abdic forces and the Bosnian

try Division still held the even higher peaks to the

Formore details, see Annex 59: The Demise of Abdic's Empire,
northwest and northeast and retained a secure defen January-August, 1994; Annex 60 : Operation “ Breza 94," The Bos
sive position for the winter months. As it turned out, nian and Krajina Serb Armies Attack Bihac , September 1994 ;and
the war for control of Donji Vakuf would be fought Annex 61: Punch and Counterpunch, Bihac Operations, October
December 1994 .
from ridge line to ridge line for almost another year.248

244
Serbs hit the ARBiH 5th Corps with simultaneous The emphasis of the fighting came to center on the
attacks from two directions.254 Bosnian Army Brig . key town of Pecigrad , which had been fiercely con
Gen. Arif Pasalic confirmed on 21 February that tested for over a week.266 Both the assaulting ARBiH
Abdic forces had advanced to within 10 km of govern 5th Corps and Abdic's defending 4th Brigade knew
ment-held Cazin . Atthe same time, UN officials that the town's capture would open the way for a Bos
reported that Bosnian Serb forces of Maj.Gen. Boric's nian Army advance into Velika Kladusa Abdic's 4th
2nd Krajina Corps were strongly pressuring Bihac and Brigadeprobably the APWB's best formation — did
Bosanska Krupa.255 256 For a time, the situation looked not give ground, but found itself increasingly sur
almost critical, but Dudakovic's resilient 5th Corps rounded by fast-moving Bosnian Army advances. The
managed to rally yet again . No further advances were 5th Corps forces had surrounded the town on three
reported , and comparatively little fighting took place sides by 22 June , leaving Abdic's 4th Brigade block
along the Abdic - 5th Corps confrontation line during ing the government advance but trapped in
most of spring 1994.257 Pecigrad 267 268 269

When the Bosnian Government signed a cease - fire Desperate , Abdic appealed for help to his last hope ,
with the Bosnian Serbs in early June, it freed up the the Krajina Serbs. The Krajina Serb Army ( Srpska
Bosnian Army's 5th Corps to devote its full attention Vojska Krajina – SVK ) had continued to support the
against the Abdic separatists. Abdic did not sign the Abdic rebels with artillery fire but had remained
agreement, and the 5th Corps could finally divert unwilling to commit Serb infantry into the battle itself.
scarce resources to take on its secondary opponent.258 On 30 June, UN monitors reported that the SVK had
The Abdic forces appear to have struck the first blow , removed at least 20 heavy weapons from UN
reportedly attacking government-held territory on monitored weapons collection sites in Croatia and
11 June and making some initial gains.259 260 The moved them into Abdic -controlled territory.270 The
battlefield situation changed rapidly, though , and by UN was extremely concerned that the SVK would
13 June the ARBiH had counterattacked successfully, cross over to battle the 5th Corps in Bosnia , but, in the
capturing some 30 square kilometers and advancing to event, the Krajina Serbs elected not to commit their
the outskirts of Pecigrad — a small but crucial town own troops directly in support of Abdic's failing
astride the key north - south highway from Cazin to regime.
Abdic's stronghold of Velika Kladusa.261 The follow
ing day, reports emerged that Abdic had purged his At this point in the seesaw battle that Bihac had
ranks, arresting 500 ormore of his own supporters he become, one of the oddest operations of the entire
suspected of disloyalty.262 Bosnian war was launched . The intricate and auda
cious Operation “ Tigar-Sloboda '94 ” ( Tiger-Freedom
Whether inspired by Abdic's leadership or fear of '94 ) was to prove perhaps themost daring and unor
arrest, the APWB forces rallied on 15-16 June, halting thodox stunt of ARBiH 5th Corps commander Dudak
the 5th Corps advance and counterattacking near the ovic's career .
town of Liskovac.263 By 20 June , however, the UN
reported that government forces had resumed their The first reports of odd developments in the Bihac
advance, approaching to within 13 km of Abdic's de pocket came on 7 July ,when both local and Western
facto capital of Velika Kladusa.264 The fiercest fighting news organizations reported that 5th Corps troops had
was in and around the town ofGolubovici, which sat surrounded the French UN peacekeeping contingent's
atop the high ground overlooking the approaches to compound in Bihac city.271 Later in the day, Abdic's
Velika Kladusa.265 Meanwhile , UN observers - fear news agency reported that the chaos had been caused
ing an escalation of the conflict — watched nervously by mutinying 5th Corps troops who had refused to
as Krajina Serb Army troops supported the Abdic continue fighting the Muslim rebels. On 9 July ,
rebels with tank and artillery fire from across the
border in Croatia.

245
UNPROFOR spokesmen reported gunfire and explo Meanwhile, as Abdic and the 5th Corps battled to the
sions in Bihac itself, but, as the French were still con north , the VRS also continued its own operations
fined to base , the UN could not confirm exactly who against Dudakovic's forces.283 In July, Major General
the 5th Corps was fighting.272 Reports began to filter Grujo Boric's 2nd Krajina Corps hoped to finally
in that loyal 5th Corps troops were battling defecting occupy all of the Grabez plateau and seize the south
" peace force ” elements who had gone over to Abdic's ern (right) bank of the Una River,which it had been
side. Then Abdic's own brigades — again backed by trying to do since 1992. The capture of these areas
Krajina Serb artillery and mortar fire - mounted a would allow the corps to take important railroad links
supporting assault along part of the confrontation line. running through the outskirts of Bihac city . The VRS's
Things looked bleak indeed for Dudakovic's 5th previous effort had come in February 1994. The new
Corps — simultaneously fighting against the Bosnian operation , “ Una 94," appears to have begun on
Serbs, the Krajina Serbs, the Abdic rebels, and “peace 11 July - concurrentwith the Abdic /Krajina Serb push
force” mutineers within its own ranks.273 toward Cajici. The first objective of the three light
infantry brigades leading the attack was to capture
On 10 July, however, the Bosnian Army announced important hills on the plateau — which seemsto have
triumphantly that the entire " peace force” rebellion been perpetually contested — then grab the villages
had been a charade, engineered by the 5th Corpshead- lining the Una below the hills.284 The Serb troops
quarters and executed largely through the unwitting again made little or no progress against the defending
collaboration of the Abdic forces. As it turned out, the Muslims, and the battle had ended by 15 July.
5th Corps had staged a mock mutiny, confining the
UN to base to prevent its finding out the truth and At the beginning of August the center of battle shifted
allowing reporters access only to selected pieces of once again to the little town of Pecigrad ,where
information . The capstone of the effort, however, was Abdic's surrounded defenders continued to put up a
an appeal for assistance from a fictional " Seventh Bri determined resistance . Bosnian Army forces pounded
gade” of Abdic supporters in the town of Izacic . Eager the town with mortar and artillery fire, but Abdic's 4th
to assist more supposed defectors , Abdic — with Kra Brigade hung on determinedly.285 Pecigrad finally fell
jina Serb assistance — sent truckloads of small arms, on 4 August, after the 4th Brigade's commander
rocket launchers, and ammunition to his alleged sup refused a 5th Corps surrender offer and was killed by
porters. Of course, on arrival, the 5th Corps took glee a tank round immediately afterward.286 At least 800
ful possession of both the weapons and the Abdic Abdic defenders — and their much -needed weapons
agents sent to deliver them . It was a classic “ Trojan were captured , and roughly 2,000 Bosnian Army
Horse" operation in reverse.274 troops were freed up to fight elsewhere.287 The way
was open for the 5th Corps to continue its advance .
In the end , the operation proved a brilliant and com
pletely successful combination of deception and exe On 21 August, just hours after Abdic refused the Bos
cution . The desperately underarmed 5th Corps gained nian Government's unconditional surrender demand ,
an additional 3,000 weapons and over 200,000 rounds Bosnian Army troops overran Velika Kladusa.288 289
of ammunition provided by its APWB opponents , The Bosnian Government announced a three-day
no less . A handful ofkey Abdic supporters in Bihac amnesty period for any former rebels, but hundreds of
had tipped their hand, allowing the 5th Corps to round Abdic soldiers abandoned their weapons and joined
up the enemy sympathizers within its ranks, and the massive column of 10,000 or more refugees flee
Dudakovic had achieved a public relations coup, ing Velika Kladusa for the Serb -held sections of adja
boosting the morale of his own forces and exposing cent Croatia .290 Abdic himself also abandoned Velika
the Abdic rebels as Serb collaborators. While later Kladusa for the relative safety of Croatia, where he
battlefield successes were undoubtedly greater in would seek Serb backing for a renewed effort.
scope , in many ways “ Tigar-Sloboda 94 " was the wily
Dudakovic's masterstroke.275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282

246
There was to be little rest for the Bosnian Army's tri 1 kilometer of the town. ARBiH units , however,man
umphant 5th Corps. Within three weeks of the rout of aged to hold key hills surrounding Otoka , blocking
Abdic , the VRS and Krajina Serbs would counterat further progress. To the north , on the main drive
tack with Operation “ Breza 94.” toward Buzim , VRS and SVK forces hit stiff resis
tance and advanced only 1 to 3 kilometers. By 12 Sep
tember, the 5th Corps, spearheaded by the crack 505th
Operation " Breza 94 ," The Bosnian and Krajina Buzim Motorized Brigade, was ready to counterat
Serb Armies Attack Bihac, September 1994 tack . Muslim recon - sabotage units were able to infil
trate VRS lines while hitting the VRS/SVK
In the midst of the continuing ARBiH offensive oper spearheads in the flank . Serb troops withdrew in near
ations, the VRS began planning in August for a new panic, and ARBiH units almost captured General
offensive against the Bihac enclave , " Breza (Birch ) Mladic . The offensive abruptly ended.
94.” Unfortunately for the Serbs , the new offensive
was ill timed , coming after the ARBiH 5th Corps had The 5th Corps again demonstrated that strong,well
defeated Abdic's rebel forces. As a result, the 5th organized VRS offensives could be contained by rela
Corps faced only two major attack axes, not three. The tively well-prepared Muslim defenses. The difficult
VRS plan called for 2nd Krajina Corps to lead off the terrain and low -force density frontages around Buzim
offensive with renewed attacks on the Grabez plateau favored the 5th Corps's studied use of picked recon
to seize the line of the Una River and eventually seize sabotage units to infiltrate and disrupt VRS positions.
rail lines on the east side of Bihac city . The 1st Krajina Serb deficiencies in tactical training and junior leader
Corps, in conjunction with the SVK 39th Banija ship were exposed and exploited by the superior low
Corps, would then follow with an assault between the level tactics and motivation ofMuslim units. VRS
two towns of Buzim and Bosanska Otoka on the strengths in higher -level command staff skills and
northeastern side of the enclave . Once VRS forces firepower proved of little effect in these battles .
broke through here , the Serbs would push on to the
Bihac enclave's central road and logistic hub around
the town of Cazin . The loss of Cazin , splitting the Punch and Counterpunch : Bihac Operations,
enclave in half, would virtually ensure the complete October -December 1994
defeat of the 5th Corps.
By the fall of 1994, Brigadier General Atif Dudak
Major General Grujo Boric's 2nd Krajina Corps began ovic's ARBiH 5th Corps was a confident, experi
its attack on 31 August against key ARBiH -held hill enced , and battle -hardened force . After trouncing their
defenses on the Grabez plateau . Although the Serbs “ Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia ” oppo
appear to have made some initial gains, 5th Corps nents, and having weathered the Bosnian Serb “ Breza
troops drove the VRS forcesback to their original 94 " offensive against them immediately afterward , the
positions on 6 September. 5th Corps' troops were ready to take the offensive.
The operation was codenamed "Grmec -94," and it
A day before ,MajorGeneral Momir Talic's 1st Kra was to begin late that autumn.
jina Corps — under GeneralMladic's direct
supervision — had begun the main VRS push , signaled On 25 October, almost the entire 5th Corps was
with the firing of “ Orkan ” 262-mm rockets with clus unleashed against VRS 2nd Krajina Corps to the
ter munitions at the Muslim -held towns of Buzim and south , with only a relatively small holding force
Cazin . Attacking from Serb -held Croatia and positions defending the enclave's other borders with the SVK .
in Bosnia east of Otoka, VRS and SVK troops slowly Dudakovic's forces achieved near -complete surprise ,
pushed Muslim forces back toward Buzim and Otoka and government forces captured the Grabez barracks
with the support of strong artillery fire . By 9 Septem
ber, Serb units on the secondary axis toward Otoka
had seized a bridgehead over the Bastra River within

247
and much of the long- contested Grabez plateau east of dangerously overextended . Having taken almost 250
Bihac - locations from which the VRS had constantly square kilometers in one week , 300 the 5th Corps now
shelled the town on the first day.291 As an added faced the challenge of hanging on to what it had just
bonus, the always underequipped 5th Corps forces won .
seized and distributed the contents of the barracks ,
further fueling their advance. The Bosnian Army con The VRS's GeneralMilovanovic had matched his
tinued to make major advances over the next few public threats with private actions, ordering all VRS
days, advancing along two main axes south and east of corps commands to contribute reinforcements to cre
Bihac. By 27 October the Bosnian Army had taken ate three composite brigades for deployment to Bihac,
between 100 and 150 square kilometers of territory , where he was planning a major counteroffensive .
advancing about 10 km south toward Bosanski Petro Major GeneralRajko Balac , the commander of the
vac and reaching right up to the edges of Bosanska VRS's military training center, even led some of his
Krupa to the east.292 Although the exultant 5th Corps cadets to the Krupa area to beef up the operation ,
brigades continued to press forward , the ARBiH along with troops from parts of the 1st Krajina Corps.
advance was beginning to outpace itself. Movement The arrival of these forces helped blunt the 5th Corps
began to slow as the 5th Corps attempted to consoli assault on Krupa and broke the encirclement with a
date its gains and allow its rudimentary logistic sys counterattack ; 2nd Krajina Corps troops had mean
tem to catch up with the advancing frontline forces.293 while managed to slow the 5th Corps west of Krupa.
As a result, the 5th Corps was unable to broaden the
At this point, the Bosnian Serb leadership became base of its operation, leaving its new holdings to the
genuinely concerned about the military situation in south , toward Kulen Vakuf, stretched out in a vulnera
northwest Bosnia , and they were outraged that the ble salient.
United Nations watched apparently unconcerned as
the Bosnian Governmentmounted a large-scale offen With the 5th Corps offensive contained ,General Milo
sive out of the supposedly demilitarized “ safe area” of vanovic took direct command of the combined Serb
Bihac . Bosnian Serb Army Chief of Staff Milovanovic forces and launched the VRS counteroffensive , Oper
demanded that the Bosnian Army withdraw to its con ation " Stit (Shield ) 94" on 4 November 301Milo
frontation line of 23 October and threatened that the vanovic's ambitious objective was to recapture all lost
VRS would " retaliate by attacking the area from territory, establish the “border” ofRepublika Srpska at
which their attacks are launched ” if they failed to do the Una River, and eliminate the 5th Corps as a mili
so.294 Bosnian Serb President Karadzic called for an tary threat. In addition, the Serbs clearly hoped to
all- out counteroffensive to recapture the lost territory establish Fikret Abdic as a Muslim puppet leader over
and called for retaliation “ regardless of the safe the region . VRS forces had already retaken Kulen
areas." 7295 296 297 Vakuf on 1 November, three days before the formal
start of the operation , and Serb troops quickly attacked
In the last days of October the 5th Corps would reach back up the main Bihac-Petrovac road , down which
the high water mark of its " Grmec -94 ” advance. To 5th Corps had raced in October. In addition , Balac's
the east, the ARBiH had encircled but not captured the troops — despite the general's death in action the day
very sizable town of Bosanska Krupa.298 Intense bat the counteroffensive began — assaulted 5th Corps
tles raged for two days in Bosanska Krupa, and at least forces west of Krupa, on the Grabez plateau .
one ARBiH brigade forced its way into the town itself.
In the end , however, the VRS held the town, and By 8-9 November, VRS troops, organized into four
Bosanska Krupa marked the end of the offensive's tactical groups, had closed to within 10 kilometers of
eastward advance.299 To the south , the Bosnian Army Bihac city, having driven 5th Corps forces down the
had captured the town of Kulen Vakuf, on the Bihac -Petrovac road and along the Croatian border.
Bosnian -Croatian border fully 30 km southeast of The first significant engagement of Krajina Serb
Bihac. The 5th Corps continued to press forward even
after this, although its lines had already become

248
Army (SVK ) units in the battle began as SVK 15th The Serbs now were on intent on going beyond the
Lika Corps and VRS 2nd Krajina Corps formations previous frontline and knocking out the 5th Corps.
assaulted 5th Corps and HVO positions southwest of
Bihac city for limited gains, while to the east VRS With joint VRS/SVK forces pushing toward the city
forces pushed 5th Corps units back 4 kilometers and SVK - VRS- Abdic units maintaining their pressure
northwest of Krupa. On 8 November, a Krajina Serb on Grabez at Velika Kladusa and around Krupa , the
" Orao " fighter-bomber from Udbina Air Base in the 5th Corps defenses were stretched to the limit and
RSK violated NATO's " no- fly zone" around Bihac nearing the breaking point. A NATO airstrike against
city and destroyed an ammunition storage depot in Udbina on 21 November to punish the Serbs for their
Bihac with Maverick missiles. airstrikes against Bihac had no effect on the Serb
advance, nor did Croatia's 1 December warning that it
While VRS troops were closing in on Bihac city and might intervene militarily if Bihac was about to fall.302
the Grabez plateau , the SVK , with assistance from On 23-24 November, SVK /VRS units pressing the 5th
Belgrade, wasmobilizing and reorganizing the rem Corps along the southwestern approaches to Bihac
nants of Fikret Abdic's “ People's Defense " forces of overran the key Debeljaca hill, looking directly down
the APWB. On 16 November, this new army attacked on the city. Over the next week , Serb troops edged
across the border toward Velika Kladusa. Abdic's closer to the city through its outlying villages in heavy
reconstructed force amounted to some 4,000 to 5,000 fighting. The battle for the city's water treatment plant
troops , bolstered by about 2,500 SVK troops in two was particularly intense , and it appears to have fallen
tactical groups and some 500 Yugoslav Army and Ser- only on 7-8 December.Nevertheless, although the
bian RDB/MUP special operations troops , under the Serbs certainly fought to dominate the approaches to
command of SVK Major GeneralMile Novakovic and Bihac, it does not appear that they intended to actually
Serbian RDB Colonel “ Raja ” Bozovic . The few 5th capture the city, and in the event they did not despite
Corps formations put up a stiff defense as the Serb / their substantial gains.GeneralMilovanovic in a post
Abdic forces lapped around both ARBiH flanks on the war interview makes a good case that the VRS had no
north and south sides of Velika Kladusa in an attempt intention of physically occupying the city .
to pinch it off.
Whether or notGeneralMilovanovic was ordered by
Further south , three tactical groups from the SVK 15th the RS Supreme Command not to enter the city, the
Lika Corps formations, reinforced with SVK units failure or inability of the VRS/SVK to capture Bihac
from Eastern and Western Slavonia and the Knin area , seemed to signal that the Serbs were unable to defeat
attacked along three axes , one toward Cazin and two the 5th Corps, and the strong 5th Corps defense of
toward Bihac . In support of this drive , the Serbs Grabez, Krupa, and the western approaches to the
launched another airstrike on 18 November, narrowly enclave take on more significance. Dudakovic's abil
missing 5th Corps headquarters in Bihac city with ity to hold and defend these areas in late November
napalm and cluster bombs. The attack toward Cazin , meant that the VRS/SVK operation was unable to
although it penetrated 2 to 3 kilometers, quickly reach the center of the enclave at Cazin and dismantle
stalled. Around Bihac, however, the joint 15th Lika the 5th Corps, marking a partial but significant failure
and 2nd Krajina Corps's renewed assault against the of Operation “ Stit 94.”
defenses southwest of the city quickly crushed HVO
forces on 20 November, overrunning severalCroat While battles continued in December in the southwest,
villages and advancing into the UN “ safe area” around as well as at Grabez and Krupa, themain focus of the
Bihac city . The VRS launched a new attack at Bosan fighting shifted to Velika Kladusa. During the first two
ska Krupa on 20 November, crossing the Una River weeks of December, SVK /APWB forces led by the
north of the town in a move to outflank ARBiH VJ/Serbian special operations troops hammered 5th
defenses. That sameday, General Milovanovic was
able to announce that the VRS had retaken all of the
territory it had lost to the Muslims' October offensive .

249
Corps positions and inched forward against a tena VRS/SVK /APWB forces. Bihac's fall would have
cious defense. The Serb commanders' objective allowed the SVK and VRS to consolidate their posi
remained to force the ARBiH from the town with a tion in western Bosnia , virtually integrating the RS
pincer movement rather than a frontal assault. On and RSK , which Croatia obviously found politically
15-16 December the joint Serb/ APWB units seized unacceptable .More important, however, it would
key high ground overlooking the main 5th Corps sup havemade any future Croatian Army assault on the
ply line into the town. This forced the remaining RSK that much more difficult without the 5th Corps to
ARBiH troops to withdraw to avoid being cut off and threaten the SVK rear. Thus it was that Zagreb issued
annihilated; by 17 December the town was under its firstwarnings to the Serbs on 10 and 14 November
Serb /APWB control. Although battles were to con that it was considering intervening in the event that
tinue throughout the enclave for over a week — until Bihac seemed on the verge of falling. US diplomatic
the implementation of the nationwide cease -fire nego pressure on Zagreb not to widen the war persuaded the
tiated by former US President Jimmy Carter — the fall Croatians to hold back on these threats, but on
of Velika Kladusa was the lastmajor action of the 29 November the Croatian Army, together with the
campaign . HVO , initiated Operation “ Zima (Winter ) 94 ” in the
Livno Valley, hitting a long quiet 2nd Krajina Corps
The operations at Bihac during late 1994 were some sector. This operation was designed both to relieve
of the most operationally and tactically interesting pressure on Bihac in the near term and to position HV
actions ofthe year, highlighting the strengths and forces for a later advance on the RSK capital of Knin .
weaknesses of both sides. The Bosnian Army's light Two days later, on 1 December, Croatian Defense
ning offensive in October clearly showed the Minister Susak again warned that the Croatians would
ARBiH's superiority at the tactical level, particularly intervene directly against the RSK if necessary : " If
in its use of elite recon- sabotage units and infiltration Croatia should estimate that Bihac will fall, Croatia
tactics. The complete collapse of the VRS 2nd Krajina will intervene before that happens.??303 Neither the ini
Corps in this offensive showed the lack of discipline , tiation of “ Zima 94” nor the Croatian threats seemed
training, and cohesion — despite clear recognition at to have any effect on the continued advance of the
senior levels of the VRS — that infected the lower lev VRS/SVK forces .
els of the Army. The VRS counteroffensive (together
with the SVK ) also showed the Serb forces' continued Nominally under the control of HVO MajorGeneral
resiliency when it threw back 5th Corps forces Tihomir Blaskic and the HVO Main Staff, " Zima 94 "
through the VRS's combination of unparalleled com employed as many as 3,000 to 4,000 HV troops of the
mand and staff work and heavy firepower. Finally, “ Livno" Operational Group for the main attack force,
Dudakovic's ability to hold his ground at the gates of with more in reserve.304 The HVO -led “ Kupres" Oper
Bihac and Velika Kladusa , despite the VRS/SVK's ational Group contributed another 2,000 to 3,000
overwhelming strength , illustrated the ARBiH's great troops for supporting attacks. They faced up to 3,500
est asset throughout the war - its morale . VRS 2nd Krajina Corps troops spread along some 55
kilometers of front.

Operation " Zima 94” : Croatia Reenters the War, The assault began on 29 November in bitterly cold
November December 1994 weather and heavy snow , when Major General Ante
Gotovina's HV troops began infiltrating VRS posi
It was not only the Western nations that vigorously tions in the Dinara Mountains along the Croatian
protested the VRSmove toward Bihac . The Croatian Bosnian border. In more than a week of fighting,HVI
Government had important strategic reasons for want HVO troops attacking along the Livno Valley and the
ing to ensure that the enclave was not occupied by

* For a more detailed account, see Annex 62.

250
Dinara mountains penetrated some 10 to 12 kilome Chapter 64
ters into VRS positions. On the far right, southeast of Conclusion *
Glamoc, however,HVO units attacking alone were
unable to gain any significant ground against a stub Although it may not have been evident at the time,
born VRS defense. Over the next two weeks, as the 1994 was to prove a turning point in the war. At the
HV “Livno " OperationalGroup kept up the pressure , beginning of the year the VRS had the initiative, con
VRS resistance continued to crumble, despite some tinuing offensives from late in 1993 and pushing the
reinforcements from neighboring SVK units across ARBiH to the brink of defeat at Gorazde in April. By
the border. The VRS managed only a few local coun the end of the year,however, the VRS was clearly on
terattacks and, with all hope gone of holding positions the strategic defensive ,barely halting some ARBiH
in the middle section of the Livno Valley at manage and HVO offensives, conceding key towns for the first
able costs ,by 24 December the 2nd Krajina Corps had time in the war, and facing a hemorrhaging loss of ter
pulled back to more defensible positions along the ritory as the combined HV -HVO offensive drove inex
northern rim of the valley . Operation “ Zima 94" was orably up the Livno Valley.
over.
The settlement of the Croat-Muslim war was crucial
The operation had two primary strategic objectives. to the turning of the military tide against the Serbs. As
The firstwas to relieve pressure on the Bosnian Army long as their Croat and Muslim opponents were killing
5th Corps; the second was to seize VRS positions that each other off, they did not have to do anything at all
would eventually allow HV forces to attack the Kra to retain control over almost three - quarters of Bosnia .
jina Serb capital of Knin and the southern half of the Once the Croat-Muslim peace was brokered , the VRS
RSK . The HV /HVO attack failed to achieve its first had to actively defend itself against a series of increas
goal of diverting the VRS, although this was not the ingly powerful and sophisticated offensives — and
fault of the Croats, but rather represented a choice with less and less success. The Bosnian Army's spring
made by the VRS Main Staff. Mladic andMilo offensives were stopped cold atMt. Vlasic ,Mt. Sto
vanovic clearly chose to continue their counteroffen lice, Donji Vakuf, and Tesanj- Teslic . Repeated attacks
sive at Bihac rather than shift reserves to block the against these same locations were now wearing away
HV/HVO operation . They could not do both , and so the VRS, even if it was not conceding the territory.
the Croats were able to wear down the weak VRS The Bosnian Serbs were winning the battles and los
defenses along the Livno -Glamoc front. By default, ing the war.
the VRS decision not to transfer significant forces to
the sector gave the Croatians their secondary objective By October the VRS was not even winning all the bat
while the 5th Corps's successful stand against the tles. The ARBiH 5th Corps' October attack south of
VRS at Bihac gave the Croatians all that they had Bihac caughtthe 2nd Krajina Corps off guard , and the
desired . Bihac had survived , and the Croatians had VRS had to scramble to reinforce collapsing units,
gained their first steppingstone to Knin . restore the defense lines , and recapture the lost
ground . By November the VRS had lostKupres — the
Operation “ Zima 94" also gave observers their first first major Serb -held town surrendered during the
chance since 1993 to see how the HV conducted a rel war — and was losing territory southwest of Tesanj,
atively large offensive operation . The results were southeast of Konjic , and in the Livno -Glamoc valley.
impressive. In a month of fighting the HV was able to These losses were not rapid or especially serious as
advance over 20 kilometers and seize some 200 individual cases. Cumulatively ,however, they led to
square kilometers of territory. HV forces effectively the irrefutable conclusion that the VRS could not sus
integrated armor, infantry, and artillery into a com tain its war indefinitely and that its losses of troops
bined arms force that was able to defeat the opposing and territory were almost sure to increase .
VRS units, despite exceptionally difficult terrain and
bad weather. Nevertheless, this drive - although rapid
See Annex 63: UNPROFOR in 1994 : Towards Escalation or
by Bosnia's World War I standards — was significantly
Evacuation ? for a summary of UN activities.
slower than what theHV would accomplish during the
summer and fall of 1995 .

251
 Endnotes, Section V

These were (1 ) the President of Slovenia, (2 ) the President of ' Reuters, “Moslem Offensive in Central Bosnia Clouds Peace
Croatia , (3 ) the President of the self-proclaimed “Republic of Serb Talks," Nicole Courtney, 9 January 1994.
Krajina,” (4 ) the President of the Republic of Bosnia, (5 ) the Presi 10 Reuters, “Moslems Battle Outnumbered Croats in Central Bos
dent of the Croat-Muslim Bosnian Federation, (6 ) the President of nia,” by Dan de Luce , 10 January 1994 .
the self-proclaimed “ Croatian Republic of Herzeg -Bosna ,” (7 ) the " Reuters, “Moslems Press Offensive AgainstCroats , Snub Peace
President of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska, (8 ) the Presi Talk ” by Dan de Luce, 11 January 1994 .
dent of the self-proclaimed “ Autonomous Province of Western 12
Reuters, “ U.N. Says Jets Violate No -Fly Zone in Bosnia " by
Bosnia," (9 ) the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Samir Koric , 14 January 1994.
13
(Serbia and Montenegro ), ( 10 ) the Presidentof the Republic of Zagreb Radio , 21 January 1994. FBIS London LD2101233794,
Serbia, (11) the President of the Republic ofMontenegro ,and (12) 2123372 January 1994 .
the PresidentofMacedonia. The count does not include Ibrahim 14
Zagreb Radio , 18 February 1994. FBIS London LD1802230194,
Rugova, the “ President" of the outlawed Kosovar Albanian 1823012 February 1994 .
shadow government” in Serbia . 15 The HVO's 111th Home Defense Regiment in the Zepce enclave
2 See the 1992 section , “Mladic's Own: The Bosnian Serb Army," also obstructed UN aid convoys into besieged Maglajat this time.
for an overview of the VRS -SDS conflict. See also Milovan Milu 16 Specifically, Boutros-Ghali's letter charged that the Croatian
tinovic, " Wisdom and Caution," Srpska vojska 22 March 1996 , pp . Army had a total of 3,000 to 5,000 troops from the 1st, 2nd, 5th ,
10-14 , an interview with Lieutenant ColonelGeneral Milan Gvero, and 7th HV Guards Brigades; the 114th and 116th Brigades; and
VRS Assistant Commander for Morale, Religious, and Legal military police elements .
Affairs, in which Gvero discusses in detail the problems that the 17 Reuters, “ UN Chief Lists Croatian Military Units in Bosnia" by
VRS had with the SDS throughout the war. Evelyn Leopold, 2 February 1994.
18
3 As in 1993, VJ troops — other than individual officers and NCOs 18 Reuters, “ Italy Tells Croatia it Faces Possible Sanctions” by Paul
serving as cadre in VRS formations — consisted almost exclusively Holmes, 3 February 1994.
of units drawn from the VJ Corps of SpecialUnits, primarily from 19 Reuters, “ Bosnia , Croatia Request UN Border Monitors"
the63rd Airborne and 72nd Special Brigades. RDB/MUP troops 10 February 1994.
were drawn from " Frenki” Simatovic's “ Red Beret" special opera 20 Sarajevo Radio , 20 February 1994. FBIS London
tions unit, regionalMUP special police elements, and the MUP LD2002 194394, 201943Z February 1994.
controlled Serbian Volunteer Guard under Arkan . These Yugoslav / 21 Zagreb Radio , 23 February 1994. FBIS London LD2302220794,
Serbian troops were primarily involved in the Bihac counteroffen 23220787 February 1994.
sive in November-December 1994. 22 Reuters, “Moslems, Croats, British Forces Wary of New Bosnian
* The Krajina Serb Army (Srpska Vojska Krajina ) was the little Truce" by Kurt Schork, 24 February 1994.
brother of the VRS and was bound to the VRS through their former 23 Reuters, “ 189 Moslem , Croat Prisoners Freed in Bosnia,"
JNA ties. The two armies often operated as one force in the Bihac 1 March 1994 .
area, with integrated commands and other links. Both armies 24 Zagreb Radio , 12 March 1994. FBIS London LD1203125094,
received substantial financial and logistic support from the Yugo 1212507 March 1994 ,
slav Army (VI), as well as VJ officer and NCO cadres. The “ Peo 25 Reuters, “ Bosnia Accord Paves Way For IMF Help To Croatia "
ple's Defense" of Fikret Abdic's Autonomous Province of Western by Kolumbina Bencevic, 20 March 1994.
Bosnia was essentially a 5,000-man puppet army run by the SVK . 26 Paris AFP, 4 March 1994. FBIS Vienna AU0403135994 ,
Abdic's reliance on the Serbs became even greater after his forces 0413597 March 1994 .
were evicted from the Velika Kladusa in August 1994. When his 27 Paris AFP, 5 March 1994. FBIS Vienna AU0503193294 ,
rearmed and reorganized troops were sent back into Bihac in 051932Z March 1994 .
November 1994,an operational group headed by a Serbian RDB 28 Paris AFP, 7 March 1994. FBIS Vienna AU0703120294,
special police commander and a senior SVK officer directly com 0712027 March 1994 .
manded the force, superimposing Serbian authority over thenomi 29 Zagreb Hina, 7 March 1994. FBIS London LD0703152594,
nalMuslim commanders. 0715257 March 1994 .
5 A variant of these tactics often demonstrated on Mount Vlasic , 30 Paris AFP, 8 March 1994. FBIS Vienna AU0803184394,
near Travnik , and also during the summer 1994 Ozren offensive , 081843Z March 1994 .
was for a VRS frontline unit to withdraw to lure ARBiH infantry 31 There is no evidence to suggest that Beslagic - a strong believer
into an artillery killing zone pinned in by mines . After the Muslim in multiethnicity and a political independent— would have knuck
units were decimated, the Serbs would walk back in and take over led under to Serb demands. Beslagic was a longtime foe of Serb
their old positions. nationalism as well as ofMuslim nationalism .
6 Halilovic, Sefer, Lukava Strategija (“ Clever Strategy"), chapter 32 In a late January 1994 interview Bosnian Serb vice president
13. Nikola Koljevic — a member of the RS Supreme Command - stated
Reuters, " Change in War Aims, Generals Breeds Fear in Bosnia ” that the objective of the Olovo operations was to cutlinks between
by Kurt Schork, 16 December 1993. Tuzla and Sarajevo. Zeljko Garmaz, “ Croatia Could Return Krajina
8 Atits narrowest point, the Vitez enclave was less than 2 kilome
ters wide - narrow enough to see across.

252
 If the Serbs Are Given Considerable Autonomy,” Zagreb Globus Corps sent the bulk of the reinforcements, shifting local
28 January 1994, pp. 5-7 , from an interview with Vojislav Seselj reserves from otherbrigades in the 3rd Operational Group
and Nikola Koljevic. Essentially, Koljevic meant not just Sarajevo (Kladanj),while drawing a tactical group from the 2nd and
but links to all of central Bosnia (that is, Zenica). See also Dragan 5th Operational Groups (about a battalion from each bri
Cicic, “When the Spring Comes,” Belgrade Nin 21 January 1994, gade in the groups; brigades involved included the 1st and
pp . 25-26 . 2nd Tuzla , the 109th Doboj, 111th Gracanica, 117th Luka
33 The boundaries of two VRS corps, the Sarajevo-Romanija and vac), while the 3rd Corps also appears to have sent a tactical
the Drina Corps, ran just south of Olovo . As a result, it is unclear group. The 6th Corps shifted local reserves from the Visoko
which corps was in overall command of the operation ; it may in OG's other brigades. Total ARBiH troops probably num
fact have been directly led by theMain Staff. There was normally bered up to 12,000 men . See the Bosnian Army newspaper/
one brigade — 2nd Romanija Motorized Brigade/Drina Corps journal, Prva Linija 14 February 1994.
plus elements of the 1st Ilijas Infantry Brigade/Sarajevo-Romanija 36 The Herzegovina Corps appears to have organized a tactical
Corps deployed opposite the Olovo area. These formations appear group — referred to in the Serb press as the “ Combined Brigade" of
to have been reinforced with at least one tactical group from 1st the Herzegovina Corps — to reinforce the VRS offensive , probably
Krajina Corps (apparently up to a battalion of the 11th Mrkonjic taking over from tactical groups drawn from other corps thathad
Light Infantry Brigade, plus probably a battalion of the 6th Sanske been in the line for some time. Belgrade Tanjug 13 January 1994.
Infantry and 43rd Prijedor Motorized Brigades), plus major ele The tactical group appears to have consisted of composite battal
ments of the 65th Protection Motorized Regiment, and up to a bat ions drawn from at least the 15th Herzegovina Infantry and 18th
talion from 1stGuardsMotorized Brigade. The Sarajevo -Romanija Herzegovina Light Infantry Brigades, plus probably the 8th Herze
Corps appears to have siphoned assault units from its line brigades, govinaMotorized Brigade. In addition to the Herzegovinian
and the Drina Corps also sent composite units from several of its troops, itappears that the Yugoslav Army (VJ) transferred elements
brigades to reinforce the area. The estimated 10,000 troops of the elite 63rd Airborne Brigade— which had been fighting near
involved almost certainly were not all used in a single attack but Teocak — to help spearhead the attack. See Dragan Cicic , “When
rotated into the line when necessary . There were probably no more the Spring Comes,” Belgrade Nin 21 January 1994, pp. 25-26 , for
than 2,000 to 3,000 infantry attacking during any given assault. information from VRS sources on the presence of VJ troops at
34 The frontline in the Olovo sector ran from Olovske Luke, some 3 Olovo .
kilometers east of town to near the HVO -held Dastansko pocket 37 This narrative is again based primarily on a 1/50,000 scale map
(the remnants of the Vares force), a front of about 35 kilometers . analysis of contemporary press reporting, although this time
Olovo town was about 7 kilometers north of the forward trenches including additional information from Serb sources -Belgrade
directly to the south , protected by a line of hills over 1,000 meters. Tanjug and Belgrade Radio . The Reuters report from 15 January
An irregular feature of the front was the narrow VRS- held Brgule providing UN descriptions of thebattle area was also useful:
salient that jutted north from the Nisici plateau to Dastansko. The new VRS assault began on 12 January, another push
35 The following narrative of the battle is based primarily on a straight up the middle toward Olovo along the same line
detailed 1/50,000 scale map analysis of contemporary Sarajevo where the VRS had failed in late November-December. This
Radio reports during the VRS offensive, supplemented with checks time, however, the Herzegovina Corps troops broke through
in AFP and Reuters reporting, particularly some public UN the ARBiH line , seizing “ three rows ofbunkers covered
descriptions of the battles. Only Sarajevo Radio had details on the with earth ” (Belgrade Tanjug 13 January 1994 ), and captur
tactical information required for this analysis: ing the village of Krusevo on the right flank . The VRS
The VRS assault on 8 November began with an attack along troops continued to attack and by 15 January claimed to
two axes designed to push around the back and sides of have taken the village of Prgosevo , 3 kilometers south of
Olovo , rather than driving straight toward the town from the Olovo. The VRS had now advanced about 4 kilometers into
south . On the left-hand axis, VRS troops made initial gains the ARBiH defenses and threatened to break through the
in the Brgule salient on 8-11 November, penetrating to a Muslim lines and capture the town.
depth of 1 to 2 kilometers and overrunning severalMuslim ARBiH reinforcements from the 1st (taking over from 6th ),
populated villages, whose people fled. Attempts to exploit 2nd, and 3rd Corps were, however, rushing to the scene. In
this success failed because of the 126th Mountain Brigade's heavy fighting over the next five days, the Muslim troops
staunch defense of the important Zvijezda mountain mass, were able to halt the Serb attack and retake Prgosevo ,
which blocked the VRS from pushing behind Olovo . On the although the VRS held on to Krusevo. The VRS assault then
right, Serb troops advanced toward Olovske Luke from the petered out.
east,reaching the village's outskirts, but failed to break 38
Muslim sources refer to this attack as Operation “ Seminar 93,"
through the ARBiH defenses of the 1st Olovo Mountain although the actualnamewas Operation “ Kladanj93.” For exam
Brigade. ple , see Almasa Hadzic , “ The People of Krajina and the Drina Val
Two weeks after the first attack the VRS appears to have ley Share the Same Crust of Bread!" Travnik Bosnjak 2 January
shifted its focus to a frontal assault directly toward Olovo 1996 , pp . 10 , 23.
39
from the south , along a road into town along the line of It appears thatMajor GeneralNovica Simic, the commander of
Krusevo -Baktici-Kremenjaca (Hill 1113).Again , VRS the East Bosnian Corps, was in overall command of the operation.
attacks bogged down in the ARBiH defenses, now rein VRS forces in the area comprised the 1st and 2nd Majevica Light
forced with additional troops from 2nd, 3rd , and 6th Corps. Infantry Brigades/ Tactical Group “Majevica” from the East Bos
Fighting stretched into late December, when the operation nian Corps, which were the normal sector-holding brigades along
paused. the northwest side of the salient, probably reinforced with the elite
The successful Bosnian Army defenders were a composite 1st Bijeljina Light Infantry Brigade “ Panthers.” The Drina Corps
force that had reinforced the brigades that normally held probably reinforced the 1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade, which nor
sectors in the area. The Vares area was the corps boundary mally held the frontline along the southeast with the brigade's
between the ARBiH 2nd Corps and 6th Corps, with bri “ Drina Wolves” assault detachment. The Bijeljina SpecialPolice
gades from the 3rd OperationalGroup /2nd Corps ( 1st Detachment also probably took part. The totalforce probably num
Olovo Mountain ) and the Visoko OperationalGroup /6th bered about 5,000 troops.
Corps (126th Mountain ) normally holding the line. The 2nd

253
 42
40 The narrative is again based almost exclusively on an analysis of A good description can be found in a 24 February 1994 Sarajevo
Sarajevo Radio reporting covering the period of the offensive. See radio report, which was probably based on information provided by
also Almasa Hadzic, “ The People of Krajina and the Drina Valley the 7th Operational Group staff or the ARBiH General Staff:
Share the Same Crust of Bread !” Travnik Bosnjak 2 January 1996 , According to reliable assessments, these attacks will take
pp. 10 , 23 ,an article describing a tour of the area by General Duda the following course: the enemy will again try to cut the
kovic after the war; and Rifet Haskovic , “Crucial Test,” Travnik Doboj-Teslic route and occupy the valley of the Usora
Bosnjak 21 November 1995 , pp. 2-3, an interview with ARBiH River. There it will launch a massive offensive on the links
officer Senahid Hodzic, who served in the 206th Zvornik Brigade of the 110th Glorious HVO Usora Brigade and other units
at the time. Both articles have short descriptions of someelements ... with renewed calls for a Croatian betrayal... besieging
of the battle: Tesanj by capturing the dominant hills around it and gradu
The Serb assault began on 20 November, preceded appar ally destroying it. The aggressor's next step will be to cut
ently by SA - 2 surface-to - air missiles fired at the town of off theMaglaj- Tesanj route and thus close the circle around
Teocak in surface-to -surface role. The East Bosnian Corps Maglaj,which is at themoment under heavy attack. All this
forces attacked from the direction of Pribojtoward the vil would create the conditions for the complete occupation of
lage of Obrsine along the southwest side of the Snijeznica the Tesanj and Maglaj territories.
dam and reservoir (which supported the Ugljevik power 43 This account is based on analysis of Sarajevo , Zagreb , and Bel
plant). The Drina Corps troops advanced along a 8 -kilome grade Radio reporting covering 27 November- 28 December 1993 :
ter frontline between the village of Laze and the 700-meter The main fighting took place along a line of hills running
Zecija Kosa hill. A secondary attack pushed toward Tur from east of Teslic to south ofMaglaj and ranging from 300
sanovo Brdo and the village of Stari Teocak itself. The Mus to 600 meters in height. The main Maglaj- Tesanj road runs
lim defense was stubborn, and the VRS attack stretched into along this hill line. HVO troops claimed to have taken the
December. At some point, apparently in December, the importantBandera hill overlooking the road,and thus cut
VRS troops captured the important Visoka Glavica hill, ting it, on 5 December.Most of the battles during the rest of
between Laze and Zecija Kosa. If the Drina Corps units had the month involved VRS/HVO and ARBiH troops attacking
retained possession of the hill and continued the advance, and counterattacking in contention for control over this hill
they would soon have linked up to the East Bosnian Corps and the others along the route. For all practical purposes the
forces. Elements of the 1st Teocak and 206th Zvornik VRS and HVO appear to have severed the road butwere
Mountain Brigades, however, were able to recapture the unable to make any additional progress toward encircling
position. The battle ended on about 24 Decemberwith the Maglaj itself . Some time around mid -December, it appears
ARBiH still in control of its main defenses. that Stankovic's “ Ozren ” Tactical Group forces also under
Bosnian Armyorder of battle comprised elements of the 4th took supporting attacks against ARBiH positions along the
OperationalGroup/2nd Corps , primarily the 1st Teocak east bank of the Bosna River nearMaglaj town .
Mountain Brigade “Hajrudin Mesic” and the 206th Zvornik 44 The “ Doboj” OperationalGroup had the veteran 16th Krajina
Mountain Brigade. These brigadesmay have been rein Motorized Brigadenortheast of Teslic making the main thrust. It
forced with elements of the “ Black Wolves" Independent was supported on its left and right by the 1st Krnjin Light Infantry
Sabotage Battalion and the “ Zivinice Wasps” Countersabo Brigade and the 1st Teslic Infantry Brigade respectively. The 4th
tage Company. The force probably numbered about4,000 Battalion /43rd Prijedor Motorized Brigade also appears to have
troops. been involved in this sector. The 1st Gradiska Light Infantry Bri
41 The VRS/HVO forces operating southwest of Maglaj consisted gade later reinforced the 16th Krajina. The total attack force had an
of the following units: most of the 27th Derventa Motorized Bri estimated 4,000 to 5,000 troops. The forces around Maglaj town to
gade, elements of the 2nd Armored Brigade, the 4th Battalion /43rd the south and Ozren to the east remained aboutas described above.
Prijedor Motorized Brigade, and probably two to three battalions In addition , elements of the VRS light infantry brigades defending
from various VRS light infantry brigades, such as the 1st Prnjavor Doboj town - 1st Doboj, 2nd and 4th Banja Luka — and elements
Light Infantry or 1st Teslic Infantry Brigades. The VRS “ Ozren ” of the 2nd Armored Brigade made supporting attacks south of the
TacticalGroup 6 , under MajorMilovan Stankovic, had at least one town.
Ozren light infantry brigade, probably the 3rd Ozren, directly The ARBiH 7th OperationalGroup's 110th HVO Usora and 207th
opposite Maglaj town on the east bank of the Bosna River, and Usora Mountain Brigade — some 5,000 troops — took thebrunt of
likely reinforced it with assault elements from the other three the attack, supported by the 202nd TesanjMountain Brigade. The
Ozren brigades. The VRS forces were all under the command of 203rd Doboj-Bosna Motorized Brigade defended the area directly
“ Doboj” Operational Group 9 , headed by Colonel Arsic . HVO south of Doboj town. The other ARBiH forces remained as
Colonel Ivo Lozancic had two to three battalions of the 111th described above.
Zepce Brigade, plus the “ professional” Andrija Tadic Battalion 45 This narrative is based on analysis of Zagreb and Sarajevo Radio
arrayed againstMaglaj. The total number of troops probably was reporting covering 17 January to 20 March 1994 :
about 4,000 to 5,000 Serb troops and 1,000 to 2,000 Croattroops. Despite the size and experience of the VRS force, they
Someof these forces, however, plus another 1,000 to 2,000 HVO made little headway against the Usora defenders. The main
personnel,may have faced ARBiH troops around Zepce and Zavi effort by 16th Krajina Motorized over thenearly two
dovici to the south . months of the operation came against a 10 -kilometer front
ARBiH forces comprised the 7th (South ) OperationalGroup/2nd along the northwest corner of the enclave between the
Corps,but attached to 3rd Corps , because of the awkward distance Usora River and the Bandera hill (different feature ) toward
between it and the main 2nd Corps forces around Tuzla. Two bri the town of Jelah. The attack opened on 17 January, with the
gades , the 201stMaglaj and the 204th Teslic Mountain Brigades, apparent firing of a FROG -7 [Luna -M ] rocket at Tesanj.
comprised the bulk of the forces facing the attack along the south Attacks over the nextweek made no dent in the ARBiH
side of the enclave with about 4,500 troops. Three additional line, either in the main sector or aroundMaglaj town .
ARBiH brigades, plus an HVO brigade, defended the rest of the
enclave to the north (see endnote 44).

254
 On 21 January the 7th OG attacked out of Maglaj, penetrat analyst that a Bosnian Armymortar crew would have been able to
ing HVO defenses and advancing about 2 kilometers on a intentionally hit a difficult target such as the market— wedged
5 -kilometer front and capturing several villages. This suc between several buildings — without a few ranging shots. It seems
cess does not appear to have had a major effect on the con more likely that themortar round was fired randomly from VRS
tinuation of the offensive. At the beginning of February, the positions and happened to hit the market. For a detailed discussion
VRS launched a supporting attack from Doboj,crossing the of the UN investigation , see David Binder, “Anatomy of a Massa
Usora River toward Ularice. It gained little ground. In mid cre," Foreign Policy Winter 1994-1995 , pp . 70-78 . Also see Silber
February, themain attack also was renewed but failed to and Little ,pp. 310-311 for an informative commentary on the idea
break the HVO -ARBiH line. An even stronger attack at the that the Muslims fired the mortar round at themselves. In an
end of the month likewise failed. Nevertheless , the VRS excerptof this analysis, Silber and Little note ,
continued the operation into March and called it off only The common sense observation that if you fire around
after the Muslim -Croat Federation agreementdisrupted the 500,000 mortar, artillery, and tank rounds into a small city
encirclementof the enclave on 19 March . over 22 months (as the Bosnian Serbs did )—many of these
46 HVO Colonel Ivo Lozancic indicated on 19 March that he had randomly lobbed into civilian areas — sooner or later one
ordered all VRS forces withdrawn to Teslic. Zagreb Radio will land somewhere where crowdsare gathered,was swept
19 March 1994 . away in the ensuing row .
47 The VRS normally manned the frontline with three of its light 50 This account is based primarily on Silber and Little, chapter 24,
infantry brigades, the 15th Bihac holding positions directly south / " A Question of Control: TheMarket Square Bomb and the NATO
southeast of Bihac city, and the frontline to the northeast along the Ultimatum , February 1994 ,” pp. 309-323.
Grabez plateau rotating between three light infantry brigades, the 51 Rose's " Four Point Plan " called for a cease- fire, a withdrawal of
1st Drvar, 3rd Petrovac, and 17th Kljuc. Interestingly, the forces heavy weapons outside of a 20 -kilometer exclusion zone (or their
required to hold the Grabez had continued to grow since 1992, placement under UN control), the interpositioning ofUN troops
when just the 15th Bihac and the neighboring 11th Krupa manned along the confrontation line, and the creation of a joint implemen
the Bihac sector. By early 1993 the VRS had to commit two addi tation committee. Silber and Little, p. 313. For a description of
tional brigades to holding it, and after the February 1994 operation General Rose's flamboyant personality,see Martin Bell, In Harm's
all three of the brigades— 1st Drvar, 3rd Petrovac, and 17th Way: Reflections of a War-Zone Thug (Revised) London : Penguin ,
Kljuc — had to hold the front, leaving 2nd Krajina Corps with few 1996 , pp . 174-185 . For a discussion of Rose and the UN strategy in
corps reserves. Krajina Serb Army (SVK ) forces appear to have early 1994, see James Gow , Triumph of the Lack of Will : Interna
held positions southwest/west of town in the Pljesevica area. tional Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War New York : Columbia Uni
For the operation against Bihac, the VRS committed all four of the versity Press, 1997, pp. 145-155 .
light infantry brigades listed above, reinforced by one battalion of 52 The Serbs demanded on 12 February that the Bosnian Army
the 6th Sanske Infantry Brigade/Ist Krajina Corps and MUP spe withdraw its infantry from the frontlines in exchange for a Serb
cial police detachments from Banja Luka and Prijedor. In addition, heavy weapons withdrawal.
the 2nd Krajina Corps may have sent elements of the 5th Glamoc 53 Silber and Little note that the UN's definition of " control"
Light Infantry Brigade to the frontin mid -February . An armor bat quickly slid from UN personnel physically in possession of the
talion and major elements of the 2nd Mixed Artillery Regiment weapons to essentially UN observation of them as the UN desper
provided fire support. The total force probably numbered about ately attempted to obtain compliance and avoidmaking good on its
5,000 troops . airstrike threats. In addition, the Serbs were allowed to choose the
The Bosnian Army 5th Corps defended the Grabez plateau with a " weapon control points ," many ofwhich were essentially broad
mixture ofbattalions from several different brigades, including the field -deployed areas where mortars and artillery pieces were sta
501st and 502nd Bihac Mountain Brigades, the 503rd Cazin Moun tioned to maintain the siege. Silber and Little , pp. 316-317.
tain Brigade,and the 1st Bosnian (later 510th ) Liberation Brigade. 54 Silber and Little, p . 318.
In addition , the battalion -sized HVO 101st Bihac Brigade held 55 Claimsmade at the time by the Bosnian Government and others
positions to the south /southwest of town. The total force probably that the VRS would simply move all the heavy weapons allowed to
numbered 4,000 to 5,000 troops. withdraw from Sarajevo to attack theMuslims elsewhere were
48 This following narrative is based primarily on an analysis of greatly exaggerated . Certainly, the VRS could use the armor and
Sarajevo Radio and Belgrade Tanjug reporting: artillery units pulled out in other sectors, but, given their impor
The VRS attacked on 6 February, quickly penetrating the tance to the defense of Serb -held Sarajevo should the fighting
5th Corps line some 7 to 8 kilometers northeast of Bihac resume, they had to stay close to home. They were in fact used pri
city, capturing Hasin Vrh and Barakovac positions. After marily for operations near the city, such as Gorazde and the Nisici
taking these, the 2nd Krajina Corps then hoped to break out plateau, although the VRS almost certainly could have carried out
into the plain along the Una around Bihac city, taking the the Gorazde operation without this equipment.
56
city from behind and seizing the rail line and road to the Sarajevo Radio , 16 March 1994. FBIS Vienna AU 1603104794,
north , through Mrkonjic Lug, and the railyards east ofBihac 1610477 March 1994 .
city. The 5th Corps, however,managed to block the deter 57 Reuters, “ On Some Bosnian Fronts, No Truce , No Peace" by
mined VRS advance and then drove the Serbs back , appar Laura Pitter, 18 March 1994 .
ently retaking the two important hills between 10 and 15 58 The VRS 19th Infantry Brigade from Donji Vakuf (which the
February. A week later, on 21 February, the VRS appears to Serbs renamed “ Srbobran” ) bore thebrunt of the attack , supported
have broken through the ARBiH positions again . Another by the 11th Mrkonjic and 1st Sipovo Light Infantry Brigades.
week of fighting, however, enabled the 5th Corps to retake Colonel Jovo Blazanovic commanded the 30th Infantry Division.
nearly all of the lost ground. Sarajevo Radio , 17 March 1994. FBIS Vienna AU1703102094,
49 The UN never announced definitively which of the warring par 171020Z March 1994 .
ties was responsible for the attack. UN experts were able to deter 59 Belgrade Tanjug, 19 March 1994. FBIS London LD 1903214994,
mine only that the market was hit by a 120 -mm mortar round fired 1921497 March 1994 .
from the northeast,where both Bosnian Serb and government Belgrade Tanjug, 21March 1994. FBIS London LD2103202894 ,
forces had positions and probably mortars. Circumstantial evidence 212028Z March 1994 .
pointed to the Bosnian Serbs , but leaders of both sides publicly
traded accusations of responsibility. It seems unlikely to this

255
61 Belgrade Tanjug, 21March 1994. FBIS London LD2103152194,
80 The VRS 2nd Majevica Light Infantry Brigade was deployed on
211521Z March 1994. and around Stolice with the 3rd Majevica Infantry Brigade
62
Belgrade Tanjug, 21March 1994. FBIS London LD2103152694, deployed to the north /northwest and the 1st Majevica Infantry Bri
2115267 March 1994 . gadedeployed to the northeast. TG “Majevica " was under the comm
63 Belgrade Tanjug, 29 March 1994. FBIS London LD2903134594, mand of Colonel Momir Zec .
2913457 March 1994 . 81 Belgrade Tanjug, 14 May 1994. FBIS London LD1405133794 ,
64 Reuters, “Moslems Poised for Bosnian Offensive ,UN Says” by 1413372 May 1994.
Laura Pitter, 31 March 1994 . 82
Sarajevo Radio , 15 May 1994. FBIS London LD1505175094 ,
65 The VRS 22nd Infantry Brigade defended the frontline on Vlasic . 151750Z May 1994.
83
Colonel Janko Trivic commanded the “ Vlasic" OG . Sarajevo Belgrade Tanjug, 15 May 1994. FBIS London LD1505215194,
Radio , 28 April 1994.FBIS Vienna AU2804124394, 281243Z 152151Z May 1994 .
April 1994 . 84 Belgrade Tanjug, 20 May 1994. FBIS London LD2005215294,
66 Belgrade Tanjug,
29 April 1994. FBIS London LD2904125894, 2021527 May 1994.
291258Z April 1994 . 85 Reuters, “ Bosnian Rivals Blame Each Other Over Talks” by Kurt
67 Reuters , "Moslems Seized Land While World Watched
Schork, 27 May 1994.
Gorazde — UN ” by Davor Huic, 6 May 1994. 86 Belgrade Tanjug , 27 May 1994. FBIS London LD2705132492 ,
68 Sarajevo Radio , 23March 1994. FBIS Vienna AU2303202594, 271324Z May 1994 .
2320252 March 1994 . 87 Belgrade Tanjug , 27 May 1994. FBIS London LD2705153294 ,
69
Sarajevo Radio , 25 March 1994. FBIS Vienna AU2503180394, 271532Z May 1994.
251803Z March 1994 . 88 Paris AFP, 8 May 1994. FBIS Vienna AU0805155294, 081552Z
70 The attacks probably hit the 1st Teslic Infantry and 2nd Teslic May 1994.
Light Infantry Brigades, together with the reinforcing 16th Krajina 89 Reuters, "Moslem 'Safe Haven ' Shelled After Serb Town Hit"
Motorized Brigade. by Davor Huic , 11 May 1994.
71 See statements from President Karadzic and GeneralMladic on 90 Reuters, “Bosnian Rivals Report Increased Fighting," 15 May
7 April.Mladic refused to enter into any talks with Bosnian Army 1994 .
91
commanderGeneral Delic, stating that “only an instantaneoushalt Sarajevo Radio , 16 May 1994. FBIS Vienna AU1605190194 ,
of all combat activities on all the separating lines in the former 161901Z May 1994 .
Bosnia -Herzegovina can be discussed .” Belgrade Radio 7 April 92 Reuters, “ Tuzla Shelled AfterMoslems Claim Military Gains”
1994. According to Belgrade Tanjug, “ in connection with the situa by Dan De Luce, 16 May 1994.
tion in Gorazde,” Karadzic said that, 93
Sarajevo Radio , 19 May 1994. FBIS Vienna AU1905185994,
the Serb side had earlier warned of the planned Muslim 191859Z May 1994.
94
spring offensive, saying that it would respond with all avail Reuters , “ Serbs Widen Battle Fronts in Bosnia " by Dan De Luce ,
able forces. If the Muslimsdo not stop attacking, we will 21May 1994.
launch a counteroffensive and then let the Security Council 95 Paris AFP, 29 May 1994. FBIS Vienna AU2905132294,
save them ... 291322Z May 1994.
Belgrade Tanjug 7 April 1994. Silber and Little seem to miscon 96 Zagreb Globus, “ The Tuzla Corps HasGotten Through Almost to
strue the entire offensive as Mladic's attempt to eliminate the Han Pijesak ,GeneralMladic's Headquarters !" by Karlo Jeger,
Gorazde enclave before peace talks solidified the frontlines. 27 May 1994. FBIS Vienna AU0706183794, 071837Z June 1994.
Rather,as the general's own statement indicates he and the Serbs 97 Based on analysis of Sarajevo Radio reporting from 16 May to
wanted to “ solidify ” the frontlines because it would lock in their 31May 1994. VRS forces were under the overall command of the
territorial gains. The Serbs were trying to force the Muslims into Sarajevo -Romanija Corps. The 1st Ilijas Infantry Brigade was the
such an agreement. See Silber and Little, p . 325. normal sector-holding brigade along the front. It was reinforced
72 This narrative is based primarily on Sarajevo Radio reports from with the assault battalions from the 3rd Sarajevo , 1st Ilidza, and 1st
12 April to 19 April 1994. Igman Infantry Brigades, which together with the 1st Ilijas Bri
73 The main thrust of the operation was to be undertaken by the 1st gade's Assault Battalion , a tactical group from 1st Krajina Corps
Bijeljina Light Infantry Brigade “ Panthers ” toward the Boderiste (the 1st Battalion /43rd Motorized Brigade, plus probably a battal
area, severing the Brcko -Boce road . While the 1st Posavina Infan ion from 6th Sanski Infantry Brigade and possibly elements of 1st
try Brigade carried out supporting attacks in the center, the 65th MP Battalion or 1stRecon -Sabotage Detachment), and a MUP
Protection Regiment and 5th Kozara Light Infantry Brigade were Special Police Detachment,comprised the assault units for the
to make a right hook (from the VRS's perspective ) toward Brcko , attack. The VRS force probably had 3,000 to 4,000 troops. See
linking up to the “ Panthers" coming from Boderiste . The 3rd Sarajevo Radio 27 May 1994 and Zivko Ecim , “WeKnow Our
Mixed Artillery Regiment provided corps-artillery support with its Goal,” Kozarski Vjesnik 20 May 1994, an interview with Colonel
155-mm howitzers . The total VRS force, including sector troops Radmilo Zeljaja , commander of 43rd Prijedor Motorized Brigade.
from the 1st Posavina Brigade, numbered about 4,500 troops. ARBiH forces came under the command of OperationalGroup 3
74 The ARBiH 108th Motorized Brigade and the HVO 108th Infan “ Vares " from the 1st Corps. The 126th Mountain Brigade, rein
try Brigade, numbering about 5,500 troops , provided the bulk of forced with elements of the 322nd Vares Mountain Brigade, the
the defenders . 304th Breza Mountain Brigade, and probably the 315th and 316th
75 The VRS order of battle appears to have remained the same as Visoko Mountain Brigades /"'Visoko" Operational Group also
that in the earlier ARBiH operations . about 3,000 to 4,000 troops.
76 Sarajevo Radio , 2 April 1994. FBIS London LD0204175994 , 98 Paris AFP, 24 May 1994. FBIS Vienna AU2405163694,
0217592 April 1994.
99241636Z May 1994.
Belgrade Tanjug, 24 May 1994. FBIS London LD2505023194 ,
77 Belgrade Tanjug, 4 April 1994. FBIS London LD0404091794 ,
0409172 April 1994. 250231Z May 1994.
78 Belgrade Tanjug, 6 April 1994. FBIS London LD0604155794 , 100 Paris AFP, 25 May 1994. FBIS Vienna AU2505123094,
0615572 April 1994 . 251230Z May 1994 .
79 Belgrade
Tanjug, 11May 1994. FBIS London LD1105150594 , 101 Paris AFP, 26 May 1994. FBIS Vienna AU2605142294,
111505Z May 1994. 261422Z May 1994.

256

- - -
102 Paris AFP, 9 June 1994. FBIS Vienna AU0906120994, 091209Z 116 The attack again hit the 1st Trebava Infantry Brigade.
June 1994 . 117 ARBiH units took the villages of Sibovac, Razljevi, and Lipora
103 Paris AFP, 11 June 1994. FBIS Vienna AU1106204694, sce, among others. The 6th Sanske Infantry Brigade, the bulk of
112046Z June 1994 . which was under TG -4's command, took the brunt of the ARBiH
104 Reuters , “ Bosnian Rivals Sign Compromise Truce Deal" by attack .
Kurt Schork , 8 June 1994 . 118 Elements of the 1st Armored Brigade deployed in the Odzak
105 Reuters, “ Cease-Fire Collapsing in Central Bosnia, UN Says" area were sent to strengthen the 6th Sanske Brigade's counterat
by Kurt Schork, 28 June 1994. tacks.
106 Also known as Srpska Brka . 119 Serb troops held onto three key hills — Ciganiste, Hill 522, and
107 Belgrade Tanjug, 3 August 1994. FBIS
London LD0308074894 , Bregova Kosa — which would have allowed the ARBiH to look
030748Z August 1994 . directly down on Doboj.
108 Bosnian Army commander Delic stated publicly at the time that 120 VRS formations involved in Doboj's defense included the 1st
the Brka attack was a limited operation and that the ARBiH was Doboj Light Infantry Brigade , 2nd Banja Luka Light Infantry Bri
not attempting to sever the Posavina corridor. gade, 4th Banja Luka Light Infantry Brigade, elements of the 2nd
109 Sarajevo Radio , 5 August 1994. FBIS Vienna AU0508092294, Armored Brigade, and the 9th Reconnaissance Company - all part
050922Z August 1994. of Colonel Vladimir Arsic's “ Doboj" OperationalGroup 9 .
110 Sarajevo Radio, 8 August 1994. FBIS Vienna AU0808104694 , 121 Sarajevo Radio , 3 October 1994. FBIS Vienna AU0310202794 ,
0810462 August 1994. 3 October 1994 .
IlSarajevo Radio , 12 September 1994. FBIS Vienna 122 Sarajevo Radio , 7 October 1994. FBIS Vienna AU0710095494,
AU1209191294 , 1209127 September 1994 . 7 October 1994 .
123 Sarajevo Radio , 10 October 1994. FBIS Vienna
112 The narrative is based on Sarajevo Radio 9 August 1994 and
Said Huremovic “ 222nd Liberation Brigade: ' Young Lions' Stan AU1010195294 , 10 October 1994 .
124
dard Bearers of Freedom ," Prva Linija March 1997, p . 23-24 . Sarajevo Radio , 11 October 1994. FBIS Vienna
113 Elements of the 111th Gracanica Mountain Brigade supported AU1110210394 , 11 October 1994 .
the 212th . The ARBiH troops faced elements of the 1st Trebava 125 Sarajevo Radio , 12 October 1994.FBIS Vienna
Infantry Brigade/TacticalGroup 3. The hills were in the Skipovac AU1210120394, 12 October 1994 .
section of Trebava , some 10 to 15 kilometers northwest of 126 Sarajevo
Radio , 12 October 1994. FBIS Vienna
Gracanica. AU1210193394, 12 October 1994 .
114Narrative based primarily on Sarajevo Radio , Belgrade Tanjug, 127 Sarajevo Radio , 19 October 1994. FBIS Vienna
Sarajevo Radio -Republike Srpske, and Zagreb HINA covering the AU1910205894 , 19 October 1994 .
128 Sarajevo Radio , 8 November 1994. FBIS Vienna
period 15-26 October. In addition, the following sources provided
supporting detail: AU0811195694, 8 November 1994.
129 Sarajevo
• Said Huremovic, “-222nd Liberation Brigade: ‘ Young Lions' Radio , 9 November 1994. FBIS Vienna
Standard Bearers of Freedom ," Prva Linija March 1997, AU0911204494, 9 November 1994 .
p . 23-24 130 Sarajevo Radio , 17 November 1994.FBIS
Vienna
• " Three Years of the 241st Spreca -Muslim Light Brigade: AU1711124194, 17 November 1994 .
Lisaca - A Victory That Will Be Inscribed in Gold Letters," 131 Brigadier Vahic Karavelic, the commander of the 1st Corps,
Prva Linija July 1997, p . 3 reinforced the OperationalGroup 3-" Vares" with up to two tactical
• “ On the Occasion of the Third Anniversary of the Formation of groups from the Sarajevo OperationalGroup . For example, it
the 242nd Zvornik Muslim Light Brigade,” Prva Linija October appears that the 2nd Motorized and 101st Mountain Brigades each
1997, p . 31. sentat least a battalion to the sector. See Ismet Bajrovic, “ Com
• S. Cehajic , “My “Serbian Republic ' Is Shaking,” Sarajevo
memoration of the Fifth Anniversary of the Formation of the 101st
Ljiljan 9 November 1996 , p . 15 , an article based on captured
VRS documents . Mountain Brigade: Thunderers from Mojmilo and Heroes Square,”
• Ozren Jorganovic, “ The Second Anniversary of the Great Serb Prva Linija October 1997, p . 30 and Ismet Bajrovic, “ Heroji sa
Victory Over the Muslim Army— the Successful Defense of Zuci," Prva Linija November 1997, p . 24 (2nd Motorized Bri
Doboj ...," Banja Luka SrpskiRadio 21 October 1996 . gade). Personnel from Sarajevo city were sent via the airport tunnel
• Zora Kuzman, “ Doboj Between the Java and Sana: The Tragedy then over Mount Igman and then through Visoko in order to reach
of Families," Srpska Vojska 15 November 1994, pp. 28-29. the battlefield . The 1st Corps probably fielded about 5,000 to 6,000
Major GeneralMomir Talic, “ Praise of the Units for Heroically troops.
Holding OutDuring the Attack on the City of Doboj,” Krajiski 132 Zeljko Garmaz and Sasa Buric, “ The Offensive Aimed At Cut
Vojnik 15 November 1994, p . 22 , commendations for units ting the Corridor and Lifting the Blockade of Sarajevo Has
defending Doboj. Started,” Zagreb Globus 12 August 1994, pp. 2, 4 , 13.
L.Zaric, “ A Song 'On the Krajina's Heights: Three Years of Bat 133General Delic announced the capture of several villages and
tles of the 4th Banja Luka Brigade,” Krajiski Vojnik August hills in the salient on 11 August 1994 , Sarajevo Radio 11 August
1995, p . 36 . 1994 .
• “ The Wartime Journey of the 1st Armored: A Striking Fist," 134 The VRS launched an attack toward Breza about a week later. It
Krajiski Vojnik June 1996 , pp. 26-29, an article on the 1st is unclear what the objective of this small operation was,but it
Armored Brigade .
probably was designed to disrupt ARBiH lines of communication
11s OperationalGroup 2 was responsible for the attacks toward
in Cemerska Planina and thenewly captured area around Brgule.
DobojandModrica (Skipovac). For the Dobojoperation, the 109th Although the VRS made some gains, it appears that the 1st Corps
Doboj Brigade was reinforced with the 242nd Zvornik -Muslim was able to push the Serbs back out of the area. Paris AFP 20 and
Lightand 251st Liberation Brigades. The 212th Liberation Brigade
23 August 1994, Davor Huic, “ Serbs Stop Bosnian Offensives,
led the attack against Skipovac before being shifted to the Doboj
Reaffirm Superiority," Reuters 7 September 1994.
sector. OperationalGroup 1 undertook the Gradacac attack , receiv
ing the 241st Spreca -Muslim Light Brigade as reinforcement for
the 107th Gradacac Motorized Brigade.

257
135 Paris AFP, 18 September 1994. FBIS Vienna AU 1809190894, hour until his “ lost platoon ” was released . The threat was no bluff,
181908Z September 1994. and regular (if not hourly ) shelling of the urban Tuzla area began
136 Reuters, “ Serbs Stop Bosnian Offensives, Reaffirm Superiority" early on the morning of 21 November. Asthe periodic shelling of
by Davor Huic, 7 September 1994. Tuzla continued, Bosnian Army infantry attacks proceeded on
137 At about the same time, the VRS Herzegovina Corps attacked Majevica mountain . There is no reporting to indicate the captured
the ARBiH 4th Corps-controlled Mostar-Jablanica road at Bijelo Serbs were released, but in any event the Bosnian Government
Polje/Vrapcici, just north ofMostar. The closest the VRS came to assaults and the Bosnian Serb shelling of Tuzla had tapered off by
cutting the route was on 12-14 October, when the Serbs seized the very end of November.
149 Belgrade
somehills overlooking the road, and it was temporarily closed. Tanjug, 25 August 1994. FBIS London
ARBiH troops,however,managed to retain their hold on Bijelo LD2508221494, 2522142 August 1994 .
Polje . 150 Sarajevo Radio , 29 August 1994. FBIS Vienna AU2908120894,
138 Milosevic had recently replaced Galic in command of the corps. 2912087 August 1994.
For information on the VRS forces, see Zeljko Radovanovic , 151 Sarajevo Radio , 30 August 1994. FBIS Vienna AU3008192194,
"Muslim Scale of Defeats on Nisici and Olovo : Mathematics 3019212 August 1994.
Against “ Vitez's,”” Srpska Vojska 15 November 1994, p . 26.Rein 152 Ljubljana Radio , 7 September 1994. FBIS Vienna
forcements included major elements of the 65th Protection Motor AU0709142394, 0714232 September 1994.
ized Regiment, and tactical groups from the Drina and 153 Belgrade Tanjug, 9 September 1994. FBIS London
Herzegovina Corps. In addition, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps LD0909161794 , 0916172 September 1994 .
shifted its own reserves, such as the Assault Battalion /1st Ilidza 154 Sarajevo Radio , 6 September 1994. FBIS Vienna
Infantry Brigade, to the sector. The VRS force probably had about AU0609192894, 061928Z September 1994.
155 Belgrade Tanjug, 12 September 1994. FBIS London
3,000 assault troops, in addition to about 1,000 sector holding
troops from the 1st Ilijas Infantry Brigade. ARBiH forces from LD1209165294, 1216527 September 1994 .
OperationalGroup 3-“ Vares" included the 126th Mountain Brigade 156 Sarajevo Radio , 14 September 1994.FBIS Vienna
and a tactical group from Sarajevo city, apparently comprising the AU1409100794, 1410072 September 1994 .
2nd and 5th Battalions/ 101stMountain Brigade, plus a battalion of 157 Belgrade Tanjug, 14 September 1994. FBIS London
the 124th Light Brigade “ King Tvrtko,” which was a former HVO LD1409114994, 141149Z September 1994.
formation . 158 Reuters, “ Bosnian Serbs Vow To Defy US Ultimatum " by Kurt
139 The battle narrative is from Reuters reporting from 13-17 Octo Schork , 15 September 1994 .
ber 1994 , Belgrade Tanjug 4 and 5 October 1994 , and Vildana 159 Paris AFP, 15 September 1994. FBIS Vienna AU1509093494,
Selimbegovic, “Mt. Cemer is the Chetniks' Nightmare," Sarajevo 150934Z September 1994 .
Vecernje Novosti 26 October 1994, pp. 4-5 , an interview with Brig 160 Paris AFP, 15 September 1994. FBIS Vienna AU 1509100894,
adierGeneral Vahid Karavelic. The Reuters pieces include: 1510082 September 1994 .
• Giles Elgood, “ Serbs Seize Land From Moslems Near Sara 161 Paris AFP, 15 September 1994. FBIS Vienna AU1509182894,
jevo," Reuters 13 October 1994. 151828Z September 1994.
• Giles Elgood , “ Serb Shelling Shuts Vital Supply Road,” Reuters 162
Zagreb Hina, 19 September 1994. FBIS Vienna
14 October 1994. AU1909184194 , 1918412 September 1994 .
• Giles Elgood, “ Convoys Reach Sarajevo With 500 Tonnes of 163 Sarajevo Radio , 20 September 1994. FBIS Vienna
Food ," Reuters 15 October 1994 .
AU2009205094, 2020507 September 1994 .
• Giles Elgood , “War Flares Anew But Aid Gets to Sarajevo," 164 Zagreb Radio , 15 September 1994. FBIS London
Reuters 16 October 1994 .
LD1509161994 , 1516197 September 1994 .
• Giles Elgood, “UN Rules Out Force To Shift Bosnian Army," 165
Reuters 17 October 1994 . Zagreb Hina, 15 September 1994. FBIS Vienna
AU1509171494 , 1517142 September 1994 .
• Giles Elgood, “Serbs Hijack Sarajevo Medical Supplies,” Reu 166 Sarajevo Radio , 16 September
ters 17 October 1994. 1994.FBIS Vienna
140 See especially Vildana Selimbegovic, “Mt. Cemer is the Chet AU 1609171694, 1617162 September 1994.
niks' Nightmare," Sarajevo Vecernje Novosti 26 October 1994 , 167 Zagreb Hina, 17 September 1994. FBIS Vienna
pp. 4-5 , an interview with Brigadier General Vahid Karavelic, for a AU1709144194, 1714412 September 1994 .
168
description of the ARBiH counterattack againstMosevacko hill. Sarajevo Radio , 20 September 1994. FBIS Vienna
141 Based on Reuters 6 November 1994 and Sarajevo Radio AU2009144894 , 201448Z September 1994.
6 November 1994, which carried Brigadier General Karavelic's 169 Belgrade Tanjug, 23 September 1994. FBIS London
announcement of which villages and hills 1st Corpshad seized. LD2309192794 , 2319272 September 1994 .
142 Belgrade Tanjug, 12 October 1994. FBIS London 170 Reuters, “ Serbs Renege on Pledge to Unblock UN Convoys” by
LD1210163994 , 121639Z October 1994 . Kurt Schork, 2 October 1994.
143 Belgrade Tanjug, 20 October 1994. FBIS London 171 Belgrade Tanjug, 10 October 1994. FBIS London
LD1010160994, 101609Z October 1994 .
LD2010224394 , 202243Z October 1994 .
172 In addition to being demilitarized (that is,no troops or equip
144 Belgrade Tanjug, 9 November 1994. FBIS London
LD0911231894, 092318Z November 1994 . mentbelonging to any faction were supposed to be on or transit
145 Zagreb Hina, 13 November 1994. FBIS Vienna AU1311151694, across the mountains),both mountains were within the 20-km
131516Z November 1994 . heavy weapons exclusion zone in any case .
146 Sarajevo Radio , 15 November 1994.FBIS Vienna 173 Belgrade Tanjug, 20 September 1994. FBIS London
AU1511164494 , 1516442 November 1994 . LD2009170994, 201709Z September 1994.
174
147 Zagreb Hina, 17 November 1994. FBIS Vienna AU1711160794, Sarajevo Radio , 15 December 1994. FBIS Vienna
171606Z November 1994. VA1512202794, 1520277 December 1994 .
175
148 During the course of the November offensive, the Bosnian Sarajevo Radio , 1 October 1994. FBIS London LD0110170894,
011708Z October 1994 .
Army encircled some 30 Bosnian Serbs on the secondary Vitovaca
peak nearMajevica itself. The local Serb commander threatened to
pound Tuzla — a UN -declared “ sa area” —with artillery fire every

258

- —
176 Belgrade Tanjug, 2 October 1994. FBIS London 204 Reuters , “ Bosnian Army Claims Advances on Serb -Held Town"
LD0210135594, 021355Z October 1994 . 1 November 1994 .
177 Paris AFP, 3 October 1994. FBIS Vienna AU0310102294 , 205 Zagreb Hina, 5 November 1994. FBIS Vienna AU0511140294,
031022Z October 1994. 0514027 November 1994 .
178 Belgrade Tanjug 5 October 1994. FBIS London 206 Belgrade Tanjug, 19 September 1994. FBIS London
LD0510184494, 051844Z October 1994 . LD1909105994, 1910592 September 1994.
207
179 Reuters , “UN Withdraws Mutilation Charge in Bosnia " by Kurt Belgrade Tanjug, 19 September 1994. FBIS London
Schork , 7 October 1994 . LD1909200394, 192003Z September 1994.
180 Reuters , “ Serb Corpses Mutilated in Attack ” by Kurt Schork, 208 Belgrade Tanjug, 21 September 1994. FBIS London
6 October 1994 . LD2109150794, 2115072 September 1994 .
181 Reuters, “Serb Threaten to Ignite Sarajevo After Atrocity" by 209 Belgrade Tanjug, 24 September 1994. FBIS London
Kurt Schork , 7 October 1994 . LD2409183994, 241839Z September 1994.
210
182 Reuters, “UN Drives Bosnian Troops From Mountain DMZ" by Belgrade Tanjug, 25 September 1994. FBIS London
Kurt Schork , 7 October 1994. LD2509141194 , 2514112 September 1994.
211
183 Reuters , “UN Withdraws Mutilation Charge in Bosnia " by Kurt Belgrade Tanjug, 25 September 1994. FBIS London
Schork , 7 October 1994. The Trnovo Battalion waspart of the VRS LD2509192894, 251928Z September 1994.
2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade. 212 Belgrade Tanjug, 26 September 1994. FBIS London
184 Reuters, “ Bosnian President Demands UN Public Apology" by LD2609161794, 2616172 September 1994 .
Kurt Schork , 7 October 1994 . 213 Belgrade Tanjug, 12 October 1994. FBIS London
185 A warning of sorts came on 8 October, when Bosnian Serb LD1210130894 , 121308Z October 1994.
troops used machineguns — notdefined as heavy weapons— to fire 214 Belgrade Tanjug, 13 October 1994. FBIS London
on city tramsand pedestrians, killing one and wounding 11. The LD1310111094, 131110Z October 1994.
12-minute volley of fire represented the worst single attack since 215 Belgrade Tanjug, 19 October 1994. FBIS London
the Merkale market shelling and the subsequent creation of the LD1910213294, 192132Z October 1994 .
216 Belgrade Tanjug, 11 November
20-km heavy weapons exclusion zone in February 1994. Reuters, 1994. FBIS London
" Serb Guns Avenge Moslem Attack As Victims Buried" by Kurt LD1111143994 , 111439Z November 1994.
Schork , 9 October 1994 . 217 Belgrade Tanjug, 11 November 1994. FBIS London
186 Reuters , “ UN Resumes Vital Airlift Into Sarajevo" by Kurt LD1111153694, 111536Z November 1994.
Schork , 9 October 1994 . 218 Belgrade Tanjug, 11 November 1994. FBIS London
187 Reuters , “ Bosnian Rivals Agree on Demilitarized Zone," LD1211141294 , 121412Z November 1994 .
9 October 1994 . 219 Belgrade Tanjug, 12 November 1994. FBIS London
188 Reuters, “ Bosnian Serbs Give MoslemsDeadline to Clear LD1211190594 , 121905Z November 1994.
Zone,” 13 October 1994 . 220 Belgrade Tanjug, 12 November 1994. FBIS London
189 Reuters , “ Talks on Demilitarized Zone Break Down in Bosnia" LD1211192694 , 121926Z November 1994.
by Kurt Schork, 18 October 1994 . 221 Belgrade Tanjug, 13 November 1994. FBIS London
190 Reuters , “ Sarajevo DMZ Pact Faces New Hitch ” by Kurt LD1311203494 , 132034Z November 1994 .
Schork , 23 October 1994 . 222 Belgrade Tanjug, 18 November 1994. FBIS London
191 Reuters, “ Bosnian Army Fires on French Peacekeepers in LD1811210494 , 182104Z November 1994 .
DMZ" by Kurt Schork , 24 October 1994. 223 Belgrade Tanjug, 21 November 1994. FBIS London
192 Reuters , “ Bosnian Government, UN Agree to Clear DMZ" by LD2111180294, 2118027 November 1994 .
Kurt Schork , 25 October 1994 . 224 The Kupresmunicipality had a prewar population numbering
193 Reuters , “UN Chief Defends Peacekeeping Commander" by some 9,600 , of which about 51 percentwere Serb, almost 40 per
Kurt Schork , 25 October 1994 . cent Croat, 8 percentMuslim , and 1 percent other. Miroslav Krleza
194 Mt. Treskavica was just south of the 20 -km exclusion zone and Lexicopgraphical Institute , A Concise Atlas of the Republic of
had not been included in the August 1993 demilitarization agree Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Zagreb:
ment and hence had no restrictions on weapons or forces. GrafickiZavod Hrvatske, 1993, p . 125.
195 Reuters, “Moslems Spread Offensive to Zone Near Sarajevo," 225 Belgrade Tanjug, 20 October 1994. FBIS London
29 October 1994 . LD2010224394, 202243Z October 1994. The boundary between
196 Reuters, “UN Threatens Bosnian Army With NATO Strikes” by the VRS 30th Infantry Division 1st Krajina Corps and the 2nd Kra
Kurt Schork , 29 October 1994 . jina Corps ran between Kupres and Donji Vakuf.
197 Reuters, “ Bosnian Army Resumes Shelling From DMZ,” 226 Paris AFP, 3 November 1994. FBIS Vienna AU0311133894,
30 October 1994 . 031338Z November 1994 .
198 Reuters, “ Bosnian Army Closing in on Serb -Held Trnovo” by 227 Belgrade Tanjug, 23 October 1994. FBIS London
Kurt Schork , 31 October 1994 . LD2310203794 , 2320372 October 1994 ,
199
Sarajevo Radio , 1 November 1994. FBIS Vienna 228 Sarajevo Radio , 26 October 1994. FBIS Vienna
AU0111210294, 0121022 November 1994 . AU2610130594, 2613052 October 1994 .
229 Sarajevo Radio , 26 October 1994. FBIS Vienna
200 Reuters, “ UN Reports Bitter Fighting for Northwest Town,"
6 November 1994 . AU2610173894, 2619577 October 1994 .
201 Belgrade Tanjug, 4 November 1994. FBIS London 230 Zagreb Radio , 3 November 1994.FBIS London
LD0411234294 , 042342Z November 1994 . LD0311172994 , 031729Z November 1994 .
202Sarajevo Radio , 15 December1994. FBIS Vienna 231 Zagreb Radio , 2 November 1994. FBIS London
AU1512105994 , 151059Z December 1994. LD0211132994 , 021825Z November 1994 .
203 Sarajevo Radio , 3 November 1994.
FBIS Vienna
AU0311134994, 031349Z November 1994 .

259
 232 Zagreb Hina , 2 November 1994. FBIS Vienna AU0211212094, 259 Reuters, “ Bosnian Ceasefire Gradually Taking Hold — UN " by
02212OZ November 1994 . Kurt Schork , 11 June 1994.
233 Zagreb Radio , 3 November 1994. FBIS London 260 Reuters, “ U.N. Says Fighting Decreases With Bosnian Cease
LD0311112394 , 031123Z November 1994. fire " by Kurt Schork, 11 June 1994 .
234
Sarajevo Radio , 3 November 1994. FBIS Vienna 261Reuters, “ Bihac Fighting DimsHope of Bosnia Truce Lasting”
AU0311154294, 031541Z November 1994. by Kurt Schork, 14 June 1994 .
235 Mostar Croatian Radio , 3 November 1994. FBIS London 262 Reuters, “ Fierce Bihac Fighting Adds to Peace Doubts” by Kurt
LD0311172794 , 0317277 November 1994. Schork , 15 June 1994 .
263
236 Zagreb Vjesnik, Ivan Sabic Interview With Bosnian Croat Offi Reuters, “ RivalMoslem Forces Fight in Bosnia " by Kurt
cial Valentin Coric, “ I Do NotWish to be at War With Press Schork, 16 June 1994.
Reporters,” 14 November 1994. 264 Reuters, " Sarajevo Forces Advance in Bihac Conflict" by Mark
237 Just before the HVO intervened , ARBiH 7th Corps commander Heinrich , 20 June 1994.
Alagic stated publicly that the “HVO is not participating, but I 265 Ibid .
hope they will.” (Alagic may have gotten more than he had bar 266 Reuters, “ Bihac Fighting Continues as Bosnia Truce Falters" by
gained forwhen the HVO took Kupres two days later.) Justafter Kurt Schork , 18 June 1994.
the town fell,HVO commander Ante Roso told reporters that “ This 267 Reuters, “ RebelMoslems Counte on Serb Help Against Enemy
is a very good moment for cooperation.” When asked if the Croats Kin " by Mark Heinrich , 22 June 1994 .
268 Reuters, “ Bosnian Government Forces Attack RebelMoslems”
and Muslims were operating under a joint command, however, he
immediately followed the statement with “ We're coordinating, we by Mark Heinrich , 22 June 1992.
don't need a joint command.” Reuters , “ Bosnian Army Claims 269Reuters, “ Army Attack on Moslem Kin Will Fail - Rebel
Advance on Serb -Held Town," 1 November 1994. Reuters , Tycoon " by Mark Heinrich, 23 June 1994.
Bosnian Serbs Lose Key Town of Kupres” by Kurt Schork , 270 Reuters, “ Serbs Give Heavy Weapons to Rebel Moslems” by
3 November 1994. Davor Huic , 30 June 1994 .
238 Belgrade Tanjug, 4 October 1994. FBIS London 271 Reuters, “ Bosnian Army Surrounds UN Compound in Bihac,"
LD0411161194 , 041611Z November 1994 . 7 July 1994
239 Reuters, “ Bosnians Plan Fresh Offensives — U.N .” by Sean 272 Reuters, “Moslem Troops Hold Aid Workers in Bosnia " by
Maguire , 7 November 1994. Mark Heinrich, 7 July 1994.
240 Reuters, “ Serbs Hit New Bombardment in Bosnia" by Sean 273 Reuters, “ RebelMoslems, Serbs Jointly Attack Bosnian Army"
Maguire, 7 November 1994. byMark Heinrich , 10 July 1994.
241 Reuters, “ Bosnian Muslims, Croats Pound Serbs Around 274 Reuters, “ Bosnian Army Stages Mock Mutiny to Flush Out
Kupres” by Kurt Schork, 7 November 1994 . Rebels” by Mark Heinrich , 10 July 1994.
242 Reuters, "Bosnian Serbs Said Attacking Croat Troops," 275
Sarajevo Radio , 9 July 1994, FBIS London LD0907215694 ,
14 November 1994 . 0921567 July 1994.
243 Reuters, “ Bosnian Army Attacks in Central Bosnia," 16 Novem 276 Zagreb Radio , 10 July 1994 , FBIS London LD1007180494,
ber 1994 . 101804Z July 1994 .
244 Paris AFP, 16 November 1994. FBIS Vienna AU1611100594 , 277
? Zagreb Globus, “ The 5th Corps of the Bosnia -Herzegovina
161005Z November 1994 . Army Has Cut the Una Railroad at the Serb Corridor to Knin
245 Belgrade Tanjug, 20 November 1994. FBIS London Again !" by Karlo Jeger, 15 July 1994. FBIS Vienna
LD2011172894 , 2017287 November 1994 . AU1907203394 , 192033Z July 1994.
246 Reuters, “ Croats Supplying Armsto Bosnian Army 278
Sarajevo Radio , 23 August 1994 , FBIS Vienna AU2308113694,
Commander” by Kurt Schork , 6 November 1994 . 2311362 August 1994.
247 Reuters, " Bosnian Muslims, Croats Pound Serbs Around 279
Zagreb Globus, “ The Command of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia
Kupres” by Kurt Schork, 7 November 1994. Herzegovina Army Announces: WeWill Enter Velika Kladusa and
248 Reuters, “ Bosnian ArmyReadies Attack on Donji Vakuf" by Put Fikret Abdic on Trial As a Traitor" by Karl Jeger, 19 August
Kurt Schork , 8 November 1994 . 1994. FBIS Vienna AU2508104794 , 2510472 August 1994.
280
249 Reuters, “ Sarajevo Forces Advance in Bihac Conflict" by Mark Sarajevo Ljiljan , Interview With Brigade Commander Hamdija
Heinrich , 20 June 1994 . Abdic , “ The War Comedy in Which We Made a Jackass Outof
250 Reuters , “Sarajevo Pounding Continues Despite Airstrike Fikret Abdic ," by Mustafa Borovic and Mirsad Sinanovic , 4 Octo
Threat” by Chris Helgen , 11 January 1994. ber 1995. FBIS Reston VA , 96BA0015D , 020323Z February 1996 .
251 Belgrade Tanjug, 11 January 1994. FBIS London 281 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Herzegovina, 7 July 1996.FBIS
LD1101132394, 1113232 January 1994 . London LD0707214696 , 0721462 July 1996 .
252 Zagreb Radio , 11 January 1994. FBIS London LD1101151994, 282
Sarajevo Prva Linija , “ The Anniversary of the Formation of the
111519Z January 1994. 517th Liberation-Light Brigade, 15 August 1997 : On the Road to
253 Reuters, “ Serbs Planning Offensive on Bihac - Croat Com Freedom " by Z. Seferagic, September 1997. FBIS Reston VA ,
mander," 27 January 1994 . 96E08028A , 151724Z January 1998 .
254 O'Shea, Brendan , Crisis at Bihac: Bosnia's Bloody Battlefield , 283 The narrative is based primarily on Sarajevo Radio reports from
UK : Sutton Publishing, 1998. p . 35. 7 July and 11 July to 15 July 1994 and Paris AFP reports from
255 Reuters, “ Sarajevo Ultimatum Fails to Stop Bosnia Fighting," 11-13 July and 15 July .
21 February 1994 284 The 1st Drvar, 3rd Petrovac, and 17th Kljuc Light Infantry Bri
256 See the section “ Ending the War? Bosnian Serb Offensive Oper gades were themain VRS combat formations.
ations, November 1993 to March 1994 " for additional details . 285 Abdic declined a UN offer to evacuate the town's civilian popu
257 Reuters, “ Bosnian Radio Reports Fighting in Gorazde " 21 April lation, reasoning that, if the town's population left, Pecigrad's
1994 . defenders would see no reason to carry on the fight. Reuters ,
258 Reuters, “ U.N. Says Fighting Decreases With Bosnian Cease " Inter-Moslem Fighting Traps Up to 2,000 Civilians” by Richard
fire" by Kurt Schork , 11 June 1994. Meares, 4 August 1994 .

260
-
-

-
286 A UN official narrated the story somewhatmore colorfully : 295 Reuters, “ Bosnian Serbs Issue Fresh Threats” by Kurt Schork ,
The Fourth Brigade realized they were in a rather parlous 28 October 1994 .
296 Apparently unimpressed by the Bosnian
position. Their commanderwas a hero but they were Serb rhetoric, UNPRO
trapped in their castle HQ ... FOR Bosnia commander Rose responded with a counterthreat of
The message came back ( to the 5th Corps] “ OK , kill us NATO airstrikes should the Bosnian Serbs shell any the UN
all." declared safe areas. Reuters, “ U.N. Warns Bosnian Serbs Over
So Dudakovic fires one tank round straight through the door Sarajevo Threat,” 28 October 1994 .
of this fort, kills the brigade commander and everyone
99 there 297On 29 October, the Bosnian Serb President underlined the Pale
says, “ Well, this is a bad idea, let's forget it... leadership’s concern with the situation by declaring a “ state of
Reuters, “ Separatist Bosnian Moslem Leader Vows to Fight On" by war" in the VRS 2nd Krajina Corps ' area of responsibility . It was
Davor Huic, 10 August 1994. not fully clear what thismeant - more than two years into the con
287 Reuters, “Moslem Rebels Surrender as Bosnian Town Falls" by flict— but the declaration did suspend all leaves for soldiers,
Richard Meares, 4 August 1994 . directed full mobilization within the corps area ,and (in an effort to
288 Reuters, “ Bosnian Government Troops Crush Abdic Revolt” by prevent thousandsmore from fleeing) imposed movement restric
Mark Heinrich, 21 August 1994 . tions on all citizens in the Serb-held municipalities ofnorthwest
289 There are conflicting reports regarding the behavior of the 5th Bosnia . Reuters , “ Bosnian Serb Leader Declares 'State of War,'
Corps forces that occupied the town after 11 monthsof fighting. 29 October 1994 .
UN observers initially reported they were disciplined and profes 298 Reuters, “Moslem -Led Army Advances on Serb -Held Town,"
sional, taking the town with a minimum of casualties and causing 29 October 1994 .
little damage during and after the attack. Reuters , “Moslem Refu 299 Reuters, “ Sarajevo Comes Under Shelling Attack” by Kurt
gees Block French UN Troops” by Davor Huic , 23 August 1994 . Schork , 31 October 1994.
Later reports from Abdic refugees and at least one UN observer 300 Reuters, “ Serbs and Moslems Battle in Northwest Bosnia" by
maintained that Bosnian Army troops had fired on retreating Abdic Kurt Schork , 21 October 1994 .
soldiers and civilians as they fled Velika Kladusa . Reuters, 301 The VRS signaled the start of its assaultby firing a salvo of
“ Refugees Accuse Bosnian Forces of Killings" by Davor Huic , SA -2 surface -to -air missiles in the ground -to - ground mode at
24 August 1994. Bihac and Cazin .
240 Reuters, “ Bosnian Government Troops Crush Abdic Revolt" by 302 NATO aircraft also struck at two VRS air defense sites northeast
Mark Heinrich , 21 August 1994 . of the Bihac sector on 23 November after two British RoyalNavy
291Reuters, “ Bosnian Army Push Back Serbs Around Bihac" by Sea Harriers were fired on the previous day.
Mark Heinrich, 26 October 1994. 303Giles Elgood, “ Croatian Would Intervene to Stop Bihac Fall,"
292 Reuters, “ 7,000 Serbs Flee Bosnian Army Onslaught" by Mark Reuters 1 December 1994 .
Heinrich , 27 October 1994 . 304HV frontline units regularly rotated so that, although possibly as
293 Reuters, “Moslem -Led Army Advances in Northwest Bosnia " many as 9,000 HV troopswere involved in “ Zima 94,” only 3,000
by Kurt Schork, 27 October 1994 . to 4,000 probably were ever on the ground in Bosnia at any one
294 time.
Reuters , “ Bosnian Serb Army Threatens Retaliation ,”
27 October 1994 .

261
 Bosnia 1994

Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) T -55 tanks, probably from the 1st Antisniper barriers in downtown Sarajevo, as seen in 1996 .
Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade, near Sarajevo, early 1994 .

The Oslobodjenje newspaper building in Sarajevo, as seen in Damaged houses near Sarajevo Airport, as seen in 1996 .
1996 .

© Reuters Reuters

Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) M - 56 105-mm howitzers and crews, Bosnian Army (ARBiH ) 2nd Corps troops overlooking Bosnian
probably from the Ist Majevica Infantry Brigade, north of the Serb Army(VRS) positions in the Ozren Mountains following
Bosnian Government-controlled town of Teocak, December the capture of Mount Vijenac, May 1994.
1993.

DIDesign Center/MPG 3826401D 04-02

262

- -
 Bosnia 1994

Reuters

Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) soldiers, probably from the 1st Sarajevo Mechanized
Brigade or 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade, walk past the Olympic bobsled and
luge run on Mount Trebevic, south of Sarajevo, February 1994.

© Reuters

Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) T- 55 tanks and M -80 infantry fighting vehicles, prob
ably from the 1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade, withdraw from the Sarajevo area
following the NATO ultimatum , February 1994 .

DIDesign Center/MPG 3826401D 04-02

263
 Bosnia 1994

© Reuters
Bosnian Serb Army ( VRS) troops, probably from the Herzegovina Corps,marching
up a hill near Gorazde, April 1994 .

O Reuters

Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) Col. (later Maj. Gen.)Momir Zec and staff officers from
the 30th Infantry Division study maps near Donji Vakuf, December 1994 .

DI Design Center/MPG 3826401D 04-02

264

-
--
Section VI

Croatia 1993-1994 :

Biding Its Time, Building Its Army

265
一
 ... it is sufficient to emphasize the indisputable Army's unifying mission. Hemoved quickly to halt
position of our state policy that if all efforts the demobilization , create additionalGuards Brigades ,
failed to solve the problem by peacefulmeans and shuffle the officers serving on the Main Staff, the
and to reestablish full sovereignty of the Repub corps commands, and the Guards Brigades. Bobetko
lic of Croatia within internationally recognized appointed officers loyal to him and his objective,
borders, it would be compelled to resort to other forming a team that would develop an HV way of
legitimate means ... doing business in doctrine, training, and attitude .

Rear Admiral Davor Domazet,

Chief of HV Military Intelligence The Test Bed : Operation "Maslenica 93,"
January February 1993
The army that would launch Operation “ Zima 94 " in
December 1994 to regain its lost territories was a far Bobetko's plans for change in the HV, however, had
cry from the poorly trained , minimally disciplined no time to sink in before President Tudjman called on
scratch force that had defended Croatia during 1991. the HV to restart the war in Croatia . The formation of
During the intervening years, the Croatian Army (HV) the Republic of Serb Krajina during the 1991 war had
raised itself by its own bootstraps into a professional not only split the Croatian state in two but had also left
army, creating a new combat doctrine , reorganizing the portions remaining under Zagreb's control only
the force structure, intensively training its troops, and tenuously linked in important places. Most notably,
developing its Guards Brigades into the finest combat the destruction of the Maslenica bridge northeast of
formations in the Balkans. All of this was for one pur the city of Zadar,which carried the main land route
pose , the reconquest of the Republic of Serb Krajina . between northern and southern Croatia , had left the
Dalmatian coast accessible only by ferry . To reopen
Chapter 65 this link , President Tudjman ordered General Bobetko
General Bobetko and the Army Reorganization ,
to prepare a military operation to recapture the
November 19922
Maslenica bridge site (as well as the former JNA air
base at Zemunik , also near Zadar) and secure a buffer
The first major step toward the transformation of the zone around the bridge area to protect it from Serb
Croatian Army into the dynamic combat force that artillery fire. Tudjman directed Bobetko to finish the
took on the Serbs in 1993 and defeated them in 1995
action quickly to minimize the international outrage
appears to have begun with the appointment ofGen that was sure to follow Croatia's breach of the cease
eral Janko Bobetko to the post of Chief of the HV fire.6
Main Staff in November 1992. Except for its four
Guards Brigades, the HV in late 1992 was suffering The operation , dubbed “Maslenica 93,” began on
from a disorganized demobilization process and a lack 22 January with little warning.? Krajina Serb Army
of focus in determining its future organization , doc (SVK ) and police forces were taken by surprise, and
trine, and warplans. Bobetko complains in his mem the HV quickly secured most of its objectives in a
oirs that the 1992 demobilization that followed
three- day drive. It seized both the airport and the Serb
Croatia's successful defense of its independence had controlled bank of the Maslenica bridge site and made
been carried out haphazardly, with no thought to advances of asmuch as 7 kilometers in some places.
retaining or creating a professional core for the HV.4
Bobetko’s appointment confirmed that preparing the
HV to retake the Krajina from the Serbs would be the

267
The SVK (formed from the Krajina Serb Territorial progressed. In particular, the weakness of the HV's
Defense force and Serb -manned former JNA units ) corps- level command staffs was readily apparent,
had demobilized its forces in response to the Vance forcing General Bobetko to establish a forward com
peace plan , placing its heavy weapons under " dual mand post to directly oversee and coordinate the
key ” control with UN peacekeeping troops . When the operation rather than relying on the newly appointed
HV struck , the Serbs were able to put up only lightly Brigadier Ante Gotovina and his new staff at the Split
armed Special Police units ,which attempted to act as Corps District.'° Even with Bobetko's presence, coor
a covering force until the SVK mobilized and dinating the three axes of the attack proved difficult.
deployed its regular infantry and armored forces to the The HV's tactical limitations, particularly in the weak
front. Home Defense and reserve formations, also became
clear once the SVK had mobilized . HV units gained
With the main objectives secured , President Tudjman little against prepared Serb forces, and SVK /Serb
suddenly ordered Bobetko to halt the attack before volunteer troops managed to throw back some of the
more than a minimal artillery buffer zone could be HV's initial advances. High HV casualty figures
created . The Army was anxious to complete the opera- pointed to weaknesses in junior and midlevel officer
tion , but international reaction to the breach of the ranks and to the consequences of insufficient tactical
peace forced the Croatian Government to issue the training. All in all, the Croatian forces that had fought
stop order. The Croatians no longer controlled the sit in Bosnia and on the Dalmatian coast during 1992
uation , however, and fighting raged even harder north showed some incremental progress by 1993 in some
east ofZadar as both the Bosnian Serb Army and areas, but the HV still had a long way to go before it
Belgrade dispatched reinforcements to stiffen the could overcomethe Serbs’ inherent strengths in artil
SVK and help launch counterattacks to regain some of lery , organization , and staff work .
the lost ground . The most intense fighting began on
27 January and lasted into the second week of Chapter 66
February as SVK 7th North Dalmatian Corps troops , Back to the Frontlines: War Renewed ,
bolstered by the elite Serbian VolunteerGuard ( per January 1993–March 1994
sonally led by “Arkan" ), fought ferocious battles with
HV Guards and special operations units around the The HV operation at Maslenica not only revived fight
villages of Kasic , Paljuv, and Novigrad . Serb forces ing in Dalmatia but also brought a remobilization of
were able to break through HV lines more than once Croatian and Serb forces throughout the country . As
and recapture key points before counterattacks drove the armies took up their old positions and the SVK
them back out. withdrew its heavy weapons from UN control, clashes
began anew atmany ofthe same old hot spots, despite
By the end of February the clashes around Zadar had the continued presence of UN troops at outposts all
subsided at a heavy price to both sides. The SVK's along the frontline . Serb artillery and mortar fire
public statements appear to confirm that the Serbs suf- erupted throughout UN Sectors North and South , cov
fered at least 500 casualties , including well over a ering the Banija, Lika, and Northern Dalmatia regions,
hundred personnel killed in action. General Anton and the Croatians responded in kind ." The Croatian
Tus, Tudjman's personal military adviser (and former towns of Sisak , Karlovac, Gospic, Zadar, and Sibenik
Main Staff chief), claims that the HV lostmore dead again came under regular fire . Artillery and mortar fire
than in the much larger 1995 operations “ Bljesak " became routine,but few ground operations ensued
( Flash ) and “Oluja " (Storm ). after Maslenica except for a Croatian operation
against the Medak area , near Gospic , in September
Although “Maslenica” achieved most of its objectives, 1993 .
many of the shortcomings that Bobetko and his
staff identified in the HV when they took over in
November December were confirmed as the operation

268
-

-
-
 To the Brink: Operation “Medak 93,” withdraw their troops from the captured villages.
September 1993 After protracted haggling,Zagreb agreed on 16 Sep
tember to allow UN troops into the captured area to
One of the main targets of the Serb shelling was the act as a buffer and to keep the SVK out while the HV
Croatian -held city of Gospic, in the Lika region . The withdrew . When UN troops entered the area that day,
importance of lines of communication linking the city they found that the retreating Croatians had burned at
and the rest of Croatia to southern Dalmatia was least 11 villages and apparently had executed a num
already apparent, and the shelling apparently ber of Serb civilians. The crisis was over, however.
prompted Bobetko and the HV Main Staff to propose
a limited operation to eliminate the SVK -held posi Chapter 67
tions threatening Gospic near the village of Medak , Mladic's Little Brothers — The Krajina Serb Army
some 10 kilometers away. Tudjman approved the
operation, and on 9 September Brigadier Mirko The HV was facing an opponent that had not existed
Norac's Gospic Corps District struck.12 in 1991 when the Croatian war first erupted — the Kra
jina Serb Army (Srpska Vojska Krajina – SVK ). Like
Norac directed two reinforced battle groups — one its big brother, the Bosnian Serb Army, the SVK was
from the 9th Guards Brigade and one from General an amalgam of two forces. The first comprised the
Markac's MUP Special Police forces. In a lightning local/ regional Serb Territorial Defense units, which
pincer movement, the two units severed the neck of had made up a large percentage of the Federal/Serb
the SVK -held salient centered on the village of forces fighting the Croatians during 1991. The second
Divoselo, then mopped up the area . The HV rolled consisted of former Yugoslav People's Army units,
over a battalion of the SVK 15th Lika Corps and a now manned entirely by Serbs , which had been dis
number of civilians cut off by the HV assault. SVK owned" and left behind when the JNA had formally
counterattacks over the next three or four days retook withdrawn from the area in May 1992 .
some ground, and the HV advance halted .

The SVK retaliated for the operation by shelling both Formation of the Army
Croat frontline and urban targets . Karlovac was partic
ularly hard hit on 10 September, and on 11 September The SVK was formed during spring /summer 1992
the SVK fired either a 262-mm “ Orkan ” rocket (from following the formal announcement of its creation on
a multiple rocket launcher) or a FROG (LUNA- M ) 19 March 1992. Although the JNA sent its non -Serb
rocket in the direction ofZagreb , hitting near the HV personnel home from the republic , it not only left
heliport at Lucko . The SVK Main Staff backed up this behind the Krajina-raised officers of the JNA units but
demonstration with a threat to hit 20 or 30 military tar also continued to provide new JNA (later VJ) cadre to
gets throughout Croatia unless the HV pulled out of help organize and lead the new army. As with the VRS
the captured territory. The indiscriminate artillery in Bosnia , Belgrade continued to pay these personnel
exchanges continued, with the UN recording over and give them logistic support. As they had done with
6,000 detonations,mostly near Gospic -Medak , the VRS, the former Yugoslav officers modeled the
between 12 and 13 September. On 13 and 14 Septem new SVK in the image of the JNA. A Main Staff was
ber Croatian Air Force MiG -21 fighter-bombers went created in Knin - initially under Major GeneralMilan
after suspected SVK artillery and rocket sites in Ban Torbica (later promoted to lieutenant colonel gen
ija and Kordun. SVK air defense units downed one eral)—and a new corps -brigade structure was formed ,
plane on 14 September, near the town of Vrginmost. replacing the regional Territorial Defense operational
zone headquarters. 14 The weak command and control
This creeping escalation and the attendant possibility structures at the regional and brigade levels that had
of further Croatian ground offensives against the RSK characterized the old TO during the 1991 war were
aroused international alarm and led UNPROFOR stiffened with professional officers .
commander General Jean Cot to arrange and mediate
cease- fire discussions and to urge the Croatians to

269
Political-Military Relations • 15th Lika Corps ,HQ Korenica .

The SVK senior leadership was often in conflict with • 18th West Slavonian Corps, HQ Okucani.
RSK politicians, a situation that also prevailed in Bos
nia . Despite their obvious professionalism and compe • 21st Kordun Corps, HQ Vojnic .
tence , former JNA officers were disdained by Serb
nationalists, who detested the officers' “Communist” 39th Banija Corps, HQ Petrinja .
background and needed no excuse to criticize and
harass them . General Torbica resigned in late October The six corps had 21 combat brigades, three corps
1992 to protest the treatment of ex - JNA officers in the artillery regiments, and a variety of ancillary units .
SVK and in particular the politically motivated criti The Main Staff also controlled an aviation brigade at
cism of an SVK engagementwith HV troops that had Udbina Air Base (see Appendix B ). The SVK boasted
occurred in July at the Miljevac Plateau , northeast of an impressive number of heavy weapons for its size
Sibenik , in which 48 Serb soldiers died .15 Newly pro and fielded more than 300 tanks, 100 armored person
moted Major General Mile Novakovic , another ex nel carriers or infantry fighting vehicles, and some
JNA officer (and veteran of the Croatian war in 1991 350 large -caliber field artillery pieces. This was six
and the Bosnian war in 1992 ) took over Torbica's times the holdings of the comparably sized Bosnian
position ."6 Novakovic also encountered problemswith Croat Defense Council (HVO ).
the politicians in the Krajina , particularly with then
Minister of Internal Affairs Milan Martic .Martic — in During 1992,when the bulk of the SVK was demobi
themiddle of a feud with PresidentGoran Hodzic over lized , it stored all of its weapons under a " dual key "
control of the police — saw Novakovic and the Army system , with both UN and Serb units maintaining
as a rival for his police forces. This timeit was the HV nominal control of the weapons. In place of the regu
attacks at Maslenica and Medak that the political con lar forces, the RSK Ministry of Internal Affairs in
nivers used to undercut the Army chief's position . 1992 had organized , with JNA help , a number of Spe
They were finally able to oust Novakovic in February cial Police brigades, apparently one for each UN sec
1994 when his patron , President Hodzic , was replaced tor, to act as " border guard ” forces along the UN
by Milan Martic in a political triumph for the Krajina sector boundaries. They were also to serve as a cover
nationalists.17 The politicians found in Major General ing force in the event of a Croatian attack while the
Milan Celeketic, another ex -JNA officer, a more mal SVK mobilized its formations. When that attack
leable replacement for Novakovic's position .18 Novak came, atMaslenica , the SVK mobilized and deployed
ovic became Martic's nominalnational security its units and weapons to the frontlines , and the dual
adviser. keys went out the window .

Organization Manpower : The Never-Ending Problem

As organized by its new leaders , the SVK would when As with the VRS, the SVK's primary strategic prob
fully mobilized muster only about 50,000 troops - as lem was the limited manpower it could call on to man
compared to the 200,000 -man Army of the Croatian its extensive frontline , which GeneralNovakovic
Republic. It was organized into six regional corps: claimed at one point extended to 1,600 kilometers. 19
With only 50,000 men available to hold this line, the
• 7th North Dalmatian Corps ,Headquarters in Knin . SVK was desperately limited in mobility and flexibil
ity ; it had virtually no strategic or operational reserves
• 11th East Slavonian -Baranja Corps, HQ Borovo
Selo .

270

-
--

- -
--

-
to call on from theMain Staff or corps commands.20 Although the SVK could notnecessarily count on
Only the 15th Lika and 39th Banija Corps had any for either army to come to its rescue, both continued to
mations not committed to frontline sectors opposite provide assistance and support to the Krajina Serbs .
the HV, and even these two brigades were tied down The VJ took the lead with its provision of officers and
opposite the Bosnian Army's 5th Corps around Bihac. NCOs to help lead and organize the SVK ; it also pro
When Bihac heated up during 1994 , the SVK commit- vided regular logistic support and continued to treat
ted more than 7,000 troops to either direct combat and pay some SVK officers as if they were still in the
operations in the enclave (in support of both the VRS Yugoslav Army. Belgrade and the SVK jointly took
and Fikret Abdic's rebelMuslim forces) or border control over the reformation of Fikret Abdic's forces,
security missions. This represented most of the bri making them fit for battle by providing leadership and
gade and corps -level reserves available to the SVK in organization , and sending small numbers of combat
UN Sectors North and South . Another substantial troops and weapons from their own organizations. The
chunk of the SVK's 50,000 men was garrisoned in VRS , too , occasionally deployed combat units, includ
Eastern and Western Slavonia , which were not contig- ing battalion and brigade-sized formations, to bolster
uous with the RSK's core area in UN Sectors North the SVK during 1993 and 1994, and sent a FROG -7
and South . Any forces transferred from these areas (LUNA - M ) battery during 1993. The VRS also
would have to travel a substantial distance through the worked with the SVK to coordinate actions around
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and/ or Republika Bihac and the Livno Valley, where the Serb armies
Srpska to reach the most threatened area . The lack of had a mutual interest.
strategic depth in the RSK further exacerbated these
manpower concerns . The republic was only 50 kilo
meters wide in some places, while even in Slavonia SVK Strategy and Doctrine
many key lateral lines of communications ran close to
the frontlines, the loss of which would place entire Knowing how difficult it would be for the SVK's lim
regions in jeopardy. ited forces to preserve its territory from a determined
attack, the SVK Main Staff developed - probably with
VJhelp and coordination — a bold strategy designed to
Bosnian Serb and Yugoslav Army Support deter Zagreb from launching a major offensive against
the Krajina. This strategy would make hostages of
In addition to its absolute shortages of manpower, the Croatian cities and strategic targets by employing the
SVK's shortage of reserves put it in an increasingly SVK's artillery and long- range rocket systemsagainst
vulnerable position as the HV's capabilities grew , them . HV Military Intelligence chief Admiral
making it more andmore certain that a Croatian attack Domazet later called this “ The Strategy of Real
might simply roll over the RSK's brittle defenses. It Threat.” 21 As Domazet understood it, the Krajina
therefore became even more essential that the SVK Serbs perceived themselves as engaged in a struggle
should be able to rely on the timely deployment of for their very existence and regarded any means as
VRS and VJ combat formations from Bosnia and Ser justifiable if it improved their prospects for survival.
bia in the event of a majorHV offensive. Unhappily The SVK put their deterrent strategy to work in the
for the SVK planners , the Bosnian Army was also aftermath of both “Maslenica ” and “Medak ," hitting
improving its capabilities and threatening the VRS, Croatian cities near the frontline with artillery fire and
while in Belgrade there was increasing unease about firing a long -range rocket (either a FROG or " Orkan "
the international consequences of sending Yugoslav 262 -mm rocket) in the direction of Zagreb. These
troops back into the Krajina. The prospects of reliable demonstrations did not, in the end, deter the Croatians
outside assistance becamemore problematic as time
went on .

271
from attacking the Krajina, but the strategy was to Training the Officer Corps
have some impact on the development of the HV's
strategy and doctrine. One of the Main Staff's first targets was the HV
officer corps, which at the beginning of 1993 was still
SVK combat doctrine more or less mirrored that used a disparate jumble of ex -MUP officers , former JNA
by the JNA/VRS during the 1991 war and the Bosnian regular officers, JNA reservists, and wartime volun
war. Given its limited troop numbers, however, the teers. Below the senior command levels, however,
SVK relied even more heavily on its heavy weapons even the JNA veterans generally lacked the profes
advantages to stave off an attacker. As the Serbs did in sional training necessary to lead small units well or
Bosnia , the Army constructed trench and bunker command large formations confidently. In addition ,
defenses, backed by scores ofmines , to protect its for both ideological and operational reasons , the
thin -stretched infantrymen and delay Croatian senior political and military leadership of Croatia
advances. Corps-level commands knew that any kind wanted to inculcate a new attitude and culture among
of defense in depth was denied them and that they HV officers and break cleanly with the " Communist"
would have to stop HV forces at the frontline because JNA past.22
there were no corps-level combat formations to con
ductmajor counterattacks or block holes. The limited The HV had established an officers school in early
strategic depth of the RSK itself forced a doctrine of 1992 for platoon and company commanders, butthe
forward defense on its armed forces. The more time course was very short.23 With Bobetko’s accession to
the SVK could buy , the greater the possibilities of VJ power, he and theMain Staff revamped the officer and
and VRS reinforcements arriving to save the day. NCO school courses and extended them to three
months.24 They also set about creating a new com
mand/staff school to train staff officers and senior
Chapter 68 field commanders.25 The whole enterprise was unified
The New HV - Doctrine, Training , as the “ Petar Zrinski” HV University. Later, in 1994,
and Force Structure , 1993-1994 the HV established an NCO school in Zadar exclu
sively for Guards units.26
The Croatian Army in 1992 lacked focus. Although
General Anton Tus, then the Main Staff chief, was a In his memoirs Bobetko places great emphasis on
highly competent officer, he and theMain Staff do not officer training and the establishmentof the com
appear to have developed a plan to forge an HV “ sys mand/staff school, noting that in 1992:
tem ," a distinctive way of conducting business. The
JNA was the JNA not just because the Yugoslav Gov We were weak ... in the command structure , in
ernment had designated it the " Yugoslav People's the decisionmaking structures, as factors in
Army," but because over the 50 years of its existence whether someone is a good company or battal
it had developed a particular culture, a military doc ion commander,what elements he uses and how
trine, and a marked style of doing things. The HV to prepare for defense or an ambush .
likewise needed to create such a spirit so that all who
served it did so with the consciousness that they were our ( combat] losses were excessive, ... our
theHV, that there was a certain way the HV was going command structure was weak , and ... people
to work and fight, and that the mission of the HV was did not know the basic elements. The basic pre
to retake the Republic of Serb Krajina and reintegrate cept was that we had to alter the situation exclu
its territory into the Republic of Croatia . That is what sively by training people.
Bobetko and the members of his Main Staff set out to
do when they were appointed in late 1992 .

272
 Itwas necessary to create the need and initiative how the HV would fight. During 1996 , Admiral
for learning among the people. People arrived Domazet published an excellent overview in the
from the trenches having never sat with a book Croatian military journal Hrvatski Vojnik that system
for three or four hours, unable to read a map or atically outlined the step - by -step process through
plot the situation , finding it difficult to orient which the HV developed its strategy and doctrine for
themselves. Thus, there were plenty of questions, defeating the RSK . Domazet's article , highlighted by
they had intuition and experience acquired on General Bobetko's memoirs, illuminate what theMain
the frontline of the battlefield , but the basic task Staff saw as the Serb threat and the steps it took to
was to train them to be more resolute, to lead the counter SVK capabilities and achieve the Croatian
Army better, to minimize casualties.27 war aims.29

Regarding the command/ staff school, Bobetko states The primary Croatian political objective, toward
that. which all Croatian military strategy was bent, was the
destruction of the Republic of Serb Krajina and the
The third step was giving thought to a command/ reintegration of its territory into Croatia . There were
staff school. In terms of command structure , the two qualifiers to this objective that profoundly influ
highest positions that we had were filled by bri enced HV strategy and doctrine : ensure that the
gade commanders and chiefs of staff , so that if human costs of attacking the Serbs are contained at
they had a " downward " structure consisting of acceptable levels and that the “ liberation ” of the Kra
schooled people who had undergone a course of jina occurs in such a way as to preempt countervailing
three or six months, then it would certainly be international criticism . These supplementary require
possible to bring such an overall command mentsmade it essential that, once the strategic offen
structure to the level ofan efficient, operational, sive commenced , the HV must achieve a rapid victory
and very effective unit. and eliminate the RSK in no more than a week .

I told the President this: “Without such a system , These goals required the HV to create a force structure
we can spend time, but we will not have effi married to an operational- tactical doctrine of high
ciency ; this period of neither war nor peace will speed mobile warfare that could inflict a rapid , com
pass very quickly, and I think that we should prehensive defeat on the SVK's ground forces. It also
take advantage of it ... After six months of had to devise active and passive measures of defense
schooling of those people ... they were very to counteract the SVK's strategy of reprisal and also
good commanders and fought like lions on the constructed a systematic campaign of low -level attri
battlefield . Before that they did not know even tion warfare calculated to wear down the entire RSK .
the elementary things." 28 By these means itwas hoped and expected that,when
the HV struck in force, total victory could be achieved
With the creation and strengthening of the HV's within the brief timespan allotted to it.30
school system during 1993-94 , an HV culture began to
form that created a uniform body of officers who The Croatian political and military leaderships appear
would be able to implement any warplan the Main to have decided on the attrition strategy after observ
Staff put together. ing the effects that Operation “Maslenica " and Opera
tion “Medak ,” together with the extended low -level

From Doctrine to Strategy

With the training of the officer corps on track , the

Main Staff was drawing up strategic -operational plans
to defeat the RSK and developing operational- level
and tactical- level doctrine for the HV, determining

273
shelling campaigns conducted by both sides , had on Thus, from 1993 to the beginning of Operation
the resiliency of the RSK state and the SVK itself. “ Oluja" in 1995, Zagreb continually tested and
Domazet writes, prodded the SVK , wearing it down and ripening it for
defeat.
... the Republic of Croatia needed to rapidly
create a strongmilitary force, one that would be To defeat the SVK's “ Real Threat” strategy, the HV
able to affect the enemy by the very reality of its worked to create intelligence collection assets to iden
power so as to keep it in a state of tension , tify SVK artillery and rocket system locations and
thereby exhausting and expending its military then train and equip its artillery and air units to
capability. Thus, over a lengthy period of time, suppress and eliminate them . Domazet indicated that
(until themandate of the UNPROFOR ... the HV relied on aerial photography , primarily from
expired , or under favorable general conditions unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV ) , and communica
that could be brought about), the strategic mili tions intelligence to provide the essential information.
tary prerequisites would be gradually created At the same time, HV artillery units and the nascent
for an effective offensive operation in order to Croatian Air Force (newly equipped during 1993 and
inflict a strong surprise blow , disruptthe enemy 1994 with 25 MiG -21 fighter-bombers ) trained to use
system of defense, shatter its army and all the this information to target and destroy the SVK sys
quasi- governmental institutions, and undertake tems. The HV also trained its growing force of elite
systematic and complete liberation of the occu special operations units to conduct deep penetration
pied territories. 31 missions aimed at disabling or destroying artillery and
rocket batteries. In addition, since the Main Staff real
To this end the HV ran a virtually constant campaign ized they could not hope to knock out every SVK artil
of reconnaissance -sabotage operations against the lery tube or rocket launcher, it worked to harden and
SVK and sought every opportunity to goad the SVK protect potential targets of SVK retaliation strikes.
into raising its alert levels, seeking to force the Serbs The objective, as Domazet indicates, was to bring “ ...
to expend resources while wearing down their morale . about conditionswhich would guarantee an 'accept
Domazet states, able' (rational) level of destruction and other losses.
Because this removed the advantage on which the
Systematic activities aimed at establishment and enemy was building his entire defense strategy."
planned acceleration of the process of exhaus
tion and expenditure of enemymilitary capabili
ties were an essential ingredient of this ... In Developing the Croatian Blitzkrieg
essence, it was a question of planned imposition
of the pace of deliberate activities, which had Both the attrition strategy and the defense against the
consequences for the enemy in the form of pro SVK's Real Threat strategy were secondary to the
longed and excessive tension of personnel and developmentof the HV's ability to conduct a decisive
purposeless exhaustion ofmateriel. Activities strategic offensive. The HV needed to be able to con
whose content and features were related to duct an offensive in one week that could
reconnaissance and commando operations, and
indeed the very designation of that activity, had .. liberate the occupied areas... based on the
a particularly important role in the context of idea of rapid penetration along selected routes
those efforts and kept the enemydefense system ... in order to cut the forces of the enemy into
in constant tension. It is essential, that is, that smaller parts, to break up the defense system ...
the enemywas thus compelled to spread out his and to reach the national border in order to
forces and put in a position where he could not prevent aid from arriving from the territory of
clearly define the central point of defense, and Bosnia - Herzegovina or Serbia ,33
he confronted the problem of a " broad front,"
... That realization had a particularly adverse
effect on his morale.32

274
Themain territorial objective of such an operation When launched , the HV offensive would have the
would be what the Serbs called their “ strategic focus,” appearance of a blitzkrieg. Domazet says the attack
UN Sectors North and South — Banija (Banovina), would begin with
Kordun , Lika, and Northern Dalmatia.334
.... a " maddening " fire strike of air, missile,
To undertake the offensive , the HV Main Staff and artillery forces, and with electronic mea
developed a two- tiered force — an assault force of sures after reconnaissance- commando teams
all-professional Guards Brigades, special operations had been infiltrated along the main directions of
units, and the Air Force backed by reservist-manned the attack in order to disorganize the enemy
Home Defense regiments and reserve infantry bri command and communication system and /or
gades.35 ( A third tier,according to Domazet, consisted disable his missile -artillery strikes against cities
of elements dedicated to identifying and eliminating and infrastructural facilities, to open up a pas
the SVK's artillery rocket forces as described previ sage in the defensive structure, thereby ( creat
ously ). The mission of the Guards Brigades was to ing) conditions for bringing in the striking force
(motorized Guards Brigades ) from their
... inflict a strong strike and penetrate the front (approach march ).39
in the chosen direction and to continue rapid
penetration as deep as possible into the enemy As the Guards Brigades penetrated enemy defenses,
order of battle, and then to switch to defense in they would bypass major pockets of resistance and
order to secure the success and /or undertake an push on quickly toward the Croatian state border.
attack against parts of the enemy cut off or While some reserve units attacked along secondary
surrounded. 36 axes in order to pin down flanks and potential reserve
elements , other reserve units would follow in the
The HV estimated that it needed at least six Guards Guards ' path to eliminate the formations they
Brigades for the planned offensive, and it actually bypassed ."
formed seven.
Operational and tactical doctrine as sophisticated as
While the Guards Brigades made the main drives, the this required a high degree of professionalization and
reserve forces would be used for supporting attacks training for its successful employment, butthere is
across the front to pin down SVK reserves and ease limited information about such training.40 It appears ,
the advance of the Guards. As Domazet states, these however, that in addition to its early focus on officer
attacks would have and NCO training schools the HV in 1994 began sys
tematic drills of its command staffs and formations to
the purpose of drawing out and tying up the inculcate the new HV doctrine throughout the Army.41
enemy's forces and ofpreventing their lateral As with most regular armies , the HV training program
movement along the front, in order to close off for its professional formations - primarily the Guards
those routes on which the strike of our forces Brigades and special operations units — was a build
would be inflicted in order to rapidly break ing-block process working from individual training
through and penetrate to the depth.37 through small -unit field training exercises (FTX ) up to
battalion-level field exercises.42 The frequency of each
Additional reserve formations would provide direct type and level of exercises has not been reported , but
support to the Guards along their attack axes. the small unit training appears to have been almost
continual, while battalion -size maneuvers probably
Another key aspect of HV doctrine was its focus on
the decapitation of enemy command, control, and * This section on Croatian operational-tactical doctrine is discussed
as theory rather than linked specifically to the exact warplans
communications in order to completely disrupt the drawn up for Operation "Oluja " (Storm ). These campaign plans
SVK's ability to maneuver its forces. The HV will be addressed in the section covering 1995. This theory is also
intended to use a combination of airstrikes, artillery applicable to all HV operations conducted during 1995 , including
those in Bosnia .
fire ,electronic jamming, and reconnaissance -sabotage
operations to eliminate key command posts, radio
relay towers, and other communications nodes.38

275
occurred every few months.43 The HV does not appear Chapter 69
to have conducted any brigade -size FTXs during 1994 The Diplomats Fail — Croatia Irredenta and the
or 1995, but its operations in the Livno Valley cer March 1994 Cease - Fire
tainly provided the units engaged there with the equiv
alent experience. Meanwhile, corps, district, and After the Croatia -RSK cease - fire broke down in Janu
brigade staffs carried out regular command post exer ary 1993 , UN and EU negotiators spent the rest of the
cises that almost certainly rehearsed plans for contin year trying to reestablish the protocols agreed to in
gencies and operations against the RSK . (General January 1992 as part of the Vance Plan . Their efforts
Bobetko has written that the HV Main Staff and the failed to produce any compromise even at the level of
Bjelovar Corps District ran a full-scale staff and field the lowest common denominator, let alone on the
rehearsal for Operation “ Bljesak (Flash )” — the West larger political issues . In the aftermath of theMedak
ern Slavonia campaign - three months before its exe operation in September, however, active hostilities had
cution in May 1995.)44 declined in frequency , and by spring 1994 both sides
were groping toward a cease - fire and perhaps even
HV reserve brigades and Home Defense regiments some confidence-building measures that they per
received far less training than the professional units, ceived were in their own interest.48 On 16 March , Rus
but regular callups of those manning frontline sectors sian special representative Vitaly Churkin announced
opposite the SVK , as well as other reserve formations, that he had brokered an agreement for talks between
helped to keep them militarily competent.45 These Croatian and RSK Government officials starting on 22
exercises refamiliarized reservists with their weapons March . The two sides met again on
and equipment and provided somespecialized 29-30 March , and, after extended negotiations, agreed
refresher training. Few were able to conduct any genu to halt the fighting 49
ine field training, however, and certainly no battalion
size exercises. General Bobetko's comments on their Despite the cease - fire , only moderate progress was
performance in 1995 make it clear that the HV reserve made on other issues , and it was not until December
units were considerably inferior to the Guards 1994 that somemodest confidence-building measures
Brigades.46 could be worked out. There had been no progress at all
toward reaching an overall political settlement.50 The
Equipment quality played less of a role in the reorga original Vance Plan agreed to back in 1992 had
nization of the HV than did other factors . The way the deferred the disposition of the disputed UN Protected
HV foughtwas more important than the implements it Areas to a final political settlement, and both sides
used, since most of the HV's heavy weapons were the continued to interpret the agreement according to their
ones the Army captured from the JNA during its 1991 own state interests. The Croatians — correctly insisting
war. Since then the HV had acquired only a few addi that the international community recognized that
tional systems, primarily some Argentine 155-mm Zagreb's sovereignty extended to all the Croatian
artillery pieces and Romanian 122-mm multiple borders — demanded that UNPROFOR disarm the
rocket launchers. In contrast to 1991, however, the HV SVK , permit Zagreb to reestablish its authority over
had systematically redistributed its heavy weaponry to the areas seized by the RSK , and allow displaced
provide more uniform tables of organization and Croatian refugees to return to their homes. Even as the
equipment for all its formations, particularly the two sides were agreeing on opening the Belgrade
Guards Brigades . The biggest purchases were for the Zagreb highway , the Adria oil pipeline, and some
Air Force , which at the beginning of 1992 had only water pipelines as evidence of their desire for a larger
three MiG -21s, some An - 2 biplanes, and one Mi-8 settlement, military events in Bosnia continued to
helicopter. The Zagreb government bought about overshadow the talks. First the SVK's joint assault
25 MiG - 21 fighter-bombers , some 30 Mi- 8 transport with the VRS against Bihac drew threats from Zagreb
47
helicopters, and eight Mi-24 helicopter gunships .* to invade the Krajina.* Then Croatia's military answer
While these strike weaponswere being added to the to the Serb offensive in the Livno Valley - Operation
HV armory, purchases of itemslike boots, clothing, “ Zima 94” —pointed to the solution Zagreb would
and helmets gave the Army a more uniform and disci choose in 1995 .
plined appearance .
See Section V, Chapter 63.

276

--
1
 Endnotes , Section VI

Rear AdmiralDavor Domazet- “ Loso ," " The Military Aspect of 10 Gotovina took over the corps on 5 December 1992.Zagreb Radio
the Strategic Determinants for Operations To Liberate the Occu 5 December 1992. Bobetko indicates in his memoirs that the Split
pied Areas of the Republic of Croatia," Hrvatski Vojnik October Corps District HQ was incapable of undertaking such an operation .
1996 , pp. 6-13. Bobetko, AllMy Battles, p . 367.
2Much of this section is based on General Bobetko's often self " Based on a review of Belgrade Tanjug, Belgrade Radio , and
serving memoirs.Nevertheless, many of the points Bobetkomakes Zagreb Radio during January -April 1993.
regarding the reorganization of the HV are valid , although the over 12 Bobetko , All My Battles, pp . 378-380. Bobetko's concerns that
all importance of his role in fixing identified problems remains the SVK would launch a ground attack and attempt to seize the
unclear. Gospic area or cut the lines of communication south along the
3

3 Zagreb Radio 20 November 1992. VelebitMountains appear to have been unfounded.

4 13 This account is based on the following sources:
Janko Bobetko, Sve Moje Bitke (All MyBattles), Zagreb: Vlastita
Naklada, 1996 , pp. 364-365 . Bobetko, All MyBattles, pp. 376-377, 380-384 .
5 Zagreb Radio 5 December 1992. .
6 Belgrade Radio 11 September 1993.
Belgrade Tanjug 11 September to 15 September 1993.
7 Bobetko, All My Battles, pp. 366-367. .
Analysis of the operation is based on the following sources: Zagreb Radio 14 September 1993.
Belgrade Tanjug reporting, 17 January 1993–1 April 1993. “ Fighting Reported in Croatia Between Croats and Rebel Serbs,"
. Reuters 9 September 1993 .
Belgrade Radio reporting, 17 January 1993–1 April 1993.
.
Zagreb Radio reporting , 17 January 1993–1 April 1993. “ Croats Said To Capture Rebel Serb Villages in Croatia,"
• Bobetko, All My Battles, pp. 362-363, 366-375 . Reuters 9 September 1993.
• Paul Harris , Cry Bosnia New York : Interlink Books, 1996 , • Steve Pagani, “ Croatian Army Says It Captured Three
pp. 81-83, section on “ Arkan" in Benkovac . Villages,” Reuters 9 September 1993.
Snjezana Dukic , “ If We Had Been Only 10 Minutes Late ...' • “ Krajina Serbs Shell Croatian Positions,” Reuters 10 September
Split Slobodna Dalmacija 23 May 1994, p . 9 , an interview with 1993 .
Colonel Miljenko Filipovic, commander of the HV “ Zrinski” Spe • Davor Huic , “ Serbs Launch Fiercest [Attack ] on Croatian Town
cial Operations Battalion. in Two Years,” Reuters 10 September 1993 .
Andjelka Mustapic, “ Units of Croatian Armed Forces: Slavonian .
Dan de Luce, “ Fighting in Croatia Forces 500 Serbs To Flee,”
Memoirs,” Hrvatski Vojnik 26 March 1993, p . 13,article on the 3rd Reuters 11 September 1993.
Guards Brigade. • Davor Huic , “ Blast Rocks Zagreb Suburb , Said Probable Mis
• Gordan Radosevic , “ Bite ofthe Cobras," Hrvatski Vojnik sile,” Reuters 11 September 1993.
17 June 1994 , pp. 17-19 , article on the 3rd Battalion /3rd Guards • “ Rebel Serbs Halt Croat Offensive Near Gospic ,” Reuters
Brigade. 11 September 1993.
• Vesna Puljak , “ ' Thunders ' From Banija ,” Hrvatski Vojnik 6 May . Davor Huic, “ Suspected Missile Attack Rocks Zagreb , Injures
1994, pp. 19-21, an article on the 2nd Guards Brigade. Nine,” Reuters 12 September 1993.
Gordan Lausic , “ Take Aim , But Do Not Fire,” Hrvatski Vojnik Dan de Luce , “ Serbs Halt Croats in Gospic ; UN Fear Battle Yet
5 November 1993, an article on the Mixed Artillery Battalion / To Come,” Reuters 12 September 1993.
112th Infantry Brigade. • "Croatian President Orders Troops To Halt Fighting,” Reuters
Lidija Duvnjak , “ Second Anniversary of the 53rd Marine Battal 12 September 1993.
ion,” Hrvatski Vojnik 22 October 1993, p . 84, an article on the 53rd • Dan de Luce , “ Rebel Serbs Hold Ground Against Croatian
Naval Landing Infantry Battalion. Attack,” Reuters 12 September 1993.
. “UN Says Serbs Threaten To Attack Targets in Croatia,” Reuters
Gordan Lausic, “Night Shadows,” Hrvatski Vojnik 13 August
1993, p . 14 , an article on the Reconnaissance-Sabotage 12 September 1993.
Company/4th Guards Brigade. .
Dijana Vrban, “ Croat Army Wants Serbs Disarmed Before With
• Damir Dukic, “ The Scorpions in Defense of Croatia,” Hrvatski drawal,” Reuters 12 September 1993.
Vojnik 4 June 1993, pp. 16-18 , an article on the 114th Infantry Bri • “ UN Force Commander Mediating Croat-Serb Truce,” Reuters
gade. 12 September 1993.
Andjelka Mustapic, “ Cetina Fighter — Giants ‘Under the Stars,' • Steve Pagani, “ Croatia's Rebel Serbs Threaten To Use New
Hrvatski Vojnik 18 June 1993, an article on the 126th Infantry Bri Weapons," Reuters 13 September 1993.
gade. • Dan de Luce, “ Krajina Serbs Caught On Hope by Croatian
• Gordan Lausic and Dejan Frigelj, “ St. Krsevan and 112th Offensive," Reuters 13 September 1993.
Defending Zadar,” Hrvatski Vojnik 18 June 1993 , p . 14, an Steve Pagani, “ Krajina Serbs Shell Croatian Town,” Reuters
article on the 112th Infantry Brigade. 13 September 1993.
• Andeljka Mustapic, “ The Knights of Ravni Kotari,” Hrvatski • Dan de Luce, “ Rebel Serbs Claim Gains Against Croats,"
Vojnik 12 March 1993, pp. 10-13, an interview with Brigadier Reuters 13 September 1993.
Mirko Sundov, commander 4th Guards Brigade. O “ Serb and Croat Commanders Agree To Consider Truce,"
8
Drawn from Belgrade Tanjug reports in February quoting SVK Reuters 13 September 1993 .
public announcements.
9
Igor Alborghetti, “ In Peacetime Croatia Will Have Only 50,000
Soldiers !" Zagreb Globus 31 May 1996 , pp. 15-17, 59, an inter
view with Corps General Anton Tus.

277
 • Dan de Luce, “ Serbs Soldiers Still Trapped in Croat-Held 26 Vesna Puljak , “ Academy for Winners,” Zagreb Velebit
Village,” Reuters 14 September 1993. 27 December 1996 , pp. 14-15.
• “ Serbs Shoot Down Croatian Fighter Jet,” Reuters 14 September 27 Bobetko , All My Battles, p . 503.
1993 . 28 Bobetko, All My Battles, p . 504.
• Dan de Luce, “ Croats Agree To Start Withdrawal From Serb 29 Domazet-“Loso,” Hrvatski Vojnik October 1996 , pp . 6-13 ; see
Villages,” Reuters 16 September 1993 . also Vinko Sebrek, “ The Croatian Air Force in Operation 'Storm '
• “ UN Troops Moving Into Villages as Croats Withdraw ,” Reuters Part 2," Hrvatski Vojnik November 1996 , pp . 56-59 and Marijan
16 September 1993. Pavicic , “ Struggle Between David and Goliath ,” Hrvatski Vojnik
• Dan de Luce, “ UN Eyeball-to -Eyeball With Croat, Serb Fight July 1997 , pp . 10-17, an article on the HV's UAV project and use
ers,” Reuters 16 September 1993. during the war.
• Dan de Luce, "Croatians Burn Houses Before Handing Over to 30 Domazet states that:
UN ,” Reuters 16 September 1993. From these initial premises, we had to derivemeaningful
• Dan de Luce, “ UN Says Croatian ArmyRazed Serb Villages,” responses to the fundamentaldeterminants of the “ Strategy
Reuters 17 September 1993. of Real Threat” in this order:
• Dan de Luce, “UN Major Says Croat Troops Killed Serb Villag 1. How to neutralize the enemy attempt to take
ers,” Reuters 18 September 1993. advantage of a " favorable geostrategic position and
“UN Says66 Serb Bodies Found ,Many Mutilated,” Reuters open a front from Baranja to Prevlaka” ;
23 September 1993. 2. Whatwas a sufficient balance of power for a rapid
14 The authors were unable to incorporate fully in Volume I infor offensive operation to liberate the occupied areas and
mation from the recent book Knin Je Pau U Beogradu (Knin Fell in how to attain it;
Belgrade) that covers the development and state of the SVK prior 3. How to avoid the consequences of an initial strike
to Operation " Oluja" in August 1995. This book, written by Major and prevent as soon as possible continuation of the
GeneralMilisav Sekulic , the former Chief ofOperations and Train reprisal with the enemy's missile and artillery weap
ing on the SVK Main Staff, shedsnew light on the Krajina Serb ons ;
Army, including the situation with Torbica .See also Belgrade Tan 4. By whatmode of operation and in what directions
jug 4 June 1992. Torbica was the former commander of the JNA to surprise the enemy and inflictblows on him ,select
37th (Uzice) Corps during 1991 and early 1992 when the corps was the way that would disorganize his defense system
deployed in theMostar area to guard JNA facilities during the most rapidly and guarantee a penetration to the bor
Croatian war. ders of the state, prevent possible introduction of
15 Lieutenant Colonel General Milan Torbica , “ Persecution of other strategic military forces , and bring about con
Officers From Krajina,” Belgrade Borba 20 October 1992, p . 12, ditions for breaking up the “ Army of the RSK ” com
a letter to the editor from General Torbica. pletely into separate parts.
16 Belgrade Tanjug 28 October 1992 and 26 November 1992; Domazet-“ Loso ," Hrvatski Vojnik October 1996 ,pp. 6-13.
M.Cetnik , “ Change at Top of Territorial Defense of Krajina: 31 Ibid .
Novakovic Replacing Torbica,” Belgrade Politika 29 October 32 Domazet notes that, from April 1993 to May 1995, SVK units ,
1992, p . 7 . particularly those in Lika and Northern Dalmatia, spent about650
17 Belgrade Tanjug 22 February 1994. days at“ increased level of combat alert awaiting attacks ... from
18General Celeketic had earlier commanded the JNA/ VRS 16th the forces of the HV" and about 300 days on alert because of
Krajina Motorized Brigade with distinction in Western Slavonia alarmsover HV recon- sabotage operations. Domazet-“Loso ,"
during 1991 and in the Posavina corridor during 1992. S. Radu Hrvatski Vojnik October 1996 ,pp.6-13.
lovic, “Who Is GeneralCeleketic,” Belgrade Borba 24 February 33 Domazet-" Loso ," Hrvatski Vojnik October 1996 , pp. 6-13 .
1994, p . 3 ; Filip Svarm , “ In the House of the Three Milans,” Bel Zagreb realized that it would be unable to generate sufficient
grade Vreme 28 February 1994, p . 19; Radovan Pavlovic, “ The forces to simultaneously assault all of the RSK atonce, particularly
Reason Why Torbica ,Novakovic , and Celeketic Have Left,” Bel if the Yugoslav Army intervened in Eastern Slavonia (UN Sector
grade Politika 27 May 1995, p . 7. East), and, as a result, focused its primary planning efforts on first
19 Jovanka Simic, “ Intrigues Because of Politics,” Belgrade eliminating the “ core” RSK areas in UN Sectors North and South ,
Vecernje Novosti 15 October 1993, p . 2 , an interview with Major as well as West. Domazet-“ Loso," Hrvatski Vojnik October 1996 ,
General Mile Novakovic . pp. 6-13.
20 Radovan Pavlovic , “ The Reason Why Torbica,Novakovic , and 35 The reserve infantry brigades were territorially raised formations
Celeketic Have Left,” Belgrade Politika 27 May 1995, p . 7. manned with younger personnel who had finished their conscript
21 Domazet-“Loso,” Hrvatski Vojnik October 1996 , pp.6-13 . duty and somemiddle-aged reservists.Most had been formed dur
22 Bobetko, All My Battles,pp. 364-365, 508 . ing the 1991 war. The HV began to form HomeDefense (Domo
23 Vesna Puljak , “Academy for Winners,” Zagreb Velebit branstvo) regiments in 1992; these also were territorially raised
27 December 1996 , pp. 14-15 . formations, virtually identical to the previous reserve infantry
24 Defense Minister Gojko Susak stated in October 1995 that 2,700 brigades. In fact,most were simply reserve infantry brigades that
personnel had graduated from the officers ' school. Report by Kris had been redesignated as regiments, that is, 137th Duga Resa Bri
tina Matica Stojan on Defense Minister Susak's speech , “ The gade was redesignated 137th Home Defense Regiment in 1994.
Future of Croatia in Safe Hands,” Zagreb Velebit 20 October 1995, However, there appears to have been little to distinguish the two
pp . 5.9 . types of formations. Part of the reason for the redesignation may
25 The HV newspaper Velebit states that: have been to give more units the traditional Domobranstvo desig
The mission of the school was (and is) to equip officers to nator, which the Austro -Hungarians had first allowed to be used in
command combined higher level tactical units and opera the 19th century and which the Ustasha Governmenthad continued
tional systems in combat,and to perform staff and other the use of in World War II. In addition to the Home Defense regi
duties in Croatian military commands and Defense Ministry ments, the Croatians also had a number of independent Home
orGeneral Staff departments and administrations.
“ Fifth Class of Officers at the Command/staff School,” Zagreb
Velebit 4 October 1996 , p. 11.

278
-
Defense battalions, most ofwhich seem to have been comprised of 44 Bobetko, AllMy Battles, p . 402.
older age categories and were truly used only for local defense. 45 In the directive for Operation “ Oluja - 1” ( Storm - 1 ) covering the
The HV also had three conscript training brigades — the 111th , Zagreb Corps District's sector for “ Oluja,” HV reserve and home
113th , and 123rd — formed from three of the 1991 territorialbri defense units, “ ... through mobilization and calling in for training
gades, all of which were combat capable and more robustly and military exercises, will be rotated every 45 to 90 days in keep
equipped than either the HomeDefense regiments or the reserve ing with the brigade/regiment resources.” Bobetko , All My Battles,
infantry brigades . p . 425. An article on the 137th Home Defense Regiment indicates
36 Domazet-“ Loso," Hrvatski Vojnik October 1996 , pp. 6-13. that it conducted rehearsals for its role in Operation “ Oluja.” Neven
37 Ibid . Miladin , " Where It Was Needed Most,” Zagreb Velebit
38 Domazet-" Loso,” Hrvatski Vojnik October 1996 , pp. 6-13; Vinko 8 December 1995 , p. 15. An article on the 145th Infantry Brigade
Sebrek, “ The Croatian Air Force in Operation Storm ' Part 2," also indicates that “ the brigade used the period ofmore than a year
Hrvatski Vojnik November 1996 , pp. 56-59. of‘ rest' for restructuring, and drilling for future actions, which was
39 Domazet-“ Loso ,” Hrvatski Vojnik October 1996 , pp. 6-13 . See evident through numerous exercises and preparations for mobiliza
also Bobetko's evaluation of the HV prepared in April 1995 for tion.” Neven Miladin , “ Proven Throughout All of Croatia,” Zagreb
President Tudjman, Bobetko, All My Battles, pp. 385-389. Velebit 26 January 1996 , p . 14 .
40 Bobetko, AllMy Battles, p .517. 46 Bobetko, AllMy Battles, p . 438.
Bobetko states in his 25 April 1995 evaluation for President Tudj 47 Vinko Sebrek , “HRZ in Operation Storm ,” Hrvatski Vojnik Octo
man that: ber 1996 , pp. 46-49, an article on the Croatian Air Force.
The preconditions for such a decision were satisfied gradu 48 The two sides had agreed to a Christmas cease -fire in 1993,
ally through the following action : the training of all com which they extended in January. It never fully went into effect in
mand staffs,both the command staffs of the corps districts UN Sector South , however, and was not comprehensive. “ Serbs
and the lower command staffs, the command staffs of the and Croats Extend Cease-Fire in Croatia,” Reuters 13 January
Guards Brigades. 1994 .
Through breaking in and training, and through demonstra 49 Davor Huic, “ Croats and Krajina Serbs Sign Cease -Fire Accord,”
tion exercises, all the variants for the most efficient use and Reuters 30 March 1994. The agreement included five main points:
most rational approaches to the execution of basic duties • Immediate cessation ofhostilities, with cease- fire on the con
have been established. The basic experiences acquired in frontation line taking effect April 4 at 0900 .
part through various training courses have been carried over Effective with signing, units are to be frozen in place for 10 km
to the basic command structures of the Croatian forces. on both sides of the contact line, except for thosemovements nec
Bobetko, AllMy Battles, p . 387. essary to execute the agreement, or those preapproved by UNPRO
42 The HV appears to have differentiated between these FTXs and FOR .
the “ demonstration " exercises that the Main Staff also held . These • Withdrawalof ground forces ofboth sidesby one km from the
seem to have been more orchestrated affairs designed more for confrontation line , to their respective ‘separation lines,' to be com
show than as a real learning experience. Three demonstration exer pleted by 0900 on April 8 .
cises are known to have been conducted in 1994 and early 1995: • UNPROFOR and ECMM (European Community Monitoring
“ Bandira 94” —a battalion -size combined armsand joint AF-Naval Mission ) to monitor the area between the separation lines.
exercise, “ Poseidon 94" —an AF -Navy exercise, and “Mlinac By April 5 at0900 ,mortars and AA artillery are to be pulled
95” —a brigade- level river crossing exercise . Bobetko, All My Bat back at least 10 km from the confrontation line, heavy guns and
tles, p. 510. For samples of Croatian unit training, see the following tanks at least 20 km .
SO
Hrvatski Vojnik articles: Douglas Hamilton , “Croatia Signs Pact With Rebel Serbs,"
• Tomislav Prusina, “General Purpose Artillerymen ,” Hrvatski Reuters 2 December 1994.
51
Vojnik February 1995, p . 18 ,an article on mortar units in the 1st Douglas Hamilton , “ Croatia Signs Pact With Rebel Serbs,"
Battalion /3rd Guards Brigade. Reuters 2 December 1994. Negotiationsover the confidence
• Vesna Puljak, “ Units of the Croatian Army: The Lika Artillery building measures went poorly throughout the year until the
men Are Heard Far and Wide,” Hrvatski Vojnik 29 July 1994, December agreement. “ Croatian Serbs Reject Agreement With
p . 23 , an article on mortar units in the 9th Guards Brigade. Zagreb,” Reuters 18 November 1994 .
• Vesna Puljak, “ Thunders ' From Banija,” Hrvatski Vojnik 6 May
1994 , pp. 19-21 , an article on the 2nd Guards Brigade.
• Vesna Puljak, “ ' Thunderbolts ' in Armor," Hrvatski Vojnik 20
May 1994, pp . 13-15 , an article on the Armored Battalion /2nd
Guards Brigade.
43 Bobetko states:
... since 1993 and 1994 the units had been gradually
trained by battalion ,while on the move; they had been
involved in exercises, and those exercises were carried out
in those regions and on topographical features where they
might eventually execute their basic mission ... two years
were devoted exclusively to preparing for such a complex
operation.
Bobetko, All My Battles, p . 438.

279
Section VII

The Bosnian and Croatian Wars in 1995 :

The Long and Bloody Path to Dayton

281
Though none of the key players could know it at the Organization
start of the year, 1995 was destined to be the last act of
their violent drama, closing the war not only in Bosnia The ARBiH in 1995 consisted of six regionally based
but also in neighboring Croatia . Indeed , the two wars corps and one independent division , with a small num
were to become so interlinked during the course of the ber of special-purpose units directly subordinate to the
year that by war's end they had essentially become a General Staff. Each corps was numbered and had a
single conflict. In the last few months of the war, the specified area of responsibility: the 1st Corps in Sara
Croatian Army (HV) would attack the Krajina Serb jevo and some of the suburbs outside the city ; the 2nd
Army (SVK ), partly to rescue the 5th Corps of the Corps headquartered in Tuzla , with responsibility for
Bosnian Army (ARBiH ). Thereafter, the Croatian most ofnortheast Bosnia (and the isolated Srebrenica
Army along with the Croatian Defense Council and Zepa enclaves); the 3rd Corps centered on Zenica,
(HVO ) and the Bosnian Army would bring the Bos including the Maglaj- Tesanj finger and the western
nian Serb Army (VRS) to the verge of collapse , while half of the frontline along the Serb -held Ozren salient;
the Yugoslav Army (VJ) would threaten to defend the the 4th Corps in northern Herzegovina , covering the
last vestiges of the Krajina Serbs in the eastern Mostar-Konjic - Jablanica area ; the 5th Corps in the
Slavonia region of Croatia . Thus, as the Dayton talks still- surrounded Bihac pocket; and the 7th Corps
began , no fewer than six armies — HV, SVK , ARBiH , based in the Travnik area , facing toward the Serb-held
HVO , VRS, and VJ — would be at war or on a war Krajina region (which was the former home ofmost of
footing within 100 kilometers of each other. the corps' fighting men ). The surrounded Gorazde
enclave in eastern Bosnia had the independent 81st
Chapter 70 Division directly subordinate to the General Staff.
The Bosnian Army in 1995
The Army had made good use of the winter cease- fire
The Bosnian military establishment — having taken of 1994-95 to effect a major change in its force struc
advantage of the January -May cease -fire agreement to ture below the corps echelon , beginning with the con
give its exhausted soldiers a respite from the previous version of most of its “ OperationalGroups” (OGs) —
year's fighting - was better prepared for offensive semipermanent combinations of several brigades
operations in the spring of 1995 than ever before . By grouped by region or function — into permanent divi
this time, the Bosnian Army could field a force of sions. The ARBiH did more than just reflag the ad hoc
some 230,000 personnel, organized into six corps and OperationalGroups and change the terminology. The
about 120 maneuver brigades.' It was not so much that conversion from OGs to divisions was accompanied
the Armyhad grown in overall size (which remained by a redistribution of precious heavy equipment and
relatively constant from aboutmid - 1993 onward ), but some changes in combat doctrine. The new divisions
rather that its capabilities had significantly improved . were intended to improve mobility , logistics , fire
Three years into the conflict, the ARBiH was more control, and responsiveness by concentrating the
experienced , more confident, somewhat better ARBiH's scattered heavy weapons and transportation
equipped , generally better trained , and apparently assets in a division -level mobile reserve .Whereas bri
willing to fight for as long as it took to win back criti gades had previously been operating with perhaps a
cal territorial objectives. Even though it still had to single captured tank or artillery piece (and possibly no
fight essentially the same war of attrition ithad begun ammunition ), these precious resources could now be
back in 1994, it was using a more efficient fighting
force and improved tactics that it hoped would achieve
greater gains at lower cost.

283
concentrated for greater effect wherever and whenever VRS superiority in command and control and heavy
they were most needed for offensive operations in the weapons by hitting opposing command posts, commu
division's area of responsibility . The new arrange nications , and artillery forward observation posts. The
ments also improved the distribution of supplies and ARBiH high command embedded this doctrine in the
ammunition , which had always been a problem for the force structure by establishing a recon -sabotage battal
ARBiH . ion at the corps echelon and a company within each
brigade . By 1995 many battalions even had organic
The new divisionswere not intended to be very recon - sabotage platoons, an indication of how the
mobile and, in fact, functioned as static regional com ARBiH had evolved organizationally.
bat commands much more than as maneuver forma
tions. Most of the divisions were still sorely deficient
in the specialized support elements — particularly the Equipment
engineering, communications , and logistic func
tions — which would have been part of a comparable The Bosnian Army's material situation had noticeably
sized NATO or Warsaw Pact unit. Nevertheless , the improved, thanks largely to the previous spring's
evolutionary transition from OperationalGroups to Croat-Muslim Federation agreement that again
divisions showed that the ARBiH leadership was try opened Croat-held territory on the coast for the transit
ing to develop a more sophisticated force, with of weapons into Muslim -held central Bosnia . By the
improved command and logistic structures. beginning of 1995 most Bosnian Army units were
adequately outfitted with uniforms, personal weapons,
Another part of the restructuring expanded the core of and ammunition — at least compared with the truly
elite , offensively oriented " liberation ” and “ light” desperate days of 1992 and 1993. The ARBiH stillhad
brigades to support the largely static "mountain " fewer weapons than people , however, and was forever
brigades,most ofwhich were still based on former ter short of supplies; ammunition , in particular,had to be
ritorial defense formations. As Bosnian Army com carefully husbanded. The Croatian Government kept a
mander Delic stated in early March 1995, the latter tight hand on the spigot that controlled the flow of all
types of units would serve as static, frontline brigades military supplies to Muslim -held Bosnia . The Croats
to defend specific territories. This made a virtue of the took a substantial percentage of these supplies as a
fact that such units were primarily composed of local “ tax ” on their passage and, still wary of their recent
conscripts and reservists and had comparatively little adversaries, categorically refused to allow most of the
mobility or offensive capability. The ARBiH's critical weapons — armor and field artillery — to pass.
maneuver brigades, on the other hand , were specifi
cally designed for offensive purposes, with greater The Croats ' selective arms embargo insured that the
mobility and generally better equipment. Exemplified Bosnians would remain dependent on an almost
by the crack 7th Muslimski and 17th Krajina Bri entirely infantry- based army. In early 1995 all of the
gades, these were all- volunteer units of experienced ARBiH - a force of nearly a quarter million troops
troops - usually drawn from the picked men of the had only a few dozen tanks and perhaps a hundred
static brigades — who were willing to serve wherever heavy field artillery pieces of more than 100 -mm cali
the Army directed them to fight. These were the ber. This haphazard collection of captured vehicles
legionaries of the new ARBiH . and weapons was a hodgepodge of varying calibers
and types, and each gun crew knew its ammunition
The ARBiH also actively developed its special opera reserves had to last for the remainder of the war. These
tions elements, which since 1994 had played a vital gaping deficiencies in artillery and armor forced the
role as storm troops, infiltrating ahead of offensives to Army to rely almost exclusively on mortars
create breakthroughs for the main forces. These especially 82-mm medium mortars — to provide its
“ reconnaissance-sabotage” forces were employed to infantry with indirect fire support.
infiltrate enemy positions and generally to disrupt
enemy operations. Their purpose was to offset the

284
Capabilities Chapter 71
The HVO in 1995 — Still Playing
A significant operational consequence of the ARBiH's in the Minor Leagues
lack of artillery , armor, and vehicles was a limitation
on the rate its forces could advance on the offensive .
The ARBiH had been reminded on several painful Organization
occasions in 1993 and 1994 that even on foot its forces
could not advance beyond the range of their indirect At the beginning of 1995 the Croatian Defense Coun
fire support, which was essentially that of the 82-mm cil (HVO ) had a nominal strength ofbetween 40,000
medium mortar. Time and again , eagerness to regain and 50,000 troops. However, after the conclusion of
lost ground and exploit all-too-rare breakthroughs had the Croat-Muslim conflict the previous spring, the
led ARBiH infantry beyond the short range of its sup HVO had taken advantage of the opportunity to demo
port weapons and into the prepared killing zones of bilize most of its conscripts and reservists and retain
the far superior VRS artillery, which was followed by only a small standing force for local offensive opera
timely VRS counterattacks to which they could not tions. By 1995 no more than half the HVO's theoreti
effectively reply. cal troop strength was actually in the field at any given
time, a clear indication that the Bosnian Croats per
It was not until 1995 that the ARBiH really began to ceived little strategic threat to Herceg-Bosna. These
adopt operational-level campaign plans that were HVO forces were organized into four " corps districts "
more consistent with the Army's firepower and abili comprising some 30 infantry brigades and regiments,
ties and that allowed it to challenge the VRS effec several independent battalions, and assorted corps
tively and consistently on the battlefield . The infantry level support elements .
tactics themselves — infiltration , assault forces , and
light infantry follow - up attacks — were essentially The four HVO corps districts were organized
sound and had been worked out the year before. geographically : the Tomislavgrad Corps District
Whereas in 1994 overambitious corps- and division ( formerly the “ Northwest Herzegovina Operational
level battlefield management had led to disasters at Zone" ) had responsibility for Croat- held western
Bihac and the Ozren mountains, in 1995 more modest Herzegovina; the Mostar Corps District ( formerly the
and systematically directed “ bite and hold ” advances “ Southeast Herzegovina OperationalZone" ) had
would allow the ARBiH to achieve lasting gains in responsibility for the Mostar area and Croat-held
both theaters . Herzegovina along the Neretva river; the Vitez Corps
District (formerly the “ Central Bosnia Operational
Operationally , the Bosnian Army had come far since Zone” had responsibility for the various Croat
its traumatic birth in April 1992, when it lacked orga enclaves of central Bosnia ; while the Orasje Corps
nization, weapons, and practically everything else . District (formerly the “ Posavina Operational Zone" )
Improved weapons supplies, formalized training, and defended the Orasje pocket area and the small Croat
the harsh lessons of combat had all been crucial held areas along the south side of the Posavina corri
factors in the ARBiH's improving capabilities. It still dor. In addition , there was also a tiny “ Bihac Military
lagged far behind the VRS in staff work , logistics and District,” consisting only of the isolated 101st HVO
supplies, and heavy equipment. If the ARBiH was Home Defense Regiment, fighting alongside the
clearly not the best fighting force in Bosnia , it was ARBiH 5th Corps in the Bihac pocket.
starting to become good enough to defeat its
increasingly exhausted and overtaxed Bosnian Serb
opponent.

285
Using a system closely patterned after the Croatian second -level forces of generally smaller size , simpli
Army, each HVO corps district consisted of one elite fied organization , far fewer heavy weapons, and very
" Guards Brigade" and usually eight to 10 territorially limited capabilities .
based "Home Defense regiments." Each corps district
also had a variety of its own specialized elements ,
generally including a corps logistic base, some kind of Equipment
artillery unit, an air defense battalion , a military police
battalion or company, and a communications By early 1995 most HVO units were adequately sup
company. plied with small arms, ammunition and uniforms,
although logistic support sometimes broke down dur
When directing battlefield operations, the HVO in ing operations. Zagreb was as lavish in supplying
someareas would establish intermediate command Croat forces as it was miserly with the Muslims, so
echelons below the corps district, including " opera most HVO units were better equipped than their
tional groups” and “ tactical groups.” As in the VRS ARBiH counterparts. Heavy weapons were the force's
and ARBiH , operational groups were semipermanent most serious material weakness. Even at the conclu
groups of several brigades or tactical groups working sion of the war, the HVO would have only about four
together in a particular geographic area — such as the dozen tanks (almost all T- 55s and T- 34s), about three
surrounded Vitez region. Tactical groups, by contrast, dozen APCs, IFVs and light tanks (such as M -60
were more ad hoc commands of temporarily detailed APCs, M -80 IFVs, and PT- 76s), and around four
units (frequently of battalion or company size ) assem dozen towed indirect-fire field artillery pieces over
bled under a designated commander for a particular 105 mm (about half of these 130 -mm M - 46 guns and
combat action. (One example was “ TacticalGroup 1," 122-mm D - 30 howitzers). By way of comparison, the
which was drawn from small combat elements con entire Bosnian Croat Army could probably field less
tributed by each of the HVO units in the Tomislavgrad firepower from heavy weapons than a single VRS
Corps District and was collectively assigned to hold a armor-mechanized brigade, such as the 2nd Armored
particular section of the front in western Bosnia under Brigade.
an operational group.) These ad hoc arrangements
complicated command and control and made for The HVO had decided in mid -1994 to make the most
constant rotations of personnel, but also distributed of its limited heavy weapons inventory by collecting
the military and economic burden of operations most of its armor, APC , and artillery pieces and
throughout all of the HVO's units and across all of the assigning them to its most professional units, the
communities of Croat-held Bosnia . recently formed Guards Brigades. This consolidation
had the twofold benefit of distributing the equipment
By the beginning of 1995, the HVO had clearly to the professional soldiers who would be able to use
chosen to adopt a two -tier military structure . The it most effectively, and of concentrating the firepower
backbone of this structure was to be the HVO's elite , where and when needed offensively instead of having
professionally based formations — the special opera individual vehicles or guns scattered across the long
tions units , the four HVO Guards Brigades, the Main Bosnian front. More than three - quarters of the HVO's
Staff and corps- level artillery units, and the specialist heavy weapons inventory went to the four Guards Bri
units like themilitary police battalions. Their better gades, the corps artillery units, the HVO's training
equipment, greater degree of training, and overall pro center at Capljina, and the army-levelRepair and
fessionalism made these elite forces by far the most Maintenance Battalion .
capable units in the HVO .Most of the HVO's man
power, however, still resided in the territorially based This consolidation left the rest of the force — specifi
" Home Defense regiments " raised in each of the cally, the Home Defense regiments — almost devoid of
majormunicipalities in Croat-held Bosnia . Unlike the serious firepower, so that the HVO Home Defense
HVO Guards Brigades, the Home Defense regiments
were made up of conscripts and reservists, distinctly

286
regiments — like most Bosnian Army brigades — had convergence of interests fostered an increasing degree
only their organic mortar complement and corps -level of military cooperation between their military com
artillery for indirect fire support. These regiments had mands, and by the timeof the autumn 1995 offensives
already been stripped of their best officers and men to they were coordinating plans at the strategic level. The
form the Guards Brigades, and the loss of their Croats and Muslims remained deeply suspicious of
organic heavy weapons diminished their combat each other, however, and military cooperation
potential even further. remained carefully circumscribed and strictly gov
erned by each faction's self- interest.

Capabilities The overall record of Croat-Muslim military coopera

tion in 1994 had been mixed ; in some areas there was
The bottom line in early 1995 was that the Bosnian still no cooperation at all. For instance, the HVO's
Croat Army's efforts to improve itself had been Vitez Corps District commander and later Chief of the
largely ineffective , producing little real forcewide HVO Main Staff, Tihomir Blaskic , stated publicly a
improvement over the preceding three years. The cre month after the cooperation agreement was signed
ation of the four Guards Brigades had greatly that not only were the HVO's 110th and 111th Bri
improved local offensive capabilities, creating a core gades not participating in the Bosnian Government
of shock troops able to fight alongside the Croatian attack in the Tesanj- Teslic area but also that his HVO
Army (HV ), but at the expense of drastically weaken troops had been explicitly directed not to cooperate
ing the rest of the Army in both firepower and troop with the Muslims.3
quality. With a few exceptions, endemic weaknesses
in the HVO's higher -level command and controlleft it Even where the level of cooperation was better, itwas
still incapable of conducting complex , coordinated poorer than advertised and less than effective .
offensives . AsOperation “ Zima 94" had shown the Although cited at the time asmodels of military coop
previous winter, the HVO remained heavily reliant on eration, the HVO and ARBiH forces in the Kupres and
the Croatian Army for its higher-level combat direc Livno operations actually displayed very poor military
tion . It had also developed a nearly total dependence coordination , and the operations revealed asmuch
on Croatian Army heavy weapons for offensive sup about the failings in the Croat-Muslim military alli
port,especially during the western Bosnian campaigns ance as it did about the successes . The November
in late 1995. Far from becoming a fully capable , 1994 Kupres offensive was at best a " concurrent"
autonomous fighting force , the Bosnian Croats ' operation of simultaneous but ill-coordinated HVO
inability to overcome their substantial shortcomings in and ARBiH attacks. As such , it represented a largely
command, coordination, discipline, heavy weapons, unsuccessful attempt to coordinate actions by two sep
and logistics left the HVO in 1995 the same kind of arate militaries, not a true integration of forces for a
semi-independent force it had been in 1992. Though it joint attack .Most telling, the force that actually took
could manage some local attacks on its own, during the objective , the HVO , made no effort to share the
the major offensive operations of the year, it would spoils : Kupres remained closed to the Bosnian
function as a mere supporting auxiliary of the HV. Muslims.

Chapter 72 True, the HVO had supported Bosnian Army infantry

The Rocky Road Toward Croat -Muslim attacks with its field artillery on occasion , as in the
Federation ,March 1994 -November 1995 failed ARBiH offensive toward Donji Vakuf in
November 1994 , and HVO units appear to have
Although the Bosnian Muslims and Croats had agreed offered marginal support during the ARBiH's unsuc
to form an ARBiH -HVO " joint command" in the cessful attempt to break out from Sarajevo in June
Washington and Split Agreements signed in 1994 ,
transforming this ideal into reality was to prove slow ,
arduous, and fraught with difficulties. An obvious

287
1995. These were very much the exception rather than transportation and logistics. Both armies eased
the rule , however, and neither the HVO nor the restrictions on the movement of troops and supplies
ARBiH was inclined to expend scarce artillery through each other's territories, improving logistics
resources for the other force unless they would and mobility for both forces .
themselves benefit.
Chapter 73
The establishment of a “ Joint Military Headquarters” The " Red Generals " Refuse To Bow
as part of the Federation agreement somewhat Political-Military Relations and the
improved liaison and communication between the Strategic Debate in Republika Srpska , 1995
ARBiH and HVO , although it fell far short of the the
oretical objective of a Croat-Muslim joint command Like an egg pierced at both ends, the Bosnian Serb
that could actually issue orders to forces of either military at the end of 1994 found itself under strong
army. Coordination was also fostered at lower eche pressure from the Bosnian Army while suffering the
lons, where some liaison officers were exchanged to negative pressure of its economic and political isola
improve cooperation . These genuine improvements in tion from Serbia and Federal Yugoslavia . These pres
ARBiH -HVO relations nevertheless left fundamental sures in 1995 would help weaken the fragile
disagreements about the ultimate structure and objec relationship between the political and the military
tives of a Croat-Muslim Federation military organiza leadership in the Republika Srpska (RS ). A Belgrade
tion . For the foreseeable future , integration beyond the Vreme article from August 1995 accurately assesses
level of local cooperation was unacceptable to either this conflict as taking place on four different yet inter
side . related levels. The first of these conflicts, at the
" social" level, derived from the military leaders'
The best that could be said about the arrangement was objections to the political and economic preference
that military relations between Croats and Muslims given by the SDS to well-placed businessmen whose
were better than when they had been fighting a bloody war profiteering undercut the Army's combat readi
civil war only months before .Under the umbrella of ness . The second area of political difficulty was the lit
the ARBiH -HVO Federation there was still as much tle discussed regional conflict between the Banja
divergence of view about a Croat-Muslim military Luka/Bosanska Krajina region of western Bosnia,
establishment as there had been in 1992 when , going which was more “ Communist” or “ socialist” in out
their separate ways, they had collided with each other. look , and the SDS-dominated Pale/eastern Bosnia
In particular, this disagreement — an extension of the area ,which had a more “ chetnik ” flavoring. The third
fundamental disagreements about the structure of a problem area was the longstanding ideological divide
future Bosnian state — was expressed in the troubled between the ex -Communist “ partisans” of the VRS
drafting of the Federation Defense Law , the official and the Serbian nationalist SDS " chetniks " (discussed
document that was to lay out the organization , com earlier in Section III). This split would surface most
mand relationships, procedures, and legal principles notably in 1995 when the SDS hurled the " Commu
governing the new joint force . nist" epithet at the VRS Main Staff when their battles
over strategy became public. These three conflict
Even though the Joint Military Headquarters was an areas became the battleground over political policy
extremely weak organization and Croat and Muslim and military strategy in Republika Srpska between
brigades were only rarely to be found fighting side by Slobodan Milosevic , VRS Main Staff Commander
side , the Croat-Muslim alliance nevertheless brought General Ratko Mladic , and his Main Staff on one side
very real benefits in the common struggle against the against Radovan Karadzic and the SDS on the other.
Serbs. The cease -fire itself was of incalculable value, At the fourth level, injected like a catalyst into the
for by disengaging the HVO and freeing up sizable simmering chemistry ofpolitical-military debate, was
Bosnian Army troop reserves it mademost of the what Vreme calls the " political line," the struggle
offensives of late 1994 and 1995 possible. In more
mundane terms, the greatest benefit of the Croat
Muslim alliance was probably in the realm of

288

-- --
between Milosevic and Karadzic over acceptance of VRS would eventually go public with these charges in
the Western nations’ “ Contact Group ” peace plan . October 1995 , after the Serbs had suffered major terri
torial losses in western Bosnia , in a Vreme article that
GeneralMladic and the VRS were ideal tools for recalled ,
Milosevic in his political battles with Karadzic ; they
were ideologically closer to Milosevic and formed the At the Assembly's session in Sanski Most on
only Bosnian Serb power base outside of Karadzic's 15 April, the Main Staff highlighted the essence
control. The SDS dominated every othermajor institu of the problem of the defense and supply of the
tion in the Republika Srpska, including the parlia Army and warned of whatwas to come... [ and ]
ment, the police ,Ministry of Defense, and industries. that the assembly and state authorities failed to
Only in the Banja Luka /Bosanska Krajina area , the pay due heed to this, so that the problems
regional rival to the Karadzic -controlled area of Pale increased , and events unfurled in an unfavorable
and eastern Bosnia , did the VRS leaders enjoy a bloc way - something which the Main Staff drew to
of political support. the attention of the Supreme Command ( the Bos
nian Serb equivalent of the National Security
The opening shot in the battle between Mladic and Council ), the state authorities, and the Assembly
Karadzic (and by proxy, Milosevic ) came in April several times. 10
1995. The Bosnian Serb Assembly met — at whose
behest it remains unclear — at SanskiMost for a spe The debate apparently went on for 30 hours.11
cial session to discuss the political-military situation Karadzic and the assembly dealt with Mladic's
in Bosnia and Croatia . It met in the shadow of the charges by accusing him of attempting a coup against
ARBiH spring offensive and the fall ofMount the political leadership . Only a small group of dele
Vlasic — the loss of which was widely seen as a gates from Banja Luka and Bosanska Krajina stood by
debacle.6 Mladic.12 At least one senior SDS official, Velibor
Ostojic, openly proposed that the assembly reorganize
In his scheduled briefing on the military situation , and the Main Staff to make sure the party -directed
particularly on military supplies, Mladic turned his Supreme Command exercised full control over the
verbal guns on the SDS, lambasting its support for Army." Attempts to remove three of Mladic's key
" businessmen " who profited from the war yet failed to advisers, however, failed .14
supply what the Army needed to win it and who
ignored the plight of disabled veterans and the fami The private war between the Army and the political
lies ofdead soldiers.'The Belgrade magazine Vecernje leadership smoldered on in the aftermath of the
Novosti states that Mladic assembly meeting. The continuing disagreements
ensured that little agreement on adapting Serb military
... pointed to the fact that the burden of war has strategy to the new situation would be reached
not been equally shared in the RS and that even between the Supreme Command and the VRS Main
the state is trading in commodities of strategic Staff for the rest of the year .
importance for the Army, which left it above all
without fuel, primarily oil. 8 Military operations continued to be guided generally
by the strategic plan that the Main Staff prepared and
The deputies retaliated by blaming Mladic and the the Supreme Command approved in March , before the
Army for the losses of Serb territory at Bihac , Vlasic, ARBiH offensive . In this directive issued on 8 March ,
and Majevica . Mladic shot back , targeting Karadzic the VRS was ordered — in addition to defending key
and the SDS for providing poor political guidance to sectors — to prepare several offensive operations. The
the military and failing to set viable war aims. Then most importantof these , named " Sadejstvo 95 ," was
he fired his most powerful salvo pointblank at the pol
iticians: unless these and other problems were dealt
with , the Republika Srpska could lose the war. The

289
intended to seize a large portion of ARBiH -held terri the ARBiH broke the country -wide cease -fire indis
tory north of Tuzla , which would force " the Muslim criminately, striking the VRS at Mount Vlasic and
political leadership to recognize the factual situation Stolice in Majevica .More pressure came in May when
on the war front and sign an agreement ending the the Croatian HV defeated SVK forces in Western
war.” Another was a plan for a major operation to Slavonia , sending thousands of Serb refugees pouring
seize theMount Igman - Bjelasnica area and cut off into the Bosnian Serb enclaves. VRS forces were too
Sarajevo from central Bosnia , as the VRS had done in stretched to reinforce the SVK , and a retaliatory offen
1993. Two smaller operations were to serve as prelim- sive against the HVO -held Orasje pocket failed miser
inary attacks for these strategic moves: “ Spreca 95 ” to ably. HV troops also nibbled away in the Dinara
cut off and eliminate the Spna- Teocak salient east of region against hard - pressed VRS troops. By June the
Tuzla prior to “ Sadejstvo ," and " Lukavac 95 ” to retake battered VRS was bracing for a long- heralded
portions of the Bjelasnica - Treskavica area lost in ARBiH offensive to relieve the siege of Sarajevo . VRS
1994. The VRS also was ordered to strangle the forces were able to halt the attack , but at a severe price
enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica in the Drina valley in manpower and resources. The ARBiH refused to
and capture them if their UN protectors withdrew . give up and continued to gnaw away at VRS forces
Operation “ Zvijezda 95 " was a plan to reduce the south ofSarajevo around Treskavica over the next four
Gorazde enclave to a 3 -kilometer radius around the months. One of the few bright spots in 1995 for the
town itself . The VRS was also directed to undertake VRS , the seizure of the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves,
planning for two other operations to cut routes was quickly overshadowed by the HV's capture of
through the Neretva River valley and to drive to the Glamoc and Bosansko Grahovo . Operation “Oluja "
sea near Dubrovnik , although it remains unclear how soon followed, and the Krajina Serb Army collapsed ,
much effort the Main Staff put into these less likely bringingmore refugees and dejected soldiers stream
operations. ing into the Republika Srpska . The RS's strategic situ
ation changed overnight, widening the frontage the
The VRS never got set for its offensive strategy, and already thinly spread VRS had to defend.
many of the planned attacks never occurred . Bosnian
Army operations during the spring and summer kept As the VRS situation deteriorated during June and
the VRS off balance and used up offensive reserve July, it appears that General Mladic and President
units in defensive operations. As the VRS found in Milosevic began working even more closely to find a
late 1993 and early 1994 , the ARBiH's defenses way to achieve a permanent cease- fire and accept the
remained tough , and the ARBiH had plenty of elite “ ContactGroup ” plan as a basis for negotiations. As
units in reserve to throw into a battle to stop a VRS an important prerequisite to negotiations, Mladic and
penetration. When the VRS did carry our “ Spreca 95 ” Milosevic (together with Krajina Serb Army Chief of
and “ Sadejstvo 95 ” —its main attack of the year — in Staff General Mile Mrksic ) also appear to have been
late April and early May against the ARBiH 2nd coordinating military plans to clean up the post
Corps , both failed with barely a whimper. The Bos Yugoslavia map and achieve important Serb strategic
nian Government retained the strategic initiative its objectives.15 To this end Milosevic appears to have
Armyhad seized in 1994 , and the VRS had to be satis approved and supported (with some Serbian State
fied with isolated Serb victories at Treskavica in May Security and VJ special operations personnel) VRS
and Srebrenica /Zepa in July, and defensive successes plans to eliminate the three eastern enclaves
around Sarajevo . Srebrenica , Zepa, and Gorazde. Although the timing
of this operation would have to depend on other events
Instead , the Serbs had to fend off a reorganized and in Bosnia , the capture of the enclaves would finally
revamped ARBiH while resisting operations by the secure the Drina valley, important to both the Bosnian
Croatian Army and its Bosnian Croat allies in the Serbs and Milosevic because of its proximity to the
Livno Valley and Dinara Mountains. Under enormous
pressure from these twin assaults, early in 1995 , VRS
forces were forced back around Bihac. Then in March

290
 Yugoslav border. 16 17 SVK General Mrksic's July oper- prudentmilitary move prompted by the Croatian Gov
ation to knock out the ARBiH 5th Corps and restore ernment's offensive against its Serb enclaves; it is
Fikret Abdic to power in Bihac also appears to have clear, however, that he had planned , well before the
been part of the overall Serb strategy to give the two Croatian Army launched Operation " Oluja " against
western Serb states ample borders in any subsequent the RSK , to separate Mladic from his power base and
peace agreement. Unfortunately for the Serbs, Mrk halt his collaboration with Milosevic on peace terms.
sic's operation triggered reactions in Zagreb , leading ( The VRS and SVK had never had any major prob
to the Croatian offensive that destroyed the Republic lemscoordinating operations before the HV offen
of Serbian Krajina (RSK ) and eventually brought an sive ).Mladic , backed by every general in the VRS,
end to the war at the expense of a considerable amount flatly rejected Karadzic's order, and Karadzic backed
of Bosnian Serb territory . down and rescinded it a week after its promulgation.22

The peace efforts pursued by Milosevic and Mladic With Mladic's refusal to obey Karadzic's orders , their
culminated in their openly acknowledged meeting subrosa battle went public . TheMilosevic -controlled
with the Russian Foreign Minister in Belgrade on Belgrade Radio broadcast a scathing condemnation of
25 July.18 Karadzic's outrage at the meeting was Karadzic's decision and touted Mladic as " themost
reflected in a public statement that said , willing to embrace ... the Contact Group plan " and
" halt the war." The broadcast denigrated Karadzic and
No authorized representatives of the Serb the Bosnian Serb political leadership as war profiteers
Republic had contacts at this time with the and cowards who were serving the interests of the
Russian delegation ... The Parliament has des Croats and the Muslims by prolonging the conflict.23
ignated a six -member delegation led by the Karadzic responded with an open letter blasting
President of the Republic as the only negotiators Milosevic, claiming that he had “ turned [his ] back on
. . All other officials, including Army Serbdom ." 24 The SDS Main Committee launched pub
officers ...don't have the right to have contacts lic attacks on GeneralMilan Gvero , the senior VRS
with foreign delegations without the ( Presi political officer and a key Milosevic backer, accusing
dent's ) authorization. 19 him of spreading “ socialist” influences in the Army
and the state.25 The SDS propaganda also sought to
Intensifying Karadzic's fury was his military chief's drive a wedge between Gvero and Mladic . The SDS
almost certain collaboration in the open letter that then attacked “ leftist" attempts to take over the RS ,
Milosevic addressed on 1 August to Bosnian President claiming that,
Izetbegovic and General Mladic — but not to
Karadzic — appealing for an immediate cessation of ... the revived Communist forces, gathered
hostilities. around the Yugoslav Left [headed by Milosevic's
wife, Mira Markovic, and supported by General
Karadzic quickly countered what he saw as an attempt Gvero ) are using methods of conspiracy and
by Milosevic, Mladic, and the VRS Main Staff to obstruction in order to topple the Serb Republic,
usurp political control over Republika Srpska. On just as they toppled the Republic of Serb Krajina
28 July, Karadzic finally declared a “ state of war," an through their fatal activity based on lies and
administrative action designed to mobilize more fully rumors. 26
the resources of the Republika Srpska behind the war,
a step Mladic had been urging on the government for This was a slam at both Milosevic and the Army.
some time.20 As part of this decision, however, Mladic responded to the diatribes over Belgrade Radio
Karadzic , in his position as " suprememilitary com and demanded that criticism of the Army and Gvero
mander,” ordered Mladic on 4 August to assume the stop .
newly created role of joint coordinator ofthe VRS and
SVK , while the VRS Main Staff was to be trans
formed into a General Staff directly subordinate to
Karadzic.21 Karadzic insisted that his action was a

291
In late August the debate over ending the war intensi The battles between Karadzic andMladic continued
fied . The loss of the RSK and the potential for further unabated , however. On 18 October Karadzic had tried
Croatian Army intervention in Bosnia had led Mladic to relieve four of Mladic's top officers, including the
and theMain Staff to conclude that negotiations for a three who had accompanied him to Belgrade, blaming
general peace settlement should begin while most of them for the territorial losses in western Bosnia - even
their territory was still intact. They also reiterated their though none of the four held command positions in
view thatMilosevic should be the one to lead any the area.30 Again he had to back down in the face of
negotiating team , and they leaned hard on Karadzic to the VRS's refusal to comply. Karadzic's unrelenting
promise Milosevic this authority.27 Karadzic yielded to campaign to bring down Mladic and impose SDS con
the extent of going to Belgrade on 27 August to meet trol over the military would outlast the war and gain
with Milosevic and the Federal Yugoslav Govern temporary success in November 1996 , but only after
ment.28 He was accompanied by Bosnian Serb Assem Karadzic himself had had to give up his government
bly chiefMomcilo Krajisnik and a bevy of generals post under Western pressure .
representing the VRS: Mladic ,Gvero , Tolimir, and
Djukic , all of whom Karadzic had at one time or Mladic and the military, however, would win the last
another tried to relieve. The VRS generals and battle . When the new Presidentof the Bosnian Serb
Milosevic were like the jaws of a closing vise , and, by Republic , Biljana Plavsic, split with Karadzic and
29 August, Karadzic had agreed that in any peace Krajisnik in 1997 , she went on to appoint a new RS
talksMilosevic would head a joint delegation of FRY Government led by an independent,Milorad Dodik ,
and RS officials. The delegation members would vote who had supported Milosevic during the 1995 Serb
on any deal, with Milosevic having the tie-breaking political-military battles. The Defense Minister in
vote.29 Karadzic had lost. Dodik's government was Mladic's former deputy,
GeneralMilovanovic , with other old - line officers
This breakthrough agreement, however, was overshad- including one ofthe generals Karadzic had tried to
owed by the air campaign launched by NATO on 30 fire - in firm command of the Army.31
August (after another mortar incident in Sarajevo on
28 August) to punish the Serbs for refusing to with Chapter 74
draw their heavy weapons from around the besieged Dudakovic Takes the Initiative — The Battles
city. Both Karadzic and Mladic had agreed that to pull Around Bihac City, January February 1995
out the heavy weapons was to invite a Bosnian Army
ground attack , which almost certainly would have suc As the cease - fire that commenced at the beginning of
ceeded where the June offensive had failed . Both 1995 took on its tenuous, four-month hold across the
eventually agreed to withdraw VRS heavy weapons rest of Bosnia , there was little discernible change to
from around the city because of the even greater threat the military situation around the still-surrounded
posed by Croatian and Bosnian forces in the west. Bihac enclave. In theory , both the Bosnian Army and
the Bosnian Serbs were to agree to maps delineating
In fact, the Army's pessimistic view of the military the lines of confrontation , which were to be patrolled
balance on the ground and its insistence on the neces by UNPROFOR observer teams.32 In reality , fighting
sity of an early peace was confirmed in October when raged on the margins of the Bihac enclave throughout
VRS forces were overwhelmed by Croatian , Bosnian the duration of the January -May cease- fire. In the far
Croat, and Bosnian Army forces. It was the Croat north , General Atif Dudakovic's 5th Corps continued
Muslim ground offensive launched in late September to battle the rebel Abdic forces, which were still
that particularly drove Milosevic in his negotiations heavily supported by the Krajina Serb Army (SVK )
for a cease -fire with US envoy Richard Holbrooke. As and small numbers of elite Yugoslav Army and Ser
the Serbs yielded more and more ground and Banja bian State Security (RDB ) special operations troops33
Luka was threatened , agreement became imperative. It
finally came on 5 October, and by 20 October the
fighting had stopped .

292
in the Velika Kladusa area. Along the enclave's south artillery, and small-arms fire also continued along the
ern border, the Grabez plateau and the town of Bosan Grabez plateau as they had for nearly three years.
ska Krupa remained contested . Bihac itself — as well
as other key towns like Cazin — suffered periodic On the first day of February a UNPROFOR spokes
shelling by both Bosnian and Krajina Serb forces. men warned that “whole units of the RSK Army are
being deployed in the Bihac area," possibly for a Serb
The very beginning of January saw concerted UN offensive against the Bihac enclave.45 Two weeks later,
efforts to bring two additional parties onboard with the UN officials reported that an additional 1,000 Bosnian
Bosnian cease -fire: the Krajina Serb Army from adja Serb troops had been seen redeploying to the Bihac
cent Croatia and Fikret Abdic's Muslim fighters act pocket after transiting Serb -held Croatia.46 Despite the
ing as proxies for the Serbs. On the first of January , as redeployment of more Krajina and Bosnian Serb
the cease - fire took effect, the UN charged the Krajina troops , however, the feared Serb offensive never mate
Serbs with actions in Bosnia and demanded that the rialized. Instead, it was the Bosnian Army forces
SVK withdraw its troops as " foreign forces.” The besieged within the enclave that attacked and made
Serbs countered with objections to the presence of most of the advances during this period .
Croatian Army regulars fighting in the Livno -Glamoc
area, and criticized the UN for maintaining a double On 9 February — as Abdic forces were trying in vain to
standard. 34 capture government-held Komarica hill southeast of
Velika Kladusa ,47 VRS 2nd Krajina Corps forces posi
At first, prospects for a comprehensive cease -fire tioned on Mt. Pljesevica moved forward in a bid to
encompassing all the factions looked promising. On recapture the Klokot reservoir from the ARBiH 501st
2 January the UN announced that Fikret Abdic would Brigade. Supported by SVK artillery fire, they
honor the cease- fire agreement and sought to secure a advanced 2 to 4 km but failed to take their objective.48
Krajina Serb guarantee of responsibility for Abdic's 49 The ARBiH 5th Corps took back the initiative on
forces.35 36 On 3 January the UN reported that the SVK 13-14 February, when the 501st Brigade ( supported by
had started a withdrawal of forces and equipment from the HVO 101st Home Defense Regiment) advanced to
the Bosnian side of the border.37 These movements capture the villages of Zavalje and Sokolac and 572
toward peace proved illusory : Abdic's forces never meter Debeljaca Hill several kilometers southeast of
accepted any form of cease-fire arrangement, and Bihac.50 51 The offensive by combined ARBiH -HVO
SVK troops and heavy weapons remained engaged in forces swept all the way to the Croatian border (held
Bosnia . by the Krajina Serbs ) along a 35 -km -long segment and
captured roughly 50 square kilometers of territory 52 53
Klokot Reservoir and Mt. Pljesevica , Meanwhile, battles continued around Bosanska Krupa
January-February 1995 and along the other edges of the Bihac enclave , with
neither side making any major gains.54
The most significant fighting near Bihac town in Janu
ary was for control of the Klokotwater plant, 4 kilo Chapter 75
meters northwest of Bihac and the source of the Abdic -Krajina Serb Operations in Bihac ,
town's water supply.38 39 On 13-14 January a lightning January- June 1995
surprise attack launched by government forces from
the 501st Mountain Brigade recaptured the water res While Dudakovic was on the attack in the southern
ervoir and the villages ofKlokot and Vedro Polje from part of the Bihac enclave , in the north the vicious little
the SVK 103rd Donji Lapac Light Infantry Brigade inter-Muslim war continued. The Serbs (Milosevic ,
and the VRS 15th Bihac Infantry Brigade.40 The Serbs Mladic , and the Krajina Serbs) had successfully rees
retaliated by shelling Bihac town but ceded control of tablished Fikret Abdic's Autonomous Province of
the reservoir and several square kilometers of territory Western Bosnia (APWB) in Velika Kladusa during
after a failed counterattack.41 42 Further to the east their December 1994 operations. The Serbs and
there was intermittent fighting around Bosanska
Krupa, where the ARBiH 511th Brigade fought com
bined VRS/SVK opponents.43 44 Exchanges ofmortar,

293
Abdic's political objective now was first to create a operations against the VRS 2nd Krajina Corps on the
more viable APWB and then extend Abdic's sway Bihac city -Grabez plateau -Bosanska Krupa front.*
over the entire enclave .
The battles between OG “ Pauk ” and the 5th Corps
To achieve these objectives, Abdic's Serb command from January through June were hard - fought, slow
ers — SVK General Mile Novakovic and Serbian RDB motion affairs eventually won by Serb infantry backed
officer “ Raja " Bozovic - planned a series of opera by superior firepower. APWB/SVK forces gnawed
tions that would gradually take over the region. The away at Dudakovic's men in over five months of
first goal was to eliminate the 5th Corps salient just almost continuous combat. (By contrast, while these
south of Velika Kladusa; the second, to seize the troops were winning their painfully slow victories in
important town of Vrnograc, some 12 kilometers east the north , the 5th Corps was achieving small but rapid
of Velika Kladusa . The capture of Vrnograc would and cheap victories over the VRS in the south .) The
give Abdic control of the northern third of Bihac with first sizable attack of the new year — to eliminate the
almost the same amount of territory he had dominated 5th Corps -held salient around Podzvizd -Mala
at the height of his power in late 1993. With the terri Kladusa — came in late January . OG “ Pauk’s” attack ,
tory around Velika Kladusa thus consolidated , APWB/ however, gained hardly any ground in more than a
SVK forces would move on Cazin - Todorovo and week of fighting, and assaults made in the next week
Buzim , the capture of which should lead to the almost or so appear to havemet with even less success .
certain defeat of Dudakovic and the 5th Corps. Abdic /SVK forces did somewhat better during the lat
ter half of February, pressing the offensive southeast
Novakovic and Bozovic had at their disposal a force of Velika Kladusa toward the government-held vil
similar in composition to that which had executed the lages of Pozvizd, Elezovici, and Sumatac .57 58 From
November-December 1994 operations around Velika mid -February to the end of themonth , a stronger
Kladusa . OperationalGroup “ Pauk ” comprised the attack by Bozovic's troops won a northern chunk of
three brigades of Abdic's Muslims- probably 5,000 territory near Podzvizd before the 505th and 506th
personnel in all — including two 1,000 - to 1,500 -man Brigades drove them out.59 APWB/SVK units, how
tactical groups from the SVK 21st and 39th Banija ever, did manage to hold on to small gains around
Corps, and some 500 fighters drawn from the elite for Mala Kladusa in attacks coming from Johovica in the
mations of the VJ Corps of Special Units, the Serbian west.
RDB Special Operations Unit “ Red Berets," and
Arkan's RDB -controlled Serbian Volunteer Guard (an March was the turning point in the battle for Podzvizd .
element nicknamed the “ Black Legion " under Arkan's During the first week of the month , OG “ Pauk” edged
deputy commander,Mihailo Ulemek-" Legija ” ).55 forward in the north , gradually taking territory from
These crack units, fielded in platoon and company the stubborn 5th Corps defenders. By 21March the
size groups, would provide the cutting edge for the Serb and rebelMuslim troops appear to have finally
APWB /SVK regular infantry. An SVK artillery group taken most of the Podzvizd salient and were now
provided fire support from across the border with a pressing on to the next objective - Vrnograc. The
battalion of SVK armor in direct support. drive on Vrnograc was two -pronged ,moving north
east from Mala Kladusa and south from the Bosanska
The keystone of 5th Corps ' defenses was the 505th Bojna area. Fighting stretched into April. Again , the
Buzim Mountain Brigade, flanked by the far weaker battles were slow , grinding pushes, with incremental
506th Velika Kladusa Mountain Brigade (made of ex gains. The most significant success came in mid -April
APWB personnel and Velika Kladusa residents ), and when APWB /SVK troops took a series of villages ,
the 510th Liberation Brigade. These formations were
augmented by pieces plucked from most of 5th Corps' See Chapter 74 , “ Dudakovic Takes the Initiative: The Battles
other brigades for a total of 4,000 to 5,000 troops in Around Bihac City,January-February 1995” and Chapter 79 ,
defense of the area.56 The remainder of 5th Corps was “ ARBiH 5th Corps Offensive Operations,March -June 1995” for a
detailed discussion of these actions.
tied up with the small- to medium - scale offensive

294
penetrating about a kilometer toward Vrnograc from over the next two months. It also made RSK President
the west. During May there appear to have been no Martic and the RSK Government far less willing to
major pushes, but some low -level clashes enabled the discuss any peace agreement, while making the imple
APWB to claim to have taken a couple of villages. mentation of the economic agreementmore difficult.
The end for Vrnograc began in mid - June, and the In fact, on 8 February the RSK Assembly voted to
505th and 506th Brigade defenders finally succumbed freeze action on the accord unless the UN forces were
to the unrelenting pressure from OG " Pauk " and allowed to stay.63More ominously ,General Bobetko,
pulled out of Vrnograc on 21 June. Over the next the HV Main Staff chief, had stated three days earlier
week , OG “ Pauk ” units pushed another 2 kilometers that any closure of the Belgrade-Zagreb highway
south before 5th Corps ' defenses solidified . For now , would bring a Croatian military response to reopen the
major fighting between APWB /SVK forces and Duda road.64
kovic's troops was over. It would resume in July.
The war clouds appeared to lift on 12 March when
Chapter 76 Zagreb agreed to a new UN mandate that employed
The Croatian -Serbian War Begins Again , fewer troops but established UN border controls at the
January- June 1995 Bosnian and FRY borders to block any contraband
shipments to the RSK.65 The new force also had a new
The end of 1994 saw the situation in Croatia hovering name, UNCRO , which stood for UN Confidence Res
between a military and a political settlement to the toration Operation. The good news faded quickly
Croatian -Serb conflict over the existence of the when Martic rejected UN controls over the RSK “ bor
Republic of Serbian Krajina. In December the two der.''66 Then , less than a month later, Zagreb renewed
sides had agreed to an economic confidence -building its military operations in the Dinara Mountains, push
agreement that included opening the long-closed ing toward Bosansko Grahovo , the gateway to Knin .
Belgrade-Zagreb highway , as well as oil pipelines , Conflictwas rapidly overtaking confidence building.
electrical power grids, and waterlines. Countering this
positive movement, the joint Krajina-Bosnian Serb Chapter 77
counteroffensive in Bihac and the Croatian military The " Skok " Operations — The HV
response in the Dinara Mountains and the Livno Val Continues its Drive , Spring 1995
ley signaled that both sides still had irreconcilable
interests that only force could settle . Although Operation “ Zima 94 " officially closed in
December 1994 , HV/HVO and VRS/SVK forces con
Nevertheless , Western negotiators and the UN perse tinued to wage winter warfare in the Dinara Moun
vered in their effort to promote a comprehensive peace tains bordering Croatia and Bosnia. The SVK 7th
settlement between the Croatian Government and the North Dalmatian Corps and the VRS 2nd Krajina
Krajina Serb Government. At the end of January they Corps sporadically struck back at some of the HV
presented to both sides the so - called “ Z -4 ” plan , troops deployed along the border, but the HV was able
which called for the reintegration of the RSK into to consolidate its main positions and hold on to most
Croatia while providing for substantial Serb autonomy ofthe ground taken during “ Zima 94 ," including some
and the return of all refugees.60 Zagreb tentatively wel- just inside the RSK /Croatia .
comed the plan , but the Krajina Serbs refused to dis
cuss it unless the Croatians renounced their intention General Ante Gotovina, commanding the HV Split
to block renewal of the UNPROFOR mandate for Corps District, nevertheless worried that the HV
Croatia 61 salient in the Livno- Dinara area was too narrow and
too vulnerable to a VRS/SVK counterattack . To rem
On 12 January, Croatian President Tudjman had edy this, he ordered preparations for an operation to
announced that Croatia would refuse to renew the UN
mandate.62 Persuading the Croatians to change their
mind on this issue was to dominate diplomatic efforts

295
widen the salient,which would also facilitate some 75 square kilometers of ground on a 15 -kilome
advances toward the HV's ultimate objective ter front. And it had achieved its further aim of secur
Bosansko Grahovo , the gateway to Knin . ing a salient pointing toward Grahovo.69 While the HV
was consolidating its gains from Operation " Skok - 1,"
In mid -March , Gotovina's Operational Group however, the situation in Western Slavonia began to
“ Rujani" (the former OG “ Livno” ), opened proceed deteriorate . A much larger HV operation would soon
ings with attacks to seize key tactical points held by be under way.
VRS/SVK units . During the period 14-18 March, ele
ments of the 4th Guards Brigade and 126th Home
Defense Regimentadvanced up to 4 kilometers . The Operation “ Bljesak” : The Capture of Western
4th Guards troops took and held two criticalmoun Slavonia
tains, 1,831-meter Presedla and 1,777 -meter Jankovo
Brdo. The 126th HomeDefense Regiment units , pro Opened to traffic in December 1994, the Belgrade
tecting the 4th Guards flank, cut a swath of their own Zagreb highway was one of the major success stories
in their continuing march along the border and inside of the common- sense December economic agreement
RSK territory between the Serbs and Croatians. The highway was a
key strategic and commercial link between the Zagreb
Themain operation , “ Skok - 1” (Leap - 1),came in early area and eastern Slavonia; without it, the two regions
April. GeneralGotovina states that his goals were : were only tenuously linked via an elongated route to
the north that added several hours to the trip . Thou
From the positions on Dinara achieved and held sands of Croatian vehicles were able to travel the
during the winter of 1994-1995 , to use surprise , Serb -controlled stretch with relative ease up to April
short attacks by the defensive forces to capture 1995 .
more favorable tactical positions ...
The highway was important enough to Zagreb to
To approach the enemy outposts west ofMount justify a threat by General Bobetko to reopen the high
Dinara (in the Unista and Cetina region ) (the way by force if the Serbs closed it. For their part,
first, a key pass on the Grahovo -Knin road and Martic and the RSK leadership were already anxious
the second, an SVK artillery group area ] and to and defensive about the renewed UN mandate and
place them under fire control. potential UN border controls . So when Croatian
customs officials began holding up Krajina Serb com
To secure the left flank of the forces on Dinara in mercial truck traffic - particularly vital fuel tankers
a timely fashion and to thwart enemy attacks at the exit from Serb - controlled UN Sector East
from the direction of Kijevo - Unista (in the (Eastern Slavonia ),Martic in reprisal ordered the
RSK ), the goal being to regain the positions lost highway closed through Western Slavonia for
during the winter of 1994-1995.67 24 hours on 22/23 April.

The attack into themountain border area would extend Martic's action very likely brought President
into RSK territory , with the primary axis divided into Tudjman's government close to a decision to eliminate
two phases requiring an advance of about 4 kilometers the Serbs' troublesome encroachment by force . A
each . “ Skok - 1 ” was scheduled to take one to two tragi- comic chain of events gripping the highway less
days.68 than a week later would push Tudjman over the edge .
On 29 April a Croatian refugee stabbed and killed a
The operation began on 7 April with the 7th Guards Serb at a Croatian gas station in the town of Nova
Brigade replacing the 4th Guards Brigade and the Gradiska, east of Serb - controlled territory . The Serb's
126th HomeDefense Regiment again providing flank enraged brother then opened fire on Croatian vehicles
support, attacking to the left of the Guards. Rolling
quickly over the VRS defenses, the 7th Guards
advanced 5 kilometers into Serb territory to occupy

296

-
along the highway and, despite UN warnings to VRS reserves from entering it.76 The total HV /MUP
Zagreb to close the highway, severalmore Croatians ground force probably totaled some 15,000 troops,
blundered into Serb territory and were fired on . Three with the main strike force numbering about 7,500
were killed and five others were taken prisoner by men ." HV commanders and units had been training
Serb soldiers while the UN tried in vain to calm the for the operation since December and were already in
situation . Zagreb had enough . In the early morning position and primed to launch as soon as President
hours of 1 May, the Croatian Army launched Opera Tudjman gave the order.78
tion “ Bljesak ” (Flash ) to retake not only the highway
but all of Western Slavonia as well. Krajina Serb Army forces in the enclave were Colonel
Lazo Babic's 18th West Slavonian Corps, with three
The HV Main Staff had finished its campaign plan for light infantry brigades, an armored battalion, and a
the recapture of Western Slavonia in December 1994 . mixed field artillery battalion , together with a few
The operation directive declared that its objective was ancillary units and some Special Police.79 These forces
to “ liberate Western Slavonia and break out to the numbered about 4,000 to 5,000 troops when fully
Sava River ... 70 To achieve this, HV forces were mobilized . Unlike the other SVK corps , however, the
ordered : 18th Corps was in the habit of keeping only about
1,000 to 2,000 troops mobilized at any time and
Through rapid and energetic action by armored expected help from the VRS 1st Krajina Corps to rein
mechanized and infantry forces along the high force its defenses, which proved to be a vain hope .
way from the direction of Nova Gradiska and
Novska, cut off the enemy forces and liberate The HV attack struck the 18th Corps with almost no
Okucani. warning on 1 May , leaving it minimal time to call up
its reservists or even deploy formations into blocking
If the HV could do this they would indeed cut off all positions before the HV crashed through its defenses.
SVK forces north of Okucani from any reinforcement Artillery fire and HRZ airstrikes created chaos and
by the VRS .?' Then , in a second phase, HV and MUP panic in the SVK rear but failed to destroy the defend
Special Police forces would mop up whatever armed ers' only withdrawal route to Bosnia and Republika
combatants remained in the area . Srpska — the Bosanska Gradiska bridge.80 Except for
this, the HV campaign plan worked almost perfectly.
Brigadier Luka Dzanko's HV Bjelovar Corps District On the Novska axis , elements from the 1st Croatian
had overall command of the operation , butthree Main Guards Brigade; the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Guards Bri
Staff forward command posts would maintain a close gades; and MUP Special Police forces got astride the
watch on Dzanko and his forces, allowing rapid highway and quickly swept it clear while Special
adjustments to be made by theMain Staff's acting Police and the 125th Home Defense Regiment seized
chief,GeneralZvonimir Cervenko, and even by Gen the town of Jasenovac.81 The defending SVK 98th
eral Bobetko , who was in a Zagreb hospital.72 Each of Light Infantry Brigade was crushed. On the Nova
the main axes, one from Novska and one from Nova Gradiska axis, a breakdown in command and commu
Gradiska,were to be led by the equivalentof one nications delayed part of the attack, and troops of the
Guards brigade augmented by MUP Special Police.73 81st Guards Battalion , 5th Guards Brigade, and 265th
Home Defense regiments and reserve infantry bri Reconnaissance -Sabotage Company had to fight
gades would support the attacks on the flanks and at through the toughest SVK resistance , from the 54th
the tip of the enclave near Pakrac to pin down SVK Light Infantry Brigade. Even so , they reac
forces.74 Artillery and multiple rocket launcherswould enclave's main town , Okucani, by 1300 on 2 May.82
target SVK command posts to disable the SVK com As Okucani fell, 18th Corps soldiers and refugees
mand and control system at the outset of the attack south of the town fled across the bridge into Bosnia .
and disrupt the Serb defenses.75 Croatian Air Force
(HRZ ) fighter-bombers and helicopters would inter
dict SVK lines of communication to hamper the shift
ing of SVK reserves within the enclave and to bar

297
The capture of Okucani and the linkup of the two HV some forces from the First Army and sent them to the
pincers ended the primary phase of the operation . border with eastern Slavonia in a gesture of force and
Now it was time for HV and MUP troops to mop up belatedly sent a senior VJGeneral Staff officer, Lieu
the remaining elements of the SVK around Pakrac, tenant ColonelGeneralMile Mrksic , to take over the
including the bulk of the 51st Light Infantry Brigade, command of the SVK . Significantly, Mrksic had been
which was now completely cut off. As HV Home one of the key commanders in the capture of Vukovar
Defense units and MUP Special Police troops quickly in 1991. *
attacked and pushed toward Pakrac , the senior SVK
commander, Lieutenant Colonel Stevo Harambasic ,
realized that further resistance was pointless and for Operation “ Plamen - 95 ” : The VRS Attempts To
mally surrendered what was left of his brigade — about Capture the Orasje Pocket,May - June 1995
600 troops - on 2-3 May.83 Hundredsmore SVK per
sonnel remained at large in villages bordering the In the aftermath of Operation “ Bljesak ," and probably
Psunj mountains, east/ southeast of Pakrac . On 4 May , in retaliation for it, the VRS shifted its focus to the
GeneralBobetko gave ColonelGeneral Petar Stipetic , HVO -held Orasje pocket, which began some 10 kilo
head ofMain Staff forward command post in Nova meters northwest of Brcko. Not only would the cap
Gradiska, the job of organizing an action to clear the ture of Orasje punish the Croats for their seizure of
area and capture or eliminate these skulkers and Western Slavonia but it would also help free up the
potential guerrillas. Artillery and rocket fire would be northern side of the Posavina corridor. It is also possi
used to flush the Serb troops from their hiding places ble that the VRS Main Staff had planned to eliminate
and into a cordon of HV and MUP troops surrounding the enclave as part of its plans to clean up the map in
the area . The tactic was instantly effective , and by the 1995 in preparation for accepting a peace settlement.
end of the day some 1,500 personnel had surrendered
to the HV M
/ UP.84MUP Special Police and some HV To carry out Operation “ Plamen - 95 ” (Flame- 95 ) —
units mopped up holdouts and stragglers in the sur which the Croats referred to as Operation “ Osveta"
rounding mountains over the next few weeks.85 (Revenge )—and seize the Orasje pocket, Lieutenant
ColonelGeneralMomir Talic's 1st Krajina Corps
The Krajina Serb response was predictable and swift, planned to employ Colonel Dragoslav Djurkic's Tacti
for it was their policy to retaliate for any attack by calGroup 5 , which normally held the front opposite
shelling Croatian cities. On 2 May and again the next the HVO's Orasje Corps District with about 6,000
day , President Martic ordered SVK chief of staffGen troops drawn from four infantry or light infantry bri
eral Celeketic to fire " Orkan " 262-mm rockets , fitted gades. To spearhead the attack , Djurkic received
with cluster munitions , at Zagreb . The attacks killed another 2,000 troops from elite assault formations in
six people and wounded 180 , causing some panic in the 1st Krajina Corps and other VRS corps,major
the city and outrage abroad . President Tudjman elements drawn from the 1st Armored Brigade, and
showed unusual restraint when he refrained from corps artillery units.88 General Mladic and General
ordering retaliatory strikes against the Serbs. The Talic would together directly supervise Djurkic's
successful surprise and conclusion of “ Bljesak ," at a operation .
cost of 60 personnel killed in action and 186 wounded ,
had left the Croatians satisfied for now , and they HVO Staff Brigadier Djuro Matuzovic , whose Orasje
claimed the SVK had lost over 400 dead .86 Corps District would receive the VRS attack , con
trolled one Guards Brigade and three Home Defense
Neither Belgrade nor the Bosnian Serbs appeared to
have had the time or the ability to stop the HV opera
For details on Mrksic's accession to command of the SVK and
tion . VRS air defense units shot down one HRZ MiG his plans to reorganize the force, see Chapter 88, “ The Fateful
21 that was attempting to hit the Bosanska Gradiska Krajina Serb Offensive Against Bihac, July 1995."
bridge, but no VRS ground forces were sent to assist
the 18th Corps.87 The Yugoslav Army did mobilize

298
regiments — some 6,000 troops.89 Because Matu assault units to spearhead attacks with strong fire sup
zovic's enclave was extremely shallow , only 10 kilo port. In contrast to 1992 and 1993, however, the VRS
meters deep , the HVO had prepared a strong forward faced a well-organized foe manning well-fortified
defense based on well-prepared bunkers and trenches bunkers and trenches and supported by relatively large
because a VRS breakthrough anywhere could quickly numbers of artillery,mortars, and multiple rocket
wipe out the entire enclave . The fortifications were launchers integrated into defensive fire plans. The
stiffened by the firm morale of the HVO defenders, all VRS did not have enough firepower to break up these
of whom either lived in the Orasje area or had homes defenses and was unwilling to commit its weakened
further west in the Posavina that had been lost to the infantry to a do -or- die attack against the grimly moti
Serbs in 1992. HV artillery and multiple rocket vated Croat defenders. VRS offensive operations
launcher batteries across the Sava in Croatia provided against Croat and Muslim troops manning these types
the HVO with strong fire support. of defenses repeatedly failed during 1994 and 1995. *

The VRS operation began on 5 May with a strong

artillery preparation. The initial ground assault, how Operation " Skok - 2” : The HV Rolls On
ever, was quickly beaten back, and the 1st Krajina
Corps paused for five days. On 10 May a salvo of As the VRS operation against Orasje was winding
LUNA- M ( FROG - 7) surface-to -surface missiles sig down , the HV /HVO forces in the Dinara -Livno area
naled resumption of the offensive . The VRS renewed began preparations for a new drive designated “ Skok
the offensive in three prongs spread across the 2.” The primary objective of the operation was to
enclave's frontline but concentrated on the central and secure themain pass out of the Livno Valley and key
southern sectors along the direct routes to the towns of mountains above Glamoc,which would put HV troops
Orasje and Vidovice. The Serb thrusts made some in a position to grab Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoc
headway, particularly in the secondary attack in the in the next HV /HVO bite . 92 The HV /HVO apparently
north at Grebnice, but the HVO defenses held , and the hoped that the attack would also help relieve the lin
Croat troops drove the attackers back . The VRS was gering Serb pressure on Orasje.93
to repeat this performance for the nextmonth , hurling
at least seven ground assaults at the defenses spaced General Gotovina's plan called for a two-phased, two
between two and seven days apart. (Attacks on con pronged advance , supported by an attack along the
secutive days are counted as a single attack ).Most of border, inside the RSK . In the first phase ,HV troops
the attacks were supported by strong mortar and artil would seize the remaining VRS -held pocket in the
lery fire , with tanks in direct support. UN monitors Livno Valley at Crni Lug, then capture the entrance to
counted 2,000 to 5,000 detonations during most of the the main pass exiting the valley toward Grahovo.
assaults . One of the most successful attacks came on Supporting attacks along the border would guard the
14-15 May when VRS troops almost broke through to left flank of this axis. In the second phase, HV/HVO
Vidovice (just as they had in late 1992), before ele units were to capture several key mountain tops
ments of the 4th Guards Brigade and 106th Home directly north of the Livno Valley, severing the main
Defense Regiment pushed them back to their start VRS lateral supply road between Grahovo and
line.9 By 10 June the VRS had to give up and call the Glamoc and leaving Glamoc surrounded on three
a halt to the operation . The HVO , with no ground sup sides.
port from the Croatian Army,had decisively defeated
a major Serb offensive . The HV /HVO deployed about 5,000 troops for
" Skok - 2 ," centered around the 4th Guards Brigade,
The VRS failure at Orasje and Vidovice marked the augmented with two additional Guards battalions, a
effects of the decline in relative capabilities the VRS
had suffered in three years of war. The Serbs con For details on VRS operations in northeastern Bosnia preceding
the VRS attack on Orasje, see heading “ The VRS Shoots Its Bolt:
ducted their operation competently, in keeping with Operations 'Spreca 95 ' and 'Sadejstvo 95'" under Chapter 78.
VRS offensive doctrine, using armor and elite infantry

299
Home Defense battalion , and the 3rd HVO Guards
a temporary phenomenon and not a step toward a per
Brigade .94 They faced about 3,000 VRS 2nd Krajina
manent peace settlement, as some outside negotiators
Corps troops drawn from three light infantry brigades ,
plus about 500 SVK troops in a composite battle had initially hoped .UN Special Representative
Akashi expressed the anguished anxiety of the peace
group from 7th North Dalmatian Corps. 95
makers when he observed that “both sides are clearly
undertaking military preparations in violation of the
The operation began on 4 June and lasted one week .
spirit of the agreement reached on December 31, 1994
On the first day, HV/HVO troops quickly seized their
main objectives, with 4th Guards Brigade taking Crni ... " He glumly warned that “ a further deterioration of
the cease- fire in coming weeks is almost inevitable." 98
Lug and the pass out of Livno.Over the period 6-10
As Akashi and others were coming to realize , both
June, elements of the HV 1st Croatian Guards Brigade
( 1st HGZ) , 1st Guards Brigade, and 264th Recon sides were using the truce merely as a breather for
another round of fighting.
Sabotage Company methodically drove the second
phase of the attack ,making a step -by -step advance
As this realization sank in , the international commu
north from Livno and taking importantmountains
heights , including Veliki and Mali Sator (about 1,900 nity began to stir itself with proposals to extend or at
least maintain the cease- fire . This was a losing propo
and 1,400 meters, respectively ). The lateral road to the
sition for, despite some high -level diplomatic pressure
north of these positions was also cut. VRS/SVK forces
from the Contact Group and Western governments, the
responded with counterattacks against the 4th Guards
cease- fire visibly began to fray during the month of
on 6-7 June , as well as two airstrikes against HV units
March .
inside the RSK on 9 June. None of these measures,
nor the huge “ Orkan ” rockets fired at 4th Guards tar
gets, stemmed the HV/HVO advance.96 International diplomatic efforts fizzled out entirely,
and the cease -fire broke down completely at the very
end of March when the Bosnian Government took
Operation “ Skok - 2” capped the HV /HVO’s prelimi
nary operations designed to threaten Bosansko Gra military action against the Serb -held radio transmitters
atop Mt. Vlasic and Mt. Stolice. Both had been key
hovo and eventually Knin . General Gotovina states,
objectives of the previous year's spring offensive ,
when the ARBiH had temporarily captured portions of
The three offensive battles known as “ Zima 94,"
" Skok - 1," and " Skok - 2 " were three separate them and the surrounding hills. As the bitter weather
actions by the HV and HVO and were planned of the new year began to ease , the Bosnian Army was
and executed as such , but essentially they com ready to try again .
prised one unified action.97
Chapter 78
“ Who Will Rule the Airwaves ?” — The Contests
With the completion of “ Skok- 2," the HV was now
for Mts . Vlasic and Stolice, 1995
ready to take Bosansko Grahovo and then - Knin .

The Bosnian Government shattered the cease-fire a

full 40 days before it was due to expire with the spring
The 1995 Spring Offensive Begins in Earnest
offensive that dawned in the early morning hours of
20 March .” As in early 1994 , the twin targets of the
Meanwhile , the Bosnian Army had not been quiet
ARBiH attacks were the Serb -held radio transmitters
either. While the Croatian Army was driving a wedge
atop Mt. Vlasic, near Travnik , and Mt.Majevica , east
into western Bosnia, the Bosnian Armywas escalating
of Tuzla .
the scope of its attacks against the Serbs in defiance of
the country -wide cease- fire that ostensibly had pre
vailed since the beginning of the year. Already by
early March , it was becoming clear that the truce was

300
Mt. Vlasic : The Thrill of Victory dawn to overwhelm the surprised Serb outposts. 102
Next day the elite of the elite , the 7th Muslimski Bri
This time Brigadier GeneralMehmed Alagic's 7th gade, was fed into the fight, pushing the advance for
Corps' operation against long-contested Mt. Vlasic ward and upward .
and its radio relay station would be truly “massive” by
Bosnian Army standards ; just under 21,000 troops Even after the ARBiH released word of its sudden
were allocated to the attack , and the preparations were offensive , the direction of the fighting atop Mt. Vlasic
long and detailed . Under General Alagic's close remained unclear for days. Meanwhile , the Bosnian
scrutiny, the 7th Corps began an intensive training 7th Corps had mounted a secondary attack in the
program during the early weeks of the 1995 cease - fire Komarmountains west of Turbe and around Donji
that focused on coordinated offensive actions and win Vakuf to divert VRS Major GeneralMomir Zec's 30th
ter operations. The corps rounded up 3,000 white win- Infantry Division / 1st Krajina Corps reserves from the
ter camouflage uniforms and stockpiled hundreds of main objective of the Bosnian attack .103 104 Behind the
tons of ammunition , fuel, and food supplies. Barracks fog of war and winter storm , only the mounting num
sprang up close to the frontlines , supported by new bers of fleeing Serb refugees suggested that the
field hospitals ,bakeries, and improved roads, all of Bosnian Army must be gaining the upper hand. By
them designed to conserve the troops ' time and energy 25March, UN relief officials reported thatmore than
formore intensive training. Officers went back to 1,200 Bosnian Serbshad evacuated the town of
school to achievemore uniform and professional stan- Imljan , some 12 km northwest ofMt. Vlasic, and that
dards, while soldiers honed their fighting skills in more were fleeing.105 They also believed the Bosnian
daily exercises and simulations. Staff officers broke Armyhad taken the television tower atop 1,933 -meter
the campaign plan down to the squad level to define Mt. Paljenik in the Vlasic mountain range , but severe
individual responsibilities, and company officers weather and the combatants ' restrictions on the UN's
rehearsed their men in individual tasks. Afterweeks in movement prevented them from confirming this. 106
which the almost undivided attention of his Corps was Other reports suggested that the HVO was actively
focused on achieving just one objective, Alagic's assisting the offensive , almost certainly with artillery.
attack force was as ready as itwas going to be .100 Behind the reporting blackout and the impenetrable
weather, vicious fighting continued for days as
The ARBiH assault against the towering Mt. Vlasic Alagic's 7th Corps stormed up the mountain , lashed
peak began in the most forbidding weather conditions , by late winter blizzards and temperatures as low as
with bitter cold , cutting winds, and high snowdrifts 13 below zero Farenheit .
combining to impede movement and visibility. The
seeming folly of the timing suggests that the 7th Corps The outcome of the battle for Mt. Vlasic remained
actually planned to attack in these hellish winter con uncertain until 4 April, when General Alagic
ditions, reckoning that the Serbs would never expect it announced his troops were holding a victory celebra
and that the dreadful fighting conditions would negate tion at its summit.107 108 While Alagic had undoubtedly
many of the Serbs' defensive preparations and mate captured the Mt. Paljenik summit and some 50 square
rial advantages . Near-zero visibility would permit kilometers surrounding it, there were reports that the
Bosnian Army units to creep unnoticed through no retreating Serbs had destroyed the object of the fight
man's land while the deep snowdrifts cushioned the ing, the communications facility ,rather than let it fall
men's weight and allowed them to cross the Serb into Muslim hands.109 Even so , Bosnian television
minefields unscathed . 101 broadcast images of jubilantMuslim troops cavorting
in deep snow on the mountain's peak , celebrating one
The attack on Mt. Vlasic (Operation “ Domet- 1," or of the signal ARBiH victories of the war.110 The cap
“ Reach - 1” ) commenced at 0430 on 20 March with a ture of the peak was strikingly visible evidence of the
brief but fierce artillery and mortar barrage against Army's improvement and gave a huge boost to gov
positions held by the VRS 22nd Infantry Brigade / 30th ernment morale . In the longer term , it would also be
Infantry Division . Handpicked infantrymen of the seen as a first step taken by the ARBiH -HVO on the
General Staff's Guards Brigade, the crack 17th road to the territorial redemption of Donji Vakuf and
Krajina Mountain Brigade, and the 727th Mountain Jajce.
Brigade surged forward in the darkest hours before

301
 The Bosnian Army's capture of long-contested Mt. In contrast to its charge up Mt. Vlasic, the ARBiH
Vlasic was also a significant measure of the improve sustained exceptionally heavy casualties on the first
ment in ARBiH capabilities relative to their Serb day of the Stolice offensive , as VRS artillery took a
opponents . Although the victory was, in the end , one particularly heavy toll on advancing government
of infantry slogging through terrible terrain to win the infantry. There were fierce, close -quarters battles
battle at close quarters — the ARBiH's basic tactic around the peaks surrounding Mt. Stolice - Banj
since the beginning of the war - its execution differed Brdo, 870-meter Mt. Kolijevka, and Mala Jelica hill
from previous campaigns by visible improvements in as the Bosnian Army sought to encircle Stolice in a
equipment, planning, organization , and execution. UN pincer attack from the southwest and southeast.116 117
military observers and Western journalists reported Driving snow and severe cold slowed the government
better equipped Bosnian Army units now taking the advance late in the afternoon and all but halted the
field , their soldiers bearing adequate small arms and offensive the following day.'18 Intense fighting
ammunition , flak jackets, helmets , and radios." resumed on 23 March , however, with UN observers
Observers also noted changes in Bosnian Army tactic reporting over 2,700 detonations in under 24 hours
toward more mobile , offensive operationsmade possi- despite continuing bad weather."19 UN officials were
ble by such things as improvements in brigade organi hampered by severe restrictions on their movements in
zation ,more experienced planning staffs, greater the battle area but by 24 March were making
ability to coordinate simultaneous operations , and bet cautious statements that the government forces
ter training of individual soldiers. 112 UN officials appeared to have advanced . A UN spokesman stated
noted , for instance, that the ARBiH offensives on that the fighting was very close to the tower, while
Vlasic and Stolice had begun with separate battlefield Bosnian Serb President Karadzic promised a Serb
actions 100 km apart kicked off within minutes of counteroffensive .120 The following day,UN authorities
each other — visible evidence that the ARBiH had stated that the ARBiH had captured some 50 square
finally mastered the art of directing complex, simulta kilometers of territory surrounding the Stolice trans
neous operations in separate locales.113 The Bosnian mitter, but the Bosnian Government conceded that it
Army still fell short of its Bosnian Serb opponents in had not captured the tower itself.121 122 Both the
weaponry, operational planning, and battlefield execu ARBiH and VRS admitted to heavy losses in the fight
tion , but the gap in capabilities between the two sides ing .123
had narrowed tremendously since the first dark days
of early 1992. The Bosnian Serbs retaliated for the two Muslim
offensives on 25-26 March with artillery barrages
against Muslim -held cities across Bosnia and,more
Mt. Stolice : The Agony of Defeat practically , a counterattack aimed at relieving the gar
rison surrounded on top of Mt. Stolice.124 Thanks to
Atthe same time Alagic's ARBiH 7th Corps launched elite MUP Special Police troops , the “ Panthers” from
its campaign to take Mt. Vlasic , Brigadier General the VRS 1st Bijeljina Light Infantry Brigade, and the
Sead Delic's ARBiH 2nd Corps kicked off its own 3rd Military Police Battalion , the counterattack suc
attack along a broad front in the Majevica hills east of ceeded in breaking the encirclement.125 The level of
Tuzla . Under the command of its 25th Division , the fighting decreased over the next few days, partly
2nd Corps employed some6,000 assault troops from because of heavy spring snows blanketing everything
six elite liberation and light brigades, backed by 8,000 on the mountains ,while the Bosnian Serbs hung on to
troops from four of the 25th Division's sector holding the Mt. Stolice summit through a tenuous supply link
mountain brigades, plus a handful of supporting tanks running across a small stream.126 Hoping to bleed off
and artillery pieces.114 The main thrust was aimed at Serb reserves by broadening the front, Delic's ARBiH
916 -meter Mt. Stolice (the site of the long- sought Sto 2nd Corps mounted additional secondary attacks in
lice radio and TV transmitter ) along with the nearby the Piperi-Lukavica area to the northwest and the
700 -meter elevation of Banj Brdo , both held by the Priboj area to the northeast, but the entrenched Serbs
VRS 2nd Majevica Light Infantry Brigade.115 Second hung on and held out.127 128 Eschewing a frontal
ary attacks, however, were blossoming like crocuses
along the entire line stretching from Celic to Teocak .

302

-
assault, Delic's 2nd Corps forces kept trying to com the bitter cold . The cold hindered them more
plete their encirclement of the peak while calling on than our bullets ... The Muslims are fools: snow
the Serb garrison to surrender the radio relay station 2 meters high , and they attack ?! How can one
intact, all to no avail. 129 conduct an assault then ? We shot them like rab
bits...
On 4 April, having captured Mt. Vlasic , ARBiH again
tried to take the Stolice tower by storm when milder The peak and the relay tower on Stolice were
weather allowed fighting to flare once again in the saved by the police, their elite unit (for instance ,
Majevica area .130 131 Government troops again man the MUP Special Police detachment committed
aged to surround the summit but were still unable to to the counterattack ). Ifnot for it, the Turks
wrest control from the Serb garrison.132 Having beaten would have seized all of Majevica by now ...
off a series of ARBiH 2nd Corps attacks , the Bosnian [ The adjacent peak of ] Konjic was liberated by
Serbswere ready to counterattack on 6 April.133 The the Special Forces, not by us fighters. After all ,
VRS “ Panthers" and 3rd Military Police Battalion , what do we know except to shoot blindly ? They
together with elite MUP Special Police assault troops, are professionals. They know that they will hit
backed by field artillery fire, again launched a coordi what they aim at. We common soldiers are differ
nated assault that recaptured Banj Brdo and another ent: we sip a little brandy, we smoke a little
nearby peak the following day, effectively lifting the Feel free to write that the Serbswould have
Bosnian Army blockade of Stolice .134 135 lostMajevica and then probably also the corri
dor between Serbia and themselves if it had not
By mid -April it had become evident that the attempt been for that Special Police unit.137
to capture the strategic Stolice site had been another
costly infantry - only attack that had fallen just short of In the end, neither the Bosnian Army nor the Bosnian
success, and again the price of failure had been high . Serbs owned the Stolice radio tower. On 30 August
Sead Delic's 2nd Corps had suffered hundreds of the Serb -held communications node was demolished
casualties, many of them from frostbite, sustaining by a NATO airstrike.138 Just a few months later, under
losses at a rate that even the ARBiH's largest corps the termsof the Dayton Agreement, both Stolice and
could not sustain . Thereafter the 2nd Corps infantry Banj Brdo were transferred to the Muslim -held side of
men would make occasional probes, and exchanges of the line when the new Inter-Entity Boundary Line was
shelling continued all along the line, butthe ARBiH shifted by several kilometers in that area . For the Bos
would not to mount another infantry campaign against nian Government, the stroke of a pen eventually won
Stolice for the remainder of the war.136 more than the hacking of a sword.

Analysis and Conclusions The VRS Shoots Its Bolt : Operations " Spreca - 95"
and “ Sadejstvo 95 "
While the battle for Mt. Vlasic had ended in victory,
Mt. Stolice had been an expensive defeat. In neither Despite the pressure from the ARBiH operations at
case had the margin of success or failure been great. In Vlasic and Stolice, the VRS Main Staff forged ahead
the case of Stolice , a few key factors - perhaps most with what was supposed to be its “ war-winning
important, a critically timed snowstorm , superior Bos offensive operation of 1995 — Operation " Sadejstvo
nian Serb firepower, and the presence of a small but 95 ” (Joint Action 95 ). The objective was to defeat the
telling number of elite Serb infantry forces — had com ARBiH 21st and 22nd Divisions of the 2nd Corps in
bined to give the Bosnian Serbs the battlefield edge . the Brcko -Gradacac -Doboj-Gracanica box, thereby
As one exhausted Bosnian Serb soldier interviewed widening the Posavina corridor and removing the
near Stolice told a Slovene reporter at the time, threat to Doboj.More important, the RS Supreme
Command and the VRS Main Staff hoped that a defeat
To tell you the truth , we would have lost like this would force the Bosnian Government to sue
Majevica if it had not been for that snowstorm .
The Turks (Bosnian Muslims) were bothered by

303
for peace. The VRS 1st Krajina Corps was to spear Heavy fighting raged over the next 10 days as VRS
head the attack , supported by the East Bosnian Corps . assault units led by the 1st Bijeljina Light Infantry
Preceding the main attack, a preliminary operation to Brigade " Panthers " managed to penetrate HVO
cut off and eliminate the Sapna- Teocak salient, defenses at Boderiste . The VRS forces as a whole ,
" Spreca- 95 ," was to be a joint East Bosnian and Drina however, were unable to break out of this lodgement.
Corps operation under the overall command of the By 26-27 April, the ARBiH 21st Division, which had
East Bosnian Corps. The VRS Main Staff was to been supporting the 108th HVO Brigade, was able to
supervise the two operations.139 mount a strong counterattack with major elements of
the elite 211th Liberation Brigade plus troops from the
The VRS launched “ Spreca 95 ” at the same time that local 215th Mountain Brigade. The attack wiped out
the ARBiH was making its latest and last attempt to the VRS gains and , although the offensive sputtered
take Stolice. The VRS East Bosnian and Drina Corps on for a few more days, it had been effectively
began the operation by 4 April — although it may have defeated .
started in late March — against the southeastern side of
the salient.140 The VRS's opponents were the rein The VRS defeat was the Serbs ' last effort at a war
forced 24th Division of the ARBiH 2nd Corps and one winning offensive to break the Bosnian Government's
brigade of the 25th Division.141 In two weeks of fight will. The limited gainsmadeby the operations and the
ing, VRS troops managed to inch forward near the limited press coverage they received indicates how
villages of Sapna and Vitinica but failed to wrest badly the attacks failed . VRS forces — despite their
permanent control of the key high ground from the advantages in armor, artillery, and other heavy weap
ARBiH defenders. 142 Another advance in May , ons — were almost completely unable at this point in
simultaneous with the VRS offensive against Orasje , the war to break through ARBiH positional defenses
also petered out and failed to achieve the VRS in the Bosnian Government's core territory of northern
objectives. 143 and central Bosnia ( ormost HVO defenses, as Orasje
demonstrated ). The VRS was unable to defeat the
Despite the failure at Sapna- Teocak , the VRS went ARBiH's fortifications, and ARBiH troop reserves
ahead with the main effort, " Sadejstvo 95." It appears allowed the ARBiH to block any penetration the VRS
that the 1st Krajina Corps did not play a major role in made . The shift in the military balance between the
the attack in spite of the original plan ; it remains ARBiH and the VRS that began in early 1994 was
unclear why,but concern over the successful ARBiH now complete.
attack at Vlasic may have drawn off the 1st Krajina
Corps ' reserves. This also may have prescribed the Chapter 79
scope of the operational objective , limiting it to an ARBiH 1st and 5th Corps Offensive Operations,
expansion of the Posavina corridor around Brcko. As March - July 1995
a result, Major General Novica Simic's East Bosnian
Corps pushed ahead with its attack near Brcko on While the ARBiH forces elsewhere in Bosnia were
19 April, hitting the HVO -held Boderiste sector, breaking the country -wide cease -fire with their late
8 kilometers south of Brcko town . Presumably , the March offensives, the 5th Corps was preparing to con
corps' initial objective was the key ARBiH -held vil tinue the series of “ bite and hold ” attacks it had begun
lage of Brka, the capture of which would widen the in January against the VRS 2nd Krajina Corps on the
corridor by another 3 kilometers . The VRS probably Grabez plateau and in the Pljesevica Mountains near
hoped they might be able to reach Gornji Rahic ,which Bihac city. There was relatively little fighting in the
would widen the corridor by a total of 8 kilometers. Bihac - Bosanska Krupa area during March , as combat
The Serbs may have hoped , too, that the HVO was concentrated in the northern area against the
controlled sector would be more weakly defended Abdic /SVK forces. Instead , themajor development in
than the ARBiH 21st Division /2nd Corps lines Bihac at the timewas the mysterious disappearance of
directly in front of Brka itself, which had proved
impenetrable the previous year.

304
HVO MajorGeneral Vlado Santic, the commander of Operation " Una 95"
the battalion -sized Bosnian Croat unit in the Bihac
enclave . Santic was abducted by three military police In themiddle ofMay,while Bosnians elsewhere began
men from the ARBiH 502nd Brigade on 8 March and to focus on new fighting around Sarajevo , the center
never was seen again . A joint Croat-Muslim commis of the fighting around Bihac was to shift from south
sion investigated the kidnapping and, although the west of the town to its eastern approaches as Dudak
three Muslim soldiers were arrested , the Croats ovic launched what had been codenamed Operation
rejected the Bosnian Army's explanation that the inci “Una 95.” First, elite reconnaissance -sabotage troops
dent was no more than a settling of personal and per infiltrated some 5 kilometers behind enemy lines and
haps criminal scores.144 145 Happily , the crisis did not waited for zero hour when they would begin sabotage
escalate , and Croat -Muslim relations returned to nor and disruption operations in the enemy rear. With
mal with the appointment of a new HVO commander scarce 5th Corps artillery reserves diverted to support
for the area , Colonel Ivan Prsa .146 the operation, on the afternoon of 12 May Dudak
ovic's Cazin -based 503rd Mountain Brigade launched
Sporadic and inconclusive fighting resumed on the its offensive on the Grabez plateau against (probably)
southern side of the Bihac enclave at thebeginning of the VRS 3rd Petrovac Light Infantry Brigade, with
April, with the Serbsmaking weak efforts to break supporting operations further east around Bosanska
through government lines on the Grabez heights and Krupa against the 11th Krupa Light Infantry and 1st
the Grmusa - Srbljaniplateau.147 On 7 April — as the 5th Novigrad Infantry Brigades. Effective execution of the
Corps was being pushed back around Vrnograc to the attack plan , combined with surprise, resulted in the
north — the Bosnian Army and HVO countered with a capture of 56 square kilometers in under 24 hours.156
small joint operation to sever a Serb -held road link These ARBiH gains helped somewhat to protect Bihac
west of Bihac connecting the towns of Donji Lapac from VRS shelling and gave theMuslims control over
and Licko Petrovo Selo . The operation was a success, part of the Bihac - Bosanska Krupa roadway.157 158
pushing back elements of two SVK 15th Lika Corps
brigades from positions they had regained in Bosnia
and allowing the government forces to reestablish Operation “ Zora 95"
their defense line along the Croatian border. The Serbs
retaliated by shelling the Bihac safe area .148 149 The 503rd Brigade's success in Operation " Una 95 "
was to set the stage for a follow -on operation , “ Zora
Three days later the 501st Brigademade another small (Dawn) 95.” Elements of the veteran 501st and 502nd
push south and west of Bihac, capturing the hilltop Mountain Brigades led the advance , supported by the
south of Veliki Skocaj from the VRS composite 1st 5th MP Battalion and the 510th Liberation Brigade .
Serbian Brigade and attacking the Krajina Serb -held They faced the VRS 15th Bihac, 17th Kljuc, and 1st
radar installation atop Mt. Pljesevica with rocket Drvar Light Infantry Brigades of the 2nd Krajina
launcher fire.150 Back -and- forth fighting continued in Corps. The 501st and 510th Brigades breached the
the Mt. Pljesevica area into early May , with the two VRS 1st Drvar Brigade line near Grabez village on the
sides jockeying for control of some of the secondary first day of the attack . The 502nd Brigade's frontal
peaks. The Serbs grimly hung on to the summit and attack to the south against the 17th Kljuc Brigade
the radar installation that crowned it.151 152 The SVK / failed , but then the 502nd shifted a battalion to the
VRS forces even hit Veliki Skocaj with an airstrike by north through the hole cut by the 501st and 510th Bri
two Krajina Serb aircraft on 29 April .153 154Mean gades and plunged into the 17th Kljuc Brigade's rear,
while , UNPROFOR threatened retaliation — even a sending its troops fleeing toward Ripac.159 160 As of
NATO airstrike — for the Serbs' continued nuisance 17 May , Dudakovic had again captured Ripac, but this
shelling of the Bihac safe area.155 International atten timehe advanced more cautiously than he had the pre
tion was diverted elsewhere after Croatia's Operation
" Flash " against UN Sector West a few days later, and
nothing cameof the airstrike threat.

305
vious year and avoided the overextension that had led The VRS Sarajevo-Romanija and Herzegovina Corps
to disaster in October 161 162 Instead, on 18 May - a both would bear the brunt of the ARBiH operations on
little under a week after the commencement of “ Una the Treskavica- Trnovo front. The Sarajevo -Romanija
95" -Dudakovic began consolidating his recent gains. Corps fielded the same formations it had during late
According to UN officials, 5th Corps forces had begun 1994 — an attached 1st Krajina Corps brigade, a battal
to fortify newly taken positions southeast of Bihac , ion of attached Drina Corps troops , plus elements of
were mopping up surrounded pockets of Serb forces, one of its own brigades - covering the area from
and had achieved a net gain of several dozen square Sarajevo to Trnovo town.170 The Herzegovina Corps
kilometers. 163 164 165 deployed a single brigade in the Treskavica area ,
northwest of Kalinovik .171 Total VRS forces probably
A several- day pause in the 5th Corps offensive numbered about 3,500 to 4,000 troops. Both corps
brought a temporary halt to military activity around could call on Main Staff and corps- level reserves to
the embattled Bihac enclave , and a surprising calm counterattack from southwest of Trnovo.172
pervaded the area . Indeed , a UN spokesperson issued
the unusual statement on 21 May that, “ It's completely Fierce battles fought in heavy snow and bitter
quiet ... almost nothing happening anywhere." 166 cold weather (temperatures ranging as low as
-22 degrees F.) went on for the next several days.173
UN observers , barred from the area, were unable to
Ivanjska and Cojluk , July 1995 report which side was gaining.174 175 On 20 April,
however, the Bosnian Government triumphantly
The 5th Corps broke the quiet on 3 July with another announced that soldiers of the 1st Corps' 14th Divi
limited offensive, Operation " Trokut ( Triangle ) I,” this sion had captured the highest summit of Mt. Treskav
time east of Bosanska Otoka, in the Ivanjska-Glodna ica — 2,086 -meter Djokin Toranj,176 30 km southeast
Corkovaca Mountain area . Troops from the 502nd , of Sarajevo .177 178 179 These newly captured positions
505th , 510th , and 511th Mountain Brigades drove the threatened Mladic's birthplace of Kalinovik with artil
VRS 1st Novigrad Infantry and SVK 33rd Dvor Infan- lery fire, and optimists on the government side pre
try Brigades from positions that VRS/SVK forces had dicted that the way would soon be opened to Trnovo
held since 1992 north of the Una River.167 A week and Gorazde.
later, on 10 July , the 511th eliminated the last remain
ing VRS bridgehead across the Una River,recapturing The VRS, however, was not about to let this long
the Cojluk area near Bosanska Krupa from the 11th contested peak remain in Muslim hands. Fighting had
Krupa Brigade. 168 Although the 5th Corps now had the slowed by 26 April , but the VRS were assembling
initiative , the Krajina Serb Armywould soon take it forces for a counterattack .180 Herzegovina Corps
back . forces — supported by Sarajevo -Romanija Corps ele
ments and the 2nd (Zvornik ) and 9th (Foca ) Detach
ments of the MUP's elite Special Police brigade181—
Mt. Treskavica, Spring 1995 began striking back shortly thereafter and claimed the
recapture of the crucial Djokin Toranj summit on
ARBiH offensive operations on Mt. Treskavica also 4 May.182 183 The ARBiH 1st Corps struggled unsuc
resumed on 16 April 1995, concurrent with the cessfully to regain control of the peak for the next few
assaults on Mounts Vlasic and Stolice. 169 While Meh days ,making attack after attack to dislodge the
met Alagic's 7th Corps undertook the Mt. Vlasic Serbs.184 185 All their efforts failed and, by 11 May , UN
attack and Sead Delic's 2nd Corps took carried outthe military observers were reporting the withdrawal of
Mt. Stolice attack, Brigadier General Vahid Karav Bosnian Army forces from territory they had gained
elic's 1st Corps renewed its attack atMt. Treskavica to around the summit.186 The fighting did not cease
sever VRS-controlled north -South lines of communi entirely ; the ARBiH continued to shell the Serb -held
cation through Trnovo and simultaneously secure summit and periodically flung infantry forward in
jumpoff points to reopen its own supply route through attempted breakthroughs for the remainder of May
Trnovo to the isolated Gorazde enclave .

306
and the first half of June. 187 188 189 It was to resumewith In fact, the intensity of fire directed at downtown Sara
full intensity soon enough , as the ARBiH attempted to jevo was never as great as televised images led many
crack the siege of Sarajevo . observers to believe. Some sections of the city were
laid waste, and numerous buildings were destroyed ;
Chapter 80 yet other sections (indeed , some entire neighbor
The Sarajevo Breakout Attempt, June 1995 hoods) were relatively unharmed but failed to merit
the scrutiny of drama-seeking television crews. Statis
tically , the volumeof fire directed into urban Sarajevo
Background
was far less intense than in most sieges of most cities
during the past century. The Bosnian Serbs ringed the
On 27 January 1995 the city of Sarajevo officially city with only 600 to 800 heavy weapons of all types,
marked its 1,000th day under siege . Its residents had
ofwhich only about 200 were artillery pieces or tanks;
already endured one of the longest sieges in modern the restwere heavy and medium mortars. Before the
history , and still the artillery shells andmortar rounds February 1994 cease -fire, on an average day, approxi
and sniper bullets rained down ,as unpredictable as the mately 300 artillery ormortar rounds were fired into
weather. 190 Sarajevo had been surrounded for longer
the city. The most intense shelling day was probably
than the famous 900 days of World War II Leningrad ,
22 July 1993, when the UN recorded 3,777 artillery
and the Vietnamese Army encirclements of Dien Bien and mortar impacts . On days when the NATO exclu
Phu and Khe Sanh seemed short by comparison at
sion zone was actually in effect, only a scattering of
56 and 77 days respectively . As 1995 began another
shots might be fired , or sometimes none at all.191 By
dismal year, no one in or out of Sarajevo could esti
contrast,Groznyy , a city generally comparable in size
mate for how many moremonths— or even years — the to Sarajevo , first came under attack in early 1995 .
siegemight continue.
Within a short time, major portions of the Chechen
capital were literally pounded to pieces by a Russian
It was a strange sort of siege, in strictly military terms.
Army frustrated by its inability to locate and destroy a
For most of the three and a half years since Serb
few thousand defenders , leaving tens of thousands of
armed forces had isolated the capital from the rest of civilian residents dead in the rubble of their homes .
Bosnia an international airlift had brought food, fuel,
and medical supplies into the city . Although frequent
These historical comparisons in no way detract from
interruptions of the relief flights and the occasional the heroism and stoicism of Sarajevo's defenders and
overland convoys tightened the belts and hollowed the
residents, some 10,000 of whom died between 1992
cheeks of its citizens, they were able to endure far
and 1995. The fact that the suffering was less awful
longer than if they had been truly cut off by a conven than the siege of Leningrad or less devastating than
tional siege . Simply put, international humanitarian
the capture of Berlin does notmean that Sarajevo's
assistance managed to sustain the city throughout the battles were neither awful nor devastating. Asan event
war and thwart the Serb objective of a starvation in military history , however, the siege deserves some
induced capitulation . International intervention also careful scrutiny and comparisons .
spared the city from more than a year of incessant
artillery fire , thanks to the UN -imposed ban on the
emplacement of Serb heavy weapons within a 20 The Military Situation and the Opposing Forces
kilometer circle around the city's center. Although this
restriction was frequently flouted, the exclusion zone
On the surface , the force balance in the area might
vastly reduced the volume of shelling into the city for appear to significantly favor the Bosnian Army. The
most of 1994 and the early part of 1995. As a conven ARBiH 1st Corps had some 26,000 troops inside the
tional military operation , the siege of Sarajevo was a city , together with another 33,000 arrayed in central
distinct oddity : a city surrounded that still received
supplies routinely from the outside, and the besieging
force at times banned outright from attacking the city.

307
Bosnia facing the siege's outer wall. The 1st Corps imminent infantry attack that had allowed the Serbs to
faced only some 13,000 Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) actually occupy contested towns. While defensive
troops surrounding the city and holding the outer wall . artillery fire consistently enabled the VRS to thwart
Whereas the VRS Sarajevo -Romanija Corps devoted Muslim offensive attempts, the Bosnian Serb Army
more than 600 artillery pieces, tanks, and heavy and still lacked the manpower to do more than maintain
medium mortars to the siege, the Bosnian Army's 1st the existing confrontation lines in an essentially
(Sarajevo ) Corps had only a ridiculous collection of defensive posture . Serb commanders knew the alterna
10 to 20 artillery pieces of half a dozen types , with lit tive would have been unacceptable: a bloody,man
tle or no ammunition , and maybe 100 or so assorted power-intensive infantry assault into Sarajevo along
mortars to support its lightly armed infantry forces. In the lines of Stalingrad , Vukovar, or Groznyy, a contest
this, the strengths and weaknesses of the opposing thatwould have pitted all of the ARBiH defenders '
forces around Sarajevo reflected the differing capabil- strengths against all of the VRS attackers ' weak
ities of their parent armies. nesses. Even at the outset of the campaign against the
Bosnian capital in 1992, a Bosnian Serb Army that
Like the Bosnian Army as a whole , the ARBiH 1st wasmuch stronger than the defending Muslimshad
Corps had a great deal ofmanpower but very little neither the forces nor the willpower to occupy signifi
equipment, a composition that gave the corps defen cant portions of the city itself. The VRS Sarajevo
sive staying power (especially in an urban setting) but Romanija Corps therefore generally contented itself
very limited offensive capability. Sarajevo's defending with holding its trenchlines opposite those of the
forces were ill equipped even by ARBiH standards ARBiH while harassing and terrorizing the city with
almost entirely cut off from outside military supplies artillery ,mortar, and sniper fire .
and deprived of access to the military training areas
and programsby then available to the rest of the These strategic realities had made the confrontation
Army. Starved of equipment, desperately short of lines around Sarajevo essentially static for practically
ammunition , and with little training, the Bosnian the entire war. Almost from the start, both sides had
Army forces in Sarajevo lacked the ability, weaponry, constructed elaborate trench complexes to protect
and logistic follow - through to advance into the teeth their frontlines, further contributing to the static nature
of prepared Serb defenses. Despite the 1st Corps' sig of the siege . The Bosnian Armyhad made a few cru
nificant numericaladvantage in troops and the support cial territorial gains in June and December 1992, but
of a highlymotivated population, there was simply no most of the intense fighting and territorial adjustments
hope that it could sustain a drive that not only would had taken place at the margins, where small contests
break through but also would dislodge the enemy had been fought for control over local areas of particu
forces and raise the siege . lar tactical value. The military limitations of the two
forces - combined with the UN - imposed heavy weap
The Bosnian Serb Army's Sarajevo -Romanija Corps, ons exclusion zone and the ostensible demilitarization
conversely,had ample numbers of field artillery pieces of the city — had combined to produce a tactical stale
and mortars ringing the city, reflecting the VRS' over mate , a battle frozen in place.
whelming advantage in firepower. With this material
superiority, the VRS could apply military and political
pressure by pounding the city's urban center or beat The Strategic Context
back infantry attacks with concentrations of artillery
fire . For entirely different reasons, however, the Serb A stalemate might have been acceptable to the Serb
besiegers also lacked a true offensive capability . besiegers, but the situation was becoming increasingly
Throughout Bosnia — at Sarajevo ,Mostar, Gornji unacceptable to the city's residents and the Bosnian
Vakuf, and elsewhere — artillery barrages had wrought political leadership . After more than three years under
great destruction but in and of themselves had never the gun, both literally and figuratively ,morale within
succeeded in forcing defending units to either surren
der or evacuate. Always, it had either been a success
ful but costly infantry assault or the clear threat of

308
the city was finally beginning to flag.More than once, victory to its citizens at homeand its supporters
the Bosnian Government proclaimed to all that break abroad. If the Bosnian Presidency's long-promised
ing the siege of Sarajevo had become a top priority relief to Sarajevo's quarter-million residents could be
and that the ARBiH was determined to do so before accomplished by military means, then Bosnians every
the next winter began . Sarajevo's Mayor, Tarik Kupus- where might be persuaded that the government's attri
ovic, told correspondents that the city's residents tion strategy was finally starting to reap dividends.
could not survive a fourth winter of the siege , and, in Internationally , the government could trumpet the
May, Bosnian President Izetbegovic would vow pub city's “ liberation ” —achieved without the benefit of
licly that the siege would be lifted - politically or mil international assistance — as evidence of the state's
itarily — by 25 November. The offensive , when it viability .
finally came, would be heralded by similar public
statements by senior Bosnian military A convergence of reasons, all centered on morale , thus
officers .192 193 194 195 drove the ARBiH toward a breakout attempt from
Sarajevo sometime in mid - 1995 . The "what" having
The attitude of this domestic audience was of vital been established , the next question became “how .”
importance , for both political and military reasons.
When all was said and done, the Bosnian Army
especially in Sarajevo — was a citizen army, not an all The Battle Plan
professional, regular force . If these citizens lost their
will to fight, whether from exhaustion or from despair, A can is always opened from the outside.
the ARBiH would cease to exist. The political and
military realities therefore compelled the ARBiH -Bosnian Proverb
General Staff to make at least a credible effort to raise
the siege of the capital sometime in 1995. With these considerations in mind, the Bosnian Army
appears to have begun planning for a Sarajevo break
There was another crucial audience to consider - off out attempt in the late spring of 1995. In fact, rather
the Bosnian stage , but no less important: the interna than break out of the city , the staff planners apparently
tional community . Serious doubts were being raised in concluded that a more promising strategy might be to
a number of Western capitals that the Bosnian Gov try to break in . The final plan called for a combination
ernment and the ARBiH were viable forces worth sus of attacks from within the city and toward the city ,
taining diplomatically , economically, or militarily . with the largest efforts coming from outside.
From the Bosnian Government's standpoint, it was
thus absolutely vital to convince the international Everyone recognized that if the Bosnian Army sought
community that the Bosnian Army was still in the to break the siege of Sarajevo it would most likely be
fight.196 By 1995 one could well argue that the ARBiH one of the largest government offensives of the war,an
was already on the winning side of a war of attrition . all-out, costly battle of daunting scope and difficulty.
Wars of attrition produce few battlefield victories, The government's preparations to break the siege
however, and , without visible successes, the Bosnian would be its most ambitious offensive effort to date ,
Army was having difficulty convincing either domes and its employment of troops from no fewer than four
tic or foreign audiences that itwas not on the edge of corps represented a quantum leap in the size and com
collapse . plexity of ARBiH combat operations. What was in
doubt was the Army's ability not only to advance but
A breakout from Sarajevo , however slim its chances of to hold ground against Bosnian Serb counterattacks,
military success , promised substantial political something it had only rarely been able to do .
rewards. If the Bosnian Government could somehow
make good on its vow to break the siege of its
capital — perhaps only by establishing a narrow land
route a few kilometers long — it could portray this as a

309
The campaign plan that the ARBiH General Staff and seizing a few key terrain features along the way. Even
the 1st Corps devised called for a phased attack to first a limited advance would leave the government forces
sever key VRS supply routes to the Sarajevo in better positions for later attempts to break the siege.
Romanija Corps's units deployed both around the city
and facing ARBiH positions in central Bosnia.197 As a
result, the Bosnian Army's primary attack routes for Preparations
the first phase would be north , southeast, and south of
the city, cutting or threatening the VRS's three major After a political decision most likely made in mid
supply routes: one linking Serb - controlled Ilijas and April, military preparations for the battle began in
Hadzici to Vogosca and Serb -held territory northeast mid -May .More fighting flared as the ARBiH 1st
of Sarajevo , another connecting Pale to the Serb -held Corps probed Bosnian Serb positions, seeking better
suburbs of Lukavica and Ilidza, and finally the route positions for further attacks and hoping to confuse
connecting Pale with Serb -held Herzegovina via enemy perceptions of where the main axes of attack
Trnovo and Kalinovik . The ultimate objective was to would be . There was particularly sharp fighting in
cut off Serb populations — both military and civilian— mid -May on the contested Debelo Brdo heights — a
west and south of the city's center, which would count key position overlooking the Serb -controlled road
as a signal victory for the Bosnian Army and give the from Lukavica barracks to Pale . In the comingmonth
government significant leverage in its dealings with there would be even larger and sharper confrontations
the Serbs. here .

If successful, the first phase would weaken the Serbs' By mid -June 1995 it was clear that the ARBiH was
ability to resist a second phase designed to create the undertaking a massive troop buildup — by Bosnian
actual corridor linking Sarajevo to central Bosnia and standards— outside and even inside the city. UNPRO
relieve the siege . To achieve this second phase, the FOR observers and others were certain that a full
Bosnian Army would have two major options. One scale offensive was imminent. UN spokesmen
option would be for ARBiH troops from centralBos announced on 13 June that the Bosnian Army had
nia and the city to link up northwest of Sarajevo , along assembled 20,000 to 30,000 troops in the Visoko
a line from Visoko- Ilijas- Vogosca. The other most Breza area northwest of the city, while UN observers
promising direction for a corridor would be to the reported that Bosnian Government forces had moved
southwest, possibly attacking along a front from more medical facilities, including field hospitals , into
Hadzici to Hrasnica and seeking to open a connection the area. The Bosnian Army also began restricting
into Dobrinja west of Sarajevo airport. Either route UNPROFOR movements —a sure giveaway that gov
would require an advance astride 15 to 20 kilometers ernment forces were trying to conceal troop move
of Serb - held roadway, securing enough territory on ments or offensive preparations— but this did not
either side to prevent the Serbs from interdicting traf prevent observers from counting units from four
fic with direct fire.198 From the ARBiH General Staff's ARBiH corps in the largest ARBiH troop concentra
force disposition , it appears that the Visoko- Ilijas tion yet seen . Some troops — perhaps a few thou
Vogosca route was the option selected . sand - may even have been brought into the inner city
from outside through the tunnel under the airport. The
This is undoubtedly what the Bosnian Army planners UN was also reporting VRS preparations in the same
hoped for, an overland corridor that could bring food , area to counter these deployments.199
troops, and military supplies into Sarajevo . Realists
within the ARBiH may instead have visualized “ liber All told ,after the troop buildup the ARBiH had the
ating" the city over time with a series of smaller offen 60,000 troops from the 1st Corps — not all of which
sives . Even the ARBiH planners may have recognized would or could be used as assault troops - reinforced
that they were unlikely to achieve their ambitious
objective in the next few weeks and might make only
limited gains outward along lines of communication ,

310
with as many as 10,000 to 15,000 elite shock troops The Breakout Attempt - The Battle Begins,
drawn from eight to 11 brigades of the General Staff, 15-16 June
and 2nd ( Tuzla ), 3rd (Zenica ), and 7th ( Travnik )
Corps.200 In addition , Brigadier General Ramiz Drek The battle commenced in the early morning hours of
ovic's 4th Corps had some 5,500 troops conducting a 15 June, when the Bosnian Army began shelling the
secondary attack south of the city toward Kalinovik . Serb -held suburb of Ilijas northwest of the capital. The
Even some HVO artillery from Kiseljak may have Bosnian Government declared a general alert,
contributed to the attack in a largely political gesture . extended the country -wide nighttime curfew by two
These forces were arrayed along the three primary hours , and closed down shops in the city. Serb author
attack routes as follows: ities sounded sirens and summoned more troops for
the coming battle.208 The UN played down initial
• North : (Breza/Visoko - Ilijas-Semizovac - Vogosca reports of fighting, but by midday it was clear that a
route ): one operational group (eight to 11 brigades major battle had begun . UN spokesmen reported
from the General Staff, and 2nd, 3rd , and 7th Corps ) intense fighting north of the city and counted more
and the 16th Division (five brigades ).201 than 1,600 artillery detonations along UN Route
" Python" with rounds coming in at a rate of five or six
. Southeast: (Pale -Lukavica road ): 12th Division a minute 209
(11 brigades, including defenses of Sarajevo city ).202
President Izetbegovic's office issued a proclamation
• South : (Sarajevo- Trnovo -Kalinovik road): 14th that evening that “ The world had been doing nothing
Division ( eight brigades ) 203 and 4th Corps (five to prevent an obvious catastrophe ... Under these cir
brigades).204 cumstances , the Army was ordered to act to prevent
the strangulation of the city ... " Bosnian Serb Presi
The bulk of the 1st Corps's heavy weapons were nor dent Karadzic characterized the Bosnian Government
mally deployed in Sarajevo city, but the other support action as a “ last -ditch effort to change the situation on
ing corps probably contributed some of their limited the ground." The European Union's new peace envoy,
armor, artillery , and mortar assets to supporting the Carl Bildt, took a gloomy view of the prospects for a
attack . diplomatic settlement in the near future : “ At the
moment there isn't a political process ... At the
Defending on the Serb side were roughly 13,500 moment we're heading toward war." 210
troops of the Sarajevo -Romanija Corps, organized into
one mechanized brigade, five infantry brigades , three The Bosnian Army kicked off its campaign to break
light infantry brigades, and a mixed artillery regiment, the siege with a flurry of short-range attacks by the
plus additional support troops.205 The corps was rein 12th Division inside the city against key points to gain
forced with an additional 1,000 -man composite light better positions for future operations.211 These were
infantry brigade from the Drina Corps either just intended to interdict Bosnian Serb Army lines of com
before or during the battle 206 In addition , the VRS munication, probe for weaknesses, and tie down Serb
Herzegovina Corps deployed some 3,000 in the forces before the main operation was launched from
Trnovo -Kalinovik sector, facing elements of both the outside the city. These local attacks were generally
ARBiH 1st and 4th Corps.207 Both the Sarajevo successful at the start. Meanwhile , government forces
Romanija and Herzegovina Corps would be reinforced undertaking the main operationsmade important tacti
with another 500 to 1,000 troops of the 65th Protec cal advances along all three of the primary attack
tion Motorized Regiment ( theMain Staff's elite body routes, including, cutting the Serb supply line (UN
guard formation ), a 1,000-man composite infantry Route Python ) north of the city , threatening other
brigade from the Herzegovina Corps, and 500 MUP Serb -held road links south toward Trnovo and Kalino
Special Police troops during the battle for use as vik , and nearly severing the road link from Lukavica
" intervention " (counterattack ) forces . east toward Pale.

311
The first and primary objective for the operation was Corps) and Kalinovik (4th Corps ) thus severing the
to cut UN Route Python northwest of Sarajevo . Sarajevo - Trnovo -Kalinovik road and limiting the
Python — which continues north to Olovo and eventu VRS's ability to reinforce its troops around Sarajevo
ally to Tuzla — was the lifeline for VRS forces itself. On 12 June four brigades of the 14th Division
deployed around the Ilijas, Hadzici, and Ilidza in the the 109th and 181st Mountain Brigades and the 145th
Serb - held regions west of Sarajevo. When the ARBiH and 182nd Light Brigades — once again claimed the
cut the road in its initial attacks on 16 June it achieved capture of Djokin Toranj and the surrounding territory
a major if momentary success .212 Assault brigades from the VRS 1st GuardsMotorized Brigade.215 The
from the ARBiH 2nd and 3rd Corps, supported by the adjacent forces of the 4th Corps also claimed to have
ARBiH 16th Division , captured a swath of territory simultaneously seized a swath of territory in the
from the VRS 1st Ilijas Brigade in the Cemerska Hills Treskavica, south ofDjokin Toranj, in the direction of
(the Ravni Nabozic feature ) and continued their Kalinovik.216 217 The 14th Division and the 4th Corps
advance across the road to the south and east.213 If the elements continued to expand on these gains, pushing
Bosnian Army could cut the route , while seizing the from Mt. Bjelasnica toward Trnovo against the VRS
Ilijas- Semizovac - Vogosca road, it would at one stroke 12th Kotorsko and 4th Drina Light Infantry Brigades
provide Sarajevo with an excellent north -south supply and deeper into the Treskavica against the 1stGuards,
corridor while threatening the Serb forces west of the seizing numerous peaks and villages 218219 ARBiH
city with encirclement themselves . troops advanced to within a few kilometers of the
Serb -held town of Trnovo and briefly came to within
Southeast of the city , Bosnian Army 12th Division / 1st 6 kilometers of Kalinovik.220 Although the Bosnian
Corps forces also made significant gains against the Army was unable to actually cut the Serbs' north
VRS 1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade, threatening south supply line (UN Route “ Viper” ), it was in a
the main road connection between Pale and Lukavica position to interdict Serb traffic along the route with
in an effort to cut off the Serb -held suburbs southwest mortar and sniper fire.
of the city ,while limiting the Sarajevo -Romanija
Corps's ability to shift its troop reserves.214 On There was also heavy fighting both east and west of
16 June, government troops seized the long-contested Sarajevo airport on 16 June. Bosnian Army 12th Divi
Debelo Brdo ridge line and the Sharpstone feature sion forces apparently launched attacks against the
both high positions overlooking Serb lines of commu VRS 1st Ilidza Infantry Brigade toward both Stup and
nication. Later that day, they continued their advance Nedzarici but made only limited gains. The 12th Divi
past Debelo Brdo , taking positions on Mt. Trebevic sion also seized several key tactical points around the
and threatening the route with artillery and sniper fire . city's perimeter, as the ARBiH placed additional pres
This road — UN Route “ Tuna" —was the only one that sure on the Sarajevo -Romanija Corps to fix its
ran along the southern edge of the city, eventually reserves in place.221 An attack by elements of the 14th
reaching the VRS Lukavica barracks. Having been Division against the VRS 1st Igman Infantry Brigade
pounded relentlessly by Karadzic's artillery for over near Hadzici fared better, taking key high ground
three years , Bosnian Army forces now gleefully overlooking the town and possibly breaking through
repaid the Serbs with artillery rounds fired into Pale the first Serb defense lines.
from their newly won positions on 17 , 18 , and
19 June — shelling the Bosnian Serb capitalfor the
first time since 1992 . UN Responses to the Situation

Approximately 20 kilometers south of the city, Briga As the Sarajevo battle began , the UN was still negoti
dier Zaim Imamovic's 14th Division/ 1st Corps and ating its way out of the crisis that had erupted on
Brigadier General Drekovic's 4th Corps kicked off 27 May when the Serbs took some 377 UNPROFOR
their portion of operation three days earlier, on personnel hostage in response to a NATO airstrike on
12 June. Their objective was to seize Trnovo ( 1st

312
the Pale ammunition depot.* UNPROFOR command If UNPROFOR personnel weathered the renewal of
ers were understandably cautious after the nightmare hostilities rather well it was at least partly due to the
of a hostage situation that had not yet been completely fact that UN forces in and around Sarajevo had
resolved and were disinclined to respond vigorously already been pulled out of the most vulnerable posi
to military actions by either of the two armies. ( The tions around Sarajevo in response to theMay - June
Bosnian Serb authorities eventually released the last hostage debacle . Bosnian Army soldiers did confine
26 UN hostages on 18 June, two days after the Sara 560 Canadian troops to their barracks in Visoko , how
jevo battle had started .) Even if the Serbs did not take ever, and detained eight UN Military Observers in the
more hostages or directly challenge UNPROFOR town. All were released without incident a few days
forces in retaliation for Bosnian Army actions, they later, but this second round ofUNPROFOR deten
could have sought to indirectly pressure the Bosnian tions — this time, by the Bosnian Muslims— made for
Government by again harassing and obstructing UN a few testy moments .
personnel. The VRS could have increased its harass
ment of resupply convoys — especially to the eastern
enclaves — or completely blocked vehicle and air traf The Tide Begins to Shift: 17-22 June
fic into Sarajevo . Fortunately for UNPROFOR , the sit
uation did not turn into another hostage-taking After the first couple of days, the outcomestill hung in
catastrophe, and there were no major repercussions for the balance, although things still looked fairly promis
UN relations with any of the Bosnian factions. Never ing for the heavily bolstered ARBiH 1st Corps. Hav
theless, UNPROFOR kept a low profile while battles ing absorbed the ARBiH's first punch , the VRS was
raged on all sides , quietly reporting from most of its already preparing to swing back. Even by late on the
observation posts and checkpoints and maintaining 16th , the second day of the attack , the offensive was
their monitoring routines wherever possible . beginning to slow as the VRS discerned ARBiH lines
of advance and Serb resistance began to stiffen .
The peacekeepers abandoned the Sarajevo Weapons
Collection Points between 16 and 18 June, after both Initial Bosnian Serb responses to the ARBiH offensive
government and Serb soldiers flouted UN weapons were relatively restrained , with shelling primarily
restrictions on the first day of the battle ; the UN action directed at areas of confrontation rather than popula
may even have been a quid pro quo for the Serbs' tion centers . The first VRS counterattacks stalled Bos
release of their last hostages. In any case, both Bos nian Army advances in some areas but did not retake
nian Government and Bosnian Serb forces removed significant amounts of territory. The thinly stretched
many of the heavy weapons from the UN Weapons VRS was very selective about the time and place of its
Collection Points around Sarajevo as soon as the battle counterattacks in the Sarajevo area. Wisely, the VRS
began, and the positions were left unguarded . Bosnian first responded with artillery against the ARBiH infan
Government forces withdrew most of the heavy equip- try forces conducting the assaults, wearing theMus
ment from the Marshal Tito barracks site inside the limsdown and leaving them weakened and
city, as well as several guns from the Kosevo tunnel vulnerable to later Serb moves.
collection point. Bosnian Serb forces fired at least 100
rounds from the Osijek Weapons Collection Site west Over the next few days, however, the military pendu
of the city on 16 June. They also used at least three lum continued to swing in the other direction as the
captured UN light tanks from the Lukavica Muslim attack lost momentum along all three of its
Barracks area — seized from the French three weeks main attack routes and as the VRSMain Staff ,
earlier during the hostage crisis — in fighting on Sarajevo -Romanija Corps, and the Herzegovina Corps
16 June . gathered their forces for a counterstroke. Fighting was
intense and inconclusive for several days , with key
· See Annex 60:UNPROFOR in 1995 : From Vacillation to Retali terrain changing hands and each side gaining ground
ation to Peace Implementation for a more detailed narration of the
UN hostage crisis .

313
in some areas and losing ground in others . Overall, the few areas where the Serbs were able to employ
though government forces gave up bits of captured their armored forces as maneuver units — seizing sev
territory to Serb counterattacks on 17-18 June, the eralderelict industrial facilities in heavy street fighting,
ARBiH still held most of the key terrain features it incrementally driving ARBiH troops back. Counterat
had taken . tacks from the 102nd Motorized and the elite 143rd
Light Brigade recovered the lost ground , but any hope
VRS forces from the 3rd Sarajevo Brigade blocked of taking additional territory was gone.223
Bosnian Army attacks on 17 June near Rajlovac ,
northwest of the city — and then advanced to retake The 1st and 4th Corps' attacks around Trnovo and
part of the territory lost along UN Route Python . The Treskavica also had lost momentum by the beginning
VRS also stopped Bosnian Army efforts to advance of July. The VRS Main Staff committed elements of
around Hrasnica and along the road to Pale . The the crack 65th Protection Regiment to the battle
Sarajevo -Romanija Corps regained control over the around Trnovo , driving 14th Division troops away
Pale-Lukavica road itself , although Bosnian Army from positions overlooking the highway by 26 June 224
positions atop the recently captured heights on Debelo Meanwhile , the VRS Herzegovina Corps's composite
Brdo allowed ARBiH forces to fire on Serb vehicles brigade , together with MUP Special Police troops,
along the way . VRS infantry also reversed Bosnian again rallied to recapture the crucial Djokin Toranj
Army gains on the nearby Mojmilo hill ridge line peak in late June 225
south of the city on 17 June, retaking at least one
trench position.222 By about 28 June it was clear that the ARBiH com
manders had decided to suspend the Sarajevo offen
Between 18 and 22 June, the VRS appears to have sive indefinitely while they reconsidered their strategy
focused on checking further ARBiH advances while it and options. Essentially , the Sarajevo offensive had
marshaled its own elite forces for a counterattack . been stopped dead in its tracks in some areas ,been
Stiffening VRS resistance halted several more ARBiH rolled back with partial gains in others, and in no place
offensive probes, after which the Serbs launched a seemed likely to successfully interdict Serb supply
counterattack late on the 20th along the Debelo Brdo lines. Casualties had far exceeded expectations and
ridge line, overlooking the Serb supply route from were continuing to mount. Itwas time to call a halt.
Pale to Sarajevo . The focus of fighting shifted on the For the foreseeable future , Sarajevo would remain
following day to the western suburbs of Hadzici, under siege .
Ilijas , and the area around Visoko .

Mt. Treskavica , July -October 1995

Bosnian Serb Countermoves
Despite the failure of the ARBiH's Sarajevo operation ,
The main Serb counterattack commenced on the 22nd battles between the ARBiH 1st and 4th Corps and the
as elite MUP special police troops combined with ele VRS Herzegovina Corps continued to seesaw back
ments of the VRS 3rd Sarajevo Brigade to force the and forth across Mt. Treskavica for the rest of the war.
ARBiH lines back in bitter fighting northwest of the The VRS counterattacks at Trnovo and Treskavica in
city in the Cemerska Hills. At the end of the day , the late June raged on in a series of fierce battles begin
Serbs had regained control of UN Route Python , a ning on 4 July and continuing almost to the end of the
critical accomplishment that robbed the government month.226 227 228 229 The battered ARBiH troops,having
forces of their most important gain of the previous few progressively lost territory for nearly a month ,made a
days and halted their most powerful spearhead from successful counterpunch on 24 July, retaking several
lifting the siege. For a time, the ARBiH had com villages south of Mt. Treskavica and again advancing
pletely blocked the Serbs' northern supply route , but toward Kalinovik.230 A composite brigade from the
this was no longer the case . VRS Herzegovina Corps231 — once again spearheaded
by elite MUP Special Police reinforcements — forced
On 28 June, VRS 1st Ilidza Brigade forces counter the Bosnian Armyback with a counterattack from 1 to
232 233 234
attacked against the western suburb of Stup - one of 3 August

314
_
Exhausted but undaunted , the Bosnian Army launched Aftermath and Analysis
its last effort in the Mt. Treskavica area on 3 October,
with a major Herzegovina-wide offensive directed We're a much better army after three years of
initially at the Serb -held town of Krupac along the fighting, but we still don't have the tanks and
Sarajevo - Trnovo road , but extending further south artillery the Chetniks have ... If we smashed
toward Glavaticevo and Mt. Prenj.235 236 237 238 Bosnian through, we would have to hold the ground we
Army 1st and 4th Corps troops initially regained take, and thatwould be very difficult unless the
control of three key elevations on Mt. Treskavica Serbs ran away. Every soldier would rather die
following vicious close -quarters battles, but the liberating the city than defending a stinking
Bosnian Serbs succeeded in containing the advance trench , but this could be suicide.
and in pushing the government troops back by the
following day.239 -An experienced Bosnian Army
officer four days before the start of the
offensive 245
After stillmore days of bitter struggle , the Bosnian
Army on 10 October was able to announce that it had
The ARBiH General Staff's campaign plan was well
achieved significant success, including the occupation
of several elevations on Mt. Treskavica and the cap conceived , focusing its initialmoves on isolating and
ture of a substantial amount of Serb equipment.240 The weakening VRS forces around the city by severing
their supply lines, before moving to create the corridor
proclamation was good for no more than a day and a
night, for the Bosnian Serbsmounted a last counter linking central Bosnia and Sarajevo . The overall effort
did not succeed because of the VRS's effective defen
stroke spearheaded by the Sarajevo -Romanija Corps's
sive doctrine, which relied on extensive minefields
4th “ White Wolves" Recon -Sabotage Detachment and
retook much of the territory claimed by the govern and the VRS heavy weapons superiority to break the
attack's momentum ; this was followed by the judi
ment the very next day.241 242 The ARBiH managed ,
cious commitment of elite infantry units at key
however, to finally retain the bloody ground on the
moments to eliminate ARBiH territorial gains. As a
heavily contested Djokin Toranj— or as theMuslims
call it,Mala Caba. In this, the last major battle of the result, the Sarajevo breakout attemptmustbe regarded
war in the area, the ARBiH's veteran 14th Division as a costly failure , expensive in lives and potentially
Commander, Zaim Imamovic , was killed.243 diverting precious elite troops from other battles else
where . Casualties were unquestionably very high . The
official Bosnian Army journal Prva Linija stated in
The heroic efforts of the Bosnian Army troops not
July 1995 that the Bosnian Serb forces around Sara
withstanding, their lack of adequate artillery and
armor support doomed most of the ARBiH'sMt. jevo had suffered 200 killed and 600 wounded during
Treskavica offensives to limited and temporary gains. the battles — a perhaps slightly inflated but credible
figure. What the journal fails to mention is the num
Exhausted government troops frequently found them
selves unable to hold onto the valuable territory they bers of casualties the Bosnian Army sustained in the
same battles, which were undoubtedly several times
had gained at such great expense in the face of skilled
counterattacks by elite Bosnian Serb Army and MUP higher. Between mid - June and mid - July 1995 , the
Bosnian Army may well have lost over 1,000 killed
Special Police troops supported by an overwhelming
and 3,000 or more wounded in the battles around
advantage in heavy weapons firepower.244 In the end,
nment forces retained someof their hard -won
govern Sarajevo and Trnovo — a steep price in blood by any
standard .
gains in the areas south of the capital but had been
unable to push on toward the key towns of Kalinovik
and Trnovo . On Mt. Treskavica and the surrounding This bloody effort seems especially wasteful knowing
what we know now — that the war would end with a
heights, the Bosnian Army was to find the price of
victory was high ... and a only a partial victory , at
that.

315
cease- fire only fourmonths later, that the siege would connection to the city in the late fall. Even if the Bos
never actually be lifted by force of arms, and that the nian Armyhad succeeded in opening one of the over
whole of Sarajevo city (even includingmost of the land routes into the city, it probably would have had
Serb -majority neighborhoods surrounding the urban difficulty maintaining the corridor, and traffic would
center ) would be awarded to the Bosnian Federation have been vulnerable to Bosnian Serb artillery and
anyhow under the termsof the peace settlement. In sniper fire. Given the massive forces employed in the
retrospect, the attempted breakout operation can be June breakout attempt and their more productive
seen as a needless and tragic expenditure ofmanpower employment elsewhere in Bosnia in the later summer
and resources — one of the Bosnian Army's many and fall, it seemsmost likely that the siege of Sarajevo
offensive efforts that cameheartbreakingly close to would have dragged on for still more months or years.
success but was ultimately driven back to end as a As events later showed , the most effective way to raise
costly defeat. the siege was to end the entire war — and that would
not be accomplished by storming the hills around the
At the time, however, neither the Bosnian political capital. In the end , the siege of Sarajevo was broken
leadership nor its military commanders nor the thou not on Mts . Zuc or Igman but rather on the battlefields
sands of residents of Sarajevo knew that a peace set of western and northeastern Bosnia, and ultimately at
tlement was just around the corner. It is crucial to view Dayton .
the failed Sarajevo breakout effort in that context.
Most people fully expected the war to go on for Chapter 81
another year or more. To stay in the war, the Bosnian The Fall of Srebrenica ,
Government leadership had to convince both its own July 1995 — Bosnia's Darkest Hour
citizenry and the international community that the
Bosnian Armywas not on the verge of defeat, that the
war effort ( costly though it might be) would ultimately Background and Overview
produce tangible results, and that victory — however
far away — was nonetheless visible on the horizon . According to Yugoslavia's last prewar census , the
entire Srebrenica municipality (opstina )—the town
From a political standpoint, therefore, even a failed and its dependent villages and farms — had some
effort to break the siege might still be considered a 37,000 residents , of which three-quarters were Mus
strategic victory , even though a serious military lims and one- quarter were Serbs.246 247 Within the
defeat. As long as Sarajevo could convince the inter town, the largest community in the sparsely populated
national community (most crucially, Washington) that municipality , the ethnic percentages were aboutthe
the Bosnian Army was still a viable and determined same: at the time of the 1991 census, Srebrenica
fighting force and could convince the Bosnian Muslim registered 5,746 residents, of which 64 percent were
population that the Army was indeed battling to Muslims, 28.4 percent were Serbs, 0.6 percent were
relieve the country's besieged populations — which it Croats, and the remaining 7 percent were “ Yugoslavs "
eventually would do, though perhaps in many incre or other ethnic groups .248 249
mental steps — the breakout effort was worth the price .
Viewed in this light, the hugely expensive Sarajevo The town's history stretches back to Roman days,
breakout effortmay have been a worthwhile gambit . when the Caesars would have known the mining vil
lage as Domavium or Argentaria. Slaves from across
Since the war ended only a few months afterward , it the Empire worked the mines, smelted the ores, and
will always remain conjecture whether the Bosnian produced the silver ingots that were then floated down
Army might ever have lifted the siege, perhaps in a the Drina river on barges and eventually minted into
series of small advances , or whether the battle lines coins bearing the Caesar's likeness . By the twilight of
would have remained essentially frozen in place. Hav
ing failed to open a secure corridor on its first try, the
ARBiH could have tried a series of limited offensives
to seize strategic territory that mighthave completed a

316
-
-

-
-
the Empire, that same Drina river would mark the When Naser Oric took command of Srebrenica's
physical, administrative , and psychological boundary defenses in April 1992, he was a policeman from
between West and East. In 395 A.D., when the sons of nearby Potocari in his twenties. (Some claim that he
the Emperor Theodosius formally split the Empire had briefly served as one of Serbian President
into two halves, the Drina was used to demarcate the Milosevic's bodyguards.252) Oric had foresightedly
boundary between them . Whether by accident or con confiscated the police station's rifles, grenades, and
sequence, the Drina would divide empires, religions, ammunition when the Serbs — following the same
and cultures for more than 16 centuries thereafter.250 chilling pattern they had employed to deadly effect in
Bijelina, Zvornik , and Foca - issued an ultimatum
Perpetually situated on the edge of empires, ordering allMuslimsto surrender their weapons by
Srebrenica was to change hands constantly in those 17 April. Although forced to abandon the town as
centuries to come. Like most of Bosnia , the Drina Serb artillery fire rained down on their homes, Sre
valley did not fall clearly under the sway of either the brenica's Muslims took their weapons and the police
Latin -dominated Catholic west or the Byzantine (later armory with them , and Oric was able to form and lead
Greek ) Orthodox east. A succession of minor princes a small resistance band that employed classic partisan
and lesser kings reigned over the region as the various tactics against the Serb occupiers. Within a week of
empires of Croats, Hungarians, Serbs, Bulgarians, and the town's capture , Muslim snipers firing from the
others expanded and contracted like rising and woods began to pick off individual Serbs. Soon hit
receding tides. and -run ambushes began to cut down Serbs in clusters,
culminating in a large attack on a Serb convoy on 18
Of the many empires that ruled Srebrenica over the May. Without a single Muslim casualty , Oric's troops
years , it was the Ottoman conquest in 1463 that was to wiped out 28 Serbs, including Goran Zekic ,whom the
have themost lasting consequences for modern his Serbs had just appointed the new mayor of Srebrenica .
tory, etching deep religious and cultural patterns into When word of the ambush spread , the Serb population
eastern Bosnia and slowly altering the demographic of Srebrenica decided to flee the town and its envi
mix so that, even after the Turkish tide had receded , rons. A triumphant Naser Oric reoccupied Srebrenica
the region had become predominantly Muslim . In in one of the first Muslim battlefield
1995 the Serbs set out to erase the Muslim majority victories of the war.253
with a single stroke.251
The rare victory at Srebrenica was like a magnet to the
Thanks to its relative isolation , the town suffered only Muslim population of the Drina valley as refugees
the briefest Serb occupation at the very start of the flooded in from ethnically cleansed areas such as
conflict in April 1992 and had remained in Muslim Zvornik and Bratunac , soon to be followed by armed
hands thereafter. The geography of the area helped Serbs converging on the Srebrenica lowlands. With
make the town defensible: the hilly terrain is over the collapse of Muslim defenses in neighboring
looked in places by high mountains ( several peaks regions in 1993 , still more refugees filtered into the
near Srebrenica reach nearly 1,000 meters) and the surrounded town from Konjevici Polje, Jadar, and
heavily forested slopes are cut through by streams and other villages in the countryside as the Serbs tightened
river valleys such as those of the Drina and the Jadar. their noose . By the end of 1994 the population of
This cut-up terrain could help offset Serb advantages urban Srebrenica had swelled from its a prewar total
in armor and screen small bands ofMuslim soldiers as of 6,000 residents to about 25,000 , of which only
they prepared ambushes and smuggled supplies
See Section III, Chapter 28, “ Battles on the Drina, Round One:
through Serb lines into the town . The town's valley April to December 1992” and Section IV, Chapter 36 , “ Battles on
location , however, also represented a serious liability : the Drina, Round Two: December 1992 to August 1993,” for a nar
in Serb hands, those high hills and mountains would ration of the fighting in and around Srebrenica in 1992 and 1993.
allow besiegers to observe Muslim activities and fire
down into the town at will .

317
about 2,000 were original residents. In the villages Srebrenica's strategic location was whatmade it most
and hamlets contained within the larger area of the important, however. Only 15 km from the Serb border
Srebrenica enclave, there were an additional 19,000 or at the Drina river, Srebrenica was more than just an
so people, of whom only 8,500 or so were original res irritant. The little town was a constant security threat
idents. Thus , by mid - 1995 the population within the to Serb -held eastern Bosnia and its vital lines of com
Serb - surrounded enclave had more than tripled to munication and resupply. Srebrenica , Zepa, and
roughly 44,000 people occupying an area of roughly Gorazde were three bones in the throat of the Repub
144 square kilometers.254 255 lika Srpska. According to one estimate ,more than
3,000 Serb soldiers and civilians had been killed or
Over time, Naser Oric's Srebrenica became a Hobbe wounded by Bosnian soldiers from the Srebrenica area
sian world of black -marketers and gun -toting quasi since the war began.257
military commanders. For a tiny fraction of the popu
lation (including, of course, Oric himself) life was not For the Muslims, Srebrenica's chief value was psycho
too bad and very profitable as black -market trades in logical. The little town and its local hero , Naser Oric ,
fuel and goods brought deutsche marks into the hands had becomenationally recognized symbols of resis
of a select few . For the vast majority of the populace, tance , expanded into folklore and song. Economically
life wasmiserable indeed. The threefold increase in and militarily , the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves were
the town's population had led to massive overcrowd essentially unsustainable , but their political value as
ing (according to UNHCR, an average of 12 people islands of Muslims still resident in eastern Bosnia was
were living in every habitable room in the town ),256 immense. So long as a Muslim population still held
destitution , and disease . Food was constantly in short out in the Drina valley, the Sarajevo government could
supply ; the surrounded enclave could not begin to lay claim to at least part of the valley in any map
produce enough food for three times its former popu based settlement of the conflict. Conversely, if the
lation , and UN relief supplies were constantly being Bosnian Serbs could clear the map and occupy the ter
blocked by the Serbs. For these displaced and destitute ritory , their presence on the ground would almost cer
denizens, Srebrenica was a squalid , armed refugee tainly make the entire valley Serb at the end of the
camp, crammed with thousands of people with noth war.
ing to do , no place to go , and no way to get out. This
reality was only a very small aspect of the Srebrenica For the international community, the eastern enclaves
landscape, and people outside the enclave perceived it had become emblematic of the inherent problems of
in different ways for different reasons. the several peace plans and the UN safe areas. The
enclaves were to be awarded to the Muslims under all
For the Serbs, the town's chief value was economic of various peace plan proposals largely because the
and strategic . Ever since Roman times, the chief international community could not bring itself to actu
resource of the area has been its mining industry . Its ally partition the country and reward the Serbs by cod
Roman -era name, Argentaria ,meant" silvermine," ifying the results of their ethnic cleansing ofthe Drina
and themodern name came from the word Srebren , valley . When the enclaveswere made three of the six
which was similarly derived . The silver mines had UN safe areas in April-May 1993 , the UN assumed
long since closed , but an important bauxite mine oper some sort of responsibility for the enclaves ' fates—
ated just outside the southwest corner of the enclave . but exactly what responsibility was never agreed to or
The mine was owned by Rajko Dukic, a Serb who was made clear.
reportedly an associate of Bosnian Serb President
Karadzic and a prominent figure in the Serbian Thus, by early 1995 the importance of the three east
Democratic Party . The bauxite mine, still held by the ern enclaves had for other reasons become more sig
Serbs, supplied the Birac aluminum plant in Zvornik nificant than just Srebrenica town ,minuscule Zepa
but could not be fully exploited because the Muslims village , and Gorazde town. Although militarily
controlled a small segment of the road leading through
it. Thus, there was a financial incentive for the Serbs
to capture at least the southwest part of the enclave .

318
indefensible, economically unsustainable , and if any UN “ safe area," defined by United Nations Security
thing a political liability, the Bosnian Government Council Resolution 819 as an area that “ should be free
could not or would not give them up. The Bosnian from any armed attack or any other hostile act.” 264 Not
Serbs were equally determined to take the enclaves to even the resolution's drafters knew exactly what this
achieve their fundamentalwar aim of an ethnically meant. Indeed , the phrase " safe area ” itself was a
pure state in eastern Bosnia , and they needed to do this vague compromise indicative of the Security Coun
soon to free up desperately needed troops for military cil's uncertainties: the stronger and more familiar term
actions elsewhere. For the UN , the safe areas had " safehaven ” (already used in Iraq ) was rejected
become embarrassments that it could neither properly because it implied a degree of protection for the area
defend nor justifiably abandon . under international law . Shortly thereafter, Security
Council Resolution 824, passed on 6 May 1993,
extended the same protection to Sarajevo , Tuzla , Zepa,
The Safe Areas: A History Gorazde, and Bihac. The parameters of this protection
were defined - partially — with the subsequent passage
Given the number of troops we have, the level of of UN Security Council Resolution 836 , on
protection we are able to provide is very limited 4 June 1993 .
... That is why wewere tasked with deterring
attacks and not defending " safe areas" because Under the terms of the UNSC resolutions as finally
we didn't ever receive the number of troops nec written , the Srebrenica area was to become a demilita
essary to defend them ... At the time the " safe rized zone. The Bosnian Army forces in the Sre
areas” were set up the level of deterrence was brenica enclave were supposed to turn in all their
really quite high ... but over time and with expe weapons at UN -supervised control points, while
rience , the Bosnian Serbs learned the limit of the UNPROFOR was supposed to enforce a permanent
combat power available to deter attacks. cease - fire around the enclave, supervise the enclave's
demilitarization , and respond to any Serb attacks .
-UN Spokesman Lt. Col. Gary Neither provision really came to pass as originally
Coward , 13 July 1995258 intended . According to UNSC Resolution 836 ,
Bosnian Army troops were clearly allowed to remain
It has never been asked of the United Nations within the enclave,but were supposed to be disarmed .
forces to defend the safe areas and the means to A handful ofweapons were turned in to the UN
do so have never been approved ... butwith the monitored weapons collection point in the town, but
aid of NATO we can deter attacks on the safe thousands of Muslim soldiers and hundreds of weap
areas.
ons remained in the enclave and visibly outside UN
control. Meanwhile , the cease - fire held , after a fash
-UNPROFOR CommanderGen.
ion , in the sense that fighting generally died down .
Bernard Janvier, 28 July 1995259
Firing incidents , raids, clashes, and outright attacks
occurred frequently and regularly throughout the
You are now under the protection of the United
entire duration of the UN mission , with both Serbs and
Nations ... I will never abandon you.
Muslims at fault at different times.

-Gen . Phillipe Morillon , UN

Commander in Bosnia , to the residents of Partly as a result of the ARBiH's refusal to demilita
rize the enclave , relations between the UN's Dutch
Srebrenica , 12 March 1993260
Army enforcers and the Bosnian Armywere often
On 16 April 1993 — following a widely publicized strained.265 266 Each side saw the other as failing to live
Serb artillery barrage on 12 April that killed 56 civil
ians (including 15 children ) and wounded dozens
more 261 262 263 — Srebrenica became the world's first

319
up to its obligations. The Bosnian Army essentially The inconsistencies in the UN regime were even more
did not trust the UN to guarantee the enclave's safety apparent regarding the appropriate response to outside
and was criticalof the weak UNPROFOR responses to attacks on the safe area — an anomaly that would in
Serb violations including shelling the safe area and time contribute to tragedy. Paragraph 5 of UNSC
blockading the entire enclave. The Dutch , on the other Resolution 836 stated that UN troops were “ to deter
hand, faulted the ARBiH for refusing to disarm and attacks against the safe areas,” and paragraph 9 of the
even more so for mounting periodic raids out of the same resolution authorized UNPROFOR troops in
safe area in clear contravention of the Security Coun carrying out the mandate defined in paragraph 5
cil resolutions. Relations reached a crisis point in above, acting in self-defense, to take the necessary
January 1995 when the Bosnian Army announced measures, including the use of force , in reply to bom
restrictions on UN movements in an area called the bardments against the safe areas by any of the parties
“ Bandera Triangle” located in the western part of the or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any
enclave , where Serb forces had moved right up to the deliberate obstruction in and around those areas to the
edge of the enclave . The Dutch ignored the prohibi freedom ofmovement of UNPROFOR or of protected
tion and sent in three patrols, whereupon the ARBiH humanitarian convoys.” Paragraph 10 expanded this to
began seizing and holding Dutch soldiers. Some 100 include the potential use of airpower “ in and around
Dutch personnel were taken hostage between 27 and the safe areas.” Moreover, UNSC Resolution 770 in
31 January. The situation was resolved, after a fash 1992 had previously authorized UN member coun
ion , and the Dutch never reentered the restricted zone tries, " acting under Chapter VII (peace enforcement]
after their people were released . Relations between of the Charter of the United Nations ... to take nation
UNPROFOR and the ARBiH in Srebrenica were now ally or through regionalagencies or arrangements (for
permanently strained , while the attitude of the example, NATO ) allmeasures necessary to facilitate
enclave's population in general went from essentially in coordination with the United Nations the delivery
positive to distinctly negative after the Dutch battalion ... of humanitarian assistance.”
allowed the Bosnian Serbs to occupy a UN position
(OP Echo ) in early June, compounding fears that, The resolutions were imprecisely permissive in their
when push came to shove , the UN would not stand up wording, and still less clearly prescriptive . The bottom
to the Serbs. line on the use of force to defend the safe areas
remained , perhaps deliberately, unclear. UN troops
It was becoming clear over timethat some things were were clearly supposed to " deter " attacks and could
distressingly unclear: what exactly were the UN , the defend themselves if attacked — but the text was
international community, or the peacekeepers on the ambiguous on what they were supposed to do in the
ground supposed to do if one or both of the parties event of “ armed incursions” or “ deliberate obstruc
simply defied the UN resolutions ? Within the enclave, tions." How the term self -defense could or should be
the UN guidance on demilitarization was at best applied was essentially left to anyone's interpretation :
ambiguous . Although the safe area was supposed to be whether to return fire only if the peacekeeping troops
demilitarized under UN supervision , the Dutch battal were themselves brought under attack or whether a
ion was never authorized to use force to disarm vigorous UN response that could include the use of
ARBiH soldiers or gun-toting Muslim civilians, nor NATO airpower would be used to halt an armed incur
was it allowed to enter or search houses without con sion into the safe areas.
sent. ( The Dutch peacekeepers probably had little
enthusiasm in any case for forcibly disarming ARBiH When the safe areas policy was first advanced , UN
troops or proactively seizing weapons within the planners estimated that some 34,000 peacekeepers
enclave.) A basic inconsistency had become evident: would be required to properly implement the new UN
the UN force was supposed to demilitarize the town so resolutions. As proposals evolved , the international
that it would not become a target for attack , but the community - primarily the Western governments that
Dutch soldiers were not empowered to do anything
about standing violations of the demilitarization .

320
-

- -
had pushed for the safe areas policy in the first scraps . Probably only one-third to one-half of Sre
place - proved unwilling to assume the staggering brenica's 6,000 troops carried weapons of any kind,
human and financial burdens of a 34,000 -troop com and , of these , hundreds had only hunting rifles and an
mitment of indefinite duration . Opting instead for a assortment of antiquated or ill-maintained small
much cheaper plan colloquially known as " safe areas arms. 270
lite ” the member nations instead contributed about
7,600 troops for the defense ofthe six safe areas.267 Of After the UN weapons collection point was estab
these forces, just over 1,000 were actually assigned to lished , the ARBiH in Srebrenica appears to have had a
the defense of the three eastern enclaves and not even single functioning artillery piece : a 76 -mm M -48B1
these nominal strengths were actually attained . When “ mountain gun ” with 40 rounds of ammunition . The
it came down to implementing the Security Council crew of the lone field gun was under strict orders not
resolutions, grand ideals were definitely not translated to fire lest the enclave's demilitarized status be jeopar
into great deeds. dized. The 28th Division also appears to have had a
single Chinese -manufactured TF -8 “ Red Arrow " anti
Chapter 82 tank guided missile launcher. Its presence was at best
Srebrenica - The Military Forces symbolic, since no one was quite sure how to operate
the Red Arrow , and it eventually was discovered that a
broken trigger mechanism made it useless.271
The Bosnian Army in Srebrenica
A couple of covert helicopter flights from govern
At first glance , the ARBiH appeared to have a fairly ment-held centralBosnia had brought a meager
credible fighting force in the Srebrenica and Zepa assortment of weapons and munitions into the Sre
enclaves. Organizationally, the Bosnian Army's brenica and Zepa enclaves between January and May
grandly titled 28th Division was responsible for the 1995. They totaled " approximately 300,000 rounds of
defense of both Srebrenica and Zepa . For this mission ammunition , 44 rocket- propelled grenades, six light
the Division had inside the Srebrenica enclave the mortars, 60 mortar grenades , 100 AK -47 semiauto
280th , 281st, 282nd, and 283rd Brigades (each matic (sic ) rifles, a half a dozen Motorola walkie
assigned to defend a particular segment of the talkies , and cartons of cigarettes and salt.” 272 These
enclave's perimeter) along with the 284th Light Bri minuscule additions did little to redress the paucity of
gade and the independent 28th Mountain Battalion as military equipment in the enclave. Neither the weap
a mobile reserve and reaction force . The defense of ons nor their ammunition came close to being ade
nearby Zepa fell to the 285th “ Zepa ” Brigade. All quate in numbers or in types for a serious defense of
told , the 28th Division probably had some6,000 the town .
troops available at any given time, with a paper
strength of about 12,000 fully mobilizable troops— a The forces in the two enclaves had perforce been
far greater number than the relatively undermanned excluded from the improvements in organization and
VRS Drina Corps could spare to contain them.268 The training that had advanced the military capabilities of
numbers did not tell the whole story , however. the ARBiH elsewhere in Bosnia . Bosnian Army bri
gades elsewhere had evolved from masses of armed
The 28th Division's available manpower total was people into organized units with better officers, better
essentially irrelevant, as there were far too few weap planning and staff work , better training, and better
ons to arm even the 6,000 troops on active duty. The weaponry. The Bosnian Army brigades in Srebrenica
Srebrenica and Zepa garrisons - cut off from central in 1995 were essentially still masses of armed men
Bosnia since 1993 and reachable only by helicopter , fighting their own war in the only way their leader had
had received only minimal supplies ofweapons or learned. The procedural and material improvements
ammunition.269 As in Sarajevo's most dire moments , that had increased the capabilities of Bosnian Army
critical battles had often been decided by almostmedi- forces elsewhere had not made it to cut off Srebrenica .
eval makeshift weapons fashioned from welded iron
pipes stuffed with raw gunpowder and nails and metal

321
Finally, when full battle was thrust on the 28th Divi less of a challenge . The VRS appears not only to have
sion , not even its charismatic leader or the division felt confident about attacking the enclave but even saw
staff would be presentto provide the fighting drive little need to muster the kind of heavy armor and artil
and leadership that for three years had helped com lery force that the 1st Krajina Corps employed in its
pensate for its many deficiencies. As VRS tanks drove attempt to capture the Orasje pocket in May 1995.
north toward the small town, Naser Oric was not to be
found in Srebrenica nor anywhere nearby. He and all In preparing for Operation Krivaja 95 , its codename
ofhis senior and most experienced staff had left the for the assault on Srebrenica , the VRS reinforced the
enclave in April under cover of night for Tuzla , appar estimated 1,500 troops in the area — the 1st Bratunac
ently under orders to catch up with the rest of the Light Infantry Brigade , 1stMilici Light Infantry Bri
Army in a command training course . Three months gade, and Skelani Independent Infantry Battalion
later,Naser Oric was still there , and only 28th Divi with several units drawn from other Drina Corps
sion Deputy Commander and chief of staff Ramiz brigades, plus the VRS Main Staff and Ministry of
Becirovic and one of the five brigade commanders had Internal Affairs (MUP). The corps directed that the 1st
returned . Srebrenica's defenders lacked not only Zvornik Infantry Brigade form a tactical group head
weapons and training but now the leaders who had quarters with an infantry battalion , the “ Drina
organized and led them.273 Wolves" special operations detachment, and an armor
mechanized company to spearhead the main attack .
The corps also dispatched elements of the 2nd
The Bosnian Serb Army — Preparations for Romanija Motorized Brigade — probably one to two
Operation "Krivaja 95" infantry companies and a tank platoon — and troops
from the 1st Birac Infantry Brigade — again probably
Srebrenica lay within the area of responsibility of the one to two infantry companies — to take part in the
VRS Drina Corps ,which would exercise overall com attack . The VRSMain Staff contributed the 10th Sab
mand of the operation against the enclave that would otage Detachment and elements of the Military Police
commence at midyear. The commander of the Drina Battalion from the 65th Protection Motorized Regi
Corps at the beginning of July 1995 was Major ment. The corps was to have one infantry company
General Milenko Zivanovic, but he was on the verge from the 1st Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade and
of retirement and would be replaced by his chief of most of a battalion - size detachment from the MUP
staff, MajorGeneralRadislav Krstic, as soon as the Special Police Brigade in reserve. Elements of the 5th
main operation was completed . Krstic rather than Mixed Artillery Regimentwould provide additional
Zivanovic , in fact, exercised direct command of the fire support. There is some evidence that a few Yugo
attack from a forward command post east of Sre slav Army (VJ) or Serbian State Security Department
brenica . The tactical group headquarters that normally (RDB ) special operations troops may have been
controlled the formations guarding the enclave present, possibly from the VJ 63rd Airborne or 72nd
appears to have played no role in the attack and proba- Special Operations Brigades and the RDB Special
bly was dissolved sometime prior to the assault. Fur Operations Unit ("Red Berets" ). The Serb forces allot
thermore , a VRS Main Staff forward command post ted to the operation totaled about 3,000 troops with
occupied by General Mladic himself would supervise about 10 tanks and APCs, six to 12 field artillery
Drina Corps actions from 10 through 13 July.274 pieces or multiple rocket launchers over 100 mm ,
40 to 50 mortars, recoilless rifles, and 76 mm artillery
Since 1993, VRS forces in Bosnia had had little suc pieces.
cess in attacking Bosnian Army fixed defenses ,and its
commanderswere properly respectful of the Muslims'
defensive positions. The isolated ARBiH force in
Srebrenica , however,was a different proposition ;
mostly demobilized , it had few defensive fortifications
and almost no sources of supply, and so offered much

322
UNPROFOR in Srebrenica : Dutchbat- 3 slightly better off than the town's local population , the
Dutch troops almost always lacked fresh food , elec
On the day the Serbs launched their attack, the Dutch tricity, and fuel; lack of gasoline made most of their
peacekeeping battalion assigned to safeguard Sre patrols walking ones. By July they had been living on
brenica had a nominal assigned strength of 730 troops combat rations for a month and had approximately 12
under the command of Lt. Col. Ton Karremans, a days ' reserve of drinking water. Deprived first of their
46 - year-old career soldier. Serb refusals to allow the helicopters and then the use of their vehicles , the
replacementof troops who had rotated out or returned Dutch battalion had for most practical purposes gone
home had cut the unit to only 370 men on the day of from airmobile to immobile .
the attack - barely half its assigned strength . Subtract
ing a company on detached duty , this left a UN garri A modern army is hugely dependent on supplies and
son of only 310 peacekeepers in and around parts and can deteriorate rapidly if deprived of both .
Srebrenica 275 276 For a variety of reasons the Dutch UN battalion in Sre
brenica had stocked only 16 percent of its operational
In addition to the Dutch peacekeeping battalion , there requirement of ammunition . By the time of the Serb
were three UN Military Observers (UNMOs) in Sre offensive, the effects of the blockade had left crucial
brenica: one observer each from Ghana, Kenya, and weapons systems like the TOW and Dragon antitank
the Netherlands.277 They were not formally affiliated missiles unreliable ; unused, ill - stored , and unreplaced ,
with the Dutch peacekeeping battalion or under these weapons and their ammunition were suffering
Dutchbat command. Also serving in the enclave at the from accumulated moisture . The Serbs certainly had
time, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees no intention of letting in any more.281
(UNHCR ), the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC ), and Medecins sans Frontiers (MSF ) The Dutch repeatedly emphasized their battalion's
each had a small number of doctors and humanitarian worsening situation within the enclave at the highest
relief workers in the enclave . levels of UNPROFOR . As far back as May, the Dutch
bat commander reported that, as a result of the Serb
Like most national contingents in UNPROFOR, blockade, he could no longer regard his battalion as
Dutchbat- 3 was a composite unit. The backbone of the operationally effective. The UN higher command saw
force — about half of the total — was drawn from the little it could do. In its view , supplies had to go in
Dutch Army's 13th Airmobile Infantry Battalion and overland, and the Serbs controlled the transit routes,
were regular combat infantry . The rest of the UNPRO so any replacements of people, materiel, or even con
FOR battalion - individuals from approximately 50 sumables for the Dutchbat were dependent on either
other Dutch Army units — were specialists in logistics, Serb goodwill or the UN's willingness to use force to
support,medical, and other functions.278 In theory, ram supply convoys through . Neither Serb goodwill
Dutchbat- 3 was a highly modern mechanized infantry nor UN willingness to apply force were in great sup
battalion equipped with some 30 YPR -765 armored ply in the first half of 1995. A proposal to airdrop sup
personnel carriers ( essentially,M113 APCs), six TOW plies into the enclave without the Serbs ' consent was
antitank missiles, and six 81-mm mortars. The reality , rejected as impractical.
however, was very different.279 280
Organizationally, Dutchbat-3 had four subordinate
The truth was that the Serb blockade had reduced the companies: the headquarters, headquarters and sup
battalion's supplies of food , fuel, medicines, weapons port company (HHC ); and Alpha, Bravo , and Charlie
.

spares , and ammunition to the point where the unit Companies. In terms of infrastructure, the Dutch bat
was almost nonoperational. According to the UN reso talion had two main bases within the Srebrenica
lutions , the Serbs were explicitly prohibited from enclave . The battalion headquarters was collocated
obstructing either UNPROFOR’s freedom ofmove
ment or international humanitarian aid convoys . In
practice , the VRS routinely did both . Sometimes only

323
with Charlie Company and the logistic unit at an aban more they could do.284Meanwhile ,both armies flouted
doned car battery factory in the town of Potocari, different portions of the UN resolutions.
somewhat north of Srebrenica town . Charlie Company
was assigned responsibility for monitoring events in Lacking an understandable mission , adequate num
the northern part of the enclave. Bravo Company was bers of troops , or even functional equipment, the
based in Srebrenica itself, taking over the site of a Dutch battalion felt less and less capable of doing
former textile mill and assuming responsibility for the more than observing and reporting events in and
southern portion of the enclave.282 Alpha Company, around the enclave. In early April 1995, one of the
though still part of Dutchbat- 3 , was stationed at Simin Dutch peacekeepers became UNPROFOR's 56th
Han , in the government-held “ Sapna Thumb” area combat-related fatality when an artillery shell hit his
east of Tuzla . Alpha company therefore played no role observation post. The unpunished incident under
in the events around Srebrenica in 1995. The head scored the vulnerability of the soldiers in the OPs, and
quarters, headquarters and support company's primary their morale plummeted .285 As the soldiers' time of
function was generalbattalion -level support, including trial approached , the convergence of their declining
administration of the attached field dressing station capabilities and theirmuddied mandate was setting
and medical facilities. In addition , Dutchbat- 3 had them up for disaster.
within the enclave a reconnaissance platoon , two
security platoons, an engineer platoon, a military Chapter 83
police detachment, an explosive ordnance detachment, The Battle, 6-11 July 1995
and two teamsof forward air controllers (FACs).

The twomain bases at Srebrenica and Potocari served The Eve of Battle : Events and Explanations
as the administrative and logistic heart of the battal
ion, but the 13 observation posts (OPs) surrounding To support its mid -June attempt at a breakout from
the enclave were supposed to be its eyes and ears . Sarajevo , the ARBiH General Staff directed the
These OPs, each identified by a letter designator ( for Srebrenica garrison to make raids against the sur
example , observation post “ F ” or “ Foxtrot") were situ rounding Serb areas in hopes of distracting the VRS
ated at roughly equal intervals along the enclave's 50 and drawing off Serb forces from the ring around
kilometer perimeter, usually atop a hill. Intended to be Sarajevo.286 In retrospect, this was probably an unwise
visible rather than defensible , each OP was painted move ; itdid nothing to reduce the forces besieging the
white and flew a large UN flag . All were sandbagged capital and seemsto have infuriated the Serb military
and had .50 -caliber heavy machineguns; a few also leaders. The order generated a minor and little -noted
had TOW or Dragon antitank missiles or 81-mm mor attack that was to have far-reaching consequences: on
tars. The weak military positions of the OPs, their 26 June 1995, ARBiH forces from the Srebrenica safe
inadequate defensive construction ,marginal arma area made a guerrilla raid on the Serb village of
ment, and small troop contingents made them Visnjica just outside the enclave's boundaries. Taken
militarily indefensible in the event of any serious by surprise, the town's residents abandoned it and then
confrontation with a properly armed Bosnian Army or watched asMuslim soldiers burned their homes and
Bosnian Serb opponent.283 stole their cattle . When Serb forces arrived at the
scene , the Bosnian Army troops promptly withdrew ,
At any given time, about 95 of the battalion's troops killing one VRS soldier and wounding three Serb
were assigned to man the OPs, an average of seven civilians in the process .
soldiers per post. Their assignmentwas to monitor,
record , and report any military activity along the The Visnjica raid may or may not have been the proxi
enclave's boundary : artillery explosions , firefights, mate cause of subsequent events in Srebrenica, but it
troop movements, or anything else of note. Given the certainly appears to have been the catalyst. From a
vulnerability of their positions and the weakness of purely military standpoint the raid's significance was
the peacekeeping forces within , there was not much

324
negligible : the battle was small, the town was not held , the Drina valley, safeguarding east-west lines of com
and casualties were few . The political and historical munication , and improving the Serbs' geopolitical
consequences, however, were to prove enormous: the position for a final peace settlement with whatever
gadfly sting would spur the VRS into wiping out not land they could grab . If the campaign seems to have
only the military provocation posed by Oric and his been properly grounded in military objectives, how
urban guerrilla raiders but also the town of Srebrenica ever, the Serbs' execution of it , especially the massa
itself and all it represented.287 Early in July, General cres thatwere permitted , appears to have been largely
Mladic sent an outraged letter to the UN , charging that personal. Raw revenge for events dating back to 1992
Muslim forces from within the enclave had repeatedly seems to have been the motivation for mass atrocities
violated the UN safe area provisions to cause the that would outrage Western governments, provoke
deaths of more than 100 Serb civilians.288 For a whole decisive responses to subsequent Serb actions, and
variety of reasons, in this one little corner of a vicious leave the Serbs with the adverse political-military con
sidebar struggle in a wider civil war, the conflict had sequence of an imposed peace settlement.
become more than purely military. Politics had
become personal, and the Serbs had scores to settle . The prevailing explanation for the VRS attack is that it
was spurred by growing pressure for a favorable geo
Much speculation has been focused on why the VRS graphic outcomein the peace settlement that by then
chose with seeming deliberation to mount an all-out most everyone could see glimmering at the end of the
attack on the UN safe area of Srebrenica and then long, dark Bosnian tunnel. This undoubtedly was a
permit or direct the massacre of its population. The major motivation behind the attack. All sides recog
first decision seems to have been grounded in sound nized the reality that possession of land on the battle
military and political considerations that had little or field would largely dictate who held what at the end of
nothing to do with any particular Muslim provocation . the war. The Bosnian Serbs therefore had a powerful
AtGeneral Krstic's trial in the The Hague, prosecutors incentive to clear the board of the ARBiH pawns
for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former remaining in eastern Bosnia: Srebrenica, Zepa , and
Yugoslavia (ICTY) presented documents bearing Gorazde. An unbroken hold over the entire Drina val
directly on the operation . They showed that the ley would give the Bosnian Serb statelet a secure
political guidance for the year issued to the VRS on boundary with Serbia itself, anchoring it firmly to the
8 March 1995 by the Bosnian Serb Supreme Com mother republic and cementing the two halves of
mand under President Karadzic included directions " greater Serbia.” *
for the Drina Corps to block any communications or
movement between Srebrenica and Zepa and, A second (but only secondary ) practical reason for the
attack would have been a desire to at least neutralize
By planned and well-thought-out combat the Bosnian Army forces in the eastern enclaves and
operations, create an unbearable situation so release the 6,000 or so troops tied down around
of total insecurity with no hope of further Srebrenica , Zepa, and Gorazde.289 This also appears to
survival or relief for the inhabitants of have been a logicalmotivation , given the near exhaus
Srebrenica and Zepa . tion of Serb manpower reserves that had already
forced the VRS to start stripping the Drina Corpsofits
The directive also instructed the VRS and other state reserve elements. The release of several thousand
organizations to use bureaucratic means to block troops in the Drina valley would have allowed the
UNPROFOR and the international community from VRS to shore up dangerously weak segments of the
supplying the enclaves. main confrontation line, rotate tired units, conduct
.
If successful, the campaign planned by the VRS For an analysis of Bosnian Serb war aims, military strategy , and
political-military relations , see Chapter 73, “ The “Red Generals"
would achieve the Serbs' core political-military objec
Refuse to Bow : Political-Military Relations and the Strategic
tives of wiping the three Muslim -held blotches from Debate in Republika Srpska, 1995."
the map of eastern Bosnia , securing solid control over

325
limited offensives elsewhere , or create a more robust strategic planning for the VRS operation to capture
mobile reserve to counter the increasing number of Srebrenica . Pent-up desires to punish the Muslims for
ARBiH attacks. the Visnjica village raid might have sharpened the
broader military and politicalmotivations and ade
Others have also theorized that the impending arrival quately explain both the nature and the timing of the
of UNPROFOR's new Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) attack - but not the subsequent massacre of the town's
spurred the Serbs — who may have feared that the RRF male population. Finally, an unreasoning sense of out
would soon preclude further action against the safe rage and revenge precipitated by the Srebrenicans'
havens— into a preemptive strike . This may have been obstinate resistance — and all of the previous raids,
a factor,but hardly a deciding one. Despite some ambushes , and attacks launched from an ostensibly
rhetoric to the effect that the RRF was a further mani demilitarized enclave under UN protection - might
festation of UNPROFOR's alleged anti -Serb bias, the well have driven both the timing of the attack only a
Serbs do not appear to have been overly concerned few days after Visnjica and the subsequentmassacre
that its presence would greatly constrain their conduct of the town's male population .
of military operations. UNPROFOR had been almost
wholly ineffective, even NATO airpower had affected
events only at the margins, and there is no strong evi 6 July 1995 : The Offensive Begins
dence that the VRS viewed the RRF's heralded but
much -delayed arrival as a fundamental change to the The Bosnian Serb campaign to eliminate the enclave
situation . Indeed , it was the Muslims and Croats who kicked off with heavy shelling in the very early morn
were visibly concerned about the RRF constraining ing of 6 July. At about 0315 , rockets began soaring
their military options, rather than the Bosnian Serbs, from the launchers of the VRS 5th Mixed Artillery
and it was the Croat-Muslim Federation that was cre Regiment north of Srebrenica and slamming into the
ating administrative obstacles to the RRF's advent." town . By 0500 , four UN observation posts in the
southeast corner of the enclave (Delta , Foxtrot, Kilo ,
All of these factors probably contributed to the VRS and Sierra ) were reporting heavy infantry fighting all
decision to attack, but it appears to have been the around them . Ominously, though, it was not only
28 June raid that crystallized the Bosnian Serbs ' deter small-arms fire they were hearing but also the detona
mination to wipe out the enclave once and for all. The tions of mortars, artillery, and tank guns.290
ICTY presented Drina Corps documents indicating
that the initial planning order for the attack on Sre There had been few visible indications that the VRS
brenica, issued to the corps' subordinate echelons on was preparing an early attack on Srebrenica. On
2 July, was based on the directives promulgated by the 5 July, the day before the attack opened , some Dutch
SupremeCommand and VRS Main Staff in the spring. troops reported that the Serbs were repositioning some
The objective of the Drina Corps , according to these heavy weapons. Others noted Serb soldiers with white
documents, was to “ split apart the enclaves of Zepa ribbons tied to their shoulders, a common unit recog
and Srebrenica and to reduce them to their urban nition symbol employed for avoiding friendly -fire
areas” and .. create conditions for the elimination incidents during offensive operations.291 Neither the
ofthe enclaves.” In essence, the corps was to eliminate Dutch battalion nor its higher UNPROFOR headquar
opposition in the territory surrounding the towns , ters were aware of any significant reinforcements
compacting the large number of displaced civilians so brought into the area , however,much less any VRS
tightly into the central urban areas as to make them plans to mount a major offensive to capture the
uninhabitable , and forcing the UN to evacuate them . enclave . Similar troop movements had been recorded
around the enclave dozens of times in the past, and the
The Bosnian Serbs' twin goals of clearing the map VRS was constantly adjusting its forces all across
and relieving their besieging troops would explain the Bosnia . There was no special indicator thatwould par
* See Annex 60 , UNPROFOR in Bosnia , 1995: From Vacillation to
Retaliation to Peace Implementation for additional details on the
UN Rapid Reaction Force and the difficulties it was facing atthis
time.

326

- -
ticularly distinguish these reports from the hundreds possible aftermonths of fruitless talk and mightbe the
of reports filed over themonths and across the coun first step toward the outright conclusion of the Bos
try. Until the guns began to fire, no one thing or even nian war.Nobody wanted to jeopardize the talks by
combination of things told UNPROFOR that now was antagonizing the Serbs with NATO military action at
the time and Srebrenica was the place . this time, and the anxieties of the hostage -taking deba
cle of only four weeks ago were still fresh in every
The most intense fighting began to shape up around one's mind . Neither UNPROFOR norNATO had yet
OP Foxtrot, perched on one side of 836 -meter Mt. figured out how to deal with the hostage -taking threat,
Javor, just outside the boundary of the southeast cor and there were legitimate fears that, if UNPROFOR
ner of the enclave . The Drina Corps' main assault responded to the shelling of OP Foxtrot with air sup
camehere in the southeast and was led by troops and port, the Serbs might take the whole Dutch battalion
armor from the 1st Zvornik Brigade and its Drina prisoners, seize the undefended enclave , and maybe
Wolves special operations unit, together with troops even round up UN personnel all over Bosnia. At
from the 10th Sabotage Detachment and the 2nd UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo it did not seem
Romanija Motorized Brigade. The attack on OP Fox worth jeopardizing the diplomatic talks and perhaps
trot itself was supported by at least three VRS tanks, the whole UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia for the sake
two field artillery pieces, and a multiple rocket of seven peacekeepers in one observation post.
launcher, which were either actively firing or within
firing distance . By early afternoon, artillery shells Fortunately for the Dutch soldiers hunkered down in
were hitting just outside the OP, and then two Serb OP Foxtrot, the weather worsened late in the day and
tanks fired directly at the OP from pointblank range . heavy rains began to obscure visibility. The firing in
Although entitled to return fire , the Dutch peacekeep and around their outpost tapered off and lapsed into a
ers in OP Foxtrot concluded it would be much safer respite — but itwas only a respite .
not to do so . They had considerable justification for
their decision . OP Foxtrot had a lone TOW antitank
guided -missile launcher in its inventory ,but the Dutch 7 July 1995 : The Lull Before the Storm
had mounted it in a tower on top of the OP, where its
night- vision scope and positioning made it excellent Friday, 7 July 1995 , was to be Srebrenica's last day of
as an observation tool but virtually useless as a relative peace . Dense , heavy fog reduced visibility to
weapon . The tower itself had taken several hits , and the end of a gunsight and made combat operations all
no one had much confidence that the old and weath but impossible . The Serbsmay also have paused any
ered TOW system would be effective. The short range way to reposition their forces or to take stock of the
of the two Dragon antitank missiles made their use a international reactions to the previous day's attack . As
last -ditch act of desperation . the Dutch recorded the few artillery detonations heard
during the day, they and others allowed themselves to
Unwilling to hazard the consequences of returning fire hope that perhaps the VRS was not ready to press an
directly, the Dutch battalion commander raised the offensive after all.
possibility of air support with the UNPROFOR Chief
of Staff in Sarajevo - BrigadierGeneral Cees Nicolai, Despite the vulnerable positions and harrowing expe
by happenstance also the senior-ranking Dutch officer riences of his men , Lieutenant Colonel Karremans, in
in UNPROFOR . Nicolai told Lt. Col. Karremans that the report he composed for UN headquarters on the
UNPROFOR was very reluctant to authorize air sup evening of 7 July, was still cautiously optimistic. On
port , especially in view of the prevailing diplomatic the basis of what he had seen thus far, Karremans
situation . At that very moment Carl Bildt, the Euro believed that the VRS attacks in and around OP Fox
pean Union's chief negotiator, was discussing with trot had been " attempts to provoke and intimidate the
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic the possibility
of mutual diplomatic recognition by Yugoslavia and
Bosnia . A diplomatic breakthrough suddenly seemed

327
A [ R ]BiH and Dutchbat.” He concluded that, although the UN or the ARBiH commanders to establish a
the VRS would try to “ neutralize” the Bosnian Army fallback position .
forces in the Srebrenica enclave, “ in the long term ”
the Serbs lacked sufficient infantry and would “not be As for calling in air support for Srebrenica , the
able to seize the enclave in the short term ." 292 UNPROFOR decisionmakers had to take into account
UN directive 2/95 of 29 May, which remained in
Karremans' line of reasoning was still defensible , effect. In this instruction, French General Bernard
even (as it turned out) on the day before the main Serb Janvier, UNPROFOR’s top commander,had directed
offensive began. For one thing, the attack on OP Fox that “ the execution of themandate is secondary to the
trot did not look all that different from the Bosnian security of UN personnel” and that force was only to
Serb attack on adjacent OP Echo only a month before be used as a last resort.294 With such explicit marching
on 3 June. At that time, the VRS had attacked the orders still on the books despite the escalation of
UNPROFOR OP with small arms, mortars, and anti threats to the UN mission , UNPROFOR planners
tank weapons, forcing the Dutch to abandon a similar believed they could not call in large- scale NATO air
strategic position in the southeast of the enclave while strikes on behalf of the Srebrenica safe area unless
the Serbs occupied a square kilometer or 2 of impor these strikes could first be justified as necessary for
tant territory around Zeleni Jadar. It was therefore rea the defense of the UN peacekeepers.
sonable to conclude that the Serbs were probably
mounting an operation limited to gaining control of The cumbersome, slow , and much -hated dual-key pro
the vital south road , which would connect Bratunac cedure for authorizing air support would be radically
and Vlasenica and allow them to fully exploit the changed after the fall of Srebrenica , in largemeasure
bauxite mine a little further to the west. because of the failings of the system evidenced during
the attack and the horrific consequences that were in
Relevant to Karremans' conclusions was the fact that somemeasure the result. On 7 July , however, the
neither he nor his higher headquarters in Sarajevo and established procedures were what everyone in
Zagreb had yet seen the buildup of forces that every UNPROFOR had to work with . The potential for con
one believed would signal a Serb campaign to take the fusion , delay , and ineffectiveness inherent in these
enclave . In this they were overlooking the crucial con procedures would become all too evident in the next
sideration that neither the forces required nor the dis few days.
tances involved in a Serb move to overrun the enclave
were very great. This would not be Operation Bar
barossa or the Normandy invasion, with hundreds of Saturday, 8 July 1995
thousands of troops and vehiclesmassed against a
border awaiting orders to start. When the battle for As dawn rose misty on the morning of 8 July, it
Srebrenica was in fact joined, the infantry advance remained uncertain whether the Serb attack would be
was accompanied by probably no more than 10 tanks renewed . During themiddle of the night the Dutch had
and APCs supported by six to 12 field artillery pieces recorded 275 more artillery detonations around the
and a number ofmortars - most of them deployed enclave , but only scattered shots were noted here and
around the enclave beforehand in a mountainous, for there during themorning hours. It was notuntil a little
ested region that made cover and concealment of after noon that the unfortunate OP Foxtrot again came
weapons and troop movements almost a trivial con under VRS attack . Shells began exploding close
cern.293 Moreover, the line of advance from Serb -held enough that it was obvious that the UN observation
OP Echo through all of Srebrenica town to the UN post was the intended target. About 20 Serb soldiers
compound was no more than 8 kilometers or so — a were seen approaching the UN position on footwhen ,
couple ofminutes' driving, or an hour's brisk walk . at about 1345, a Serb tank round smashed directly into
By the time it became apparent that a real attack had
in fact begun , it was already too late to do anything
about it . There was neither timenor space enough for

328

-
one wall of the OP and demolished a portion of it. Finding his exit route blocked , Sergeant Van Rossum
Two more tank rounds slammed into the OP a couple radioed Bravo Company commander Captain Jelte
of minutes later. All doubts about the seriousness of Groen in Srebrenica and asked for guidance. The com
Serb intentions had been removed.295 pany commander inquired whether the Dutch troops
could see any antitank weapons that could threaten
As fighting raged around the OP, its senior noncom their APC . When van Rossum replied in the negative ,
missioned officer, Sergeant Frans van Rossum , radi the Captain ordered him to drive through the barricade
oed Dutchbat headquarters for permission to withdraw and make his way back to Srebrenica.
self and his troops from a clearly untenable posi
tion . The higher command readily agreed that van Van Rossum told the YPR's crew to button up the
Rossum should evacuate the position as soon as an vehicle and proceed . As they were closing their
opportune momentmade it safe to do so . hatches, a loud noise inside the compartment signaled
that they had already been attacked by theMuslim sol
Unfortunately, no such moment presented itself. Just dier. Private First Class Raviv van Renssen slumped to
when the Dutchbat troops thought the fighting had let his knees and then to the floor, a gaping wound sur
up enough for them to climb into their YPR armored rounding a hole in his skull behind the left ear. The
personnel carrier and retreat back to the UN com YPR raced down the road the short distance to
pound, one of the soldiers noticed a Serb T-55 tank not Srebrenica, its radio blaring frantic appeals for medi
more than 100 meters away with its main gun leveled cal help while Van Renssen's three companions
straight at them .Unable to argue with this kind of searched desperately for the medical kit in the
weaponry , the Dutchbat troops decided that surrender ransacked vehicle . An armored ambulance met the
ing their weapons and negotiating with the Serbs was YPR on the road just south of Srebrenica , and van
the better part of valor and the best of a bad set of Renssen was rushed to the UN medical compound at
choices. After sometense moments while the 10 or 20 Potocari. It was already too late ; he had died in his
VRS troops — probably from the 1st Zvornik Brigade vehicle while still on the road . Private van Renssen
or “ Drina Wolves” -rummaged through the OP and was pronounced dead at 1627. An X -ray later found
their possessions, the disarmed Dutch troopsmanaged 30 fragments from a handgrenade lodged in his
to talk the Serbs into letting them return to Srebrenica skull.2297 298
in their armored vehicle. All seemed surprisingly well,
but events were about to take a tragic turn just a few Another, less serious, confrontation with the Bosnian
moments later.296 Muslimsoccurred that evening. Bravo Company com
mander Captain Groen ordered two of his YPRs to
On the road back to Srebrenica, at the base ofMt. move south to locate the fluid Serb -Muslim frontline
Javor, the Dutch vehicle from OP Foxtrot encountered and report on the situation there. On the way, one of
a makeshift roadblock set up by a Muslim soldier and the APCs was blocked by a group of Muslim soldiers
three armed civilians, their purpose being no less than and another makeshift barricade. Some of the troops
preventing the Dutch troops from abandoning their might have had antitank rockets, and nobody wanted
position. Several of the Dutch Battalion's observation to risk a firefight after van Renssen's death only hours
posts — including OP Foxtrot — had previously been earlier. Groen ordered the vehicles to turn around and
Bosnian Army positions, sometimes located in tacti head back to Srebrenica . As they did so , one of the
cally key positions. These positions had only reluc Muslims threw a handgrenade at the APCs. This time
tantly been turned over to the UN under the terms of the grenade exploded harmlessly beside the vehicles,
the April 1993 safe area agreement. The ARBiH was but it was the second Bosnian Army attack on the
now both furious and afraid that it would end up sur Dutch battalion that day and yet another signal that the
rendering its few good defensive positions, first to the Muslimswere furious and frustrated with the Dutch
UN and then to the Bosnian Serbs, without even a failure to halt the Serb advance. 299
fight.

329
Having overrun OP Foxtrot, the VRS moved to take Unfortunately , Karremans ' conclusions— though
control of the road segment just to the west, north of based on sound logic and supported by three UNPRO
OP Uniform . Capture of the road beyond the OP and FOR command echelons above him — were wrong.
the surrender of its defenders would open the way for
the Serbs to advance the last couple of kilometers
toward Srebrenica town. These facts were not lost on Sunday, 9 July 1995
the Muslims, and a fierce three -hour firefight ensued
north of the Dutch OP, with Muslim soldiers behind On 9 July, Dutch Defense Minister Joris Voorhoeve
the peacekeepers and Serbs in front of them . Well summed up the situation bleakly but accurately : the
aware of what had already happened to Private van safe area's Dutch defenders were “ surrounded , out
Renssen , OP Uniform's senior NCO , Sergeant Alwin numbered , and afraid of further actions” by the Serb
van Eck ,made no attempt to evacuate the position . At forces advancing against the enclave.302 The UN and
about 1830 the attacking Serbs gained the upper hand the Dutch Government still clung to the hope that the
and occupied the ridge line around the OP and a small Bosnian Serbs would not overrun Srebrenica . A better
section of the road ; a little later a VRS platoon showed understanding of the battlefield situation was neces
up at the OP and began looting it. The disarmed Dutch sary, however, before the UN could decide what the
peacekeepers were given the same choice as that of Serbs' real objective was .
OP Foxtrot: return disarmed to the UN base at
Srebrenica or place themselves in Serb custody. Con With the loss of the southern OPs, UNPROFOR had a
sidering the experiences of the retreating crew of OP blind spot in the most crucial part of the enclave. To
Foxtrot, Sergeant van Eck opted to turn himself and try to remedy this, Karremans told Bravo Company
his five men over to the Serbs.300 commander Captain Groen to send four APCs of his
" Quick Reaction Force " to two positions south of the
Significantly, this VRS movement suggested that the town and report back what they saw .
Serbs intended to drive northward toward Srebrenica
and from OP Echo (occupied by the VRS back in Meanwhile , the Bosnian Serbs renewed their attack ,
June), and not westward to force open the Muslim this time surrounding OP Sierra, last of the three UN
303
held road segment along the southern side of the OP's in the southeastern corner of the enclave.3
Srebrenica enclave. It is far easier to see this in retro Recognizing the futility of resistance, Sergeant Jan
spect than it in the swirl of confusing events all taking Bresser, the commander of OP Sierra , surrendered to
place within a kilometer or so of each other. the Bosnian Serbs at 0900 .

During thenight of 8-9 July, Lieutenant Colonel Kar Itwas still conceivable that the Serbs had the limited
remans reached a different conclusion based on the objective of taking the southern road . Indeed , some of
same evidence . Despite the Serb takeovers of OPs the day's events supported that theory. After OP
Foxtrotand Uniform , Karremans still did not foresee a Sierra , the next to fall was OP Kilo , west of the cross
general offensive aimed at taking over the enclave roads in the enclave's southeast corner. Its crew was
itself. Rather, he still expected the Serbs to take over taken away under Serb guard to be held in Milici.
the strip of land along the southern border of the After OP Kilo surrendered at 1815 , Sergeant Zuur
enclave to secure the road south of the Jadar river and man , the commander of OP Delta — the next OP to the
a passage from the bauxite mine southwest of the west of Kilo — abandoned his position before the
enclave. Judging by the seemingly limited size and Serbs could take it and his men . (Zuurman's men were
direction of the Serb attack , Karremans concluded held by some ARBiH soldiers overnight but were
again that it was a diversion and an attempt at allowed to continue on to Srebrenica the following
intimidation " :

The attacks on OP Foxtrot and P Uniform must

be regarded as part of an attempt to take posses
sion of the Jadar valley. The fact that there are
no attacks on the rest of the enclave perimeter
reinforces this view.301

330
morning.) Five consecutive OP's had been given up, in saw no Muslim defenders opposing their advance .
precise east- to -west chronological order. The Serbs Frantically, Egbers radioed back to the harried Bravo
had secured all the positions south of the Jadar river Company commander, Captain Groen , to report that
and had perhaps achieved their military objectives — or “ One Serb tank backed by 50 infantry are advancing
so some still hoped . north ." 305Not only did the Serb force represent trouble
of the first order but it was also much closer to the
Karremans— lacking any reporting from the southeast town and its UN compound than anyone in the UN
following the losses of OPs Uniform , Foxtrot, and chain of command had realized . It meant that the
Sierra — remained unaware , of another crucial fact for Serbs were advancing north — into Srebrenica itself
most of the day. While the five OPs that fell to the rather than west toward the aluminum company's
Serbs on 9 July were indeed all along the southern mine.
edge of the enclave, a VRS column led by two tanks,
an APC , and a small column of Serb infantry was Meanwhile , Karremans spoke with the acting com
advancing due northward at the same time. By about mander of the ARBiH forces in the enclave ,Major
midday this force had reached as far as the village of Ramiz Becirovic , and offered to allow the Bosnian
Pusmilici, just about halfway between the Serb's start Army to take possession of the arms it had turned over
line that morning and the town of Srebrenica . After a to the UN and that were currently stored in the
series of running battles along the road , the Serb weapons collection point in the town. Somewhat to
forces had advanced to within about 2 kilometers of Karremans' surprise , Becirovic declined the offer,
the town by early evening. explaining that accepting the weapons would give the
Serbs a pretext to continue their advance, while
Troubled by the Dutchbat's poor knowledge of events decreasing the odds that the UN would order NATO
in the southeast part of the enclave , Bravo Company airstrikes — which is what Becirovic clearly really
commander Captain Groen sent another of his Quick wanted . “ We don't want to take the weapons,” Kar
Reaction Force APCs down the road from Srebrenica remans heard him say ; “ Why don't you call for air
with the inelegant but vitalmission of driving south strikes ?""306 Given that the weapons in the collection
until it ran into the frontline . The mission was success point consisted of two inoperable tanks , two howit
ful, after a fashion . The YPR armored vehicle came zers, an antiaircraft gun , a few mortars, and a hodge
upon Serb soldiers near the Swedish Shelter Project, a podge of about 150 small arms — all in poor repair, out
housing development built by relief workers near OP of ammunition , or both — Becirevac's position was
Sierra in the southern part of the enclave. Once again probably a reasonable one. Desperate as the 28th Divi
the Serbs surrounded the Dutch peacekeepers and sion'smilitary situation now was , a few more wornout
insisted they surrender their weapons. At about 1330 , weapons would not have improved it, and any action
Sergeant Johan Bos, the vehicle's commander, radioed that jeopardized Srebrenica's status as a safe area
back to Captain Groen that they had been disarmed probably was not worth the risk . Neither then nor later
and that the YPR's crew was being taken to Bratunac. did the Bosnian forces try to retrieve the weapons in
Dutchbat had found the frontline — at the cost of an the UN storage point.307
APC and several more UN prisoners.304
The events of 9 July had substantially changed the sit
It was notuntil late in the afternoon , probably around uation of the peacekeepers, and that evening Kar
1700 , that the Dutchbat headquarters got a real appre remans again wrestled with the airpower option . Even
ciation of the seriousness of the situation . Looking the strict UN rules of engagement clearly permitted a
down from a hill, Dutch peacekeepers in a UN vehicle legitimate call for Close Air Support: during the day
under Lieutenant Egbers saw a Serb force advancing the Serbs had unquestionably and deliberately targeted
near the village of Bibici — a scant kilometer or so UN OP's Kilo and Mike with artillery and mortar fire .
from the south end of Srebrenica. Worse yet, Egbers

331
Yet nothing that had happened during the day, not Karremans had good reason to doubt that even
even an offer from General Nicolai in Sarajevo to have advanced NATO jets would be able to find and destroy
NATO planes at least do a flyby over the enclave , them in densely forested and mountainous
changed Karremans' disinclination to call in NATO terrain on the first try .
aircraft 308
Karremans shared his concerns with the UNPROFOR
There were practical considerations that caused Kar headquarters, where the debate continued . It was now
remans to fear thatNATO airpowermight accomplish irrefutably clear that the VRS did intend to occupy
little and actually create more problemsthan it solved . Srebrenica and capture the enclave . Perhaps 2,000
As he put it, meters separated the advancing Serb tanks from the
edge of the world's first UN - guaranteed safe area.
Using Close Air Support in all possible ways is What did this portend, and what could be done about
not feasible yet. It will provoke the Bosnian Serb it ?
Army in such a way that both Srebrenica itself
and observation posts and compounds will be Seeking to resolve these questions and develop a prac
targeted by all means ... Unless these weapons tical course of action , General Nicolai, the UNPRO
309
systemscan be eliminated at one time ... FOR Chief of Staff in Sarajevo , conferred with Col.
Harm De Jonge, the Dutch UNPROFOR Chief of
As Karremans saw it, the NATO airstrike package Operations in Zagreb . Combining two ideas , they
would have to be big enough to cripple both the decided to establish "blocking positions," which ,
advancing Serb forces and the surrounding artillery at when combined with a countervailing UN ultimatum
the same time. If only the infantry column was to the Serbs, would serve as tripwires for engaging
stopped , the Serbs could respond by shelling the town, NATO's airpower. If the blocking positions worked
the Dutch UN compound, or both . If just the artillery so the theory went — the Serbs would halt their
ringing the enclave was destroyed , the Serb forces advance. If the Serbs failed to respect the UN road
could easily manage the last few kilometers along the blocks , they would have provided a clear justification
road and occupy the town anyhow . So -called " pin for NATO airstrikes.
prick " air attacks , like those used around Gorazde and
Sarajevo in 1994 (and like those thatwould eventually After getting approval for the idea from both General
be used around Srebrenica two days later ), would have Janvier and the civilian Special Representative of the
no military impact at all and would only antagonize UN Secretary General, Yasushi Akashi, Nicolai
the VRS. relayed Karremans his new orders. He would deploy
his battalion to establish a UN presence astride all the
By Karremans' reasoning, a determined Serb advance main roads into Srebrenica town . Specifically, his
could only be deterred by an airstrike against a large troops were to :
package of targets — the assault formation itself and
probably at least two dozen heavy weapons and take up blocking positions using all means avail
assorted vehicles situated around the enclave. Such a able in order to prevent further penetration and
strike would vastly exceed any previous UN air opera advance of BSA (Bosnian Serb Army] units in
tion and mark a dramatic escalation in the level of UN the direction of Srebrenica. Every possible mea
retaliation . It might inflame the Serbs into making a sure must be taken to reinforce these positions,
more violent assault on the enclave or touch off including measures relating to weapons.310
another round of retaliatory hostage taking all over
Bosnia . Karremans was acutely aware that 30 of his At about the same time the Dutchbat received its
own men from the captured OPs were already in Serb orders , the UN headquarters in Zagreb issued an
hands. Finally, even if NATO were willing to assemble ultimatum to the Serbs from General Janvier and UN
the bombing package thathe considered necessary to
destroy the enemy weapons in onemassive strike,

332
Special Representative Akashi. The catalog of UN There were a number of reasons for the narrowly
demands specified that the Serbs were not only to halt focused warning to the Serbs. Partly, it stemmed from
their attack and withdraw to the original boundaries of the ambiguities in UN Security Council Resolution
the Srebrenica enclave : the detained Dutch soldiers 836 , which talked about deterring (though not resist
must be released and all of their equipment and per ing) attacks on the safe areas, allowed the use of force
sonal belongings returned. The Serbs were notified in self-defense (though not necessarily for the defense
that the UN had established “ blocking positions” of the enclave itself) , and authorized the use of air
within the enclave and warned that, if they failed to power to carry out the mission (butwithout specifying
respect these blocking positions, “ NATO Close Air the scope or circumstances for the employment of air
Support will be employed.” power, or indeed the mission itself). The ambiguous
text leftmuch of the interpretation up to its readers , in
Here, somehow , arose one of the misunderstandings this case the UN's military decision makers. UNPRO
that helped to contribute to the Srebrenica disaster. FOR Commander General Janvier — who had to deal
Following their conversation , General Nicolai in Sara with the disastrous hostage-taking episode that had
jevo and Lieutenant Colonel Karremans in Srebrenica followed the last attempted use ofNATO airpower
had completely different understandings of what chose a very narrow interpretation of the UN's man
NATO airpower was likely to do the following day . date in his 29 May directive .Moreover,UN Secretary
Karremans, for whatever reason ( and in spite of the General Boutros Boutros -Ghali still had to personally
written text of the UN threat, which had been faxed to approve all UN requests for NATO airstrikes. For all
him ), believed that NATO was prepared to launch of these reasons, the Bosnian Serbs found themselves
massive airstrikes all around the enclave the following threatened with “ air support" rather than " air
morning. After Karremans relayed this to his staff, the strikes ” —a distinction not lost on any of the com
misconception was in turn relayed to the entire Dutch manders who were the objects of the ultimatum .
battalion . Karremans even met with the Muslim lead
ers of Srebrenica around midnight to inform them that The effect was to make it plain that, despite its “block
NATO would be carrying out large - scale airstrikes ing positions” and the threat of airpower, the UN was
with the dawn. ExultantMuslim residents and harried simply not prepared to engage the VRS Drina Corps
UN peacekeepers everywhere around Srebrenica went in effective combat. The UNPROFOR APCs ordered
to sleep that nightbelieving that NATO's winged out on the roads were armed with nothing heavier than
might would be flying to the attack first thing in the .50- caliber machineguns. Damp storage had made the
morning.311 Dragon and AT4 antitank weapons held by the Dutch
soldiers entirely unreliable , and their range was sui
Of crucial importance — and what everyone except cidally short. The soldiers had been furnished no artil
Karremans appears to have appreciated immedi lery support. There had been neither the time nor the
ately — was the fact that the phrase used in the written means to prepare defensive positions or to lay mines
ultimatum was NATO Close Air Support,” with no or even to string barbed wire . If the light blue UN flag
mention of " NATO airstrikes." The capitalized phras failed to stop the Serb advance — and it certainly had
ing strongly implied to most UN leaders and the Bos not done so to date — it was unclear what, if anything,
nian Serb Army commanders that the air attacks the UN peacekeepers would or could do about it.
would be individual ground-support flights to defend
Dutch troops under threat from specific Bosnian Serb General Mladic's intelligence chief, Gen. Zdravko
guns or tanks. The limited size and nature of this kind Tolimir,speaking from the other end of a telephone
of threat was entirely distinct from the large tactical line to UNPROFOR Chief of Staff General Nicolai,
air package Karremans had postulated as necessary to was dismissive . Not only did Tolimir pay scant heed to
suppress the numerous VRS weapons around Sre the UN's threats, he simply denied that there were any
brenica. Its deterrent threat differed by several orders Bosnian Serb forces in the enclave in the first place .
ofmagnitude from , say, a strategic campaign against
VRS infrastructure targets across Serb - held Bosnia.

333
Even before the first Dutch YPRsmoved out to their northward . Their lightly armored YPR went off the
stations along the roads, the prospects for the blocking road when a near miss from a tank or artillery piece
positions halting the Serb advance looked slim indeed . detonated nearby . Unable to get the vehicle back on
the road , the crew abandoned it and headed back on
foot to meet their comrades at the Bravo Four post.
Monday, 10 July 1995
At about 0900 on 10 July there began the worst epi
In the early morning hours of 10 July, Bravo Company sode in the confused and disastrous story ofNATO
commander Captain Groen began to implement the Close Air Support for Srebrenica. At this time, the
order he had received during the night. Although Dutch battalion formally requested NATO air support
many of the Dutch soldiers were uneasy about the via UNPROFOR headquarters. About 50 NATO
“ blocking position ” order — it smacked too much of planes of all types (fighters , bombers, electronic
lying down in front of an oncoming truck — Captain warfare planes, tankers, and so on ) were already cir
Groen promptly directed six YPRs and about 50 sol cling overhead , armed and ready. Everything seemed
diers to establish four roadblocks with the APCs and a straightforward , and Dutch battalion troops antici
handful of antitank missiles and rockets. Positions pated imminent air action on their behalf.
Bravo One and Bravo Four, west and south of the
town, respectively , had two YPRs each . Positions They were mistaken. UNPROFOR headquarters
Bravo Two and Three , also south and east of the town , instead requested an updated target list, since their
each had a single YPR . The battalion's four forward previousone was almost 24 hours old and some of the
air controllers — men trained specifically to direct targets had since moved during the course of the Serb
NATO aircraft against hostile ground targets — were attack . The Dutch peacekeepers and their forward air
split between Bravo One and Bravo Two . controllers within the enclave dutifully set about
updating the target list. At about 1400 — some five
The UN was now in the extremely delicate position of hours after the initial air support request — the NATO
trying to appear to be defending the civilians of the warplanes on station returned to base as the weather
Srebrenica safe area without appearing to assist the deteriorated and their fuel dwindled . There was no
Bosnian Army forces in the same enclave. It was an pressing sense of urgency, either in UN headquarters
almost impossible task ,but the Dutch tried to make or most Western capitals. There had been reports of
the distinction as clear as possible. Bravo Company fighting just south of the town , but, as far as most
commander Captain Groen explicitly directed his decisionmakers knew , Srebrenica was not in imminent
blocking troops not to fire at the VRS forces unless danger of capture .
they were directly attacked themselves .
While the UN fumbled , the battle raged on . The Serbs
Bravo One, under Lieutenant Egbers, cameunder fire had resumed their shelling into the enclave shortly
at about 1100 , probably from a Serb tank on Pribice after dawn with the heaviest volume of fire yet felt.
vac to the east. The crews took refuge in their YPRs Dozens of rounds exploded in Srebrenica in flagrant
and listened to the sound of shrapnel ricocheting off violation of the UN safe area provisions and forced
the APC's armor. One British Forward Air Controller the town's population into basements or underground
accompanying the Dutch peacekeepers was wounded , shelters .
though not seriously . As soon as everyone could be
accounted for, Bravo One's two APCs abandoned At about 0700 , Srebrenica's defendersmounted their
their blocking position and headed north toward only successful counterattack , near the village of
Srebrenica.312 Kozlje about 2 kilometers south of Srebrenica. A
roughly company -sized force of volunteers from the
Bravo Two , the southernmost of the planned 28th Division's elite “ maneuver unit" bushwhacked
positions, was never even occupied . On their way
south , the Dutch soldiers assigned to this position
encountered one of the advancing Serb tanks headed

334
--
the farthest advanced group of Serbs while they were frontline forces to create a mobile reserve.314 Late in
still asleep . Firing at close range , the Bosnian the day , Becirovic finally scraped together a scratch
commandos damaged a Serb T-55 tank with a rocket force to send south , but the reinforcements were too
propelled grenade, while a spray ofmachinegun bul few and their arrival too late to change the course of
lets raked through a platoon of sleeping Serbs. For the battle .
many ofthem , it was a last wake-up call , and their sur
prised and disorganized companions fled the field , a While Becirovic and his 28th Division subordinates
second T -55 dragging the damaged tank southward.313 bobbled their chance for a counterattack , the Serbs
continued to pound the daring Muslims who had
The exultant Muslims realized that there were no reoccupied the hills around Kozlje. By midafternoon
enemy troops between the advance element they had casualties and withdrawals had reduced the original
just dispatched and the main body of the attacking force of 100 to only 10 defenders posted above the
force to the south . A kilometer ormore of contested morning's ambush site. When the Serbian advance
territory lay open before them . Captain Mido Sali force , reinforced and reorganized , finally returned
hovic , commanding the raiding party, urgently called with a tank and a full infantry company around 1600 ,
for reinforcements to take and reoccupy the key high there was nothing the 10 Muslim defenders could do
ground around OP Foxtrot,where thebattle had begun to stop them .
four days earlier. The UN had not saved the enclave ,
but for a moment it looked as though the town's Late in the afternoon the air began to go out of the
Muslim defenders might defy the odds and do it ARBiH defensive balloon. Beginning about 1800 ,
themselves. Bosnian Army forces began to fall back in numbers,
though still in fairly good order, and sought to regroup
The little battle at Kozlje once again showed the criti for a literal last-ditch defense along a line immediately
cal limitations ofthe Bosnian Army. Armed with skill , south of the town. As the Bosnian Muslims pulled
bravery, small arms, surprise , and luck , a handpicked back , the Serbs resumed their advance. This left the
force of 100 or so troops had not only blunted the Bos three remaining UN blocking positions - Bravo One,
nian Serb attack buthad actually forced the advance Bravo Three , and Bravo Four - in serious danger of
VRS elements — including two tanks - into outright being outflanked by the advancing Serbs. The UN
retreat. As so often before, the Bosnian Serbs were APCs from the blocking positions perforce were
able to win back the lost hand with their ubiquitous ordered to fall back to new positions on the southern
trump card : field artillery fire , which the Muslimshad most edge of Srebrenica town.
no way of countering. As soon as the Muslims occu
pied the key hills at Kozlje and nearby Zivkovo Brdo , The two hours between 1800 and 2000 were nerve
VRS artillery and mortar fire rained down on them . wracking in the extreme for Dutchbat, as the peace
The ARBiH infantry was pinned down for hours , keepers did their doughty best, without actually using
unable to advance, unwilling to retreat, and slowly force , to deter the Serbs from advancing. Attwo ofthe
accumulating casualties as shrapnel and tree bursts UN blocking positions — Bravo One and Bravo Four
wounded troops hiding in or under whatever cover the defenders opened fire but over the Serbs ' heads.
they could find. One brought an 81-mm mortar into play but fired only
warning flares . When these gestures failed to stop the
While the commandos clung to their perilous position , Serbs in their tracks, Captain Hageman , commanding
28th Division commander Ramiz Becirovic was fran the little force , had no choice but to turn his vehicles
tically scrambling to find reinforcements to send south around and fall back into the town , where the fright
to their support. Although he might have had 3,000 or ened residents assumed that he was going to flee and
more troops under his command, probably fewer than abandon them to their fate . Grim -faced Bosnian Army
a third of them were even armed . These few hundred soldiers confronted Hageman and told him they would
armed men were all Becirovic had to defend nearly knock out his APCswith antitank rockets if he tried to
50 kilometers of frontline, and none of his subordinate
brigade commanders was willing to thin his own

335
pull back any further. The Dutch peacekeepers were had again come to a halt, and the UN and the ARBiH
now being threatened by both the Serbs and the Bos leaders had a breathing space to think of a realistic and
nian Muslims. feasible way to deal with it.

Pursued by the Serbs closing in behind them and The Serbs helped to clarify their thinking when they
blocked by the Muslims from falling back , at around raised the ante with an ultimatum to UNPROFOR and
1900 the Dutch battalion sent another formal petition the ARBiH . Using one of the radios from a UN APC
for the promised Close Air Support. The Serbs had captured in Bratunac, the Serbs announced that, as of
again directly targeted the UN troops in the blocking 0600 the followingmorning, the Dutchbat and the
positions, and the UN compound in Srebrenica was in Srebrenica population had 48 hours to evacuate the
imminent danger of being hitby the shells now raining enclave. The VRS guaranteed safe passage for all who
on the town . The forward air controllers specified complied with the ultimatum — but declined to specify
three areas where all-out NATO air support was what would happen if they did not.
needed : south of the blocking positions and in Sre
brenica itself,north of OP Papa in the northeast part of On the night of 10 July 1995 , Lieutenant Colonel Kar
the enclave near Bratunac, and along the high ridge remans again called for a robust package of airstrikes
line the Serbs had occupied in the southeast part of the against the Bosnian Serbs. During the day, the Dutch
enclave near OP Uniform . In these circumstances , this battalion had faxed a list of 38 identified Bosnian Serb
time the Dutchbatmightwell have considered its mes weapons positions suitable for air attack . Karremans'
sage less a request for support than a last appeal for deputy ,Major Robert Franken , conferred with General
salvation . Nicolai in Sarajevo and was led to believe that, if the
Serbs did not withdraw from the enclave , they would
The UN's top force commander,Gen. Bernard Janvier, suffer retaliatory airstrikes the next day. Karremans
was not one to act unilaterally , and he called a meeting went to bed that evening believing that in themorning
of his advisers to discuss the Dutch colonel's request. NATO jets would begin a vigorous air campaign
The discussions went on formore than an hour and a against the Serb tanks and artillery that had been
half while Karremans called Sarajevo every 15 min attacking both the Srebrenica safe area and the UN
utes to ask if his request had been approved yet. The forces within it. In fact, he reportedly told Sre
UN command staff was in parallel discussionswith brenica's civilian leadership that, “ Everything that
The Hague to see if the Dutch Government — which moves, whether on two legs, four legs, or on wheels ,
" 315
now had 30 peacekeepers held hostage in Serb will be destroyed , erased from the ground .
hands — would be willing to take the risk of allowing
the UN to strike back . After deliberations at the high Karremans was horribly mistaken .General Janvier
est levels of the Dutch Government, Dutch Defense had in fact vetoed his request for NATO air action.316
Minister Voorhoeve replied that, yes, despite the risks, Janvier considered his instructions to be clear: only
the Netherlands was prepared to permitNATO Close Close Air Support was authorized and only if the
Air Supportmissions in defense ofthe Dutch battalion Serbs continued to attack the blocking positions or
and the Srebrenica enclave. advanced into the town . Overruling the opinions of
almost all his advisers , he had concluded that any
Fortunately for Karremans and his tiny command, more comprehensive air action would be too danger
while their superiors were mulling over their fate , ous. Months earlier, Janvier had privately concluded
nightfall brought a respite from their touchy predica that the enclave was militarily indefensible , and , as far
ment. After about 2000, the firing tapered off quickly, back as 24 May, six weeks before the attack on Sre
leaving the defenders to wonder if the Serbswanted to brenica , he had urged his UN superiors to withdraw
allow the town's population to flee northward to Poto
cari so they could enter Srebrenica uncontested or if
they simply preferred to wait until daylight to resume
their advance . For whatever reason , the Serb offensive

336
the peacekeepers from Bosnia's three eastern The drama of the NATO Close Air Supportmission
enclaves : continued on its farcical way toward its unscripted,
tragic conclusion . Still assuming that a NATO bomb
We have little time ahead of us. Wemusttake ing package was being worked up , Dutchbat had faxed
measures which allow us to limit the risks another formal request for Close Air Support at 2200
incurred by our forces. the previous night, followed by an updated target list
dispatched to UN Sector Northeast in Tuzla at about
Let usbe pragmatic and above all honest, espe 0500 thatmorning. At Tuzla as well as Srebrenica the
cially toward those whose security we hold in UNPROFOR commands seemed confident thatNATO
our hands: without lightning rods, stay out of the air action would soon be on the way. After the fog
storm . 317 318 lifted around 0800 , the Dutch filed yet another formal
air support request (the battalion's fourth ) with the UN
Janvier seemed not to be alone in his assessment, and , Sector Northeast headquarters .
for all of the rhetorical threats in the UN resolutions
and warnings, it seemed that all the knowledgeable The Muslim commander, Becirovic, had by now
authorities — the UN , the Western governments, even wholly entrusted the future of the enclave and his
the Bosnian Serb commanders — understood that a command to Lieutenant Colonel Karremans, the
massive NATO air campaign was simply out of the United Nations, and its NATO airpower. Overruling
question. Everyone, it seems, but Lieutenant Colonel the advice of someof his staff, Becirovic gave strict
Karremans and the Bosnian Muslim leadership within instructions that the UN peacekeepers among them
the enclave — who, more than anyone else, needed to were not to be harmed , threatened , or taken hostage ;
know that there was no airstrike in the cards that had that the weapons were not to be removed from the UN
been dealt them . weapons collection point; and the 28th Division's own
heavy weapons were not to fire for fear of undermin
ing the enclave's safe area status .
11 July : The Enclave Falls
Both Karremans and Becirovic were completely
The morning of 11 July dawned heavy with anticipa wrong, however, about the prospects for NATO air
tion. The Dutch peacekeepers thought thatNATO air action . No planes were on the way; none had even
strikesmight come as early as 0600. In their morning been approved . While the Dutch on the ground
summary , the UN Military Observers reported that, believed that the severity of their situation and their
“ The situation this morning has been unusually , but repeated requests for help had already provided ade
creepily , calm and quiet ... The usual hail of shells quate justification for NATO Close Air Support,
that have been greeting our mornings is surprisingly UNPROFOR's higher headquarters did not believe the
absent today. We view this as a positive change in the Dutchbathad met the rigid criteria for CAS in self
current circumstances, which undoubtedly have come defense, since no UN positions had yet come under
from the NATO ultimatum ... ' 319 Even the Muslims, direct Serb attack that morning. UNPROFOR had yet
traditionally skeptical of UN promises, were able to to share this reasoning and General Janvier's decision
believe that NATO airpower was going to save them . with the beleaguered force in Srebrenica .
After conferring with the civilian leaders of the
enclave , acting 28th Division commander Becirovic After another hour had gone by without any sign of
had even pulled his troops back from the “ zone of NATO warplanes , Dutchbat Deputy Commander
death ” in which Karremans and he believed NATO Franken again radioed UN Sector Northeast in Tuzla
warplanes were going to devastate the Serb forces.320
Throughout the enclave , expectations of the UN and
NATO were high .

337
to ask what had happened . At this point, the saga of always behind the events of the fast-breaking situa
NATO air support crossed the line from the confused tion — had not persuaded him that Srebrenica was in
to the surreal. Speaking with the acting Chief of Air imminent danger or that the Serbs necessarily even
Operations in Tuzla , a Pakistani colonel, Franken intended to capture the town .
learned that the battalion's request for air support had
been denied because it had been submitted on the At about the time the Dutch air support request
wrong form . The Dutch had filed a request for air reached Janvier, the Bosnian Serbs began attacking
strikes, not Close Air Support. Before their request several of the UN OPs with artillery ,mortars, and
could be considered , they would have to resubmit the heavy machineguns. OPs Hotel (just east of Sre
request using the proper Close Air Support form along brenica ) and Mike and November (both on the north
with yet another updated target list. ern edge of the enclave) in particular came under fire .
The Serbs may have been trying to divert attention to
To keep in touch with the situation , another scout the north (they had attacked OP Mike before , perhaps
force of two UN APCs had been sent southward to as a distraction) as they prepared to launch their final
find the frontline using the now -familiar method of assault on the town , or they may have been trying to
blundering into it. At the hairpin turn in the road less tie down the UN peacekeepers in the OPs that had not
than a kilometer south of the town, the two YPRs dis been captured to keep the UN headquarters guessing.
covered a Serb tank and several trucks. Turning UN peacekeepers pinned down by fire could not effec
around as fast as the vehicles would move, the UN tively locate Serb heavy weapons or help NATO air
APCsmanaged to flee the scene without being hit by craft target them .
Serb fire . At about 0930 the scouts reported that the
Serbs had advanced to within a kilometer of the town . Janvier's reflections were interrupted when news of
If the UN ultimatum had been intended to force the the attacks on OPs Mike and November arrived , but he
Serbs to withdraw to the original borders of the continued to think for a few more minutes before con
enclave , then the threat was clearly not producing the sulting with UN Special Representative Akashi.
desired effect.321 Finally, just after noon , Janvier and Akashi approved
the Close Air Support request. Shortly after Janvier
With the scout force having established beyond all signed the papers, NATO aircraft were leaving their
doubt that the Serbs were indeed still violating the runways in Italy, bound for Bosnia . It would take them
terms of the UN ultimatum , the Dutch refiled a Close almosttwo hours to get there .
Air Support request on the required form at about
0945. Then they resubmitted the request two more Atthe samemomentwhen the UN finally decided to
times, since the UN headquarters in Sarajevo objected send NATO aircraft to defend Srebrenica, the Bosnian
to the target list they had attached . After a secure fax Muslim leadership appears to have concluded that
line broke and was repaired , an acceptable Close Air help would never come. In Srebrenica , acting com
Support request form and target list could finally be mander Becirovic — with his enemy only hours away,
passed on for consideration in Sarajevo.322 no plan to cope, not enough fighting men , and entirely
inadequate weapons — appealed to his higher head
NATO warplanes had in fact been in an aerial parking quarters in Tuzla for instructions. The ARBiH 2nd
orbit since 0600, and now they had run out of fuel and Corps was in no position to help Becirovic, however.
been ordered back to base. Two more hours would The 2nd Corps had just exhausted itself in the failed
pass before they were refueled and ready to launch and bloody effort to break the siege of Sarajevo , and it
again . lacked the means to mount a relief attack toward Sre
brenica - especially in the next couple of hours, dur
The " correct" Dutch request for Close Air Support ing which time the enclave would surely fall. The 2nd
reached Janvier's desk . He was still not ready Corps command had never felt able to get weapons or
to give his approval, partly because UN reporting ammunition to the beleaguered and desperate
incomplete, occasionally inaccurate, and nearly

338
defenders, and it was even less able now . It could not Running somewhat behind their schedule, the NATO
even give Becerovic any real guidance on what he was aircraft appeared in the skies above Srebrenica at
supposed to do. The bleak reality of the 2nd Corps about 1430. Serb soldiers from the 1st Zvornik Bri
inability to give any help to its doomed 28th Division gade and its Drina Wolves unit, the 10th Sabotage
was a bitter pill for the defenders of Srebrenica , and Detachment, the 2nd Romanija Brigade, and the 1st
the taste would linger for years among the survivors, Birac Brigade had already entered the southern part of
poisoning the past and the future with allegations of the town and were picking their way through its aban
323
conspiracies , secret deals, and sellouts by Sarajevo.3 doned buildings. Guided by one of the four specially
324
forward air controllers , two F - 16s of the Royal
Dutch Air Force swooped down to attack the Bosnian
While Becirovic and the 2nd Corps staff in Tuzla des Serb vehicles advancing up the road just south of Sre
perately discussed what to do about the Serbs ' final brenica. The woman pilot of the first plane dropped a
push , the Bosnian Army's defense of Srebrenica was bomb on or near what looked like a tank . A few min
already beginning to unravel into a confused tangle utes later, the other Dutch warplane dropped its high
thatmade the sequence of events difficult to recon explosive bomb nearby, and that was it. Fully five days
struct. At about 1300 , when the VRS advance brought after the Dutch battalion's first request for Close Air
enemy troops into the immediate vicinity of the town, Support and six to eighthours after the Dutchbat had
it appears that the thousands of refugees clustered in expected a vast NATO air armada to create a “ zone of
Srebrenica's center made a wholesale dash northward . death ” obliterating all Serb heavy weapons in the area ,
The UN peacekeepers decided to retreat with them , two planes had dropped two bombs and departed .325
trying to stay ahead of the advancing Serbs and
between the VRS and the fleeing civilians . The retreat While the Dutch planes made their attack runs, two
was given further impetus at 1340 when the UN com American F - 16s looked for Serb targets south of Sre
pound took two direct hits from Bosnian Serb mortar brenica. Visibility was poor, and they gave up after
rounds. As both the refugees and the UN fell back , the failing to locate anything. Two other American F - 16s
defense of the enclave's eastern boundary unhinged , then took up the search , hunting for the Serb artillery
and the ARBiH 283rd Brigade swung around to join pieces that had been targeting OPs Mike and Novem
the northward retreat of the 282nd Brigade. The ber in the northwestern part of the enclave that morn
stream of refugees had become a torrent. Soon as ing. They, too , failed to find any suitable targets and
many as 25,000 Muslimswere huddled around the UN took off after a Serb soldier loosed an antiaircraftmis
compound at Potocari. sile from his shoulder-fired SA - 7 launcher.

Of the 18 NATO aircraft that had assembled over the The actual damage inflicted by NATO's ground attack
Adriatic Sea in preparation for making their way to package is difficult to assess, but the first bomb proba
Srebrenica, not all were capable of striking Serb bly at least damaged a Serb tank, and the second may
ground targets. The downing of an American F - 16 on have damaged some of the soft- skinned vehicles
2 June had brought a tightening of NATO rules for nearby . The practical results were even less impres
combat operations over Bosnia . The so - called ground sive , especially to the Bosnian Serbs , whose damaged
attack package thus had a substantial air defense com vehicles may not have been part of the advance attack
ponent of two EF -111 Suppression of Enemy Air wave . (They may have been parked south of the town
Defenses (SEAD ) aircraft, two EA -6B electronic war because their occupants had dismounted and were
fare aircraft, fighter escorts , two AWACS radar and already inside Srebrenica .) Militarily speaking, the
airborne command and control aircraft, fighter escorts , practical effect ofthe NATO airstrikes was approxi
and two tankers to keep the force in the air. This cara mately zero.326
van would keep the ground attack planes much safer
in hostile Serb airspace , but it also meant that only a
handful — six , actually — of the 18 planes in the air
were detailed to hit the Serbs on the ground .

339
Having tried and failed to affect the Serb operation Chapter 84
with their first aerial attack , the UNPROFOR com Srebrenica : After the Battle
manders had to decide whether to launch another and
perhaps larger air operation to make the point clearer; What would the Bosnian Serbs do with 40,000
they might even hope find and destroy some Serb Muslims?
heavy weapons before nightfall made this too difficult.
The decisionmaking process jumped a track only min -Rhetorical question by a senior UN
utes later, however,when an important message from official on 10 July 1995328
the Bosnian Serbs was relayed by radio through the
Dutch battalion headquarters in Potocari. Briefly but Clearly with respect to the protection of this
very clearly , the VRS explained that, if the UN did not particular eastern enclave, it has not been a
immediately put a stop to NATO air operations , all of good day.
the 30 Dutch prisoners — now hostages — in Serb cus
tody would be killed . More immediately, Serb artillery -White House Spokesman Michael
McCurry, 11 July 1995329
pieces were zeroed in on the UN compound in Poto
cari,which had become the focus of throngs ofMus
It doesn't take a rocket scientist to understand
lim refugees. If another airstrike was made, the VRS
what is happening ... The Serbs won a military
stated , the guns would open fire to slaughter peace
victory and now they want to ethnically cleanse
keepers and civilians alike. From the UN's standpoint,
the territory they captured . The sad fact is that
the choice was not a choice . The NATO warplanes
there isn't anything much we or anyone else can
were called off.
do about it.

About an hour after the VRS threat to kill the hos

-A UN official in Zagreb ,
tages , Bosnian Serb Army troops strode into the aban 12 July 1995330
doned UN compound at the extreme north end of
Srebrenica . Between 1,000 to 1,500 Bosnian Serb The Muslim enclaves in Bosnia are no longer
troops had traversed and occupied the entire town in viable and have to disappear. If notwewill take
defiance of the pale blue flag with its one-world them by force ... What's happening is not ethnic
imprint.327 Not long past 1600 on 11 July 1995 the cleansing, it's ethnic displacement - people who
noble experiment of the UN's first guaranteed safe want to leave.
area had fallen .
-Bosnian Serb President Radovan
The Serb operation and the UN responses had pro Karadzic , in an interview for El Pais331
gressed with a rapid mechanical precision that had
seemed to numb the participants to its implications. No one will do you any harm .
Now there was left a profound sense of shock and
amazement in UNPROFOR , the United Nations, and -Gen . Ratko Mladic, patting a Muslim
much of the Western world . Stunned statesmen first boy on the cheek on Serb television 332
had to grasp what had happened and then wonder
what to do next. What the Serbs had been able to do
seemed unreal, almost unimaginable , a bad dream
played out in a distant land . The nightmare was just
starting, however.

340
-

-
Those Who Stayed - UNPROFOR and the Karremans' insistence, the Dutch would be allowed to
Srebrenica Refugees, 11-21 July, 1995 escort the departing convoys. First, however, the refu
gee population would be separated into groups before
In the aftermath of the UN's failed aerial deterrent and being allowed to depart: wounded , sick and weak ;
the occupation of Srebrenica town by Serb forces, the women and children ; and able-bodied males. All able
UN commander there and the enclave's remaining bodied men would be " screened " for possible involve
Muslim leaders had some decisions to make. Late on ment in " war crimes " before being released. Kar
11 July , Lieutenant Colonel Karremans received remans objected vigorously to this ominous condition ,
orders from UN headquarters to negotiate an agree but Mladic summarily overruled him . To facilitate the
ment with the Bosnian Serbs, but, as before , his evacuation , the VRS further demanded that the UN
instructions gave him little advice about resolving provide the diesel fuel for the buses transporting the
their inherent difficulties. He was to negotiate a refugees out of the enclave. The Dutchbat had to dem
cease - fire with the VRS, surrender none ofhis weap onstrate that they had no diesel fuelbefore the Serbs
ons or equipment, safeguard the civilian population to consented to " advance" the fuel themselves. (The UN
the best of his ability, provide medical care to the made good on this condition only two days later when
roughly 25,000 refugees surrounding the UN com a logistic convoy was allowed to enter the enclave and
pound, and defend his battalion from attack by all transfer 30,000 liters of fuel to the VRS.) 336
means available.
With remarkable rapidity , Serb drivers began arriving
A shocking portent of a worse nightmare to come was with about 50 buses and trucks outside the Potocari
played out around 2000 on the night of 11 July when UN compound . As the first transports arrived , thou
GeneralMladic summoned Lieutenant Colonel Kar sands of panicked Muslims stormed the vehicles in a
remans to his new forward headquarters outside Poto rush to abandon their surroundings as quickly as pos
cari. On the floor of the room lay a live, trussed -up sible.337 Fearing the civiliansmight trample each other
pig. The Serb general offered Karremans a glass of in their rush to board the vehicles 338 and unwilling to
sljivovica plum brandy — which the Dutch commander let the Serb convoys leave wholly unmonitored , Kar
could hardly refuse — and, as the two raised their remans faced a dilemma: if he refused to help , he
glasses in a toast for the photographers, Mladic would have no control over a situation that kept deteri
ordered a Serb soldier to slaughter the pig in front of orating toward disaster ; the alternative, however, was
them . As the Serb slit the pig's throat and blood to assist the Bosnian Serbs with a form of ethnic
gushed on the floor, Mladic looked Karremans in cleansing on termsof their dictation. Karremans
the eye and said , “ This is how we deal with our elected to cooperate with the evacuation .
enemies.''333 334 335
Early in the afternoon the first convoys left westward
Karremans' firstmeeting with Mladic ended soon for Kladanj, but the ride ended well short of that desti
afterward, but he was summoned to a second one nation . Instead, the deportees were dropped off some
around 2300.Mladic , who held all the cards and knew 10 km outside Kladanj and left to make the rest of the
it , began listing the Serb conditions for the evacuation way themselves. Not only did this mean walking for
of Srebrenica, and he was uncompromising on hours in the blazing July sun carrying the sick , elderly,
everything injured , and small children , it also meant crossing
Serb -Muslim lines with the attendant risks of detonat
ing a mine or drawing rifle fire.339
12 July
The Dutch attempted to follow every convoy to ensure
Karremansmet with Mladic a third time the next the safety of the deportees , but Serb restrictions soon
morning, and now the terms for the evacuation of the left them with almost no ability to do this effectively .
residents were to be agreed upon - or, rather, dictated When GeneralMladic had agreed to let UNPROFOR
by GeneralMladic. The evacuation to Muslim -held
Kladanj was to start that very day at 1300 ; at

341
escorts accompany the refugee convoys, the Dutch When UNHCR staff people accompanying an aid con
had assumed that this meant there would be at least voy arrived at the Potocari base on the 14th , they
one peacekeeper per bus.340 Mladic, however, disputed found some 3,000 Srebrenica residents still there
this assumption , and the Serbs instead said they would including several hundred Muslim males already
allow two Dutch vehicles to accompany each convoy. aboard buses and under guard . When the UNHCR
This gave the peacekeepers far less scope to monitor staff departed Potocari a few hours later,nomore than
the fate of the refugees . The convoys were large, and it a few hundred Srebrenicans remained .342
proved impossible for either escorting vehicle to see
all parts of the convoy at all times. The Serb drivers
could simply divert from the route , if they wanted to , 15-21 July
without being detected , and the best the UN monitors
could do was try to verify that the samenumber of Virtually all of the enclave's population had departed
vehicles arrived near Kladanj as had set out from by now , either on foot during a desperately cata
Potocari. strophic breakout attempt or in the trucks and buses of
the Serb- run evacuation . There remained several
It was not long before even this much monitoring dozen seriously sick and wounded , the UN's Bosnian
became impossible as the Serbs began stealing Dutch Muslim employees,and the peacekeepers themselves.
vehicles, leaving the escorts to fend for themselves Problems created over their departures would take
and their charges on foot. In all, 13 UN convoy escort almost a week .
vehicles — along with weapons, blue helmets, and flak
jackets — were confiscated during this time.341 The UN On 15 July, 55 Dutch peacekeepers captured around
had not only surrendered control of the evacuation , it Srebrenica and held by the Bosnian Serbs at Bratunac
could no longer even monitor and report the situation . were released and allowed to make their way through
One way or another, between 3,000 and 4,000 refu Serbia for an eventual safe return to the Netherlands.
geesmade it to Kladanj that first day. The rest of the Dutch battalion remained in Sre
brenica .

13-14 July On 17 July, the last group of Bosnian wounded was

transferred to the custody of the ICRC.343 The VRS
The evacuation resumed at approximately 0630 on authorities required the Dutch battalion's deputy com
13 July. So many Dutch vehicles had already been mander,Major Franken , to sign a document specify
stolen by Serb troops that the peacekeepers had to fall ing that the evacuation of the refugees had proceeded
back on static monitoring from four observation posts " correctly " and that the “ Serb side has adhered to all
set up along the approximately 70 -kilometer route the regulations of the Geneva conventions and interna
from Potocari to Kladanj. This provided hardly more tional war law ." 344 Apparently fearing for the well
than a symbolic observation of the convoys and almost being of these last Muslim civilians, Major Franken
no ability to prevent abuses . Unhindered , the Serbs agreed to sign the text, after appending to it the hand
claimed they had all but completed the grim task of written amendment “ as far as it concerns convoys
deporting the Srebrenica refugees by about 1930. In actually escorted by UN forces.” The turnover of the
the course of the day ,Mladic had demanded that Kar wounded cleared the way for the Dutch battalion to
remans order the Dutch peacekeepers to leave the depart, as there was no one left to protect except for
town with the departing refugees, but this was one the few Bosnian UN employees. It would be a matter
demand that Karremans refused comply with . The of days , however, before the peacekeepers actually
Dutch commander insisted that the last peacekeepers departed the former safe area .
would not leave the enclave until all of the Muslim
wounded had been safely evacuated under UN
supervision .

342
After prolonged negotiations, the Dutch left the Sre from Konjevici Polje and Cerska, the area through
brenica enclave around noon on 21 July. Along with which the column would pass .350 Next followed the
them departed the Bosnian Muslim UN employees 283rd Brigade under its commander, Major Ejup
and the UNPROFOR vehicles and weapons not Golic , now the de facto leader of the entire refugee
already confiscated by the Serbs. For the UN peace column. With Major Golic were most of the town's
keepers, the wounded and the employees they tried to leaders and many of the enclave's best armed ARBiH
safeguard , and the Srebrenica women and children soldiers, all of whom knew that those at the front of
who had been bused out of Potocari and then forced to the column stood the best chance of survival. Bringing
walk to safety, escaping the enclave had been a dan up the rear was Ibro Dudic's 282nd Brigade, arguably
gerous and harrowing ordeal. They had no idea how the 28th Division's weakest and most expendable for
much harder it had been for those who left by other mation. Spaced in between were the other three 28th
means . Division brigades , with each brigade along the line
notionally responsible for looking after the unarmed
and unmilitary civilians in their segment of the col
Those Who Left: " The Death March ,” 11-16 July umn.351 Coordinating the movement of the column's
1995 components would be difficult at best, even within the
brigade areas. Communications would be limited to
Die , you scum , we are the champs ... Come out messages passed by hand up and down the column. A
on the terrace and hail the Serb race. command or report would take hours to pass all the
way down the line.
-A popular Serb radio tune,
July 1995345 To reach safety , the fleeing Muslim soldiers and their
civilian charges first had to traverse a gauntlet of Serb
patrols and ambushes. Dutch peacekeepers driving
14 July : TheMarch Sets Out northward had already seen Bosnian Serbs forming
cordons all along the main road north , which the flee
On the evening of 11 July, a few hours after Serb sol ing Muslims inevitably had to cross at one point or
diers had occupied the town center of Srebrenica , another. These UN personnel later reported small
some 12,000 ARBiH soldiers and Muslim civilians
encampments of Bosnian Serb soldiers with weapons
gathered in the little village of Susnjari in the north and blankets every 10 to 20 meters along the length of
western corner of the enclave. They had decided to road from Bratunac to Nova Kasaba to Milici. This
make a break for freedom rather than surrender to the apparentdemonstration of VRS strength , however ,
advancing Serbs.346 Their barely conceivable intention was actually a weak screen that the ARBiH 28th Divi
was to sneak past the VRS patrols and make their way sion's speartip — despite the pathetic state of the rear
through tens of kilometers of Serb -held territory to portions of the column — would easily penetrate . The
government-held lines. Their collective decision was a ICTY's presentation at Krstic's trial of VRS com
terrible gamble ,borne of fear and desperation, and a mander conversations intercepted by the ARBiH and
horrific odyssey lay before them . Fewer than half VRS documents make it clear that the VRS lost con
would survive the trek . tact with the 28th Division on 10 and 11 July and that
on 12 July the bulk of the Drina Corps' combat power
The assemblage ofmilitary - age males could only was vainly searching for the 28th Division in the
loosely be called a fighting force. Probably no more southwestern portion of the former enclave known as
than 1,200 of the thousands in the column were the Bandera triangle. In the process, the Drina Corps
armed , so the rest could fairly be described as civil was also shifting its assault formations toward jump
ians.347348 To minimize the effects of the landmines
ing off positions for the upcoming attack against Zepa.
they would encounter, they formed themselves into a To stop the 28th Division in the box between the east
long column, two abreast, that stretched for about west Bratunac-Konjevic Polje road and north -south
12 kilometers.349 Roughly 500 meters ahead of the Konjevic Polje -Nova Kasaba-Milici road were
column scouted 600 troops from the 284th Light
Brigade , most of whose soldiers had originally come

343
stretched two battalions from the 1st Bratunac Brigade Serb patrols , fixed positions, and ambushes took a
along the east-west route and elements of the 5th ghastly toll of the fragmented column. Tired ,
Engineer Battalion, theMilitary Police Battalion of exhausted,many of them unarmed, the retreating
the 65th Protection Regiment, someMUP Special Muslimswere often caught unawares in the open and
Police , and sometroops from the 1st Milici Brigade simply mowed down. One survivor described a Serb
along the north -south route . Beyond these units, there machinegun nest killing 70 men at one go while their
were little or no VRS troops until the frontlines south- Muslim comrades pushed on as fast as they could ,
east of Tuzla . Unwittingly, the Drina Corps had left its praying that the bullets would not reach them.361 Oth
back door open.352 ers were fooled and trapped by Serb soldiers driving
white -painted UN vehicles and wearing the peace
The long line of retreating Srebrenica men set out at keepers ' distinctive blue helmets. Then the captured
about 0200 on 12 July.353 Most of the first day's travel dupeswould be forced to try to lure other Muslimsout
proceeded without incident, but their luck was not to of hiding.
last. That evening themain body of the column was
ambushed for the firsttime as it approached an asphalt Countless fleeing Muslims simply gave up . Some
road between Bratunac and the villages of Kamenica committed suicide, shooting themselves or lying down
and Konjevic Polje,354 about 10 km from Srebrenica. on live grenades. Others wentmad from the cumula
The front end , however, had already penetrated the tive effects of no food, poor water, and insufficient
VRS ring on the Konjevic Polje -Nova Kasaba road sleep while trekking dozens of miles through enemy
and was pushing up the Cerska valley . territory where Serb ambushes could be sprung at any
second.
Still only loosely organized and taken by surprise , the
main body of the column suffered someof the worst Numerous reports of hallucinations and crazed behav
and costliest fighting of the long journey to come on ior experienced or witnessed by survivors of the jour
12-14 July 355 Relentless waves of mortar and infantry ney left some wondering if they had been exposed to
fire swept down and over its ranks,killing hundreds of chemical weaponry during the battle for Srebrenica or
men as they stood and scattering hundreds more in its aftermath . Specifically , international investigators
heaps of writhing wounded .356 357 Men further back in have questioned whether the VRS may have used the
the column later reported passing bodies piled on the chemical warfare agent BZ on Srebrenica's defend
ground or dumped into streams.Many of the victims ers.362 A hallucinogen like BZ would produce many of
had their throats cut; a few had been completely the strange behaviors reported by survivors and the
decapitated.358 occasional reports of shells emitting a ground-hugging
smoke instead of detonating. No accurate reconstruc
The consequences of this first ambush were cata tion of the 28th Division's incredible journey has been
strophic and doomed any possibility of a coherent possible, and two scientific investigations failed to
march to freedom for the back end of the column. The find traces of BZ in areas of its alleged use . Within a
sudden attack precipitated a panicked stampede group of thousands of hungry , sleep -deprived men
among the mostly civilian Muslims, dissolving much marching for days through miles of enemy-held terri
of the tenuous organization and discipline they had tory it is entirely plausible that some, even many,
started out with . At one stroke on their first day's would simply snap . Years after the fact, it may now be
march the column had been cut in half, and thereafter impossible to prove or disprove whether chemical
neither portion would know the whereabouts or the agents were used during or after the Srebrenica
condition of the other. The forward part the column battle . 363 364
roughly one-third of the original and including the
best armed andmost capable of the troops - continued As they continued their escape through the forest and
the advance still in its original, semiorganized forma glens west of Srebrenica , the surviving Muslims from
tion . The remaining two -thirds disintegrated into the main body of the column on 13 July faced a daunt
smaller groups , each proceeding separately along ing obstacle: they had come to the asphalt highways
generally the same route but with little or no
knowledge of each other. 359 360

344

--
running between Bratunac -Konjevic Polje and areas of the 1st Zvornik Brigade and even threaten
Konjevic Polje-Milici. They could treat the roads as a Zvornik itself. As the OTP expert stated during
barrier confining them to starvation or surrender or as Krstic's trial:
a shooting gallery for the thinly stretched Serb pickets
and patrols drawn from the 1st Bratunac Brigade , 2nd one of the consistent themes that's found
Romanija Brigade, 5th Engineer Battalion , the MUP when you look at the reports and the documents
Special Police , the 65th Protection Regiment, 10th is that ... all of the relevant VRS officers under
Sabotage Detachment, and 1st Milici Brigade posted estimated the physical size of the column and the
along their edge. Most eventually tried to traverse the military threat that it posed to a point where , by
road, and many perished in the attempt. Somemade the afternoon of the 13th , by the late evening
no decision at all, hiding out in the woods until dis hours of the 13th , it was a very significantmili
covery or death from the elements made it for them.365 tary threat and additional resources had to be
Perhaps as many as 2,000 would surrender — to suffer mobilized
the same fate as those who had been herded off back at
Srebrenica , gunned down in a hail of bullets, and bur As the Main Staff realized the size of the column, it
ied in mass graves.366 issued an order on 13 July that “ all available able
bodied manpower” be used to destroy the column.
The bravest or most desperate attempted to cross the With the best units of the 1st Zvornik Brigade near
road, mostly in small groups and at night. Those who Zepa, however, it was too late .
succeeded then pressed on through a series of devas
tated villages where many of them had once resided . As the 28th Division's advance guard moved out on
They had to cross two small mountain ranges and ford 14 July, the few reserves of the 1st Zvornik Brigade
two rivers.367 Passing by the abandoned village of Cer that remained attempted to stop its escape. The 28th
ska, they arrived atMt. Udrc late on 13 July. There Division troops — despite their depletion and exhaus
they rested , willing to wait a day or so for less lucky tion — vastly outnumbered the VRS defenders and
and more disoriented fragments of the column to overran them , apparently near the small village of
arrive and regroup.368 After about a day's time, about Snagovo, southwest of Zvornik . Like the first ambush
5,000 to 6,000 people had gathered — roughly half the on 12 July, this one opened with a rain of mortar
group that had originally set out.369 The Muslims rest rounds, followed by Serbs pressing the attack with
ing on Mt. Udrc on 14 July had been lucky and rela small arms. This time the Muslims rallied under fire
tively unmolested by the Serbs . They had also despite their desperate state — or perhaps because of it.
exhausted their supplies , however, and drained the last For five hours they fought to clear the ambush.371 This
of their drinking water.370 For the next two days the time, however, they disengaged from their attackers in
retreating Muslimswould be tested to the limit by two good order as heavy rain and approaching night
opponents: the Serb enemy and their own physical obscured their movements.372 373 According to a VRS
exhaustion. Nevertheless, the 28th Division was set to document acquired by the ICTY, the 1st Zvornik Bri
give the VRS a bloody nose . gade's chief of staff reported to the Drina Corps late
on 14 July that, with his few reserves overrün and two
of his infantry battalions squeezed between the main
14 July : The Battle at Snagovo 2nd Corps force in the “ Sapna Thumb” and the des
perate 28th Division, he expected the Muslimsto
Since the fall of the enclave on 11 July , the Main Staff make a significant breakthrough at that point later that
and the Drina Corps had underestimated the size and evening or on 15 July.
cohesion of the escaping Muslim column. With their
escape from the Konjevic -Milici road , the toughest
veterans of the 28th Division — who had given the
VRS almostmore than it could handle in 1992 and
1993 — were now in a position to plunge into the rear

345
Just northwest of Zvornik , the ARBiH 28th Division Responsibility for the hastily planned rescue effort fell
and the VRS 1st Zvornik Brigade, including the Drina mostly on units of Brigadier Salih Malkic's 24th Divi
Wolves, slugged it out on 15 and 16 July. Lieutenant sion . The main attack would come from the area
Colonel Vinko Pandurevic , the Zvornik Brigade com around Dugi Dio and Gaj, led by the 242nd Zvornik
mander, had started moving his best troops back from Muslim Light Brigade379 and the 243rd Muslim
the Zepa attack on 15 July to help stop the column,but Podrinje Mountain Brigade , with elements of the
they were not yet in position.374 The final hurdles for 245th and 246th Mountain Brigades and Naser Oric's
the 28th Division lay just outside the Muslim -held vil own small group of forces, which had been with him
lages ofMedjedja and Nezuk and the Serb -held Baljk- in the Tuzla area during Srebrenica's agonized fall.380
ovica Hill along the frontline trenches in the " Sapna The 241st Spreca -Muslim Light Brigade ,381 the 24th
Thumb." Here the surviving Bosnian troops collected " Black Wolves " Sabotage Battalion , and a composite
for a last dash past Serb lines to the safety of govern force scraped together from elements of the 21st and
ment- held territory . Atthis moment of final hope in 22nd Divisions would try to divert and draw off Serb
what had been a virtually hopeless enterprise, the col fire with a supporting attack.382 383
umn's Moses, Major Ejup Golic, picked 120 of his
bestmen to lead a charge through the Serb lines and to It was dawn on 16 July when 24th Division troops
freedom . Major Golic and his troops overwhelmed the made their first contact with the lead elements of the
4th Infantry Battalion of the 1st Zvornik Brigade, wip- 28th Division column who had stormed Serb defenses
ing out its headquarters on 15 July . Their rush had by day and wriggled past sentries by night. In less than
taken the enemyby surprise , and they not only drove two hours the contact pointwas widened into a narrow
through to safety but also seized and carried off a escape corridor for as many fleeing Muslims as could
Praga self - propelled antiaircraft gun and two self be rounded up , despite frantic efforts by 1st Zvornik
propelled artillery pieces.375 376 377 Brigade and Drina Wolves troops to stem the tide .
Almost incredibly, the VRS picked this moment to
The dash for freedom led by the gallantMajor Golic propose a five -day local cease - fire beginning at 1300 ;
and the 28th Division soldiers who followed him was VRS documents acquired by the ICTY indicate that
facilitated by men of the 2nd Corps ' 24th Division , the Zvornik Brigade had suffered very heavy casual
assembled at the lastminute for an offensive designed ties in the fighting on 15-16 July, losing 40 to 60 sol
to open a corridor for the desperate survivors of Sre diers killed in action and over 150 wounded .384 The
brenica . When word had first reached Sarajevo that unlooked - for respite permitted some 4,500 soldiers
the Srebrenica enclave had fallen and that a column of and civilians of the tattered 28th Division column to
troops and refugees was trying to break westward to pass through the corridor to friendly lines. Even after
reach friendly lines , Naser Oric and others petitioned the cease -fire expired , the 24th Division tried to keep
for a 2nd Corps thrust eastward to link up to the flee the rescue corridor open , but VRS attacks soon
ing forces. From 11 to 16 July , the ARBiH leadership pinched it off. Thereafter, the best the 2nd Corps could
debated what should , could , and might be done. An ad manage were periodic infiltration missions behind
hoc offensive operation looked like as vain a hope as Serb lines to try to locate Muslim bands still in hiding
the 28th Division's breakout attempt, which was leav and convey them back safely. Defying the odds, these
ing a trail of dead and dying refugees all the way back missions succeeded in helping back another 700 or so
to Srebrenica and had yet to encounter the main Serb survivors.385 This last remnant brought the total survi
lines .Not until the last possible hour did the 2nd vor list to less than half of the 12,000 who had set out.
Corps commanders agree to allow a quick rescue
operation ; their delay in granting the grudging Late in the day on 16 July the first survivors of the
approval would generate endless recriminations and longmarch from Srebrenica began to arrive in Tuzla ,
frequent finger pointing by those who thought more ready to tell the world tales of their horrific journey.
could have been done sooner.378

346
There was more to the horrors of the fallen enclave , out candy to captiveMuslim children . Few non -Serb
however, than even the journey's pitiful survivors viewers saw any sincerity in the general's smiling
knew . More, and worse , was still to come.386 387 exterior, and on succeeding days he would be reported
at nearby locales such as Nova Kasaba and Karakaj,
where Muslim men from the enclave were being
17-18 July : Arrival held . 391

Probably around 5,000 to 6,000 of Srebrenica's In the stark and brutal world of the Balkan wars, the
defenders finally made it to the safety of government detention of fighting-age males in captured terr
controlled territory, most arriving in late July but a few had been played outtime and again . Some were exam
straggling through in August or even September ined and dismissed , some were accused of “ war
weeks after the enclave's fall.388 389 The long and wind crimes” and imprisoned or executed on the spot, and
ing route the column took and the detours it made to many others were simply held captive for eventual
avoid Serb ambushes meant that the ragged remnants release or exchange for the other sides ' prisoners. The
who finally streamed into Tuzla had covered more Serb forces were not unique in their detention of hun
than 100 km on foot,much of it without food or water. dreds or even thousands of fighting-age males . Just
They had prevailed with few arms and hardly any two months before the fall of the Srebrenica safe area
communications equipment, battling enemy forces the Croatian Government had detained captured Kra
that lay in ambush or pursued them from behind.390 By jina Serb males for “war crimes” when it took over
the standards of not only the Bosnian conflict but of UN Sector West. After the evacuations from Sre
modern military history as well , it had been an epic brenica there was natural concern about the where
journey . abouts of the men who had been kept back , but it
would take some time before concern turned to suspi
cion and finally to alarm . It would be longer still
TheMassacre of the Fighting-Age Males, before the mass executions thathad been their fate
11-14 July 1995 * would be discovered and confirmed . 392

12 July : The Separations 13-14 July : The Executions

From the very start of the evacuation organized by the The Muslim men rounded up and segregated by the
Serbs on 12 July , it was clear that they had different victors of Srebrenica on 12 and 13 July were driven
plans for different segments of the Srebrenica popula off and detained in nearby villages like Bratunac ,
tion. Some people were allowed to leave immediately, Nova Kasaba, and Kravica . These locations seemed to
and women , children , and older couples were waved be collection points where Muslim prisoners were
on to buses and trucks as quickly as they could be brought in over time as they surrendered or were
rounded up . It was equally clear that the victors were captured . There was often brutal treatment, random
detaining most of themales over 16 , uniformed or not, abuse, and sporadic executions in these holding areas,
reportedly for questioning in nearby Bratunac. What but in general these initial holding points did not serve
was not clear was where exactly these men were as killing grounds. Rather, the Muslim prisoners to be
going, how long they would be held , or when and killed were taken away and executed at sites spread
under what circumstances the Serbs would release out all across northeast Bosnia.393
them . On the first day of the evacuation , Bosnian Serb
television showed General Mladic at Srebrenica play
ing the role of the magnanimous victor and handing

* For additionaldetails of the VRS commanders and their organiza

tion and planning of the mass executions, see ICTY Krstic trial
transcripts from 28-30 June 2000 .

347
 The largest single execution appears to have taken outside the village of Kravica , about 15 kilometers
place near the village of Karakaj, 25 km northwest of northwest of Srebrenica.405 The Kravica warehouse
Srebrenica , near Zvornik , where on 14 July at least appears to have been first a transfer point for Muslim
several hundred and asmany as 2,000 men died .394 prisoners captured during the retreat and then an exe
According to one witness, dozens of Muslim men cution site. At first prisoners from the vicinity of
were first brought to a house near the UN compound Kravica seem to have been taken elsewhere to be
in Potocari, which served as a collection point, during killed , probably the execution sites near Karakaj or
the day on 12 July. Around 1900 ,Mladic himself Bratunac . Then , for two or three hours on the evening
showed up , insisting that they were merely being held of 13 July, Serb soldiers simply fired into the holding
until a prisoner exchange could be negotiated : “ Don't area in the Kravica warehouse, tossing in some gre
be afraid ... Nothing will happen to you. Not a single nades for good measure.406 (Months later, bullet holes
hair will be missing from your head . We just need you and grenade fragments were still visible in the ware
for the exchange.” The prisoners were then loaded house walls.) The next morning a huge earthmover
aboard buses and taken north toward Bratunac and drove straight through the wall of the warehouse to
lodged in a warehouse with a dirt floor. About 50 pris make a wider opening for the equipment used to scoop
oners were taken away during the night of 12-13 July out the bodies. Loaded onto trucks, the bodies were
and beaten , some so severely that they died upon their buried in mass graves in two adjacent fields at
return .GeneralMladic returned to the site on the 13th , Glogova,407 about one and a half kilometers away.
again around 1900 , and ordered a count of the prison
ers. The tally came to 296.Later that evening the pris AtNova Kasaba, south of Konjevic Polje , probably
oners boarded buses once again . This time they were about 1,000 Muslim males were herded into a soccer
taken to a large school gymnasium near the town of stadium surrounded by Serb guards.Most of the men
Krizevici, where as many as 2,500 prisoners had col had been captured after the disastrous first ambush of
lected by the night of 13-14 July .Mladic appeared a the 28th Division's escape column between Nova
third time at the sports hall around noon on 14 July, Kasaba and Kravica . During the day on the 13th ,
after which the prisoners were loaded onto trucks and probably after his appearance at the warehouse near
again driven off. This time, however, their destination Bratunac ,GeneralMladic addressed the prisoners at
was not just another collection point.395 396 397 the Nova Kasaba stadium and assured them they
would not be harmed . Then he left. A few hours later,
According to survivors of that last truck ride , two in the evening, the prisoners were taken to two nearby
groups of captured Muslim men were executed near fields, lined up and shot, and buried in mass graves.410
411 412
the village of Sahanici outside Karakaj. One group
was taken to a grassy field , lined up into four rows,
and mowed down with automatic weapons fire . Perhaps the most chilling account of the executions
Another group was reportedly taken to a gravel field came from Drazen Erdemovic , an ethnic Croat origi
atop a small plateau and executed in similar fashion. nally from theMuslim -majority town of Tuzla who
After knocking down waves ofmen with Kalashnikov had joined the Bosnian Serb Army. He described how
and machinegun fire , Serb soldiers walked among the he had participated in the mass killing of some 1,200
piled bodies, looking for signs of life and putting extra Muslim males at the Branjevo collective farm near the
rounds into the heads of those who moved . The hand small village of Donja Pilica. The execution site was
ful ofmen who survived the executions by hiding almost 50 km north of Srebrenica , an indication of the
nder the bodies escaped in the night to the sound of scope of the Serb extermination effort and of an inten
heavy machinery moving or covering up the dead. 398 to scatter and conceal the gravesites over a wi
399 400 401 402 403 404
area . Erdemovic had been a member of the VRS ' 10th
Sabotage Detachment, commanded by Lt.Milorad
Asmany as 2,000 more Muslims - captives who had Pelemis . The 80 -man detachment was one of the most
surrendered after the first VRS ambush thwarted their
attempt to escape - died in an agriculturalwarehouse

348
elite units in the VRS , reporting directly to Col. Petar Security Council resolutions, occupy a UN safe area ,
Salapura, Chief of Military Intelligence within the and effectively take an entire UN peacekeeping battal
VRS Main Staff's Intelligence and Security Director ion hostage , it seemed likely that they held all interna
ate. Its job was “ eliminating troublesome people” and tional conventions lightly ,making the UN's presence
" sabotaging sensitive targets behind enemy lines.” 413 something less than a deterrent to whatever Serb
forces wanted to do .
As Erdemovic related it , he and seven other members
of the 10th Sabotage Detachment were ordered to The first reports of rape, brutality, and murder in their
report to Zvornik where they met an unnamed VRS violated safe area began to reach the UN after the
lieutenant colonel, possibly the Chief of Security for night of 11-12 July, when the Bosnian Serb troops
the Drina Corps. They followed him to an obscure moved at will through the 20,000 or so people camped
location near a collective farm ,where he told them outside theUN compound . They grabbed people
curtly : “ This is where the buses will arrive." Each sol seemingly atrandom and took them away to be raped ,
dier had his AK -47 rifle , and an M84 machinegun beaten , or disposed of without trace. The first narra
with a load of ammunition was mounted in a nearby tives of these experiences reached journalists in Tuzla
vehicle . The first of the promised buses arrived shortly and the outside world in a matter of days. As thou
afterward,with about 60 Muslim prisoners guarded by sands of refugees began to pour into Tuzla, stories of
the two VRS military policemen . In groups of 10 , the Serb atrocities multiplied : rapes of women , random
men were led out into the field and gunned down in executions in the night,bodies left in the streets. These
rows. At first Erdemovic and his Serb companions accounts came only from the area immediately around
used their Kalashnikov rifles, but later they fired the theUN camp at Potocari and outrightkillings reported
M84 machinegun to speed things up . They finished were few . The level of brutality said to have been vis
their work around 1530 that afternoon and left the ited upon temporary captives of the Serbs began to
field covered with the corpses of 1,000 to 1,200 Mus raise fears about the fate of others still being held , par
lim men . Later in the day,men described as volunteers ticularly the military -age men.418 419 420 421
from Bratunac - most likely soldiers from the 1st Bra
tunac Light Infantry Brigade — executed some 500 The arrival in Tuzla of the first survivors of the “ death
more Muslim prisoners stillheld in the Pilica commu march ” late on 16 June raised the scope and scale of
nity hall. When it was all over, a bulldozer cameto the after-action horrors to a new level. These survivors
cover the bodies.414 415 described almost defenseless men beingmowed down
by machinegun fire and blown apart by shells,
In the weeks after Srebrenica's capture smaller groups ambushed in traps and hunted down like game,men
ofMuslims, a dozen or so at a time, were executed at driven crazy by the travails of pursuit,men whose
places like Zabrde and Rasica Gai. Many Muslims still-twitching bodies were stacked like firewood. To
captured along the escape route were probably shot foreign observers of the Balkans, however, even these
where they were found by VRS soldiers, and probably gruesome actions fell within the scope ofmilitary
manymore Muslimswere simply left to die of their experience : there had been a battle and one army was
wounds. Few of the victims of these smaller execu in hot pursuit of the remnants of an enemy formation
tions will ever be named or even numbered.416 417 still in retreat. In wars across the centuries, it could be
said , armies have hounded each other unmercifully,
riding down defeated foes and seeking to eliminate as
Late July : The Realizations many potential adversaries as possible. The Serbs'
post-Srebrenica pursuit tactics could be seen as just a
From the very beginning after the enclave's capture , particularly grim example of the familiar horrors of
there were indications that bad things would happen . war. It was troubling to reflect, however, that it was
The real question was how many bad things, how bad , aspects of the Serbs' previous behavior that had
and whether the UN could do anything about it . If the
Bosnian Serbs could casually defy a sheaf of UN

349
created such terror within the enclave as to impel This Bosnians' tactic failed disastrously on every
thousands of its male inhabitants to prefer the desper level. Their efforts to blockade the Dutch withdrawals
ate gamble of a breakout to peaceful surrender. Nei and to maneuver Dutch teams into firefights with the
ther the UN nor the Bosnian Army was yet certain just VRS merely antagonized the Dutch peacekeepers and
what had happened , but fears were growing about the their higher headquarters. They also played into the
men still unaccounted for. hands of Serb propagandists , who, as the VRS
advanced on Srebrenica , were able to contrast the
The full truth would not emerge nor be confirmed Serbs ’ initial “ correct” dealings with Dutchbat to the
until a tiny handful of survivors from among the thou threatening actions ofMuslim commanders and sol
sands ofmassacred men eventually made their way to diers. Bosnian Serb media reveled in the story that the
safety and began to narrate the unthinkable . Their Dutch peacekeepers manning the isolated OPs were
narratives — detailed , credible, and eventually corrobo choosing to be taken in by the Serbs rather than risk
rated by other evidence provided the first insights ing a return to hostile Muslim lines. The death of Pri
into the full scope of the Srebrenica horrors. The vate van Renssen at the hands of a Muslim solder was
assembled evidence presented a compelling, compos particularly telling, at least as far as the Dutchbat was
ite picture of the systematic execution of 7,000 or concerned . UN peacekeepers who had only limited
more Muslim males,most of them taken captive and contacts with the enclave's Muslim population (and a
summarily executed . Clearly , the Bosnian Serbs ’ generally negative impression of its 28th Division
actions could no longer be written off as either iso defenders ) were going to think more than once before
lated , unauthorized brutalities or an extreme example risking their lives in defense of a populace that had
of warfare . It was mass murder. just murdered one of their comrades.

Another manifestation of the hope that the UN and

Chapter 85 NATO could be brought in on their side occurred
Srebrenica — Analysis and Aftermath when the 28th Division declined to accept the weap
ons in the UN weapons control point. The lack of
these marginal weapons hardly made a difference in
The Bosnian Army the final outcome of the battle , but the ARBiH's
refusal to accept the armswhen they were offered is
Bosnian Army strategy in Srebrenica had rested further evidence of their reliance on the UN for their
entirely on getting the UN to defend the enclave , one defense and an acknowledgment that their own mili
way or another. There is no evidence that they had any tary position was hopeless .
other plan . As events unfolded , the idea was to prove
catastrophic. However disastrous its outcome, the Having depended completely on the UN for the
ARBiH had little choice except to put all its chips on defense of the enclave, when that aid was not forth
the UN . Theirs was a strategy of desperation . coming the Muslims had nothing to fall back on . It
wasnot until 11 July, when the 28th Division's leaders
From the outset, the 28th Division appears to have discovered that the UN's idea of defending the safe
deliberately planned and acted to get the Dutch peace area was a pinprick airstrike on a single Serb tank, that
keepers directly in the way of the Bosnian Serbs so they appear to have realized that the UN could or
that a confrontation between the VRS and the UN would not save them . By then there was no time to
would impel NATO to provide flying artillery for the reconsider the fundamentals of the defensive plan , and
blue helmets and the Srebrenica safe area. This is why nothing could be done. Serb soldiers were already
division personnel kept trying to force Dutch crews to occupying the southern portions of Srebrenica town .
remain at their positions, blocking their attempts to The Muslim defensive line had all but collapsed, and
pull back and trying to prevent the UN from concen
trating its forces inside the bases at Srebrenica and
Potocari.

350

---
two of the Division's brigades were in headlong seemed viable. Taking back the weapons and stores
retreat north toward Potocari. There was no time held in the UN weapons collection point, even at the
for a new gambit: the Muslims had already been very outset of the battle, would have gained him little
checkmated . and lost him the moral edge of respecting the safe
area's proscriptions. Most of the weapons surrendered
Not that a vigorous military defense could have done to the UN were turned in because they were next to
much for the crowded , beleaguered enclave . Even if useless ; a few dozen weapons, most of them without
every other factor had operated in its favor,without ammunition , would have been as effective as a cup of
heavy weapons the ARBiH had no way of stopping water on a prairie fire . The loneM48 mountain gun
even the puny armored column that poked into Sre with its 40 rounds of ammunition — the enclave's
brenica. Is it possible that they could have somehow entire heavy weapons inventory — could have been
convinced the Serbs that the costs of their operation employed briefly against the Serb armored advance to
might exceed the gains or bought enough timewith improve themorale of the enclave's defenders, but at
fighting withdrawals to prompt the cautious Serbs to best the effects would have delayed the outcome of the
be satisfied with the fruits of their initial advances ? It battle by an hour or so . Finally , Becirovic could have
is impossible to say with any certainty ,but the evi taken the Dutch troops hostage until the UN did some
dence suggests not. The nature of the attack and its thing to halt the Serb offensive . The possible sort-term
nightmare aftermath all indicate that the VRS was advantages of such a bold stroke were outweighed by
determined to eradicate the Srebrenica enclave , ini its likely consequences. If the UN did accept the
tially through the seizure of all the territory around blackmail and intervene to halt the July fighting, the
Srebrenica town to make it untenable, and then — with aftermath would almost certainly be Srebrenica's
its opposition weakened — the direct capture of the doom . The surrounded enclave was completely depen
town itself. This being so , it seems unlikely that even a dent on the UN for not only its defense but also for its
master tactician ,making the fullest possible use of the sustenance — food,medical assistance , military
resources available, could have saved the enclave with defense, and political protection. How much of this
a military defense. A successful counterattack follow would continue after a momentarily successful show
ing the 28th Division's surprise recapture of Kozlje down with the UN at gunpoint ? The thin blue line of
and Zivkovo Brdo on the 10th could have bought time the Dutch battalion would be withdrawn , the nebulous
for a UN response or perhaps forced an indecisive cover of a NATO air umbrella would vanish , the tenu
VRS commander to reconsider - for a time. In a situa ous international lifeline would shrivel, and Becirovic
tion where the UN was the indecisive party and the would be totally on his own to face the next and last
Serb offensive .
VRS apparently dead set on achieving victory, the
28th Division could have held out for no more than
another day or two, however. Ammunition reserves Such must have been Becirovic's thinking when he
were almost exhausted by the 11th , a shift of forces to entrusted everything to the UN , which offered the only
block the VRS advance from the south would have left defense available to him and left him without a
the north or west of the enclave undefended, and the backup plan if that defense should fail. It is only with
2nd Corps in Tuzla was simply incapable of hacking a the hindsight knowledge of the UN's failure and its
corridor through Serb -held Bosnia to relieve the sur consequences that Becirovic's last unchosen option
rounded enclave . a sacrificial last stand — can reasonably be examined .
House -to -house battles fought in the streets of Sre
In sum , acting 28th Division commander Becirovic brenica and a guerrilla war conducted from the sur
probably made themost sensible choice for the cir rounding woods: these now look preferable to the
cumstances of the moment. Only in hindsight could it docile surrenders and desperate flights that left thou
be said that fighting and dying in the enclave might sands executed in the fields outside the town. Whatwe
seem a nobler course than the surrendering and dying
that was to be the fate of so many of the defenders . At
the time, none of Becirovic's visible alternatives

351
know now they did not know then , however, and it is had somehow gotten by in the face of seemingly insur
uncertain that in terms of lives lost and advantages mountable adversities: it had survived withoutweap
gained another military option would have had any ons, without ammunition , and often without the UN .
better outcome. Lacking all of these things and facing the most deter
mined Serb offensive yet, Srebrenica could not survive
A fighting stand in Srebrenica, if one could be made, without leadership .
might have made a difference , given the Serbs' tradi
tional reluctance to close with the enemy and suffer
the inevitable combat losses ofmodern urban warfare. The Bosnian Serbs — The Consequences of
There were serious problems even with this course of Srebrenica
action. Not all the men of the 28th Division were
armed, and after the Serbs attacked few had more than Srebrenica was taken in a matter of days and atmar
a day's supply of ammunition . Even when the ARBiH ginal cost to the Serbs. Arguably, it was one of the eas
decapitated the first Serb column on 10 July and iest VRS victories of the war. From a political
seized a critical defensive point, it took Becirovic too standpoint, the post-victory massacres and the world
long to round up too few men to exploit the opportu wide outrage and international condemnation that fol
nity. A street- by -street contest for Srebrenica town at lowed constituted a colossal defeat. The long-term
that point would probably have prolonged the fight consequences of the Bosnian Army operation at Sre
and increased the losses to the Bosnian Serbs, but it brenica remain open to debate .
could only have delayed , not changed , the final
outcome. The emerging news of themass execution of thou
sands of civilians at Srebrenica seared international
A resumption of the partisan struggle the enclave had public opinion in a way that no previous events in the
so bravely mounted in 1992 and 1993* was theoreti Balkans had ever done. Even the earlier images of
cally also an option , but Srebrenica in 1995 was not Serb -run concentration camps or occasional shelling
Srebrenica in 1992, and the guerrilla campaign fought massacres had not provoked this sort of reaction in
from the woods in 1992 lasted only about a month . In Western capitals. The French Government was partic
1995 , Srebrenica's defenders were responsible for ularly agitated that such barbarities could be con
almost 60,000 refugees who could neither be aban ducted in blatant defiance of the international
doned nor easily taken to the woods . If, on the other community . The immediate practical effects of this
hand , the enclave's civilian population had somehow public condemnation could be quickly calculated by
been evacuated to government-held territory , there the Serbs : they were practically nil . No punitivemili
would be neither reason nor incentive for the enclave's tary steps , not even diplomatic wrist slaps , followed as
soldiers to fight on . a direct consequence of the Srebrenica operation .

Finally, and significantly, Ramiz Becirovic was no On the other side of the balance, Bosnian Serbs
Naser Oric. A young, vibrant, charismatic fighter like retained possession of both Srebrenica and Zepa , even
Oric could perhaps have inspired the people to make a after the divvying up of territory imposed by the Day
last fighting stand or embark on an arduous guerrilla ton peace accords . Thus, the VRS occupation of the
campaign on the slim hope of regaining their homes. safe area achieved a crucial war aim , " clearing the
A weak, thin , 45 -year- old deputy commander, who map " for the entire region north ofGorazde. The cost
had painfully survived a helicopter crash two months to the Serb international image may have been irrepa
earlier and was barely able to walk , could not. In the rable , butthe eventual situation on the ground seems
more than three years of war it had faced , Srebrenica to have been the overriding consideration for Bosnian
Serb decisionmakers at the time. From this standpoint,
See Section III, Chapter 28 , “ Battleson the Drina, Round One:
they achieved their goals.422
April to December 1992” and Section IV , Chapter 36 , “ Battles on
the Drina, Round Two: December 1992 to August 1993 ” for a nar
ration of the Muslim guerrilla campaign fought in the area around
Srebrenica in 1992 and 1993.

352
How the international outrage generated by the Although it is certainly believable that the VJ may
takeover of Srebrenica ultimately affected the Bosnian have sent some special operations forces to assist its
Serbs in practical termsis hard to judge . Srebrenica VRS allies in a briefbattle only a few miles from the
was clearly a major milestone on the path to more vig- Yugoslav border, it does not follow that they were
orous Western diplomatic and military engagement in either an essential part of the operation's execution or
Bosnia .* While it did not result in punitive NATO mil a decisive factor in the battle's outcome. The VRS ,
itary action (the first of which was triggered by a sub though undermanned at the strategic level, was more
sequent shelling incident in Sarajevo ) or directly bring than capable of defeating a weak , disorganized , and
about the Dayton negotiations (prompted more by the nearly unarmed opponent in a local engagement with
ongoing Croatian and Bosnian Army offensives at the out Belgrade's assistance. The limited number of VRS
time), it certainly did incline NATO and the Contact reinforcements allotted to the operation seems to con
Group further in the direction ofmore immediate and firm this . Once a concerted VRS effort was mounted ,
forcefulmeasures to end the Balkan crisis. How much Srebrenica was doomed to fall, with or without VJ or
the events at Srebrenica brought about subsequent RDB assistance.
Western intervention , as well as the relative impor
tance of that Western intervention in conjunction with No basis has been established to implicate Belgrade's
other concurrent events on the ground, is and may military or security forces in the post-Srebrenica
remain a matter of speculation.423 ** atrocities. While there are indications that the VJ or
RDB may have contributed elements to the Srebrenica
battle , there is no similar evidence that Belgrade
The Possibility of Yugoslav Involvement directed forces were involved in any of the subsequent
massacres. Eyewitness accounts by survivors may be
There are some reports from UN officials and Bosnian imperfect recollections of events , and details may
survivors that suggest Yugoslav Army (VJ) troops have been overlooked . Narrations and other available
( likely from elite formations such as the 63rd Air evidence suggest that only Bosnian Serb troops were
borne or 72nd Special Operations Brigades), as well employed in the atrocities and executions that fol
as possibly elements of the Serbian State Security lowed the military conquest of Srebrenica .
Department (RDB) Special Operations Unit (“ Red
Berets” ),may have been engaged in the battle at
Srebrenica.424 Bosnian Army forces have cited a jeep The United Nations
they captured with Yugoslav Army license plates
N - 2660 — as evidence that VJ forces had been directly Whatmust be learned for the future is that
involved in the fighting, although this could indicate enough military power must be provided from
only that VJ equipment was being used on the other the start, so that you can escalate when the
side of the Drina.425 VJ and RDB assistance in some enemy adopts terror tactics . . . You also need a
form is also consistent with the Serbian President clarity of command thatnever existed with the
Milosevic's close coordination and planning with UN operation.
General Mladic of Bosnian and Krajina Serb political
goals and military strategy during 1995. Elements of -Dutch Defense Minister
these sameunits had helped the Bosnian Serbs at other Joris Voorhoeve 426

times in other places in Bosnia .

The UN's actualmandate to Dutchbat was not to
defend the enclave , but to deter aggression. The
assumption - or the hope — that a largely sym
See Annex 60 : UNPROFOR in Bosnia, 1995 : From Vacillation to bolic UN presence in the safe areas would be
Retaliation to Peace Implementation for a more detailed discussion
of the internationalcommunity's evolving perspective on peace sufficient to accomplish this was cruelly belied
keeping and peace enforcement at this time.
See “ The Political Impactof the NATO Air Campaign ” later in
Chapter 94 for a discussion of the role and impact of the interna
tional community in the latter stages of the Balkan conflict.

353
 in Srebrenica and elsewhere in Bosnia credibility in its threats. To a degree, the failures that
Hercegovina. The safe area concept was led to the fall of the enclave and themassacre of its
dependent on the cooperation of the warring inhabitants can be traced to decisions made years
factions. before in nationalcapitals all around the globe by the
UN's constituentmembers.
-Dutch Ministry of Defense report

The UN's assumptions about the safe area concept had Aftermath and Conclusion
been exposed as fundamentally flawed , at least in this
time and place with these parties. The UN of necessity Precisely how many Bosnian Muslims died in and
relied on a token presence and the good faith of the around Srebrenica will never be known. Estimates
warring parties to implement the terms of the Security produced by the UNHCR put the number of Bosnian
Council's resolutions. Secretary General Boutros Muslims in and around Srebrenica in July 1995 at
Boutros-Ghali surely would have preferred to have about 38,000. (Other estimates generally range
employed a genuine military force like the 34,000 between 38,000 and 42,000 residents.)427 Roughly
blue helmets he had originally requested to carry out two-thirds of these remained around the UN com
the UN resolutions establishing and governing the six pound at Potocari on 11 July , whereupon they were
safe areas, if only to secure a greater range of military either bused to the relative safety of the frontline
and political options. The UN'smember nations, how around Tuzla or were taken away to scattered loca
ever, did not grant Boutros-Ghali 34,000 more peace tions in the Drina valley and executed . Between
keepers, or even the 7,600 projected for the reduced 12,000 and 15,000 Muslims, soldiers, and military
safe areas plan . Lacking resources on the ground, the
age civilian males attempted to break out on foot
UN Secretary General and UNPROFOR commander beginning on the night of 11-12 July. Thousands of
General Janvier relied on the deterrent value of a rela these were also hunted down and killed , although
tively small UN presence , combined with the threat of under different circumstances from those who were
airstrikes, to forestall military action against the taken from Potocari and shot en masse . All told , per
enclaves. haps 1 in 5 residents of the area was either executed or
died trying to escape ; among military -agemales, this
Thus , the ill-equipped and outgunned ARBiH 28th fraction is far higher.
Division relied completely on the UN for the enclave's
defense , while the underfunded and resource-starved
Probably the most accurate accounting of the death
UN hoped that speaking loudly and carrying a small toll to be compiled is that of the International Com
stick would be enough to safeguard the enclaves . The mittee of the Red Cross , whose official statistics indi
enclave's last line of defense - NATO airpower - was
cate that between 12 and 16 July 1995 a total of 7,079
at times viewed by various parties as either a too pow Bosnian Muslimswere killed in the fighting, executed
erful provocation to the Serbs or as a too weak deter or died on the march , or remain otherwise unac
rent of them . When it was actually employed as a counted for.Numbers alone do not tell the entire story .
counter to VRS actions, the NATO air component The true horror of Srebrenica cannot be expressed
proved embarrassingly ineffective . simply by the statistics of dead and missing, if indeed
it can be expressed at all. It was not just the things that
No one thing doomed the Srebrenica enclave. happened but also the manner in which they happened
Through no faultoftheir own, the Dutch peacekeepers and the whole panorama of failures that allowed them
in Srebrenica did not have the manpower, equipment, to happen , which in combination make Srebrenica the
or the mandate to physically defend the enclave in any darkest chapter in the history of the Bosnian war and
military sense . A long history of encounters, failures , an ugly blot on the pages of humanity .
and incidents over the preceding four years had
completely undermined the UN's reputation in the
region , giving it little clout in its negotiations and little

354
-

--

-
1
 Chapter 86 resistance to the German Nazis , who, it was said , had
The Demise of Zepa - A Second Safe Area Falls never fully subdued the area .

If they want to take Zepa, they can, and we can't After refugees had streamed in from the surrounding
stop them . area , roughly 10,000 Muslimswere jammed into and
around the village.431 Just before the Zepa enclave
-A UN Official in Zagreb , came under assault, it received a few hundred addi
July 1995.428 tional refugees from the north . These were civilians
who had fled the collapsing Srebrenica enclave, only
The people of Zepa want the government of Bos to walk into the closing trap at Zepa immediately
nia Herzegovina to ask the Security Council if afterward .
Zepa is still a " safe area ” and if so who is pro
tecting it.
This population was thinly guarded by a woefully
inadequate , company-sized Ukrainian UNPROFOR
-Open letter broadcastby Zepa
contingent. The safe area was nominally guarded by
town officials, 16 July 1995429 79 Ukrainian blue helmets , but the small number of
peacekeepers was hardly adequate to even observe and
I am saddened by the fall of Srebrenica and the
report on developments, let alone do anything about
imminent fall of Zepa ... We are in no position
them .Moreover, the humiliating failure of the larger
to physically protect them .
and better equipped Dutch peacekeeping contingent at
Srebrenica days earlier had effectively exposed
-UN Special Envoy to the Former
Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi, especially to the Serbs — the impotence of the
19 July 1995430 UNPROFOR forces in eastern Bosnia .

As the leaders of the international community met in The Drina Corps — now under the formal command of
London in the wake of Srebrenica's fall, a second safe Major General Krstic — was to again control the attack
area was under sentence of death , and its death throes against the enclave , under Mladic's direct supervision
had indeed begun. If the vague wording of the London as at Srebrenica. The Drina Corps normally had one
conference statement could be understood to threaten tactical group with 750 to 1,000 troops from two dif
the use of military force to defend the Gorazde ferent brigades guarding the enclave.432 To bolster this
enclave , its failure to mention the Zepa enclave force, the corps shifted many of the same units that
already on the verge of falling - was a near invitation had taken part in “ Krivaja 95 ” at Srebrenica to the
to the Serbs to complete their attack as quickly as Zepa sector to undertake the assault. This included :
possible.
• The tactical group from the 1st Zvornik Infantry Bri
gade, including the elite “Drina Wolves," which
The Zepa enclave -- an assemblage of 20 tiny villages
assembled at Krivace northwest of the enclave.
at the bottom of a deep canyon and by far the smallest
of the UN -designated safe areas — was next in the
sights of the Bosnian Serbs and very likely became a • Elements of the 1st Milici Light Infantry Brigade
target at the same time the Srebrenica operation was with an attached company from the 1st Bratunac
planned . The enclave was centered on the village of Light Infantry Brigade - near Podravanje , north of
Zepa , which was scarcely more than a few dozen the enclave.
houses, a small school, and a cemetery enclosing a
crossroads 15 kilometers southwest of Srebrenica. Its • Elements - probably an infantry company - of the
valley was surrounded by steep , forested slopes and 1st Birac Infantry Brigade.
numerous caves, and the town in World War II had
been the site of a famously tenacious partisan

355
• Elements - probably an infantry company - from The VRS Drina Corps had no trouble sticking to the
the 1st Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade. consequential terms of its ultimatum and opened its
assault promptly at 1400 with an artillery and armor
• Parts of the 65th Protection Regiment from Mount attack from south of the enclave.434 Almost immedi
Zep. ately, UN spokesmen reported that two of the nine
Ukrainian observation posts had been directly targeted
All told , the VRS force probably totaled about 2,000 by VRS big guns.435 A loftily impotent “NATO air
to 2,500 troops. presence " flew over the area during the Bosnian Serb
attack , but their show of force had no perceptible
The ARBiH 285th “ Zepa " Brigade (really little more effect on events on the ground.436 (Not only had the
than a battalion ) was, if anything, even less prepared limitations of NATO airpower been shown at Sre
and equipped than the defenders had been at Sre brenica three days earlier but also Zepa did not have
brenica . Numbering at most 1,500 men , most ofwhom any trained forward air controllers who could accu
lacked even small arms, the ragtag unit apparently had rately directpilots to Serb ground targets.)437 The VRS
only a few mortars and was short of ammunition . Led attack slowed for a time in the early evening, but shell
by Colonel Avdo Palic - apparently a courageous , ing and fighting resumed after a pause of several
skilled , and dedicated leader — the force was hardy hours .438 439
and tenacious but lacked training, organization , and
almost every category ofmilitary supplies . Besides Once again the UN forces assigned to protect a Bos
Palic's leadership and its own determination , about the nian “ safe area” found themselves in the middle of a
only thing the Zepa Brigade had going for it was the fight, literally and figuratively .Not only was Serb
hilly , forested terrain , which favored the defenders and artillery fire falling on someUkrainian OPs at the
made direct attack difficult. enclave's periphery but confrontations were also
brewing with Muslim soldiers and citizens at other
position in the enclave. Within hours of the Serb
Operation " Stupcanica 95 ” —The VRS Takeover assault's opening, Zepa's almost defenseless ARBiH
of Zepa contingent surrounded the Ukrainian UNPROFOR
compound and demanded that the peacekeepers turn
The VRS began initial preparations for Operation over their weapons and vehicles.440 After a very heated
“ Stupcanica 95" on 11 July as Srebrenica fell ; the debate punctuated by shots fired in the air , the Ukrai
Main Staff began issuing orders to the Drina Corps for nians surrendered some of their small arms and dis
its units surrounding Zepa to coordinate with the 65th abled five of of their armored personnel carriers.441442
Protection Regiment to take advantage of the develop 443 Bosnian Army spokesmen subsequently claimed
ing situation. On 13 July, the Drina Corps issued its that it was “ renegade” soldiers who had simulta
operation order for the attack , and General Krstic neously tried to seize UNPROFOR weapons at gun
established his forward command post that evening at point in both Zepa and Gorazde, but no one believed
the village of Krivace , northwest of Zepa , at the foot them.444
of theMain Staff command bunker in MountZep . The
Serbs delivered an ultimatum to the Zepa enclave the Meanwhile, pessimism - bordering on despair
next day. Bosnian Serb commanders ordered the Bos ruled the international community . The Bosnian Serb
nian Army defenders of the town to lay down their assault had begun only hours after French President
weapons by 1400 or be attacked . Atthe same time, the Jacques Chirac's defiant Bastille Day speech calling
Serbs warned Zepa's Ukrainian peacekeepers , insist for vigorous international action to defend the remain
ing that they stay out of the way during the coming ing safe areas . At the same time, UN Under Secretary
offensive or suffer the consequences.433 It was not General Chinmaya Gharekhan reportedly estimated
much of a choice, but enough word of what had hap that the Zepa enclave would fall within 48 hours.445
pened at Srebrenica had reached the town that accep Given the paucity of Zepa's defenders and the
tance of any Serb guarantees was all but out of the
question . The townspeople of Zepa elected to mount
the best defense they could for as long as could be
managed

356
negligible credibility of the UN defending force , the The Serb assault began anew in the early morning
prediction seemed entirely believable .Meanwhile , hours of 16 July when a sizable contingentof VRS
Zepa MayorMehmed Hajric directed a loud and troops crossed the Rijeka river west of Zepa and
forceful appeal for help toward the international com mounted an infantry attack supported by artillery and
munity : " We are waiting forNATO airstrikes on the mortar fire . Ukrainian OP number 3 in the southwest
aggressors around Zepa. We expect the UN to send the part of the enclave also came under fire thatmorning.
Rapid Reaction Force to Zepa to intervene and prevent Meanwhile, the ARBiH attacked and occupied three
the aggressors taking Zepa, where the civilian popula other Ukrainian OPs, temporarily detaining their
" 9446
tion had been left to themercy of the aggressors. crews and seizing their weapons and ammunition . The
The prevailing belief that the enclave was already ARBiH command in Zepa also announced a “ general
doomed made it extremely unlikely that Mayor mobilization ” of all able -bodied citizens in the
Hajric's calls would be translated into forceful UN enclave, although it was unclear what practical effect
action . The UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia , Gen this was likely to have since there were far too few
eral Rupert Smith , warned the Bosnian Serbs in a let weapons for the men alreadymobilized.450 During the
ter not to attack the Zepa enclave and reminded them day the Serbs continued with infantry probes along the
that he was free to recommend the use of NATO air northern confrontation linebutmounted their main
power in its defense . Smith , however, had few real attack from the west.451 Disregarding the NATO air
threats in his armory, and everybody knew it. presence and ARBiH resistance , a column of VRS
infantry supported by following tanks advanced about
For a time the plucky defenders ofZepa miraculously half a kilometer to halt about 1.5 kilometers outside of
452 453 454
managed to defy the odds, the experts, and the enemy. Zepa.
Their success appears to have been duemuch more to
the Serbs' cautious advance than the Muslims' defen The 17th was mostly quiet, while the Bosnian Serbs
sive abilities. The following day, UN spokesmen mysteriously suspended their attack yet again . The
reported that there had been heavy fighting in the UN essentially quit the field that morning , abandoning
eastern part of the enclave but that the attacking VRS six of the nine observation posts and falling back to
troops did not seem to have made any gains.447 Despite themain base just north of Zepa . One of the other
the shelling by Serb fire the previous day, all nine of observation posts (OP number 2 ) was, however,block
the Ukrainians observation posts were manned , indi aded by the Bosnian Serbs and became a hostage,with
cating that none of the positions had yet been overrun the Serbs threatening to fire on it if NATO warplanes
or destroyed. Despite Zepa radio operators ' claims again appeared over the enclave .Meanwhile, the
that the Serbs were assaulting the town from all direc Ukrainian Government announced that it was working
tions, the UN reported that the 15th saw only modest out a plan to evacuate its
Serb offensive activity along a segment of the front peacekeepers from Zepa if necessary — but without
line 4 kilometers north ofthe town, possibly because suggesting how.455
the Drina Corps had to withdraw troops from the 1st
Zvornik Brigade, including the Drina Wolves, from On the 18th the Ukrainian contingent in Zepa
the attack and rush them back to the Zvornik area to announced that it was disabling all of its remaining
deal with the retreating 28th weapons and equipment in order to prevent its seizure
Division.448 by the Bosnian Government forces in the enclave .
( This announcement followed the ARBiH's forcible
Although the Serb attacks on ARBiH positions on the confiscation of the vehicles, weapons, ammunition ,
15th were restrained , the confrontations between the and equipment belonging to the Ukrainian company in
ARBiH and the UN teamswere not. Some 150 Bos Gorazde the previous night.)456 While this decision
nian Army troops surrounded one Ukrainian observa (although apparently never fully carried out) discour
tion post, demanding weapons ,while another crowd aged further harassment of the UN contingent by
of about 70 civilians surrounded a Ukrainian check Zepa's defenders, it also made the UNPROFOR force
point.Warning shots from the peacekeepers dispersed within the enclave almost entirely irrelevant, as it
both crowds, but the UN's ability to mount vehicle undercut even the symbolic capability of resisting
patrols was effectively nullified , and the Ukrainians further attacks.
were from then on confined to their positions.449

357
After the one-day lull, the VRS assault force evacuation of civilians.466 The Bosnian Serbs unilater
bolstered by a reinforced battalion from the 1st ally announced that they were prepared to evacuate
Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade dispatched on the town's population — while detaining men aged 18
16-17 July — resumed the offensive early on the 18th , to 55 as prisoners of war — and brought in some 50 to
dropping intense mortar fire into the town.457 In 60 buses for this purpose.467 468Mladic's frustration
response , Bosnian Government troops surrounded the appeared to grow as the Muslims — undoubtedly fear
Ukrainian UNPROFOR base in Zepa and threatened ing the same fate as their massacred Srebrenica kin
to use the peacekeepers as human shields unless categorically refused to accept the surrender terms.469
NATO airstrikes were called in.458 Ukrainians were
now being held both by the Serbs ( at OP number 2) His patience at an end, Mladic issued another ultima
and the Muslims (at the main compound) , with the tum : accept the surrender termsby 1900 or face
former threatening to shoot the Ukrainians if NATO unspecified consequences. As soon as the deadline
aircraft attacked and the latter levying threats if NATO expired , the Serbs resumed fire into the enclave with
did not. Meanwhile , there was fierce fighting west of heavy weapons and machineguns . Once again , the
the town, but the tenacious Bosnian Army defenders Ukrainians found themselves assailed from all direc
managed to stall the Serb advance for yet another tions. While Serb weapons fire showered the town , the
day.459 Nevertheless, Bosnian President Izetbegovic frustrated and near-panicked Bosnian Muslims opened
essentially conceded their defeat when he publicly fire on the Ukrainian compound , hijacked three UN
offered to negotiate with the Bosnian Serbs for the armored vehicles, and seized the pathetic and haphaz
evacuation of the civilian population of Zepa.460 In ard collection of arms they had turned in at the UN
defiant reply to sharp criticism that he was thereby controlled weapons collection site.470 471472
abetting the ethnic cleansing of the enclave , Izebe
govic replied that, “ There are worse things than ethnic The failure of the international community to
cleansing ... and that is ethnic killing." 461 explicitly support them at the 21 July conference in
London — convened to discuss international actions to
Confusion reigned on the 19th , as contradictory state defend the remaining safe areas — further amplified
ments about the enclave's status followed one upon the Zepa residents ' fears that they were being
another. Preliminary statements by the UN that Zepa abandoned . The anemic conference statement made
may have been captured were refuted by Mayor no reference to their besieged town and left unclear
Hajric.462 463 Then the Bosnian Serb Army issued a what the West actually intended to do if its demands
statement that the town had indeed agreed to surren for a halt to the attacks on safe areas continued to be
der ; two civilian representatives had accepted the Serb ignored . Statementsmade over the next few days that
terms in a meeting with General Mladic at 1800.464 NATO was prepared to defend not only Gorazde but
Unconfirmed UN information suggested that the civil also other threatened safe areas garnered little credi
ian population had evacuated the town, retreating bility and failed to impress either the residents of Zepa
slightly north to areas where the Bosnian Army was or their Bosnian Serb attackers.473 474
still holding out.465 The situation remained unclear at
the close of the day, and nightfall broughtboth dark On 22 July , the day after the conference in London ,
ness and obscurity. the Serbs stepped up their artillery and armor attacks
against the western part of the enclave.475 Neverthe
The UN was able to shed some light on the situation less , Zepa's Mayor, Mehmed Hajric , told British
on themorning of the 20th , reporting that the Serbs reporters that day that, “We're still holding on ” and
had surrounded Zepa, that there was still no evidence asserted that, although the Bosnian Serbs were press
that they had entered the town itself, but that the ing the offensive from Rogatica , the defending lines
"9476
enclave's fall seemed only a matter of time. Izetbe “ had not moved an inch .'
govic's public statement on the 18th had in fact
prompted a meeting in the Zepa enclave with repre
sentatives of the ARBiH , VRS, and UN to discuss the

358

-
The defense mounted by the tenacious Bosnian On 26 July the evacuation of the thousands of civilians
defenders against what appeared to be either a lacka from Zepa commenced in earnest, transported to Mus
daisical or a timid Serb offensive had notbeen without lim -held Kladanj in Serb buses with UN peacekeepers
cost. On the 23rd the UN reported continued Serb aboard.486 Determined to avoid a repetition of the hor
shelling and an increase in tank,machinegun, and rors of Srebrenica two weeks before, the UN insisted
sniper fire . UN spokesmen said the Zepa police had on compiling lists of all passengers and accompanying
also been heavily engaged and that casualties among them along their entire route of travel.487
the defenders had been high.477
The following day,General Mladic met for the first
The heroic ARBiH defense began to give way on the time with his adversary in Zepa, ARBiH Colonel
24th . Serb forces shelling from Brezova Ravan Avdo Palic , the 285th Zepa Brigade commander.
barely a kilometer west of Zepa — were wreaking Mladic still appeared to be intent on securing a surren
destruction almost at will ,while the villages of Ribjoc der agreement in spite of the Sarajevo government's
and Vratar southeast ofZepa were captured and set refusal to accept his terms. Palic , however, was faced
aflame.478 The Serb penetration of the southern with two stark choices: battle the Bosnian Serbs from
defense line — apparently spearheaded by approxi the hills and hope eventually to reach safe territory , or
mately a company of armor, which was all but impos acceptMladic's termsand risk the fate of Srebrenica's
sible for the ARBiH to counter - ended any hope for soldiers.488 Even in these dire straits , Colonel Palic
the defense of the enclave.479 The end could not be far adopted a hard line: Zepa's defending troops would
away. turn themselves over only to the United Nations and
not to the Bosnian Serbs. Sarajevo offered to release
The following morning there was yet another Serb prisoners of war held elsewhere in Bosnia in
sequence of conflicting statements on the enclave's exchange for the men from Zepa, but the two
surrender. First, UN spokesmen announced that agree negotiators remained at an impasse.489
ment had finally been reached on the evacuation of
Zepa's civilians.480 This was followed by statements In the cruel and brazen traditions of the Bosnian con
that the Zepa Brigade had agreed to hand over its flict, the impasse was resolved through themuzzle of
weapons in exchange for the safe evacuation of the a gun. On 29 July a UN spokesman reported that
town's civilians. The Bosnian Government rejected Mladic had told a UN officer that Colonel Palic had
this claim , stating that these were simply the terms of been shot after surrender talks failed to produce
a Serb ultimatum that the Zepa leadership had not in results.490 ( This was never definitively confirmed , but
fact accepted.481 At the close of the day it appeared Palic was never seen alive again .) The remaining
that nobody — not the UN , the Bosnian Government, ARBiH negotiators— " encouraged ” by Palic's fate
nor the Bosnian Serbs — was clear about what was then agreed to Mladic's demand that all military -age
going on or what had been agreed to . Around midday males should be taken into Serb custody and await a
there had been confused statements that Zepa may prisoner exchange . This did notmean that those hid
have been abandoned and that Bosnian Serb troops ing out in the hills would necessarily heed the agree
may have occupied it.482 After some delay these state ment, and it appears the vastmajority did not.
ments gained credibility as both the UN and the Bos Meanwhile, in the valley below , Zepa burned in the
nian Army confirmed that the VRS had indeed wake of Serb troops moving from house to house loot
occupied the abandoned village. An official Bosnian ing anything left of value.491
Army statement conceded the loss of Zepa itself but
wenton to say that the defenders had not yet surren With the fall of the enclave, the Bosnian Serbs needed
dered and that they would continue to resist from the to redirect vitalmanpower to a more pressing objec
surrounding hills.483 Late in the day a convoy of 150 tive : countering the threats posed by the Croats
Muslim wounded was allowed to leave for Sarajevo , advancing into western Bosnia . Asmany as 3,000 of
and the Security Council authorized the use of UN the MuslimsofZepa — most of them unarmed — were
troops to assist with the evacuation of civilians from lurking in the hills and villages north of the town, but,
the enclave.484 485 The saga was almost, but not quite ,
over.

359
without food , weapons, or supplies , they were not a War.499 Chirac had openly called for the UN's new
threat to worry about.492 The VRS Drina Corps con Rapid Reaction Force to swing into action after Zepa
tented itself with containing this minor problem with a came under assault later thatmonth , and Gorazde
garrison of second-string units and withdrew most of seemed next in line to fall.500 501 Defense Minister
the assault troops to reinforce more important sectors; Charles Millon warned that, if the French call to arms
the townsmen were left to the exigencies of the for was not heeded by its allies , then Paris would consider
est.493 Several hundred of these men eventually chose withdrawing its troops from Bosnia.502
to filter into Serbia ,494 while the rest either made their
way back to government-held territory or were found French urgings that the United Nations prepare to
and captured by the Bosnian Serbs. True to their word , retake Srebrenica by force ignored the reality that
the stubborn defenders had never formally agreed to UNPROFOR was barely capable of defending the
any terms of surrender.495 remaining safe areas, let alone forcibly retake one that
had already been occupied by the VRS.503 504 505 As
Chapter 87 French Maj. Gen. Andre Soubirou — commander of
Srebrenica Aftermath Gorazde and the Rapid Reaction Force — admitted at the time, only
Operation “ Daring Lion ” the RRF's multinational brigade ( composed of
reflagged French , British , and Dutch elements already
If no one wants to make a commitment to retake in Bosnia ) was even operational. Any offensive action
Srebrenica , at leastwe should guarantee the by the RRF was still out of the question . For the time
safe area of Gorazde, where there are British being at least, other options for taming the Serbs
blue helmets, but really defend ourselves ... If would need to be examined .
it's to be like Srebrenica, that is, leaving as soon
as the first Serbs show up , then it's useless to
pretend to make an effort. Operation " Daring Lion ”

-French President Jacques Chirac , With the demise of first the Srebrenica and then the
14 July 1995.490 Zepa safe areas , all eyes turned toward Gorazde. It
was the last remaining eastern enclave , and there was
It is not good enough simply to make speeches broad consensus that this time something had to be
calling for action ... If France actually believed
done to preserve it — but there was no agreement on
that military action could save Zepa and Sre what that “ something” might be . Lacking such agree
brenica , then no doubt French troops would be
ment,NATO planning staffs spentthe last few days of
marching on Zepa and Srebrenica at this time. July working frantically on two radically different
They are not plans for helicopter airlift operations — one to get the
hundreds of UN peacekeepers out of the enclave, and
-British Foreign Secretary Malcom another to reinforce it with possibly thousands more .
Rifkind, 15 July 1995.497

The first plan ,codenamed “ Daring Lion ” would — if

We have to declare war on Gen. Mladic or get
out. necessary - employ a force of helicopters probably
drawn from American units in Italy or Germany to
evacuate UN forces trapped in Gorazde. The hope, of
-Gen . Philippe Morillon , former
course , was that the airlift would be unmolested by
UNPROFOR Bosnia commander then
serving on the French General Staff , either side, but an escort force of attack helicopters or
July 1995.498 combat aircraft would clearly be necessary to safe
guard the evacuation transports. The bold appellation
Ata Bastille Day news conference, France's new Pres- notwithstanding,“ Daring Lion ” was clearly an avenue
ident, Jacques Chirac , launched a blistering criticism of last resort. All UN heavy equipment would have to
of the international community's failure to defend Sre be destroyed or abandoned , and it would be very hard
brenica, calling up analogies with the Anglo -French
appeasement ofHitler before the Second World

360
to characterize such an operation as anything but a themost acidic commentary naturally coming from
humiliating retreat from a life - and - death situation and the Bosnian Government.511512 513 For now , the consen
a visible abandonment of a UN guarantee of personal sus was for strong words and weak actions.
security. For the planners, the potential for disaster or
escalating involvement if the heavily laden transports The Gorazde enclave was quietly evacuated between
came under fire was all too evident. 24 and 28 August. All of the Ukrainian and British
peacekeeping troops headed out overland, leaving a
The second plan under consideration was a French brave handful of unarmed UN Military Observers and
proposal whereby American helicopters and air cover forward air controllers in place to report on events in
would be used to reinforce Gorazde in a last- ditch the enclave and, if necessary and feasible , guide
effort to save both the safe area concept and the credi NATO warplanes to their targets.514 515 516 517 UNPRO
bility of the United Nations in Bosnia.506 A thousand FOR had left the last of the eastern Bosnian safe areas
or more French and British troops would be brought under a cloud of shameful dissimulation , but the cloud
into the enclave by American helicopters in a grand had a thin lining of silver. The pullback of the last siz
show of overawing international force and commit able contingent of vulnerable UN peacekeepers — the
ment. The British were very hesitant to commit last potential hostages — left the UN and NATO con
themselves to such a risk -laden proposal and the siderably freer to employ NATO airpower. This cru
Americans even more so.507 The British accused the cial change would be demonstrated when Operation
French of posturing, and the Bosnian Government Deliberate Force was launched at the very end of
accused the British of delaying while civilians under August , only a few days later.
UN protection were being slaughtered around the
enclaves.508 Relations among all the major actors visi Chapter 88
bly sank to a new low . The Fateful Krajina Serb Offensive
Against Bihac, July 1995
The one-day conference held in London on 21 July *
had foremost on its agenda a study of measures that
might prevent the fall of Gorazde, although this was in Desperate Measures — The Reorganization of the
the broader context of how to resolve the Bosnian con Krajina Serb Army
flict as a whole . Intended to achieve consensus on the
allies' next steps to ensure Gorazde's safety, when the The Krajina Serb Army had been a major actor in the
conference broke up without agreement on action it Bihac enclave since 1993, when it had helped launch
did as much to highlight Western disunity as it did to Fikret Abdic's grab for a separate republic in western
threaten the Serbs or reassure the Muslims. Even as Bosnia . Under its new commander, Lieutenant Colo
the British PrimeMinister opened the conference with nel General Mile Mrksic , it was destined to play an
a strong warning to the Serbs notto attack anymore of even larger role — a role thatwould see its eventual
the UN safe areas, the VRS was shelling Sarajevo , departure from the Balkan stage.
attacking Bihac, and tightening its noose on Zepa .509
The aggressive French plan to airlift reinforcements Mrksic was appointed to command the SVK on
into Gorazde died when the French were unable to 16 May 1995, replacing Lieutenant Colonel General
recruit any supporters for this option from among the Milan Celeketic.518 The change was clearly dictated by
16 nations that convened in London.510 The partici Belgrade in the aftermath of the fall of Western
pants could agree only on a summary statement that Slavonia and the controversial firing of “ Orkan” rock
was instantly recognized for the cop-out it was. The ets at Zagreb . Mrksic came to his new appointment
world press was instantly and roundly critical, with from Belgrade , where he had been an Assistant Chief
of the Yugoslav ArmyGeneral Staff. He had also been
* Note that the 21 July meeting in London was not the same as the
subsequent postwar “ London Conference.” The latter began on
8 December 1995 and was a much larger forum addressing the
issues of how the Dayton Agreement(which had yet to be signed)
would be implemented .

361
the first commander of the VJ Corps of Special Units fixed to a rocket-propelled frame. Both were more
(KSJ) and — more significantly to most Croatians impressive in appearance than in performance.524
had commanded the JNA Ist Guards Motorized Bri
gade when it spearheaded the conquest of Vukovar in
November 1991.519 Genesis of the Bihac Operation : Milosevic,Mladic,
Mrksic, and Abdic
Mrksic's mission was to shore up the SVK and
increase its ability to hold off the HV in the eventof a Less than a month after its parade, the KSJ would
Croatian invasion of the RSK . Overall, in organiza march into action — against the Bosnian Army,
tion, structure, and leadership , the SVK had become a though , not the Croatian one. Initially, the SVK and
fairly professional army, thanks to three years of assis VRS planned a joint operation against the most imme
tance and grooming by the VJ. At the lowest levels of diate threat to the RSK — the HV /HVO forces in the
the force, however, problemswith such basic elements Dinara Mountains and the Livno Valley. However,
as discipline and training had surfaced that he aimed Belgrade apparently changed this plan to first attack
to repair.520 Mrksic's main focus , though , was on find the Bihac enclave, and then shift to attack the Dinara
ing ways to offset the SVK'smajor shortcoming: the Livno sector. The neutralization of Bihac and the HVI
lack of adequate manpower to hold its frontline HVO forces had become a matter of immediate impor
defenses while maintaining sufficient brigade, corps, tance to the SVK and the RSK state . A Croatian mili
and General Staff reserve forces .Mrksic's principal tary offensive to retake the RSK was expected
step in this direction was to create for the SVK a clone sometime in 1995. Both the 5th Corps and the HVI
of the VJ's Corps of Special Units , which would pro HVO forces in Dinara posed serious threats to the
vide mobile reserves to plug HV penetrations of SVK SVK's ability to defend against the expected HV
positions. Belgrade attempted to address the man offensive . The question was which to attack first, the
power problem by rounding up Krajina Serb deserters 5th Corps or Dinara. If the Bosnian 5th Corps was still
and draft dodgers living in Serbia and shipping nearly in control of Bihac when the Croatians attacked , Serb
5,000 of them back to the Krajina. Along with Mrksic , lines of communication through the enclave would not
the VJ also transferred a number of veteran ex - JNA be available to shift SVK forces from one part of the
officers to the Krajina to help implement changes , crescent-shaped RSK to the other. More critical still,
analyze the SVK's strategic and operational-tactical the 5th Corps could combine with the expected HV
situation , and strengthen the Army's tactical defenses. invasion to attack the SVK positions from two sides,
With them came some additional equipment for the making them untenable and threatening the very exist
SVK , including possibly a battalion of M -84 tanks to ence of the RSK . On the other hand, the HV /HVO
521
help equip the new mobile reserve force.5 forces in Dinara , if left free to capture Bosansko
Grahovo , would threaten Knin .
RSK President Martic and GeneralMrksic picked a
historic holiday, “ Vidovdan " on 28 June , to parade the In attacking Bihac, the SVK's objective was the logis
new KSJ at its base in Slunj as a morale- boosting tic and road hub of the Bihac enclave, the city of
demonstration of the SVK's new prowess for the Cazin , and the destruction of the Bosnian Army 5th
people of the Krajina.522 The corps , headed by newly Corps, achievements that Abdic and Krajina Serb
promoted Major General Milorad Stupar — a former troops had so far been unable to accomplish . Abdic
brigade commander in the VI's KSJ— consisted of an would then assume his designated place at the head of
armored brigade, a special operations brigade, a a new Republic of Western Bosnia , a further fragmen
Guards Brigade, an RSK MUP Special Police brigade, tation of the old republic that would enhance and pro
and some assorted training units.523 Its personnel prob tect the existence of the RSK . These final operations
ably numbered 4,000 to 5,000 troops. Mrksic took the to knock out General Atif Dudakovic's 5th Corps and
occasion to trumpet two “ new ” rocket systemsto
threaten the Croatians— “ Styx " antiship missiles
converted to land use and the “ Kosava ” rocket bomb
system , which were fashioned from aerial bombs

362
strike the HV /HVO was part of the strategic plan by holding actions on the Grabez plateau to pin down 5th
which Milosevic and Mladic intended to snatch vital Corps troop reserves. The SVK forces probably
territory for the Krajina Republic with a series of totaled some 5,000 assault troops and 9,000 sector
lightningmilitary operations and then sue for peace . holding troops with two or three armored battalions
Both recognized that the Serbs could not sustain their and four artillery groups in support, together with
war of independence indefinitely, and they wanted to Abdic's 4,000 -plus soldiers. There were also an esti
bring it to a quick and profitable end .525* mated 500 special operations troops from the VJ, the
Serbian RDB , and Arkan's Serbian Volunteer Guard ,
The VRS's major targets were the ARBiH -controlled and these were probably augmented by VJ KSJ per
Drina valley enclaves and possibly Orasje.General sonnel detailed to provide shock troops and combat
Mrksic and the SVK , together with Abdic and his leaders for the SVK KSJ attack. However, VRS and
Serb-led Operational Group “ Pauk ” would take care Bosnian Serb MUP units that were to be detailed to
of Bihac . The SVK /VRS would then jointly attack OG “ Pauk ” for the operation never arrived.
Dinara -Livno .

To the Brink of Defeat: The Battle for Cazin ,

Campaign Plan - Operation “Mac (Sword ) 95 " 19-26 July 1995

Mrksic's campaign plan to defeat the 5th Corps The SVK planned to start the operation on 15 July .
Operation “Mac (Sword ) 95” —focused on the seizure The start was delayed four days, however,by prob
of Cazin , and for good reasons. Cazin sat at the center lems in regrouping units,mobilizing additional SVK
of the Bihac enclave (in fact, the area was often called and Krajina Serb MUP personnel to replace the miss
" Cazinska Krajina" ), and all lines of communication ing VRS troops, and an ARBiH spoiling attack.526
ran through it. Supplies to support the 5th Corps were
flown into the town's Coralici airfield in light trans On 17 July ,two LUNA- M (FROG -7 ) surface -to
ports and helicopters, and makeshift ammunition pro surface rockets landed near the border town of
duction facilities there helped keep 5th Corps going. Izacic - a typical start to a Serb offensive . Two days
Cazin's loss would effectively bisect the Bihac pocket, later, General Stupar and GeneralNovakovic's troops
fragmenting 5th Corps and exposing it to the prospect launched their attack at 0300 , pushing across the fron
of complete destruction . tier from the west on four axes and south from Velika
Kladusa . OG “ Pauk ” and TacticalGroup- 1 attacked
Two operational groups, one formed from the head toward Johovica - Sturlic , Tactical Group - 2 assaulted
quarters of the KSJ and the other OG “ Pauk ,” were to the Trzacka Rastela sector, Tactical Group - 3 hit the
undertake a converging attack toward the city.Major Bugar area, and Tactical Group -4 struck Zeljava
General Milorad Stupar's KSJ forces, augmented with Izacic.527 TG - 2 , -3, and -4 ran into stiff resistance from
forces from the 15th Lika and 21st Kordun Corps, a battalion of the crack 502nd Mountain Brigade, and
would provide the main spearhead . Organized into SVK troops here managed to advance only a kilometer
four tactical groups, the reinforced KSJ was to attack or two.528 They also failed to take the important border
from the western border area along a roughly 25 village of Trzacka Rastela on the main road to Cazin .
kilometer front stretching from the destroyed JNA The SVK offensive was weakened by morale prob
Zeljava airbase to Johovica. SVK Lieutenant Colonel lems in the RSK Special Police Brigade — apparently
GeneralMile Novakovic and Serbian RDB officer part of TG - 2 — which refused to attack. OG “ Pauk”
"Raja " Bozovic's OG “ Pauk ” troops of the Autono and TG - 1 , however, smashed the weak 517th Light
mous Province of Western Bosnia and TG -9 from the Brigade around Sturlic , quickly driving ARBiH troops
SVK 39th Banija Corps would attack along the Mala back more than 2 kilometers by 20 July . To meet this
Kladusa -Pecigrad -Cazin and toward Buzim road . To development, 5th Corps staff quickly alerted the
the south , the VRS 2nd Krajina Corps would fight 502nd Brigade to rush the rest of its available troops
from the Bihac city area to the site of the
* See Chapter 73, “ The ‘Red Generals ' Refuse to Bow : Political breakthrough.529
Military Relations and the Strategic Debate in Republika Srpska,
1995 ," for a more detailed discussion of the collusion between
Milosevic and Mladic .

363
Barely checked by the arrival of the Bosnian reserves, the " Split Agreement," proved to be one of the key
the SVK advance continued to the east of Sturlic , and events of the war. The military operation that it
by 21 July the KSJ penetration had extended to 7 kilo- spawned would not only bring Croatia more openly
meters. The Serbs were still failing in their efforts to and deeply into the Bosnian conflict, presaging direct
reduce Trzacka Rastela — which was blocking the wid Croatian military operations against Bosnia’s Repub
ening of the breach — and not even a salvo of seven lika Srpska, but would also set the stage for Croatia's
surface- to -surface rockets seemed to make a dent in reconquest of its own territory usurped by the RSK .
the defenses. General Stupar, though , had not yet
renewed TG - 3 and -4's attack around Bugar and Iza On 22 July , Presidents Tudjman, Izetbegovic , and
cic . The next day, SVK troops pushed on , advancing Zubak , heading delegations of the Croatian , Bosnian ,
further east toward the town of Pecigrad , a key choke and Bosnian Federation Governments, gathered for a
point on the Velika Kladusa-Cazin road. OG " Pauk " summitmeeting in Split. They quickly reached agree
now launched a major thrust toward Pecigrad , coming ment on the provision of military aid to Bosnia . Their
directly from the north . joint declaration stated that,

On 25 July, Dudakovic's defensive situation grew crit ... the Republic and Federation of Bosnia
ical. He was still being pounded by TG -1 and OG Herzegovina have issued an appealto the
“ Pauk” when TG - 3 and -4 launched a new attack Republic of Croatia to provide urgentmilitary
toward Bugar and Izacic, breaking through the 502nd and other assistance against the aggression ,
Mountain Brigade before being contained in front of especially in the Bihac area, which the Republic
Izacic and Gata Ilidza.530 OG “ Pauk ” and TG - l's con of Croatia has agreed to .
tinuing drive had brought the SVK another 2 kilome
ters into the pocket since 23 July, and it had seized key They have agreed to continue cooperation and to
positions at Pecka Brda, Liskovac ,and Krivaja. The constantly coordinate defense activities between
key passes at Pecigrad and Skokovi were seriously Croatia and Bosnia -Herzegovina.533
threatened as the SVK offensive approached its apex .
Serb troops were within 5 kilometers of Coraliciair In making common cause with the Bosnians against
field and Cazin town, and , on 26 July , Abdic confi the Serbs of Bosnia and Yugoslavia , however, Presi
dently announced the transformation of the dent Tudjman intended also to make an opportunity of
Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia into the the crisis aimed at achieving Croatia's consummate
Republic of Western Bosnia.531 General Dudakovic political objective — the destruction of the Republic of
would later describe this SVK offensive as his most Serbian Krajina.
difficult experience of the war.532 He had called for
help , however, and now help was on the way. The Croatians' first contribution to defending Bihac
would be a move to relieve the Serb pressure on it ,
and incidentally put their forces in direct striking dis
Croatia Intervenes: The Capture of Bosansko tance of the RSK capital at Knin . For these purposes
Grahovo, July 1995 the HV and HVO joined forces in Operation "Ljeto
95" (Summer 95), whose objective was the capture of
The Croatian Government had frequently made it Bosansko Grahovo — the primary road junction link
more than clear that it could not and would not toler ing Republika Srpska and the RSK . The VRS-held
ate the loss of Bihac to its Serb besiegers and that it town ofGlamoc was a secondary objective. The HV
was prepared to fight if the enclave's continued exist hoped that an attack on a location so vital to both the
ence were threatened . The new SVK offensive now Serb minirepublics would draw SVK and VRS
threatened exactly that. When the Bosnian Govern reserves away from Bihac. The actual capture of Gra
ment recognized that itmight not be able to save hovo would give the HV excellentjumpoff positions
Bihac on its own, it was natural for it to ask for
Croatian military assistance . The resulting compact,

364
for its next operation , which would be nothing less Someone had the forethought to send reinforcements
than a campaign to destroy the SVK and eliminate the to the VRS 2nd Krajina Corps following the HV's
RSK . The HV in fact began to mobilize its forces and successful completion of Operation " Skok - 2 ” in June.
move units into position for this strategic offensive In front of Bosansko Grahovo , the 3rd Petrovac Light
already dubbed Operation " Oluja " ( Storm )—even as it Infantry Brigade and the 9th Grahovo Light Infantry
was launching “ Ljeto 95.” If the first operation suc Brigade, together with the SVK Vijuga Battle Group ,
ceeded in capturing Glamoc as well, the HV/HVO still comprised the main force , but it was bolstered by
would have additional staging points for a further elements from other 2nd Krajina Corps formations
assault against the VRS in Bosnia , particularly toward and from other VRS corps. To the east, the composite
the town of Jajce , which the HVO had lost in 1992 . 3rd Serbian Brigade had reinforced the 5th Glamoc
The summer campaign was planned and conducted by Light Infantry Brigade.538 Elements of the 7th Kupres
General Ante Gotovina, commander of the HV Split Sipovo Motorized Brigade beefed up the 5th Glamoc's
Corps District left flank. All told ,MajorGeneral Radivoje Tomanic's
2nd Krajina Corps fielded some 5,500
General Gotovina's campaign plan called for two dis personnel.
tinct attacks, one against Bosansko Grahovo — the
main effort and another toward Glamoc , the second The Croatian summer offensive operation commenced
ary objective.534 OperationalGroup “ Rujani” of the at 0500 on 25 July . Both thrusts immediately ran into
Split Corps District maintained unified control over stiff resistance from the Serbs, who appeared to be
the two quite separate subgroups formed for the ready and waiting for the attack .GeneralGotovina
divided operation . In the first group , the 7th Guards states that,
Brigade would be augmented by an elite composite
infantry company from the 114th Infantry Brigade for At the beginning of the attack , the enemy fiercely
the main assault toward Grahovo , the Guards attack resisted at all its defense positions. The enemy
ing along themain road from the Livno Valley while defense lines, particularly in the direction
the infantry company seized mountain positions on the toward Bosansko Grahovo, were exceptionally
right side of the road. The 4th Guards Brigade, with well fortified. There were a large number of
the 2nd Battalion /9th Guards Brigade attached ,would shelters and covered trenches with ... a series of
be held in reserve . The second force , for the attack on consecutive defense lines and formidable obsta
Glamoc, would form up in two areas to conduct a con cles consisting ofminefields.539
verging attack on the town . The main force was to
attack from the SatorMountains, hitting VRS In the Bosansko Grahovo attack , the 7th Guards took
defenses in the rear and coming back up the Glamoc themain road and the left-hand sector along the bor
Valley toward the town; it comprised the 81st Inde der while the independent infantry company from the
pendent Guards Battalion , the 3rd Battalion /1st 1 14th Brigade attacked on the right. The 7th Guards
Guards Brigade , elements of the 1st Croatian Guards pushed forward about 2 kilometers before halting
Brigade ( 1st HGZ), and Bosnian Croat Special because of concerns about its right flank. The 114th's
Police.535 The HVO's 2nd and 3rd Guards Brigades lone infantry company was a completely inadequate
formed the rest of the attack group , reinforced with the force to deal with the strong VRS defenses dug in
HVO 60th Guards Airborne Battalion and 22nd Sabo along the ridge line in front ofMarino Brdo; the Serbs
tage Detachment. They would make direct assaults on had stopped the attack in its tracks.
VRS -held ridge lines southwest and southeast of
Glamoc.536 The HV 1st Battalion /1stGuards Brigade HV /HVO forces in the battle for Glamoc were facing
and the Reconnaissance- Sabotage Company of the similar difficulties. The 81st Guards Battalion broke
HV Main Staff were their reserve.537 The total the 3rd Serbian Brigade's forward defenses southeast
HV /HVO force numbered about 8,500 troops.

365
of Sator and advanced 1 or 2 kilometers before com the right and 7th on the left . This combination finally
ing to a halt because the HV /HVO units on its right cracked the tough VRS defenses , and the Guards
had been held up . It appears that troops from 1st HGZ, moved on Grahovo , reaching positions some 5
1st Guards Brigade, and the Bosnian Croat Special kilometers in front of town after an advance of 10
Police were blocked in front of a mountaintop fortified kilometers on the right.
by the VRS , while both the 2nd and 3rd HVO Guards
Brigades gained little or no ground in their attacks In the Glamoc sector, however, the HV /HVO were
southwest of Glamoc against the VRS 5th Glamoc making only marginal progress. HV 1st HGZ troops
Brigade. The HVO 60th Guards Battalion and 221 and the Bosnian Croat Special Police moved forward
Sabotage Detachment likewise made minimal across themountains another kilometer or so , and a
progress in the Kujaca hill area southeast of town. Mostar Corps District tactical group (comprised of
elements from several different HVO HomeDefense
The operation wentmuch better the next day after the units ) gained some additional ground. The Croatian
forces were regrouped and given additional reserves. Air Force (HRZ ) contributed an airstrike (and violated
In the Grahovo attack the 2nd Battalion /9th Guards the No-Fly Zone) by two MiG -21s near Glamoc,
Brigade was sent in to reinforce the 114th Brigade aimed at interdicting the road net.
company and managed to infiltrate around the left
flank of the VRS position to take it from the rear. The On 28 July ,HV/HVO forces finally defeated the VRS
HV units on the right were still having a hard time and 2nd Krajina Corps, first at Grahovo when the 4th and
managed to advance only about a kilometer. This was 7th Guards Brigades crushed the remaining Serb posi
enough , however, for the 7th Guards to resume its tions and entered the town, and then at Glamoc. The
attack in the center and on the left, gaining another 5 HV 81stGuards Battalion and 1st HGZ troops (with
kilometers. HV units were now about 7 kilometers the Special Police ) reached the outskirts ofGlamoc
from Grahovo on the left. from the north to cut the main route out of town. That
may have helped the HVO 2nd Guards Brigade, 60th
Opposite Glamoc , the momentum of the HV's Guards Battalion , and 22nd Sabotage Detachment
advance on the left picked up when troops from 1st push through the VRS positions in front of Glamoc,
HGZ , 1st Guards Brigade, and the Special Police out for the sudden exposure of their rear would have less
flanked the fortified area that had held up their attack ened the Serb soldiers ' readiness to stand and fight.
the previous day. This done, they pushed forward That night they may have tempered their valor with
some 5 kilometers, with the 81stGuards Battalion on discretion . In any case , HVO troops entered Glamoc
the left flank threatening VRS lines of communication the next day.
out of Glamoc to the north . Meanwhile , to speed up
the impetus of the attack , OG “ Rujani” committed
additional reserves 1st Battalion/1st Guards Brigade The SVK Withdraws From Bihac
and the HV Main Staff Recon -Sabotage Company,
plus a 72nd MP Battalion Antiterrorist Group — to a Operation “ Ljeto 95" failed in its avowed purpose of
new attack in the center against the 1,600 -meter slowing the SVK assault on Bihac by forcing the
Vrhovimassif. The 2nd HVO Guards Brigade was diversion of forces from among the enclave's attack
able to grind forward about a kilometer against the ers. Few of the SVK mobile reserve forces engaged at
VRS 5th Glamoc Brigade, while the HVO 60th Bihac — the SVK 2nd Guards Brigade from the Spe
Guards Battalion and 22nd Sabotage Detachment con cial Units Corps was possibly sent— and only a few
tinued to inch forward around Kujaca. VRS reserves were transferred to the Grahovo area ;
nor did ARBiH attacksmade at the same time as
With the HV attack still behind schedule , on 27 July " Ljeto 95" draw any reserves from around Bihac . It
Gotovina decided to commit to the Grahovo attack his
trump card — the 4th Guards Brigade. He now had two
full Guards Brigades engaged in the assault , the 4th on

366
--
was only after the July attacks that the Serbs altered against its renegade minority , trying to bring the two
their plans for Bihac, when wiping the Muslim sides together in Geneva on 3 August to have " talks
enclave off themap suddenly seemed a less important about talks.” Even this was unacceptable to the Croat
pan -Serb objective than dealing with the threat of a ians, who insisted that substantive talks on ending the
Croatian strategic offensive to eliminate the RSK RSK's existence be the focus of any discussion.543
That threat was manifested in the HV's full-scale RSK Foreign Minister Milan Babic — the same Babic
mobilization and deployment to attack positions dur who in 1990-91 had led the Serbs out of the Croatian
ing late July and the threat to Knin represented by the state — made a last-ditch peace offer, pledging accep
Croatian capture of Grahovo . These alarming develop- tance of a modified “ Z -4 ” plan for Serb autonomy in
ments were enough to change not only the Serb lead Croatia .His efforts failed despite their endorsement
ers' plans for Bihac but also their whole attitude by the United States.544 Zagreb was not interested in
toward it and its UN defenders. On 30 July, President what it saw asmore delaying tactics. Time had run out
Martic and General Mrksic met with UN Special Rep- for the RSK , and its day in the sun was coming to a
resentative Yasushi Akashi and agreed to withdraw close.
from Bihac as part of a six -part accord that, from the
UN's point of view ,might avert the danger of wider
war posed by the sudden threat of a Croatian offen Campaign Planning and Order of Battle
sive.540 SVK troops began pulling back from the
enclave that very day. The ever -optimistic Akashi's The HV offensive would be led by a new Main Staff
hopes for the breaking out of peace , however, were to chief - Corps General Zvonimir Cervenko . On 15
be quickly dashed . July, Cervenko had replaced the ailing, 76 - year-old
Staff General Janko Bobetko — the HV Chief of Staff
Chapter 89 since 1992. Cervenko , though more vigorous than
Operation “ Oluja ” —The Fall of the Bobetko , was of the same vintage, having been
Krajina Serb Republic, August 1995 drummed out of the JNA in 1971 for nationalist ten
dencies. In his previous position he had served as
The Croatian Government rejected the withdrawal Chief of the Presidential Military Office .
agreement that had been so hastily drafted by the
Serbs and the UN . President Tudjman had never had Bobetko and the Main Staff , however, had molded the
such a promising opportunity for themilitary recon campaign plan for the HV offensive well before Cer
quest of the RSK , and he was not going to pass it up venko took office and had issued the final version on
unless the RSK surrendered without a fight and 26 June.545 The strategic offensive - dubbed “ Oluja "
accepted Zagreb's terms for reintegration into the ( Storm )—was divided into operations numbered
Croatian state . Tudjman's conditions for even meeting " Oluja - 1" through “ Oluja -4 ." A single corps district
with the Krajina Serbs were haughtily presumptuous : would direct and execute each operation. Main Staff
control over the operation would be exerted from the
talks on the immediate implementation of main command post in Zagreb and a forward com
the Croatian Constitution on the occupied areas mand post — under Major General Marijan
shall begin , aswell as the talks on the implemen Marekovic - deployed to the town of Ogulin to over
tation of regulations of the constitutional act on see Karlovac and Gospic Corps District coordination .
Serb ethnic community's rights.541 The entire offensive was scheduled to last four to five
days. In order to better control its far flung units, the
Talks under these conditions would have meant that SVK Main Staff divided its forces in two , forming
the RSK had already agreed to reintegration , so the Operational Group “Kordun " under Lieutenant Colo
Krajina Serbswere not likely to swallow them . Yet nel General Mile Novakovic to control the three
Tudjman had threatened that, unless the terms were
met, Zagreb would use force to impose them.542 The
UN worked frantically to avert a Croatian offensive

367
corps - 21st, 39th , and KSJ — in UN Sector North battalion.549 The total force numbered about 30,000
while leaving the 7th and 15th Corps directly under HV troops, including support personnel, and would
the SVK Main Staff. eventually involve some 1,000 ARBiH personnel.

Plan for “ Oluja - 1” 546 The Zagreb Corps District's primary opponent was the
The Zagreb Corps District, under the command of SVK 39th Banija Corps under the command of Major
MajorGeneral Ivan Basarac , was to undertake “ Oluja- General Slobodan Tarbuk.550 Tarbuk had only four
1" in two stages against two objectives. In view of the infantry brigades, comprising some 9,000 troops ,
Krajina Serbs' doctrinal habit of compensating for any facing the oncoming HV, one of which was in reserve .
injury by rocket attacks on Croatian cities, the corps' Part of this force , a composite tactical group, plus the
first- stage objective was to encircle Petrinja and pene reserve brigade were already engaged against ARBiH
trate to a line some6 to 7 kilometers south of the town forces in Bihac — about 3,500 men (although some of
to eliminate SVK artillery -rocket groups in range of these obviously would be redeployed in the event of
Croatian urban and industrial targets. This first phase an HV assault). The corps was stronger in armor than
would include a strong secondary attack from the the HV but weaker in field artillery and heavy mortars.
Sunja area toward Hravatska Kostajnica . To undertake A critical concern was the corps ' shallow operational
this phase , the Zagreb Corpswas to have been given depth ; the frontline brigades had two defensive posi
the 2nd Guards Brigade as themain assault formation , tions constructed in the first or tactical zone — the area
the 81st IndependentGuards Battalion , a composite within 5 kilometers of the front — butno positions
battalion of MUP Special Police, two reserve infantry behind them . If the town ofGlina, some 10 kilometers
brigades, and five Home Defense regiments .Modifi from the frontline, should be lost, the corps'smain lat
cations made in the plan late in July, however, dis eral line of communication would be cut and with it
rupted the planned order of battle by withholding two most of its defensive maneuverability. With few
key shock units — the 81stGuards and theMUP battal reserves for a counterattack force and no VRS or VJ
ion . The corps was forced to modify the attack plan at reinforcements on the horizon , Tarbuk's men had to
Petrinja to compensate for the lack of the MUP troop stop the HV at or in the forward defense lines.
and to substitute another Home Defense regiment and
a reserve infantry brigade for the 81st Guards in the Plan for “ Oluja -2551
Kostajnica attack . These compromises would play The role of the Karlovac Corps District, under Major
havoc with the first phase of the corps operation . General Miljenko Crnjac , was a minor one compared
to the other three HV corps. Crnjac's mission was to
During the second phase , the corps 'mission was to conduct a holding attack against the SVK 21st Kordun
quickly break through Serb -held territory out to the Corps to pin it down and keep it away from the flanks
Bosnian border. (A subsequent linkup with ARBiH of the Zagreb and Gospic Corps Districts. His forces
5th Corps forces in the Zirovac area added to the orig would also try to capture SVK -held areas south of
inal plan appears to have resulted from difficulties Karlovac , around the town of Vojnic , to limit Serb
encountered by the HV at Petrinja .)547 The Zagreb shelling of Karlovac. If things went well, the corps
Corps would then cut off SVK units in the Zrinska would then seek to occupy the entire region . Crnjac's
Gora region and eliminate them or force their surren modest objectives did not rate him any Guards units,
der, completely liberating the Banovina (or to the but he did get one MUP Special Police battalion , two
Serbs, “ Banija ” ) region . This would be aided through reserve infantry brigades , and an antitank battalion in
the Kostajnica attack force pressing along the Una to addition to the corps's normal subordinate brigades
seize the river crossings at Dvor. For this phase , the and regiments. If needed, he could probably call on a
corps was allocated an additional four reserve infantry corps -level artillery -rocket group for heavy weapons
brigades and a HomeDefense regiment. Two corps support552 as well as two helicopter gunships from an
artillery groups formed from a battalion of the HV HRZ Mi- 24 detachment to help deal with SVK
Main Staff's 16th Artillery -Rocket Brigade , plus two armored counterattacks. His total force for the
corps artillery battalions provided added fire sup operation numbered about 15,000 men .
port.548 The corps also received an additional antitank

368
Crnjac would be opposed by MajorGeneral Veljko the main axes, and two Mi-24 helicopter gunships
Bosanac's 21stKordun Corps. The mobile reserve were on call for antitank support.556 General Norac
force ofMajor General Milorad Stupar's KSJ, probably had about 25,000 HV troops in all to be
although committed to Serb operations against Bihac , joined by some 2,000 ARBiH personnel.
was also available in this sector, especially after Serb
troops started withdrawing from the enclave . Bosanac The SVK 15th Lika Corps, underMajor General
controlled three infantry brigades, only two of which Stevo Sevo , would be defending the sector that was
would be engaged against the Karlovac Corps — about the main object of the Croatian -Bosnian attack . To do
4,000 men . ( The third was stuck between Karlovac this he had only two of his brigades plus part of
and Zagreb Corps Districts.)Most of a 1,500 -man another to meet the attack, plus two in reserve oppo
infantry brigade from the 15th Lika Corps was also in site Bihac. These forces numbered no more than
the zone of the Karlovac Corps attack . Stupar had 6,000 men because Sevo's other two brigades faced
some 5,000 troops in four brigades for the earlier other enemy corps districts across a front of some
attack on Bihac , but their subsequent deployment is 150 kilometers.557 The Lika Corps would be in a virtu
not known. The SVK as usual outnumbered the HV in ally untenable position when its narrow lines were hit
armor, field artillery , and heavy mortars; but 21st and squeezed by both the HV and the ARBiH .
Corps suffered the same lack of operational depth that
the 39th Corps did and would likewise have to stop Plan for " Oluja - 49558
and hold any attack in its frontline positions. Major General Ante Gotovina had planned and
directed the “Ljeto 95 ” operation that had prepared the
Plan for “Oluja - 3" 553 way for “ Oluja 4.” His Split Corps District, together
Major General Mirko Norac would direct the Gospic with MUP Special Police forces underMUP Colonel
Corps District in the principal " Oluja - 3” mission of General Mladen Markac, now had the primary
breaking through to the Bosnian border and , in coop “ Oluja" mission of seizing the Serb political strong
eration with the ARBiH 5th Corps, splitting SVK hold at Knin and the vital road junction atGracac. By
forces in the northern RSK (UN Sector North ) from encircling the bulk of the SVK 7th North Dalmatian
those in the south . The corps would then sweep the Corps or forcing its withdrawal into Bosnia , the opera
border area of SVK outposts and pockets of resis tion would allow the HV /MUP to occupy all of RSK
tance . The operation was to be conducted in two controlled Dalmatia . Strategically , the capture of Knin
stages, the first being a push to a phase line some would be the single -most-important objective of the
10 kilometers from the frontline — outside the first entire offensive . Knin had been the center and the
SVK defensive zone - after which a second wave symbol of the Croatian Serbs' rebellion against
would be committed to continue the breakthrough to Zagreb , and its fall would send a clear message to the
the border. All units would then engage in the mop RSK Government and its people that their state had
ping-up actions. The corps's forces were grouped come to an end .
around two axes, each centered on a Guards Brigade.
The first and largest, with the attached 1stGuards The military effect of the capture of Knin andGracac ,
Brigade leading the way, would drive from near both key road hubs, would be to cut off SVK forces in
Otocac toward the Plitvice Lakes.554 Meanwhile , the a huge pocket between Benkovac and Knin , forcing a
ARBiH 5th Corps was to conduct its breakout opera Serb surrender or a rapid retreat through a narrow
tion in this area to pin down SVK reserves and route to Bosnia at Otric-Donji Srb before HV units cut
connect with the approaching HV.555 The second col them off. Gotovina and Markac organized the mission
umn, clustered around the 9th Guards Brigade, would along two primary axes. The first would use the 4th
attack from the Gospic area toward Udbina Air Base . and 7th Guards Brigades, plus a Home Defense regi
In addition to the Guards,Norac had available one ment, to assault toward Knin from the positions
conscript infantry brigade , two reserve infantry bri
gades, and six HomeDefense regiments. Two corps
artillery -rocket groups were formed to support each of

369
around Bosansko Grahovo and the Dinara Mountains pockets of resistance to avoid any delay in reaching
gained during Operation “ Ljeto 95." The 81st Guards their objectives. The bypassed Serb forces could then
Battalion (initially assigned to “ Oluja 1” ) had been bemopped up at will. Artillery -rocket salvos and
kept in place after the “ Ljeto ” operation to protect strikes by reconnaissance - sabotage units would seek
Gotovina's rear from any VRS counterattack around to disable SVK command posts and communications
Grahovo , probably because Bosnian Croat forces nodes to hamper SVK maneuvers and slow down unit
either were unavailable or were considered unreliable transfers in reaction to the HV's fast moving spear
for this mission . The second major axis would involve heads. Electronic warfare units would add to these
a composite MUP Special Police brigade, together effects by jamming SVK communications. On a
with a battalion from the 9th Guards Brigade, attack broa deeper scale the HV waged psychological
ing through the VelebitMountains toward Gracac . The warfare against the RSK state and the SVK , broad
rest of the corps, organized into three operational casting false commercial radio messages and distribut
groups (one conscript infantry brigade, three reserve ing fake government leaflets directing Serb civilians
infantry brigades, and five Home Defense regiments ), to evacuate their homes . By such means the Croatians
would make frontal attacks against SVK positions expected to lower Serb morale and clog SVK lines of
around Benkovac , Kistanje, and Drnis to pin them communication .
down or even , if possible ,break through their lines
and speed up the operation . Three artillery -rocket
groups were in support.559 The MUP and HV com The Operation Commences — 4 August 1995561
bined had some 30,000 troops to undertake " Oluja - 4 ."
Operation " Oluja " began at 0500, with immediate
The Serb 7th North Dalmatian Corps, now under the effect throughout the Krajina. One of the HV's key
command of Major General Slobodan Kovacevic, had undertakings was a program of coordinated airstrikes
the main job of defending againstGotovina and and sabotage missions by ground forces against the
Markac's operation.560 The 7th Corps had two motor SVK's command and control facilities across the
ized brigades of its own and four infantry or light RSK . It was a stunning success, disrupting the ability
infantry brigades strung along what had been the main of the SVK General Staff to coordinate the overall
front between the Bosnian border and the Velebit defense of the RSK and interfering with operational
Mountains, while an adjacent brigade from the 15th communications down to the brigade level.562
Lika Corps was defending the Velebit Mountains
Gracac axis. The HV advance made through the Despite the promising start of the overall operation, its
Dinara Mountains-Livno Valley in “ Ljeto - 95 ” had individual components were having problems. The
completely undermined the corps's defensive arrange- Zagreb Corps District ran into immediate difficulties
ments and forced it to strip its brigades of their meager as it kicked off “ Oluja - 1.” Having lost the use of the
reserves to help cover their back door at Grahovo, now elite MUP Special Police units — which were to spear
occupied and controlled by the HV. A newly head the attack against Petrinja while the 2nd Guards
constituted composite reserve force , Tactical Group - 3, Brigade bypassed it - General Basarac decided to
had little chance of halting a new HV thrust from modify his assault plan.563 He apparently ordered the
Grahovo . (Elements of the KSJ's 2nd Guards Brigade 2nd Guards to make a direct attack on Petrinja instead
which had been moved toward Grahovo in July were of following the original plan to have them encircle
positioned in Knin butwere not forward deployed the town.564 The opposing SVK 31st Infantry Brigade
with TG -3 .) The knowledge that their positions had was well prepared for a frontal assault, its antitank
now been completely turned must have severely guns knocking out severalHV tanks on the
undermined morale among the 7th Corps's 10,000 approaches to Petrinja and barring the infantry from
men . gaining any significant footholds in the town.565 Home
Defense and reserve infantry troops, lacking the
HV Doctrine
For a more detailed discussion of HV doctrine, see Section VI,
In keeping with HV offensive doctrine, all four
“ Croatia 1993-94: Biding Its Time, Building Its Army.”
" Oluja " operationswere to be conducted as rapidly as
possible, with Guards formations bypassing major

370
discipline and motivation of the Guards, proved design left Knin virtually indefensible. The SVK 7th
unwilling to try to fight their way into Petrinja, leav North Dalmatian Corps could spare only the scraped
ing the 2nd Guards to bear the brunt of the fighting.566 together Tactical Group - 3 to block this avenue of
The result was an almost immediate breakdown in the approach ; stripping any other sector would only have
attack mission . The secondary attack toward Kosta opened another invasion route . The HV 4th and 7th
jnica — deprived of its Guards battalion spearhead Guards Brigades quickly crushed TG - 3 along their
also gained little or no ground against the SVK 26th converging axes toward Knin.575 Attacks on the left
Infantry Brigade. Here ,however, the reinforced 125th flank of the main advance by a Home Defense regi
Home Defense Regiment did a better job than than ment and an infantry brigade helped cave in the
those in the primary assault as it pushed toward already tottering SVK defenses in this sector,576 and a
Hrvatska Dubica along the Una River.567 spirited attack by MUP Special Police and a battalion
of the 9th Guards Brigade in the Velebit valley made
In “ Oluja - 2," the Karlovac Corps District succeeded in more cracks in the SVK defenses .Despite a strong
its primarymission of pinning the 21st Kordun Corps defense of theMali Alan pass by the 15th Lika Corps
inside its defense perimeter but fared poorly in terms troops, the elite MUP and HV units cracked the SVK
of ground gained 568 Serb General Bosanac's troops positions and broke through , quickly pushing on
blocked a river assault by the HV 104th Infantry Bri toward the village of Sveti Rok and the Celavac hill
gade to the east of Karlovac.569 Some 20 kilometers area along the main road to Gracac . The pace of the
southwest of Karlovac, however,General Crnjac's MUP advance left the SVK 9th Motorized Brigade no
forces — parts of two Home Defense time to regroup or consolidate its defenses.577 Gracac ,
regiments — were able to push several kilometers too , was already in mortal danger. With these suc
toward the village of Primislje but were unable to cesses in two key sectors, the limited gains made by
break through the SVK brigade defending the sector, the rest of General Gotovina’s Split Corps District
which appears to have been able to consolidate its reserve formations around Benkovac mattered little.578
defense line along the Korana River.570 An attack by If Gracac and Knin fell, they would form part of the
an infantry brigade and a HomeDefense regiment to noose encircling the entire Serb position .
encircle the town of Plaski also failed. 571

General Norac's Gospic Corps District achieved Day Two — 5 August 1995
mixed results on 4 August in carrying out “Oluja -3 "
butmade enough of an advance to place the 15th Lika Knin fell on the morning of 5 August, the apex of
Corps in a difficult situation.Near Gospic , the 9th “ Oluja " and the highlight of the day's operations. The
Guards Brigade and its accompanying reserve forma collapse of the “ Vijuga” Battle Group the previous day
tions made only minimal progress, halting in front of had opened the way for the 4th and 7th Guards Bri
strong SVK defenses at Ljubovo and Medak.572 To the gades to march into the town against only scattered
north , however, the 1st Guards Brigade punched a opposition, despite 7th Corps attempts to shift a battal
hole along the boundary between two 15th Corps bri ion from the 75th Motorized Brigade to positions
gades near the Kapela mountain range , although it north of Knin.579 The RSK Government and the SVK
appears to have run into stiff opposition from the SVK General Staff had pulled out during the night to the
Corps of Special Units (KSJ) near Licka Jasenica , village of Srb , some 35 kilometers to the northwest.580
which greatly slowed its advance.573 The Home Then the fall of Gracac to the rapidly advancing MUP
Defense regiments and reserve brigades on the troops during the morning — again , despite efforts by
Guards ' right flank barely advanced against the 18th 7th Corps to shift a battalion each from the 4th Light
and 50th Infantry Brigades in their attack northeast and 92nd Motorized Brigades — forced Mrksic and the
from the Otocac area.574 commander of the 7th North Dalmatian Corps,
General Kovacevic , to make a difficult choice: with
The HV's greatest success on Day One came in the draw entirely from the Benkovac -Obrovac-Kistanje
Velebit Mountains and Northern Dalmatia with
" Oluja-4 .” The capture ofGrahovo in July had by

371
pocket or face defeat and the destruction or surrender units to break out into the open and move against the
of the entire corps. The 7th Corps, together with most RSK Udbina Air Base,587 which forced the SVK to
of the Serb inhabitants, chose to pull out. With their evacuate its aircraft to the VRS base at Banja Luka.588
defenders gone, Benkovac and Obrovac were occu Two Home Defense regiments and a reserve brigade
pied in the early evening by HV Split Corps District helped in the Ljubovo attack and pushed northeast
forces.581 The 7th Corps forces - probably most of after the breakthrough toward Korenica. The MUP
three brigades — fell back to positions southeast of breakthrough at Gracac to the south allowed General
Gracac and Obrovac near Otric to cover the main Markac's troops to roll up the flank of the SVK 9th
withdrawal route . Motorized Brigade at Medak , eliminating a key Serb
center of resistance. The 15th Corps had now been
Things had appeared to be going reasonably well for chopped into three pockets : one centered on the 50th
the 15th Lika Corps on 4 August. On 5 August, how Brigade at Vrhovine, another around the remnants of
ever, the corps began to disintegrate as multiple the 18th Brigade at Bunic , and the last around the
attacks pummeled and overwhelmed General Sevo's 103rd Light Infantry Brigade at Donji Lapac -Korenica
forces. The disabling blow was the intervention of the on the Bosnian border. Those troops and civilians able
ARBiH 5th Corps in the HV's “Oluja- 3.” The HV to flee retreated toward Lapac and the sanctuary of
Gospic Corps District eventually would have battered Republika Srpska across the border.
its way through the SVK defenses over the next two
days, but it was the attack by major elements of two While the 15th Corps crumbled to the south ,General
crack ARBiH mountain brigades atmidnight on Bosanac and the 21stKordun Corps hung tight in their
5 August that sealed and hastened the corps ' defeat.582 defenses around Slunj and south of Karlovac . Primis
Forced to commitmost of its reserves to blocking the lje fell to troops from the 14th Home Defense Regi
many HV attacks, the 15th Corps had kept only skele mentof the Karlovac Corps, but the HV made few
ton forces opposite much of the Bosnian border. The gains elsewhere against the SVK.589Nevertheless, the
502nd Mountain Brigade, bypassing the UN observa 21st Corps' days were numbered also .
tion posts along the Bosnian - Croatian border north
west of Bihac in the darkness , quickly punched across General Basarac and the Zagreb Corps District - now
the border to rampage into the 15th Corps rear areas . overseen by Colonel General Petar Stipetic of the
Quickly occupying the town of Licko Petrovo Selo , Main Staff, who had been brought in to reorganize the
the brigade pushed on , takingmore border villages faltering attack — were still making heavy weather of
and sweeping through the famous Plitvice Lakes the “Oluja - 1” operation againstGeneral Tarbuk's 39th
resort area - scene of one of the first combat actions Corps. The weight of the HV, however, was beginning
of the Yugoslav wars — to reach Rakovica, some to wear down the Serbs. The first break came when
10 kilometers inside Croatia , at about 0800.583 Three the flanking attack along the Una by the 125th Home
hours later, the “ Tigers” of the the HV 1st Guards Bri Defense Regiment seized Hrvatska Dubica.590 A
gade arrived, led by Main Staff General Marijan renewed drive from the Sunja area — bolstered by the
Marekovic, to link up with the 5th Corps 584 after over commitment of an additional reserve brigade— forced
coming resistance from SVK infantry and mines in the the SVK to begin falling back toward Kostajnica.
Licka Jasenica/Saborsko area. Their arrival meant that More important, the ARBiH 5th Corps breakout from
SVK forces in the north were now cut off from those the Bihac enclave early on 5 August toward Zirovac
in UN Sector South.585 Another ARBiH brigade — the forced General Tarbuk to use his only reserve
501st - seized the important radar and radio facilities brigade — the 33rd Infantry --to block this drive into
atMount Pljesevica and moved into the Korenica area , the corps rear area .591 Without this reserve , the SVK
site of the 15th Corps headquarters, although it was unable to stop the tenacious HV 2nd Guards Bri
encountered strong resistance around the town.586 gade from grinding down the SVK 31st Brigade
troops around Petrinja and throwing a loose cordon
General Norac's forces atGospic also achieved some around the the town . The SVK continued to hold out
notable successes. The 9th Guards Brigade overcame
strong SVK resistance at Ljubovo early on 5 August,
allowing the brigade and its accompanying reserve

372
around Petrinja throughout the day , blocking the HV capturing the town and then pressing on toward the
from a breakout thatwould spell the end of 39th Corps last crossing point into Bosnia atDvor. An attempt by
and cut the escape route of the 21st Corps units Mrksic to shift the KSJ's 2nd Armored Brigade to the
deployed to the west. Glina area and counterattack did not succeed .600 Late
in the evening, the 2nd Guards entered Glina, driving
the SVK before them . With 39th Corps defenses
Day Three6 August 1995 buckling, GeneralMile Novakovic — in overall com
nand in the north — asked for a cease - fire to evacuate
As the 7th and 15th SVK Corps defenses continued to SVK soldiers from the 21st and 39th Corps alongwith
crumble on 6 August and soldiers and civilians Serb refugees. The cease- fire, however, would only
streamed toward Bosnia , the HV Split and Gospic last for the night, breaking down the next morning
Corps Districts pressed the retreating the Serb forces when the HV claimed that the Serbs had failed to turn
toward the border. The Split Corps District airlifted over their heavy weapons as specified in the
the 1st Croatian Guards Brigade (1st HGZ) via Mi-8 agreement.602
transport helicopters to positions southeast of Obrovac
to reinforce the reserve formations in this sector;
together with MUP Special Police forces, the 1st HGZ Day of Decision — 7 August 1995
pressed the SVK back and took Otric.592Markac's men
also pushed north , through Bruvno, toward Lapac , With HV and MUP forces consolidating their posi
linking up to the 9th Guards Brigade and 154th Home tions in the south , the key actions on this day came in
Defense Regiment as they marched into Udbina.593 the north.603 General Crnjac and the Karlovac Corps
HV and ARBiH troops also linked up in Korenica , and District - led by the 1st Guards Brigade — mounted a
the HV eliminated the remaining 15th Corps pockets concentric attack on the SVK 21st Corps forces
at Bunic and Vrhovine.594 Resistance in the south was around Vojnic.604 By this point, the corps, apparently
nearing an end . now led by its former commander Colonel Cedo
Bulat, appears to have already begun to withdraw east
After the linkup between 1st Guards Brigade and the ward in an attempt to escape capture 60s Directed by
ARBiH 502nd Mountain Brigade on 5 August, the General Novakovic , elements of the corps plus parts
two formations were directed to press north toward of the 39th appear to have withdrawn toward Dvor
Slunj the next day , hitting the KSJ and the 21st Kor during the so -called " cease - fire " earlier in the day;
dun Corps in the flank 595 while two Home Defense Bulat was trying to move out the rest of the corps
regiments made a simultaneous frontal attack toward before the 39th Corps completely collapsed.606 This
the town.596 The SVK 13th Infantry Brigade, appar effort was futile , however,when the ARBiH 505th and
ently joined with elements of the KSJ , was forced 511th Mountain Brigades finally overwhelmed the
back under this onslaught toward the 21st Corps head SVK 33rd Infantry Brigade, cutting the Serb escape
quarters in Vojnic , and HV troops entered Slunj 597 route to Dvor, and then linking up to the approaching
The corps, however, held out around Vojnic and HV 2nd Guards Brigade.607 HV
Karlovac , covering for the thousands of Serb refugees formations approaching from Kostajnica occupied
from the Slunj-Plaski region fleeing east toward the Dvor itself later in the day after SVK rear guards were
town of Topusko in Banija /Banovina . pushed across the river. Bulat, most of two infantry
brigades , possibly remnants of the Corps of Special
To the east, HV Zagreb Corps District forces took Units — some 3,000 to 6,000 troops— and tens of thou
control of Petrinja early on 6 August after the SVK sands of civilians were now cut off around the town of
39th Corps withdrew its remaining troops during the Topusko.608
night.598 With the capture of the town, the 2nd Guards
Brigade, supported by Home Defense formations ,
pushed on toward the vital road junction of Glina.599
At the sametime, HV units closed in on Kostajnica ,

373
Meanwhile, General Dudakovic and the ARBiH 5th have claimed that former US military officers trained
Corps were settling accounts with Fikret Abdic and the Croatian Army or that NATO had backed the
the completely bewildered APWB forces around Croatian offensive . Another story was that Milosevic's
Velika Kladusa . With the 502nd Brigade attacking purpose in sending GeneralMrksic to the RSK was to
from the west in Croatia and the rest of the corps prepare a withdrawal of the Army and the population
launching a frontal assault from the south , Abdic's and that the SVK did not really fight but simply
army - by now deprived of its SVK troops and retreated as soon as the HV attacked . None of these
advisers — disintegrated . The victorious 5th Corps stories are true, despite recent claimsfrom a former
marched into Velika Kladusa.609 General Dudakovic SVK general that Belgrade sold out the RSK .
was rewarded with a promotion to two -star general.610
The HV's stunning victory rested on a combination of
improvements made in its force structure and doctrine
Mopping Up - 8 August 1995 before the operation and the key penetrations of Ser
bian positions that the HV and the ARBiH 5th Corps
A triumphant Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak were able to open and exploit during the operation
had pronounced the operation complete as of 1800 on itself and that unraveled the SVK's defense system .
7 August. There remained, however, a few pockets of
resistance for the HV to stamp out the next day. In the The foundation for “ Oluja " was the doctrinal and
south the Gospic and Split Corps District's coordi structural improvements made by the HV since 1993
nated a drive against the last major SVK pocket (discussed in Section VI). These professional
around Donji Lapac -Srb , unleashing three Guards Bri- improvements enhanced the HV's ability to plan and
gades, the 1st HGZ, and the MUP Special Police . By organize an operation of impressive magnitude and
this time the SVK remnants and civilians still in the complexity and to develop the capability to conduct
area were in the process of withdrawing, and the HV high-tempo breakthrough operations that could
attack merely sped them along. The action was com quickly penetrate to the depths of the enemy's
plete by 2000 hours.611 defenses. Without these improvements, the HV would
not have been able to undertake " Oluja" in the way it
The most dramatic moment of the day came in the unfolded .
north when Bulat surrendered his forces to veteran
HV Main Staff officer General Petar Stipetic — an old Doctrine alone,however, did not win the war but had
friend of his from JNA days. The 21st Corps's heavy to be faithfully executed on the battlefield . The HV
weapons, including a battalion of tanks and a 130 -mm was not everywhere nor immediately successful in the
field gun battalion , were turned over to the Croat attacks planned for " Oluja.” Itwas rather the HV's
ians.612 The defeated soldiers and as many as 20,000 success in achieving breakthroughs in key sectors
refugees escorted by the UN were allowed to depart enhanced by the disruption of the SVK command and
Croatia, driving overloaded cars, buses, trucks, and control system — that undermined the SVK's defensive
tractors along a tortuous route that ran through west system as a whole and caused its collapse .
ern and eastern Slavonia to the Federal Yugoslav
border. The Republika Srpska Krajina had ceased to The first and most visible of the critical individual
exist, with only one fragment of Croatian territory in actions was the HV's long-term advance up the Dinara
eastern Slavonia remaining under Serb control.613 Mountains and the Livno Valley that gave it excellent
jumpoff positions for a quick , direct strike at Knin ,
bypassing themain SVK defenses south of the town.
Evaluation of " Oluja " The appearance of the HV forces in Operation " Ljeto
95” at Bosansko Grahovo effectively sealed Knin's
Legends and myths about the Croatians' defeat of the
Krajina Serb Army began almost as soon as the RSK
had been destroyed by the lightning operation .Many

374
fate before " Oluja " got off the ground. Capped by the The battlefield successes of the HV and the ARBiH
MUP's breakthrough and rapid exploitation toward were facilitated by SVK structural weaknesses
Gracac during " Oluja," the HV's tactical positions vir which , of course , the HV staff had calculated on
tually assured the defeat of the SVK 7th Corps before exploiting. The SVK's biggest problem was notthat
much of its military power had been engaged by HV its troops were unwilling or unprepared to fight but
orMUP troops. An SVK Main Staff officer,Major that there were not enough of them — a problem recog
General Milisav Sekulic , claims that the evacuation of nized when GeneralMrksic was brought in to reallo
the civilians from the 7th Corps area demoralized the cate defensive formations and establish a bigger and
defenders, although it was supposed to allow SVK better mobile reserve force. The Krajina Serbs had
troops to focus on fighting. This may be true , but the fought well in the attack , in another country, during
HV had adequate forces to overwhelm the few 7th the Bihac battles; and during " Oluja" many SVK for
Corps units north of Knin . mations had been able to hold their ground against
frontal attacks by stronger HV forces. The SVK Main
The defeat of the 15th Lika Corps was accomplished Staff and its corps commanders did not have enough
by the 9th Guards Brigade's attack along a narrow axis combat formations, however, to maintain the depth
that cut like a stiletto through the strong SVK resis and mobility needed to contain an HV penetration .
tance . The fast-moving assault of the ARBiH 5th When the HV struck through SVK static defenses at
Corps , launched in darkness , acted like a catalyst that Knin , the SVK 7th Corps commander had no units in
increased the rapidity with which the SVK forces reserve to resist and prevent its the capture. The only
facing “ Oluja - 3" collapsed. The 5th Corps attack , unit left uncommitted had been cobbled together from
compounding the 9th Guards Brigade's breakthrough bits and pieces stripped out of the corps' line brigades.
at Ljubovo, fragmented what had been a cohesive 15th Lack of reserves to cushion a flank attack forced the
Corps defense and left the Serb troops isolated in evacuation of the well-defended area south of Karlo
easily eliminated pockets. vac, and Petrinja's stout defenses yielded when the
reserves it counted on were committed elsewhere . All
Although part of “ Oluja- 3,” the 1st Guards Brigade's the corps sectors faced the same difficulties and suf
successful advance toward Bihac was the clincher that fered the same fate .Mrksic's ill-fated Corps of Special
finally allowed the Karlovac Corps District's less Units was supposed to offset the lack of corps
well-endowed " Oluja -2 ” operation to dislodge its reserves. Although its elite troops had foughtwell
tough 21st Corps opponents from their positions. The against the 5th Corps during the attack on Bihac , the
Guards' drive enabled the HV to roll up the 21st KSJ in " Oluja" failed to fulfill its primary mission as a
Corps's flank so that it had to withdraw from its strong roving reserve force and was able to delay the HV 1st
positions in front of Karlovac itself. Guards Brigade for no more than a day during its drive
south of Slunj.
The loss of Petrinja and Glina defeated the 39th
Corps, and the HV's breakthrough at Petrinja after a With no reserves to call on to plug holes or outflank
stubborn SVK defense appears directly attributable enemy attack , the SVK's static infantry brigades were
to the intervention of ARBiH 5th Corps troops on unable to counter the HV's high - tempo operations
5 August: the ARBiH attack deprived General Tarbuk and, in particular, were unable to stop the HV Guards .
of reserves he could have fed into the Petrinja battle . Attacks by HV Home Defense and reserve formations,
Unaided by the ARBiH , in time the HV almost cer which had far less training , less discipline, and lower
tainly would have broken through the SVK positions motivation than the Guards units ,were repelled almost
around the town on its own, but at considerably routinely by the SVK , and it probably could have con
greater cost in time, effort, and manpower. The fall of tained an HV offensive employing only those types of
Glina soon after and the severing of the Dvor road formations.
guaranteed thatmopping up the disjointed SVK resis
tance would pose no problems.

375
 The problem in 1995 was that the SVK Main Staff had the region . " Oluja " did cause the VJ to mobilize and
traditionally counted on the Bosnian Serb and Yugo deploy large numbers of armor, artillery , and infantry
slav armies to act as its strategic reserve , and against to the border with eastern Slavonia as a warning to
“ Oluja” these reserves were not available . The VRS Zagreb , but it would have taken a major VJ-supported
was still more than willing to fulfill this role, but the offensive out of the RSK enclave to actually deter or
VRS Main Staff itself was short of the reserve forma slow down the HV offensive. Milosevic's failure to
tions it needed to contend with ARBiH attacks across order in the VJ has been taken as a sign - not justby
Bosnia. When “ Oluja " hit, the battlefield situation in General Sekulic — thatMilosevic was indifferent or at
Bosnia made it impossible for the Bosnian Serbs to ist callous about the RSK's fate. That there is a cer
contribute anything more than a few counterattacks tain amount of truth to this does not, however, imply
around Grahovo and Bihac . Difficulties in allocating that Milosevic wanted to see the RSK fall .He had
reserve formations were exacerbated by the unusually committed his personal prestige and a lot of Yugoslav
sluggish performance of the VRS Main Staff through resources to propping up the RSK , and he had been
out the HV's Dinara -Livno Valley operations, when it sending VJ officers and equipment to help defend the
appeared to have underestimated the HV's capabili Krajina Serbs since 1992. There was a line beyond
ties. This was exacerbated by the decision to attack which he was not willing to go , however, if by cross
Bihac in July rather than conduct a joint SVK - VRS ing it , Yugoslavia incurred prolonged or increased
operation against the HV south of Grahovo. The VRS Western sanctions or high military costs. With West
then reacted too late to the capture of Bosansko Gra ern governments and their people increasingly focused
hovo and committed too few reserves to the defense of on what was happening in places like Srebrenica and
the area . “ Oluja " was a wake- up call for the VRS, but Bihac,Milosevic had finally come to that line.
it came too late to help save the SVK .

The Yugoslav Army gave no direct help to the Croat Strategic Shift: The Impact of " Oluja " in Bosnia
ian Serbs because President Milosevic did not order it
to . SVK General Sekulic in fact claims thatMilosevic The sudden defeatand disappearance of the RSK had
sold out the RSK and intentionally forced decisions a profound impact on the VRS leadership’s thinking
that he knew would lead to its fall. He cites the deci and crystallized their belief that a political-military
sion to attack Bihac, the RSK Supreme Defense Coun settlement had to be negotiated as soon as possible .*
cil's order to evacuate civilians from the Knin area , The military capabilities demonstrated by the Croatian
and President Karadzic's attempt to remove Mladic . Army impressed on General Mladic and the Main
However, while these may have been mistaken deci Staff the realization that the military balance in Bosnia
sions, it does not follow that these were decisions cal could be radically altered if Zagreb shifted the focus
culated to give away the RSK , especially since there of HV actions from the defunct RSK to Republika
were good arguments for most of them . Other parts of Srpska. They and PresidentMilosevic began to put
his claim do notmake sense - only Knin was ordered unrelenting pressure on Radovan Karadzic to let
to evacuate , not Sector North , and Mladic was Milosevic head a negotiating team that could bargain
Milosevic's man in Bosnia , not Karadzic . for a secure Serb position in an overall Bosnian peace
settlement.
The VJ — with Milosevic's concurrence — was already
supplying equipment to the SVK and providing it with The Croatians and Bosnians were way ahead of them .
officers and NCOs to stiffen its units, along with some Zagreb and Sarajevo had agreed on and were planning
.

special operations units. Sending VJ units openly For a deeper discussion , see Chapter 73 , “ The Red Generals
across the borders in support of the SVK was appar Refuse to Bow : Political-Military Relations and the Strategic
Debate in Republika Srpska, 1995” and Chapter 94 , “ Evaluation
ently more than Milosevic was willing to do to save The Cease-Fire Agreement and the Final Offensives."
the RSK . Even if he had been willing, the rapidity
with which the HV struck and enveloped the RSK left
very little time for the VJ to send adequate forces to

376
exactly the kind ofwar-ending offensives in western had gone far beyond the accepted norms of military
Bosnia that had aroused Mladic's imagination and and political exigency during and after the battle .
concern . Zagreb's goals in undertaking a full-scale These revelations piled atop the past record of abuses
military intervention were to create a buffer zone removed any ambivalence about the need for a strong
astride its border with Bosnia and to establish itself as stance against the Serbs, even by those NATO mem
the dominant regional power through a full demon bers such as Greece who may have been traditionally
stration of its military might. A new Bosnian balance sympathetic to Serb interests and positions. The UN
of power with a weakened Republika Srpska, coun was withdrawing personnel from Serb -held territory ,
tered by the Bosnian Army and an HV /HVO alliance , and the evacuation of UN peacekeepers from the
would be very much in Zagreb's interests . Forcing an remaining safe areas and outposts would remove the
end to the Bosnian war would also gain Croatia points Serbs' hostage -taking weapon , freeing NATO plan
in the West. If the Serbs refused to negotiate, the HV ners for more comprehensive strike options. On
could take western Bosnia and form a protectorate of 26 July the much - vilified , civil-military dual-key
their own, leaving a portion of the area to the Mus arrangement was abandoned , giving UNPROFOR
lims. The Bosnian Government welcomed the pros commander Lt.Gen. Bernard Janvier individual
pect of Croatian military support and was actively authority to authorize NATO airstrikes to counter or
cooperating with Zagreb , but itwanted to go even fur retaliate for actions against peace and security in
ther. If it could completely defeat the VRS and take all Bosnia .
of western Bosnia for itself, it mightthen reestablish a
unitary state that would allow the return of the Mus The UN's experiences in trying to defend its safe area
lims expelled from the area earlier in the conflict. For at Srebrenica had paved the way for decisive NATO
a time, however, Zagreb and Sarajevo's planning for action , but it was a sharper, shorter incident that
their military operations was overshadowed by the finally triggered it: the Sarajevo “marketplace massa
military intervention of yet another actor — NATO . cre " of 28 August 1995 , which was almost identical to
the previous February 1994 “Markale marketplace
Chapter 90 massacre" that had evoked NATO's first explicit threat
“ Deliberate Force ” -NATO Airpower of aerial retaliation . Thirty -seven civilians died , and
Over Bosnia , 30 August - 20 September 1995 nearly 100 more were injured in the latest shelling
(only 100 yards from the 1994 one). Chilling televised
After almost three years of incremental involvement, and printed pictures of the maimed and themourning
NATO brought the full weightof its airpower into play raced around the globe, evoking cries of outrage and
in the last days of August 1995. It had taken this long calls for action . UN investigators concluded almost
because , among other factors , the political consensus immediately that the Bosnian Serbs had been
necessary for strong retaliatory air actions could not responsible " beyond reasonable doubt," and plans for
be assembled from among all the NATO Allies. The retaliation were under way within 24 hours of the
vulnerabilities of UN peacekeepers on the ground to mortar bomb's explosion.614
retaliatory Serb hostage taking had been all too clearly
demonstrated after the NATO attacks of 1994 and The first thing to be done was to remove the threat of
early 1995. Finally , effective action was inhibited by hostage taking that had bedeviled the last instance of
the cumbersome" dual-key " arrangement for airstrike NATO air action at Pale . On 29 August, the day after
authorizations, which required the approval of both the Sarajevo shelling incident, UNPROFOR began
the UNPROFOR military leadership and the UN's quietly pulling its peacekeepers out of the encircled
civilian Special Envoy, Yasushi Akashi. Gorazde enclave and directed UN troops elsewhere to
move to more defensible positions. NATO's Allied
All three of these factors changed after the searing Forces South (AFSOUTH ) commander Admiral
shambles of Srebrenica exposed the need for stronger
counters to what had become a pattern of calculated
Serb aggression and outrageous behavior. Evidence
was rapidly mounting that Serb actions at Srebrenica

377
Leighton Smith and UNPROFOR commander Janvier with precision artillery targeting and helped sort the
quickly finished drawing up an initial bombing folder results from the ongoing air operations.619620
of 10 Serb targets. The day after that the hammer
began to fall as NATO undertook its largest combat If NATO's demonstration of violent force and resolve
mission since the alliance's foundation in 1949 . made any impression on the Bosnian Serb Army com
mander,GeneralMladic , it did not show . There was
The NATO air campaign - codenamed “ Deliberate no sign that the VRS was withdrawing its weapons
Force" -commenced during the early morning hours from the Sarajevo heavy weapons exclusion zone or
of 30 August. It began with a subelement of the over that it had any intention of doing so . A second wave of
all attack plan — codenamed “Dead Eye" —which strikes, directed primarily against ammunition dumps
consisted of land- and carrier -based strikes against the around the capital, followed the next day. The opera
Bosnian Serb Integrated Air Defense System tion then continued into its third day until a little past
(IADS).615 A variety of aircraft mounting electronic noon on 1 September,621 after which NATO announced
warfare , radar- jamming, and specialized strike capa it was unilaterally suspending the operation to see if
bilities attacked 16 Bosnian Serb radar sites , the Bosnian Serbs were ready to withdraw their weap
command posts, communications relays, and surface ons from around the city as the UN had demanded .622
to -air-missile (SAM ) sites.616 After these aircraft had
opened the way ( though they had not entirely elimi The UN's gesture proved to be in vain , for the Bosnian
nated the threat), the regular bombing strike missions Serbs defiantly rejected NATO's terms in public
followed . These consisted of “ strike packages” of broadcasts. At 1600 that day, therefore , French RRF
roughly two dozen planes each and were directed at artillery was called upon to fire 24 155-mm shells at a
Bosnian Serb ground targets in eastern Bosnia such as VRS mortar position near Vogosca that UN observers
ammunition dumps and command posts. By the end of believed was preparing to open fire . Less than an hour
the first day, more than 300 sorties had struck some later, British RRF guns fired almost 100 105 -mm
90 separate aiming points at 23 major targets.617 shells at a VRS SA -6 SAM site that had earlier fired at
a NATO plane near Lukavica barracks in south Sara
NATO suffered its only aircraft loss of the Deliberate jevo.623624 625 UNPROFOR commander General Jan
Force operation on the first day when a low -flying vier then endured a long meeting with GeneralMladic
French Air Force Mirage 2000 was downed by a in the town of Zvornik to discuss the NATO ultima
shoulder -fired SAM while bombing Pale.618 The two tum , but Mladic again refused to accept the UN's
pilots ejected safely and were taken captive almost terms.626 627 The Serbs punctuated their defiance on
immediately by VRS soldiers while NATO mounted 2 September by firing a small shell (or possibly a rifle
three search -and-rescue operations in a vain attempt to grenade ) into the Sarajevo neighborhood of Mojmilo ,
find them . ( The French pilots were released after the wounding seven residents.628
signing of the Dayton Agreement.)
Now that it had assembled the means and the gump
While NATO aircrews were striking VRS targets pri tion to call Serb bluffs , the UN's next action was the
marily in the Sarajevo area, UNPROFOR called its unilateral reopening of the “ Blue Route,” the long
own Rapid Reaction Force (RRF ) into play for the closed convoy route across Sarajevo airport and into
first time. French , British , and Dutch artillery on the city. Serb threats had shut down this lifeline and
Mount Igman directed fire against Bosnian Serb heavy the airlift almost half a year earlier and put a strangle
weapons positions within the Sarajevo exclusion zone. hold on the city. This time the UN truck drivers simply
On the first day of the Operation Deliberate Force , drove past the roadblocks, daring the Serbs to chal
RRF artillery fired more than 1,000 rounds and report- lenge them . The first overland convoy since March
edly destroyed 23 of the roughly 300 Bosnian Serb passed through unharmed on 3 September, raising the
weapons positions around Sarajevo. The RRF gunners prospect that the siege might finally be lifted .629 The
were supported by Tactical Air Control saga of Sarajevo was not yet over.
Parties ( TACPs) of trained observers, who assisted

378
 The bombing pause by now had lasted longer than the NATO air operations continued at a high operational
original attack , and it appeared that the Bosnian Serbs tempo — as many as seven strike packages a day
were not doing anything to comply with the UN through 13 September, when a spell of bad weather
demands .Mladic had agreed to withdraw his heavy cut down on flight operations, and planners began
weapons from around the city only if the UN agreed to worrying that they would soon run out of targets . For
a set of conditions that included a Bosnia -wide cease tunately, before these concerns could become prob
fire (which would have locked in Serb territorial lems, the Bosnian Serbs decided they had had enough
gains ) as well as a reopening of the UN investigation and acceded to the UN requirements for the Sarajevo
into themortar attack that had precipitated its ultima Total Exclusion Zone. On 15 September a French
tum.630 NATO issued a warning that the air campaign cargo aircraft landed at Sarajevo airport like a sym
would resume unless the Serbs accepted the UN's bolic dove of peace to reopen the airbridge after a six
original terms by 2300 on 4 September.631 Mladic month standdown . On 20 September, after reviewing
responded by proclaiming a unilateral cease - fire the actions the Bosnian Serbs had taken to comply
around the city and moving two dozen of his esti with UN requirements, the UN and NATO formally
mated 300 heavy weapons out of the exclusion declared that " resumption of airstrikes is currently not
zone.632 633 The UN called this an unacceptable necessary.” 639
response and let itbe assumed that the bombing would
resume shortly . Chapter 91
Operation "Maestral” and
Perhaps to test the recalcitrance of its opponent, Operation " Sana 95 ” —Decision in Western Bosnia
NATO waited until 1300 on 5 September before the
aerial attacks began again.634 RRF artillery also went
back into action against VRS positions within range of Campaign Planning and Order of Battle
the UN guns on Mt. Igman.635 The Bosnian Serbs
expressed their disdain and defiance with several While NATO cranked up and flew its air campaign to
shells fired into the city that evening, including one bring the Bosnian Serbs to heel, the HV /HVO and the
that detonated near UNPROFOR's Zetra base in Bosnian Army were collaborating on plans for their
northern Sarajevo.636 The contest of wills continued . own forthcoming ground campaign against the
VRS.640 Other than its defiant standoff againstNATO
NATO had nearly exhausted its list of Serb targets in around Sarajevo , the VRS in western Bosnia had been
the Sarajevo area , so the air campaign expanded to hit relatively quiet since the end of “ Oluja." The excep
a greater number and range of targets all across the tion occurred the night of 11-12 August when the 2nd
Republika Srpska. Targets in western Bosnia - previ Krajina Corps hit HV reserve infantry units around
ously off limits — were added to the strike list, which Bosansko Grahovo with a strong attack that broke
included ammunition depots, army garrisons, highway through one brigade and carried VRS troops into the
bridges, and other military facilities.New weapons outskirts of the town . Two HV Guards battalions,
were also introduced into the air campaign on 9 Sep however, quickly counterattacked and drove the VRS
tember, when US Navy and Air Force planes attacked back out of town.641 The rest of themonth saw regular
Bosnian Serb air defense sites with standoff land clashes along the frontlines near Bihac , south of
attack missiles (SLAMs) and 2,000 -pound glide Drvar, and north of Glamoc . These appeared to be
bombs. The following day the cruiser USS Normandy probing actions as all three sides spentmost of the
fired a volley of 13 Tomahawk land attack missiles time reorganizing their forces in preparation for opera
(TLAMs) against two Bosnian Serb air defense targets tions in western Bosnia that would coalesce into the
near Banja Luka.637 Possibly in response , Bosnian decisive campaign of the war.
Serb artillery targeted Nordic UNPROFOR troops
near Tuzla on 10 September. The Nordic peacekeepers
immediately requested Close Air Support, and US
carrier-based aircraft responded with bombing attacks
that silenced the offending Serb guns.638

379
The main part of the joint campaign was to be under two with one part of the force heading toward Mrkon
taken by HV/HVO forces in Operation “Maestral” jic Grad and the other toward SanskiMost. The sec
(Breeze ). By seizing the towns of Jajce , Sipovo, and ond group, with the other four brigades, was to attack
Drvar, the operation would roll up large swathes of on the Krupa-Bosanski Novi-Prijedor axis.647 Briga
territory on the approaches to the Sana and Vrbas dier GeneralMehmed Alagic's 7th Corps was to take
River valleys. The capture of these areas would also Donji Vakuf, which had resisted repeated ARBiH
place Banja Luka in jeopardy, though not in imminent assaults since 1994 , then push on in the general direc
danger. tion of Banja Luka, passing through Skender Vakuf
and Kotor Varos. If possible, the 5th and 7th Corps
GeneralGotovina, the commander of the HV Split were to link up near Mrkonjic Grad . Although Col.
Corps District, was placed in overall command of Senad Dautovic's reinforced 77th Division would
what theHV/HVO officially designated the “ Croatian spearhead the 7th Corps drive on Donji Vakuf, virtu
Forces.” The attack plan devised by Gotovina and his ally all of Alagic's 12 combat brigades, comprising
staff consisted of three phases, the first two of which 20,000 men , were to be involved .648
focused on the Jajce - Sipovo axis. In the opening
assault the jointHV/HVO Operational Group “ North " Lieutenant Colonel GeneralManojlo Milovanovic
would fight its way through the VRS frontline Chief of the VRS Main Staff — was in overall com
defenses along a string of mountains northeast of mand of the VRS operations in western Bosnia, as he
Glamoc, especially the Mliniste pass and the 1,900 had been since late 1994 ;his headquarters was located
meter Vitorog heights that dominated it. After break in Drvar.Major General Tomanic's long-suffering 2nd
ing into and through these defenses, OG “ North " Krajina Corps would again bear the brunt of the
troopswould exploit their breakthrough by advancing HV /HVO /ARBiH operations, together with Major
rapidly toward Sipovo and Jajce.642 Gotovina acknowl General Momir Zec's 30th Infantry Division / lst Kra
edged the magnitude and importance of this aspect of jina Corps . To absorb the HV /HVO attack , Tomanic
the operation by assigning to OG “North ” all of the and Zec had one motorized brigade and asmany as six
elite shock units available , including the 4th and 7th infantry or light infantry brigades in the frontline plus
Guards Brigades, the 1st Croatian Guards Brigade ( 1st one in reserve, but only three of these formations,
HGZ), all three HVO Guards brigades, and other spe including the reserve brigade— some 5,000 to 6,000
cial units totaling 11,000 troops.643 Supporting the troops — were arrayed along the main Sipovo - Jajce
main effort during phase one and two, five HV Home axis.649 Opposite the ARBiH 5th Corps, Tomanic had
Defense regiments and three reserve infantry brigades six infantry or light infantry brigades with about 8,000
deployed southeast and southwest of Drvar were to troops on the Grabez plateau or at Bosanska Krupa
conduct holding attacks against VRS 2nd Krajina and Otoka.650 Against the 7th Corps ,General Zec
Corps troops in these areas. Although these forces deployed a strong force, with more than 8,500 troops
organized into OG "West” and OG " South” —were to in five infantry and light infantry brigades.651 Overall,
gain ground as possible on the approaches to Drvar, the force dispositions selected by the VRS in this the
the actual capture of the town would be the object of ater were flawed , with the bulk of the force apparently
the third phase , after the fall of Sipovo and Jajce.644 deployed opposite the 5th and 7th Corps instead of the
far more powerful HV /HVO.652
The role of the ARBiH would be a broad flanking
advance on both sides of the HV /HVO attack by the
5th and 7th Corps. The entire 15,000 -man 5th Corps, "Maestral" Breaks the VRS Line,
led by General Dudakovic, had the primary ARBiH 8-15 September 1995
mission , designated " Sana 95," of driving toward
Prijedor and seizing the towns of Bosanska Krupa, The HV /HVO assault began on themorning of 8 Sep
Bosanski Petrovac , Kljuc, and SanskiMost on the tember, despite heavy fog that hindered artillery fire
way.645 General Dudakovic grouped his eight brigades control.653 TwoHV Guards Brigades led the attack , the
into two operational groups. The first, comprising four 7th Guards attacking toward Mliniste while the 4th
brigades, was to drive on the Bosanski Petrovac -Kljuc
axis.646 After seizing Kljuc, the group would split into

380
Guards to the right pushed against the 1,500 -meter The second phase of “Maestral” —the advance to
Jastrebnjak feature. By 1000 they had broken through Sipovo and Jajce — began on 12 September. As
the VRS frontline positions, allowing the 1st HGZ to expected in the planning, the VRS forces - primarily
pass through the 4th Guards and seize its objective , the 7th Motorized Brigade — had been forced to pull
the village of Pribelja , and then outflank the tough back from their exposed positions near Vitorog to
Vitorog defenses. As soon as Pribelja was taken , the defend the Sipovo area. The rapid HV /HVO push ,
HVO 60th Guards Battalion and Bosnian Croat Spe however, gave the Serbs little time to coordinate a
cial Police were inserted to reinforce the 1st HGZ in positional defense , and they had to use their armor and
tackling Vitorog. The 4th Guards made the largest artillery to slow the Croatian attack while they tried to
advance that day, thrusting 5 kilometers into the consolidate their positions. During the day, OG
defensive zone of the 3rd Serbian Brigade. The 7th “ North ” was able to break up the VRS defenses with
Guards and the forces led by the 1st HGZ had gained strong artillery and multiple rocket launcher fire, sup
far less ground. The supporting attacks of Groups ported by three Mi- 24 helicopter gunship sorties. The
" South " and " West" had made little headway against reinforced 1st HVO Guards Brigade then broke into
the VRS troops southeast and southwest of Drvar. Sipovo , supported on the right by 1st HGZ.659 As the
VRS crumpled around Sipovo , the 2nd HVO Guards
The nextday's attack — 9 September - proved to be Brigade began its dash toward Jajce as planned , reach
the crucial one, despite continuing poor weather. ing positions some 10 kilometers directly south of the
HV/HVO forces seized most of the primary VRS town by the end of the day.660 On 13 September,
defensive zone from the 3rd Serbian and 7th Motor Jajce— the jewel of the operation — was restored to
ized Brigades. The 7th Guards Brigade advanced Croat hands, avenging its loss to the VRS in 1992.661
some 8 kilometers , capturing the Mliniste pass , while The VRS forces that had fallen back now concentrated
the 1st HGZ and its accompanying units rolled up the on holdingMrkonjic Grad and brought up reinforce
Vitorog position.654 In the center, the 4th Guards ments from the 30th Division to consolidate the
completed the capture of the Jastrebnjak area . On defenses around the town.662
10 September, the Guards' advance was held to about
2 kilometers as the VRS threw in an armored battalion The planners of “Maestral” had achieved theirmajor
of M -84 tanks from the 1st Armored Brigade.655Nev purpose with the capture of Jajce, but, as anticipated ,
ertheless, HV /HVO forces were rapidly reaching a the weaker part of the operational force had been
position from which they could break out and roll the unable to seize the secondary target, Drvar, still held
defenders toward Sipovo and Jajce. OGs“ South ” and by the stubborn VRS 2nd Krajina Corps. To bolster
“ West,” however, were still held up by a tenacious phase three and complete the operation, General
VRS defense around Drvar. Gotovina assigned a reinforced battalion -sized battle
group from the 7th Guards Brigade to put a new spear
On the next day, 11 September,most of OG “ North ” head on OG " South ." 663 On 14 September he launched
rested and reorganized ; the 4th and 7th Guards Bri a general attack on the city by OG “ South ” and
gades were withdrawn into reserve and replaced on “ West,” with the 7th Guards troops coming from the
the line by the 1st and 2nd HVO Guards Brigades . OG southeast.664 As the HV closed in on its defenses from
" North's " lineup now included the 3rd HVO Guards, three directions and the ARBiH 5th Corps threatened
1 st HVO Guards, 1st HGZ , and 2nd HVO Guards Bri the fourth with an advance on Bosanski Petrovac to
gade.656 A probing attack led by 2nd HVO Guards Bri the north , the VRS decided to call it quits and pulled
gade seized the important Demirovac hill and parts of out of the town. “Maestral” had netted the HV /HVO
the Kupres Valley on the route to Jajce. The main over 2,500 square kilometers of territory and penetra
action of the day, however, was a concerted attemptby tions in some places of up to 30 kilometers.
OGs"South ” and “West” to capture Drvar.657 The 1st
Drvar Light Infantry Brigade and the composite 1st,
2nd, and 3rd Drina Light Infantry Brigades quickly
stymied the HV assault,heavily supported by artillery
""658
and rocket fire , including 262-mm “ Orkans.”

381
 The 7th Corps Captures Donji Vakuf, his strong right arm , OperationalGroup " South ," with
10-14 September 1995 the 502nd Mountain Brigade forming its fist and
recently captured Serb armor and field guns adding
The Bosnian Army's operations against Donji Vakuf muscle to HV artillery support. VRS 2nd Krajina
had twice been beaten back , on 24 July665 666 667 668669 Corps defenses cracked under the blow , 693 breaking
and 12 August.670 671672 In the second attack , an esti the four VRS brigades defending on the Grabez ;
mated 11,000 troops673 advanced several kilometers to Dudakovic's troops pushed rapidly south toward
take high ground on Mt. Komar and south of Donji Bosanski Petrovac.694 A body of VRS men and equip
Vakuf, only to lose most of these gains when the Serbs ment, with refugees clinging to its flanks and rear,
committed their precious infantry reserves to fierce recoiled along the main road to Petrovac . Kulen
counterattacks.674 675 676 677 678 679 Now , on 10 September, Vakuf — where the October ARBiH offensive of 1994
Brigadier General Mehmed Alagic's 7th Corps began had made its high water mark — fell the next day , and
yet another string of attacks around Donji Vakuf and the 502nd Brigademarched into Petrovac on 15 Sep
in the KomarMountains northwest of Travnik .680 681 tember.695 The 5th Corps then linked up to HV forces
Again it looked as if Major General Zec's 30th Divi at the Ostrelj pass, some 12 kilometers southeast of
sion would be impossible to dislodge from its heavily Petrovac, on the route to Drvar.696 From Petrovac, the
fortified positions,which had frustrated the earlier 501st and 510th Brigades took over the pursuit, driv
ARBiH assaults. This time, however, the rapid ing on toward Kljuc , which they entered two days
HV /HVO advance on the left of the 7th Corps's later. 697 In five days the 5th Corps had advanced some
determined drive added a new element to the equation , 70 kilometers.
and GeneralZec at last had to give up Donji Vakuf and
swing his right flank back toward Jajce on 13 Septem- The 5th Corps advance so far was deep , not broad .Not
ber to avoid envelopment.682 683 684 As the VRS 30th until 15 September did OG “North ” attack to widen its
Division pivoted on its brigade north of Muslim -held gains. This disjointed operation should have allowed
Mount Vlasic, the 7th Corps pressed its advance, General Tomanic's 2nd Krajina Corps to attack and
flooding into the Mt. Komar area in the wake of the cut off the southern salient, but there were no reserves
retreating VRS and advancing along the eastern bank to exploit the opportunity. Tomanic's two brigades
of the Vrbas River.685 686 687 688 689 690 With the HVO’s around Krupa and Otoka were able to contain the
occupation of Jajce, however,most of the 7th Corps's “North " OG attack for two days, then yielded Krupa
front was pinched out and its envisioned linkage with to the combined weight of the 5th Corps ' 503rd ,
the 5th Corps fronts blocked by the intervening HVO 505th , and 511th Brigades.698
units. General Delic and the ARBiH General Staff
decided that, rather than press 7th Corps operations on With the capture of Bosanski Petrovac, Kljuc, and
a limited front toward Kotor Varos, they would trans Bosanska Krupa, the 5th Corps was ready to shift the
fermost of its troops to western Bosnia via Bosnian direction of its forces and conduct even deeper opera
Croat territory and reinforce the 5th Corps by that tions, supported by the forthcoming transfer of several
means.691 7th Corps brigades to the theater.699 After Petrovac
fell, a new " Center" OG , comprising the 502nd, 505th ,
506th , and 517th Brigades, was formed to begin the
The 5th Corps Drive to the Sana, march on SanskiMost via the village of Sanica, driv
13-18 September 1995 ing before it the remnants of the VRS Drvar garri
son — the 1st Drvar and 1st, 2nd , and 3rd Drina
While the HV /HVO were breaking through the VRS Brigades.700 The fall of Kljuc on 17 September
defenses around Sipovo , the 5th Corps was finishing enabled the 510th Brigade to join this push , driving up
its preparations for Operation " Sana 95." For reasons the western side of the Sana River. The rest of the
of his own ,GeneralDudakovic appears to have held
off the start of his operation until 13 September - five
days after the HV /HVO push began.692 Then he swung

382
“ North ” OG moved on Bosanski Novi (Novigrad ) and HV River Fiasco : Operation “ Una 95 ,”
Sanski Most, pushing back the VRS 11th Krupa and 18-20 September 1995
1st Novigrad Brigades and part of the Drvar forces.701
The “ South ” OG , now comprising the 501st and the The Croatian Army joined the developing fray on
newly arrived 17th Krajina Mountain Brigade ( from 18 September with Operation “Una 95." The objective
the 7th Corps),moved on Mrkonjic Grad , crossing the of the operation , executed by Major GeneralMarijan
Sana River. The eventual objective of OGs“ North " Marekovic's Zagreb Corps District, was to cross the
and “ Center” was Prijedor; the strategic objective of Una River from Croatia and , before the ARBiH could
the 5th Corps was Banja Luka . get there, take Prijedor and then move on Banja
Luka.708 The Zagreb government very likely feared
Both OG “North ” and “ Center” were in for a big sur that Bosnian Army forces were gaining too much ter
prise as they reached positions near SanskiMost and ritory in western Bosnia that could interfere with
Bosanski Novi on 18-19 September, for the VRS Main Croatian domination of the region . In particular, it
Staff had been shuffling some 14,000 troops from probably wanted to ensure that the HV, not the
seven brigades or regiments to the Sanski Most area ARBiH , controlled Banja Luka — the key to the area .
since 15 September,placing them under the command This would explain why the HV did not favor or sup
of ColonelRadmilo Zeljaja's reactivated port the ARBiH attack on Mrkonjic Grad , because the
“ Prijedor” Operational Group 10 / 1st Krajina . 702 capture of the town probably would have allowed the
Belgrade had contributed elements of the Serbian 5th and 7th Corps to link up and consolidate Sara
RDB Special Operations Unit (“ Red Berets” ) and jevo's hold on western Bosnia .
Arkan's Serbian Volunteer Guard (SDG )—about
2,000 troops — to the area to help round up VRS The HV 1st and 2nd Guards Brigades were to spear
deserters and be ready to serve as shock troops in a head “ Una 95," supported by the 17th Home Defense
VRS counteroffensive.703 The exhausted remnants of Regiment and elements of other Home Defense and
the 2nd Krajina Corps were allowed to regroup behind reserve formations. The 1st Guards Brigade's mission
the new line. was to seize a bridgehead near Dvor while the 2nd
Guards Brigade and the 17th HomeDefense Regiment
The 5th Corps butted and reeled against this line over assaulted and captured a bridgehead at Bosanska
the next few days , taking some sharp knocks.704 In Dubica . A supporting attack at Bosanska Kostajnica ,
three days ofhard fighting, 20-22 September, the VRS led by a reconnaissance -sabotage company, would
5th Kozara and 6th Sanske Brigades swarmed over help pin down VRS forces.709 The Guards would then
OG “ Center ” southeast of Sanski Most on the Sana break out toward Prijedor, surprising the VRS
River, almost capturing the command post of the “ Prijedor” OperationalGroup from their rear. In the
502nd Brigade at Zegar and nearly encircling the ensuing disruption , HV forces would be able to march
510th Brigade at Hrustovo.705 The 5th Corps troops down themain Prijedor-Banja Luka road .
were pushed back some 6 kilometers. The 505th and
506th Brigades of OG “North ” likewise fell back sev The operation was probably premised as a surprise
eral kilometers, pummeled by the SDG and the VRS attack on ill- prepared troops , but from the beginning it
Main Staff's elite bodyguard formation, the 65th Pro was the HV that suffered the surprises. As the assault
tection Regiment.706 The 503rd and 505th Brigades of troops entered the river opposite the positions of the
OG “ North ” had more success, grinding forward overaged reservists of the VRS 1stNovigrad and 11th
against stiff resistance around BosanskiNovi and in Dubica Brigades, a storm of artillery,machinegun,
the Majdan Mountains toward Ljubija and Prijedor.707

383
and rifle fire briefly turned the river red.710 At Dvor, “Hurricane” in North Bosnia : The ARBiH Ozren
1st Guards soldiers loaded in assault boats took griev- Mountains Offensive, 10 September - 16 October
ous casualties when a dense mortar volley descended 1995
on them . Winnowed by such fire , the three HV assault
formations nevertheless managed to take and hold From the earliest days of the war the “ Ozren salient”
small bridgeheads in their individual sectors. That was had extended a long, Serb -held finger of territory
as far as they got.711 None of the three bridgeheads stretching southeast of Doboj. Over 40 kilometers
was positioned to support the others, and the VRS from Doboj at its furthest point, and about 25 kilome
defenders kept them huddled in tiny landing perime ters across at its widest in the middle , the salient
ters. When the Zagreb Corps District tried to reinforce totaled about 500 square kilometers in area. Although
these toeholds into footholds the next day, strong river sparsely populated , the salientwas fiercely defended
currents and constant heavy shelling deepened the ini- by Lieutenant Colonel Novak Djukic's VRS “ Ozren ”
tial disaster. An entire reconnaissance element of the TacticalGroup 6 of" Doboj" OperationalGroup 9.716
2nd Guards Brigade was wiped out in Dubica.712 The " Ozren ” TG normally comprised five to six light
infantry brigades, supported by elements of the
With their advance forces trapped and exposed, Gen " Doboj" OG's 2nd Armored Brigade.717Most of these
eral Cervenko and the HV Main Staff wisely called off VRS troops were defending their home territory , and
the operation . As the units pulled back under the their intimate knowledge of the rugged , hilly terrain
zeroed -in guns of the Serbs , they may have suffered gave them a significant tactical advantage . If their
even heavier casualties than in their assault.713 One strategic position looked precarious on a map , on the
estimate — by former Main Staff chief Bobetko — put ground the Serbs had managed to maintain the borders
the HV casualty toll atmore than 70 killed in action of the thick -knuckled finger almost unchanged since
and 250 wounded in the aborted two -day action.714 the start of the war.
The Croatian planners had underestimated the
readiness of the VRS to fight, miscalculated the state Running through the salient was a vital stretch of the
of the Una River, and overestimated their ability to road that the UN had designated Route “ Duck .” Both
pull off a classically difficultmilitary operation.75 sides recognized that, if the ARBiH could capture the
few Serb -held kilometers of Route " Duck," it would
Chapter 92 regain control of the major east-west highway in that
The ARBiH Offensive Operations, part of the dismembered republic. Fingers and islands
September -October 1995 of territory held by Serbs or Croats between Tuzla and
Zenica had forced the government to devise a long and
While the Croatian Army and its Croatian Defense circuitous route to move men and equipment between
Council allies were sweeping through the Croatian east-central and west-central Bosnia and had made
Krajina and parts of western Bosnia in a surprise shifts of units of men and equipment between east
offensive to recoup their losses in the Serb -Croat war central and west-central Bosnia ponderous and
and help end the Bosnian one, the Bosnian Army was impractical. The capture and utilization of Route
sweeping up territory of its own.Less spectacular than " Duck " would allow the ARBiH to link up Brigadier
the Croat gains, the ARBiH pressed forward on sev Sead Delic's Tuzla -based 2nd Corps and Brigadier
eral fronts at once in the closingmonths of the war. Sakib Mahmuljin's Zenica-based 3rd Corps, move
Operation “ Uragan " (Hurricane ), in particular, was troops and supplies from one side of central Bosnia to
planned to retake the long-contested “ Ozren salient" the other, and fully exploit the interior lines of com
once and for all . munication it should have enjoyed from the outset of

384
the war. Another strategic advantage of reducing the VRS 1st Prjnavor Light Infantry Brigade off several
perimeter of the salient— by 20 kilometers ormore key elevations , including the 726 -meter height at Pod
would be the freeing up of two brigades' worth of sijelovo.725726 The 2nd Corps swung its second punch
Muslim soldiers for operations elsewhere.718 the following day,mounting attacks against three
Serb -held bridges across the Spreca river.727 UN
The most bitterly contested point along the Ozren observers filed optimistic assessments of the pincer
salient's perimeter was the finger's extreme southern attack's success as 2nd Corps forces drove west from
most point, near the Serb -held town of Vozuca, a way Lukavac and the 3rd Corps pushed eastward from
station on Route Duck . Sporadic but intense battles Zavidovici. The Bosnian Serbs acknowledged the seri
had been fought for the Vozuca-Ribnica area since the ousness of the situation later that day, with a public
beginning of the war,most notably and recently in the appeal for volunteers to help stop the Muslim
ARBiH's big offensive of June-July 1994. The 1994 advance .728 729
attack had made great gains into Serb -held territory ,
but virtually all of them had been lost when the inex For all of its initial promise , theMay attack , like all its
perienced ARBiH units overextended their advance predecessors, fell well short of its objectives The two
and left themselves vulnerable to a decisive Serb government columns fought heroically to close the
counterattack that pushed them back to their start line . last 2 or 3 kilometers that would join them and maybe
even surround the VRS 4th Ozren Light Infantry Bri
gade in Vozuca.730 The VRS's ability to rush reinforce
May- June 1995 : The First Attempt ments into the fray at critical moments saved them
once again , however.731 Counterattacks in the 1st
On 26 May 1995, the Bosnian Army had launched a Ozren Light Infantry Brigade's sector west of Lukavac
weighty two -pronged assault against the southern por stemmed the ARBiH's 22nd Division's advance ,
tion of the Ozren salient. Only the day before a Serb although the division retained a chunk ofterritory near
shell had exploded in an outdoor cafe in Tuzla and the village of Milino Selo . More counterattacks
killed more than 70 civilians. The ensuing ARBiH reclaimed most of the ARBiH 35th Division's cap
attack may have been directed at the area the Serb tured ground near Podsijelovo . Try as they might, the
shell camefrom , as the Bosnian Governmentmain 2nd and 3rd Corps proved unable to connect in the
tained at the time.719 The scale and promptness of the face of increasingly stiff Serb resistance, and the
operation suggests it had been planned long before offensive was halted around 4 June. When the lines
hand, however. Or possibly Sarajevo expanded an ini finally stabilized , the Serbs remained firmly in control
tially modest plan of attack to take advantage of the of Vozuca and a good-sized segment of the contested
crisis in relations between the Bosnian Serbs and road. Even at its narrowest point near the base of the
UNPROFOR as NATO threatened retaliatory air Ozren finger, the Serb -held territory still separated the
strikes and the Serbs responded by seizing some 400 centers of the 2nd and 3rd Corps by 10 kilometers or
international peacekeepers and observers as hostages . more .

In any case , the ARBiH's late May attack was The ARBiH returned to the attack in the Ozren region ,
intended to pinch off the end of the salient and gain on a smaller,more limited scale, on 21 July, when the
control of Route Duck once and for all. The 2nd and " ElMujahid " Detachment, comprised of foreign
3rd Corps each contributed several brigades to the Islamic volunteers, spearheaded Colonel Fadil
attack , supported by as much heavy weapons fire Hasanagic's 35th Division of the ARBiH 3rd Corps as
power as could be concentrated .720 721 722 The heaviest it gained some ground around Podsijelovo from the
initial attackswere by the ARBiH 2nd Corp 22nd 1st Prnjavor Brigade . 732 733 A follow - up attack south
Division and were reinforced with elements of the east from Podsijelovo on 11 August was supported by
25th Division on the eastern side of the Ozren salient, simultaneous 2nd Corps attacks.734 Neither attack
around the Serb -held town of Bosansko Petrovo gained a great deal of ground , but they kept pressure
Selo.723 724 On 29 May , the ARBiH 3rd Corps on the VRS Ozren Tactical Group .
announced significant gains in its pincer movement
against the western side, claiming to have forced the

385
Operation “Uragan 95 ” Kicks Off: Meanwhile to the west, the 3rd Corps's 35th Division,
10-14 September led by the crack 7th Muslimski Liberation Brigade
and the “ ElMujahid ” Detachment, hammered the
The next strike into the Ozren was not by the ARBiH VRS 1st Srbac Light Infantry Brigade east of Zavi
but by NATO , called in by the UN when its ultimatum dovici on the Podsijelovo and Paljenik features. As the
to the Serbs besieging Sarajevo went unheeded . As the VRS lines also yielded , the 35th Division troops
NATO “ Deliberate Force " air campaign commenced marched quickly southeast toward Vozuca .
on 30 August in response to VRS refusals to remove
heavy weapons from the Sarajevo exclusion zone, one The Bosnian Army offensive soon and at last brought
of the first targets struck was the Kraljica radio relay visible, tangible success to the nation . On 11 Septem
station atop Mt. Ozren.735 736 737 The communications ber, a government television broadcast announced that
relay station was important though not vital to VRS the 2nd and 3rd Corps had successfully linked up,
command and control in the area; its loss on the eve of securing control over the road between Tuzla and Zen
the next ARBiH offensive in the area was certainly ica and reducing the travel distance between the two
inconvenient. The tower's sudden destruction could cities by some 150 kilometers.749 Government news
have affected the outcome of the campaign in other casters stated that the two corps had linked up to the
ways : it might have shaken the morale of the defend capture of Vozuca the previous day after 10 hours of
ers but, equally, it might have diminished the impor fighting; they showed scenes of gleeful Bosnian
tance of Mt. Ozren to the Serbs and made preservation troops patrolling among damaged and burning houses
of the surrounding salientless critical to them . in the deserted town.750 The following day, the Bos
nian Army announced further gains amounting to
Although the Bosnian Government had pledged not to nearly the southern third of the Serb -held Ozren
take advantage of the NATO airstrikes with attacks out territory. A huge amount of equipment had been cap
of the UN -declared safe areas, the ARBiH's final tured , including four tanks, four tank destroyers, a
offensive in the Ozren mountains — codenamed Oper dozen artillery pieces , hundreds of rifles and machine
ation "Uragan 95” (“Hurricane" ) — commenced on guns, and a virtual cornucopia of ammunition.751 752 753
10 September, concurrent with the NATO air cam 754 UN Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi officially con
paign.738 Serb forces denounced the Bosnian offensive firmed the Bosnian Army advances and the capture of
as evidence that NATO was in effect supporting the Vozuca on 13 September.755 756 Hit once too often and
ARBiH . However,UN officials responded , a bit awk caughtwithout the elite reserves that had saved them
wardly, that since the Ozren offensive was not near in the past, the VRS Ozren Tactical Group made a vir
any of the safe areas it fell outside of proscribed areas tue of necessity, pulling out of the extreme southern
for Bosnian Army operations.739 740 741 742 bulge of the salient to shorten its defensive line and
better organize its defenses.757 758
The 2nd Corps' 22nd Division , spearheaded by the
elite 9th Muslimski,743 222nd,744 211th , 745 and 250th
Liberation Brigades, 746 drove east from the area of The Second Push : 15-22 September
Pribitkovici, over 5 kilometers north of Vozuca but
along the next major east-west road in the area . The By 15 September, Serb authorities were stating that
2nd and 4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigades' frontline thousands of Serb refugees had fled theMuslim
positions were quickly penetrated and the formations advance in the Ozren region an indication of the
fell back with difficulty.747 With Pribitkovici taken on magnitude of losses both actual and anticipated . That
10 September and the road thus open , the 22nd Divi same day the 3rd Corps renewed its push on the west
sion went on to take Seona and Lozna on the 11th , cut ern side of the Ozren, still spearheaded by the elite
ting halfway across the Ozren salient several troops of the 7th Muslimski Brigade 759 and the 35th
kilometers north of Vozuca itself. 748

386
-
Division . They pushed the VRS 3rd Ozren Light Ozren and almost certainly entertained hopes of
Infantry Brigade back from the Blizna -Kotlina advancing the rest of the distance to Doboj. 776
Karacic -Rjecica defensive line it had been holding 760
This eased Serb pressures elsewhere , and the long The fighting that had raged all across the rest of Bos
surrounded ARBiH 37th Division was able to push out nia had largely slowed to a halt. The HV and HVO had
south and east from the Maglaj area. On 16 September agreed to cease the joint offensive that had made huge
the Maglaj-based 327th Mountain Brigade supported Croatian inroads into western Bosnia , just as the VRS
by elements of the Jelah -based 377th Mountain Bri was succeeding in rallying its defense around Banja
gade linked up to advance forces of the 35th Division Luka. Brig . Gen. Atif Dudakovic's ARBiH 5th Corps
moving north near the town of Krsno Polje. For the was slowing its own offensive in western
first time in four years beleaguered Maglaj had a road Bosnia , although that battle was not yet over. In the
link to the rest of government-held Bosnia.761 Resum Ozren , fighting if anything intensified , as the Bosnian
ing the one-two punches of the previous operation , the Army sought to capture the remainder of the Ozren
2nd Corps swung at the eastern side of the Ozren territory before the battlefield lines were frozen by
salient. a peace settlement or the Bosnian Serbs used the
lull in fighting elsewhere to reinforce their Ozren
The “Ozren ” TG's weakened defensive line was again defenses.777
ruptured on 18 September when detachments from the
ARBiH 2nd and 3rd Corps broke out from two small Following the halt of the ARBiH attack on 19 Septem
bridgeheads they had held across the Bosna and ber, the VRS "Ozren ” TG had managed to regroup and
Spreca rivers - lodgements located several kilometers stabilize its defensive line with three brigades — 3rd ,
behind themain Serb defensive line. Along the 2nd, and 1st Ozren Brigades - running from west to
Spreca , Brigadier Osman Puskar's 22nd Division762 east, with a stiffening of elements of the elite
departed from the steady approach it had been making Bosnian Serb MUP Special Police Brigade.778
since the 15th , suddenly capturing Serb -held Sizje
from the 1st Ozren Brigade after crushing the 2nd
Ozren Brigade and leaving the 1st Ozren's flank wide The Advance Contained : 23-25 September
open.763 The division then advanced rapidly along the
road network out of the town.764 To the west, Colonel On 23 September, the ARBiH 22nd Division renewed
Ekrem Alihodzic's 37th Division mounted a major its drive toward Doboj, smashing the VRS 2nd Ozren
breakout effort from Maglaj itself, which advanced Brigade's defenses near the village of Panjik , to the
east to take several key peaks overlooking the north of the Tumarsko Brdo ridge line . VRS personnel
besieged town from the 3rd Ozren Brigade.765766 It fled northward with their equipment, and ARBiH
looked as though the entire salientmight eventually be troops pushed to within 1,000 meters of an Orthodox
eaten away and that the Serb stronghold of Doboj at monastery . To the east, however, troops of the VRS 1st
themouth of the salientmight even comeunder Ozren Brigade stood firm despite the penetrations to
threat.767 768 769 770 771 772 773 its rear from the flank, and “ Ozren ” TG headquarters
detailed ad hoc groups of officers andmen scrounged
On 19 September the UN confirmed that the ARBiH together and exhorted them to hold the front just a lit
had made another successful push forward , advancing tle while longer. Their stand paid off with the arrival
over two days to an east-west line running from that night, 23-24 September, of
Rjecice (slightly north of Maglaj) to just south of Colonel Miko Skoric , commander of the VRS 2nd
Krtova.774 Also on the 19th , the Bosnian Army's 2nd Armored Brigade, with a reconnaissance company
Corps trumpeted the capture of the Cerovo Brdo peak and some armored units. Their counterattack drove
and with it the notorious M - 46 gun believed to have ARBiH troops back from someof their gains, and
caused the massacre at the Tuzla outdoor cafe on
25 May.775 The Bosnian Army had now captured
almost exactly half the original Serb -held area in the

387
Skoric'smen reclaimed a key hill. There ARBiH units Moreover, although NATO air operations at the time
renewed their attacks, and seesaw battles raged all partially disrupted the Serb defenses, the Ozren offen
around the elevation . ColonelMilovan Stankovic , the sive has to be considered almost entirely a Bosnian
former commander of the " Ozren " TG , then arrived Army success . Although Dudakovic's 5th Corps made
with elite VRSmilitary police reinforcements on much greater territorial gains at the same time, ithas
24 September and finally stabilized the line, which been argued that the 5th Corps successes were sub
MUP special police troops reinforced later in the stantially aided by the concurrent and adjacent HV/
day.779 These elite additions at last secured Doboj HVO advances against the overtaxed VRS 1st and 2nd
from the threat of further ARBiH advances.780 781 782 Krajina Corps stretched across western Bosnia. No
HV or HVO forces assisted the Bosnian Army in the
Ozren area , however, and the forces the 2nd and 3rd
The Last Drive Forward : 5-7 October Corps battled in the Uragan offensive were essentially
the same as those they had confronted in 1992, 1993,
Heavy fighting continued , however, into early Octo 1994, and earlier in 1995 .
ber, as the Bosnian Army snatched back one last piece
of territory from the Serbs in an advance from 5 to The ARBiH's ultimate victory derived from its
7 October. The ARBiH 35th Division /3rd Corps improved operational skill (for example, avoiding the
attacked 3rd Ozren Brigade positions northeast of overstretch that had led to disaster the previous year),
Maglaj - a salient jutting south from the main VRS the inadequate number of VRS reserves, and probably
line — capturing some 50 additional square kilome the underlying decline in VRS morale. Put simply ,
ters . 783 784 785 786 787 The loss prompted the VRS 1st “ Uragan " was a very sizable operation ,well executed .
Krajina Corps to withdraw the veteran 16th Krajina For instance, the simultaneous offensive undertaken
Motorized Brigade from heavy fighting in western on 15-18 September by two corps some 25 kilometers
Bosnia to block any further ARBiH attacks in the apart— albeit facilitated by an overstretched and
Ozren.788 With the attacking forces exhausted after demoralized Serb opponent— was an extremely diffi
almost a month of battle and international pressure for cult undertaking and represented the degree of
a cease - fire and a peace settlementmounting, the advance the ARBiH had made in the realm of higher
ARBiH finally halted the Ozren campaign when the and more sophisticated corps-level, coordinated
country -wide cease -fire took effect atmidnight on operations.
October 11. The “ Hurricane ” had run its course.
The ARBiH's new “ divisional" force structure and
accompanying changes in tactics also helped . In a ret
Analysis : What Damage From the " Hurricane ?” rospective commentary on the operation, Brigadier
Sead Delic noted that 2nd Corps artillery pieces had
Although the “ Uragan ” offensive failed to achieve all been grouped offensively for the first time — a devel
of its original objectives, it nevertheless has to be opment made possible by the consolidation of heavy
counted as a significant feat of arms and a battlefield weapons into division -level reserves. He also pointed
success for the ARBiH . In total, some 280 square kilo out that innovations like the special “ pursuit detach
meters of territory were captured in a campaign last ments " —unique combined- arms formations com
ing some 30 days . The material gains for the Bosnian posed of tanks, APCs, heavy weapons mounted on
Army were also substantial: during the course of the light armored vehicles, and elite mobile infantry
operation , the ARBiH captured four howitzers and 17 units 790_enabled the ARBiH to operate against the
smaller artillery pieces, some60 mortars of all types, enemy's rear in a manner never before possible and
45 antiaircraft guns, dozens of trucks, and a large vol afforded the 2nd Corps a new degree of offensive
ume of other war materiel- enough weaponry to out depth.791
fit an entire ARBiH infantry brigade.789

388
Perhaps most important, the ARBiH avoided repeat some 17 kilometers, coming within 3 kilometers of
ing the costly mistakes it had made in mid -1994 . Mrkonjic Grad and reaching the edge of the Manjaca
Although the Bosnian Army stressed a high opera Mountains, which protected Banja Luka from the
tional tempo during the operation and urged rapid south.795 By 1 October, VRS forces around Mrkonjic
advances where possible, this time ARBiH command Grad were in a desperate situation .
ers were careful to restrain their units from making too
bold advances thatmight carry them beyond their Thus it was that the 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade
reinforcements or resupply and leave them vulnerable and the SDG had to break off their successful counter
to Serb counterstrokes . Instead, the government drive toward Bosanska Krupa and rush to newly
advance as a whole proceeded slowly and deliberately . threatened Banja Luka, coming under the command of
In that respect, the ARBiH offensivemay have been Colonel Milenko Lazic's Operational Group 2 /30th
more like a creeping flood than a fast-moving hurri Division.796 To conduct the counterattack , two tactical
cane ... but it got the job done without expending too groupings were created around Mrkonjic Grad . On the
much power too soon . right, the 2nd Krajina Infantry and 16th Krajina
Motorized Brigades were to drive west toward the
Sana River northeast of Kljuc ; while on the left, the
Not Dead Yet: The VRS Counteroffensive, Bosnian Serb Special Police Brigade, reinforced with
24 September - 6 October 1995 the SDG (and probably Serbian RDB troops ) pushed
the 5th Corps away from Mrkonjic Grad . This group
Despite the pummeling it was taking all over the coun would then move on Kljuc itself. At least one armored
try , the VRS still displayed its abilities as a counter battalion from the 1st Armored Brigade supported the
puncher. In western Bosnia in particular, the Serbs attack.797 In addition , the reinforced 5th Kozara and
made a determined drive to roll back Bosnian Army 6th Sanske Infantry Brigades from “ Prijedor" Opera
gains around Bosanski Novi and Kljuc . After the HV's tionalGroup 10 were to push south from the Sanski
Operation “Una 95" and the ARBiH 5th Corps attacks Most area toward Kljuc.798 The VRS hoped to crush
on SanskiMost had been contained and in some cases OG “ South ” in the converging jaws. By 3 October, the
pushed back in the fighting of 18-22 September, the VRS counterattack began to gain steam , driving back
VRS moved quickly to strike at the 5th Corps forces the 17th Krajina and the 501st, which had been rein
moving toward Bosanski Novi and Prijedor-Ljubija . forced with only one independentbattalion. Addi
Moving on the night of 23-24 September, Arkan's tional 7th Corps reinforcements were on the way, but
SDG and the VRS's veteran 65th Protection Regi they were late in arriving.799 By 6 October, the VRS
ment, 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade, and the 43rd had pushed to within 1 kilometer of Kljuc from the
Motorized Brigade struck hard against 5th Corps's east, having advanced some 17 kilometers in three
OG " North ." GeneralMladic personally supervised days.800
the operation . In six days of fighting, the OG's four
brigades were driven back as much as 15 kilometers in With the town of Kljuc on the verge of capture , the
some places.792 Then , with Bosanska Krupa and Otoka VRS apparently felt able to withdraw the 16th Krajina
in sight, the VRS had to abruptly halt its attack as Brigade to reinforce threatened VRS positions in the
ARBiH gains around Mrkonjic Grad forced the VRS Ozren Mountains.801 Just as the 16th Krajina departed ,
to shift reserves to this important sector.793 however, the ARBiH defenses stiffened with the
arrival of the new 7th Corps formations.802 VRS
Beginning about 20 September, the 5th Corps's OG troops — now primarily “ Prijedor” OG forces from the
" South ” had undertaken its drive on Mrkonjic Grad . 5th and 6th Brigades — continued to press against the
With the 17th Krajina on the left and 501st Mountain 5th /7th Corps line near Krasulje , gaining little ground
on the right, ARBiH troops pushed back parts of the in heavy fighting through 8-9 October.803 The tables ,
demoralized 17th Kljuc Brigade, together with scat
tered parts of other formations..794 In over a week of
advances, the two ARBiH brigades pushed forward

389
however,were about to turn again . The Croatian Army September. The town was now defended by three bri
was preparing to reenter the battle . It was again the gades — the 7th Motorized , 3rd Serbian , and 11th
Serbs' turn to be surprised . Mrkonjic Light Infantry Brigades. The VRS force
probably numbered about 5,500 troops . These forma
Chapter 93 tions had covered the rear of the VRS units undertak
End Game- The Fall of SanskiMost ing the Kljuc counterattack ,watching the HV /HVO .
and Mrkonjic Grad , October 1995
The HV /HVO assault began on 8 October, with a
With Kljuc threatened , the Bosnian Army had again diversionary attack by the HV 126th Home Defense
requested HV/HVO assistance. Zagreb agreed , since Regiment and 1st HVO Guards Brigade against the
the capture ofMrkonjic Grad and a drive into the VRS 11th Mrkonjic Brigade , some 15 to 20 kilome
Manjaca Mountains— the objective for the HV/HVO ters west of Mrkonjic Grad .805 Gotovina hoped to mis
operation — would give Zagreb a stranglehold over lead the VRS as to the direction and timing of the
Banja Luka. With their forces poised to drive on the main attack . This camethe next day , although the start
city, the Croatians would be in a position to ensure was delayed for two hours by thick fog . A strong
that the Serbs (the FRY and Republika Srpska) lived artillery -rocket bombardment was followed by Mi- 24
up to the tentative cease - fire agreement or to an even helicopter gunship strikes on VRS positions. Despite
tual peace deal for Bosnia — or, even more important, this display of preparatory and supporting firepower,
for eastern Slavonia , the last Serb -controlled part of the opening HV /HVO attack encountered strong
Croatia . If the Serbs refused to deal, Zagreb would opposition . General Gotovina states that,
take the city, conquering western Bosnia for itself and
leaving Sarajevo with an enlarged Bihac pocket. In the enemy offered strong resistance in all
either case , Zagreb would further demonstrate and directions, through a well-organized and forti
cement its role as the region's power broker. fied defense, but also with strong, synchronized
artillery fire.806
The new HV /HVO operation , “ JuzniPotez" (Southern
Move), was scheduled to begin on 8 October.804 The 1st HGZ , 4th Guards, and 7th Guards Brigades
General Gotovina, using HVO Brigadier Zeljko Glas weathered the onslaught to punch their way into the
novic's OG " East," again led the HV /HVO assault. VRS defenses, although the 7th Guards in particular
The main shock forces came from the redoubtable 4th had difficulties against its VRS namesake, the 7th
and 7th Guards Brigades and the 1st HGZ. The three Motorized Brigade, southeast of Mrkonjic Grad .807 By
HVO Guards brigades and other independent battal the end of 9 October, the HV had moved forward
ions and companies were in the second echelon , giv about 5 kilometers, partially enveloping the town and
ing Gotovina 11,000 to 12,000 troops. During the first giving the defenders no respite.
phase of the operation , the HV Guards formations
were to seize Mrkonjic Grad itself, together with the The next day , VRS defenses began to disintegrate
adjoining Podrasnica Valley and the road junction of under the professional pounding of the HV/HVO .
Cadjavica — an advance of about 12 kilometers. Dur Mrkonjic Grad fell after the 4th Guards Brigade
ing the second phase , the HVO Guards formations apparently broke through the 3rd Serbian Brigade's
would take over the advance , seizing the southern defenses southwest of town. This outflanked the 7th
edge of theManjaca Mountains and the important Motorized Brigade's staunch defenders , and the VRS
Bocac hydroelectric plant — the last major source of troops had to pull out.808 The 1st HGZ and 4th Guards
electricity for Banja Luka and Serb -held western Bos- occupied Podrasnica and Cadjavica as they moved on
nia . The whole operation was scheduled to take four Manjaca. On the right, the 7th Guards and the newly
days . inserted 2nd HVO Guards Brigade advanced toward
809
Bocac.80
VRS ColonelMilenko Lazic's Operational Group - 2 /
30th Division had consolidated its defenses around
Mrkonjic Grad after Operation “Maestral" in

390
On 11 October, the HV units were withdrawn and the Chapter 94
two remaining HVO Guards Brigades moved forward Evaluation — The Cease-Fire Agreement
in their place. Although VRS artillery fire raked the and the Final Offensives
attackers , the withdrawing VRS infantry and armor
formations were disorganized , and the HVO troops Operation " Oluja" and the final offensives in western
were able reach their operation stop line along the Bosnia were the most important of the several military
southern edge of Manjaca - only 25 kilometers from actions that brought an end to the Bosnian war.
Banja Luka . “ Oluja ” was the key to the chain ofmilitary and diplo
matic events that led to the final cease - fire in October.
Meanwhile, General Dudakovic had been planning a It was " Oluja " that suddenly forced on Mladic and the
counterstrike of his own against troops of the VRS VRS the realization that the military balance had deci
“ Prijedor” OperationalGroup 10 , which were still sively shifted against the Serbs ; a cease- fire and a
attempting to push south toward Kljuc. The addition peace agreement were all they had left to protect the
of some 10,000 troops from the 7th Corps and other existence of Republika Srpska.817 First Mladic and
ARBiH commands greatly strengthened his ability to Milosevic had to force this same realization on
renew the drive on SanskiMostwhile still vigorously Karadzic and the SDS leaders and then , on 29 August,
defending Kljuc.810 With the arrival of these forma persuade them to sign over their negotiating authority
tions, Dudakovic regrouped his brigades , shifting OG to Milosevic as the head of a unified Serb negotiating
" Center" —now reinforced with the ARBiH Guards team over which he would exert a final veto as neces
Brigade and the 501st Brigade — to the left, while fill sary. To the US Special Representative , Ambassador
ing OG “ South ” with five 7th Corps brigades.811 Richard Holbrooke, this signed inter -Serb agreement
provided the jolt necessary to jump-start the US diplo
On 9 October, Dudakovic attacked with OGs " Center" matic initiative for ending the Bosnian war, even while
and " South."812 Themost important assault came in the the armies continued to battle for chunks and scraps of
middle under OG " Center," where the 502nd and disputed territory .
510th Brigades faced their old nemeses from the
Grabez plateau — the 15th Bihac and 17th Kljuc Bri On 1 September, Holbrooke announced that the three
gades.813 Again these VRS formations disintegrated primary parties — the Croatian , Bosnian Government,
under the 5th Corps blow , exposing the VRS forma and joint FRY /Republika Srpska delegations — would
tions on their flanks. ColonelZeljaja's troops had to meet in Geneva on 8 September to discuss constitu
fall back or face encirclement. The next day, 10 Octo tional arrangements for the new Bosnian state.818 At
ber, elements of the 43rd Motorized Brigade and the the meeting the three sides reached a preliminary
11th Dubica Brigade tried and failed to halt the 5th " basic principles” agreement on a proposed constitu
Corps at the outskirts of Sanski Most, and the Bos tion ,which would be the basis for further negotiations.
nians seized the town.814 Despite the national cease Croatia also clearly indicated, however, that any deal
fire agreement scheduled to go into effect on the on Bosnia would have to include a simultaneous set
morning of 12 October, it looked as if Dudakovic had tlement with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on
the VRS on the run , and so he continued the offensive . the Serb holdouts in eastern Slavonia.819 As negotia
OG “ Center” suddenly took a sharp check , however, tors sought to expose Serb positions to the light of rea
when the undaunted 43rd Motorized Brigade rallied son , the launching of the key “ Maestral” and “ Sana”
northeast of SanskiMost.815 Now the battles seesawed operations focused the heat of battle on the Bosnian
formost of a week, both sides continuing to jockey for Serbs . This timely development provided dramatic
position around SanskiMost without either being able confirmation of Mladic's fears that the military bal
to force significant changes in the frontline. The fight ance was shifting dangerously and that Serb ambitions
816
ing faded to a fruitless finish on 20 October.8 must be compromised . The VRS counterattacks that

391
threw their opponents off balance kept the Serbs in the how best to deal with the daunting challenges of
diplomatic game during Holbrooke's shuttle diplo implementing the peace and reconstructing the coun
macy that September.820 Nevertheless, it was now the try.827 828 829 The results of their negotiating efforts were
Serbs who wanted to get a cease-fire as soon as possi soon to be manifested in Bosnia in the multinational
ble , while the Bosnian Government wanted to con “ implementation force ” whose responsibilities and
tinue fighting to gain as much territory as possible to powers had been specified and agreed upon in the
lever its position in future bargaining over a territorial Dayton Agreement— IFOR.830
division . When Bosnian President Izetbegovic finally
bowed to US pressure to halt the fighting, he set addi
tional conditions for the Serbs to argue over so that the Evaluations of the Forces at the End of the War
ARBiH would have increased time to gain more
ground.821 How had the armies performed during the last battles
in Bosnia's Wild West ? All three forces ( considering
This final jockeying over the cease - fire, tentatively the HV /HVO as a single military force ) had amply
agreed to on 5 October, kept all three sides moving demonstrated their strengths and weaknesses during a
military forces up to the lastminute.822 Croatia had full month of some of the most intense combat of the
craftily retired to themilitary sidelines after the com war. The Croatian Army had again established its
pletion of “Maestral,” apparently in hopes of putting a position as the premiermilitary organization in the
brake on the Bosnian Government's military gains lest Balkans. The HV's strengths included excellent staff
the Muslims gain too much weight in the Balkan bal planning, its employment of professional shock bri
ance of power. President Tudjman was also under US gades, and the ability to support its elite infantry with
pressure to refrain from shattering the military and strong artillery fire and air support. The HV had devel
diplomatic balancing act by capturing Banja Luka.823 oped a true combined arms capability in which picked
Zagreb nevertheless went ahead with its final 8 Octo infantry units backed by armor and artillery could
ber offensive— “ Juzni Potez " —thatmade it a little fight their way through tough defenses and then rap
plainer to the Serbs that they must dealnow or face the idly exploit their breakthrough to the final objective .
loss of the city .Zagreb also had achieved a tentative These traits made the HV almost impossible to stop .
deal with the Serbs — initialed on 4 October — on the The weak spots in any HV campaign remained the
full return of eastern Slavonia to Croatia , and Home Defense and reserve formations, most of which
the offensive helped underscore that essential had little offensive punch and were no match for the
requirement.824 majority of VRS units.831 .

The Bosnian cease - fire finally went into effect on the As for the ARBiH , it is true that the HV provided the
morning of 12 October.825 Although the fighting in main impetus in defeating the VRS , but the Bosnian
western Bosnia rumbled on for another week , the war Army played a key role in these operations as well .
in Bosnia was over.826 After the country -wide cease ARBiH operations throughout the country kept VRS
fire — a successful and lasting one this time— took units tied down and made it difficult to shift reserves
hold in mid -October, representatives of the Croats, the to halt the HV's attacks. General Dudakovic was not
Muslims, and the Serbs met for a long and arduous wholly reliant on Croatian attacks to ease the way for
round of negotiations in Dayton, Ohio , in November, ARBiH advances , even though analysts have argued
co -chaired by the United States, the European Union , that the 5th Corps was able to break out from the Gra
and Russia . The talks seemed perpetually to be on the bez plateau on 13 September only because of a coordi
verge of collapse , yet at the last minute enough com nated VRS withdrawalmade necessary by the success
promises were devised so that an agreement could be
HV doctrine and fighting methods are discussed in more detail in
signed on 21 November 1995. This was followed by a Section VI, “ Croatia , 1993-94 : Biding Its Time, Building Its
" London Conference " on 8 December , where minis Army," and Chapter 89, “ Operation " Oluja ': The Fall of the
ters and officials from no fewer than 42 countries and Krajina Serb Republic , August 1995."

10 international organizations attempted to work out

392
of “Maestral.” On the contrary, it is clear that the 5th The Bosnian Serb Army, denigrated throughout the
Corps defeated the 2nd Krajina Corps at Grabez on its war as armed thugs good only at slaughtering civil
own and that the VRS had no intention of pulling out ians, proved in the last months of its existence that it
of the area and was still holding out in Drvar against could still fight hard against a Croatian Army that
the HV the day of the ARBiH's successful attack . It clearly overmatched its military capabilities.833 Analy
was the arrival of the 5th Corps at Petrovac that aided sis of the latter-day war operations refutes many
the HV attack rather than the other way around. The claims and rumors that the VRS voluntarily withdrew
5th Corps won its unique victory because of the moral from its positions in western Bosnia rather than being
and tactical ascendancy that its elite infantry units had forced from the region by the HV /HVO and ARBiH .
established over the VRS forces during three years of In the first place, the VRS had firmly maintained no
hard fighting on the Grabez plateau . Time and again withdrawals would be made, even from territory not
Dudakovic's forces had demoralized the Serb defend required by the Serbs , until after a cease -was signed ;
erswith sophisticated diversion and infiltration tactics , then , if territory had to be given up, the population
and they were no longer able to resist them . Whatkept could depart in an orderly way.834 In keeping with this
the ARBiH from triumphing over the VRS in other sit- position , the VRS everywhere stood up to the initial
uationswas its persistent weaknesses in heavy weap attacksmade on it but proved unable to stem the flood
onry ,which made it vulnerable to the VRS's strengths of the Croat-Muslim tide. Against the HV , its fatal
in armor, artillery , and solid staff work. The effects of flaw almost predictably proved to be the lack of ade
this mismatch in capabilities were fully demonstrated quate corps-level reserves to seal breaches in VRS
during the late September - early October VRS coun lines. Generally the VRS appears to have been able to
terstrikes and exacerbated in the open warfare of the hold the HV for about a day in its forward defenses
last campaign . In those battles, ARBiH troops had to before the HV was able to chew through its positions.
fight offensively, unprotected by fortifications, against Because it had virtually no reserve brigades in western
VRS units that did not have the same fear of the Bosnia and because its positions there generally con
ARBiH infantry that had been impressed upon the 2nd sisted only of a single defensive zone no more than 5
Krajina Corps troops . The 5th Corps ' final capture of to 10 kilometers deep , the VRS was unable to mount
SanskiMost was , in fact, something of a fluke because the counterattacks by which it had maintained these
the VRS had placed its luckless Grabez units opposite positions against the ARBiH . In fighting the HV/
their most feared opponents . HVO , VRS units were faced for the first time with an
opponent that not only matched but also exceeded
The ARBiH commanders — particularly Generals their own firepower in armor and artillery while also
Delic and Dudakovic — firmly believed that they could outnumbering them in manpower. Finally, what tipped
have quickly gained substantially more ground from the balance , even when the offense /defense ratio
the VRS around Prijedor and Banja Luka after the vic favored the VRS, was the HV/HVO's elite shock
tory of SanskiMost. In this belief they are probably infantry brigades. The VRS could defeat Croatian
overrating their capabilities against VRS forces that reserve units. The well-trained , doggedly persistent
had regrouped and regained their footing between Guards were another matter.
SanskiMost and Prijedor. In most of the VRS - ARBiH
combat following the 15 September 5th Corps break The VRS generals,Mladic and Milovanovic , and the
out from Bihac , the VRS had held the upper hand. VRS Main Staff displayed to the end their prowess at
Even after the ARBiH captured SanskiMost, the VRS engineering strategic shifts of their limited formations.
was able to halt the 5th Corps drive on Prijedor. It The move of seven major formations from halfway
therefore seems unlikely that the 5th Corps , even rein across the country despite heavy damage to its com
forced by units from 7th Corps and other formations , mand and control structure during the NATO air cam
could have beaten the 1st Krajina Corps without the paign was a triumph of the VRS Main Staff's
help of a new HV operation directed at Banja Luka.832 professionalism and skill. The Serbs ' rapid execution

393
ofmajor counterattacks also showed how powerful the than the SVK did at Knin , for they would not have
VRS remained at the end of the war, particularly been encircled . Such a large -scale movement of
against the ARBiH . In his last campaign , however, the reserves , however, would have left the VRS vulnera
western Bosnia theater commander, General Milo ble to attacks elsewhere , particularly around Doboj
vanovic , appears to have made some initial errors in and depending on whether the HV /HVO wanted it
his force dispositions that cost the VRS dearly. His in the Posavina area opposite Orasje .
forces were split too evenly among the Donji Vakuf,
Glamoc-Drvar, and Grabez sectors, rather than con
centrated in what the VRS considered a vital sector. The Impact of the NATO Air Campaign
Given that the HV was the main threat,he should have
either concentrated more troops opposite the Glamoc Factoring in the early September standdown of NATO
Drvar area sooner or sent in his reserves before the air operations, Operation Deliberate Force lasted a
enemy breakthrough . The VRS Main Staff, too, either total of 17 days, during which aircraft from nine
did not recognize how brittle the 2nd Krajina Corps NATO countries flew a total of 3,536 combat sorties
had become or was unable to do anything about it; against 56 primary ground targets.837 838 Of these sor
General Tomanic's command appears to have been ties, 1,372 were Close Air Support or other bombing
through the wringer one too many times and collapsed missions, and about 785 more were suppression of
fatally on the Grabez under yet another 5th Corps enemy air defense (SEAD ) missions.839 In total,more
attack . In all , the VRS simply faced too many compet than 700 precision - guided weapons, over 300
ing priorities throughout Bosnia so that the Main Staff unguided bombs , and 56 high -speed antiradar missiles
could no longer focus its forces on one theater. (HARMs) were expended .Most of the targets were
assessed as destroyed , while only one NATO aircraft
One of the most discussed hypothetical questions of was lost during the two -week operation . At the con
the final campaign is whether the HV (and/or the clusion of the campaign , the Bosnian Serbs reversed
ARBiH ) could have taken Banja Luka. The answer is their position and agreed to withdraw their heavy
a heavily qualified " probably," the main qualifier weapons from the Sarajevo exclusion zone. In almost
being timing. An HV dash for Banja Luka soon after all respects , Operation Deliberate Force appeared to
the completion of “Maestral" probably would have got be an unqualified success.840 841842
to the city quickly or forced the VRS to divert all of
the reserves it was sending to Prijedor instead to Banja On the surface, the connection between the NATO air
Luka, in which case the 5th Corps could have taken strikes and the Serb capitulation seems clear: the air
Prijedor. The sameholds true for “ Juzni Potez" in that, strikes against Bosnian Serb forces were followed not
the more quickly the HV moved , the less time the only by a withdrawal of VRS weapons from the Sara
VRS would have had to prepare. On the other hand, if jevo exclusion zone but shortly afterward by a series
the VRS had been given time to transfer more units of battlefield reverses for the Serbs and a peace settle
after “ Juzni Potez," Banja Luka most likely would ment at Dayton a little over twomonths later. Still, it is
have proved a difficult nut for even the HV to crack . In important to recognize that the Bosnian Serbs faced a
the immediate aftermath ofMrkonjic Grad's fall, the panoply of opponents by this point in the war
VRS had already shifted the veteran 16th Krajina NATO , the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Croats , and
Motorized Brigade— probably the best brigade in the the Croatian Army in Bosnia — and which military fac
VRS — to Manjaca.835 If the VRS believed an HV oper tor produced what outcome is somewhat more diffi
ation against Banja Luka was imminent, the Main cult to sort out.843 To measure the military impact of
Staff would most likely have transferred all available the air campaign on the Bosnian Serb Army's ability
reserves to the Manjaca area ,building up a force that to continue combat operations or to assess whether the
could have numbered at least nine and maybe 11 bri NATO campaign had a decisive influence on Bosnian
gades , including a full-armored brigade, with upward
of 15,000 to 20,000 troops.836 The VRS troops would
very likely have fought even harder for Banja Luka

394

- -
Serb political decisions , the relative importance of all When the “Maestral” offensive began pushing the
the relevant factorsmust be examined and weighed . It VRS back on the ground — and after the Bosnian Serbs
is also necessary to consider the contribution of the air received international guarantees that theirMuslim
campaign toward the immediate objective of compel opponents would not immediately seize Serb -held
ling the VRS to withdraw its heavy weapons from the territory around Sarajevo when their heavy weapons
exclusion zone, as distinct from the broader long- term were withdrawn — there was already reason enough
goal of persuading the Serbs to accept a peace for the VRS to remove its heavy weapons from the
agreement. exclusion zone. Yielding to the UN on this point had
become an increasingly necessary choice for a Bos
The objective of the NATO air campaign as initially nian Serb military confronting too many opponents at
enunciated was “ to reduce the threat to the Sarajevo once. While there is little question that the well
safe area and to deter further attacks there or on any executed NATO air campaign helped change the
other safe area .?9844 845 A later,more complete state Bosnian Serb position , it seemslikeliest that it merely
ment stated that the objective was “ attaining the com tipped the scales farther in the direction of losing pride
pliance of the Bosnian Serbs to cease attacks on and saving weapons - particularly so that the weapons
Sarajevo and other safe areas; the withdrawal of Bos could be moved away to fight elsewhere in Bosnia.
nian Serb heavy weapons from the Total Exclusion
Zone around Sarajevo , without delay; complete free Moreover, Operation Deliberate Force did not degrade
dom of movement of UN forces and personnel and the combat capabilities of the VRS as much as it
NGOs, and unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport." 846 might have appeared if only because the destruction of
The NATO air campaign sprang from the tragic and field -deployed VRS forces was never a primary objec
humiliating fall of Srebrenica and Zepa only two tive of the campaign . The air campaign was intended
weeks earlier, followed by the gradual revelation that to disrupt Bosnian Serb command and control links,
neither UNPROFOR nor the UN Security Council's however, and to destroy war -fighting supplies, infra
threats had been able to prevent the overrunning of structure , and lines of communication . Although the
two UN -declared safe areas or the executions of thou NATO campaign successfully damaged or eliminated
sands of Muslim prisoners . The credibility of UN and most of the targets it set outto hit, the VRS was never
NATO guarantees and of the institutions themselves theless able to continue combat operations against its
had been eroded and punctured ; at a minimum , the Muslim and Croat opponents all through the aerial
UN had to mount a vigorous defense of its four campaign . The VRS ' capabilities were certainly
remaining safe areas. degraded , but it still functioned as a coherentmilitary
force throughout its operational area and was able to
Operation Deliberate Force undoubtedly was a major move multiple brigade- sized combat formations clear
influence on the Bosnian Serbs' reluctant decision to across Bosnia even at the height of the air campaign .
withdraw their heavy weapons from the Sarajevo
exclusion zone, but the concurrent ground offensives The evidence is even less convincing that the NATO
by the HV, HVO , and ARBiH also had a significant air campaign brought the Bosnian Serbs to the negoti
influence on Bosnian Serb decisionmaking. The HVI ating table at Dayton . In this regard , it is worth noting
HVO “Maestral” offensive was gaining ground in that the coercion of the Bosnian Serb political leader
western Bosnia at exactly the same time, while the ship into accepting a comprehensive peace plan was
Bosnian Army operations “Hurricane” in the Ozren not an explicitly stated objective of the air campaign ,
Mountains and " Sana 95," which would ultimately although movement in that direction was clearly a
capture Bosanski Petrovac and Kljuc in western Bos hoped -for outcome. Ironically, the Bosnian Serbs had
nia , began just as the NATO air campaign was begin already made the difficult decision to accept the peace
ning to run out of targets. The air campaign was
causing the VRS pain , but the HV, HVO , and ARBiH
ground offensives, by capturing critical territory,were
carving flesh and sinew from the body of Republika
Srpska itself.

395
process immediately before the start of the NATO was not so far advanced but had conclusively achieved
campaign . On the very day the air campaign began , its long-sought goals of independent statehood and
the Bosnian Serbs signed an agreementwith Belgrade near-ethnic purity. The future of Bosnia awaited the
empowering Serbian PresidentMilosevic to represent outcomeof a new experiment in international rela
them in what would later become the Dayton peace tions : the presence of thousands of IFOR peacekeep
negotiations.847 ers had placed the fledgling state into a sortof national
incubator in which the troubled peoples of Bosnia
A close look at the events of the time suggests that it might — if carefully and constantly monitored
was actually the combined HV-HVO -ARBiH ground develop into a viable, sustainable nation of some sort.
offensive , rather than the NATO air campaign,which Tiny Macedonia hovered on the brink of a political
finally drove the Bosnian Serbs to sit down and nego abyss : with no military to speak of, surrounded by
tiate a peace settlement. Having repeatedly fought its wary and even hostile neighbors, and host to a poten
Croat-Muslim Federation opponents to a near stand tially explosive Albanian minority, it grappled with
still for over three years, the VRS was now facing the still-unresolved questions of statehood without even
same enemies in coordinated offensives with thou an internationally recognized name for itself .
sands of the best troops from Zagreb's most elite HV
units. Overwhelmed and rapidly losing territory to its The ramshackle self-proclaimed successor state to the
combined opponents, the Republika Srpska was by former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia , con
mid -October on the verge of losing an even greater sisting only of Serbia, Montenegro , and the captive
fraction of its land area and was in serious danger of " autonomous provinces " of Vojvodina and Kosovo ,
losing the ability to defend Banja Luka itself. It was was the inheritor of the legacy of a bankrupt former
the stark reality of diminished land and power, and not state . The Croatian Serbs had been expelled at the
the lightning bolts of the NATO air campaign , that point of a gun from their centuries -old homelands in
really forced the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating the Croatian Krajina. The Bosnian Serbs were if any
table at Dayton . thing political rivals of President Milosevic and his
party. From Milosevic's standpoint, not even his rump
Chapter 95 empire within Serbia was secure : notmuch more than
Conclusions — The Slovenian , Croatian , half the population of Serbia itself was ethnically
and Bosnian Wars of 1991-95 Serb . Having started a war with the goal of creating a
" greater Serbia," Milosevic had in the end succeeded
When the last shots had been fired in Bosnia and the only in producing a lesser one.
signatures inscribed on the treaty papers agreed to at
Dayton , it was unmistakably clear that the Socialist Perhaps the flames of interethnic hostility and bitter
Yugoslav Federation was dead.Much less clear was warfare that had burned their way across the troubled
whatwould come after it. The flaming torch of ethnic Yugoslav countryside from 1991 through 1995 were
nationalism had burnt its way through the country the product of a kind of geographic and historical vul
from northwest to southeast, setting ablaze first Slove canism rather than a torch brandished by one dema
nia , then Croatia , then Bosnia . Now it had been gogue. At Dayton the flames had been damped down
snuffed out and laid aside, butno one could be certain and covered over, but beneath the surface seismic
whether the Dayton Agreement had permanently faults and tensions remained, the hot lava of ethnic
halted or merely temporarily arrested the wildfire of chauvinism flowed , and ancient and recent grievances
violence and destruction . bubbled like hot sulfur springs. It remained to be seen
whether the flames had indeed been extinguished , or
Slovenia , where it had all begun ,was by late 1995 whether they would burst forth yet again and send old
well on its way to economic recovery and political fires blazing across the new landscape of the Balkans.
integration with the institutions of the West. Croatia

* See Chapter 77, “ The Red Generals' Refuse to Bow : Political

Military Relations and the Strategic Debate in Republika Srpska,
1995" for a more in -depth discussion of political-military relations
and Bosnian Serb thinking in the runup to the Dayton negotiations.

396
 Endnotes, Section VII

"Halilovic , Sefer, Lukava Strategija (“ Clever Strategy” ), chapter 12 Lieutenant ColonelMilutinovic also notes that:
17 . Rather than meeting with understanding, the military lead
2 FBIS Vienna AU 0913287 March 1995 . ership was accused of attempting a military coup . The con
3 Reuters, " Bosnian Croats Deny Joint Offensive With Moslems” sequence was a complete neglect of preparations for defense
by Laura Pitter, 29 March 1994 . from possible attacks.
4 Milos Vasic, “ President or General,” Belgrade Vreme 14 August Lieutenant ColonelMilovan Milutinovic , " Loss
1995 , pp. 14,15 . ofSupreme Command,” Belgrade Nin, 1
5 The more populous and industrial Banja Luka area resented the November 1996 , pp . 19-22 ( A letter to the editor
power that Pale had over it and believed it should exertmore from Lieutenant ColonelMilutinovic ).
authority in the management of the Serb Republic, an idea with One group of Bosanska Krajina delegates,headed by Andjeljko
which the VRS agreed . Grahovac , a renegade SDS member and factory director from
6 VRS Information Service chief, Lieutenant ColonelMilovan Banja Luka , strongly backed Mladic during the debate. Grahovac
Milutinovic states that, had led a delegation of assembly delegates and businessmen, pri
Following the Main Staff's warning on major threats to the marily from the Banja Luka/Bosanska Krajina area, to meet
Serb Republic, and a demand for stronger defenses, a Milosevic in February 1995. Grahovac publicly expressed strong
national parliament session was held in SanskiMost in support forMilosevic in a February 1995 interview . He represented
April 1995 . the strong opposition Banja Luka felt toward the Pale /East Bosnian
Lieutenant Colonel Milovan Milutinovic , “ Loss domination of the RS Government. Grahovac, together with Milo
of Supreme Command," Belgrade Nin 1 Novem rad Dodik , later attempted in October 1995 to replace the SDS-led
ber 1996 , pp. 19-22 ( A letter to the editor from governmentwith a “National Salvation " government, headed by
Lieutenant ColonelMilutinovic ). Grahovac . Such a government almost certainly would have been
? TheMinistry of Defense , headed in 1995 by senior SDS official strongly supported by Milosevic . Grahovac was also a founding
Milan Ninkovic, was supposed to provide administrative and member of Dodik's Independent Social Democrats.
logistic support to the VRS. It often, however, acted as a conduit 13 Vladimir Jovanovic , " Coup AgainstMladic,” Podgorica Monitor,
for SDS supported " businessmen ,” including Ninkovic , to make 21 April 1995, p . 15 .
substantial profits at the expense of the VRS.GeneralGvero stated 14 Karadzic and the SDS targeted Lieutenant Colonel General
in 1996 that during the war: Milan Gvero , Assistant Commander for Morale, Religious, and
... the state used what little funds itdid provide for incredi Legal Affairs (the senior VRS political officer and key Milosevic
ble machinations. There were cases when it had its own way supporter ),Major GeneralZdravko Tolimir, Assistant Commander
of taking from us even fundsthat had not been allocated : for Intelligence and Security, and Lieutenant ColonelGeneral
they sold us food at prices as much as 400 percentmore
Djordje Djukic , Assistant Commander for Rear Services.
expensive than we would have had to pay in the open- air 15
15 This assessment is based primarily on the strong coordination
market. For example, when lard cost 4 dinars at the markets
in Sremska Mitrovica or Novi Sad (in Serbia ), the Defense that took place amongMilosevic,Mladic, andMrksic , given their
Ministry sent uspaperwork ordering us to take sizable quan ties to Belgrade and the closeness with which Mladic had been
tities of that lard from some private entrepreneur at a price working with Milosevic all year. In addition , there are indications
of 16 dinars ! Was this not organized thievery at the expense ofSerbian RDB and VJ involvement at Srebrenica (and clearly at
of the army?! We have hundreds of such examples. Bihac), although not on the scale thatmany Muslim sources claim .
Milja Vujisic , " The Truth About the General's It also fits with theMladic/Milosevic peace efforts nearly simulta
Dismissal,” Belgrade Intervju (Internet Version ) neous, which suggests that the military operations and negotiation
13 December 1996 — An interview with Lieuten planning were interrelated. See also Zeljko Markovic, “By Fall,We
ant Colonel GeneralMilan Gvero . Shall Take Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, and Finally Sarajevo , and Bring
8 B.Maric , “ Clash Between Army and Politicians," Belgrade the War in Bosnia to a Close !!!" Belgrade Svet, 21 July 1995, p . 1 .
Vecernje Novosti, 18 April 1995, p . 4. There is evidence that 16 The InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
Assembly PresidentMomcilo Krajisnik was heavily involved in oil (ICTY ) produced VRS documents — including the 8 March RS
smuggling and probably made a substantial profit as head of the Supreme Command strategic directive for 1995 mentioned ear
holding company, “ Centreks," at the expense of the state and the lier - during expert witness testimony in June 2000 at General
Army. Vladimir Jovanovic , “ Coup AgainstMladic," Podgorica Radislav Krstic's trial for the massacres at Srebrenica. These docu
Monitor, 21 April 1995, p . 15. ments indicate President Karadzic approved the operation to seize
9
Belgrade Vecernje Novosti reports that : the enclave. See Krstic Internet transcripts for June 2000 on ICTY
Mladic said that the war aimsof the RS have in factnot Web site and Office of the Prosecutor (OTP ) Exhibits 425 and 426 .
been defined and that this is one of the basic reasons for the
See also Dragan Bozanic , “ Interview with Bosnian Serb Leader
“ incompleteness of some of the RS Army operations. Radovan Karadzic ,” Banja Luka Srpska Televizija 4 August 1995
B.Maric , " Clash Between Army and Politi
cians,” Belgrade Vecernje Novosti, 18 April and Jovan Janjic, “We Are Healthy Serbs,” Belgrade Nin , 25
1995 , p . 4 . August 1995, pp . 14-16 , an interview with Momcilo
10 Belgrade Tanjug 18 October 1995. Krajisnik .
11 B.Maric, “ Clash Between Army and Politicians," Belgrade
Vecernje Novosti, 18 April 1995, p . 4 .

397
 17 The RS Supreme Command strategic directive for 1995 called the Muslim units crossed without allegedly a shot being
for the VRS to strangle the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves and seize fired . In this clash , the Serbs lost not only strategic positions
them if the UN withdrew . The VRS conducted preliminary actions around Bihac hospital, but also several villages southwest
around Srebrenica in early June 1995, but the attack on Srebrenica from the town ...
appears to have been delayed by the ARBiH Sarajevo offensive ; the The VRS reportedly lost 40 personnel killed in action and 70 miss
ARBiH raid on 28 June against a Serb village just outside the ing in action during the engagement. A. B. “ Karadzic Sacks
enclave then sparked the VRS operation . It seems unlikely that Milovanovic,” Belgrade Blic 31 January 1995 , p . 3. FBIS Vienna
Milosevic knew of or approved the mass VRS executions of Sre AU0202141895 0214187 February 1995. See also Zarif Safic, “ No
brenica's male population. There is no evidence that Serbian RDB , One Can Prevent Us From Taking, Taking Back, What Belongs to
MUP or VJ personnel took part in these actions. Us!" Travnik Bosnjak 9 January 1996 , pp. 12-14 , FBIS Reston
18 Moscow ITAR -TASS 26 July 1995. 96BA0155C 0802012 March 1996 , an interview with Brigadier
19 Quoted in Paris AFP 27 July 1995 . Senad “ Sargan ” Sarganovic , commander of the 501st Mountain
20 SRNA 28 July 1995. Brigade.
41
21Belgrade Tanjug, 4 August 1995. Reuters, “ UN Accuses Bosnia Factions of Breaking Truce" by
22 Belgrade Tanjug, 6 August 1995; SRNA 11 August 1995 . Mark Heinrich , 16 January 1995.
23 Milika Sundic, Belgrade Radio 6 August 1995, an interview with 42 Reuters, “ Fighting Flares in Bosnia's Bihac Enclave," 17 January
Dobrica Milicevic . 1995.
43
24 SRNA 8 August 1995 . Belgrade SRNA , 4 January 1995. FBIS London LD0401184595,
25 SRNA 23 August 1995 . 041845Z January 1995.
26 SRNA 24 August 1995. 44 Sarajevo Radio , 5 January 1995. FBIS Vienna AU0501160095,
27 A Belgrade Nasa Borba article claimed that GeneralGvero and 0516007 January 1996 .
45
the VRS had detained Karadzic in Bijeljina for a time in order to Paris AFP, 1 February 1995. FBIS Vienna AU0102184895 ,
have a “ conversation " with him . D.N. B.“ Karadzic Taken Away 011848Z February 1995.
for An ‘Informative Conversation,'” Belgrade Nasa Borba, 46 Paris AFP, 13 February 1995. FBIS Vienna AU1302113795 ,
26-27 August 1995, p . 2. This report has not been substantiated, 1311377 February 1995.
47 Sarajevo Radio
but clearly the VRS exerted some sort of pressure on Karadzic at , 8 February 1995. FBIS Vienna AU0802103995,
this time since he agreed to the previously unthinkable - giving 081039Z February 1995.
Milosevic negotiating authority - only a few days later, before the 48 Paris AFP, 9 February 1995. FBIS Vienna AU0902164995,
start ofNATO airstrikes and the Croatian Army's September 091649Z February 1995.
ground offensive in western Bosnia . 49 Zagreb Hina , 10 February 1995 , FBIS Vienna AU 1002142995 ,
28 101429Z February 1995.
Belgrade NTV Studio B , 28 August 1995.
29 50
Belgrade Tanjug, 30 August 1995. This report carries the full text Paris AFP, 14 February 1995. FBIS Vienna AU 1402122195 ,
of the FRY-RS agreement. 141221Z February 1995
51
30 Belgrade Tanjug, 18 October 1995. The fourth officer wasMajor Sarajevo Radio , 14 February 1995. FBIS Vienna
GeneralGrujo Boric, the commander ofthe “ Rajko Balac" Center AU 1402192795 , 141927Z February 1995 .
of Military Schools, headquartered in Banja Luka. 2 Zagreb Radio , 14 February 1995. FBIS London LD1402171395,
31 The officer in question was General Boric. 141713Z February 1995.
32 Belgrade Tanjug , 3 January 1995.FBIS London LD0301173895 , 53 Zagreb Hina, 14 February 1995. FBIS Vienna AU1402181995,
031738Z January 1995. 1418192 February 1995.
54 Zagreb Hina, 5 January 1995 (sic ), FBIS Vienna
33 Paris AFP, 27 January 1995. FBIS Vienna AU2701085395 ,
270853Z January 1995. AU0402145495,0414542 February 1995 .
34 Paris AFP, 1 January 1995. FBIS Vienna AU0101195095 , 55 The SVK 21st Kordun rotated battalions from its three infantry
011950Z January 1995 . brigades (11th Vojnic , 13th Slunj, and 19th Vrginmost) through
35 Paris AFP, 2 January 1995. FBIS Vienna AU0201150595, TacticalGroup 8 and the 39th Banija Corps rotated battalions from
0215052 January 1995. its four infantry brigades ( 24th Glina, 26th Kostajnica , 31st Pet
36 Paris AFP , 2 January 1995. FBIS Vienna AU0201155895, rinja , and 33rd Dvor) through TacticalGroup 9. The VJ troops
0215582 January 1995. were drawn from the 63rd Airborne and 72nd Special Operations
37 Paris AFP, 3 January 1995. FBIS Vienna AU0301185495, Brigades.
031854Z January 1995 . 56
The 5th Corps order of battle, working from left to right, had ele
38 Sarajevo Radio , 10 January 1995.FBIS London LD 1001220295, ments of the 517th Light Brigade near Johovica (it also guarded the
1022022 January 1995. border with the RSK running south toward Bihac), then elements
39 Sarajevo Radio , 11 January 1995. FBIS Vienna AU1101192695, of the 510th Liberation Brigade, elements of the 503rd Cazin
1119262 January 1995. Mountain Brigade (probably also combined with troops from the
40 The 501st Brigade troops — led by elite reconnaissance-sabotage 501st and 502nd BihacMountain Brigades ) south ofMala Kladusa ,
units — infiltrated along the boundary between the SVK 103rd and then the 506th and 505th Brigades covering themain sectors run
VRS 15th Brigades, cutting in behind the VRS brigade's left flank . ning through Podzvizd and Vrnograc.
According to one Serbian newspaper, 57 Belgrade SRNA , 15 February 1995. FBIS London
The 15th Bihac Brigade held a wedged -in position around LD1502141995, 151419Z February 1995.
58 Belgrade SRNA, 19 February 1995. FBIS London
the Bihac hospital and the city morgue in Bihac, and they
were barely 500 meters away from the town center. The LD1902165495 , 191654Z February 1995 .
59
units of the Muslim 5th Corps attacked them from the left Sarajevo Radio , 25 February 1995. FBIS London
flank, from the outskirt district of Cerovci. According to the LD2502221695 , 2522162 February 1995.
survivors in the 15th Bihac Serb Brigade, their left flank had
been covered by a unit from Lika, through whose positions

398
60 The term “ Z -4 ” stood for Zagreb 4 — the four key diplomatic Nova Gradiska Axis
players which had crafted the plan, the United States,Russia , the • 4th Battalion /5th Guards Brigade.
EU and the UN . Zoran Radosavljevic , “Mediators Present Croat 81st Independent Guards Battalion.
Serb Peace Plan,” Reuters 30 January 1995 . • 121st Home Defense Regiment.
61 Reuters, “ Krajina Serbs Refuse to Consider Peace Plan,” • Armored Company/123rd Infantry Brigade.
30 January 1995 . • 265th Reconnaissance -Sabotage Company.
• MUP Special Police ( battalion-size ).
62 Reuters, “Croatia Says UN Pull -Out Not Negotiable," by Dvor
Huic , 13 January 1995. The HV order of battle is based primarily on the maps and official
63 HV documents included in Bobetko, as well as information in the
Reuters, “ Serbs Freeze Talks With Croatia , Declare Alert,” by
HV newspaper, Zagreb Velebit. In addition to the Main Staff direc
Mark Heinrich , 8 February 1995.
64 Reuters, “ Croatian Can Go Own Way Without UN — CroatGen tive for " Bljesak,” Bobetko also included a number of supporting
orders assigning HV units outside the normal structure of the
eral," by Davor Huic , 5 February 1995.
65Reuters, “ Croatia Agrees UN Troops Can Stay for Now ," by Bjelovar Corps District to the operation .
74 The forces around Pakrac came from the 52nd Home Defense
Nicholas Doughty, 12 March 1995 .
Regiment, the 105th Infantry Brigade, and a battalion- sizeMUP
66 Reuters, “Rebel Serb Leader Rejects UN Mandate Changes,” by
Special Police unit.
Branimir Grulovic, 6 April 1995.
67 Colonel General Ante Gotovina, Offensive Battles and Opera 75 The HV formed two artillery -rocket groups to support each pri
mary axis .
tions of the Croatian Army and HVO, Knin : Split Corps District,
Artillery -RocketGroup I supported the Nova Gradiska axis and
1996 , p. 38 .
68 Gotovina , pp. 38-39 . comprised the following elements:
69Gotovina, pp . 38-40. 1st Battalion/ 16th Artillery -Rocket Brigade (+ ).
70 From HVMain Staff directive for Operation “ Bljesak - 1," • 18th Artillery Battalion .
Artillery-Rocket Group II supported the Novska axis and com
5 December 1994 in Janko Bobetko, Sve Moje Bitke (All My
prised the following elements :
Battles ), Zagreb : Vlastita Naklada, 1996 , pp . 392-399.
• Artillery -Rocket Battalion/2nd Guards Brigade.
71 Sve Moje Bitke (All My Battles), pp. 392-399. • Artillery-Rocket Battalion/3rd Guards Brigade.
72 Bobetko states that,
• 2nd Battalion / 16th Artillery-Rocket Brigade.
During that period I got sick and spent three or four days at 76 Sve Moje Bitke (All MyBattles), pp. 392-399, 401-403.
... the hospital ... before the beginning of the attack in 77 Susak states that the offensive involved some 7,200 troops,
early May ... Iwent to the command headquarters. There I although he probably is referring mainly to the first phase. The
found the Minister of Defense and the people who were to 15,000 /7,500 total is based on order of battle estimates through
operationally lead the operation , or rather coordinate it. I identification of formations involved in the attack .
designated General Basarac for the Novska area and Gen 78 SveMoje Bitke (AllMy Battles), 1996 , p . 402-403.
eral Stipetic for the NovaGradiska area. Their basic task 79 The 18th West Slavonian Corps was organized into :
was to objectively assess the course of the operation, so that • 51st Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Pakrac.
we would nothave to call up the commanders every hour, 54th Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Okucani.
because that would take them away from their duties... • 98th Light Infantry Brigade,HQ Rajic.
... I knew that their assessments — because they were • 59th Daruvar Detachment, HQ vic Pakrac.
acquainted with the overall mission and had checked on the • U Slatina Detachment
situation in the units — would be realistic and would provide SVK 18th Corps order of battle drawn from HVMain Staff direc
adequate substantiation for any addition to or change in tive for Operation " Bljesak- 1,” 5 December 1994 in Janko
specific decisions. Bobetko, Sve Moje Bitke (All My Battles ), pp . 392-399.
After firming things up at the command headquarters, I See also Veljko Kadijevic, “More Than a Defeat,” Belgrade Vojska
wentto Minister Susak and asked him to install a communi 11 May 1995 , pp . 14 , 41.
cations system for me in the hospital and appoint an on- duty 80 Bobetko was particularly concerned about the intervention of the
communications officer ... Thus , Imaintained contact with 18th Corps' armored battalion from Stara Gradiska and claims to
the commanders the whole time, inquiring into the situation have worked with HRZ commanderGeneral Imre Agotic to use air
every two hours. assets, including Mi-24 gunships, to interdict the movement of this
Major General Marijan Marekovic , a senior Main Staff officer, battalion toward Okucani. Sve Moje Bitke (All My Battles),
headed the officialMain Staff FCP in the village ofGaresnica and pp . 402-403
was the main watchdog and point of contact for Bobetko. The key 81 On the left, the MUP Special Police and the 2nd Battalion/1st
role in influencing the operation was to be played by Colonel Gen Guards Brigade attacked in the Kricke Brdo area. The 1st Guards
eral Petar Stipetic , however, the veteran ex-JNA staff officer, and troops then dropped down onto the secondary, “old ” road to Oku
now a senior deputy on the Main Staff. Sve Moje Bitke (All My cani,paralleling the Belgrade-Zagreb highway, while the Special
Battles), pp. 403-404 . Police made for the Okucani- Pakrac road . The 2nd and 3rd Guards
73 The HV order of battle on themain attack axes comprised the Brigade forces formed the spearhead of the main attack, driving
following units : down the Belgrade-Zagreb highway. Meanwhile , the 125th Home
Novska Axis Defense Regiment, led byMUP Special Police troops, attacked
• Elements, 1st Croatian Guards Brigade ( 1st HGZ). south on the right flank, seizing Jasenovac and pushing along the
• 2nd Battalion /1st Guards Brigade . Sava River. Sve Moje Bitke (All MyBattles), pp. 390-391, 404, and
• 1st Battalion / 2nd Guards Brigade ( + ). Boris Komadina, “ A Tiger Fighting For Croatia," Hrvatski Obzor, 6
Armored Company/2nd Guards Brigade. November 1995, pp . 28-29 , which is an interview with Brigadier
• 1st Battalion /3rd Guards Brigade ( + ) . Jozo Milicevic , commander of the 1stGuards Brigade .
Armored Company/3rd Guards Brigade.
Reconnaissance Company/ 3rd Guards Brigade.
• 125th Home Defense Regiment.
• MUP Special Police (battalion -size ).

399
82 On the Nova Gradiska axis, the SVK - according to Bobetko— 86 Zagreb HINA 4 May 1995. President Tudjman's Address to
had developed strong defenses along the main route toward Oku Parliament, Zagreb Radio 15 January 1996 .
cani,near the village of Dragalic. The attack plan called for the 87 Reuters, “ Krajina Serb Town on General Alert,” by Jovan
81st GuardsBattalion to form themain spearhead, bypassing these Kovacic, 2 May 1995. The RSK State Assembly convened a com
defenses to the north , attacking from the the Masicka Sagovina mission to investigate the loss of Western Slavonia. The commis
area toward the village of Cage, north of Okucani. The battalion sion was comprised of five members, including the RSK Internal
would then push directly into Okucani itself. This part of the plan Affairs Minister, the deputy chairman of the Assembly , two SVK
appears to have gone awry, however. Bobetko states that, colonels, and another senior RSK MUP officer. The commission
I spoke with General Stipetic three or four times. He had to found that RSK PresidentMilan Martic was primarily responsible
personally go out to check on things, because of which the for the loss of Western Slavonia because of his closure of the
strike in the [Nova]Gradiska area came late . The 81st Belgrade- Zagreb highway, refusal to reopen it, and failure to
Guard Brigade (sic), which was responsible for that delicate coordinate the defense of the RSK through the Supreme Defense
task, learned of its mission only two and a half or three Council. The commission also blamed SVK commander Lt. Col.
hours later. Accordingly , it setout for its target only after the General Milan Celeketic for failing to properly oversee the defense
enemy was prepared , after the operation had already begun . of Western Slavonia and ignoring the threat from Zagreb when he
A similar thing happened with other units as well ... In ana andMartic refused to reopen the highway on 30 April. SVK 18th
lyzing the mission in this region,GeneralStipetic concluded Corps commander Colonel Lazo Babic was blamed for ignoring
that the units were as much as two hours late . Viewed from clear intelligence that the HV was going to attack and ignoring
that perspective, this was the most criminaland dangerous UNCRO warnings that failure to reopen the highway would lead to
thing that could have happened in this operation. There was grave consequences.
no reason for this, so that the underlying responsibility of The commission also blamed the corps command for poor coordi
who was in charge of that was sought. nation of its subordinate brigades during the fighting and criticized
As a result, the 4th Battalion/5th Guards Brigade and the 265th the relocation of the corps headquarters to the Bosnian side of the
Recon Company, together with the Armored Company/123rd Sava River at Gradiska. " Such an attitude in the corps command
Infantry Brigade, were forced to intervene and bludgeon their way seriously damaged the morale of the troops and weakened their
through the SVK 54th Light Infantry Brigade at Dragalic. The determination to persevere in defense.” Overall, the commission
Guards troops then pushed on toward Okucani, while the recon assessed that the SVK commanders “ atall levels seriously underes
company moved toward Nova Varos and Stara Gradiska to try and timated the enemy's capacities, particularly those directly taking
cut the main SVK withdrawal route. It appears that SVK rear part" in the operation. The commission also criticized Martic and
guards were too strong, however, and the Serbs were able to with the SVK General Staff for failing to respond quickly and forcefully
draw across the river unhindered. with attacks on Croatian strategic targets and cities than they did , in
Colonel General Petar Stipetic played amajor role in ensuring that keeping with Krajina Serb strategy.
this axis was putback on track and well coordinated. Bobetko says, Radovan Kovacevic, “Who Is To Blame for the Fall of Western
If it were not for General Stipetic, we probably would not Slavonia," Belgrade Politika 17 July 1995 p . 17 ; Radovan
have gotten a real picture of what was going on, because on Kovacevic , " Western Slavonia - A Victim of War' Games,"
such a broad front it is impossible to keep the situation Belgrade Politika 18 July 1995 p . 7.
under control. He moved about the key points and provided 88 TacticalGroup 5 normally comprised the following brigades
full reports to the staff war room , where Generals Vrbanac ( from right to left facing Orasje ):
and Miljevac ... and the Minister of Defense were the 1st Celinac Light Infantry Brigade , vic . Krepsic .
whole time. • 11th Dubica Infantry Brigade, vic . Loncari.
Sve Moje Bitke (AllMy Battles), pp . 404-405. See also Vesna • 2nd Krajina Infantry Brigade, vic. Obudovac.
Puljak , “ Always on the Central Route,” Zagreb Velebit, 28 March • 2nd Posavina Infantry Brigade, vic. BosanskiSamac.
1997, pp. 18-19 , an article on the 265th Reconnaissance- Sabotage Djurkic's command appears to have been reinforced with the
Company. following units:
Sve Moje Bitke (AllMy Battles), p . 404. • One to two battalions/Ist Armored Brigade.
Sve Moje Bitke (AllMy Battles), p . 405; Zagreb Radio 2 May 1995 . • 1st Military Police Battalion .
83 Reuters, “600 Rebel Serbs Surrender to Croatians,” 2 May 1995. • 1st Reconnaissance -Sabotage Detachment.
84 General Bobetko states, • 4th Battalion/43rd Prijedor Motorized Brigade.
Atexactly 0900 I called up General Stipetic athis command • Elements, 1st Bijeljina Light Infantry Brigade “ Panther."
headquarters and issued an order ... We looked at the map • “ Drina Wolves" special operations detachment.
and reached an agreement aboutwhere that grouping of In addition , 1st Krajina and East Bosnian Corps probably rein
forced artillery units opposite Orasje with additional 1stMixed
[ Serbs) north of Pakrac might be, probably waiting for
nightfall to break through toward (the north ). I ordered him Artillery Regiment 155-mm howitzers and other brigade-levelartil
to use two to three 122-mm VBRs (multiple rocket launch lery and mortar units in order to form a total of two to three corps
ers ), 130-mm guns, and whateverhe deemed necessary to artillery groups in support of the main attack axes.
shell one ortwo of those sectionswhere that grouping might 89 The Orasje Corps District was organized into the following
be waiting in the woods. I told him to superficially shell that formations (from right to left, facing the VRS ):
part of the woodswith two bursts each , because if they were • 202nd HomeDefense Regiment, vic. Domaljevac -Grebnice.
• 106th Home Defense Regiment, vic . Ostra Luka.
there, they would not be able to hold out psychologically ...
• 201st Home Defense Regiment, vic. Vidovice-Vucilovac.
See SveMoje Birke (All My Battles ), pp. 405-406 , pp. 414-415 . In
• 4th Guards Brigade (in reserve, opposite the HVO left wing.)
particular, pp.414-415 have Bobetko's order to Stipetic to execute A MUP Special Police detachmentwith about 200 personnel also
this attack and Stipetic's report on the action's success. See also supported the HVO . The Orasje Corps District was originally orga
Ivanka Toma, “ Special Forces A Wall Against Terrorists," Split nized into six brigades: the 101st Bosanski Brod, 102nd Odzak,
Slobodna Dalmacija, 23 May 1996 , p. 5 ,an interview with Colonel 103rd Derventa , 104th Samac, 105th Modrica, and 106th Orasje .
General Mladen Markac, commander of MUP Special Police After heavy combat losses in 1992 and early 1993 , the corps was
forces.
reorganized during the early 1994 restructuring of the HVO . Five
85 Zagreb HTV 8 May 1995.

400
of the six brigades (all of which had lost their homeregions in the 1st Battalion/ 1st Guards Brigade (not to be confused with the 1st
1992 fighting) were combined to form two Home Defense regi HGZ) and the 264th Reconnaissance- Sabotage Company were in
ments, the 201st and 202nd. Each of the former brigades were reserve and would be introduced in the second phase. Further
downsized to battalions but retained their old numeric designators . south , southwest ofGlamoc, the 2nd HVO Guards Brigade was to
The 201stcomprised the 101st and 103rd Battalions, and the 202nd conductholding attacks around Mali Golija to pin down VRS troop
comprised the 102nd, 104th , and 105th Battalions. Atthe same reserves. The HV /HVO also broadcast false communications
time, a new 4th Guards Brigade, drawing from the old brigades, implying that Glamoc was the primary objective in a further
was formed using the youngest and most experienced personnel. attempt to deceive the VRS. ColonelGeneral Ante Gotovina,
See Zvonko Zivkovic, “We Are Thorns in Serb Flesh,” Zagreb Offensive Battles and Operations of the Croatian Army and HVO
Vecernji List, 6 June 1995, p . 7, an interview with Staff Brigadier Knin : Split Corps District, 1996 , pp. 45-56 .
Djuro Matuzovic ;Neven Miladin , “ Posavina Heroes in Armor,” 95 The 2nd Krajina Corps had arrayed two brigades— probably the
Zagreb Velebit, 13 December 1996 , pp. 16-17; Anto Pranjikic and composite 3rd Serbian Brigade or the 3rd Petrovac Light Infantry
Gordan Radosevic , “ Posavina Se Srcem Brani,” Zagreb Velebit, Brigade — and the 9th Grahovo Light Infantry Brigade on the VRS
7 July 1995, p . 14 ; Anto Pranjkic and Gordan Radosevic, “ 202. right and center and elements of the 5th Glamoc Light Infantry Bri
Iz Pobjede U Pobjedu," Zagreb Velebit, 14 July 1995, p . 14. gade on the VRS left. Bits and pieces of other VRS brigades sent to
90 This narrative of the battle is based heavily on reporting from the area as reinforcements were also integrated into the defenses.
Zagreb Radio covering the periods 5 May to 20 June 1995. These The SVK 7th North Dalmatian Corps had formed the Battle Group
reports detail the location and strength of the VRS attacks. Zagreb “ Vijuga” from several of its brigades. The battle group and ele
Velebit reporting (above) and the interview with Matuzovic also ments of the 1st Vrlika Light Infantry Brigade defended the long
provided some detail. In addition , the following Reuters and AFP border front against the HV.
reports were useful, particularly in reporting UN information on 96 This account is based almost exclusively on Colonel General
the fighting: Ante Gotovina, Offensive Battles and Operations of the Croatian
• Reuters,Davor Huic, “Heavy Fighting Erupts Along Key Bosnia Army and HVO Knin : Split Corps District, 1996, pp. 45-56 . See
Corridor - UN ,” 10 May 1995 . also Eduard Milicevic, " Heroes Never Die,” Zagreb Velebit,
• Reuters, Davor Huic , “ Fighting Rages On Along Key Bosnia 15 March 1996 , p . 11 ,an article on Staff Brigadier Ante Saskor,
Corridor," 10 May 1995 . deputy commander of the 1st Croatian Guards Corps, of which the
.
Reuters, Sean Maguire, “ Serbs Running the Game on Battle 1st Croatian Guards Brigade was themain combat formation ;
field ," 11 May 1995. Zeljko Stipanovic , “ Proven Countless Times,” Zagreb Velebit,
• Reuters, Davor Huic , “ Bosnian Croats FightSerbs, Rumours of 10 January 1997, pp. 16-17 ,an article on the Tactical Sniper
Sellout," 11 May 1995. Company ; “ Hawks From the Lasva Valley,” Zagreb Velebit,
Reuters, “Heavy Fighting Continues Along Serb Corridor,” 19 July 1996 , an article on the 3rd HVO Guards Brigade. These
14 May 1995.
• Reuters, “ Bosnian Serbs Bombard Croats Along Supply Line," articles provide little detail on the operation itself,but do note the
17 May 1995 . unit's presence in the battle .
97
• Paris AFP, “ UN Says Serbs Attacking Croat-Held Northeast Gotovina, p . 50.
Region,” 5 May 1995 . 98 Paris AFP, 9 March 1995. FBIS Vienna AU0903133995 ,
• Paris AFP, “UN Officials Say Sarajevo Calm After Overnight 091339Z March 1995.
Gunfire ," 11 May 1995. 99 Belgrade SRNA, 20 March 1995. FBIS London LD2003142295,
• Paris AFP, Florence Biedermann , " Croat Officer Tells AFP of 20 March 1995
Serb Attacks At Brcko Corridor," 11 May 1995. 100 Sarajevo Prva Linija , “Operation Vlasic” by Hasib Musinbe
Paris AFP, “UN Monitors: 4,000 to 5,000 Rounds Fired ' From govic ,March -April 1998, pp . 93-109.
Orasje,” 17 May 1995 . 101 Ibid ., pp. 93-109 .
• Paris AFP, “UN Reports Serbs Fail to TakeNortheast Croat-Held 102 Belgrade Radio , 20 March 1995.FBIS Vienna AU2003155995 ,
Pocket," 18 May 1995. 2015597 March 1995 .
• Paris AFP, “ UN Monitors ‘Uncountable Number of Explosions' 103 Banja Luka Srpski Televizija , 21March 1995. FBIS Vienna
Near Kladusa," 22 May 1995. AU2203172195 , 221721March 1995 .
91 An HVO information officer, Ilijo Duminkovic, speaking to Reu 104 Banja Luka Srpski Radio , 24 March 1995. FBIS Vienna
ters, stated that in the attack on Vidovice, the VRS had “ attempted AU2703125795, 271257Z March 1995 .
a combined tank and infantry attack from three directions, using 105 Reuters, “ Bosnian Army Captures Serb Radio Towers — UN ,” 25
10 tanks, several APCs, and several hundred soldiers ... " Reuters, March 1995.
“ Heavy Fighting Continues Along Serb Corridor,” 14 May 1995. 106 Reuters , “ Civilians Fear Serb Revenge for Moslem Success " by
92 Colonel General Ante Gotovina, Offensive Battles and Opera Davor Huic , 26 March 1995 .
tions of the Croatian Army and HVO Knin : Split Corps District, 107 Reuters, “ Bosnian Troops Take Key CentralMountain " by
1996 , p . 45. Davor Huic, 4 April 1995.
93 Zagreb HTV 11 June 1995 , interview with Major General 108 For example, the 1995 Mt. Vlasic operation consisted of a two
Tihomir Blaskic , Chief of the HVO Main Staff. pronged flanking attack that eventually made the VRS position
94 The HV/HVO Operational Group “Rujani" consisted of the untenable and forced the Serbs to withdraw . Reuters, “Long,
following units. The first phase /left axis of the attack was to be Low -Level War Likely, Say Observers in Bosnia" by Davor Huic ,
carried outby the 4th Guards Brigade, attacking along the road 11 April 1995.
through Crni Lug to the main pass and in the Dinara areas adjacent 109 Reuters, “ Fresh Fighting Reported Across Bosnia " by Kurt
to the valley. The 3rd Battalion /126th Home Defense Regiment Schork , 3 April 1995 .
was to conduct the supporting attack, protecting the 4th Guards 110 Reuters, “ Serb Attack on Aid Plane Closes Sarajevo Airport" by
flank, in the border areas, inside the RSK . The Split Corps Kurt Schork, 8 April 1995.
District's TacticalSniper Company was also employed in this area. 11Reuters, “ Bosnian ArmyGaining Battlefield Credibility” by
Along the second axis, on the northeastern side of the Livno Valley, Kurt Schork , 10 April 1995.
the 3rd HVO Guards Brigade, a battalion of the 1st Croatian
Guards Brigade (1st HGZ), and Bosnian CroatMUP Special Police
were to attack and seize the northeastern rim of the valley. The HV

401
112 As the UN source characterized it, “ It's a much more ambitious 120 Reuters, “ Karadzic Promises Counter-Offensive," 24 March
approach ... The Bosnians have rethought their doctrine. What 1995 .
we've seen is that they're now prepared to takemore risk , to move 121 Reuters , “Moslems Capture Serb Radio Towers” by Kurt
troops around.” Reuters, “ Long, Low -Level War Likely, Say Schork , 25 March 1995 .
Observers in Bosnia" by Davor Huic , 11 April 1995. 122 Reuters, "Fighting Spreads as Serbs Shell Enclave” by Kurt
113 Reuters , “Long , Low -Level War Likely, Say Observers in Schork , 25 March 1995 .
Bosnia " by Davor Huic , 11 April 1995. 123 Reuters, “ UN SaysMoslemsMay Have Won Ground,"
114 The 2nd Corps appears to have shifted almost all of its elite lib 24 March 1995.
eration and lightbrigades, as well as other elite units, to Colonel 124 Reuters, “ Bosnian Serb Gunners Bombard Moslem -Held
Refik Lendo's 25th Division sector. The 2nd Corpsmay also have Towns” by Kurt Schork , 26 March 1995.
given the 24th Division temporary command over part of the 25th 125 Zagreb Globus, 31 March 1995. “AtMinus 20 Degrees Celsius
Division's area of responsibility southeast of Stolice in order to and Deep Snow , the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army Has Taken the
better controlthe large number of formations deployed in the area . Roof of Bosnia -Herzegovina and Opened theWay Toward Jajce!"
These formations included : by Denis Kuljis. FBIS Vienna AU0404152995, 041529Z April
• 210th Liberation Brigade “ Nesib Malkic,” (24th Division). 1995 .
• 222nd Liberation Brigade (22nd Division ). 126
Reuters, “MoslemsBattle to Capture Serb Radio Tower Intact"
241stMuslim Light Brigade (24th Division ). by Davor Huic , 28 March 1995.
• 242nd Muslim Light Brigade (24th Division). 127 Belgrade SRNA, 26 March 1995. FBIS London
• 251st Light Brigade ( 25th Division ). LD2603113795, 2611377 March 1995 .
24th Independent Sabotage Battalion “ Black Wolves" (24th 128 Belgrade Tanjug , 5 April 1995. FBIS London LD0504170395,
Division). 051703Z April 1995.
24th Antiterrorist Company “ Zivinice Wasps" (24th Division ). 129 Reuters , “ Bosnians, Serbs Battle On, Ignoring Pleas to Halt" by
The 25th Division's normal sector holding mountain brigades in Kurt Schork , 28 March 1995 .
the Stolice-Ugljevik sector included : 130 Paris AFP, 4 April 1995. FBIS Vienna AU0404120895,
• 250th Mountain Brigade,NE of Tuzla . 0412087 April 1995.
• 252nd Mountain Brigade, E of Tuzla. 131 Belgrade Tanjug, 5 April 1995. FBIS London LD0504170395 ,
• 253rd Mountain Brigade , SE of Tuzla.
• 255th Mountain Brigade “Hajdrudin Mesic,” vic . Teocak. 051703Z April 1995.
See the following Prva Linija articles: 132 Paris AFP, 6 April 1995. FBIS Vienna AU0604122795 ,
• Said Humremovic, “ 222nd Liberation Brigade : ‘ Young Lions' 0612272 April 1995.
Standard-Bearers ofFreedom ,” Prva Linija , March 1997 , 133 Reuters, “ UN Says Fighting Flares in Bosnia" by Kurt Schork,
pp. 23-24 FBIS Reston VA 98E08102A 091712Z June 1998. 6 April 1995.
• " Three Years ofthe 241st Spreca-Muslim -Light Brigade: 134 Reuters, "Serbs Regain Ground in Bosnian Fighting " by Kurt
Lisaca - A Victory That Will Be Inscribed in Gold Letters,” Prva Schork , 7 April 1995.
Linija , July 1997, p . 31 FBIS Reston VA 98E08088C 122020Z 135 Belgrade SRNA , 7 April 1995. FBIS London LD0704120395 ,
March 1998 . 071203Z April 1995.
• “ On the Occasion of the Third Anniversary of the Formation of 136 Bosnian Serb Army operations in early- to mid -May retook
the 242nd Zvornik Muslim Light Brigade :Unforgettable Suc someof the subordinate peaks — including Mt. Kolijevka, recap
cesses,” Prva Linija, October 1997, p . 31 FBIS Reston VA tured on 2 May — and further strengthened the VRS defensive line.
98E07020C 1716312 February 1998. Paris AFP, 2 May 1995. FBIS Vienna AU0205163295, 021632Z
• S. R., “ On the Fifth Anniversary of the SDB 'Black Wolves,' ' May 1995; Belgrade SRNA, 17 May 1995. FBIS London ,
Prva Linija, October 1997 , p . 11 FBIS Reston VA 98E08031A 1705174595 , 1717457 May 1995.
121934Z January 1998. 137 Maribor Vecer, “ There will be Peace, If There Is Not That Kind
115 The 2nd Majevica Light Infantry Brigade was part of Tactical of Cease - Fire," by Zarko Rajkovic , 22 April 1995 , p . 35. FBIS
Group “Majevica” in Major General Novica Simic's East Bosnian
Reston VA , 95BA0237A , 221848Z May 1995.
Corps. Together with the 2nd Majevica, the tactical group had 138 Reuters, “ Bosnian Army Says Jets Hit Serbs Near Tuzla,"
about 6,000 troops organized into the: 30 August 1995.
• IstMajevica Infantry Brigade, vic. Ugljevik (2ndMajevica's left 139 See RS SupremeCommand Directive No. 7,8 March 1995 and
flank ). VRSMain Staff Directive 02/2-15, 31 March 1995, ICTY OTP
. 3rdMajevica
Infantry Brigade, vic . Lopare (2nd Majevica's right Exhibits 425 and 426 , Krstic Trial.
flank ).
• Ist Semberija Infantry Brigade, vic .NW of Lopare . 140 The East Bosnian Corps and Drina Corps reinforced the 1st
The tactical group was supported a 155-mm howitzer battalion Majevica Light Infantry Brigade and the 1st Zvornik Infantry
from the 3rd Mixed Artillery Regiment. Brigade — which normally held the sectors opposite Teocak and
Paris AFP, 21 March 1995. FBIS Vienna AU2103134895 , 211348Z Sapna — with select elements from most of their other formations.
March 1995. Sarajevo Radio , 4 April 1995. FBIS Vienna AU0404152595
116 Belgrade Radio , 21March 1995.FBIS Vienna AU2103221295 , 0415252 April 1995.
212212Z March 1995 . 141 The 246th and 255th Mountain Brigades near Sapna and Teocak
117 Paris AFP , 23 March 1995. FBIS Vienna AU231229Z March respectively, probably were reinforced with elements of the divi
1995 . sion's two assault brigades, the 241st and 242nd Light Brigades,
118 Reuters , “ Fighting Breaks Out Again in Bosnia ” by Kurt and the elite 24th “ Black Wolves” Recon -Sabotage Battalion and
Schork , 21March 1995 . the “ Zivinice Wasps" special operations unit. In addition , parts of
119 Reuters , “ UN Reports Heavy Combat in Northern Bosnia ," the elite 222nd Liberation Brigade/22nd Division were shifted to
23 March 1995 . the sector.

402
 The ARBiH called this attack " Hammer and Anvil." See " Three 161 Sarajevo Radio , 16 May 1995. FBIS Vienna AU1605092895,
Years of the 241st Spreca-Muslim -Light Brigade: Lisaca-A Vic 160928Z May 1995 .
tory That Will Be Inscribed in Gold Letters,” Prva Linija , July 162 Paris AFP, 17 May 1995. FBIS Vienna AU1705134695 ,
1997 p . 31; “ On the Occasion of the Third Anniversary of the For 171346Z May 1995
mation of the 242nd Zvornik Muslim Light Brigade: Unforgettable 163 Zagreb Hina, 18 May
1995. FBIS Vienna AU1805140395,
Successes,” Prva Linija , October 1997, p . 31; S. R., “ On the Fifth 181403Z May 1995.
Anniversary of the SDB ‘Black Wolves',” Prva Linija , October 164 Paris AFP, 19 May 1995. FBIS Vienna AU1905083595,
1997 p . 11. 190835Z May 1995 .
Said Huremovic , “ 222nd Liberation Brigade: 'Young Lions' Stan 165 UN spokesmen issued conflicting statements at this time as to
dard Bearers of Freedom ,” Sarajevo Prva Linija ,March 1997, whether Dudakovic's 5th Corps forces were systematically burning
pp. 23-24 . The 222nd Liberation brigade had previously been Serb homes during its drive south of Bihac. A UN spokesman in
designated the 212th . Zagreb first stated that the Bosnian Armywas torching Serb houses
142 Sarajevo Radio , 5 April 1995. FBIS Vienna AU0504145495 as part of its advance south and east of Bihac. An UNPROFOR
0514542 April 1995; Sarajevo Radio , 11 April 199. FBIS Vienna spokeswoman stated later, however, on 19 May that only four
AU1104145495 1114542 April 1995; Sarajevo Radio , 14 April houses had been set afire in Ripac and that no intentional damage
1995. FBIS Vienna AU2404104095 2410407 April 1995; Sarajevo had been seen around Bosanska Krupa. The final UN statements
Radio, 17 April 1995. FBIS Vienna AU1704181595 171815Z appeared to retract the initial reports out of Zagreb , butexactly
April 1995; Sarajevo Radio , 18 April 1995. FBIS Vienna what happened remains unclear. Paris AFP, 19 May 1995. FBIS
AU 1804190095 181900Z April 1995; Sarajevo Radio , 26 April Vienna AU1905180995, 191809Z May 1995; Zagreb Hina,
1995. FBIS Vienna AU2604111395 261113Z April 1995 ; Sarajevo 20 May 1995. FBIS Vienna AU2005141395 , 201413Z May 1995 .
Radio , 26 April 1995. FBIS Vienna AU2604193595 261935Z 166 Paris AFP, 21 May 1995. FBIS Vienna AU2105140295,
April 1995. 2114022 May 1995.
143 Sarajevo Radio , 10 May 1995.FBIS Vienna AU1005154995 167 Isnam Taljic, “ I Am Proud We Aided the Liberation of Croatia ,"
101549Z May 1995. Sarajevo Ljiljan 12-19 February 1997, p. 22, interview with Briga
144 Sarajevo Radio , 15 March 1995. FBIS Vienna AU1503173595 , dier Mirsad Sedic , commander 511th Mountain Brigade, FBIS
151735Z March 1995 . Reston 98E07025E 3021072 March 1998 ; Zemka Seferagic, “ On
145 Paris AFP , 15 March 1995. FBIS Vienna AU1503180595, the Occasion ofthe Liberation of Cojluk (11 July 1995) and the
1518057 March 1995. Victory of the 511th Glorious Brigade : The Great Victory of the
146 Split Slobodna Dalmacija , 25 March 1995. FBIS Reston Krajina Soldiers,” Sarajevo Prva Linija, July 1997 , p. 32. FBIS
95BA0218A , 2418282 April 1995. Reston 98E08088D 122141Z March 1998; Sarajevo Radio, 7 July
147 Sarajevo Radio , 1 April 1995. FBIS London LD0104092995 , 1995. FBIS Vienna AU0707095295 0709527 July 1995; Sarajevo
010929Z April 1995. Radio , 11 July 1995. FBIS Vienna AU1107111295 1111127 July
148 Zagreb Hina , 7 April 1995. FBIS Vienna AU0704150095, 1995 .
0715002 April 1995 . 168 Zemka Seferagic, “ On the Occasion of the Liberation of Cojluk
149 Sarajevo Radio , 9 April 1995. FBIS London LD0904215695, (11 July 1995) and the Victory of the 511th Glorious Brigade: The
0921562 April 1995. Great Victory of the Krajina Soldiers," Sarajevo Prva Linija , July
150 The VRS 5th Battalion /43rd Prijedor Motorized Brigade, which 1997, p . 32. FBIS Reston 98E08088D 1221412 March 1998; Sara
was a component of the composite 1st Serbian Brigade, bore the jevo Radio , 12 July 1995, AU1207193495 121933Z July 1995 .
169
brunt of the attack . Sarajevo Radio , 10 April 1995. FBIS Vienna Belgrade Tanjug, 16 April 1995. FBIS London LD1604181095,
AU1004140895 1014082 April 1995 ; Sarajevo Prva Linija , “Anni 1618102 April 1995.
versary of the Battles Una-95 and Zora -95 : Behind Una the Dawn," 170 The 2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade covered the area
May -June 1998. FBIS Reston VA 98E08205A , 1213262 August around the airport to positions southeast ofMount Igman , while the
1998 . 12th Kotorsko Light Infantry Brigade was deployed from Igman
isi Zagreb Radio , 26 April 1995. FBIS London LD2604174595, south to Trnovo . Elements ofthe 1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade
2617452 April 1995.Banja Luka SrpskiRadio , 3 May 1995. FBIS appear to have supported these formations.
Vienna AU0405171495 , 0417142 May 1995. 171 The 1st GuardsMotorized Brigade, under the command of Tac
152 Sarajevo Radio , 12 May 1995. FBIS Vienna AU1205101795, tical Group “Kalinovik ."
1210172 May 1995. 172 The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps's 4th Reconnaissance-Sabotage
153 Paris AFP, 29 April 1995. FBIS Vienna AU2904171995, Detachment "White Wolves," the Main Staff 65th Protection
2917192 April 1995. Motorized Regiment,plus elements of theMUP Special Police Bri
154 Sarajevo Radio , 29 April 1995. FBIS London LD2904173695 , gade. In addition , the Herzegovina Corps usually formed a com
291736Z April 1995 . posite brigade from its formations to carry outmajor
155 Paris AFP, 6 May 1995. FBIS Vienna AU0605132295, 0613222 counterattacks.
May 1995. 173 UN Observers corroborated Serb claimsthat the Bosnian Army
156 Sarajevo Prva Linija , “ Anniversary of the Battles Una-95 and used helicopters in the operation , in violation of the UN Security
Zora -95: Behind Una theDawn,” May -June 1998.FBIS Reston VA Council's No-Fly Zone resolution. These were almost certainly
98E08205A , 1213262 August 1998. used for resupply and medical evacuation missions. Belgrade
157 Zagreb Hina , 13May 1995. FBIS Vienna AU1305151995, SRNA, 20 April 1995. FBIS London LD2004110195, 2011012
1315192 May 1995. April 1995 ;Zagreb Hina, 20 April 1995. FBIS Vienna
158 Paris AFP, 15 May 1995. FBIS Vienna AU 1505114595 , AU2004202295 , 202022Z April 1995 .
1511452 May 1995. 174 Belgrade SRNA , 19 April 1995. FBIS London LD1904 194595,
159 Paris AFP, 18 May 1995. FBIS Vienna AU 1805134395, 191945Z April 1995.
175
181343Z May 1995. Sarajevo Radio , 20 April 1995. FBIS London LD2004184195,
160 Sarajevo
Prva Linija , “ Anniversary of the Battles Una -95 and 201848Z April 1995 .
Zora- 95: Behind Una the Dawn,” May- June 1998. FBIS Reston VA
98E08205A , 1213262 August 1998 .

403
176 Djokin Toranj is the Serb , and more common, name for this 196 The day before the Sarajevo offensive began , US President Clin
peak . The Bosnian Muslims also called the same peak by its older ton and French President Chirac expressed doubts that the Bosnian
name, " Mala Caba ." Army could prevail against the Bosnian Serbs, urging instead Bos
177 Reuters, “ Bosnian Army Claims Capture of Strategic Peak,” nian Muslim acceptance of a political settlement. As Clinton
20 April 1995. stated, “ ...my judgment is ... in the end , a military solution is not
178 Sarajevo Radio , 20 April 1995. FBIS London LD2004184895 , available to the Bosnian Government.” Reuters, “UN Plays Down
201848Z April 1995. Fighting North of Sarajevo ” by Kurt Schork , 15 June 1995.
179 Brigadier GeneralKaravelic stated publicly a few days later that 197 In theory, if the Bosnian Army's offensive had proved very suc
the summit had actually been captured by recon -sabotage units sev cessful, by interdicting Serb lines of communication they would
eral days earlier, on the night of 14-15 April . The news was kept also have cut off the VRS's preferred routes of retreat and made
secret for a time,with the announcement apparently timed for max movement of Serb heavy equipment in any direction extremely
imum publicity value. difficult.
180 Banja Luka Radio , 26 April 1995. FBIS Vienna 198 Reuters, “ Lifting Serb Siege of Sarajevo a Mighty Task ” by Kurt
AU2604152995, 261529Z April 1995. Schork , 12 June 1995 .
181 Belgrade SRNA , 3 June 1995. FBIS London LD0306203295, 199 Reuters, “ Bosnian ArmyMassing to Break Sarajevo Siege
032032Z June 1995 . UN ” by Kurt Schork , 13 June 1995 .
182 Belgrade Tanjug, 4 May 1995. FBIS London LD0405225195, 200 The 1st Corps was organized into three divisions, five elite light
042251Z May 1995. brigades, plus support troops. The 12th Division (nine brigades )
183 Belgrade SRNA, 3 June 1995. FBIS London LD0306115095 , held Sarajevo city, the 14th Division (six brigades) covered the
031150Z June 1995 . Pazaric (Hadzici)-Mount Igman-Mount Treskavica sector, and the
184 Belgrade SRNA, 7 May 1995. FBIS London 0705100995 , 16th Division (five brigades) defended the Visoko -Breza-Vares
0710092 May 1995. sector. The General Staff probably committed its Guards Brigade
185 Belgrade Tanjug, 11 May 1995. FBIS London LD1105164095 , and the elite “ Black Swans” sabotage troops from the 120th Liber
111640Z May 1995. ation Brigade. The 2nd Corps appears to have loaned the 1st Corps
186 Reuters, “ Serbs Running the Game on Battlefield , UN Says," four liberation or light brigades — 211th , 222nd, 241st, and
11 May 1995. 242nd - plus a sabotage battalion , while the 3rd Corps deployed at
187 Banja Luka SrpskiRadio , 17 May 1995. FBIS Vienna least the 7th Muslimski Liberation Brigade. The 7th Corps proba
AU1805105595, 1810552 May 1995. bly contributed the 17th Krajina Mountain , 705th Mountain , and
188 Belgrade SRNA, 19 May 1995. FBIS London LD1905112895 , possibly elements of the706th and 708th Light Brigades.
1911287 May 1995 . 201 The General Staff probably committed its Guards Brigade and
189 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija, 6 June 1995. FBIS Vienna the elite “ Black Swans” sabotage troops from the 120th Liberation
AU0606190095, 061900Z June 1995. Brigade. The 2nd Corps appears to have loaned the 1st Corps four
190 Sarajevo's city authorities chose to mark the beginning of the liberation or lightbrigades — 211th , 222nd , 241st, and 242nd - plus
siege from 2 May 1992, when the JNA attacked the city directly for a sabotage battalion , while the 3rd Corps deployed at least the 7th
the first time and the field artillery shelling began. Many others Muslimski Liberation Brigade. The 7th Corps probably contributed
chose instead to date the siege from 5 April 1992, when Serb resi the 17th KrajinaMountain , 705th Mountain, and possibly elements
dents in and around the city first set up barricades and fired at of the 706th and 708th Light Brigades. The 16th Division ,head
civilian demonstrators near Vrace hill. Counting from 5 April , the quartered in Vares, was organized into the 147th Light, and 161st,
1,000th day of the siege fell on 31 December 1994. Reuters, 162nd , 164th , and 165th Mountain Brigades,most of which proba
“ Sarajevo Marks 1,000 Days of Siege,” 27 January 1995; Reuters , bly were tied down in static defenses along the frontline.
“ Truce Hopes as Sarajevo Siege is 1,000 Days Old ” by Kurt 202 The 12th Division was organized into the following formations:
Schork, 31 December 1994 . • 101stMotorized Brigade, HQ Sarajevo -Mojmilo .
191 By comparison , when the Soviet Red Army drove on Berlin in • 102nd Motorized Brigade, HQ Sarajevo -Stup.
April 1945 some 464,000 Soviet troops assaulted the city with • 105th Motorized Brigade,HQ Sarajevo -Kosevo .
.
some 12,700 heavy guns, 2,000 rocket launchers, 1,500 tanks, and 111th Vitezka Motorized Brigade, HQ Sarajevo - Zuc Hill.
tens of thousands of mortars and smaller weapons.Marshal • 112th Vitezka Motorized Brigade, HQ Sarajevo-Rajlovac .
Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front alonemassed artillery pieces south of • 115th Mountain Brigade, Sarajevo -Bistrik .
Berlin at an estimated density of650 guns per kilometer; field guns • 124th Light Brigade “ King Tvrtko," HQ Sarajevo .
• 152nd Mountain Brigade, HQ Vasin Han .
were lined up almost literally wheel to wheelfor as far as the eye
• 155th Motorized Brigade,HQ Sarajevo -Dobrinja.
could see. Keegan , Donald , The Second World War, pp . 823-824.
In addition, two elite light brigades were stationed in Sarajevo, the
Ziemke , Earl F., Stalingrad to Berlin : The German Defeat in the
141st and 143rd . The bulk of these formations were holding their
East. US Army Center for Military History,New York : Dorset normal defensive sectors and were unavailable for themain attack
Press, 1968.
but carried out supporting raids and limited objective attacks.
192 Reuters, “ Izetbegovic Vows to Break Sarajevo Siege,” 24 May 203 The 14th Division normally controlled the 104th Motorized,
1995 .
109th Mountain, 123rd Light, and 131st Light Brigades but was
193 Reuters, “ Lifting Serb Siege of Sarajevo a Mighty Task ” by Kurt
Schork , 12 June 1995 . reinforced with the elite 145th and 146th Light Brigades from 1st
194 Ljubljana Oslobodjenje, interview in two installments with Corps for the operation .
Brigadier General Rifat Bilajac, Assistant Commander ofthe Bos 204 The 4th Corps had the following formations or elements of these
formations deployed at Treskavica:
nian Army General Staff, by Djuro Kozar “ Some Croats Are Not • 4th Muslim Light Brigade.
Exactly Helping," 18-25 May 1995, p. 4. FBIS Vienna • 444th Mountain Brigade.
AU2505151395, 251513Z May 1995 . . 445th Mountain Brigade .
195 Madrid ElMundo “Bosnian Military Plans to Open Up Sarajevo
Could End Up in Slaughter” by Julio Fuentes, 15 June 1995. FBIS
Brussels BR1506112195, 1511217 June 1995 .

404
 --
• 447th Liberation Brigade. 215
Sarajevo Radio , 12 June 1995. FBIS London LD1206214295,
450th Light Brigade. 122142Z June 1995 .
• 4th Reconnaissance -Sabotage Battalion. 216 Sarajevo Radio , 13 June 1995. FBIS Vienna AU1306191695
• 4th Mixed Artillery Regiment. 1319167 June 1995 .
205 The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was organized into the following 217 As in most successful assaults by both sides, elite Bosnian MUP
formations:
Special Police troops again supported the ARBiH units. Sarajevo
• Ist Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade, vic . Sarajevo-Grbavica Radio , 16 June 1995. FBIS Vienna AU1606083295 , 160832Z June
Lukavica . 1995 .
. 218
2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade, vic . Lukavica -Sarajevo Sarajevo Radio , 19 June 1995. FBIS Vienna AU1906110995,
Airport-Mount Igman. 191109Z June 1995.
• 3rd Sarajevo Infantry Brigade, vic . Vogosca-Semizovac
Rajlovac. 219Sarajevo Radio , 23 June 1995.FBIS London LD2306214595 ,
2321452 June 1995 .
• 4th Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade, vic. Cemerska Hills/NE of
Ilijas. 220 Reuters , “ Bosnian Army Aiming to 'Besiege the Besiegers '" by
Davor Huic , 24 June 1995 .
• Ist Romanija Infantry Brigade, vic. Cemerska Hills/NE of Ilijas.
• 1st Ilijas Infantry Brigade, vic. Ilijas-Cemerska Hills. 221 Sefko Hodzic, “ They Defended Sarajevo,” Sarajevo Oslobod
• Ist Ilidza Infantry Brigade, vic . Ilidza -Nedzarici-Sarajevo jenje , 26 February 1996 , p . 3. FBIS Reston 969B0018B 221630Z
Airport. July 1996 .
• Ist Igman Infantry brigade, vic .Hadzici-Mount Igman. 222 Zagreb Globus, “ 20,000 Soldiers of the Army of Bosnia
• 12th Kotorsko LightInfantry Brigade, vic .NW of Trnovo/Mount Herzegovina in the Great Sarajevo Offensive Manage To Take Only
Igman (attached from 1st Krajina Corps). Three Small Villages on Mt. Igman " by Antun Masle,
• 4th Mixed Artillery Regiment. 23 June 1995, pp. 4 , 6 .
4th Reconnaissance- Sabotage Detachment“ White Wolves.” 223 Sefko Hodzic , “ They Defended Sarajevo,” Sarajevo Oslobod
206 The 4th Drina Light Infantry Brigade was deployed to the jenje, 26 February 1996 , p . 3. FBIS Reston 969B0018B 221630Z
Trnovo sector. July 1996 .
207 The 1stGuards Motorized Brigade (attached from the VRS 224 The 65th , under the command of Colonel Milomir Savcic ,
Main Staff) was headquartered in Kalinovik and covered the received a commendation from GeneralMladic for its success in
Trnovo - Treskavica sector, including Djokin Toranj. The 18th this action. Pale SRNA , 26 June 1995. FBIS London
Herzegovina Light Infantry Brigade was arrayed on its left. LD2606170595 261705Z June 1995.
208 Reuters, “ UN Plays Down Fighting North of Sarajevo ” by Kurt 225
Belgrade Tanjug, 19 June 1995. FBIS London LD1906155095 ,
Schork , 15 June 1995 . 191550Z June 1995 .
209 Reuters, “ Heavy Fighting Breaks Out North of Bosnia Capital” 226 Reuters, “ Lifting Serb Siege of Sarajevo a Mighty Task ” by Kurt
by Kurt Schork , 15 June 1995 . Schork , 12 June 1995.
210 Reuters, “War Fears as Heavy Fighting Erupts Near Sarajevo” 227
Belgrade SRNA , 4 July 1995. FBIS London LD04071095395 ,
by Kurt Schork, 15 June 1995. 041053Z July 1995.
211 Sefko Hodzic , “ They Defended Sarajevo,” Sarajevo Oslobod 228
Belgrade Tanjug, 4 July 1995. FBIS London LD0407140995,
jenje, 26 February 1996 , an article on the ARBiH 12th Division , 0414092 July 1995 .
p . 3. FBIS Reston 969B0018B 221630Z July 1996 . 229 Belgrade
Tanjug, 7 July 1995. FBIS London LD0707100295,
212 An adjacent spearhead attempted to advance toward Ilijas, sug 071002Z July 1995.
gesting an intended move along the Visoko -Vogosca road which 230 Paris AFP, 21 July 1995. FBIS Vienna AU2107174195,
never panned out. 211741Z July 1995 .
213 See the following articles: 231
Sarajevo Radio , 24 July 1995. FBIS Vienna AU2407153895,
Fikret Julardzija , “ The Eight, Last Wound of the Legendary 241538Z July 1995.
Koprdza ,” Travnik Bosnjak , 4 July 1995, p . 25 , an article on the 232 The Herzegovina Corps regularly formed a composite brigade ,
7th Muslim Liberation Brigade during the Sarajevo relief the “ Combined Brigade of the Herzegovina Corps," from its many
operation . units to conduct offensive operations or act as a counterattack for
• Edhem Ekmescic , “We Have to Have a Strong Army Because It mation .
Is the Guarantee of Our Return Home!” Travnik Bosnjak, 2 Janu 233
Belgrade SRNA, 2 August 1995. FBIS London LD0208124795,
ary 1996 , pp. 12-13, an interview with Major Ibrahim Salihovic , 0212472 August 1995.
commander of the 211th Liberation Brigade. 234
Belgrade Tanjug, 3 August 1995. FBIS London LD0308174995 ,
• Said Humremovic, “ 222nd Liberation Brigade: 'Young Lions'
Standard -Bearers of Freedom ,” Prva Linija ,March 1997, 031749Z August 1995.
235
pp. 23-24 . FBIS Reston VA 98E08102A 091712Z June 1998 . Belgrade SRNA, 5 August 1995. FBIS London LD0508120595 ,
• “ Three Years of the 241st Spreca-Muslim -Light Brigade: 0512052 August 1995 .
Lisaca - A Victory That Will Be Inscribed in Gold Letters," Prva 236 Paris AFP, 3 October 1995. FBIS Vienna AU0310122495,
Linija , July 1997, p. 31. FBIS Reston VA 98E08088C 122020Z 031224 October 1995 .
March 1998. 237 Pale Srpski Radio , 3 October 1995. FBIS London
• “ On the Occasion of the Third Anniversary of the Formation of LD0310164995, 031649Z October 1995 .
the 242nd Zvornik Muslim Light Brigade: Unforgettable Suc 238 Belrade SRNA, 5 October 1995. FBIS London LD0510143995 ,
cesses,” Prva Linija , October 1997, p . 31.FBIS Reston VA 051439Z October 1995 .
98E07020C 1716312 February 1998 . 239 Banja Luka Srpski Radio, 5 October 1995. FBIS Vienna
• S. R., “ On the Fifth Anniversary of the SDB Black Wolves,' AU0610194495, 061944Z October 1995 .
Prva Linija , October 1997, p . 11. FBIS Reston VA 98E08031A 240 Belgrade Tanjug, 4 October 1995. FBIS London
121934Z January 1998. LD0410211095, 042110Z October 1995 .
214 Sefko Hodzic, “ They Defended Sarajevo," Sarajevo Oslobod
jenje , 26 February 1996 , p . 3. FBIS Reston 969B0018B 221630Z
July 1996 , an article on the ARBiH 12th Division .

405
 241 Sarajevo Radio , 10 October 1995. FBIS Vienna 263Another barrage the following day, 13 April, killed eightmore
AU1010195295 , 101952Z October 1995 . and wounded 21. Reuters, “ Eight Die in New Barrage of
242 Belgrade SRNA, 11 October. FBIS London LD1210141395, Srebrenica — UN ,” 14 April 1993 .
121413Z October 1995 . 264 Time, “ Srebrenica Succumbs" by James L.Graff,26 April 1993,
243 Banja Luka Srpski Radio , 12 October
1995. FBIS Vienna pp. 34-35.
AU1210214595 , 122145Z October 1995. 265 Amsterdam De Volkskrant, “ Commander of Dutchbat-2 Admits
244Mustafa Borovic, “Anniversary of the Death of Zaim Imamovic , Dislike ofMuslims" by Ewoud Nysingh , 1 September 1995.
Legendary 14th Division commander: Zaim Died at the Dawn of 266 Amsterdam De Volkskrant, “UN Soldiers Accused of Serious
Freedom ,” Sarajevo Ljiljan 16 October 1996 , p . 30 FBIS Reston Crimes — Dutchbat Lured Children Toward Mines in Srebrenica '”
98E07025A 3018357 March 1998 . by Ewoud Nysingh and Hella Rottenburg , 9 May 1995.
245 Even the Bosnian Army essentially conceded that the offensive 267 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia : Death of a Nation ,
had originally aimed to open the road to Gorazde but that the Penguin USA . p . 356 .
exceptionally heavy casualties in the battles around Treskavica , 268 This figure is consistent with ARBiH commander Delic's state
Trnovo , and Kalinovik had contributed to the abandonment of this ment in August 1995 that 2,700 Srebrenica survivors had joined up
plan. Split Nedjeljna Dalmacija , “ If the Serbs Shell Sarajevo, We with a newly reconstituted 28th Division after the enclave's fall and
Shall Shell Banja Luka," interview with Col. Ferid Buljubasic, with official Bosnian Army estimates stating that some 3,200
Bosnia -Herzegovina Army General Staff Spokesman , by Zeljko ARBiH soldiers remain unaccounted for from the Srebrenica bat
Garmaz, 29 September 1995. FBIS Vienna AU2909151295, tles,massacres, and escape attempt. Sarajevo Prva Linija , “ A Trag
2915122 September 1995 . edy ThatMust Not Be Forgotten :On The Second Anniversary of
246 One figure given says 36,666 residents. Jan Willem Honig and the Calvary of the People of Srebrenica" by Abdulah Suljkanovic,
Norbert Both , Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime, UK : Penguin July 1997, pp. 26-26 . FBIS Reston 98E08086B , 232120Z March
Books, 1996. p . xviii. 1998 .
247Another figure provided gives 37,211 residents. Rohde, David , 269 Halilovic, Sefer, Lukava Strategija (“ Clever Strategy”), chapter
Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica , Europe's Worst 14 .
Massacre Since World War II. New York , Farrar, Straus, and Gir 270
Sarajevo Oslobodjenje, “ How Srebrenica Fell: Defenders With
oux, 1997. p . xiv. Hunting Rifles " by Sead Numanovic, 20-27 July. FBIS Reston
248 Honig and Both , p . xviii. 95BA0303A 012248Z August 1995 .
249 David Rohde gives a figure of “ a prewar population of about 271 After carefully assembling the smuggled weapon in a building
9,000" which may be more accurate but is less precise than the next to the town hall in May 1995, one of the three operators acci
figure cited by Honig and Both . Rohde, Endgame, p . xiv. dentally hit the firing switch . The rockettook off, slammed into the
250 Sudetic, Chuck , Blood and Vengeance : One Family's Story of inside wall ofthebuilding, and seriously injured the three soldiers.
the War in Bosnia . New York : W. W.Norton, 1998. p . 7 . In the end it did notmatter that they were not able to translate the
251 Note that this is almost a century after the Serb defeat at Kosovo instruction manual, since the trigger mechanism did notwork .
Polje in 1389: the (narrow ) Ottoman victory at Kosovo Polje did Rohde, Endgame, pp . 70-71, 74 .
not immediately translate into Turkish domination over the region. 272 Rohde, Endgame, p . 70 .
Rather it marked the beginning of a long but steady process of 273 Rohde , Endgame, p. 8 .
Ottoman conquests. Belgrade successfully resisted a siege in 1456 , 274 It is unclear what role the TacticalGroup “ Pribicevac” head
butmost of the rest of Serbia came under the domination of the quarters played , if any, in directing the operation as it appears that
Ottoman Turks at this time. Nine years later Sultan Mehmed the 1st Bratunac Brigade headquarters, under Lieutenant Colonel
directed his energies westward , over the Drina and into Bosnia . Vidoje Blagojevic, and a forward headquarters from the 1st
252 Although most reports claim Oric was in the Serbian special Zvornik Brigade, under Lieutenant Colonel Vinko Pandurevic , con
police, he may instead have served in the prewar Federal Secretar trolled the troops in their sectors and probably reported directly to
iat for Internal Affairs ' elite Special Police Brigade, which oper Drina Corps headquarters. Information on VRS organization, plan
ated prominently in Kosovo. It seems unlikely that Oric was ning, and actions for and during “ Krivaja 95 " —including the bat
actually one ofMilosevic's personalbodyguards, but it is plausible tles against the 28th Division column after the enclave's fall — has
that while serving in the Federal police he took part in protecting been derived largely from the details found in the transcripts of
Milosevic during some event. The Christian ScienceMonitor, “ UN General Krstic's trial at International Criminal Tribunal for the
Convoy Relieves Siege on Bosnia Town,” 30 November 1992. former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In particular, see testimony provided on
253 Rohde, Endgame, pp. 56-61. 27, 28 , 29, and 30 June 2000 available on the ICTY Web site.
254 Halilovic , Sefer, Lukava Strategija (“ Clever Strategy” ), chapter 275 The New York Times, “ Bosnia Massacre Mars Do-Right Image
18 . the Dutch Hold Dear” byMarlise Simons, 13 September 1998.
255
Sarajevo Ljiljan ,“ A Journey Through Death ” by Isnam Taljic , 6 276 The New Yorker, “ Letter From Bosnia : We Hate You" by David
13 June 1998 , pp. 18-20 . Rieff, 4 September 1995, pp. 41-48.
256 The Christian Science Monitor, “ Bosnian Serb Forces Obstruct 277
Newsday, “ UN's Deadly Deal: How Troop-Hostage Talks Led
UN Plan to 'Winterize ' Enclaves," 10 November 1993. To Slaughter ofSrebrenica" by Roy Gutman, 29 May 1996 .
257 Rohde, Endgame, p . 16 . 278
Many of the members of the support units apparently felt that
258 Reuters, “ Other Bosnia · Safe Areas' Doomed” by Sean Magu they were not fully accepted by the members of the 13th Airmobile
ire, 13 July 1995 . Infantry Battalion , although this does not appear to have seriously
259 Reuters , “UN's Janvier Says NoMandate to Defend Safe Areas" affected unit cohesion or overall operational effectiveness .
28 July 1995 . 279 Silber and Little , p . 359.
260 Rohde, Endgame, p . XV. 280
Honig and Both , p . 6 .
261
Reuters, “ UN Officials Lash Serbs for Srebrenica Attack" by 281 The New Republic , “ The Fall of Srebrenica" by Charles Lane, 14
Mark Heinrich , 13 April 1993 . August 1995 .
262 Reuters, “ Death Marched Down Srebrenica's Main Street , 282 Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both , Srebrenica : Record of a
Witness” by Michael Shields, 14 April 1993. War Crime, UK : Penguin Books, 1996. p . 5 .

406
283 Honig and Both , p . 5 . 316 The UN's civilian authority, Yasushi Akashi, was in Croatia at
284 Ibid . the time and had delegated exclusive authority to approve Close
285 Jane's Defence Weekly, “ This Week: UNPROFOR Casualty," Air Support requests to UNPROFOR commander Janvier.
8 April 1995 , p . 6 . 317 Silber and Little , p . 357.
286 Halilovic , Sefer, Lukava Strategija (“ Clever Strategy ” ), chapter 318 A similar but slightly different translation is offered in Rohde,
14 . Endgame, p . 73.
287 Bosnian Serb Army spokesman Lt. Col. Milovan Milutinovic 319 The New York Times, “ Srebrenica: The Days of Slaughter” by
articulated the Serb perception at the time: Stephen Engelberg and Tim Weiner, with further reporting from
There have been a number of incidents like this in the last Raymond Bonner and Jane Perlez, 29 October 1995 .
15 to 20 days ... The Muslim soldiers who carried out this 320 Rotterdam Algemen Dagblad, “ DutchbatOnce Again Discred
attack crossed lines patrolled by Dutch UN troops whose ited” by Othon Zimmerman, 17 February 1996 , p . 7 .
job it is to prevent just this kind of action . We therefore con 321 Rohde, Endgame, pp. 143-144.
clude that the UN forces are aligning themselves with the 322 Ibid .
Muslim army. 323 This feeling of betrayal was further compounded by the Bosnian
The New York Times, “ Bosnian Muslim Troops Government's unsupportive attitude after the refugeeswere
Evade UN Force To Raid Serb Village" by deported from Srebrenica and taken to Tuzla airfield . UN officials
Stephen Kinzer, 27 June 1995 . -caught unprepared for the overnight influx of thousands upon
288 The Washington Post, “Anybody Who Moved or Screamed Was thousands of refugees - sharply criticized the Bosnian Government
Killed" by MichaelDobbs and Christine Spolar, 26 October 1995.
for deliberately capitalizing on the suffering of its own citizens.
289 The number of VRS troops stationed around the enclaves had The Bosnian authoritiesmaximized the visibility and the suffering
steadily declined since 1993 as the VRS raided the formations for
of the refugees by at first insisting they allbe concentrated in one
manpower to bolster other sectors, transferring elements of differ
location where medical and sanitary facilities were inadequate,
ent brigades piecemeal to shore up defenses across Bosnia . Never when the UN had 37 other facilities available that the government
theless, a considerable number of complete units remained that did not permit them to use . The Bosnian Government asserted that
could be released if the enclaves fell. The entire 1st Bratunac Light since they had become refugees because of the UN's failure to pro
Infantry Brigade, for instance, was attached to the Sarajevo tect them , they were therefore a UN responsibility. While the
Romanija Corps and dispatched to the threatened Trnovo sector debate raged, the refugees suffered . The Washington Post, “ We
after the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa. Count for Nothing ' Srebrenica Refugees Unwelcome in Tuzla " by
290 Honig and Both , pp.6-7. John Pomfret, 15 July 1995; The New York Times, “ Bosnia Lets
291 Rohde, Endgame, p . 4.According to the Drina Corps planning Refugees Leave Camp But 20,000 Others Are Missing" by Stephen
order cited by the ICTY, the Drina Corps forward command post Kinzer, 16 July 1995.
under GeneralKrstic was to be established on Pribicevac Hill, east
324 The Boston Globe, “ Srebrenica Questions Hang Over Bosnia
of Srebrenica town,on 4 July. See 28 June transcript of Krstic trial. Talks" by Elizabeth Neuffer, 3 November 1995 .
292 Honig and Both , p . 9 . 325 The New Straits Times, “ Too Little , Too Late For Srebrenica " by
293
Byway of example, one ofthe UN peacekeepers related how the David Rohde, 26 January 1998.
Bosnian Army had successfully concealed a 76 -mm M -48 “moun 326 Ibid .
tain gun,” as well as a hidden bunker, from the UN for over two 327 Reuters , “ Bosnian Serb Forces Break Into Srebrenica Town”
years. The Dutch peacekeepers had been driving within about 30 11 July 1995 .
meters of the artillery piece for the entire time without ever detect 328 Reuters, “ Serb Move on Srebrenica Town Would Be Illogical
ing it. The weapon - perhaps the only functioning ARBiH artillery UN ” by Sean Maguire , 10 July 1995.
piece in the enclave — was seen only after it was removed from its 329 The New York Times, “ US and NATO Face Unhappy Choices for
hiding place on 8 or 9 July. Rohde, Endgame, p . 67. UN Force in the Balkans” by Eric Schmitt, 12 July 1995.
294 Honig and Both , p . 8 . 330 The New York Times, “ Total Takeover of UN Zone in Bosnia "
295 Rohde, Endgame, p . 6 . by Chris Hedges, 13 July 1995.
296 Rohde, Endgame, pp. 29-33. 331 The New York Times, “ Bosnian Refugees' Accounts Appear to
297 Honig and Both , p . 3 . Verify Atrocities" by Stephen Kinzer, 17 July 1995 .
298 Rohde, Endgame, pp. 34-39. 332 Time, “ Tears and Terror:Mercilessly, the War Tramples 'Safe
299 Rohde, Endgame, pp . 40-41. Areas,'” 24 July 1995 .
300 Honig and Both , p . 10 . 333 Silber and Little, p . 358.
301 Honig and Both , p . 11.
334 The Washington Post, “ Dutch Government Absolves Troops in
302 Silber and Little , p . 357. Fall of Srebrenica" by William Drozdiak, 31 October 1995.
303 Four OPs, if one includes the former OP Echo that the Serbs had
335 Jane's Defence Weekly, “ The Netherlands: Learning the Lessons
taken over in June.
ofSrebrenica" by Joris Jansses Lok, 31 January 1996 .
304 Rohde, Endgame, p . 79. 336 The New York Times, “ Serbs Expel Thousands ofMuslimsfrom
305 Rohde, Endgame, pp. 83-84. Srebrenica " by Tony Barber, 12 July 1995.
306 Honig and Both , p . 11. 337 The inability of the Dutch peacekeepers and the handful of inter
307 Rohde, Endgame, p . 91.
national aid workers to cope adequately with thousands ofMuslim
308 Rohde, Endgame, pp . 81-82.
refugees was already producing a humanitarian catastrophe by
309 Rohde, Endgame, pp. 76-77. 12 July. Shortages of food and water, the near absence of sanitary
310 Honig and Both , p . 14 . facilities, and summer temperatures above 95 degrees Fahrenheit
311 Rohde, Endgame, pp. 84-88. combined to produce a Dantesque scene. For details on the VRS
312 Rohde, Endgame, p . 104-106 . moves to shift buses and other vehicles to Srebrenica to move the
313 Rohde, Endgame, pp. 95-98 .
population , see ICTY Krstic trial transcript for 28 June 2000 .
314 Rohde, Endgame, pp. 106-109.
315 The New York Times, “ Srebrenica: The Days of Slaughter" by
Stephen Engelberg and Tim Weiner, with further reporting from
Raymond Bonner and Jane Perlez, 29 October 1995.

407
338 Atleast nine people, including seven children ,were trampled to 365 The Christian Science Monitor, “ Bosnian MuslimsWere Killed
death or died of suffocation when more than 5,000 Srebrenica by the Truckload " by David Rohde, 2 October 1995. See ICTY
civilians had packed themselves onto overcrowded trucks during an Krstic trial transcripts for 29 and 30 June 2000 for details of VRS
earlier evacuation allowed by the Serbs in April 1993. Newsweek , actions.
“ Inside Srebrenica: City of the Damned ," 12 April 1993. 366 The New York Times, “ Srebrenica : The Days of Slaughter" by
339 The New York Times, “ Total Takeover of UN Zone in Bosnia" by Stephen Engelberg and Tim Weiner, with further reporting from
Chris Hedges, 13 July 1995 . Raymond Bonner and Jane Perlez, 29 October 1995.
340
The New York Times, “ Total Takeover of UN Zone in Bosnia " by 367 The Washington Post, “ Bosnian Soldiers Evade Serbs in Trudge
Chris Hedges, 13 July 1995 . to Safety " by John Pomfret, 18 July 1995.
368
341 The Dutch UNPROFOR battalion reportedly surrendered to the Sarajevo Prva Linija , “ A Tragedy ThatMustNot Be Forgotten:
Bosnian Serbs a total of 14 armored vehicles, one truck, 18 Mer On The Second Anniversary of the Calvary of the People of
cedes jeeps, six 81-mm mortars, six TOW missiles, 18.50 -caliber Srebrenica " by Abdulah Suljkanovic , July 1997, pp. 26-27. FBIS
machineguns, and a large numberofhand -held weapons. The Reston 98E08086B , 232120Z March 1998 .
Guardian , “How the UN Crushed Srebrenica" by John Sweeney, 369 Paris Le Figaro “Bosnia : And the Serbs Cut Usto Pieces With a
17 December 1995 . Machine Gun" by Patrick de Saint-Exupery, 8 March 1996. FBIS
9
342 Reuters, “ UNHCR Warns ofZepa and Gorazde 'Nightmare,' Brussels BR0808152196 , 081521Z March 1996 .
14 July 1994 . 370 Rotterdam Algemeen Dagblad, “Muslim Fighters Hunted Like
343 The Washington Post, “ Red Cross to Evacuate Srebrenica Wild Animals on Hellish Journey” by Othon Zimmerman , 18 July
Wounded ” by Christine Spolar, 17 July 1995. 1995.FBIS Brussels BR1807143195, 1814317 July 1995 .
344 The Washington Post, “ Anybody Who Moved or Screamed Was 371 Ibid . See ICTY Krstic trial transcripts for 29-30 June 2000 .
Killed” by Michael Dobbs and Christine Spolar, 26 October 1995. 372 The Washington Post, “ Bosnian Soldiers Evade Serbs in Trudge
345 The Washington Post, “ For Ousted Bosnians, A Trail of Tears" to Safety" by John Pomfret, 18 July 1995 .
by John Pomfret, 14 July 1995 . 373 Paris Le Figaro “ Bosnia : And the Serbs Cut Us to Pieces With a
346
Sarajevo Ljiljan, “ A Journey Through Death ” by Isnam Taljic, 6 Machine Gun” by Patrick de Saint-Exupery, 8 March 1996. FBIS
13 June 1998, pp . 18-20 . Brussels BR0808152196 , 081521Z March 1996 .
374
347 Rotterdam Algemeen Dagblad , “Muslim Fighters Hunted Like Rotterdam Algemeen Dagblad, “Muslim Fighters Hunted Like
Wild Animals on Hellish Journey” by Othon Zimmerman , 18 July Wild Animals on Hellish Journey ” by Othon Zimmerman , 18 July
1995. FBIS Brussels BR1807143195, 1814312 July 1995. 1995. FBIS Brussels BR1807143195, 181431Z July 1995.
348
Sarajevo Ljiljan, “ A Journey Through Death " by Isnam Taljic, 6 375 Sarajevo Prva Linija, “ A Tragedy ThatMust Not Be Forgotten :
13 June 1998 , pp. 18-20 . On The Second Anniversary of the Calvary of the People of Sre
349 The Washington Post, “ Anybody Who Moved or Screamed Was brenica " by Abdulah Suljkanovic , July 1997, pp. 26-27. FBIS
Killed” by MichaelDobbs and Christine Spolar, 26 October 1995. Reston 98E08086B , 232120Z March 1998.
350 Paris Le Figaro “ Bosnia : And the Serbs Cut Us to Pieces With a 376 Paris Le Figaro “ Bosnia : And the Serbs CutUs to Pieces With a
Machine Gun" by Patrick de Saint-Exupery, 8 March 1996. FBIS Machine Gun" by Patrick de Saint-Exupery, 8 March 1996.FBIS
Brussels BR0808152196 , 081521Z March 1996 . Brussels BR0808152196 , 081521Z March 1996 .
351 Rotterdam Algemeen Dagblad, “Muslim Fighters Hunted Like 377 Sarajevo Slobodna Bosna, “ 'WeHave 50 of Theirs in One
Wild Animals on Hellish Journey” by Othon Zimmerman, 18 July Grove, and We Will Have to Kill Them ': 'Fine, Just Make Sure
1995. FBIS Brussels BR1807143195, 181431Z July 1995. That There Are No Complications!' ” by Mehmed Pargan , 11 July
352 The Washington Post, “ Bosnian Soldiers Evade Serbs in Trudge 1998. FBIS Reston 98E031904 , 131612Z August 1998. See ICTY
to Safety " by John Pomfret, 18 July 1995. See ICTY transcripts of Krstic trial transcript from 30 June 2000
Krstic trial for 28-30 June 2000 . 378 Halilovic , Sefer, Lukava Strategija (“ Clever Strategy” ), chapter
353 Sarajevo Ljiljan , “ A Journey Through Death " by Isnam Taljic, 6 14 .
13 June 1998, pp. 18-20 . 379 Sarajevo Prva Linija , “On The Occasion of the Third Anniver
354 Konjevic Polje had a briefmomentoffame in early 1993 when it sary of the Formation of the 242nd Zvornik Muslim LightBrigade:
too was overrun by the Bosnian Serbs. See ICTY transcripts of Unforgettable Successes” October 1997 , p. 31. FBIS Reston
Krstic trial for 28-30 June 2000. 98E07020C , 1716312 February 1998.
380
355 The Washington Post, “ Bosnian Soldiers Evade Serbs in Trudge Sarajevo Prva Linija, “ A Tragedy That Must Not Be Forgotten :
to Safety ” by John Pomfret, 18 July 1995 . On The Second Anniversary of the Calvary of the People of Sre
356 The Christian Science Monitor, “ Bosnian MuslimsWere Killed brenica" by Abdulah Suljkanovic , July 1997 , pp. 26-27. FBIS
by the Truckload" by David Rohde , 2 October 1995. Reston 98E08086B , 232120Z March 1998 .
381
357 Paris Le Figaro “ Bosnia : And the Serbs Cut Usto Pieces With a Sarajevo Prva Linija , " Three Years of the 241st Spreca-Muslim
Machine Gun” by Patrick de Saint-Exupery, 8 March 1996. FBIS Light Brigade — A Victory That Will Be Inscribed in Gold Letters"
Brussels BR0808152196 , 081521Z March 1996 . July 1997, p . 31. FBIS Reston 98E08088C , 122020Z March 1998.
382
358 The Washington Post, “Anybody Who Moved or Screamed Was Sarajevo Prva Linija, “ A Tragedy ThatMust Not Be Forgotten :
Killed” by Michael Dobbs and Christine Spolar, 26 October 1995 . On The Second Anniversary of the Calvary of the People of Sre
359 The Washington Post, “ Bosnian Soldiers Evade Serbs in Trudge brenica " by Abdulah Suljkanovic , July 1997, pp. 26-27. FBIS
to Reston 98E08086B , 232120Z March 1998 .
360 Safety " by John Pomfret, 18 July 1995.
Sarajevo Ljiljan, “ A Journey Through Death ” by Isnam Taljic, 6 383 The Washington Post, “ Bosnian Soldiers Evade Serbs in Trudge
13 June 1998, pp. 18-20. to Safety " by John Pomfret, 18 July 1995 .
361 The Washington Post, “ Bosnian Soldiers Evade Serbs in Trudge 384 Sarajevo Slobodna Bosna, “ “WeHave 50 of Theirs in One
to Safety " by John Pomfret, 18 July 1995. Grove, and We Will Have to Kill Them ': 'Fine, Just Make Sure
362 BZ is 3 -quinuclidinyl, an atropine-like compound . That There Are No Complications!'” by Mehmed Pargan, 11 July
363 London The Lancet, “ Alleged Chemical Warfare in Bosnia 1998. FBIS Reston 98E03190A, 1316122 August 1998.See ICTY
Conflict” by David Sharp, 16 May 1998. Krstic trial transcript for 30 June 2000 .
364 Human Rights Watch, Rights Watch Report “ ChemicalWarfare
in Bosnia ? The Strange Experiences of the Srebrenica Survivors,"
November 1998 .

408
385 Sarajevo Prva Linija , “ A Tragedy ThatMust Not Be Forgotten: 417 The Christian Science Monitor, “ Bosnian MuslimsWere Killed
On The Second Anniversary of the Calvary of the People of Sre by the Truckload" by David Rohde, 2 October 1995 .
brenica " by Abdulah Suljkanovic, July 1997, pp . 26-27. FBIS 418 The New York Times, "Muslims Tell of Atrocities in Bosnian
Reston 98E08086B , 232120Z March 1998 . Town" by Stephen Kinzer, 14 July 1995.
386 The Washington Post, “ Bosnian Soldiers Evade Serbs in Trudge 419 The New York Times, “ Terrorized Human Tide Overwhelms
to Safety " by John Pomfret, 18 July 1995. Relief Camp" by Stephen Kinzer, 14 July 1995 .
387 The New York Times, “Muslim Refugees Slip Across Serb 420 The Washington Post, “Witnesses Allege Abuses by Serbs” by
Lines” by Chris Hedges, 18 July 1995. John Pomfret, 16 July 1995.
388 Halilovic , Sefer, Lukava Strategija (“ Clever Strategy” ), chapter 421 The New York Times, “Bosnian Refugees' Accounts Appear to
14 . Verify Atrocities” by Stephen Kinzer, 17 July 1995.
389 The Christian Science Monitor, "Bosnian MuslimsWere killed 422 See The New York Times, “ In Bosnian Town Where Thousands
by the Truckload" by David Rohde, 2 October 1995 . Died , Ethnic Hate Overwhelms Small Kindnesses” by David
390
The Washington Post, “ Bosnian Soldiers Evade Serbs in Trudge Rohde for a description of Srebrenica three years after its takeover
to Safety" by John Pomfret, 18 July 1995 . by the Serbs.
391 The Washington Post, “ Anybody Who Moved or Screamed Was 423 See The Washington Post, “ Srebrenica Massacre's Uncertain
Killed " by Michael Dobbs and Christine Spolar, 26 October 1995. Legacy" by Michael Dobbs, 7 July 1996 for additional discussion
392 The Washington Post, “ Serbs Start ExpellingMuslim Civilians of this issue.
From Seized UN Enclave" by John Pomfret, 13 July 1995. 424 The Washington Post, “ US Official Visits Bosnian Site of 'Sheer
393 The Christian Science Monitor, “ Bosnian MuslimsWere Killed Murder?" by John Pomfret, 22 January 1996 .
by the Truckload" by David Rohde, 2 October 1995 . 425 The Washington Post, “ Bosnian Soldiers Evade Serbs in Trudge
394 Ibid . to Safety" by John Pomfret, 18 July 1995.
395 The Washington Post, “ Survivor Tells of BrutalMurders" by 426 The Washington Post, “ Dutch Government Absolves Troops in
Christine Spolar, 26 October 1995 . Fall of Srebrenica" by William Drozdiak , 31 October 1995.
396 The Washington Post, “ Anybody Who Moved or Screamed Was 427 As of 5 August 1994, the UNHCR had registered 35,632 refu
Killed" by MichaelDobbs and Christine Spolar, 26 October 1995 . gees who had arrived in Tuzla, Banovici, Srebrenik, Gracanica ,
397 The New York Times, “ Srebrenica: The Days of Slaughter” by Kladanj, Lukavac, Zivinice, Kalesija, and Brcko. This figure ,how
Stephen Engelberg and Tim Weiner, with further reporting from ever,may have included a number of refugees from the Zepa
Raymond Bonner and Jane Perlez, 29 October 1995. enclave aswell,which had also fallen by this time. Conversely, it
398 The Washington Post, “ Survivor Tells of BrutalMurders" by probably omitted most ofthe surviving members of the ARBiH
Christine Spolar, 26 October 1995 . 28th Division , who proved extremely reluctant to register them
399 The Washington Post, “ Anybody Who Moved or Screamed Was selves with any of the international organizations .
Killed ” by Michael Dobbs and Christine Spolar, 26 October 1995. 428 Time, “ Tears and Terror:Mercilessly, the War Tramples 'Safe
400 London The Times, “ Serbs ‘ Tried to HideMass Graves'" by Areas”” by Bruce W.Nelan , 24 July 1995 .
Stacy Sullivan , 3 April 1996 . 429 Reuters, “ Bosnian Enclave Issues Plea for UN Help,” 16 July
401 The Ottawa Citizen , “ Telling Testimony" by Emma Daly , 1995.
3 April 1996 . 430 Reuters, “ Akashi Buries Zepa, Says UN Powerless," 19 July
402 The Christian Science Monitor, “ Bosnian Massacre Sites Swept 1995.
ofKey Evidence" by David Rohde, 3 April 1996 . 431 Estimates of the number of civilians in the enclave had ranged as
403 The New York Times, “ In Bosnia Field , Disturbed Dirt at Suspect high as 16,000, but it later appeared that these figures had been
Site” by Mike O'Connor, 3 April 1996 . inaccurate or inflated . Reuters, “ Zepa Almost Empty of Civilians
404 The MiamiHerald , “ Investigators Find Signs ofHuge Grave in -UN ,” 28 July 1995.
Bosnian Field " by George Esper, 4 April 1996 . 432 The 1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade from Rogatica and the
405 The Christian Science Monitor, “ Bosnian Muslims Were killed 5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade from Visegrad usually contrib
by the Truckload" by David Rohde, 2 October 1995 . uted about a battalion each to the tactical group . For details on the
406 The Washington Post, “US Official Visits Site of 'Sheer Mur VRS order ofbattle, see ICTY Krstic trial transcripts from
der?" by John Pomfret, 22 January 1996 . 28-30 June 2000 .
407 This site is also sometimes referred to as the “ Tatar” mass grave 433 Reuters, " Bosnian Serbs Threaten Attack - Bosnian Govern
site. ment,” 14 July 1995. See ICTY Krstic trial transcripts for
408 The Christian Science Monitor, “More Mass Graves Found at 28-30 June 2000 .
Srebrenica" by Jonathan S. Landay , 19 January 1996 . 434 The Washington Post, “ Bosnian Serbs Strike At Second 'Safe
409 The Washington Post, "Grim Evidence Points to Muslims' Area '" by Samantha Power, 15 July 1995.
Graves" by John Pomfret, 19 January 1996 . 435 Reuters, “ Bosnian Serbs 'Target' UN Posts at Zepa Enclave,”
410 The Washington Post, “ Anybody Who Moved or Screamed Was 14 July 1995.
Killed ” by Michael Dobbs and Christine Spolar, 26 October 1995 . 436 Reuters, “ Bosnian Serbs Attack Zepa Despite NATO Air
411 The Washington Post, “New Proof Offered of Serb Atrocities" Cover," 14 July 1995 .
by Michael Dobbs and R. Jeffrey Smith , 29 October 1995 . 437 Reuters, “NATO Flying Blind OverZepa,” 17 July 1995.
412 USA Today, “New Grave Site Discovered in Bosnia Valley” by 438 Reuters , “ Bosnian Serb Attack on Zepa Subsides — UN ," 14 July
Tom Squitieri, 19 January 1996 . 1995.
413 Paris Le Figaro , “ Bosnia — The Confession of Drazen, War 439 Reuters, “ Bosnian Serbs Shell Zepa Town, Renew Assault,"
Criminal” by Renaud Girard , 8 March 1996. FBIS Brussels BE 14 July 1995 .
BR0803153096 , 081530Z March 1996 . 440 Reuters, “ Bosnian Serb Push into Zepa — UN,” 14 July 1995.
414 Ibid . 441 Reuters, “ Bosnian Army Takes Ukrainian Guns in Enclave,"
415 The New Straits Times, “ Too Little, Too Late for Srebrenica" by 15 July 1995.
David Rohde, 26 January 1998 .
416 The Sunday Telegraph , “ Killing Fields of Srebrenica" by Gaby
Rado, 22 October 1995 .

409
 442 Relations between the Ukrainian peacekeeping contingent and 473 Reuters, “US Determined To Protect All Bosnia · Safe Areas' ”
the Bosnian Armyhad long been less than cordial. Zepa's Muslim by Susan Cornwall, 24 July 1995.
residents considered the Ukrainians, who were Slavs and Orthodox 474 Reuters, “ Doubts Eat Away at West's Claim of Bosnia Resolve"
Christians, to be biased toward the Serbs. by Nicholas Doughty , 25 July 1995.
475
443 The New York Times, “ Serbs Push Into Zepa 'Safe Area "" by Reuters, “ Bosnian Serbs Ignore Ambiguous Western Warning ”
John Pomfret, 17 July 1995. by Kurt Schork , 22 July 1995.
444 Reuters, “ Radio Says Serbs Attack Zepa Enclave in Bosnia ," 476 Reuters, “ Zepa’s Mayor 'We're Still Holding On " by Kurt
15 July 1995 . Schork , 22 July 1995 .
477
445 Reuters, “UN OfficialSaid to Predict Zepa's Fall in 48 Hours" Reuters, “ Heavy GovernmentCasualties in Zepa — UN ," 23 July
by Anthony Goodman , 14 July 1995 . 1995.
446 Reuters, “ Serbs Squeeze Zepa 'Safe Area' Refugees Languish ” 478 Reuters , “ Zepa Reports New Serb Assault, Villages Burning" by
by Sean Maguire , 14 July 1995. Kurt Schork, 24 July 1995 .
447 Reuters, “ No Reports of Serbs Gaining Ground at Zepa — UN ," 479 Reuters, “ Bosnian Enclave Evacuees Tell Tales of Terror" by
15 July 1995. Kurt Schork , 26 July 1995.
448 Reuters, “No Bosnian Serb Attack on Bosnian Town Zepa 480 Reuters, “ Agreement Reached To Evacuate Zepa Civilians,"
UN ,” 15 July 1995. 25 July 1995.
449 Reuters, “ Bosnians Demand UN Weapons in Zepa" by Sean 481 Reuters, “ Bosnian Government Disputes Zepa Surrender
Maguire , 15 July 1995. UN ” by Kurt Schork , 25 July 1995.
450 Reuters ,“ Serbs Press Attack on Zepa, Western Generals Meet," 482 Reuters, “ Serbs May Have Entered a Deserted Zepa,UN Says”
16 July 1995 . by Kurt Schork , 25 July 1995 .
483
451 Reuters, “ Serbs Attack Zepa, Red Cross Seeks Prisoners," Reuters, “ Bosnian Serbs Enter Zepa Town, Civilians Flee" by
16 July 1995. Kurt Schork , 25 July 1995 .
452 Reuters, “ SerbsMove to Within 1,500 Meters of Zepa Center” 484 Reuters,“ UN Council Approves Evacuations From Zepa,"
by Kurt Schork , 16 July 1995 . 25 July 1995.
453 Reuters, “ Serbs Threaten Zepa, EU Ministers Talk ” by Kurt 485 Reuters, “ Zepa Wounded Arrive in Sarajevo,” 26 July 1995.
Schork , 17 July 1995 . 486 Reuters, “ Civilian Evacuation From Zepa Commences,” 26 July
454 The Washington Post, “ Serbs Push Into Zepa 'Safe Area '" by 1995.
John Pomfret, 17 July 1995 . 487 Reuters, “ UN Seeks to Avoid Atrocities in Zepa Exodus" by
455
Reuters , “Ukraine Draws Up Troop Withdrawal Plan forZepa,” Kurt Schork , 26 July 1995 .
17 July 1995. 488 Reuters, “ Mladic Talks Surrender With Zepa Commander,”
456
Reuters, “Government Troops Seize UN Weapons in Gorazde" 27 July 1995.
by Kurt Schork, 17 July 1995 . 489 Reuters, “ Bosnia May Give Serbs for ZepaMen in UN Swap ”
457 Reuters, “ Serbs Launch Heavy Attack on Zepa Enclave” by Kurt by Sean Maguire, 28 July 1995.
Schork , 18 July 1995. See ICTY Krstic trial transcript for 490 Reuters, “ Bosnian Serbs Said To Have Killed Zepa Com
29 June 2000 . mander” 29 July 1995 .
458 Reuters, “ ZepaMoslems Threaten To Use UN Troops as 491 Reuters, “ Serbs Loot Zepa, Say They Killed Commander" by
Shields” 18 July 1995. Sean Maguire , 29 July 1995.
459Reuters, “ Serbs Attack Zepa,Moslems Seek Human Shields" by 492 Reuters, “ Zepa Talks Impasse Hits Serb War Effort — UN ” by
Kurt Schork, 18 July 1995 . Sean Maguire, 30 July 1995.
460 Reuters, “ Bosnia Wants Civilians Evacuated From Zepa," 493 Reuters, “ Bosnian Serbs Pull Best Troops Away From the
17 July 1995. Enclave” by Sean Maguire , 31 July 1995 .
461 Reuters, “ Bosnian President Defends Call To Evacuate Zepa,” 494 Reuters, “ Several Hundred Zepa Moslems Flee to Serbia ”
18 July 1995 . 1 August 1995 .
495
462 Reuters, “ Bosnian Serb Forces May Have Entered Zepa Town Reuters, “ UN General's Helicopter Hit on Way To Meet
UN ,” 19 July 1995. Mladic ,” 31 July 1995.
463 Reuters, “Mayor Says Zepa Not Taken, Panic Breaks Out," 496 The New York Times, “ Conflict in the Balkans: The Policy, US
19 July 1995. Weighs a Response to French Call on Bosnia ” by Alison Mitchell,
464 Reuters, “ Zepa Surrenders to Serbs— Bosnian Serb Army," 15 July 1995.
19 July 1995. 497 Reuters, “ France To Offer Bosnia Action Plan Amid Blame
465 The New York Times, “ Second 'Safe Area' in Eastern Bosnia Game” by Paul Taylor, 15 July 1995.
Overrun by Serbs” by Chris Hedges, 20 July 1995 . 498 The New York Times, “ Conflict in the Balkans: In Paris, France
466 Reuters, “No Evidence Serbs Are in Zepa Town - UN ,” 20 July Asks Allies To Help Hold . Safe Areas ”” by Craig R. Whitney,
1995 . 15 July 1995 .
467 Reuters, “ Serbs Say They Start Evacuation of ZepaMoslems” 499 In part, Chirac said that:
by Kurt Schork, 20 July 1995 . I owe it to the truth to say that up to now the contacts the
468
Reuters, “ Serbs Press Zepa Moslems To Go, Bihac Enclave Hit" French Government had made have notbeen positive. I
by Kurt Schork , 20 July 1995 . deplore that. For the moment we are alone... Ofcourse , if
469 Reuters, “ Serb Commander Sets Deadline for Zepa Talks,” we want to do strictly nothing, then I don't see why UN
20 July 1995. forces should be ... accomplices to this barbarism , accom
470 Reuters, “ Fighting Flares in Zepa After Deadline Expires" by plices to these practices of ethnic cleansing ...
Kurt Schork, 20 July 1995 . Reuters, “ Serbs Attack Zepa 'Safe Area ,' Again
471 Reuters, “ Zepa Fighting Erupts as Big Powers Mull Action ” by Challenge UN " by Sean Maguire , 14 July 1995.
Kurt Schork , 20 July 1995 .
472 Reuters , “ Bosnia Government Soldiers Threaten Peacekeepers”
by Kurt Schork, 21 July 1995.

410
500 Brussels Le Soir, Interview With French Foreign Minister Herve and professional leadership is considered beneficial toward
De Charette , by Jaques Cordy, “ Herve de Charette - On Bosnia , improving the severely damaged morale of the Krajina Serb
and the Nuclear Tests Envisaged by Chirac in the Pacific," 13 July Army. His appointment from the VJGeneral Staff is seen as
1995. FBIS Brussels BR1307153795, 1315372 July 1995. an effort to thwart the feeling of abandonment by Belgrade
501 The New York Times, “ Conflict in the Balkans: The Policy, US that prevails throughout the Krajina .
Weighs a Response to French Call on Bosnia" by Alison Mitchell, 520 SRNA 11 June 1995 .
15 July 1995. 521 See Croatian Foreign Minister Granic's letter to the UN Secre
502 Time, “ Tears and Terror:Mercilessly, the War Tramples 'Safe tary General 28 June 1995,which details information on the trans
Areas'" by Bruce W.Nelan, 24 July 1995. fer of VJ officers and equipment to the SVK . The officers are
503 The Times, “ Clinton Pledges All-Out Help to Allies ” by Tom identified by name and the unit from which they were transferred
Rhodes, 13 July 1995 . and that to which they were going. The amount of detail makes it
504 Paris AFP, 13 July 1995.FBIS Vienna AU1307111595, apparent thatGranic's information camefrom Croatian intelligence
1311152 July 1995 . reporting.
522
sos Reuters,“ Bosnia Force Mustbe Deployed Quickly - Ruehe,” 13 Belgrade Tanjug , 28 June 1995.
July 1995. 523 The KSJ comprised the following formations:
506 The Muslims ofGorazde had also taken their weapons from the • 2nd Guards Brigade.
UN cantonments when Srebrenica and Zepa were overrun . • 2nd Armored Brigade.
507
Reuters, “US Mulling Proposal To Aid Bosnia's Gorazde” by • 71st Special Operations Brigade.
Carol Giacomo, 14 July 1995. • MUP Special Police Brigade.
508 Reuters, “ Bosnia Says Britain Buying Time for Slaughter," The unit designators for the brigade mirrored those of itsmodel,
15 July 1995 . the VJ Corps of SpecialUnits that included the Yugoslav Army's
509 Reuters, “ Serbs Press Attack Despite Western Threats " by Kurt 1st Guards Brigade, 1st Armored Brigade, and 72nd Special
Schork , 21 July 1995. Operations Brigade (in addition to the well-known 63rd Airborne
510 The New York Times, “ Clinton Agrees To Plan Defense of 'Safe Brigade).
Areas': French Seek Help in Shoring Up UN ” by Ann Devroy and 524 See Frane Plancic, “ The March- Past of the Possessed,” Zagreb
William Drozdiak , 15 July 1995 . Vecernji List, 1 July 1995 , p . 14; and Fran Visnar, “ Only the
511 Reuters, “ World's Press Sees Only Empty Words on Bosnia" by Kosava ' Is Something More Serious,” Zagreb Vjesnik, 29 June
Alan Raybould , 22 July 1995. 1995, p. 5 , which reviews the parade and the formation of the KSJ.
512 Reuters, “ Silajdzic Disgusted by Bosnia London Conference," 525 Coordination among Milosevic,Mladic , the RSK Government,
21 July 1995. and Abdic had long been close . On 28 April 1995,Mladic , RSK
513 Reuters , “US Assures Bosnia NATO Will Defend Gorazde," PrimeMinister Mikelic, and Abdic met with Milosevic in Bel
25 August 1995. grade, presumably to discuss objectives and strategy around Bihac.
$14 Bosnian Government troops seized virtually all of the vehicles , “Mikelic ,Abdic,Mladic VisitMilosevic,” Belgrade Nasa Borba ,
weapons, ammunition, and equipment owned by the Ukrainian 22-23 April 1995 , p . 1 .
peacekeeping contingent on the night of 17-18 July . Reuters, “ Gov 526 In addition to the sources cited directly later in the text, the com
ernment Troops Seize UN Weapons in Gorazde ” by Kurt Schork, bat narrative is based on Major GeneralMilisav Sekulic, Knin Je
17 July 1995. Pao U Beogradu (Knin Fell in Belgrade) as excerpted in Belgrade
515 Reuters, “ Doctors Group Denounces UN Gorazde Withdrawal," Politika, Online Edition .URL : <www.politika.co.yu/feljton >
24 August 1995. Accessed 18 July 2001; Belgrade Tanjug, SRNA, and Sarajevo
516 Reuters,“ Troop Withdrawal Endangers Gorazde — UN Sources” Radio reports of 15-26 July 1995; plus theReuters and Paris AFP
by Kurt Schork , 24 August 1995 . reporting — which provided UN information --as listed below :
. Reuters, “ Serbs,Moslem Rebels Attack Bosnian Bihac Enclave,"
517 Reuters, “ British Troops Join UN Withdrawal From Gorazde"
by Kurt Schork , 26 August 1995. 19 July 1995.
518 • Reuters, “ Croatian Serbs Gain Ground in Bosnia Enclave” by
Belgrade Tanjug , 16 May 1995. For more details on Mrksic's
appointment, see Major GeneralMilisav Sekulic, Knin Je Pao U Mark Heinrich, 20 July 1995.
• Reuters, “ Serb Attack on Bihac, Croatian Threat AlarmsUN " by
Beogradu (Knin Fell in Belgrade) as excerpted in Belgrade Poli
Mark Heinrich , 21 July 1995 .
tika, Online Edition . URL : <www.politika.co.yu/feljton > Accessed Reuters , “ Serbs Push Deeper Into Bosnian Enclave Bihac” by
18 July 2001. Davor Huic , 23 July 1995 .
$19 Mrksic wasborn in 1946 in Croatia . He graduated from the JNA . Reuters, “ Serb Push Continues in Bihac Enclave," 26 July 1995.
Military Academy forGround Forces in 1968.Hewas commis • Paris AFP, “ UN Officials Say Two FROG 7 Missiles Fired on
sioned a 2nd Lieutenant in the armored forces and assigned to the Bihac," 17 July 1995.
“ Tito Guards” Division in Belgrade.Mrksic graduated from the • Paris AFP, “ Serbs Launch 'Three-Pronged Offensive' On Bihac
Command and General Staff Academy in 1980.Before assuming Enclave," 23 July 1995.
command of the 1st Guards Motorized Brigade, he served as its 527 Each tactical group probably had the 15th Light Infantry Bri
chiefof staff. After Vukovar,Mrksic was given command of RSK gade or one of the KSJ infantry brigades — 2nd Guards, 71st Spe
TerritorialDefense Zone Headquarters in Banija and Kordun. In cial, and MUP Special Police Brigades— at its core with armored
mid -1992, he was appointed the first commander of the new VJ elements attached from the 2nd Armored Brigade. TG -1 and
Corps of SpecialUnits. When LieutenantColonelGeneral Mom 2 were reinforced with two to three battalions drawn from 21st
cilo Perisic was made Chief of the VJGeneral Staff in August Corps .
1993, Mrksic became an Assistant Chief of the VJGeneral Staff. 528 Isnam Taljic, “ There weren't Any Croatian Defense Council
According to one report: Soldiers To Even Photograph,” Sarajevo Ljiljan 12-19 February
Among many JNA professional officers, Mrksic was 1997, p . 22, interview with Jusuf Lipovaca,commander of the 1st
selected for command of the premier combatbrigade of the Battalion/502nd Mountain Brigade ;Major GeneralMilisav Seku
JNA during the Serbo -Croatwar in 1991. For successful lic, Knin Je Pao u Beogradu (Knin Fell in Belgrade )as excerpted
command during this period he was promoted to the rank of in Belgrade Politika , Online Edition . URL : <www.politika.co.yu/
general overmore senior officers. His strong personality feljton > Accessed 18 July 2001.

411
529 Isnam Taljic , “ The Croatian State , Too, Was Liberated With the 539 Gotovina's statementconflicts with Major General Sekulic's
Tekbir," Sarajevo Ljiljan 12-19 February 1997, p . 23 , an interview account, which claims that the VRS and SVK units “ did not putup
with Colonel Hamdija Abdic “ Tigar," commander of the 502nd significantresistance." MajorGeneralMilisav Sekulic , Knin Je Pao
Mountain Brigade. Elements of the 510th Liberation Brigade, and U Beogradu ( Knin Fell in Belgrade ) as excerpted in Belgrade Poli
elements of the 503rd Mountain Brigade — on the right of the 517th tika, Online Edition .URL : <www.politika.co.yu/feljton > Accessed
at the Velika Kladusa front — also probably shifted troops to help 18 July 2001; ColonelGeneral Ante Gotovina, Offensive Battles
stem the tide. Elements of the 5th Independent Antitank Artillery and Operations of the Croatian Army and HVO , Knin : Split Corps
Rocket Battalion were dispersed among the infantry to help halt the District, 1996 , pp . 59 .
SVK armor. See Z. S.“ On the Anniversary of the 5th SPOARD 540 The SVK Main Staff attempted unsuccessfully to order the RSK
[Samostalna Protiv -Oklopno ArtiljerskiRaketni Divizion — 5th MUP Special Police Brigade to move to Grahovo. Reuters, “UN
Independent Antitank Artillery Rocket Battalion ),” Sarajevo Prva Says Serbs Agree to Withdraw From Bihac” by Mark Heinrich,
Linija March 1997, p . 19. 30 July 1995. Major General Milisav Sekulic, Knin Je Pao U Beo
530 The attack by TG - 1 and 2 on this day, however,made little or no gradu (Knin Fell in Belgrade) as excerpted in Belgrade Politika ,
gain . Apparently, troops from the Serbian MUP 101st Special Online Edition . URL : <www.politika.co.yu/feljton > Accessed
Police Detachment refused to attack again and satdown on the 18 July 2001.
road ,blocking the movement of SVK tanks. Zagreb HTV 25 July 541 Zagreb HINA 31 July 1995.
1995, interview with BrigadierGeneral Atif Dudakovi;Major 542 Tudjman stated :
GeneralMilisav Sekulic , Knin Je Pao U Beogradu (Knin Fell in If the Serb side shows no willingness to start serious negoti
Belgrade ) as excerpted in Belgrade Politika , Online Edition. URL: ations, Croatia will be forced to carry out the reintegration
<www.politika.co.yu/feljton > Accessed 18 July 2001. of occupied areas by itself and extend maximum help to
531 Petrinja SrpskiRadio , 26 July 1995 . Bosnia to liberate Bihac.
532 Dudakovic was asked in a February 1996 interview what had Reuters, “ Croatia Tells Reeling Serbs: Talk or
been the toughest time for him . He answered : Face Defeat" by Mark Heinrich, 30 July 1995.
In the seventh month of last year,when the Autonomists 543 Reuters, “War-Ready Croatians and Rebel Serbs Talk in
[Abdic's forces) and the Special Forces Corps of Serbian Geneva " by Robert Evans, 3 August 1995 .
Krajina were attacking and took Pecka Brda, the villages of 544 Reuters , “ US Says No Reason For Croatia War After Serb Pact"
Krivaja and Likovac , when my driver was wounded and the by Mark Heinrich , 3 August 1995.
unit with me decimated. There was a question whether 545 This discussion of the Croatian offensive plans is based prima
Cazin would fall ornot. rily on Janko Bobetko , Sve Moje Bitke ( All My Battles),Zagreb :
Vildana Selimbegovic and Ozren Kebo, “ I Know Vlastita Naklada, 1996 , which includes the photographed texts of
My Fighting Men By Sight,” Sarajevo Dani, the directives for all four operations comprising " Oluja.” These
February 1996 , pp. 40-44, an interview with directives, however, appear to have been modified prior to the start
General Dudakovic . of " Oluja.” The directives also include accurate, detailed intelli
533 Zagreb Radio 22 July 1995. gence assessments of the disposition of SVK forces, in many cases
534 This narrative is based primarily on GeneralGotovina's account, down to battalion level. In addition, some information from Major
Colonel General Ante Gotovina, Offensive Battles and Operations GeneralMilisav Sekulic's study has been included. It is the most
of the Croatian Army and HVO , Knin : Split Corps District, 1996 , detailed account available of the decisions made in the SVK at the
pp. 59-68 . time. Sekulic was the Chief ofOperations and Training on the SVK
535 The 3rd Battalion/1st Guards Brigade appears to have had a tank Main Staff.Major GeneralMilisav Sekulic, Knin Je Pao U Beo
company attached for the operation . gradu (Knin Fell in Belgrade) as excerpted in Belgrade Politika ,
536 The 2nd HVO Guards also had the company -sized “ Gavran -2" Online Edition. URL : <www.politika.co.yu/feljton > Accessed
(Ravens) Special Purpose Unit attached . 18 July 2001
537 Colonel General Ante Gotovina , Offensive Battles and Opera 546
The photographed text for the original directive of Operation
tions ofthe Croatian Army and HVO , Knin: Split Corps District, " Oluja- 1," issued on 26 June 1995, is in Bobetko, pp . 422-432;
1996 , pp. 59-68. See also the following articles on HV /HVO units : Bobetko's discussion of the directive is on pp. 433-440.
.
Boris Komadina, “ A Tiger Fighting For Croatia ,” Zagreb 547 See the interview with Brigadier Mirsad Selmanovic, the 5th
HrvatskiObzor 6 November 1995, pp . 28-29, an interview with Corps chief of staff, in Isnam Taljic , “ The Chetniks Surrendered
Staff Brigadier Jozo Milicevic, commander 1st Guards Brigade. Petra Gora to the Croats To Avoid Falling Into the Hands of the
Zagreb Velebit, 2 February 1996 , pp. 16-17, article on the “Heavenly Forces,' ” Sarajevo Ljiljan 5 February 1997, pp. 57-60 .
Armored Battalion/1stGuards Brigade.
548 The6th Artillery Battalion and the 8th Howitzer Artillery Battal
• Vesna Puljak, “ Steel For the Puma's Leaps,” Zagreb Velebit, 12
January 1996 , pp. 16-17, an article on the Armored Battalion /7th ion, which was the only HV artillery unit equipped with 203-mm
Guards Brigade . ( 8 -inch ) howitzers (USWorld War II- era M -2 /M -115 pieces). For
• Zoran Vukman, “ Victorious Trail on All Battlefields," Split information on the 8th Battalion in “Oluja,” see Zeljko Stipanovic,
Slobodna Dalmacija 1 June 1996 , p . 8 , an article on the “Medals for the HTD [Howitzer Artillery Battalion ],” Zagreb
114th Infantry Brigade. Velebit 28 March 1997, pp. 18-19 .
• Nevin Miladin , “ On the Wings of Victory," Zagreb Velebit, 12 549 The 2nd Battalion /15th Antitank Artillery-Rocket Brigade.
July 1996 , pp. 16-17, an article on the 2nd HVO Guards Brigade. 550 Tarbuk was the original commander of the 39th Corps during
• Gordan Radosevic , “ While There Are Hawks," Zagreb Velebit 23 1992-93,having served as a JNA brigade commander in the Pet
January 1998, pp. 18-19, an article on the 3rd HVO Guards Bri rinja area in 1991. The VJ sent him back to the 39th Corps in 1995
gade. to help GeneralMrksic reinvigorate the SVK. He was considered a
538 The 3rd Serbian Brigade's composite battalions appear to have tough and experienced field commander.
been drawn from platoons and companies of the 2nd Krajina Infan 551
The photographed text for the original directive of Operation
try, 1st Celinac Light Infantry , 11th Dubica Infantry, 43rd Prijedor “ Oluja -2;" issued on 26 June 1995 , is in Bobetko , pp . 441-451 ;
Motorized , 1st Gradiska Light Infantry, 1st Doboj Light Infantry, Bobetko's discussion of the directive is on pp. 454-459 .
22nd Infantry, and 11th Dubica Infantry Brigades — all from the 1st
Krajina Corps — and the 1st, 2nd , 3rd Semberija Infantry Brigades/
East Bosnian Corps.

412

---
552 The group was formed from the corps' 10th Artillery Battalion. during the HV offensive . In addition to these airstrikes, the HRZ
553 The photographed text for the original directive of Operation conducted interdiction and Close Air Support missions (with
" Oluja -3 ,” issued on 26 June 1995, is in Bobetko, pp. 462-475; Mi-24 gunships ) throughout the operation .
Bobetko's discussion of the directive is on pp. 476-481. 563 General Bobetko states that:
554 The Main Staff's 350th Sabotage Detachmentwas attached to ... the aim was as follows: with MUP forces to force the
the 1st Guards Brigade for the operation. Vesna Puljak , “ A Small Kupa River, by night, while with part of them and with a
Unit for Big Assignments,” Zagreb Velebit 18 October 1996 , helicopter landing to pass to the west ... and begin battle in
pp . 16-17. Petrinja itself or east of Petrinja. . . the commander of the
555 The 5th Corps chief of staff, BrigadierMirsad Selmanovic , indi corps district was left without Special Police forces that
cates that the Croatian request for 5th Corps involvement in the were trained for that task , which during almost all of 1994
operation came via the ARBiH military attache in Zagreb and that were prepared for reconnaissance missions through training
they asked the 5th Corps to attack in the directions discussed. in various drills, exercises, and coordination with the entire
Isnam Taljic , “ The Chetniks Surrendered Petra Gora to the Croats system .
To Avoid Falling Into the Hands of the Heavenly Forces,' ” Janko Bobetko, SveMoje Bitke (AllMy Bat
Sarajevo Ljiljan 5 February 1997, pp. 57-60. tles), Zagreb: Vlastita Naklada, 1996 , p. 435.
564
556 Each corps artillery group probably was formed around the Igor Alborghetti, “ In Peactime Croatia Will Have Only 50,000
artillery-rocket battalion from each Guards Brigade, bolstered by Soldiers,” Zagreb Globus, 31May 1996 , pp. 15-17, 59 , an inter
the corps' 12th Artillery Battalion . view with Corps General Anton Tus,Military Adviser to President
557 One brigade, the 70th Infantry Brigade, faced the Karlovac Tudjman.
Corps District attack to the north , but part of one of its battalions 565 Sve Moje Bitke (AllMy Battles), p . 436. The commander of the
was opposite the Gospic Corps. The 9th Motorized Brigade was 2nd Battalion /2nd Guards Brigade, which appears to have borne
focused primarily on the Velebit sectoropposite the MUP Special the brunt of the fighting on the heavily defended eastern
Police forces,which worked in conjunction with the HV Split approaches to Petrinja ,was killed in action during an SVK counter
Corps District. attack . Neven Miladin , “ They Wove the Thread of Freedom ,"
558 The photographed text for the original directive of Operation Zagreb Velebit 21 June 1996 , pp . 16-17, an article on the 2nd Bat
“ Oluja-4,” issued on 26 June 1995 , is in Bobetko ,pp . 484-491 ; talion/2nd Guards Brigade.
Bobetko's discussion of the directive is on pp. 492-500 . 566 Bobetko makes a numberof veiled references to the less than
559 The three artillery -rocket groups were formed from the corps sterling fighting qualities of the Home Defense and reserve bri
artillery — the 14th and 20th Artillery Battalions— and a 203-mm gades . Ashe says, “ The other Home Defense regiments ... were
howitzer battery attached from the 8th Howitzer Artillery Battal nowhere near being the mainstays ofthe primary attack.” Sve Moje
ion , plus possibly the artillery -rocket battalions of the 4th and 7th Bitke (All MyBattles), p .438. The reserve formations at Petrinja
Guards Brigades. The 14th Artillery Battalion appears to have been included the 57th Infantry Brigade, 12th Home Defense Regiment,
comprised primarily of M -46 130-mm field guns, and it contrib 20th Home Defense Regiment, and the 140th Home Defense Regi
uted a battery to all three artillery -rocket groups. See Zeljko Sti ment. In addition , a small secondary attack by the 153rd Infantry
panovic, “Lethal and Precise,” Zagreb Velebit 20 December 1996 , Brigade at Pokupsko to the right of the main assault failed to pene
pp . 16-17. trate the defenses of the SVK 24th Infantry Brigade. See Sector
560 The 7th North Dalmatian Corps was the lineal descendant of North map in Rear Admiral Davor Domazet-“ Loso,” “ The Military
GeneralMladic's JNA 9th (Knin ) Corps that had caused the Croat Aspect of the Strategic Determinants for Operations to Liberate the
ians so many problemsin 1991. Occupied Areas of the Republic of Croatia,” Zagreb Hrvatski
561 The narrative of Operation " Oluja " is based primarily on Croat Vojnik October 1996 , pp. 6-13 and Vesna Puljak, “ They Carried
ian and Bosnian Army sources, augmented by Major General Out Their Tasks Conscientiously and Responsibly,” Zagreb Velebit
Sekulic's account. Except for Sekulic's study, there has been 6 December 1996 , p . 12 , an article on the 140th Home Defense
almost no reporting from the SVK military perspective . Regiment.
567
562 It seemsunlikely that the HRZ had as much success atknocking Banja Luka Srpski Radio , 4 August 1995.Bobetko states that
out the SVK C3 system as the Croatians claim , given their small because the 81st Guards Battalion was unavailable :
inventory — 25 aircraft — and the limited capabilities of these air [Basarac ) had to remobilize and mobilize forces that had not
craft - MiG -21s. In addition , these aircraft had no precision -guided seen fighting up to that point and were not trained ,because
munitions. Nevertheless, the HRZ is insistent in its writings that its the principle was thatHomeDefense units be incorporated
aircraft knocked out several key communications centers . For into the structure for at least eightdays before being sent
example, the HRZ claims that: into battle. Thus,... in the operational sense he could not
Operating according to the use plan , enemy communication develop the speed that he was supposed to ...
centers were knocked out the first day — the Celavac Janko Bobetko, Sve Moje Bitke (All My Battles ),
radio -relay junction and the transmitter on Petrova Gora , Zagreb : Vlastita Naklada, 1996 , p . 435 .
and the command post of one brigade and one corps in the The 103rd Infantry Brigade, 151st Infantry Brigade , and the 17th
village of Bunic in Lika and in BanskiGrabovac .... Home Defense Regiment carried out the attack in this sector. The
... destroyed , incapacitated , and neutralized four enemy 125th HomeDefense Regiment was reinforced with battle groups
communications centers, four command posts, and a num from the 24th and 52nd Home Defense Regiments of the Bjelovar
ber of points of resistance, facilities,... Corps District for its attack. The spearhead of the 125th's attack ,
See Vinko Sebrek , “ The Croatian Air Force in Operation Storm ' however, was the 265th Reconnaissance - Sabotage Company. See
Part 2 ," Zagreb Hrvatski Vojnik, 1 November 1996 , pp . 56-59. Dur Vesna Puljak , “ Always on the Central Route," Zagreb Velebit,
ing the operation , General Mrksic seemed to second the HRZ's 28 March 1997,pp. 18-19, an article on the 265th Recon-Sabotage
claims,mentioning the same targets cited in the Hrvatski Vojnik Company; and SectorNorth map in Rear Admiral Davor Domazet
article above. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel General Mile “ Loso ,” “ The Military Aspect of the Strategic Determinants for
Mrksic, Belgrade Radio 4 August 1995.Whether through sabotage Operations To Liberate the Occupied Areas of the Republic of
missions by ground troops or airstrikes from the HRZ , the SVK C3 Croatia,” Zagreb Hrvatski Vojnik, October 1996 , pp. 6-13.
system does appear to have suffered severe damage or disruption

413
568 During a frank discussion of the SVK's status late on 4 August, 577 In an interview less than a week after the operation, Special
GeneralMrksic made it clear that the 21st Corps had been able to Police commander General Markac described the action in the
hold its ground . Belgrade Radio , 4 August 1995. Velebit:
569 Banja Luka Srpski Radio 4 August 1995; Sector North map in The top priority was for us to break through the enemy's
“ The Military Aspect of the Strategic Determinants for Operations frontline on almost inaccessible terrain at 1,400 meters
To Liberate the Occupied Areas of the Republic ofCroatia," above sea level,where specialconditions prevailed. After
pp. 6-13 . The SVK 11th Infantry Brigade was responsible for this breaking through that frontline, we were supposed to
sector. advance extremely rapidly and destroy their defense at a
570 Banja Luka Srpski Radio, 4 August 1995. The 14th and 137th pace that would prevent their forces from regrouping and
Home Defense Regiments carried out the assault. The SVK 13th creating a second line of defense. We carried out the assign
Infantry Brigade was the defending force. The 13th was able to ment as planned ...
stop part of the 137th's attack . We did not cross that frontline without a struggle, butrather
571 The 143rd Home Defense Regiment attacked to the north of the by fighting for it for almost two days.When we broke
town, while the 99th Infantry Brigade attempted to drive around the through their line of defense, because of our rapid penetra
town from the south . tion , they were unable to form a second line. Anyone who
572 Neven Miladin ,“ Invincible Armor of the Wolves," Zagreb wants to analyze the operation will see that that was the cru
Velebit, 15 December 1995, pp. 16-17, article on the Armored cialmoment. None of them really expected or planned for
Battalion /9th Guards Brigade; Gordan Radosevic, Neven Miladin , our lightning advance ...
Zeljko Stipanovic, Vesna Puljak , Nikolina Sutalo , and Kristina It was most difficult for us near Mali Alan ,mainly because
Matica Stojan, “ Storm — The Culmination of Our Tempests," of the configuration of the terrain ,and then also because the
Zagreb Velebit, 2 August 1996 , pp. 4-7, 10-11, an anniversary arti night just before our attack, that line was reinforced with
cle describing in some detail the movement of HV formations dur another company of infantry. The battle there lasted for
ing “ Oluja.” In addition to the 9th Guards, the HV attack force eight hours.
included the 111th Infantry Brigade and the 118th Home Defense Ivanka Toma, “ The Terrorists Did Not Have
Regiment attacking in the Ljubovo-NoviLicki Osik area, while the Time," Zagreb Hrvatski Obzor, 14 August 1995 ,
150th Infantry Brigade, with elements of the 111th Infantry Bri pp. 14-15, an interview with Colonel General
Mladen Markac, commander of the Croatian
gade and 8th HomeDefense Regiment attacked Medak . The SVK MUP Special Police.
18th Infantry Brigade was defending Ljubovo , while the 9th See also ColonelGeneral Ante Gotovina, Offensive Battles and
Motorized Brigade was holding Medak.
Operations of the Croatian Army and HVO, Knin : Split Corps Dis
573 Boris Komadina,“ A Tiger Fighting For Croatia,” Zagreb trict, 1996 , p. 73 for a short discussion of the role of the 2nd Battal
Hrvatski Obzor 6 November 1995, pp . 28-29, an interview with ion/9th Guards Brigade in the attack on the Mali Alan area.
Staff Brigadier Jozo Milicevic , commander of the 1st Guards Bri 578 The SVK claimed to have repelled a strong attack against the
gade; “ Storm — The Culmination of Our Tempests,” pp. 4-7 , 10-11. village ofGornji Zemunik , southwest of Benkovac. Belgrade Tan
574 The 138th and 133rd Home Defense Regiments attacked in sup
jug, 4 August 1995 .
port of the 1st Guards Brigade on the right against the SVK 50th
579 Colonel General Ante Gotovina, Offensive Battles and Opera
Infantry Brigade deployed around Vrhovine. South of Vrhovine, tions of the Croatian Army and HVO , Knin : Split Corps District,
the 8th Home Defense Regiment and the 128th Infantry Brigade, 1996 , p. 74. An article on the Armored Battalion / 7th Guards Bri
supported by the 154th HomeDefense Regiment, carried out addi gade, which attacked from the Dinara area, noted that the unit
tional attacks on the 50th and 18th Infantry Brigades.
faced the “ strongest resistance" on the first day, including SVK air
575 During a radio interview , General Mrksic indicated that the only strikes, but that on 5 August, “... resistance weakened, and the
sector in which he was seriously concerned was that around
enemy's line of defense was no longer organized well enough to
Grahovo -Dinara Mountains. Belgrade Radio , 4 August 1995 , 1500 offer any significant resistance.” Vesna Puljak, “ Steel For the
local time.
Puma's Leaps,” Zagreb Velebit, 12 January 1996 , pp. 16-17;Major
576 Operational Group “ Sinj” controlled this sector. The 126th GeneralMilisav Sekulic , Knin Je Pao U Beogradu (Knin Fell in
Home Defense Regiment- probably the best formation of this type Belgrade) as excerpted in Belgrade Politika,Online Edition . URL :
in the HV - and the 144th Infantry Brigade crushed the flank of the <www.politika.co.yu/feljton > Accessed 18 July 2001.
1st Vrlika Light Infantry Brigade, while the 6th Home Defense 580 GeneralMrksic stated in an interview late on 4 August that SVK
Regimentmounted a frontal assault on its positions around Peruca units had withdrawn to the immediate vicinity of Knin to defend
Lake. The 126th's incursions along the border during the last eight the town from there and that he intended to launch a counterattack
months had effectively made the 1st Vrlika's defensive zone unten against the approaching HV Guards units if the VRS 2nd Krajina
able. Zeljko Stipanovic, “ Defense of the Homeland — A Sacred Corps was able to carry out an attack against the HV around Gra
Task,” Zagreb Velebit, 8 December 1995, p . 14 , an article on the hovo. Belgrade Radio, 4 August 1995. The VRS appears to have
126th Home Defense Regiment. While these units attacked on the
been able to mount some kind of attack against Grahovo on
left ofthe Guards, their right flank was covered by the special com 5 August - possibly carried out by the newly arrived composite 1st
posite company of the 114th Infantry Brigade that had fought in
Drina Light Infantry Brigade — but it apparently made little impres
"Ljeto 95.” See Zoran Vukman , “ Victorious Trail on All Battle
sion against theHV 81st Guards Battalion. Belgrade Tanjug,
fields,” Split Slobodna Dalmacija, 1 June 1996 , p. 8 , an interview 5 August 1995.
with Colonel Marko Skejo , commander of the 114th Infantry
Brigade.

414
581 The HV spokesman,Major General Ivan Tolj, claimed at the Korenica and Slunj. All this happened under combat condi
time that Benkovac fell in the early evening , while GeneralGotov tions. We captured some 120 Chetniks . . . In the afternoon ,
ina states in his postwar account that it fell in the early morning of after part of our forces reached Grabovac and Rakovica, the
6 August. Elements of the 2nd Battalion/9th Guards Brigade orders camefor us to halt. This was done in agreement with
entered Obrovac in the early evening of 5 August. ColonelGeneral the Croatian Army, to preventa possible confrontation with
Ante Gotovina, Offensive Battles and Operations of the Croatian us.
Army and HVO ,Knin : Split Corps District, 1996 , p . 74.Opera The 502nd (and its neighbor the 501st)both used the ARBiH's
tionalGroup “ Zadar," comprising the 112th Infantry Brigade, 7th standard infiltration tactics against the SVK . Abdic stated that:
Home Defense Regiment, and 134th HomeDefenseRegiment, also We almost never attacked frontally, we always practiced
pushed forward into Benkovac and the Obrovac area against the reconnoitering and infiltration of our units ... We generally
SVK 92nd Motorized, 3rd Light Infantry , and 4th Light Infantry conducted our actions at night and always strove for sur
Brigades. Operational Group “ Sibenik,” comprising the 113th prise ... It was the samein Croatia.
Infantry Brigade, 15th Home Defense Regiment, and 142nd Home Isnam Taljic, “ The Croatian State, Too, Was Liberated With the
Defense Regiment, had already had some success penetrating the Tekbir," Sarajevo Ljiljan , 12-19 February 1997 , p . 23, an interview
front defense zone of the SVK 2nd Infantry Brigade and part of the with Colonel Hamdija Abdic-" Tigar," commander of the 502nd
75th Motorized Brigades, supported by Operational Group “ Sinj’s” Mountain Brigade. See also the interview with Major Senijad
roll up the flank of the 1st Light Infantry and 75th Motorized Bri Mesic, commander of the 5th Military Police Battalion, in Isnam
gades . See Sector South map in Rear Admiral Davor Domazet Taljic , “ The Chetniks Surrendered Petra Gora to the Croats To
“Loso ," " The Military Aspect of the Strategic Determinants for Avoid Falling Into the Hands of the 'Heavenly Forces,"" Sarajevo
Operations to Liberate the Occupied Areas of the Republic of Ljiljan, 5 February 1997, pp . 57-60 .
Croatia," Zagreb Hrvatski Vojnik, October 1996 , pp. 6-13 and 584 Boris Komadina, “ A Tiger Fighting For Croatia ,” Zagreb
Zeljko Stipanovic, “ Always Among the Best,” Zagreb Velebit, Hrvatski Obzor, 6 November 1995, pp. 28-29, an interview with
15 December 1995 , an article on the 112th Infantry Brigade; Staff Brigadier Jozo Milicevic , commander of the 1st Guards Bri
582 Brigadier Mirsad Selmanovic, the 5th Corps chief of staff , gade; Isnam Taljic , “ The Croatian State , Too, Was Liberated With
states: the Tekbir," Sarajevo Ljiljan, 12-19 February 1997 , p . 23, an inter
... atmidnight on 4 August [i.e.,morning of 5 August ), view with Colonel Hamdija Abdic-“ Tigar," commander of the
units of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia -Herzegovina Army 502nd Mountain Brigade.
crossed the international border on the Izacic -Licko Petrovo 585 Velebit later described the advance of the 1st Guards Brigade on
Selo and Klokot-Zeljava line and, the same day ,continued 4 and 5 August:
in the direction of Rakovica and the Plitvice Lakes. Partici Its 1st Battalion first defeated the enemy in the area of
pating in this operation were the 502nd Brigade, elements of Kapela, captured dominant elevations, and descended to
the (military ) police battalion, and the corps reconnaissance Licka Jasenica, and then blocked the left flank from Plaski
company ... they were joined by the 501st Brigade in the and the Slunj (SVK training ) range. Part of the unit contin
direction of Pljesevica- Titova Korenica. ued cleanup operations in the direction of Plaski,while the
General Dudakovic directly oversaw corpsoperations on this axis . 2nd Battalion continued toward Saborski and then toward
See interview with Brigadier Mirsad Selmanovic, in Isnam Taljic , Rakovica , cutting off the enemy and linking up with the 5th
" The Chetniks Surrendered Petra Gora to the Croats To Avoid Fall Corps on the second day of the operation. During that time,
ing Into the Hands of the 'Heavenly Forces,' ” Sarajevo Ljiljan, the 1st Guard Brigade's 3rd Battalion advanced through
5 February 1997, pp. 57-60 . “ Heavenly Force ” was one of 5th Saborski and the Plitvice Lakes... on the second day of the
Corps' nicknames. operation .
583 Colonel Hamdija Abdic-" Tigar” described his brigade's attack Gordan Radosevic , Neven Miladin , Zeljko Stipanovic,
in a 1997 interview : Vesna Puljak , Nikolina Sutalo , and Kristina Matica Sto
1 ...“ cooperated” with (Polish UN troops stationed on the jan , “ Storm — The Culmination of Our Tempests,"
Croatian-Bosnian border] at that time. Now we took advan Zagreb Velebit, 2 August 1996 , pp .4-7, 10-11, an anni
tage of it. Well, perhaps it is not nice to write about it, but versary article describing in somedetail themovement
we broughtthem some brandy,we got them drunk, and then of HV formations during “ Oluja."
we captured them ; in themeantime we infiltrated two battal 586 See interview with Brigadier Senad Sarganovic, commander of
ions behind the enemy's back . Actually we disarmed the the 501stMountain Brigade, and Captain Ahmo Selimovic, com
Chetniks in their bunkers in the vicinity of the Poles. Thus mander of the Recon-Sabotage Company/501stMountain Brigade
we succeeded in infiltrating along the main road . Atabout in Isnam Taljic , “ The Chetniks Surrendered Petra Gora to the
1600 on 5 August, two of our battalions arrived at Celopek Croats To Avoid Falling Into the Hands of the 'Heavenly Forces,'
Hill unobserved ... Onebattalion had to take Licko Petrovo Sarajevo Ljiljan, 5 February 1997, pp . 57-60. Sarganovic also notes
Selo and then proceed to Preboj (sic ) and Plitvice ; the other, that in the short interlude between the end of the SVK offensive
together with the “ Tiger” Reconnaissance-Sabotage Com against Bihac and the start of “ Oluja," the 501stMountain Brigade
pany, had to advance to Grabovac and Rahovica (sic ). Atthe had seized much of the territory southwest of Bihac city that the
same time a partofour forcesblocked Chetnik units in their SVK and VRS had held for most of the war.
positions from the rear. A part of (one) battalion received 587 On the basis of comments from Colonel Ante Dosen , the 9th
orders to proceed in the direction of the Zeljava barracks ; Guards Brigade chief of staff,Zagreb Velebit states :
this was executed as ordered. The Chetniks were totally lost. Ljubovo was not liberated on the first day; it possibly could
At about 0800 we captured Licko Petrovo Selo , and part of have been , but thatwould have required high infantry casu
the unit continued to Vaganac , Drenik , and Grabovica. Here alties . On the following day... the Croatian forces changed
wemet with misfortune. The ammunition depot exploded,
killing 12 men from the 2nd Battalion ... It was a huge
depot, and it was boobytrapped . There were also many
wounded , so the action slowed down a bit, but then we pro
ceeded toward Plitvice, cutting themain road between

415
 their tactics, and the enemy resistance was crushed by a 593 Neven Miladin , " Invincible Armor of the Wolves,” Zagreb
combination of artillery support and infantry . Velebit, 15 December 1995, pp. 16-17, article on the Armored Bat
Gordan Radosevic,Neven Miladin , Zeljko Stipanovic, talion /9th Guards Brigade; Neven Miladin , “ Freedom Through
Vesna Puljak, Nikolina Sutalo , and Kristina Matica Courage,” Zagreb Velebit, 20 December 1996 , p. 13, an article on
Stojan, “ Storm — The Culmination of Our Tempests," the 154th Home Defense Regiment.
Zagreb Velebit, 2 August 1996 , pp . 4-7 , 10-11 , an anni 594 Zagreb Radio 6 August 1995.
versary article describing in some detail the movement 595 Boris Komadina, “ A Tiger Fighting For Croatia,” Zagreb
ofHV formations during “ Oluja.” Hrvatski Obzor, 6 November 1995,pp. 28-29, an interview with
588
Major General Ivan Tolj,HV Press Conference, Zagreb Radio Staff Brigadier Jozo Milicevic , commander of the 1st Guards Bri
5 August 1995. gade; Gordan Radosevic, Neven Miladin , Zeljko Stipanovic , Vesna
589 Gordan Radosevic, Neven Miladin , Zeljko Stipanovic, Vesna Puljak, Nikolina Sutalo , and Kristina Matica Stojan, “ Storm — The
Puljak, Nikolina Sutalo , and KristinaMatica Stojan, “ Storm — The Culmination of Our Tempests,” Zagreb Velebit, 2 August 1996 ,
Culmination of Our Tempests," Zagreb Velebit, 2 August 1996 , pp. 4-7, 10-11, an anniversary article describing in some detail the
pp .4-7 , 10-11, an anniversary article describing in some detail the movement of HV formations during “ Oluja;" Isnam Taljic , “ The
movement of HV formations during “ Oluja." Croatian State, Too , Was Liberated With the Tekbir,” Sarajevo Ljil
590 Reuters “ Croats Said to Enter Big Serb Town, Seize Roads” by jan, 12-19 February 1997, p . 23, an interview with ColonelHam
Mark Heinrich, 5 August 1995; Prijedor Radio 5 August 1995. dija Abdic-" Tigar," commander of the 502nd Mountain Brigade.
President Tudjman personally directed Stipetic to supervise the 596 The 14th and 143rd Home Defense Regiments. Gordan
Petrinja-Sisak sector after the failure of the first day's attack . Radosevic , Neven Miladin, Zeljko Stipanovic, Vesna Puljak, Niko
Dragan Djuric , “New Commander of the Croatian Army.” Zagreb lina Sutalo, and KristinaMatica Stojan ,“ Storm - The Culmination
Nacional, 15 March 2000, pp. 21-23, an interview with General of Our Tempests,” Zagreb Velebit, 2 August 1996 , pp . 4-7 , 10-11,
Petar Stipetic . an anniversary article describing in some detail the movement of
591 Prijedor Radio 5 August 1995. The ARBiH attack initially HV formations during “ Oluja.”
involved onebattalion from the 505th Mountain Brigade and one 597 After 1st Guards took the town, the 99th and 119th Infantry Bri
battalion from the 511th Mountain Brigade. While General Dudak gades were deployed to secure the area and free up the Guards.
ovic was leading 5th Corps operations in Lika, Brigadier Sel Gordan Radosevic, Neven Miladin , Zeljko Stipanovic, Vesna Pul
manovic headed a corps forward command post controlling this jak, Nikolina Sutalo , and KristinaMatica Stojan, “ Storm — The
action and ongoing operations against APWB forces. See interview Culmination of Our Tempests,” Zagreb Velebit, 2 August 1996 ,
with Brigadier Mirsad Selmanovic, in Isnam Taljic, “ the Chetniks pp. 4-7, 10-11, an anniversary article describing in some detail the
Surrendered Petra Gora to the Croats To Avoid Falling Into the movement of HV formations during " Oluja;” Major General Mil
Hands of the 'Heavenly Forces,'” Sarajevo Ljiljan, 5 February isav Sekulic , Knin Je Pao U Beogradu (Knin Fell in Belgrade) as
1997, pp . 57-60 . The 511th Brigade commander described the 5th excerpted in Belgrade Politika , Online Edition. URL : <www.poli
Corps plan : tika.co.yu/feljton > Accessed 18 July 2001.
One of our battalions, together with someother units, was 598 Zagreb Radio 6 August 1995.
engaged to break through to Velika Kladusa and reach the 599 Gordan Radosevic, Neven Miladin , Zeljko Stipanovic, Vesna
state border in that direction; the other was to break through Puljak , Nikolina Sutalo , and Kristina Matica Stojan , “ Storm — The
to Dvor na Uni and meet the 505th Chivalrous Brigade on Culmination of Our Tempests," Zagreb Velebit, 2 August 1996 ,
the road from Glina to Dvor. All preparations were con pp. 4-7 , 10-11, an anniversary article describing in some detail the
cluded on 4 August, and the breakthrough planned for movement of HV formations during "Oluja ."
5 August. There were some problems, so I decided with 600 The 145th Infantry Brigade was the formation that the Main
[505th Brigade commander ] Izet Nanic to regroup our Staff released on 5 August to support the Kostajnica attack. An
forces and get to Corkovaca and then ... continue on with article on the brigade in Velebit describes the operations of the
our goal 145th and other formations on 5-6 August in this sector:
Isnam Taljic , “ I Am Proud We Aided the Liberation of ... the 145th Brigade was one of the last ones called up,
Croatia,” Sarajevo Ljiljan, 12-19 February 1997, p . 22 , because its status was a reserve for theMain Staff. In line
interview with Brigadier Mirsad Sedic , commander with that, and under the command of Colonel Bruno Cavic ,
511th Mountain Brigade it received orders to carry out assignments in the area of
During heavy fighting with the SVK 33rd Infantry Brigade, the Banovina, one of the most difficult areas in the entire opera
505th Mountain Brigade's famous commander, Colonel Izet Nanic, tion, in the direction of Bobovac (near Sunja )-Strmen
was killed in action. The shock of Nanic's death clearly had an Slovinci-Timarci, and toward Kostajnica. The brigade
effect on the 505th , and the brigade deputy commander/chief of encountered the first strong organized resistance from the
staff temporarily halted the brigade advance when he was notified . enemy in the village of Seliste Kostajnicko on 6 August and
The brigade operations officer,however, states that, before Nanic's crushed it,with help from the Zagreb Corps reconnaissance
death , the 505th had advanced 7 to 8 kilometers deep into the RSK sabotage company, the 17th Home Defense Regiment, the
on a 3 -kilometer front. Formore details of the 505th Brigade's 151st Brigade, three BOVs (air defense vehicles) from the
actions in this sector, see Isnam Taljic, “ Buzim Did Not Want To 202nd Air Defense (Brigade) and two tanks from the 2nd
Be Shut Into a Pen ,” Sarajevo Ljiljan, 12-19 February 1997, p . 21, Guards Brigade;
an interview with Major Sead Jusic , Assistant Chief of Staff for Neven Miladin , “ Proven Throughout All of Croatia,”
Operations and Training, 505th Mountain Brigade,and Isnam Tal Zagreb Velebit 26 January 1996 , p . 14 , an article on the
jic, “ Buzim Military Leader Izet Nanic Was Killed,” Sarajevo Ljil 145th Infantry Brigade. See also Neven Miladin , “ They
jan, 12-19 February 1997, p. 22 , an interview with Major Hamdija Responded to Every Assignment,” Zagreb Velebit,
Mustafic , deputy commander of the 505th Mountain Brigade. 19 January 1996 , p . 12, an article on the 151st Infantry
592 ColonelGeneral Ante Gotovina , Offensive Battles and Opera Brigade.
tions of the Croatian Army and HVO Knin : Split Corps District, 601 Zagreb Radio 7 August 1995 .
1996 , p. 74 .

416
 602 Reuters, “Refugee Passage Deal Collapses, Fighting Erupts ," 612 Statementby ColonelGeneral Petar Stipetic, Zagreb Radio
7 August 1995. 9 August 1995 ;statement by Corps General Zvonimir Cervenko ,
603 GeneralGotovina states that the Split Corps District was “... “ Slikom na Sliku,” Television Program , Zagreb HTV 8 August
engaged in securing the liberated area.” In addition , the corpswere 1995 ; and conversation between Colonel Cedomir Bulat and Colo
preparing for further operations. nel General Petar Stipetic in statement by CorpsGeneral Zvonimir
After resting briefly and receiving additional supplies of Cervenko, Zagreb HTV 8 August 1995.
ammunition and other material, Guard units (the 4th and 7th 613 HV and MUP forces continued to mop up isolated bands of
Guard Brigades, 2nd /9th Guard Brigade, and the 1st HGZ ) SVK soldiers over thenext few days, before themission was turned
were brought to the Gracac-Otric line . They took up posi completely over to theMUP. For a description of someof this
tions from where they were to launch their final attack to actions, see Ivanka Toma, “ The Terrorists Did Not Have Time,"
liberate the last part of the territory in the Split (Corps Dis Zagreb Hrvatski Obzor, 14 August 1995, pp . 14-15 , an interview
trict] zone of responsibility the following day. with Colonel-GeneralMladen Markac, commander of the Croatian
Colonel General Ante Gotovina, Offensive Battles and MUP Special Police.
Operations of the Croatian Army and HVO Knin : Split 614 The UN concluded that Bosnian Serb forces were responsible
Corps District, 1996 , pp . 74-75. for the attack based primarily on the estimated firing location about
604 The 1stGuards were supported by the 14th and 143rd Home 3 km south of the impact area. As with the earlier Markale market
Defense Regiments on thebrigade's left flank, while the 137th massacre , Bosnian Serb authorities accused the Bosnian Govern
Home Defense Regiment and 110th Home Defense Regiment ment of staging an attack against its own people in an effort to sab
attacked from the west and north respectively. Neven Miladin , otage the peace process . An article in the 1 October 1995 British
“Where ItWasNeeded Most,” Zagreb Velebit, 8 December 1995, p . Sunday Times accused the Bosnian Muslims of firing the mortar
15, an article on the 137th Home Defense Regiment; Gordan round that caused most of the casualties, as did a Russian Colonel,
Radosevic, Neven Miladin , Zeljko Stipanovic, Vesna Puljak, Niko Andrei Demurenko, who was assigned to the UN at the time. UN
lina Sutalo , and Kristina Matica Stojan , “ Storm — The Culmination officials subsequently dismissed the claims, however, citing inac
of Our Tempests,” Zagreb Velebit, 2 August 1996 , pp. 4-7, 10-11, curacies in the article and indicating that the final conclusions of a
an anniversary article describing in some detail the movement of panel of French , British, Spanish , and American experts had firmly
HV formations during “ Oluja.” concluded that the Bosnian Serbs were responsible .
605 The original corps commander, General Bosanac ,had a reputa 615 The SEAD plan had called for US Navy aircraft to fire radar
tion as a hard fighting combat commander. Hemay have been decoys near Serb air defense positions, then for other aircraft to
killed in action around Karlovac. Colonel Bulat had commanded destroy these sites with HARM missiles when they turned on their
the 21st Corps since 1992 before Bosanac took over in 1994. Bulat radars . The Bosnian Serbs apparently learned of these tactics from
appears to have been involved on the staff of OG “ Pauk” with Gen the Iraqis during the Gulf war,however,and did not illuminate the
eral Novakovic before "Oluja" and thus was readily available to decoys. Air Force Magazine, “ Deliberate Force," by John A.
step into the breach to lead his old corps out of danger. Tirpak, October 1997, pp. 36-43.
606 Conversation between Colonel Cedomir Bulat and Colonel 616 Aviation Week and Space Technology, “ Air Power Alters Bosnia
General Petar Stipetic in statementby Corps General Zvonimir Equation " by Craig Covault, 4 September 1995.
617
Cervenko, Zagreb HTV 8 August 1995. Reuters, “ NATO Claims SignificantSuccess in Air Strikes” by
607 The 511th Brigade commander indicated that after Nanic's Philip Pullella , 31 August 1998.
death : 618 Ibid .
It all took two more days. According to the amended plan, 619 Reuters, “ UN Troops Fires 600 Shells at Bosnian Serbs” by Sab
the 511th moved along the valley of the little Jamnica River ina Cosic, 30 August 1995 .
toward Dvor. There were no significant problems. . . some 620 Aviation Week and Space Technology, “Air Power Alters Bosnia
6 to 7 kilometers inside Croatia . Equation " by Craig Covault, 4 September 1995.
Isnam Taljic, “ I Am Proud We Aided the Liberation of 621 On this day, Luftwaffe Tornado reconnaissance aircraft under
Croatia,” Sarajevo Ljiljan, 12-19 February 1997, p . 22, took the first combatmissions by the German armed forces since
interview with Brigadier Mirsad Sedic, commander the conclusion ofWorld War II. The firstGerman military actions
511th Mountain Brigade; Isnam Taljic , “ Buzim Did Not in 50 years happened to coincide with the anniversary of the open
Want To Be Shut Into a Pen," Sarajevo Ljiljan, 12-19 ing event of the Second World War, the German invasion of Poland
February 1997, p . 21, an interview with Major Sead on 1 September 1939.
Jusic, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Train 622 Reuters , “ How The Clock Ticks in NATO Blitz on Bosnian
ing, 505th Mountain Brigade ; and Isnam Taljic, “ Buzim Serbs,” 1 September 1995.
Military Leader Izet Nanic Was Killed,” Sarajevo Ljil 623 Reuters , “ NATO Jets Pause , Artillery Fires on in Bosnia " by
jan, 12-19 February 1997, p . 22, an interview with Kurt Schork , 1 September 1995.
Major Hamdija Mustafic, deputy commander of the 624 Reuters, “ French Guns Counter Serb Mortar Near Sarajevo,"
505th Mountain Brigade. 1 September 1995.
608 Personnel totals derived from statement by Colonel-General 625 Reuters, “ UN Guns Blast Serb Weapons Despite Air Pause,”
Petar Stipetic , Zagreb Radio 9 August 1995 and statement by 1 September 1995.
Corps GeneralZvonimir Cervenko, “ Slikom na Sliku," Zagreb 626 Reuters , “ NATO Calls Pause to Air Raids, but Big Guns Boom ,"
HTV 8 August 1995 . 1 September 1995.
609 Reuters, “ Bosnian Troops Crush Moslem Rebels in Bihac 627 Reuters , “NATO Gives Bosnian Serbs Breather, But Mladic
UN,” 7 August 1995 ; Sarajevo Radio 7 August 1995. Defiant” by Douglas Hamilton, 2 September 1995.
610 Sarajevo Radio 7 August 1995. 628 Reuters , " Shell Hits Sarajevo in NATO Bombing Lull,"
611 ColonelGeneral Ante Gotovina, Offensive Battles and Opera 2 September 1995.
tions of the Croatian Army and HVO Knin : Split Corps District, 629 Reuters, “NATO and UN Move to Lift Sarajevo Siege" by Kurt
1996 , p . 75 . Schork , 3 September 1995.

417
 630 Reuters, “NATO Finger on Safety Catch as Ultimatum Nears” Vakuf, from south to north had the 707th Bugojno Mountain Bri
by Kurt Schork , 4 September 1995. gade, 770th Donji Vakuf Mountain Brigade, and the 717th Gornji
631 Reuters , "UN Gives Ultimatum of Hours to Bosnian Serbs,” VakufMountain Brigade holding its front, with the 705th Jajce
3 September 1995 . Mountain Brigade in reserve . The rest of the corps frontage from
632 Reuters, “UN Says No Strikes Yet, Under Consideration” by south to north was held by the 708th Light Brigade, 712th Krajina
Steve Pagani, 4 September 1995. Mountain Brigade, 706th Muslim Light Brigade, 733rd Busovaca
633 Reuters, “ UN Sees Little Serb Compliance With Weapons Mountain Brigade , and the 725th VitezMountain Brigade. The
Demand,” 5 September 1995. 17th Krajina Mountain Brigade, 727th Banja Luka Mountain Bri
634 Reuters, “ Smoke Rises From Explosions Outside Sarajevo," gade, and the 737th Muslim Light Brigade were normally in
5 September 1995. reserve near Travnik . Elements of the corps reserve brigades, plus
635 Reuters, “ British Troops Strike Serb Mortar From Mount the 7th “ Bosnjak” Reconnaissance- Sabotage Battalion, probably
Igman" by Kurt Schork , 5 September 1995 . reinforced 77th Division for the operation .
636 Reuters, “ Shells Hit Sarajevo After NATO Air Strikes," 649 The 2nd Krajina Corps had the 1st Drvar Light Infantry and up
5 September 1995 . to three Drina Corps composite formations, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd
637 The 13 Tomahawk cruise missiles were fired using theGlobal Drina Light Infantry Brigades — formed from elements ofmost of
Position System (GPS) guidance mode only.Ofthese, 11 were the Drina Corps ' brigades - deployed to defend Drvar and its
assessed to have landed within the 30 - foot circular error probable approaches. The 1st Drvar was directly in frontof the city , facing
(CEP) for the weapon; the other twomissed . Air Force Magazine, the south and west, while the Drina Brigades covered the south
“ Deliberate Force," by John A. Tirpak , October 1997 , pp.43. eastern approaches. They held a front of about 20 kilometers. In
638 Ripley, Tim , Air War Bosnia : UN and NATO Airpower. Shrews addition, the corpsmay have had the remnants of the 9th Grahovo
bury , UK : Airlife Publishing, 1996, pp. 92-93. Light Infantry Brigade deployed near Drvar as well,although the
639 Air Force Magazine, “ Deliberate Force” by John A. Tirpak, brigade may have earlier been destroyed in “ Ljeto 95.” The rein
October 1997, pp . 36-43. forced 3rd Serbian Brigade manned the sector adjacent to the Drina
640 For a short discussion of ARBiH /HV/HVO coordination, see brigades on their left, covering the importantMliniste pass. The 7th
Zeljko Garmaz, “ Not Even the Yugoslav Army Will PreventUs Kupres-Sipovo Motorized Brigade/30th Division took over from
From Entering Gorazde,” Split Nedjeljna Dalmacija, 20 October here, defending the most important terrain feature — Vitorog.
1995 , p. 12 , an interview with Brigadier GeneralMustafa Hajrula 650 On the Grabez, the 2nd Krajina Corps had deployed the 15th
hovic , Chief of ARBiH Military Intelligence. Bihac, 17th Kljuc (with a battalion from the 6th Sanske Infantry
641 The VRS attack hit the 141st Infantry Brigade. One battalion Brigade), 3rd Petrovac, and probably the 1st Serbian Brigades.
each from the 4th and 7th Guards Brigades, supported by the6th From Bosanska Krupa through Bosanska Otoka to BosanskiNovi
and 126th Home Defense Regiments, led the HV counterattack. (Novigrad ) were the 11th Krupa Light Infantry and 1st Novigrad
ColonelGeneral Ante Gotovina, Offensive Battles and Operations Infantry Brigades.
of the Croatian Army and HVO Knin : Split Corps District, 1996 , 651 From south to north, Zec arrayed the 31st Light Infantry Bri
p . 79. gade, the 19th “ Srbobran ” (Donji Vakuf) Infantry Brigade, the 11th
642 Description of the operational planning derived from Colonel Mrkonjic Light Infantry Brigade (with a battalion from the 5th
General Ante Gotovina, Offensive Battles and Operations of the Kozara Light Infantry Brigade attached), the 1st Sipovo Light
Croatian Army and HVO Knin : Split Corps District, 1996 , Infantry Brigade, the 22nd Krajina Infantry Brigade, and the 1st
pp . 85-87 . Kotor Varos Light Infantry Brigade.
643 These additional units included the HV Main Staff Recon 652 The VRS probably should have shifted the 1st Sipovo and 11th
Sabotage Company, the HVO 60th Guards Airborne Battalion and Mrkonjic Brigades to the Vitorog-Mliniste area where the two for
22nd Sabotage Detachment, and Bosnian Croat Special Police. mationsmost likely would have fought tenaciously to defend their
HVO Brigadier Zeljko Glasnovic was in command of OG “ North ," hometowns. The 11th Mrkonjic in particular had acquired an excel
although General Gotovina appears to have exercised direct author lent reputation during defensive operations in the Donji Vakuf
ity over the HV Guards formations. Colonel General Ante Gotov Komar Mountains area .
ina, Offensive Battles and Operations of the Croatian Army and 653 This account of “Maestral" drawsprimarily on Colonel General
HVO Knin : Split Corps District, 1996 , pp. 87, 194. Ante Gotovina, Offensive Battles and Operations of the Croatian
644 OG “ South " —the former OG “ Sinj” in “ Oluja " -comprised the Army and HVO Knin : Split Corps District, 1996 , pp . 5-102 and a
6th and 126th Home Defense Regiments, plus the 141st Infantry series of articles in Zagreb Velebit commemorating the one-year
Brigade, under Brigadier Ante Kotromanovic. OG “ West" —the anniversary of the operation.
former OG “ Zadar” in “ Oluja - comprised the 7th , 15th , 134th , and 654 The 7th Guards attacked Mliniste with two battalions, each of
142nd Home Defense Regiments, plus the 112th and 113th Infan which had one armored company attached from the brigade
try Brigades, under the command of BrigadierMladen Fuzul. armored battalion. Vesna Puljak, “ Steel for the Puma's Leaps,"
Colonel General Ante Gotovina, Offensive Battles and Operations Zagreb Velebit, 12 January 1996 , pp. 16-17 .
of the Croatian Army and HVO Knin : Split Corps District, 1996 , 655 “ The Wartime Journey of the 1st Armored : A Striking Fist,"
pp . 95 , 194. Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996 , pp . 26-29.
645 See Dudakovic interview quoted below in Danica Juricic, “ We 656 The HVO 60th Guards Airborne Battalion and the Bosnian
Will Liberate Banja Luka and Bijeljina,” Split Slobodna Dal Croat Special Police still appear to have been attached to the 1st
macija, 21 September 1995, p . 4 . HGZ.
616 The OG , led directly by General Dudakovic , comprised the 057 ColonelGeneral Ante Gotovina, Offensive Battles and Opera
501stMountain , 502nd Mountain , 510th Liberation , and 517th tions of the Croatian Army and HVO Knin : Split Corps District,
Light Brigades, plus elements of the 5th MP Battalion . 1996 , p . 91.
647 This OG was headed by the corps chief of staff, Brigadier Mir 658 There appears to be no basis to charges in the Serb press after
sad Selmanovic ,and comprised the 503rd Mountain , 505th Moun this action that the“ Drina Brigade” —actually three brigades — fled
tain , 506th Liberation , and 511th Mountain Brigades . from the battle atMlinista -Vitorog, leaving a gap for the HV/HVO
648 The 7th Corps appears to have been normally arrayed with eight to advance through; in addition , it seems clear from the evidence
brigades in line and four of its best brigades in reserve. The 77th
Division, headquartered at Bugojno and directly opposite Donji

418
that 3rd Serbian and 7th Motorized Brigades held that sector. There he did notmanage to do anything more with his small forces
are indications, however, that on 15-17 September, elements of the because the front was largely dispersed. Dragan held out
3rd Drina Brigademay have withdrawn precipitously from posi until the night of 12 September. Only thanks to his personal
tionsnorth of Kljuc during 5th Corps operations to seize the town. bravery and ability did he avoid dispersal of the unit, being
This withdrawaldoes notappear to have had any significant impact cut off,having personnel captured , and he managed to pull
on the campaign . Colonel Vinko Pandurevic, the commander ofthe out of the semi-encirclement with minor losses. Boskan dis
Ist Zvornik Infantry Brigade, claimed the elements of the compos tinguished himself during the battles for the defense of
ite formation that he was temporarily commanding — the 1st Drina Mrkonjic Grad. With two tanks and about 100 fighting men,
Brigade — foughtwell at Drvar.Momcilo Joksimovic , “ Organiza he defended the Previle Pass ... he remained until 0200
tion on Perfect Principles," Pale Oslobodjenje, 8 May 1997, hours on 14 September. He withdrew the personnel and
p . 4 , an interview with Colonel Vino Pandurevic . For claimsabout equipment only when it seemed that the [Croatians) were
the Drina Brigade's poor performance , see Djoko Kesic and Zoran pressing from the opposite direction — from Rogolj (to the
Lukic, “ Banja Luka Coincidentally Avoided Knin's Fate: About a northwest)... because it would have been too risky to
Hundred Special Troops Prevented the Krajina's Fall,” Belgrade remain on Previle with inadequate forces . And thenext day,
Telegraf, 27 September 1995, p . 6 . when it turned out that the (Croatians) had not dared to take
659 Colonel Antun Luburic's 1st HVO Guards Brigade “ Ante Bruno the pass, with three tanks and “ Praga' [self-propelled air
Busic " had the 60th Guards Battalion and the HV Main Staff defense weapon ) he joined a company from the43rd Motor
Recon -Sabotage Company attached . During the fighting around ized Brigade and thus prevented the [Croatians) from enter
Sipovo the 1st HGZ chief of staff, Brigadier Ante Saskor, was ing the city .
killed in action. Eduard Milicevic , “Heroes Never Die,” Zagreb Because a complete line of defense was not established
Velebit, 15 March 1996 , p . 11. around Mrkonjic Grad, Boskan and the commander ) of the
660 The 2nd HVO Guards Brigade had the 22nd Sabotage Detach 11th (Mrkonjic ] Light Infantry Brigade, and some 30 fight
ment, the “Gavran - 2" Special Purpose Unit , and the Bosnian Croat ing men and scouts of the 11th Light Brigade who were
Special Police attached. Neven Miladin , “ On the Wings of Vic from Mrkonjic rushed to take the dominant peaks of Lisina .
tory,” Zagreb Velebit, 12 July 1996 , pp. 16-17,an article on the 2nd Steven Stojicic, “ Dragan is the Best,” Srpska vojska, 28 December
HVO Guards Brigade; Colonel GeneralAnte Gotovina, Offensive 1995, pp. 25-26 ; Slavisa Sabljic , “One Day in the Life ofOfficer
Battles and Operations of the Croatian Army and HVO Knin : Split Branislav Bojic's Unit: They Have Never Knuckled Under,” Kra
Corps District, 1996 , p. 92 . jiski Vojnik, December 1995, p . 51, an article on the 4th Battalion/
661
Zagreb Velebit later described the HV /HVO drive on Sipovo and 43rd Motorized Brigade. The 1st Armored Battalion /1st Armored
Jajce: Brigade also supported the 7th Motorized at Previle Pass. “ The
The operation to liberate Sipovo was carried out from two Wartime Journey of the 1st Armored : A Striking Fist,” Krajiski
directions. The ‘Busices' [ 1stHVO Guards) infantry, using Vojnik, June 1996 , pp . 26-29. TheHV 81st Guards Battalion was
the recently liberated town of Strojnica as their starting inserted in the second phase of“Maestral” to support theHVO
point, rapidly liberated the town of Dragnic, supported by exploitation force. During its short involvement in the combat
artillery, tanks, and air defense weapons. Sipovo was now operations around Mrkonjic Grad against the 7th Motorized Bri
within reach , butthe enemy still did not surrender.During gade, the battalion suffered relatively heavy casualties of eight
the morning of 12 September, the “ Busices” 1st Infantry killed and 32 wounded in action. Statement by Staff Brigadier
Battalion , accompanied by armor and air defense forces, Renato Romic, Zagreb Velebit, 13 September 1996 , p . 13; Romic
entered Sipovo by the main road,following several hours commanded the 81st.
later by the “ Ludvig Pavlovic" HVO 60th Guard Battalion, 663 Colonel General Ante Gotovina , Offensive Battles and Opera
and the HVO 22nd Sabotage Detachment. tions of the Croatian Army and HVO Knin : Split Corps District,
Next, the HVO 2nd Guard Brigade, commanded by Major 1996 , pp. 95-98.
General Stanko Sopta , the 81st HV Guard Battalion , the 664 See Statement by Major General Ivan Korade, Zagreb Velebit,
" Gavran -2 " Special Purpose Unit,and members of the 13 September 1996 , p . 14; Korade commanded the 7th Guards Bri
Herzeg-Bosna (Bosnian Croat) Special Police continued the gade.
665
operation .Moving from the direction of Dragnic on the Belgrade SRNA , 24 July 1995. FBIS London LD2407230895 ,
slopes of Vitorog, the 2nd HVO Guard Brigade and the 242308Z July 1995.
666 Banja
attached units penetrated along the villages of Vagon, Pri Luka Srpski Radio , 25 July 1995. FBIS Vienna
beljci, and Vukovo and the Vrbas River. During the night AU2607150695, 261506Z July 1995 .
667
they received a new order to move along the route of the vil Banja Luka Srpski Radio , 27 July 1995. FBIS Vienna
lages of Babic and Knezevici and point 1335 in Gorica. AU2707145595, 271455Z July 1995.
They were then to break through to Plivsko Lake, enter 668 Sarajevo Radio , 28 July 1995. FBIS Vienna AU2807192395,
Jajce, occupy dominant points around the city, and break 281923Z July 1995.
669
through to the canyons of the Rika River and the Ugar Banja Luka SrpskiRadio , 30 July 1995. FBIS Vienna
River. AU3007154695, 301546Z July 1995.
670
Gordan Radosevic , Vesna Puljak , Zeljko Stipanovic , Belgrade Tanjug, 12 August 1995. FBIS London
Nikolina Sutalo , and Neven Miladin , “ Through Maestral LD1208133595 , 1213352 August 1995.
to Freedom ,” Zagreb Velebit, 13 September 1996, 671 Mostar Croatian Radio , 12 August 1995 , FBIS London
pp. 10-15 . LD1208164195, 1216417 August 1995 .
662 Elements of the 7th Motorized Brigade managed to hold the 672 Paris AFP, 12 August 1995, FBIS Vienna AU1208183595,
important Previle Pass against the advancing HV 81st Guards Bat 121835Z August 1995.
talion, after a harrowing escape from Sipovo . The following narra 673 Paris AFP, 14 August 1995. FBIS Vienna AU 1408080495,
tive from the VRS journal Srpska Vojska gives a flavor of the VRS 140804Z August 1995.
rear guard actions: 674 Reuters, “ Bosnian ArmyLaunchesMajor Attack in Central
...when the line was broken in the general area of Vitorog, Bosnia " by Kurt Schork , 12 August 1995 .
2nd Lieutenant [Dragan ] Boskan and 120 fighters from the
7th Motorized Brigade went to defend Sipovo . With no
neighbor on the left and a vacillating neighbor on the right,

419
 675 Paris AFP, 13 August 1995. FBIS Vienna AU1308135595 , 697M. Smajic , “ If You Had Been Just A Day Late, the Chetniks
1313552 August 1995. Would Have Massacred All ofUs!" Travnik Bosnjak, 17 October
676 Reuters, “ Bosnian Army Keeps Up Attack Around Serb Town" 1995, pp. 14-15 , an article on the 501st Mountain Brigade and the
13 August 1995 . capture of Kljuc.
677 Reuters, “ GovernmentGains Apparent Around Donji Vakuf" 698 Senada Avdagic, “ (511th Glorious' Came Back Home,” Travnik
14 August 1995. Bosnjak, 3 October 1995, p. 5 .
678 Paris AFP, 14 August 1995. FBIS Vienna AU 1408192595, 699 Dudakovic stated in a 21 September interview that:
141925Z August 1995. The 5th Corps was assigned the task ofbreaking through to
679 Sarajevo Radio , interview with Ferid Buljubasic, Spokesman for the valley of the Japra River (near Bosanski Novi) and the
the Bosnia-Herzegovina ArmyGeneral Staff,byMladen Bosnjak , valley of the Sana River, and our units moved from Bihac
21 August 1995. FBIS Vienna AU2108153795 , 2115372 August towards Bosanski Petrovac and onward to Kljuc, and from
1995 . Bosanska Krupa toward Sanski Most. In the first three days
680
Sarajevo Radio , interview with Ferid Buljubasic, Spokesman for of combat activity, our forces completed the first stage of
the Bosnia-Herzegovina ArmyGeneral Staff, 11 September 1995 . their task . Bosanska Krupa , Bosanski Petrovac , and Kljuc
FBIS Vienna AU1109150995, 1115092 September 1995. were liberated. The second stage will require an additional
381 Paris AFP, 11 September 1995. FBIS Vienna AU1109162995, effort on the part of the 5th Corps,but in practice it is under
111629Z September 1995. way. The aim is to break through to the Sana Valley across
682 Reuters, “ Croats, Moslems Take Key Town From Serbs — UN " the Sana River toward Banja Luka.
by Davor Huic , 13 September 1995. Danica Juricic, “We Will Liberate Banja Luka and Bijel
683 See Dzemal Sefer, "We Are Ready for War and for Peace!" jina,” Split Slobodna Dalmacija , 21 September 1995,
Travnik Bosnjak, 5-12 December 1995, pp. 13-15, an interview p . 4 , an interview with Division General Atif
with Senior Captain Miralem Imamovic , chief of staff/705th Glori Dudakovic .
ous JajceMountain Brigade for a brief description of the 705th Bri Dudakovic earlier stated in an interview on 17 September that:
gade's move across the Komar, following up the VRS withdrawal. Tomorrow , we are advancing in three directions: Kljuc
684 Reportedly up to 6,000 Bosnian Serb troops were withdrawn Mrkonjic Grad , Kljuc- SanskiMost, and Bosanski Petrovac
from the area, Reuters, “ Serbs Flee Croat, Muslim Advance in SanskiMost. The fourth direction is Bihac -Bosanska
Central Bosnia ” by Davor Huic , 13 September 1995. Krupa.
685 Reuters,“ Bosnian Army Confirms Capture of Donji Vakuf" by Zilhad Kljucanin , “ I am LiberatingMyOwn Country,
Kurt Schork , 14 September 1995 . but the Serbs Suffer From a Mania of Expulsion,"
686
Sarajevo Radio, 13 September 1995, interview with Brigadier Travnik Bosnjak, 3 October 1995, pp . 2-4 , an interview
GeneralMehmed Alagic, Commander of the 7th Corps of the with Division General Atif Dudakovic .
Army of Bosnia -Herzegovina, by Senad Hazifeizovic. FBIS 700 For details of the advance of the 505th , 506th , and 517th Bri
London LD1309231895, 1323182 September 1995 . gades , see Zemka. Seferagic , “ The Anniversary of the Formation of
687
Sarajevo Radio , 14 September 1995 , FBIS Vienna the 517th Liberation-Light Brigade , 15 August 1997: On the Road
AU1409182395, 141823Z September 1995. to Freedom ,” Sarajevo Prva Linija , September 1997 , p . 23, and
688
Sarajevo Radio , Statement by Ferid Buljubasic , Spokesman for Ibrahim Majdankic , “ Ako Ikad, Sada Je Vakat!," Travnik Bosnjak,
the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army General Staff, 14 September 1995 . 21 November 1995, an interview with the 505th Brigademorale
FBIS Vienna AU1409194095 , 1419407 September 1995 . officer, Hussein Kovacevic, and Zemka Seferagic , “ For the Heroes,
689 “ Slavisa Sabljic , “ Notes from the Agino Selo Front: We Have Lest We Forget," Saraevo Prva Linija , November 1997,pp. 19 , for
Nowhere Further to Go,” Krajiski Vojnik, December 1995 , p. 50 , information on the 505th and 506th Brigades.
describes the ordered withdrawal of the 1st Sipovo Light Infantry 701 For details of the advance of the 503rd , see Zemka Semeragic ,
Brigade from the Turbe area near Travnik ; Sefko Hodzic, " Opera “ Fifth Anniversary of the Formation of the 1st Cazin /503rd Glori
tion Werewolf,” Sarajevo Oslobodjenje, 13 January 1996 , p. 5. ous Mountain Brigade , 17 August 1997: From Mokres to Sanski
690 Sarajevo Radio , 15 September 1995. FBIS Vienna
Most; Zemka Seferagic, “Smotra Gazije Koji Bosnu Zude Od Una
AU 1509105395, 151053Z September 1995. Do Drine!" Travnik Bosnjak, 21 November 1995 , p . 17 , discussing
691 Sead Suskic , “ With Rifle in Hand," Travnik Bosnjak, 7 Novem the 503rd .
ber 1995, pp . 11-13; Sefko Hodzic , “ An Honorable Departure Into 702 Zeljaja had previously served as the commander of the 43rd
History,” Sarajevo Oslobodjenje, 10 January 1996 , p . 6 . Prijedor Motorized Brigade for most of the war. His chief of staff
692 Samira Dzanic, “ In Memory of the Great Liberating March of appears to have been Colonel Nikola Kajtez , the former chief of
the Republic of Bosnia -Herzegovina Army: Sana 95,” Sarajevo staff of the 30th Division and commander of the 6th Sanske Infan
Prva Linija, October 1997, pp. 25-26 . See also Sarajevo Radio try Brigade. Hemost likely was transferred to Zeljaja because of
reporting covering 13 September through 1 October. his experience in the SanskiMost-Prijedor area. The main forma
693
Sanja Dzafic, “An Avalanche of Successes Has Been Started,” tions arriving were the 5th Kozara Light Infantry, 6th Sanske Infan
Travnik Bosnjak, 17 October 1995 , p . 19, an article on the 502nd try, 11th Dubica Infantry, the 16th Krajina Motorized , and major
Mountain Brigade. See Dudakovic's comments on HV artillery elements of the 43rd Motorized Brigade, plus the Main Staff's 65th
support in Danica Juricic , “ We Will Liberate Banja Luka and Bijel Protection Motorized Regiment and the 1st Krajina Corps's IstMP
jina," Split Slobodna Dalmacija, 21 September 1995, p . 4 . Battalion and Ist Recon -Sabotage Detachment. Bosnian Serb Vice
694 Zilhad Kljucanin, “ I am Liberating My Own Country, but the President Plavsic was in SanskiMost when the reinforcements
Serbs Suffer From a Mania of Expulsion ,” Travnik Bosnjak, began to arrive and indicated that the difference in morale between
3 October 1995 , pp . 2-4 , an interview with Division General Atif the arriving 1st Krajina Corps troops and personnel of the Drina
Dudakovic. brigades — who were being withdrawn from battle - was consider
695
Sanja Dzafic , “ An Avalanche of Successes Has Been Started," able.Momo Joksimovic, “ Absolutely Srpska,” Banja Luka Glas
Travnik Bosnjak, 17 October 1995, p . 19, an article on the 502nd Srpski, 20 September 1995 , p . 3, interview with Biljana Plavsic .
Mountain Brigade.
696 HV and ARBiH troops briefly clashed at Ostrelj after apparently
mistaking each other for VRS personnel.

420
703 Arkan had arrived in Sanski Most by 19 September; he and his 707 The 505th Mountain Brigade's elite "Hamze ” (Lions ) Special
deputy commander,Mihailo Ulemek-“Legija,” both led the SDG in Purpose Battalion lost its commander and two other senior person
battle. SRNA 19 September 1995. Presumably, the Serbian RDB nel in heavy fighting at the village of Skucani Vakuf,northwest of
troops, led by veteran RDB commander “ Raja” Bozovic — last seen SanskiMost. Ibrahim Majdankic, “ Ako Ikad, Sada Je Vakat!"
in Velika Kladusa - arrived at the sametime. The SDG appears to Travnik Bosnjak, 21 November 1995,an interview with the 505th
have been organized into three 300-man battalions totaling about Brigademorale officer, Hussein Kovacevic .
708
1,000 troops. Borislav Pelevic , one of the leaders of Arkan's politi Major GeneralMarijan Marekovic formerly served on the HV
calparty, stated on 22 September that the SDG had about 1,000 Main Staff and had coordinated “ Oluja- 2” and “ Oluja- 3” from a
personnel in western Bosnia , while Arkan described the with forward command post in Ogulin during “ Oluja.” He was
drawal of his " last battalion " of 300 men on 23 October 1995. In appointed to replaced Major General Ivan Basarac as commander
addition to serving as shock troops, the SDG and the RDB acted as of the Zagreb Corps District on 14 September 1995 because of the
military police, rounding up deserters and stragglers, whom they heavy casualties thatHV troops took during the capture of Petrinja
“ disciplined,” shaving their heads, tying them to lampposts, then under Basarac's command. Zagreb Radio 14 September 1995 ;
sending them back to the front. The SDG lost 17 personnel killed Davor Butkovic, “Why Have Croatian Generals Vinko Vrbanec,
in action and 118 wounded during the fighting in western Bosnia. Nojko Marinovic, Ante Roso , and Djuro Basarac Been Dismissed ,"
Interview with Arkan , BK TV 4 June 1997. The “ official” invita Zagreb Globus, 29 September, pp. 2 , 50 .
tion for Arkan and the Serbian MUP troops to come to the Repub 709 Because of “Una 95's" failure the HV has never discussed the
lika Srpska came from Bosnian Serb Internal Affairs Minister operation. The most detailed description is in Zeljko Grigurinovic,
Tomo Kovac. Djoko Kesic and Zoran Lukic , “ Banja Luka Coinci “ Action Stopped on Demand of the Amercans? Why Croatian
dentally Avoided Knin's Fate ; About a Hundred Special Troops Army Action ‘Una' Failed , in September 1995, About Which Gen
Prevented the Krajina's Fall,” Belgrade Tanjug 27 September 1995, erals Bobetko and Cervenko Still Polemicize." Zagreb Obzor,
p. 6 and D. A., “ Journalists As Spies,” Pale Oslobodjenje, 13 September 1997, pp. 32-33. The attack was also covered in the
15 November 1995, p . 5, a press conference by Tomo Kovac. contemporary Serb press reports, including SRNA , Banja Luka
704 The Washington Post“ Bosnian Standoff: Serbs Stiffen Defenses Srpski Radio , and Belgrade Tanjug , during the period 18-20 Sep
AgainstMuslim , Croatian Forces " by John Pomfret, 21 September tember 1995 .
1995 . 710 Many of the VRS's brigadesmaintained a reserve garrison bat
705 The experience of the 5th Kozara Brigade is a good example of talion that wasmanned by elderly reservists over 50 and 60 years
how rapidly the VRS units had been shifted and inserted into battle of age — who were only mobilized as a last resort. These reserve
on 17-18 September. The counterattack involved one wing of the battalions in the 1st Novigrad Infantry, 11th Dubica Infantry, and
5th Kozara and 6th Sanske attacking from Sanski Most toward 1st Gradiska Light Infantry Brigades had the responsibility of
Zegar on the western bank of the Sana while one battalion from the guarding the Una and Sava River sectors opposite Croatia .
711
5th Kozara crossed the Sana River further south at Vrhpolje in an Zeljko Grigurinovic , “Action Stopped on Demand of the Amer
attempt to envelop the 502nd and 510th Brigades. Boro Grubic , cans? Why Croatian Army Action ‘Una' Failed, in September
“ Life Is Flowing Upstream ,” Krajiski Vojnik, November 1995 , 1995 , About Which Generals Bobetko and Cervenko Still Polemi
pp . 36-37 : cize." Zagreb Obzor, 13 September 1997, pp. 32-33.
712
[ The counterattack ]began at about0400 hours. There was a Banja Luka Srpski Radio described the destruction of elements
drizzling rain . The Sana was cold , it frothed as it flowed of the “ Black Mambas,” the 1st Battalion /2nd Guards Brigade, in
around what was left of the demolished bridge at Vrhpolje . Dubica. Banja Luka Srpski Radio 19 September 1995 .
Someone had already stretched a cable to be used to get to 713 Zeljko Grigurinovic, “ Action Stopped on Demand of the Ameri
the other shore. It came up to some people's chests, others cans? Why Croatian Army Action ‘Una' Failed, in September
to the neck, some to the waist ... wehad covered 300 kilo 1995 , About Which Generals Bobetko and Cervenko Still Polemi
meters ; some of them went directly from the bus into com cize." Zagreb Obzor, 13 September 1997, pp. 32-33.
bat, because there was no line of defense at all ... You 714 Bobetko was highly critical of the operation , slamming the HV
throw the enemyback , you get a break , and then you have to for poor intelligence and preparation , as well as criticizing General
ford the Sana, to chase the Muslimsand not give them a Cervenko for failing to be present in Zagreb or on the scene during
chance to dig in ... the action. Cervenko apparently was in Dubrovnik at the time.
Wemopped up the terrain by bringing one company after Janko Bobetko , Sve Moje Bitke (All My Battles), Zagreb : Vlastita
another of ourbattalion into the fighting over the course of Naklada, 1996 , pp . 511-512.
an hour. 715 Only one officer was relieved,Major General Vinko Vrbanec,
Boro Grubic , “ Unit at the Ready," Srpska Vojska , 3 November the Chief of Operations on the HV Main Staff. Zagreb HTV
1995 , pp. 22-23 . See Zemka Seferagic , “ 5th LARD PVO (5th Light 23 September 1995; Davor Butkovic , “ Why Have Croatian Gener
Air Defense Artillery -Rocket Battalion ): Successful War Road," als Vinko Vrbanec, Nojko Marinovic , Ante Roso, and Djuro Basa
Sarajevo Prva Linija ,March 1997, p . 22 , for a discussion of the 5th rac Been Dismissed,” Zagreb Globus, 29 September, pp. 2, 50.
716
Air Defense Battalion's efforts to save the nearly encircled 510th “ Doboj” OperationalGroup 9 was under the command ofMajor
Brigade . General Vladimir Arsic.
For a firsthand account, see Anthony Loyd, My War Gone By, I 717 The “ Ozren" TacticalGroup consisted of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and
Miss It So, London: Doubleday, 1999, pp . 295-311. Loyd was 4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigades ,usually reinforced with at least
present at the 502nd Brigade forward command post. one or two additional light infantry brigades, often the 1st Prnjavor,
706 Pale Srpska TV 21 September 1995; Mirjana Micic , “ Sweating 1st Vucjak , 1st Krnjin , and /or 1st Srbac Light Infantry Brigades.
at Minus 10 ," Srpska Vojska , 3 November 1995, pp . 28-29 , an arti Up to a battalion from the 2nd Armored Brigade probably sup
cle on the 65th Protection Regiment; Milan Celeketic , “ Defense of ported the tactical group, plus a battery from the 1st Mixed Artil
the Krajina," Krajiski Vojnik , June 1996 , p . 25,an article on the lery Regiment. OG -level units such as the 9th Reconnaissance
16th Krajina Motorized Brigade ; “ Where It Was Hardest, There Company and 9th Military Police Battalion ,plus the 5th (Doboj)
Was the 4th Battalion : From Romanija to the Una and Sava ," Kra Detachment/MUP Special Police Brigade, could reinforce the TG
jiski Vojnik, June 1996 , p. 36 , an article on the 4th Battalion /43rd necessary .
Motorized Brigade.

421
718 740
Sarajevo Prva Linija , “Great Victories of the Republic of Bos Reuters, “Government Troops Report Gains Across Bosnia,"
nia-Herzegovina Army in the Defensive Liberating War: Bosnian 11 September 1995 .
Hurricane," October 1997, pp. 22-23. 741 Reuters , " Serbs Flee Croat,Moslem Advance in Central Bos
719 Paris AFP, 28 May 1995. FBIS Vienna AU2805183595, nia," 13 September 1995 .
2818352 May 1995 . 742 Paris AFP, 12 September 1995. FBIS Vienna AU1209174295 ,
720 The recently formed 9th Muslimski Brigade served as one of the 121742Z September 1995 .
2nd Corps assault formations during this attack. "Second Anniver 743 Sarajevo Prva Linija , " Second Anniversary of the 9th Muslim
sary of the 9th Muslim Liberation BrigadeMarked : Heroes, Sons Liberation BrigadeMarked :Heroes, Sons of the Drina" by Said
of the Drina" by Said Huremovic, Sarajevo Prva Linija, October Huremovic , October 1997, p . 11.FBIS Reston VA 98E08031C ,
1997. FBIS Reston VA 98E08031C , 1220077 January 1998. 1220077 January 1998 .
721 The ARBiH 222nd Liberation Brigade also appears to have 744 The 222nd Liberation Brigade had been temporarily reassigned
functioned as a spearhead unit involved in this attack. Banja Luka to help the 24th Division assist the survivors of the Srebrenica
Srpska Televizija, 5 June 1995. FBIS Vienna AU0606190095, escape attempt in late July ,but the brigade was transferred back to
061900Z June 1995. the 22nd Division before the start of this operation . Sarajevo Prva
722 Reuters, “ Bosnia Fighting Surges, Pressure on UN Grows" by Linija ,March 1997, pp. 23-24.
Kurt Schork , 29 May 1995. 745 Travnik Bosnjak, Interview with Major Ibrahim Salihovic, Com
723
Belgrade Tanjug, 29 May 1995. FBIS London LD2905164895, mander of the 211th Liberation Brigade of the Army of the Repub
291648Z May 1995. lic of Bosnia -Herzegovina , by Edhem Ekmescic, “WeHave to
724 Sarajevo Radio , 11 June
1995. FBIS London LD1106174495 . Have a Strong Army Because it is the Guarantee of Our Return
111744Z June 1995. Home!" FBIS Reston VA 96BA0155B , 060140Z March 1996 .
746
725 Sarajevo Radio , 29 May 1995. FBIS Vienna AU2905222095 , Sarajevo Prva Linija , " Springtime in May” by Said Huremovic ,
292220Z May 1995. May 1997, pp . 23-24. FBIS Reston VA 98E08093A , 022350Z
726 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija, 9 June 1995. FBIS Vienna April 1998 .
AU1206202695 , 1220252 June 1995. 747 An additional VRS brigade— probably the 1st Krnjin Light
727 Belgrade SRNA 30 May 1995. FBIS London LD3005200995, Infantry Brigade , but possibly the 1st Prnjavor or 1st Vucjak
3020092 May 1995. Brigade — may have been deployed between the 2nd and 4th Ozren
728 Reuters, “ Bosnian Serbs, Facing Assault, Seek Volunteers” by Brigades near Seona.
748
Tim Judah, 30 May 1995.
749 Sarajevo Prva Linija ,March 1997, pp. 23-24 .
729 The Serb proclamation called for Sarajevo Radio 11 September 1995. FBIS London
All those who bear a Serb name and have Serb blood in their LDI 109214795, 1121472 September 1995.
veins to take a gun and march under the flag of liberation in 750 Reuters, “Government Troops Report Gains Across Bosnia "
order to resolutely stop the Muslim offensive on Ozren ... 11 September 1995 .
This is a criticalmoment for the entire Serb nation, our ' to 751 Sarajevo Radio , 12 September 1995.
FBIS Vienna
be or not to be ...Let us raise the banner of victory and AU1209152295, 121522Z September 1995 .
defeat the united enemies of Serbdom and the Orthodox 752 Sarajevo Radio , 13 September 1995. FBIS Vienna
Church and all the hellish plans of the world power players. AU 1309153195 , 1315312 September 1995 .
Belgrade SRNA, 30 May 1995. FBIS London 753 Sarajevo Radio , 14 September 1995.FBIS Vienna
LD3005160295, 301602Z May 1995. AU 1409182495, 141824Z September 1995.
754 Sarajevo Radio , 15 September 1995. FBIS Vienna
730 Reuters , “ Bosnian Army Squeezes Serb Bastion in Pincer " by
Davor Huic , 30 May 1995 . AU1509105895 , 151058Z September 1995 .
731 Belgrade Tanjug, 4 June 1995.
FBIS London LD0406194895 , 755 Reuters, “ Croats,Moslems Take Key Town from Serbs — UN ,"
0419487 June 1995 . 13 September 1995 .
732 756 International relief workers in the area also reported seeing sur
Sarajevo Radio , 4 November 1995 ; London The Guardian ,
28 November 1995 ; Paris AFP, 28 December 1995 . rounded Serb soldiers surrendering near Mt. Ozren, though the UN
733
Sarajevo Radio , 28 July 1995. FBIS Vienna AU2807192395 , could not corroborate these reports. Reuters, “Bosnian Serb Refu
2819232 July 1995.
734 gees Flee North to Banja Luka" by Dan De Luce , 14 September
Banja Luka Srpska Televizija, 14 August 1995. FBIS Vienna 1995 .
AU 1408202595 , 1420252 August 1995 . 757 Pale Srpska Televizija, 12 September 1995. FBIS London
735 Reuters, “ Serb Commander Rejects Weapons Withdrawal LD1209210995, 1221097 September 1995.
Order," 30 August 1995. 758 Serb media sources later reported that some 1,500 Serb soldiers
736
Sarajevo Radio , 31 August 1995. FBIS Vienna AU3108113795, and civilians did not escape in time and that they remained in occu
3111377 August 1995. pied Vozuca after the Muslim takeover. Atleast 12,000 refugees
737 The communications tower, atop 883-meter Kraljica Peak , the successfully fled the Vozuca area, streaming into Doboj in mid
second-highest elevation on Mt. Ozren, was struck again by NATO September. Belgrade SRNA 20 September 1995, FBIS London
aircraft on 6 and 7 September. Belgrade Tanjug , 6 September 1995. LD2009124795 , 2012472 September 1995 ; Banja Luka Srpski
FBIS London LD0609132295, 0613227 September 1995.Bel Radio , 19 September 1995. FBIS Vienna AU2009160995 ,
grade Tanjug, 7 September 1995. FBIS London LD0709164995 , 201609Z September 1995.
759 Sarajevo Prva Linija , “ Five Years of the 7th VitezMechanized
071649Z September 1995. The third strike,on 7 September,
demolished the main relay tower. Sarajevo Radio , 7 September Brigade: Always in the First Rank,” by T. Terovic , November 1997 ,
1995. FBIS Vienna AU0709185895 , 071858Z September 1995. pp. 22-23. FBIS Reston VA 98E08079C , 111455Z March 1998.
738 Reuters, “NATO Strikes Serbs After Shelling in Tuzla ," 760 Sarajevo Prva Linija , “ Five Years of the 7th Vitez Mechanized
10 September 1995. Brigade” by T. Terovic, November 1997, pp . 22-23. FBIS Reston
739 Reuters, " Croats Seize Serb Areas, NATO Bombing Continues," VA , 98E08079C , 111455Z March 1997.
12 September 1995 .

422
761 Travnik Bosnjak, “ Naprijed Should Not Have Been Burned " by 765 Formerly known as Operational Group 7 -South . 37th Division
R. Ibrahimofendic, 3 October 1995. FBIS Reston VA , 96BA0100B , Elements known to have fought in Operation “Uragan ” inlcude the
151942Z February 1996 . 327th Brigade from Maglaj and the 377th (formerly 207th ) Moun
762 tain Brigade from Jelah . Other brigades almost certainly also con
763 Formerly the 2nd Corps's 2nd OperationalGroup .
Major Dragan Vasiljevic, commander of the 1st Ozren Light tributed to the fighting east of Maglaj, including the 37th Division's
Infantry Brigade, described the situation VRS forces faced on elite 375th Liberation Brigade. See Sarajevo Prva Linija , “ On the
17 September in Srpska Vojska : Anniversary of the 207th ChivalrousMountain Brigade: the Fierce
On 17 September, I was receiving reports from commander Pousorska: Chivalrous Brigade” by Said Huremovic,March -April
Jovicic of the 1stBattalion that the situation on his right 1998, pp . 34-35 . FBIS Reston VA , 161818Z September 1998.
flank was in order, and this was confirmed by commander 766 Zagreb HINA 18 September 1995. FBIS Vienna
Mecin ofthe 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Ozren Brigade, AU1809122595, 1812252 September 1995.
although ...he lacked two or three platoons to close the line 767 Reuters, “Bosnian Serbs in Mass Exodus as Tide of War Turns"
in the area of Micijevici. I decided at once to send another by Dan De Luce, 15 September 1995.
three platoons to that area ... Less than an hour later, I 768 Later figures suggest the numbermay have been closer to 7,000 .
myself went to make the rounds of the army sent to help the In any case, the Bosnian Serb authorities responded by beating up
2nd Ozren Brigade and to spend the night with them , and evicting hundredsof Bosnian Muslim residents from Doboj in
because I expected a new attack in the morning. In the area retaliation and to make room for displaced Serb refugees streaming
of Azbest (an asbestos mine), I met some forces coming into the city. Reuters, “ Serbs Expel Hundreds of Moslems From
from the direction ofManastir [an Orthodoxmonastery near Doboj,” 22 September 1995.
the frontline) with one of my platoons. They told me that 769 Belgrade Tanjug , 16 September 1995. FBIS London
there was no longer a line and that the entire 2nd Ozren Bri LD1609123395, 161233Z September 1995 .
gade had withdrawn. I sentthem back , and then near 770 Belgrade SRNA, 16 September 1995. FBIS London
Manastir I saw the chaotic situation ; there were about 300 LD1609144695, 161446Z September 1995.
771
men , five or six tanks , self- propelled guns, three-barrel guns Sarajevo Radio , 16 September 1995. FBIS London
(air defense artillery ),mortars, and material. LD1609175095, 1617507 September 1995.
I stopped a tank which headed a column, turned it athwart 772 Sarajevo Radio , 16 September 1995. FBIS London
on the road, and thus prevented the column from retreating LD1609203395, 162039Z September 1995.
773
further. Atthat time, I learned from the commander of the Sarajevo Radio , 18 September 1995. FBIS Vienna
1st Battalion (of the 1st Ozren Brigade) that there was no AU1809111495 , 1811147 September 1995.
line from Borice to Bukovica (a distance of about 15 km ). I 774 Reuters, "Government Troops Sweep North on Ozren Moun
succeeded in persuading the soldiers to get down from the tain " by Kurt Schork , 19 September 1995.
775 Sarajevo Radio , 19 September 1995. FBIS Vienna
vehicle , although someof the soldiers were reluctant.
Srpska Vojska then writes: AU1909112195, 1911212 September 1995.
That was where commander Vasiljevic called for an 776 The Doboj area was shelled heavily on 20 September 1995, with
advance toward the village of Stupari in order to protect the -unusually — many more Bosnian Army shells going in than Bos
right flank ofthe 1st Battalion and its possible withdrawal. nian Serb shells coming out. Over 1,000 shells were fired atDoboj,
It was nighttime, about 2200 hours. The men were uneasy according to UN officials, with only some 300 shells being fired
because they did not know where the enemy was and back in response. Paris AFP 20 September 1995 , FBIS Vienna
whether he had already taken up new lines.Major Vasiljevic AU2009095395, 200953Z September 1995.
sat in the Puh [a light truck ] and departed in the direction of 777 Reuters, “ Croats Quit Offensive,MoslemsFight on in East” by
Sizje . Douglas Hamilton , 21 September 1995.
Vasiljevic states: 778 Reuters, “ Serb Weapons Pullback Slow ,MoslemsSeize New
I told mymen that if I got through alive they were to go Town” by Kurt Schork , 17 September 1995.
down to Stuparska Rijeka and set up the line there , and if I 779 Skoric was severely wounded during the fighting. See M.Djuk
encountered the enemy, to organize defense at that place. vanovic , “ We Had To Hold Out," Srpska Vojska, 28 December
Traveling crossroads, Irealized Sizje at about 2400 hours. 1995 , pp . 26-27 FBIS Reston 96BA02150 , 102058Z April 1996
Here, I found commander Jovicic ,who familiarizedmewith and “ Colonel Miko Skoric : From Victory to Victory," Krajiski
the situation at the moment, in the end askingmeif the bat Vojnik June 1996 , pp . 38-39. FBIS Reston 98E08008A , 2820172
talion could withdraw to a new line; I did not consent to October 1997. Colonel Stankovic's position at the time was
that,because I expected that new forces would be arriving unclear,but he probably was on the “ Doboj" OG ståff, possibly the
as promised throughout the day. chiefof staff. Banja Luka Srpski Radio , 18 September 1995. FBIS
I called for commander Djukic [" Ozren ” TG commander Vienna AU1909164095 , 191640Z September 1995.
LTC Novak Djukic ), who arrived in Sizje at 0100 hours. I 780 The 35th Division/ 3rd Corps also hit the 3rd Ozren Brigade on
told him that we did not have a right flank and that unless 23 September, seizing three or four villages. Reuters, “ Bosnian
new forces arrived during the night and closed the line, I GovernmentUnveils Cease -Fire Terms" By Kurt Schork, 22 Sep
would call for the withdrawal of the battalion to a new line. tember 1995 .
When it was established after detailed verification that noth 781 An ARBiH 3rd Corps advance captured several villages on
ing was to come of the arrivalof fresh forces and closing the 23 September.Sarajevo Radio , 23 September 1995. FBIS London
line, silence ensued. We exchanged looks, and then battal LD2309192295, 231922Z September 1995 .
ion commander Jovicic ordered the withdrawal of the unit 782 The ARBiH's measured advances continued on 24 September,
according to plan, and Colonel Djukic did not react to that. when the ARBiH announced the capture of the town on Mladici.
Troops from the 2nd Ozren Brigade finally closed the gap on the Sarajevo Radio, 24 September 1995. FBIS London
1st Ozren's right flank on 19 September. LD2409185195, 2418517 September 1995.
M.Djukvanovic , “We Had To Hold Out," Srpska Vojska, 783 Paris AFP, 21 September 1995. FBIS Vienna AU2109082295 ,
28 December 1995,pp. 26-27 . FBIS Reston 96BA02150 , 102058Z 210821Z September 1995.
April 1996 .
764
Sarajevo Radio, 18 September 1995. FBIS London
LD1809220695, 1822062 September 1995 .

423
 784 Zagreb HINA 5 October 1995.FBIS Vienna AU0510140895, had previously commanded the VRS 1stGuards Motorized Bri
051404Z October 1995 . gadebefore taking over as 30th Division chief of staff in late sum
785 Sarajevo Radio , 6 October 1995.FBIS Vienna AU0610184795, mer or early fall.
0618472 October 1995 . 197" The WartimeJourney of the 1st Armored: A Striking Fist,"
786
Reuters, “ Bosnian Battlefields Static Pending Cease -Fire " by Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996 , pp . 26-29 ; Slavisa Sabljic , “Lest We
Kurt Schork , 5 October 1995 . Forget — The Government's Battle ‘ Steel Against Steel,' " Srpska
787 Reuters, “ Bosnian Army ClaimsGains on Ozren Mountain," Vojska, June 1996 , p . 24 .
7 October 1995. 798 Boro Grubic , "Life Is Flowing Upstream ,” Krajiski Vojnik,
788 The brigade was very quickly shifted back to western Bosnia , November 1995, pp . 36-37.
after the fall ofMrkonjic Grad. “ The Infernal Fall of 1995: From 799 The 7th “ Bosnjak” Reconnaissance -Sabotage Battalion rein
Area to Area of Krajina,” Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996 , p . 22. FBIS forced the Sana River line. The 707th Mountain Brigade was the
Reston 98E08023B , 0520007 December 1997, an article on the formation, however, which did not arrive on time. Sead Suskic ,
16th Krajina Motorized Brigade. “With Rifle in Hand,” Travnik Bosnjak, 7 November 1995,
789 Sarajevo Prva Linija ,“ Great Victories of the Republic of pp . 11-13.
Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in the Defensive Liberating War: 800 Pale Srpska TV, SRNA, and Belgrade Tanjug reporting covering
Bosnian Hurricane," October 1997, pp. 22-23. the period 3 to 6 October provide a detailed account of the VRS/
790 The core of the “ pursuit detachments” appears to have been MUP/SDG counterattack. For a description of the SDG's promi
most ofthe vehicles and personnel of the 2nd Corps' 2nd Armored nent role in this action ,see “Guard Near Kljuc," Belgrade Vecernje
Battalion (later to become the ARBiH 2nd Armored Brigade). Novosti, 4 October 1995. The commander of the Bosnian Serb Spe
Sarajevo Prva Linija, “ Anniversary of the 2nd Armored Brigade of cial Police Brigade,Goran Saric, also described the role of his men
the Army of the Republic of Bosnia -Herzegovina: Armored Units and the SDG in the Kljuc counterattack . See Darko Grabovac ,
of the 2nd Corps” May 1997, pp . 20-21. “ Serbs of a Special Breed," Banja Luka Glas Srpski, 21-22 October
791 Sarajevo Prva Linija , “Great Victories of the Republic of 1995 , pp. 2-3 , an interview with Goran Saric . See also “ The Infer
Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in the Defensive Liberating War: nal Fall of 1995: From Area to Area of Krajina,” Krajiski Vojnik ,
Bosnian Hurricane” October 1997, pp. 22-23. June 1996 , p . 22, an article on the 16th KrajinaMotorized Brigade.
792 See Belgrade Tanjug and Banja Luka Srpski Radio reporting 801 “ The Infernal Fall of 1995 : From Area to Area of Krajina,” Kra
from 22 September to 1 October. See also Milan Celeketic , jiski Vojnik, June 1996 , p . 22, an article on the 16th Krajina Motor
“ Defense of the Krajina,” Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996 , p . 25, an ized Brigade.
article on the 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade ; “Where It Was 802 The 708th Lightand 712th Mountain Brigades helped block the
Hardest, There Was the 4th Battalion : From Romanija to the Una 5th Kozara and 6th Sanske Brigades' attack atKrasulje,while the
and Sava," Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996 , p . 36 , an article on the 4th 707th and 717th Mountain Brigades bolstered the Sana River
Battalion/43rd Motorized Brigade;Mirjana Micic, “ Sweating at defenses atKljuc. Sead Suskic, “With Rifle in Hand," Travnik
Minus 10 ," Srpska Vojska, 3 November 1995 , pp. 28-29, an article Bosnjak, 7 November 1995, pp. 11-13.
on the 65th Protection Regiment. 803 The 5th Kozara and 6th Sanske Brigadeswere also reinforced
793 Milan Celeketic , “ Defense of the Krajina,” Krajiski Vojnik , June with the 2nd Reconnaissance-Sabotage Detachment/2nd Krajina
1996 , p . 25. Corps.
794 See Sead Suskic, “ With Rifle in Hand,” Travnik Bosnjak, 804 This account of “ Juzni Potez" is based primarily on General
7 November 1995 , pp. 11-13, for a discussion of the 17th Krajina Ante Gotovina's account in Offensive Battles and Operationsof the
Mountain Brigade'smovements during this action and Zarif Safic , Croatian Army and HVO Knin : Split Corps District, 1996 ,
“No One Can Prevent Us From Taking, Taking Back, What pp. 103-115; the abbreviated version of “ Juzni Potez" in Zagreb
Belongs to Us!” Travnik Bosnjak, 9 January 1996 , pp. 12-14. On Velebit appears to be based on Gotovina's study. See Gordan
the VRS side , the 17th Kljuc had theMixed Battalion /6th Sanske Radosevic, “ Southern Move," Zagreb Velebit, 11 October 1996 ,
Infantry Brigade attached, while the 4th Battalion /43rd Motorized pp . 12-15 .
Brigade was also fighting in this sector. In addition, the 2nd Kra 805 Zeljko Stipanovic, “ Defense of the Homeland — A Sacred Task ,"
jina Infantry and 11th Mrkonjic Light Infantry Brigades probably Zagreb Velebit, 8 December 1995, p . 14.
was also arriving in the area, together with elements of the MUP 806 ColonelGeneral Ante Gotovina, Offensive Battles and Opera
Special Police Brigade. Slavisa Sabljic, “ One Day in the Life of tions of the Croatian Army and HVO Knin : Split Corps District,
Officer Branislav Bojic's Unit: They Have Never Knuckled 1996 , p . 106 .
Under,” Krajiski Vojnik, December 1995, p . 51, an article on the 4th 807The Reconnaissance -Sabotage Company/4th Guards Brigade
Battalion/43rd Motorized Brigade ; Interview with Rajko Vasil played a key role in forcing an opening through the VRS defenses
jevic , War Bulletin of the6th Sanske Infantry Brigade, September by capturing the important Lisina Mountain , southwest of Mrkon
1995 , p . 3. jic Grad. The company captured it once , but a VRS counterattack
795 The 501st Mountain Brigade reached the road junction at Cad forced it back off. Itwas recaptured against “ extremely strong
javica by 21 September, and the 17th KrajinaMountain Brigade resistance.” Zeljko Stipanovic, “ Proven Countless Times,” Zagreb
appears to have taken the important 1,200-meter Tisovac mountain Velebit, 19 January 1996 , pp. 14-15, an article on the Reconnais
at the foot of the Manjaca area by 29 September. See Sead Suskic, sance-Sabotage Company/4th Guards Brigade. The commander of
“With Rifle in Hand,” Travnik Bosnjak, 7 November 1995, the Armored Battalion/4th Guards Brigade, Andrija Matijas
pp. 11-13 on the 17th Krajina Mountain Brigade; Danica Juricic, " Pauk," who had foughtin the brigade throughoutthe war, includ
" We Will Liberate Banja Luka and Bijeljina,” Split Slobodna ing at Dubrovnik in 1992, was killed in action entering Mrkonjic
Dalmacija, 21 September 1995, p . 4 , an interview with Division Grad . Gordan Radosevic, “ Southern Move,” Zagreb Velebit,
General Atif Dudakovic ;and Reuters, “ Bosnian Army Advances in 11 October 1996 , pp. 12-15.
Western Bosnia - Source," 29 September 1995. 808 Counterattacks along thenorthwest side of town, by the 11th
79 Colonel Lazic was the chief of staff of the 30th Infantry Divi Mrkonjic Light Infantry and 3rd Serbian Brigades and apparently
sion. General Zec appears to have divided his division into two supported byMUP Special Police units, failed to check the 4th
operational groups: OG - 1 under his command on the left, defend Guards and 1st HGZ.Gordan Radosevic, “Southern Move,” Zagreb
ing the Travnik -Skender Vakuf (Knezovo) line over to the Vrbas Velebit, 11 October 1996 , pp . 12-15.
River; and OG -2 under his chief of staff, Lazic , covering from the
Vrbas over to Kljuc and the boundary with OG - 10 . Colonel Lazic

424
809 Neven Miladin , “ On the Wings of Victory," Zagreb Velebit, 821 ARBiH commander General Rasim Delic begged Izetbegovic to
12 July 1996 , pp. 16-17 , an article on the 2nd HVO Guards let the fighting continue, arguing that the army could gain addi
Brigade. tional ground.Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia : Death of a
810 Sefko Hodzic, “ I Congratulate the People of Sarajevo ,” Sarajevo Nation (Revised) London : Penguin , 1996 , p . 369; Reuters “ Izetbe
Oslobodjenje, 12 January 1996 , p. 5 , an interview with Division govic Demands Serb Concessions For Truce" by Kurt Schork,
General Atif Dudakovic . 28 September 1995. In many interviews and public statements at
811 In OG “ South ," the 17th Krajina Mountain , 707th Mountain , the time and in the immediate aftermath of the war,many ARBiH
and 717th Mountain Brigades, plus the 7th “ Bosnjak” Reconnais commanders and soldiers , including Generals Dudakovic and
sance- Sabotage Battalion and someMUP special police , appear to Alagic, claimed that the West had stopped them from gaining addi
have led the attack, while the 708th Light and 712th Mountain Bri tional ground they could have taken . Despite these strongly held
gades guarded the right flank near Krasulje . Sead Suskic , “With beliefs, it seems unlikely that the ARBiH could have gained signif
Rifle in Hand," Travnik Bosnjak , 7 November 1995, pp . 11-13. icant amounts of territory on its own in the near term against
812 See Sead Suskic , “ With Rifle in Hand,” Travnik Bosnjak, strengthened VRS forces around Prijedor-Banja Luka.
7 November 1995, pp . 11-13 for a short discussion of OG 822 Reuters “ Clinton Announces Bosnian Cease-Fire, Peace Talks”
" South’s” role in the fighting around Krasulje - Tomina-Gornja by Kurt Schork, 5 October 1995; Reuters “ Factions Manoeuver
Tramosnja against the VRS 5th Kozara and 6th Sanske Brigades. Before Bosnia Truce Begins" by Kurt Schork, 7 October 1995.
The commander of the 708th Brigade was killed in action during 823 The US pressure to halt theHV/HVO operations apparently
the fighting came in September after “Maestral.” Silber and Little, p. 368. Nev
813 The 15th Bihac appears to have fallen back toward SanskiMost ertheless, Zagreb went ahead and ordered “ Juzni Potez" in October.
during the initial retreat from Bihac,while the 17th had been 824 Reuters “Croats,Serbs Strike Preliminary Dealon Slavonia" by
shifted to the SanskiMost area from Kljuc. Peter Humphrey, 4 October 1995; Reuters “ Serbs, Croats to Con
814 The 502nd Mountain Brigade, the Guards Brigade, and the 5th tinue Slavonia Talks” by Zoran Radosavljevic, 23 October 1995.
Military Police Battalion “ liberated " Sanski Most. Edin Zeljkovic, 825 Reuters “ Bosnian Enemies Sign Deal for Midnight Cease -Fire "
“Mozda Messa I Nije Napisao ‘Tvrdani' ?” Travnk Bosnjak, by Angus MacSwan , 11 October 1995.
7 November 1995, p . 18; “Where It Was Hardest, There Was the 826 Reuters “ Bosnian Foes Meet To Cement Truce in Northwest,"
4th Battalion : From Romanija to the Una and Sava,” Krajiski by AngusMacSwan , 20 October 1995 .
Vojnik , June 1996 , p . 36 , an article on the 4th Battalion/43rd 827 Reuters, “London Conference Takes on Daunting Bosnia Task "
Motorized Brigade. by Lyndsay Griffiths, 8 December 1995 .
815 " Where It Was Hardest, There Was the 4th Battalion : From 828 Reuters, “ London Conference Discusses Yugoslav Refugees" by
Romanija to the Una and Sava," Krajiski Vojnik, June 1996 , Lyndsay Griffiths, 9 December 1995 .
p . 36 , an article on the 4th Battalion/43rd Motorized Brigade. 829 Reuters, “ Bosnia Framework Set by London Conference"
816 The 5th Corps appears to have halted a VRS counterattack 9 December 1995 .
toward Sanski Most during these final clashes. See Zemka. Sefer 830 For the most detailed account of the Dayton talks, see Richard
agic , “ The Anniversary of the Formation of the 517th Liberation Holbrooke, To End a War,New York : Random House, 1998 .
LightBrigade, 15 August 1997: On the Road to Freedom ,” Sara 831 President Tudjman announced in January 1996 that the HV lost
jevo Prva Linija , September 1997, p. 23. 473 troops killed in action and 2,017 wounded in action during
817 GeneralMladic and the VRS believed that a cease-fire was vital 1995 , including 228 dead and 1,205 wounded during " Oluja " and
to ensure that no additional territory was lost, and, if the same terri 60 dead and 186 wounded in “ Bljesak.” Tudjman also claimed that
tory had to be given up in the negotiations, it was better to have 9,909 Bosnian Croats — both military and civilian - died during the
achieved a cease-fire first so that the population could safely emi entire Bosnian war,while 20,649 were wounded ,about 1.3 percent
grate with their belongings rather than fleeing with only what they of the population according to the 1991 census. The bulk of these,
had on their backs. Belgrade Telegrafwrites: probably 65 to 70 percent, were HVO soldiers . The HVO Orasje
GeneralMladic demanded that the army remain in its cur Corps District lost 3,000 dead and 10,000 wounded alone. Presi
rent positionsuntil peace is signed , and only later, if need dent Tudjman's Address to Parliament, Zagreb Radio 15 January
be, have both the army and the civilians withdraw , so that 1996 ; Neven Miladin , “ The Pride and Strength of Croatian Posav
the latter would be able to pack up their belongings in peace ina,” Velebit, 28 November 1997 , pp. 14-15 .
and not flee with plastic bags in their hands. 832 Bosnian Army casualties during the war have notbeen publicly
Djoko Kesic and Zoran Lukic , “ Banja Luka Coincidentally released. In early 1995, the Bosnian Government's Ministry of
Avoided Knin's Fate : About a Hundred Special Troops Prevented Health and Social Welfare claimed 105,000 Muslim civilians and
the Krajina's Fall, “ Belgrade Telegraf, 27 September 1995, p . 6 . soldiershad been killed . If true, the bulk of these probably died
818 Reuters “ US Brokers Ground-Breaking Yugoslav Talks” by during 1992. It's unlikely that this exceptionally high death rate
Sean Maguire , 1 September 1995. continued after 1992 but probably was more in line with the 1.3 to
819 Reuters “ Yugoslav Parties Take Tentative Step To Peace" by 1.5 percent dead associated with the VRS andHVO , although pos
Philippe Naughton, 8 September 1995; Reuters, “ Holbrooke State sibly somewhat higher, given that the ARBiH was often on the
ment on Bosnia Agreement," 8 September 1995 ; Reuters, “ Eastern attack and relied heavily on itsmanpower. An estimate of 25,000 to
Slavonia SpilsGood Day for Balkan Diplomacy” by Jovan 30,000 official ARBiH soldiers killed in action seems likely - as
Kovacic, 8 September 1995. opposed to the many armed civilianswho died in 1992 and proba
820 Reuters, “US Launches Fresh Round of Bosnia Peace Talks ” by bly were not on official TerritorialDefense or ARBiH rolls
Jovan Kovacic , 13 September 1995. The key breakthrough during although it could be higher.
the September negotiations came on 26 September in New York ,
where the three sides agreed to constitutional principles for a Bos
nian state . Reuters, " Yugoslav Parties Strike Key Deal at Talks" by
CarolGiacomo, 26 September 1995 ; Reuters, “ Text of JointState
ment on Bosnia," 26 September 1995.

425
833 According to postwar statements from the Bosnian Serb 835 Dragan Stegic , “ Place in History Already Reserved for Fighters
Defense Ministry and from General Milovanovic — while serving of the 16th 'Black' Brigade: Sixty Days of Hell,” Krajiski Vojnik,
as RS Defense Minister — the VRS lost 18,543 soldiers killed and December 1995.
about 53,000 wounded, of which 36,543 soldiers remain " dis 836 With the reassignment of the 16th Krajina Motorized Brigade to
abled.” (It is unclear how the RS defines disabled.) The number of theManjaca sector, Colonel Lazic handed over command of the
VRS dead is about 1.4 percentof the 1991 estimated Bosnian Serb area to the 16th's commander, Colonel Vlado Topic . As com
population . The equivalent US killed figure, as a percentage of the mander of a new Operational Group -1, Topic had under his control
US population (about 273 million , according to the official 1997 the 16th , the 7th Motorized , the 2nd Krajina Infantry, the 11th
estimate ), would be some 3.8 million. Clearly, Bosnian Serb sol Mrkonjic Light Infantry, and the remnants of the 3rd Serbian Bri
diers knew how to fight— and die . Belgrade Beta , 10 March 1998 ; gades. In addition, he probably would have received the entire 1st
Mirha Dedic, “ If They Try To TakeMe to The Hague by Force , I Armored Brigade (elements were already deployed to the area ), the
Will Resist: They Should ArrestMein a Dignified Manner as They 1st, 2nd , 3rd, and 4th Banja Luka Light Infantry Brigades, the 1st
Did Talic ," Slobodna Bosna, 13 April 2000 ,pp. 28-31, an interview Sipovo Light Infantry Brigade, and the 1st Celinac Light Infantry
with GeneralManojlo Milovanovic . Brigade, plus much of the MUP Special Police Brigade.
834 GeneralMilovanovic has flatly denied that he was ordered to 837 The number of planes that flew strike missions is a little uncer
withdraw : tain , but the total was approximately 200 land- and carrier-based
I spent most of the waron the Western Front... the western combat aircraft. Additional aircraft were assigned for other, non
part of Bosnian Krajina. No one ever ordered me to retreat strike missions.
or to surrender part of our territory . I am not a politician . I 838 A total of 14 NATO nations participated in some aspect of air
can make no claims aboutwhat happened between that or operations over Bosnia between 1992 and 1995. This included the
below that. I cannot accuse a single person from the politi provision of personnel and /or aircraft for the humanitarian airlift,
cal sphere of having told me to retreat, abandon territory, the Deny Flight no- fly zone mission , and/or combat air operations
surrender a city, or surrender a unit. No one actually ever against Bosnian Serb ground forces. The participating NATO
told me that ... nations included Belgium , Canada, Denmark , France, Germany,
Hedoes strongly criticize local officials, however,who ordered the Greece, Italy,Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain , Turkey,
premature evacuation of their municipalities withoutmilitary United Kingdom , and the United States. Of these 14 countries, 12
authorization , which profoundly undermined the will to fight of provided aircraft for one or more of the UN -sponsored air mis
many Serb soldiers: sions. The nine nations that contributed aircraft for Deliberate
...But there were somecircumstances that prompted such Force itself were France,Germany, Greece , Italy,Netherlands,
actions. I will never forgive the state leadership for forming Spain , Turkey, United Kingdom , and the United States.
crisis staffs. These were crisis staffs by municipality,where 839 US aircraft,which flew about66 percent of the Deliberate Force
the commander of the crisis staff was the president of the sorties, provided about 90 percent of the suppression of air defense
municipality. And he decided, say,on the problem of evacu (SEAD ) sorties. Aircraft from Spain and Germany did the rest.
ating the population or evacuating physical property. 840 Laura Silber and Alan Little in Yugoslavia : Death of a Nation
Nowhere in the world is there a single unit in a war zone state that “ ...NATO flew 3,400 sorties, including 750 attack mis
where decisions are made by other than the commander. sions against 56 ground targets.” The authors donot state where
Accordingly, the commander is the one who also decides on they got their figures, but the numbers they provide are consistent
the evacuation of the population, on the evacuation of phys with the other available figures .
ical property, on any military retreat. Our military never 841 Of these 3,536 sorties, about 39 percentwere ground attack,
retreated anywhere, but was pushed back because of techni about 23 percentwere SEAD, about 9 percent were combat air
cal superiority ... The enemy enjoyed military, personnel, patrol, and about 30 percentwere other support (recce , elint, etc.)
and technical superiority. We were pounded by the Croats flights.
... theMuslims, and the NATO Rapid Intervention Corps. 842 Precision -guided weapons comprised about 70 percent of the
Accordingly, the superiority in equipment and personnel roughly 1,150 weapons dropped . US aircraft dropped about 88
was enormous, and there really was not any political manip percent of the precision - guided munitions. Other NATO Allies
ulation here. dropped about 85 percent of the general purpose weapons.
843
Ranko Vojvodic , “We Lost 13 Western Krajinan Municipalities See US News & World Report, “ Will This Lead to Peace ?"
Militarily: Power is Power,” Banja Luka Nezavisne Novine, 11 September 1995, for a contemporary discussion of the various
21-27 May 1997, pp. 20-22. factors pressing the Bosnian Serbs toward the negotiating table .
VRS spokesman Lieutenant ColonelMilutinovic also criticized the 844 Statement by NATO Secretary General Willy Claes, Reuters ,
local officials, nearly all of them SDS: “ NATO Planes Hit Serbs in Alliance's Biggest Action” by Philip
General Ratko Mladic's orders on organizing the Krajina Pullella , 30 August 1998 .
defense in September 1995 were carried out by the army to 845 UNPROFOR commander Janvier later expanded on this initial
the best of its ability. However, not one wartimemunicipal statementby demanding that the Serbs withdraw their weapons
presidency followed these orders. Instead, the population of from the Sarajevo TEZ , accept a ceasee - fire, and refrain from
13 Krajina municipalities was evacuated without the agree attacking the UN -declared safe areas ofGorazde or Tuzla. Reuters,
mentof military commands. " Serb Commander Rejects Weapons Withdrawal Order,"
Lieutenant ColonelMilovan Milutinovic, “ Loss of Supreme Com 30 August 1998.
846
mand,” Belgrade Nin , 1 November 1996 , pp. 19-22. See also Milja Reuters, “ Text of Statement on Air Strikes byNATO's Claes,"
Vujisic , “ The Truth About the General's Dismissal,” Belgrade 5 September 1995.
Intervju, 13 December 1996 (Internet Version), an interview with 847 Reuters, “ Serb Commander Rejects Weapons Withdrawal
Lieutenant Colonel GeneralMilan Gvero . Order," 30 August 1998 .

426
 Bosnia and Croatia 1995

Trenchlines in northern Bosnia , as seen in early 1996 . Troops from the Bosnian Army(ARBiH ) 211th Liberation
Brigade near Brcko, as seen in spring 1996 .

A Bosnian Serb Army(VRS) bunker and trench in the Ozren Mountains, as seen in early 1996 .

DIDesign Center/MPG 3826411D 04-02

427
Bosnia and Croatia 1995

Croatian Army (HV)

Mi-24 attack helicopters
at Zagreb- Pleso Airport,
as seen in early 1996.

Srebrenica area , as seen

in late 1996 .

ies

Trenchlines in northern
Bosnia , as seen in early
1996 .

DIDesign Center/MPG 3826411D 04-02

428
 Bosnia and Croatia 1
199 5

Bosnian Army ( ARBiH )

troops from the 9th
Muslim Liberation
Brigade, near Tuzla , as
seen in early 1996 .

A derelict UN Protection
Force (UNPROFOR )
BTR -80 armored
personnel carrier, as
seen in early 1996 .
2

An M - 1 Abrams tank
from the 1st US Armored
Division assigned
to the NATO - led
Implementation Force
( IFOR ), as seen in early
1996 .

STOP
IFOR
CHECKPOINT

DIDesign Center/MPG 3826411D 04-02

429
Appendix A

Order of Battle : Slovene Territorial Defense

Forces (TO ), June- July 1991

Janez Jansa , Slovene Minister of Defense

Jelko Kacin , Slovene Deputy Minster of Defense

Maj. Gen. Janez Slapar, Acting To Commander

Maj. Gen. D. Ozbolt, Slovenian To Chief of Staff

174th Territorial Defense Antisabotage Unit

1st Special Brigade of the Slovenian Ministry of Defense

(1. Specialna BrigadaMORIS )
Col. Tone Krkovic , Commander

—1st Detachment
Captain 1st Class Zvonko Zagar, Commander

-2nd Detachment
Captain 1st Class Antisa Grgantov , Commander

— 3rd Detachment
Captain 1st Class Cveto Zorko, Commander

2nd (Doljenska ) Regional Command of the Territorial Defense ,

HQ Novo Mesto
Lt. Col. Albin Gutman , Commander

—21st Regional Detachment (21. Obm STO ), HQ Novo Mesto

Captain 1st Class Janez Butara , Commander

-23rd Regional Detachment (23. Obm STO ), HQ Crnomelj

Major Janez Dragos , Commander

-25th Regional Detachment (25. Obm STO ) ,HQ Brezice

Major Ernest Breznikar, Commander

The regional commands are brigade/division- equivalent headquarters controlling TO

brigades and /or battalion -sized detachments in each localmunicipality.

431
 —27th Regional Detachment (27. Obm STO ), HQ Ribnica
MajorMilan Bavdek , Commander

3rd (Gorenjska) Regional Command of the Terrirorial Defense ,

HQ Kranj
Lt. Col. Peter Zupan , Commander

-31st Regional Detachment ( 31. Obm STO ),HQ Kranj

Major Mihael Rauter, Commander

—33rd Regional Detachment (33. Obm STO ),HQ Radovljica

Major Janez Smole, Commander

—35th Regional Detachment ( 35. Obm STO ), HQ Skofja Loka

Major Vinko Bester, Commander

4th ( Juznoprimorska) Regional Command of the Territorial Defense ,

HQ Postojna
Lt. Col. Franc Anderlic, Commander (before 30 June 1991)
Major Vojko Stembergar, Commander (after 30 June 1991)

41st Regional Detachment (41. Obm STO ), HQ Cerknica

Major Vojko Stembergar, Commander (until 30 June 1991)

43rd Regional Detachment (43. Obm STO ), HQ Izola

Major Slavko Dekleva , Commander

45th Regional Detachment (45. Obm STO ) ,HQ Sezana

Major Drago Bozac, Commander

5th (Ljubljanska ) Regional Command of the Territorial Defense ,

HQ Ljubljana
Lt. Col. Miha Butara , Commander (before 30 June 1991)
Janez Lesjak , Commander (after 30 June 1991)

-52nd Territorial Defense Brigade

-51st Regional Detachment (51. Obm STO ), HQ Ljubljana

Major Rihard Urbanc, Commander

432
 –53rd Regional Detachment (53. Obm STO ),HQ Logatec
Captain 1st Class Joze Molk , Commander

-55th Regional Detachment (55. Obm STO ) , HQ Domzale

Captain 1st Class Marjan Mahnic , Commander

-57th Regional Detachment (57. Obm STO ), HQ Grosuplje

Captain 1st Class Milos Sonc, Commander

6th (Severnoprimorska) RegionalCommand of the Territorial Defense ,

HQ Nova Gorica
Lt. Col. Bogdan Beltram

-61st Regional Detachment (61. Obm STO ), HQ Nova Gorica

Major Rafael Mokorel, Commander

-63rd Regional Detachment (63. Obm STO ),HQ Tolmin

Major Vito Berginc , Commander

7th (Vzhodnostajerska) Regional Detachment of the Territorial

Defense , HQ Maribor
Lt. Col. Vladimir Milosevic , Commander

—71st Regional Detachment (71. Obm STO ), HQ Maribor

Major Franc Rudolf, Commander

–73rd Regional Detachment (73. Obm STO ),HQ Ljutomer

Major Ljubo Draznik , Commander

-75th Regional Detachment (75. Obm STO ), HQ Murska Sobota

Major Edvard Mihalic , Commander

-77th Regional Detachment ( 77. Obm STO ), HQ Ptuj

Captain 1st Class Miran Fiser, Commander

—79th Regional Detachment ( 79. Obm STO ), HQ Slovenska Bistrica

MajorMarijan Strehar, Commander

433
8th (Zahodnostajerska) Regional Detachment of the Territorial
Defense , HQ Celje
Major mag. Viktor Krajnc, Commander

-81st Regional Detachment (81. Obm STO ), HQ Zalec

Major Adi Vidmajer, Commander

-83rd Regional Detachment ( 83. Obm STO ),HQ SlovenjGradec

Major Viktor Jeromel, Commander

-85th Regional Detachment (85. Obm STO ), HQ Slovenske Konjice

Major Alojz Groleger, Commander

-87th Regional Detachment (87. Obm STO ), HQ Trbovlje

Major Matjaz Piskur, Commander

-89th Regional Detachment (89. Obm STO ), HQ Velenje

Major Joze Prislan, Commander

510th Training Center (510. Ucni Center ), Ljubljana

Major Bojan Culigoj, Commander

710th Training Center (710. Ucni Center ),Maribor

Major Andrej Kocbek , Commander

Slovenian Ministry Of Interior (MUP) Special Police Forces

Igor Bavcar, Slovenian Minister of Internal Affairs

434
-
Appendix B

Order Of Battle : Yugoslav People's Army

( JNA ) Fifth Military District During Slovenia
Operations, June- July 1991*
V Military District ( V. Vojno oblast — V . VO ), HQ Zagreb
Col. Gen.Konrad Kolsek , Commander (to 1 July)
Col.Gen. Zivota Avramovic ( from 1 July )
Lt. Col. Gen. Andrija Raseta, Deputy Commander
Lt. Col. Gen. Prascevic, Assistant Commander and Chief of Staff

-65th Protection Motorized Regiment, HQ Zagreb

-580th Mixed Artillery Brigade, HQ Karlovac

Col. Svetozar Marjanovic, Commander

-60th Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Slovenska Bistrica

—288th Mixed Antitank Artillery Brigade, HQ Vitovitica

-149th Medium Self- Propelled Air Defense Rocket Regiment

(SA -6 /KUB - M ), HQ Zagreb - Pleso
Col. Milan Torbica , Commander

—367th Communication Regiment, HQ Samobor

- 47th Pontoon Bridge Battalion ,HQ Novo Mesto

10th (Zagreb ) Corps,HQ Zagreb [Elements deployed from Croatia into

Slovenia ]
Lt. Col. Gen. Dusan Uzelac , Commander
Maj. Gen. Ivan Stimac, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff

4th Armored Brigade, HQ Jastrebarsko

—140th Mechanized Brigade, HQ Zagreb

-622nd Motorized Brigade, Petrinja

Lt. Col. Slobodan Tarbuk , Commander

—6th Mixed Artillery Regiment,HQ Petrinja

-6th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment,HQ Petrinja

* JNA elements definitely known to have participated in the Slovenian conflict are shown in
boldface . Order of battle does not include all JNA reserve partisan divisions and brigades.

435
13th (Rijeka ) Corps, HQ Rijeka
Lt. Col. Gen.Marjan Cad , Commander
Maj. Gen. Trajce Krstovski, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff

-6th Mountain Brigade, Delnice

Lt. Col. Anton Racki, Commander

—13th Motorized Brigade, HQ Ilirska Bistrica

—236th Motorized Brigade,HQ Gospic

-13th Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Rijeka

-13th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment, HQ Rijeka

-306th Light Air Defense Artillery Regiment, HQ Karlovac

14th (Ljubljana) Corps, HQ Ljubljana

Maj. Gen. Jovan Pavlov, Commander
Col. Jovan Miskov, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff
Lt. Col. Emin Malkoc , Chief of Security

- 1st Armored Brigade, HQ Vrhnika

Lt. Col. Pane Matic , Commander

-14th Motorized Brigade, HQ Ljubljana

Col. Jovan Miskov, Commander

-228th Motorized Brigade, HQ Postojna

[Armored Battalion/ 228th Motorized Brigade located at Pivka ]

—253rd Motorized Brigade, HQ Ajdovscina

[Armored Battalion/253rd Motorized Brigade located at Vipava )

—345th Alpine Brigade, HQ Kranj

1st Battalion , HQ Tolmin
2nd Battalion , HQ Bovec
3rd Battalion , HQ Skofja Loka

- (13th Partisan Brigade , HQ Rakek )

436
-14th Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Ribnica

—14th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment, HQ Postojna

-635th Light Air Defense Artillery Regiment, HQ Ljubljana

-14th Military Police Battalion , HQ Ljubljana

-61st Border Guard Battalion , HQ Radovljica

—62nd Border Guard Battalion , HQ Tolmin

-63rd Border Guard Battalion , HQ Nova Gorica

-64th Border Guard Battalion , HQ Sezana

-Unidentified Engineer Regiment,HQ Skofja Loka

-14th Communication Battalion , Ljubljana

31st (Maribor) Corps, HQMaribor

Maj.Gen.Mico Delic , Commander
Lt. Col. Ratko Katalina, Chief of Security

-6th Motorized Brigade, HQ Celje

- 195th Motorized Brigade, HQ Maribor

—145th Motorized Brigade, HQ Novo Mesto

— ( 11th Partisan Brigade , HQ Ptuj)

— (27th Partisan Brigade, HQ Celje )

-31st Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Maribor

-417th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment, HQ Ptuj

-Light Air Defense Artillery Regiment,HQ Maribor

-31st Military Police Battalion , HQ Maribor

-Dravograd Border Guard Battalion, HQ Dravograd

437
-Maribor Border Guard Battalion , HQ Maribor

-Murska Sobota Border Guard Battalion , HQ Murska Sobota

—522nd Engineer Regiment, HQ Celje

32nd (Varazdin ) Corps, HQ Varazdin [ Elements deployed from Croatia

into Slovenia ]
Maj.Gen. Vlado Trifunovic , Commander
Col. Sreten Raduski, Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff

-32nd Mechanized Brigade, HQ Varazdin

Col. Berislav Popov, Commander

—265th Mechanized Brigade, HQ Bjelovar

Col. Rajko Kovacevic, Commander

–73rd Motorized Brigade, HQ Koprivnica

-32nd Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Varazdin

-411th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment,HQ Krizevci

-32nd Military Police Battalion , HQ Varazdin

-32nd Engineer Regiment, unlocated

-42nd Border Guard Battalion , HQ Vitrovica

-43rd Border Guard Battalion ,HQ Koprivnica

5th Air and Air Defense Corps, HQ Zagreb -Pleso (Slovenia -based
elements only ) (subordinate to Air and Air Defense Force Headquarters)

-82nd Air Brigade,HQ Cerklje

237th Fighter-Bomber Squadron ,HQ Cerklje
238th Fighter-Bomber Squadron , HQ Cerklje
351st Reconnaissance Air Squadron , HQ Cerklje

-350th Air Defense Rocket Regiment, HQ Vrhnika (SA - 3)

438
Appendix C

Skeleton Order of Battle ,

Yugoslav People's Army ( JNA ) Strategic
Offensive, Late September 1991 to 1 January 1992*
JNA General Staff (Staff of the Supreme Command )
Colonel General Blagoje Adzic, Chief of the General Staff

Eastern Slavonia Campaign

Operational Group 3
(Headquarters, IMilitary District)

Colonel General Aleksandar Spirokovski, Commander (to late

September 1991)

Lieutenant Colonel General Zivota Panic, Commander (from late

September 1991); Colonel General (from 29 November 1991)

Forward Headquarters : Sid

Operational Group “ North ”

(Headquarters, 12th (Novi Sad ] Corps)
(activated late September 1991)

Forward Headquarters: Borovo Naselje

OperationalGroup “ South ”
(Headquarters, 1st GuardsMotorized Brigade )

Forward Headquarters : Negoslavci

(activated late September 1991)

1st GuardsMechanized Division

Forward Headquarters : Negoslavci

12th (Novi Sad ) Corps (-) **

Forward Headquarters: Dalj

* Does not include blockaded formations; only those corps and operational groups (OG )
involved in ongoing combat operations.
** OG “ North ” appears to have been responsible only for operations on the north side of
Vukovar. The 12th Corps forces not engaged in the Vukovar fighting, primarily south /south
eastofOsijek , possibly reported to the corps chief of staff while the corps commander dealt
directly with Vukovar as commander, OG “North .”

441
 OperationalGroup “ Baranja "
Forward Headquarters: Beli Manistir

17th ( Tuzla ) Corps*

Western Slavonia Campaign

OperationalGroup 1
Major General Spiro Nikovic, Commander

5th (Banja Luka) Corps

Forward Headquarters: Stara Gradiska

Karlovac Campaign (and Banija -Lika-Kordun Minor Operations)

“ Banija and Kordun” Operational Group 5

(Headquarters, 10th (Zagreb ) Corps)

Lieutenant Colonel General Dusan Uzelac, Commander

Forward Headquarters : Dvor na Uni

10th (Zagreb ) Corps

Forward Headquarters : Petrinja

Elements, 13th (Rijeka ) Corps

Forward Headquarters: Plitvice

Mostar -Split/Dubrovnik Campaign

“ Herzegovina" OperationalGroup 2
(Headquarters, Montenegrin Territorial Defense )

Lieutenant Colonel General Pavle Strugar, Commander

(Colonel General from 29 November)

Forward Headquarters: Trebinje

***
4th (Sarajevo) Corps (-) *
Headquarters: Sarajevo

* Involved in defensive role along Sava River; did not engage in major combat operations.
** Both the 4th and 37th Corps were originally earmarked for an operation in the direction of
Split that the JNA was unable to carry out. As a result, they were not involved in major
combat operations but served in a supporting role within OG 2 .

442
 37th (Uzice) Corps ( + )
Forward Headquarters: Nevesinje

2nd ( Titograd ) Corps

Forward Headquarters : unclear, probably west of Trebinje

9th (Boka Kotorska )Military -Maritime Sector

Forward Headquarters : Herceg -Novi (to mid -October)
Cavtat (from mid -October )

Knin -Zadar Campaign

Operational Group 4
Vice Admiral Fredrih Moreti, Commander (to late September 1991)

Major General Nikola Mladenic , Commander (from late September 1991)

Forward Headquarters : Split

9th (Knin ) Corps

Headquarters: Knin

Naval Blockade

Fleet Command
Rear -Admiral Nikola Ercegovic , Commander

Other Major JNA Headquarters in Croatia

V Military District* Headquarters

Colonel General Zivota Avramovic , Commander

Forward Headquarters: Slunj Training Area

Military-Maritime District Headquarters

Vice Admiral Mile Kandic , Commander

Forward Headquarters: Vis Island

* The exact role of the Fifth Military District and Military -Maritime District Headquarters
during these combat operations remains unclear. Operational Groups 1, 2 , 4 , and 5 may
have reported directly to the JNA General Staff rather than the military districts, probably
leaving the military districts in a logistic support role.

443
Appendix D

Skeleton Croatian Army

(Croatian NationalGuard ) Order of Battle ,
October 1991- January 1992

Main Staff of the Croatian Army (Glavni Stozer Hrvatske vojske)

Colonel General Anton Tus, Chief of the Main Staff

Eastern Slavonia - Baranja

1st Osijek Operational Zone

Headquarters: Osijek

Brigadier KarlGorinsek , Commander

OperationalGroup “ Osijek ”
Headquarters : Osijek

OperationalGroup " Vinkovci-Vukovar-Zupanja ”

Headquarters: Vinkovci

Western Slavonia

2nd Bjelovar Operational Zone (formed 1 October)

Headquarters: Bjelovar

Brigadier Miroslav Jerzecic, Commander

OperationalGroup " Posavina”

Headquarters : Novska

OperationalGroup “ Pakrac "

Headquarters: Pakrac

OperationalGroup “Gradiska” /1st Osijek Operational Zone*

Headquarters: Nova Gradiska

* It is unclear whether this operational group was attached to 2nd Bjelovar OperationalZone
or remained under the command of 1st Osijek Operational Zone during the Western
Slavonia operations.

445
Banija -Karlovac/Kordun -Lika Operations

3rd Zagreb Operational Zone

Headquarters: Zagreb

Brigadier Stjepan Matesa , Commander

Operational Group “ Sisak -Banija -Posavina "

Headquarters: Sisak

Zagreb City Defense Command

Forward Headquarters: probably northwest/west of Sisak

4th Karlovac Operational Zone

Brigadier Izidor Cesnjaj, Commander

Forward Headquarters : Karlovac

Lika OperationalGroup (formed November )

(from Headquarters, 5th Rijeka Operational Zone )

Forward Headquarters : Krasno

5th Rijeka Operational Zone (formed 30 September 1991)

Brigadier Anton Racki, Commander

Headquarters: Rijeka

Zadar-Northern Dalmatia Operations

6th Split Operational Zone

Brigadier Mate Viduka, Commander

“ Zadar” Sector

Dubrovnik -Southern Dalmatia Operations

Southern Sector /6th Split Operational Zone

Forward Headquarters: Metkovic

* This command served as the equivalent ofan operational group headquarters along the
Kupa River line west of Sisak .

446
Appendix E

The Organization of the Croatian Army,

January 1995

Ministry of Defense

1st Croatian Guards Corps ( 1. Hrvatski gardijskizbor - 1. hgz ), HQ Zagreb

1st Croatian Guards Brigade (1. hrvatski gardijskizdrug - 1. hgz),

HQ Rakitje

1st Guards Honor Battalion

2nd Guards Assault Battalion

3rd Guards Naval Honor Assault Battalion

4th Guards Special Purpose Battalion

Mixed Aviation Squadron

300th Central Logistics Base , HQ Zagreb

310th Maintenance Support Brigade,HQ Zagreb

311th Transportation Battalion , HQ Zagreb

Main Staff of the Croatian Army (Glauni Stozer Hrvatske Vojska

GSHV )

Reconnaissance -Sabotage Company of the Main Staff , HQ Zagreb

350th Sabotage Detachment, HQ Zagreb

1st Guards Brigade, HQ Zagreb

7th Guards Brigade,HQ Varazdin

15th Antitank Artillery -Rocket Brigade, HQ Krizevci

16th Artillery -Rocket Brigade, HQ Bjelovar

447
33rd Engineer Brigade, HQ Zagreb

40th Communications Regiment, HQ Samobor

50th NBC Defense Battalion , HQ Zagreb

66th Military Police Battalion , HQ Zagreb

“ Petar Zrinski” Croatian Military University, HQ Zagreb

“ Blago Zadro " Command/Staff School, HQ Zagreb

Officers School, HQ Zagreb

NCO School, HQ Jastrebarsko

“ Damir Tomljanovic-Gavran ” Guards Center for Special Training of

NCOs, HQ Zadar -Sepurine

Military Police Training Center, HQ Zagreb

“ Ban Krsto Frankopan ” Center for Training and Education of Soldiers,

HQ Koprivnica

“Muzil” Center for Training and Education of Soldiers, HQ Pula

“ Pozega " Center for Training and Education of Soldiers ,

HQ Slavonska Pozega

" Petar Barislavic" Center for Training and Education of Soldiers, HQ Sinj

“ Borongaj” Logistics Training Center, HQ Zagreb -Borongaj

Osijek Corps District, HQ Osijek

3rd Guards Brigade, HQ Osijek

5th Guards Brigade, HQ Vinkovci

106th Infantry Brigade, HQ Osijek

108th Infantry Brigade,HQ Slavonski Brod

448
-
-
122nd Infantry Brigade, HQ Djakovo

123rd Infantry Brigade ,HQ Slavonska Pozega

127th Infantry Brigade, HQ Virovitica

132nd Infantry Brigade, HQ Nasice

5th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Osijek

9th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Osijek

10th HomeDefense Regiment, HQ Vinkovci

107th Home Defense Regiment,HQ Valpovo

109th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Vinkovci

121st Home Defense Regiment, HQ Nova Gradiska

131st Home Defense Regiment,HQ Zupanja

136th Home Defense Regiment,HQ Podravska Slatina

157th Home Defense Regiment,HQ SlavonskiBrod

81st Independent Guards Battalion ,HQ Virovitica

261st Reconnaissance -Sabotage Company, HQ Osijek

68th Military Police Battalion ,HQ Osijek

1st Antitank Artillery -Rocket Battalion , HQ Virovitica

2nd Artillery Battalion , HQ Djakovo

3rd Antitank Artillery Battalion , HQ Slavonski Brod

4th Artillery Battalion , HQ Osijek

201st Air Defense Artillery -Rocket Brigade , HQ Osijek

32nd Engineer Pontoon Battalion , HQ Nasice

449
37th Engineer Pontoon Battalion , HQ Slavonski Brod

2nd River Brigade,HQ Osijek

302nd Logistics Base, HQ Osijek

Bjelovar Corps District, HQ Bjelovar

104th Infantry Brigade , HQ Varazdin

105th Infantry Brigade, HQ Bjelovar

24th Home Defense Regiment,HQ Varazdin

52nd Home Defense Regiment,HQ Daruvar

117th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Koprivnica

265th Reconnaissance -Sabotage Company,HQ Bjelovar

69th Military Police Company, HQ Bjelovar

13th Antitank Artillery Battalion , HQ Koprivnica

18th Artillery Battalion ,HQ Varazdin

34th Engineer Battalion , HQ Cakovec

312th Logistics Base , HQ Varazdin

Zagreb Corps District, HQ Zagreb

2nd Guards Brigade, HQ Sisak

57th Infantry Brigade , HQ Sisak

99th Infantry Brigade, HQ Zagreb

101st Infantry Brigade, HQ Zagreb -Susegrad

102nd Infantry Brigade, HQ Zagreb -Novi Zagreb

450
103rd Infantry Brigade, HQ Krapina

144th Infantry Brigade , HQ Zagreb -Sesvete

145th Infantry Brigade,HQ Zagreb

148th Infantry Brigade , HQ Zagreb - Trnje

149th Infantry Brigade, HQ Zagreb - Tresnjevka

150th Infantry Brigade,HQ Zagreb -Crnomerec

151st Infantry Brigade , HQ Zagreb -Samobor

153rd Infantry Brigade, HQ Velika Gorica

1st Home Defense Regiment, HQ Zagreb

2nd Home Defense Regiment, HQ Zagreb

4th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Zagreb

12th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Sisak

17th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Sunja

20th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Sisak

21st Home Defense Regiment, HQ Krapina

125th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Novska

140th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Jastrebarsko

67th Military Police Battalion ,HQ Zagreb

5th Antitank Artillery Rocket Battalion ,HQ Zagreb

6th Artillery Battalion ,HQ Sisak

8th Howitzer Artillery Battalion (203 mm ), HQ Zagreb

202nd Air Defense Artillery -Rocket Brigade,HQ Zagreb -Kerestinec

451
 36th Engineer Pontoon Battalion ,HQ Sisak

1st River Brigade, HQ Sisak

303rd Logistics Base, HQ Zagreb

Karlovac Corps District, HQ Karlovac

13th Home Defense Regiment,HQ Karlovac

14th Home Defense Regiment,HQ Ogulin

110th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Karlovac

137th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Duga Resa

143rd Home Defense Regiment, HQ Ogulin

266th Reconnaissance -Sabotage Company, HQ Karlovac

7th Antitank Artillery Rocket Battalion, Karlovac

70th Military Police Company, HQ Karlovac

10th Artillery Battalion , HQ Karlovac

38th Engineer Pontoon Battalion, HQ Karlovac

304th Logistics Base , HQ Karlovac

Gospic Corps District, HQ Gospic

9th Guards Brigade , HQ Gospic

111th Infantry Brigade, HQ Rijeka

119th Infantry Brigade , HQ Pula

128th Infantry Brigade, HQ Rijeka

8th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Rijeka

452
-
118th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Gospic

133rd Home Defense Regiment, HQ Otocac

138th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Delnice

154th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Pazin

268th Reconnaissance -Sabotage Company, HQ Rijeka

71st Military Police Battalion , HQ Rijeka

9th Antitank Artillery -Rocket Battalion ,HQ Rijeka

12th Artillery Battalion, HQ Rijeka

203rd Air Defense Artillery -Rocket Brigade,HQ Rijeka

35th Engineer Pontoon Battalion , HQ Pula

Split Corps District, HQ Split

4th Guards Brigade , HQ Split

112th Infantry Brigade,HQ Zadar

113th Infantry Brigade , HQ Sibenik

141st Infantry Brigade, HQ Split

6th Home Defense Regiment,HQ Split

7th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Zadar

15th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Sibenik

126th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Sinj

134th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Biograd

142nd Home Defense Regiment, HQ Sibenik

264th Reconnaissance -Sabotage Company, HQ Split

453
72nd Military Police Battalion , HQ Split

11th Antitank Artillery Rocket Battalion, HQ Zadar

14th Artillery Battalion , HQ Zadar

20th Artillery Battalion ,HQ Split

204th Air Defense Artillery Rocket Brigade, HQ Split

40th Engineer Battalion , HQ Split

306th Logistics Base , HQ Split

307th Logistics Base , HQ Zadar

Southern Front, HQ Dubrovnik

114th Infantry Brigade , HQ Split

115th Infantry Brigade,HQ Imotski

163rd Infantry Brigade, HQ Dubrovnik

116th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Metkovic

156th Home Defense Regiment,HQ Makarska

16th Artillery Battalion , HQ Dubrovnik

39th Engineer Battalion ,HQ Dubrovnik

Key NavalGround Forces Units

53rd Naval Landing Infantry Battalion ,HQ Split

352nd Combat Diver Sabotage Battalion ,HQ Split

73rd Military Police Battalion ,HQ Split

454
Appendix F

The Organization of the Krajina Serb Army,

January 1995

Main Staff of the Krajina Serb Army, HQ Knin

44th Air Defense Rocket Brigade, HQ Udbina

75th Mixed Artillery Brigade, HQ Vojnic

105th Aviation Brigade, HQ Udbina

107th Education Center for Reconnaissance and Sabotage Training

(Alpha Training Center ), HQ Bruska

7th North Dalmatian Corps, HQ Knin

1st Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Vrlika

2nd Infantry Brigade, HQ Devrske

3rd Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Benkovac

4th Light Infantry Brigade,HQ Obrovac

75th Motorized Brigade, HQ Knin

92nd Motorized Brigade, HQ Benkovac

7th Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Knin

7th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment, HQ Benkovac

7th Light Air Defense Artillery Regiment

7th Military Police Company, HQ Knin

7th Rear Base , HQ Knin

11th East Slavonian -Baranja Corps, HQ Borovo Selo

35th Infantry Brigade, HQ Bijelo Brdo

40th Infantry Brigade, HQ Brsadin

455
43rd Infantry Brigade, HQ Tenja

45th Infantry Brigade, HQ Stari Jankovci

Baranja Division , HQ Beli Manistir

37th Infantry Brigade, HQ Darda

39th Infantry Brigade,HQ Beli Manistir

60th Border Guards Battalion , HQ Knezovi Vinogradi

15th Lika Corps, HQ Korenica

9th Motorized Brigade, HQ Gracac

18th Infantry Brigade, HQ Korenica

50th Infantry Brigade, HQ Vrhovine

70th Infantry Brigade,HQ Plaski

103rd Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Donji Lapac

37th Independent Infantry Battalion , HQ Zeljava

15th Light Air Defense Artillery -Rocket Battalion ,HQ Korenica

15th Military Police Company, HQ Korenica

81st Rear Base , HQ Zeljava

18th West Slavonian Corps,HQ Okucani

51st Light Infantry Brigade,HQ Okucani

54th Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Pakrac

98th Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Jasenovac

456
21st Kordun Corps, HQ Vojnic

11th Infantry Brigade, HQ Vojnic

13th Infantry Brigade,HQ Slunj

19th Infantry Brigade, HQ Vrginmost

21st Light Air Defense Artillery -Rocket Battalion, HQ Slunj

21stMilitary Police Company, HQ Vojnic

39th Banija Corps, HQ Petrinja

24th Infantry Brigade, HQ Glina

26th Infantry Brigade, HQ Kostajnica

31st Infantry Brigade,HQ Petrinja

33rd Infantry Brigade, HQ Dvor

39th Light Air Defense Artillery -Rocket Battalion , HQ Petrinja

39th Rear Base , HQ Kostajnica

457
Appendix G

Skeleton Bosnian Serb Army Order of Battle,

July 1995 *

Main Staff of the Army of the Serb Republic (VRS ),

HQ Han Pijesak -Mount Zep

1st Guards Motorized Brigade , HQ Kalinovik

(attached from VRS Main , Staff )

65th Protection Motorized Regiment, HQ Han Pijesak -Mount Zep

10th Sabotage Detachment, HQ Bijeljina -Vlasenica

89th Rocket Artillery Brigade, HQ Banja Luka

“ Rajko Balac” Center for Military Schools, HQ Banja Luka

67th Communications Regiment, HQ Han Pijesak

63rd Autotransport Battalion, HQ Zvornik

14th Rear Base , HQ Banja Luka

27th Rear Base , HQ Sokolac

30th Rear Base , HQ Bileca

35th Rear Base , HQ Bijeljina

410th Intelligence Center, HQ Banja Luka

TechnicalRepair Institute “ Hadzici,” HQ Hadzici

Military Hospital, HQ Sokolac

1st Krajina Corps, HQ Banja Luka

1st Reconnaissance - Sabotage Detachment, HQ Banja Luka

1st Military Police Battalion , HQ Banja Luka

* This order of battle provides the normal distribution of VRS formations,but does
not include task organization for specific operations ongoing in July 1995 .

459
1st Communications Battalion ,HQ Banja Luka

1st Mixed Antitank Artillery Brigade, HQ Banja Luka

1st Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Banja Luka

1st Light Air Defense Artillery Regiment, HQ Banja Luka

1st Engineer Regiment, HQ Banja Luka

1st Pontoon Engineer Battalion ,HQ Banja Luka

1st Autotransport Battalion ,HQ Banja Luka

1st Medical Battalion , HQ Banja Luka

“ Doboj” Operational Group 9,HQ Doboj*

9th Reconnaissance Company, HQ Doboj

9th Military Police Battalion , HQ Doboj

9th Mixed Engineer Battalion ,HQ Doboj

30th Infantry Division , HQ Sipovo

30th Reconnaissance Company,HQ Sipovo

30th Military Police Company, HQ Sipovo

30th Communications Battalion , HQ Sipovo

36th Independent Armored Battalion , HQ Sipovo

1st Armored Brigade, HQ Banja Luka

2nd Armored Brigade, HQ Doboj

2nd Krajina Infantry Brigade, HQ Banja Luka

This skeleton order of battle does not show the normal tactical group structure within the
" Doboj" Operational Group .

460
5th Kozara Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Prijedor-Omarska

6th Sanske Infantry Brigade, HQ SanskiMost

11th Dubica Infantry Brigade ,HQ Kozarska Dubica

12th Kotorsko Light Infantry Brigade ,HQ Kotorsko

16th Krajina Motorized Brigade, HQ Banja Luka

11th Mrkonjic Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Mrkonjic Grad

19th Krajina Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Srbobran (Donji Vakuf)

22nd Krajina Infantry Brigade ,HQ Knezevo ( Skender Vakuf)

27th Derventa Motorized Brigade, HQ Derventa

31st Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Srbobran (Donji Vakuf)

43rd Prijedor Motorized Brigade, HQ Prijedor

1st Doboj Light Infantry Brigade,HQ Doboj

1st Celinac Light Infantry Brigade,HQ Celinac

1st Srbac Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Srbac

1st Gradiska Light Infantry Brigade , HQ Gradiska

1st Novigrad Infantry Brigade, HQ Novigrad (Bosanski Novi)

1st Banja Luka Light Infantry Brigade , HQ Banja Luka

2nd Banja Luka Light Infantry Brigade , HQ Banja Luka

3rd Banja Luka Light Infantry Brigade , HQ Banja Luka

4th Banja Luka Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Banja Luka

1st Kotor Varos Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Kotor Varos

1st Prnjavor Light Infantry Brigade ,HQ Prnjavor

461
1st Sipovo Light Infantry Brigade , HQ Sipovo

1st Teslic Infantry Brigade, HQ Teslic

2nd Teslic Light Infantry Brigade , HQ Teslic

1st Ozren Light Infantry Brigade,HQ Bosansko Petrovo Selo

2nd Ozren Light Infantry Brigade,HQ Tumare

3rd Ozren Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Gornja Paklenica

4th Ozren Light Infantry Brigade , HQ Vozuca

1st Trebava Infantry Brigade ,HQ Modrica

1st Krnjin Light Infantry Brigade ,HQ Krnjin

1st Vucjak Light Infantry Brigade,HQ Modrica

2nd Krajina Corps, HQ Drvar?

21st Independent Armored Battalion , HQ Petrovac

2nd Reconnaissance - Sabotage Detachment, HQ Drvar

2nd Military Police Battalion , HQ Drvar

2nd Communications Battalion , HQ Drvar

2nd Mixed Artillery Regiment,HQ Bosansko Grahovo

2nd Light Air Defense Artillery Regiment,HQ Drvar

2nd Engineer Regiment,HQ Kljuc -Laniste

2nd Autotransport Battalion , HQ Drvar

2nd Medical Battalion , HQ Drvar

462
1st Drvar Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Drvar

3rd Petrovac Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Petrovac

5th Glamoc Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Glamoc

7th Krajina Motorized Brigade , HQ Kupres

9th Grahovo Light Infantry Brigade ,HQ Bosansko Grahovo

11th Krupa Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Krupa

15th Bihac Infantry Brigade, HQ Ripac

17th Kljuc Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Kljuc

East Bosnian Corps, HQ Bijeljina

3rd Military Police Battalion , HQ Bijeljina

3rd Communications Battalion , HQ Bijeljina

3rd Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment, HQ Donji Polje

3rd Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Bijeljina

3rd Light Air Defense Artillery Regiment, HQ Vukosavci

3rd Engineer Regiment, HQ Dvorovi

3rd Pontoon Engineer Battalion ,HQ Bijeljina

3rd Autotransport Battalion ,HQ Bijeljina

3rd Medical Battalion , HQ Bijeljina

1st Posavina Infantry Brigade, HQ Brcko

2nd Posavina Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Bosanski Samac

3rd Posavina Light Infantry Brigade , HQ Pelagicevo

463
1st Semberija Light Infantry Brigade ,HQ Bijeljina

2nd Semberija Light Infantry Brigade ,HQ Bijeljina

3rd Semberija Light Infantry Brigade ,HQ Bijeljina

1st Majevica Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Ugljevik

2nd Majevica Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Ugljevik

3rd Majevica Infantry Brigade,HQ Lopare

1st Bijeljina Light Infantry Brigade “Panthers,” HQ Bijeljina

Sarajevo -Romanija Corps, HQ Sarajevo -Lukavica

4th Reconnaissance -Sabotage Detachment “White Wolves,” HQ Pale

4th Military Police Battalion ,HQ Lukavica

4th Communications Battalion, HQ Lukavica

4th Mixed Antitank Artillery Regiment, HQ Lukavica

4th Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Lukavica

4th Light Air Defense Artillery Regiment,HQ Lukavica

4th Engineer Battalion ,HQ Pale

4th Autotransport Battalion ,HQ Lukavica

4th Medical Battalion , HQ Pale

1st Sarajevo Mechanized Brigade,HQ Lukavica

2nd Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade , HQ Vojkovici

3rd Sarajevo Infantry Brigade , HQ Vogosca

4th Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade , HQ Pale

1st Romanija Infantry Brigade , HQ Han Pijesak

464
1st Ilijas Infantry Brigade ,HQ Ilijas

1st Ilidza Infantry Brigade ,HQ Ilidza

1st Igman Infantry Brigade, HQ Hadzici

Drina Corps , HQ Vlasenica

5th Military Police Battalion ,HQ Vlasenica

5th Communications Battalion , HQ Vlasenica

5th Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Vlasenica

5th Engineer Battalion , HQ Vlasenica

5th Medical Battalion , HQ Vlasenica

1st Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade ,HQ Rogatica

5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade,HQ Visegrad

1st Zvornik Infantry Brigade, HQ Zvornik -Karakaj

1st Birac Infantry Brigade , HQ Sekovici

1st Bratunac Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Bratunac

1st Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade,HQ Vlasenica

1st Milici Light Infantry Brigade , HQ Milici

2nd Romanija Motorized Brigade, HQ Sokolac

Independent Infantry Battalion “ Skelani,” HQ Skelani

Herzegovina Corps,HQ Trebinje/Bileca ?

7th Reconnaissance -Sabotage Detachment,HQ Bileca

7th Military Police Battalion ,HQ Bileca

465
7th Communications Battalion ,HQ Bileca

7th Mixed Antitank Artillery Battalion , HQ Bileca

7th Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Bileca

7th Light Air Defense Artillery Regiment, HQ Bileca

7th Engineer Battalion , HQ Bileca

7th Autotransport Battalion , HQ Bileca

7th Medical Battalion , HQ Bileca

1st Herzegovina Motorized Brigade,HQ Trebinje

2nd Herzegovina Light Infantry Brigade, HQ Borci

8th Herzegovina Motorized Brigade, HQ Nevesinje

11th Herzegovina Infantry Brigade, HQ Srbinje ( Foca )

14th Herzegovina Light Infantry Brigade,HQ Cajnice

15th Herzegovina Infantry Brigade , HQ Bileca

18th Herzegovina Light Infantry Brigade, HQGacko

Air and Air Defense Force , HQ Banja Luka

474th Air Base , HQ Banja Luka-Mahovljani

474th Light Air Defense Artillery Regiment, HQ Banja Luka-Zaluzani

92nd Mixed Aviation Brigade ,HQ Banja Luka-Zaluzani

474th Light Air Defense Artillery Regiment, HQ Banja Luka-Zaluzani

155th Air Defense Rocket Brigade , HQ Banja Luka

172nd Medium Self-Propelled Air Defense Rocket Regiment, HQ Sokolac

Early Warning Battalion, HQ Banja Luka

466
 Endnotes, Appendix G

The combat formations of the 1st Krajina Corps were normally assigned or attached to the
corps's two division-level headquarters , “Doboj” OperationalGroup 9 and the 30th Infantry
Division. The “ Doboj” OperationalGroup was the larger of the two commands covering the
vital Posavina corridor up to a boundary line with the East Bosnian Corps near Brcko. The
operationalgroup was further broken down into six tactical groups incorporating the bulk of
the corps's combat brigades. In addition ,one 1st Krajina Corps brigade was attached to the
East Bosnian Corps at Brcko, while an East Bosnian Corps brigade was attached to the oper
ational group near Orasje.
2 The 2nd Krajina Corps also had at least two composite brigades formed from 1stKrajina
Corps formations under command.
3 The Herzegovina Corps usually had one composite brigade, the “ Combined Brigade ofthe
Herzegovina Corps," under its command . It was formed from elements of all the corps's
combat formations.

467
Appendix H

Skeleton Bosnian Army Order of Battle,

October 1995

General Staff of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH ),

HQ Kakanj

Guards Brigade, HQ Sarajevo *

120th Liberation Brigade “ Black Swans,” HQ Kakanj *

Military School Center, HQ Zenica

Main Logistics Center, HQ Visoko

1st Corps, HQ Sarajevo

1stMixed Artillery Regiment,HQ Sarajevo

1st Armored Battalion ,HQ Sarajevo

1st Military Police Battalion, HQ Sarajevo

1st Reconnaissance -Sabotage Battalion , HQ Sarajevo *

1st Light Air Defense Artillery Battalion , HQ Sarajevo

1st Engineer Battalion ,HQ Sarajevo

1st Medical Battalion , HQ Sarajevo

1st Logistics Base , HQ Sarajevo

1st Training-Recruit Center,HQ Sarajevo

17th Muslim Light Brigade,HQ Pazaric *

141st Light Brigade ,HQ Sarajevo *

Elite mobile /assault formation

469
143rd Light Brigade , HQ Sarajevo *

145th Light Brigade, HQ Fojnica *

146th Light Brigade , HQ Fojnica *

12th Division , HQ Sarajevo

101st Mountain Brigade, HQ Sarajevo -Mojmilo

102nd Motorized Brigade, HQ Sarajevo -Stup

105th Motorized Brigade ,HQ Sarajevo -Kosevo

111th Vitezka Motorized Brigade , HQ Sarajevo -Zuc Hill

112th VitezkaMotorized Brigade, HQ Sarajevo -Rajlovac

115th Mountain Brigade, Sarajevo -Bistrik

124th Light Brigade “ King Tvrtko ,” HQ Sarajevo

152nd Mountain Brigade,HQ Vasin Han

155th Motorized Brigade , HQ Sarajevo -Dobrinja

14th Division, HQ Tarcin

104th Vitezka Motorized Brigade, HQ Hrasnica

109th Mountain Brigade, HQ Pazaric

123rd Light Brigade, HQ Bilalovac

131st Light Brigade,HQ Fojnica

181nd Mountain Brigade , HQ Pazaric

182nd Vitezka Light Brigade , HQ Pazaric

470
16th Division , HQ Vares

147th Light Brigade, HQ Vares

161st Slavna Olovo Mountain Brigade, HQ Olovo

162nd Mountain Brigade, HQ Vares

164rd Mountain Brigade, HQ Breza

165th Mountain Brigade, HQ Visoko

185th Light Brigade, HQ Vares

2nd Corps, HQ Tuzla

2nd Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Tuzla

2nd Armored Battalion , HQ Tuzla

2nd Military Police Battalion , HQ Tuzla

2nd Reconnaissance - Sabotage Battalion ,HQ Tuzla *

2nd Light Air Defense Artillery Battalion , HQ Tuzla

2nd Engineer Battalion , HQ Tuzla

2nd Medical Battalion , HQ Tuzla

2nd Logistics Base , HQ Tuzla

2nd Training-Recruit Center, HQ Tuzla

9th Muslim Liberation Brigade,HQ Smoluca*

471
21st Division, HQ Srebrenik

211th Liberation Brigade ,HQ Srebrenik *

212th Mountain Brigade, HQ Srebrenik

213th Vitezka Mountain Brigade, HQ Gradacac

215th VitezkaMountain Brigade, HQ Gornji Rahic (Brcko)

217th Vitezka Mountain Brigade, HQ Gradacac

22nd Division , HQ Gracanica

221st Mountain Brigade , HQ Gracanica

222nd Liberation Brigade , HQ Gracanica *

223rd Mountain Brigade,HQ Lukavac

224th Mountain Brigade, HQ Klokotnica (Doboj)

225th Muslim Mountain Brigade , HQ Banovici

25th Division , HQ Tuzla

250th Liberation Brigade, HQ Tuzla *

252nd Slavna Mountain Brigade, HQ Tuzla

253rd Mountain Brigade, HQ Tuzla

254th Mountain Brigade, HQ Celic

255th Slavna Mountain Brigade “Hajrudin Mesic ,” HQ Teocak

472
3rd Corps, HQ Zenica

3rd Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Zenica

3rd Armored Company,HQ Zenica

3rd Military Police Battalion, HQ Zenica

3rd Reconnaissance -Sabotage Battalion , HQ Zenica *

3rd Light Air Defense Artillery Battalion, HQ Zenica

3rd Engineer Battalion , HQ Zenica

3rd Medical Battalion , HQ Zenica

3rd Logistics Base ,HQ Zenica

3rd Training -Recruit Center, HQ Zenica

7th Vitezka Muslim Liberation Brigade, HQ Zenica *

303rd VitezkaMountain Brigade ,HQ Zenica *

314th Slavna Liberation Brigade,HQ Zenica *

319th Liberation Brigade, HQ Zepce *

330th Liberation Brigade, HQ Zenica *

35th Division , HQ Zavidovici

327th Vitezka Mountain Brigade,HQ Maglaj

328th Mountain Brigade, HQ Zavidovici

329th Mountain Brigade,HQ Kakanj

351st Liberation Brigade, HQ Zavidovici*

473
37th Division , HQ Tesanj

372nd Vitezka Mountain Brigade, HQ Tesanj

373rd SlavnaMountain Brigade, HQ Tesanj (Doboj)

374th Slavna Light Brigade , HQ Tesanj

375th Liberation Brigade, HQ Tesanj*

377th Vitezka Mountain Brigade , HQ Tesanj (Jelah )

37th Armored Company, HQ Tesanj

4th Corps, HQ Jablanica

4th Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Mount Igman

4th Military Police Battalion, HQ Mostar

4th Reconnaissance- Sabotage Battalion ,HQ Jablanica *

4th Light Air Defense Artillery Battalion ,HQ Konjic

4th Engineer Battalion , HQ Bradina

4th Medical Battalion , HQ Jablanica

4th Logistics Base , HQ Celebici

4th Training-Recruit Center, HQ Jablanica

4th Muslim Light Brigade, HQ Bradina*

443rd Mountain Brigade, HQ Konjic

444th Mountain Brigade, HQ Jablanica

445th Mountain Brigade, HQ Bijelo Polje

474
446th Light Brigade, HQ Prozor

447th Liberation Brigade, HQ Dreznica *

450th Light Brigade, HQ Bijelimici

41st Division , HQ Mostar

441st Vitezka Mountain Brigade,HQ Mostar

442nd Mountain Brigade, HQ Mostar

448th Liberation Brigade, HQ Mostar*

449th Eastern Herzegovina Mountain Brigade,HQ Mostar

5th Corps, HQ Bihac

5th Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Bihac

5th Armored Battalion , HQ Bihac

5th Military Police Battalion , HQ Bihac

5th Reconnaissance -Sabotage Battalion , HQ Bihac *

5th Light Air Defense Artillery Battalion ,HQ Bihac

5th Engineer Battalion , HQ Bihac

5th Medical Battalion , HQ Bihac

5th Logistics Base , HQ Bihac

5th Training -Recruit Center, HQ Cazin

501st Slavna Mountain Brigade , HQ Bihac *

502nd Vitezka Mountain Brigade ,HQ Bihac *

503rd Slavna Mountain Brigade, HQ Cazin *

475
505th Vitezka Mountain Brigade, HQ Buzim *

506th Mountain Brigade, HQ Velika Kladusa

510th Bosnian Liberation Brigade , HQ Cazin *

511th Slavna Mountain Brigade , HQ Bosanska Krupa *

517th Light Brigade, HQ Sturlica

7th Corps, HQ Travnik

7th Mixed Artillery Regiment, HQ Travnik

7th Armored Company, HQ Travnik

7th Military Police Battalion, HQ Travnik

7th “ Bosnjak ” Reconnaissance -Sabotage Battalion ,HQ Travnik *

7th Light Air Defense Artillery Battalion , HQ Travnik

7th Engineer Battalion ,HQ Travnik

7th Medical Battalion , HQ Travnik

7th Logistics Base , HQ Travnik

7th Training-Recruit Center, HQ Travnik

17th Vitezka Mountain Brigade,HQ Travnik *

706th Muslim Mountain Brigade,HQ Travnik

708th Mountain Brigade, HQ Novi Travnik

712th Mountain Brigade, HQ Travnik

725th Light Brigade , HQ Vitez

727th Slavna Mountain Brigade,HQ Travnik *

733rd Mountain Brigade, HQ Busovaca

737th Muslim Light Brigade, HQ Travnik *

476
77th Division, HQ Bugojno

705th Slavna Mountain Brigade, HQ Rostovo (Bugojno )*

707th Slavna Mountain Brigade, HQ Bugojno

717th Slavna Mountain Brigade ,HQ Gornji Vakuf

770th Slavna Mountain Brigade, HQ Donji Vakuf (Bugojno )

28th Independent Division, HQ Zivinice **

210th Vitezka Liberation Brigade “ Nesib Malkic,” HQ Zivinice*

240th Muslim Mountain Brigade, HQ Zivinice

241st Spreca Muslim Light Brigade “ Gazije,” HQ Kalesija *

242nd Zvornik Muslim Light Brigade, HQ Kalesija *

243rd Muslim -Podrinje Mountain Brigade, HQ Kladanj

244th Mountain Brigade, HQ Kladanj

245th Mountain Brigade, HQ Kalesija

246th Vitezka Mountain Brigade,HQ Sapna

286th Mountain Brigade, HQ Stupari

287th Mountain Brigade,HQ Vitalj

24th Sabotage Battalion “ Black Wolves,” HQ Donje Vukovije

24th Antiterrorist Company “ Zivinice Wasps,” HQ Zivinice

* This division was formed from a merger of the 24th Division ,HQ Zivinice , and the rem
nants of the Srebrenica-based 28th Division in July -August 1995. The division was then
subordinated directly to the General Staff from the 2nd Corps.

477
81st Independent Division , HQ Gorazde
801st Light Brigade, HQ Gorazde

802nd Light Brigade ,HQ Gorazde

803rd Light Brigade, HQ Gorazde

807th Muslim Liberation Brigade, HQ Gorazde*

808th Liberation Brigade, HQ Gorazde*

843rd Light Brigade, HQ Gorazde

851st Vitezka Liberation Brigade, HQ Gorazde*

81st Reconnaissance -Sabotage Company,HQGorazde

478
 Endnote, Appendix H

The Bosnian Army awarded its formations two honorifics for superior performance in bat
tle , “ Vitezka" (Chivalrous or Knights ) and “ Slavna" (Glorious or Famous ), of which
“ Vitezka" was the most prestigious. Brigades designated “ liberation" (as well as some light
brigades) were usually formations of picked troops organized as elite shock units . In addi
tion ,many ARBiH brigades were given the appellation “Muslim .” In some cases, such as
the 225th Muslim Mountain Brigade, this designator had no particular religious signifi
cance — most ARBiH brigades were virtually all Muslim . Some “Muslim ” brigades,how
ever — such as the 4th Muslim Light Brigade, 7th Vitezka Muslim Liberation Brigade, 9th
Muslim Liberation Brigade, and possibly 737th Muslim Light Brigade — had a much larger
percentage of practicing Muslims, followed Muslim dietary restrictions, and included daily
prayer and other Muslim religious duties .

479
Appendix I

Croatian Defense Council Order of Battle ,

October 1995

Main Staff of the Croatian Defense Council (HVO ), HQ Posusje

10th Artillery -Rocket Regiment, HQ Siroki Brijeg

15th Independent Air Defense Artillery -Rocket Battalion

1st Military Police Battalion ,HQ Ljubuski

60th Guards Airborne Battalion “ Ludvig Pavlovic,” HQ Capljina

22nd Sabotage Detachment, HQ Siroki Brijeg

" Gavran - 2" (Ravens) Special Purpose Unit, HQ Citluk

33rd Communication Company, HQ Posusje

88th Electronic Warfare Center, HQ Posusje

Training Center, HQ Capljina

11th Mixed Aviation Squadron ,HQ Posusje

Tomislavgrad Corps District, HQ Tomislavgrad

2nd Military Police Battalion , HQ Livno

14th Independent Air Defense Artillery-Rocket Battery,HQ Tomislavgrad

71st Communication Company, HQ Tomislavgrad

154th Logistics Base , HQ Livno

1st Guards Brigade “ Ante Bruno Busic ,” HQ Tomislavgrad

1st Home Defense Regiment,HQ Posusje

55th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Kupres

481
79th Home Defense Regiment “ King Tomislav,” HQ Tomislavgrad

80th Home Defense Regiment “ King Petar Kresimir IV,” HQ Livno

42nd Independent Home Defense Battalion, HQ Prozor

43rd Independent Home Defense Battalion “ Dr. Ante Starcevic,”

HQ Gornji Vakuf (Uskoplje )

Mostar Corps District,HQ Mostar

12th Air Defense Artillery Rocket Battalion ,HQ Mostar

3rd Military Police Battalion , HQ Capljina

72nd Communication Company, HQ Mostar

150th Logistics Base , HQ Citluk

2nd Guards Brigade,HQ Mostar

50th Home Defense Regiment “ Knez Domogoj,” HQ Capljina

51stHome Defense Regiment “ Stjepan Radic,” HQ Ljubuski

56th Home Defense Regiment “Herceg Stjepan,” HQ Konjic

81st HomeDefense Regiment, HQ Mostar

82nd Home Defense Regiment, HQ Mostar

83rd Home Defense Regiment“Mario Hacak Cikota,” HQ Siroki Brijeg

40th Independent Home Defense Battalion “ Ratko Boban ,” HQGrude

41st Independent Home Defense Battalion “ Knez Bramani,” HQ Citluk

482
Vitez Corps District, HQ Vitez

35th Artillery-Rocket Battalion ,HQ Vitez

99th Air Defense Artillery -Rocket Battalion, HQ Vitez

4th Military Police Battalion , HQ Vitez

73rd Communication Company, HQ Vitez

154th Logistics Base ,HQ Vitez

3rd Guards Brigade “ Hawks,” HQ Vitez

90th Home Defense Regiment“ Stjepan Tomasevic,” HQ Novi Travnik

91st HomeDefense Regiment, HQ Travnik

92nd Home Defense Regiment,HQ Vitez

93rd Home Defense Regiment “ Nikola Subic Zrinski,” HQ Busovaca

94th Home Defense Regiment“ Ban Josip Jelacic,” HQ Kiseljak

95th HomeDefense Regiment “Marinko Bosnjak,” HQ Kresevo

96th HomeDefense Regiment“ Bobovac,” HQ Vares

110th Home Defense Regiment “ Usora ,” HQ Rosulje ( Jelah )

111th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Zepce

44th Independent Home Defense Battalion “ Jure Francetic ,” HQ Vitez

45th Independent Home Defense Battalion, HQ Zepce

483
Orasje Corps District, HQ Orasje

5th Independent Military Police Company ,HQ Orasje

74th Communication Company, HQ Orasje

162nd Logistics Base , HQ Orasje

4th Guards Brigade “ Sons of Posavina,” HQ Orasje

106th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Orasje

108th Home Defense Regiment, HQ Ravne-Brcko

201st Home Defense Regiment, HQ Orasje

202nd Home Defense Regiment, HQ Domaljevac

BihacMilitary District

6th IndependentMilitary Police Company, HQ Bihac

101st Home Defense Regiment, HQ Bihac

484
Appendix J

Sketches and Photos ofKey

Wartime Commanders

485
 Sketches and Photos of Key Wartime Commanders

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

and Yugoslav People's Army ( JNA)/ Yugoslav Army (VJ)

Slobodan Milosevic
President, League of Communists
of Serbia , 1986-89; President of
Republic of Serbia , 1989-97

Army General ColonelGeneral

Veljko Kadijevic Blagoje Adzic
Federal Secretary Chief of the General Staff,
for NationalDefense , 1990-91; Acting Federal
1990-91 Secretary for National
Defense , 1992

Lieutenant ColonelGeneral
(later Colonel General)
Zivota Panic
Commander First Military District,
Late 1991; Chief of the Yugoslav
Army (VJ) General Staff, 1992-93

ColonelGeneral Major General

Milutin Kukanjac Aleksandar Vasiljevic
Commander Second Chief of the Security
Military District, 1992 Directorate , Federal
Secretariat for National
Defense , 1991-92
ㅋ

Lieutenant ColonelGeneral
(later Colonel General)
Momcilo Perisic
Chief of the General Staff,
1993-98

Slovenian Territorial Defense

(Slovenian TO )

Janez Jansa
Minister of Defense,
Republic of Slovenia ,
1991

DIDesign Center 3827351D 12-01

486
 Sketches and Photos of Key Wartime Commanders

Bosnian Serb Army (VRS)

Lieutenant Colonel General Major General

(later ColonelGeneral) (later Lieutenant
Ratko Mladic Colonel General)
Commander of the Main Staff, Manojlo Milovanovic
1992-96 Chief of the Main Staff,
1992-96

Major General (later Lieutenant

Colonel General)
Milan Gvero
Assistant Commander of the Main
Staff for Morale , Religious, and
Legal Affairs, 1992-96

Colonel Major General

(later Major General) (later Lieutenant
Zdravko Tolimir Colonel General)
Assistant Commander of the Main Momir Talic
Staff for Intelligence and Security, Commander 1st
1992-96 Krajina Corps, 1992-97

Colonel
(later Major General)
Radivoje Tomanic
Commander 2nd
Krajina Corps, 1994-95

Colonel Colonel
(later Major General) (later Major General)
Novica Simic Stanislav Galic
Commander East Bosnian Commader
Corps , 1992-97 Sarajevo -Romanija
Corps, 1992-94

DI Design Center 3840881D 04-02

487
 Sketches and Photos of Key Wartime Commanders

Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) continued

Major General Major General

Radislav Krstic
Dragomir Milosevic
Commander Sarajevo -Romanija Commander Drina
Corps, 1994-95 Corps, 1995-96

Colonel
(laterMajor General)
Radovan Grubac
Commander Herzegovina
Corps, 1992-96

Krajina Serb Army (SVK )

Milan Martic Lieutenant

Minister of Internal Affairs, Serbian Colonel General
Autonomous Region of Krajina and Mile Mrksic
Republic of Serb Krajina, 1990-94; Chief of the Main
President of Republic of Staff, 1995
Serb Krajina, 1995

Major General
(later Lieutenant ColonelGeneral)
Mile Novakovic
Chief of the Main Staff, 1992-94 ;
National Security Advisor to Milan Martic ,
1994-95 : Joint Commander of Operational
Group "Pauk ," 1994-95

DI Design Center 384089 04-02

488
 Sketches and Photos of Key Wartime Commanders

Croatian Army (HV)

ColonelGeneral Gojko Susak

Martin Spegelj Minis of Defense ,
Minister of Defense, 1990-91 1991-98

Corps General
Anton Tus
Chief ofthe Main Staff,
1991-92

Corps General Corps General

(later Staff General) Zvonimir Cervenko
Janko Bobetko Chief of the Main Staff,
Chief of the Main Staff, 1995-97
1992-95

ColonelGeneral
Peter Stipetic
Deputy Chief of the Main Staff,
1991; Commander Posavina Front,
1992 ; Commander Zagreb Corps
District, 1993-94 ; Assistant Chief of
the Main Staff, 1995

Brigadier Major General

(later Major General and (later Colonel General)
Colonel General) Ante Gotovina
Marijan Marekovic Commander
Commander 1stGuards Brigade, Split Corps District,
ty

1991-93; Assistant Chief of the 1993-96

Main Staff, 1994-95 ; Commander
Zagreb Corps District, 1995

DI Design Center 384090 04-02

489
 Sketches and Photos of Key Wartime Commanders

Croatian Army (HV) continued

Major General MajorGeneral

Luka Dzanko Mirko Norac
Commander Bjelovar Corps Commander Gospic
District, 1994-95 Corps District, 1994-95

Colonel
Branko Borkovic
Commander 204th
Vukovar Brigade, 1991

Bosnian Croat Defense Council (HVO )

Colonel Major General

(later Major General) Tihomir Blaskic
Milivoje Petkovic Chief of the Main
Chief ofthe Main Staff, 1992-94 Staff , 1995

Major General
Slobodan Praljak
Commander of the Main Staff,
1993-94

Major General Staff Brigadier

Ante Roso Zeljko Glasnovic
Commander of the Commander 1st
Main Staff, 1993-94 Guards Brigade,
1994 ; Commander
Tomislavgrad Corps
District, 1995

DIDesign Center 384091 04-02

490
 Sketches and Photos of Key Wartime Commanders

Bosnian Army (ARBiH )

ArmyGeneral
Brigadier General
Rasim Delic
Enver Hadzihasanovic
Commander of
Commander, Third
the General Staff,
1993-97 Corps 1992-93; Chief
of the General Staff
1993-97

Brigadier (later
Brigadier General)
Sead Delic
Commander 2nd Corps,
1993-2000

Brigadier (later
Brigadier (later
Brigadier General)
Division General)
Sakib Mahmuljin
Atif Dudakovic
Commander 3rd
Commander 5th
Corps, 1994-97
Corps , 1993-97

Brigadier General
Mehmet Alagic
Commander
3rd Corps, 1993 ;
Commander 7th Corps,
1994-96

Autonomous Province ofWestern

Bosnia (APWB) People's Defense

Fikret Abdic
President, 1993-95

DIDesign Center 384092 04-02

491
 Index

A Bihac enclave 148-150, 188-189, 201, 221,

244-247 , 283-285 , 292-293 , 305-306 , 361-367,
Abdic , Fikret 161-166 , 187-189, 208, 222 , 228, 372 , 390 , 398 , 410-411
244-248 , 258-261, 271, 291-294, 304 , 361-364 , Bijeljina 135-137 , 164
374, 411-416 Boban, Mate 156-159 , 169, 189-191, 196-198 , 207 ,
Adzic , ColonelGeneral Blagoje 57, 64-66 , 70, 88 , 92, 213
129 , 163, 441 Bobetko , Corps General Janko 134 , 155-157,
Ahmici massacre 192-193, 209 164-168, 267-279, 295-298, 367, 384 , 399-400 ,
Aircraft/airstrikes 47 , 58-69, 95 , 184-186 , 221 , 412-413 , 421
231-232 , 239, 249 , 261, 275, 297 , 300, 328-339 , Boric , Major GeneralGrujo 150, 398, 423
354-358 , 370 , 377-379, 394-396 , 413-414 , 426 Borkovic , Branko 99-101
Akashi, Yasushi 240, 300, 332-333 , 338 , 355, 367, Borovo Selo 89-91
377 , 386 , 407 Bosanak ,Major General Veljko 369, 371-372, 417
Alagic , Brigadier GeneralMehmed 195, 244, 260 , Bosanska Krupa 148-149, 163-167, 245-249,
301, 380 , 425 293-294 , 304-306 , 380-389 , 403, 418-420
Aksentijevic, Major GeneralMilan 55 , 75 Bosansko Grahovo 364-365, 379
Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia (APWB ) Bosnia , central 121, 151, 179, 181, 189-219, 228-237 ,
187-189, 244-252 , 293-294 , 363-364 , 374 , 416 252-260 , 284-285 , 290 , 304, 308, 310-321, 384 ,
APWB armed forces 166 , 187, 222 , 244-249, 419-422
252-261, 271, 292-294 , 362-364 Bosnia , eastern 137 , 228 , 288 , 317-410
ARBiH (Armija Bosnia i Hercegovina ) Army of Bosnia ,western 140-145 , 166 , 187ff, 229 , 244, 250 ,
Bosnia and Herzegovina see Bosnian Army 288, 300 , 359-364, 377-379, 387-396 , 421-424
Arkan's Tigers - Serbian Volunteer Guard 85 , 99 , Republic of Western Bosnia 362-364
101, 135-137 , 164 , 252, 268 , 294 , 420-421 Bosnia and Herzegovina 43, 47, 108 , 120-122 , 128,
Armbrust antitank rocket launchers 54, 66 , 75 , 439 134 , 135, 161, 163, 190 , 259
Austro- Hungarian empire 119, 148 Bosnian Army ( Armija Bosnia i Hercegovina,
APWB see Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia ARBiH ) (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
Avramovic , Colonel General Zivota 64-67 130-133 , 150-152 , 179-181, 187 , 190-191,
194-195, 207, 219 , 223-224 , 250-251, 283-285,
B 308-309, 315-316 , 321-322 , 350-352 , 388-389 ,
392-393, 469
Babic , Colonel Lazo 297 , 400 , 419 General Staff 162 , 235 , 283 , 309-311, 315 , 324 ,
Babic ,Milan 84, 85 , 106-113, 367 382, 469
Banija 93, 99, 102, 112, 268, 368, 373 Corps 283
Banja Luka 161, 289, 380 , 383, 387, 389-398 , 420 1s Corps 139 , 201, 211-212 , 229 , 234 ,
Baranja 85, 93, 99 , 111-113 237-241, 256-258, 283, 304-314 , 404, 469
Bavcar, Igor 52-53, 63 2nd Corps 146 , 166 , 183, 202-211, 221, 228-236 ,
Becirovic ,Major Ramiz 322 , 331, 335-339, 253-254 , 283, 290 , 302-312 , 338-351,
351-352 384-404, 422 , 471
Belgrade-Zagreb highway 93 , 99 , 276 , 295-296 ,
399-400

493
 3rd Corps 162, 193-198 , 206 , 211, 229, 235-237 , Herzegovina Corps 157, 185, 229, 231,
253-254 , 283, 312 , 384-388 , 404 , 423, 473 240-242, 253, 258 , 306 , 311 , 313-314 , 403 ,
4th Corps 200, 239-242, 257, 283, 311-314, 474 405 , 465 , 467
5th Corps 148-150 , 188-189, 201, 221, 229, Air /Air Defense Force 141, 149, 261, 298 , 466
244-251, 271, 283-306 , 362-425, 475 Drina Wolves special operations unit 253 , 322 ,
6th Corps 185 , 206 , 211 , 224 , 229, 253 327, 329, 339, 346 , 355-357, 360, 400
7th Corps 224-244, 260 , 283, 301-311, Bosnian Serb government 123, 135-136 , 140, 182 ,
380-404, 476 188 , 221-222, 232 , 248 , 289, 291-292 , 376 , 391
7th Muslimski Brigade 195, 199, 206-207, 211 , Bosnian Serb Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP)
233 , 236-237 , 284, 301, 386 , 404 128-130 , 135-136 , 162, 302-303
17th Krajina Brigade 195 , 211, 284 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 227, 252, 333, 354
East Bosnian Operational Group 231 Bozovic, Colonel “ Raja " 249, 294 , 363, 420-421
specialized units 224 Brcko 141, 146 , 179, 183, 208 , 211, 232 , 235, 256 ,
Bosnian Croat Army (see Croatian Defense Council) 298 , 304 , 409
Bosnian Federation 227, 252, 316 , 364 (see also Brgule 232, 237-238 , 253, 257
Croat-Muslim ) Brioni Accord 68
Bosnian Government see also Izetbegovic, Alija Brka 235 , 236 , 257 , 304
122-125, 223 , 231-232 , 240-245 , 255 , 300-304, Brnik airport 58 ,60
309-311, 359-361, 377, 386 , 391-392, 407 Bugojno 147, 159 , 181, 193, 198-199, 202-208 ,
.

Bosnian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) 126 , 230-233 , 242, 343-345 , 418
131-132 , 152 , 405 Bulat, Colonel Cedomir 373-374 , 417
(Bosnian ) Party for Democratic Action (Stranka
Demokratske Akcije , SDA ) 122-123, 130-132, С
139-143, 159-161, 187 , 432
Bosnian (Muslim ) Patriotic League 130-168 Carrington Plan 105 , 113
Bosnian nationalities 121-124 Casualty estimates
Bosnian Serbs 121, 123-124 Bosnian war 425-426
Bosnian Croats 123, 394-397 Srebrenica 354
Bosnian Serb Army (Vojska Republika Srpska, VRS) Cazin 132 , 148-149, 166-167, 188 , 208 ,
129-130 , 133-134, 140-142, 222-223, 250-251, 245-249, 261, 293-294 , 305 , 362-364 , 398 , 412
308-309, 315-316 , 322, 352-353, 393, 426 , 459 Celeketic , Lieutenant Colonel GeneralMilan 270 ,
Main Staff 141-142 , 221, 228, 288-291, 303, 322, 278, 298, 361, 400 , 421, 424
376 , 393-394 , 459 Cemerska Planina 234 , 238 , 257
1st Krajina Corps 142, 145-150 , 167, 183, Cengic , Hasan 130 , 163
229-231, 234-235, 248, 259, 297-298, 301, Cerklje 58-64, 76
304, 393, 420 , 459, 467 Cerska 151, 184
2nd Krajina Corps 149-150 , 167, 229 , 243-251, Cervenko, Corps GeneralZvonimir 168, 297 , 367 ,
255, 261, 293-294 , 300, 304, 363-366 , 384 , 417 , 421
381-383 , 393-394 , 401, 418, 462 , 467 chemical warfare agent BZ 344, 408
East Bosnian Corps 146, 183, 232-233 , 236 , Chetniks 120 , 121, 144
253-254 , 304 , 400 , 402 , 463 Close Air Support 336-338 , 379, 394
Sarajevo-Romanija Corps 153, 168 , 234, Communist Party /Communism 44-45 , 50 , 72-74
237-238 , 241, 256 , 258, 306 , 308, 311-315 , Contact Group 219-222, 289-291, 300 , 353
403 , 405. 464 Cosic . Dobrica 158-162
Drina Corps 185 , 228-229 , 253-254, 304 ,
321-322, 325-327, 333, 343-345 , 349,
355-357 , 360 , 402, 406-407, 418, 465

494
Croatia , Croatians 43 , 84-96 Northwest Herzegovina OZ /Tomislavgrad
declaration of independence 81-83, 91 Corps District 285 , 481
war of independence 81-109 Central Bosnia OZ /Vitez Corps District 193,
World War II Independent State of Croatia 81-83 226 , 285 , 287, 483
Croatian Armed Force (Hrvatske Oruzane Snage , Posavina OZ /Orasje Corps District 201, 204,
HOS) 126 , 133-134 , 143, 163 212 , 298 , 400 , 484
Croatian NationalGuard Corps (Zbora Narodne Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska
Garde, ZNG ) see Croatian Army Zajednica,HDZ ) 82-84 , 87 , 91 , 112, 122-123,
Croatian Army (Hrvatska Vojska, HV ) 86 , 93-112 , 133-134 , 158 , 161-162 , 432
250-251, 267-268 , 272-276 , 297 , 367, 374, 392, Croatian Fascists (Ustashe) 81-84 , 121, 145 , 162
447 Croatian Government 83-113 , 155, 225-227, 250 ,
Main Staff 109, 267 , 272-276 , 367-370 , 447 268 , 284 , 291-295 , 347 , 364 , 367
Operational Zones 101-103, 445 Ministry of Defense 86 , 95
Corps Districts 447 Croatian Serbs 83-113 , 127, 162, 271, 280, 296-299 ,
1st Croatian Guards Corps 401, 447 369, 376 , 390-392, 396 , 400 , 411
Osijek OZ /Corps District 101, 445, 448 Croat-Muslim 123-124 , 134, 137, 140-141, 147,
Bjelovar OZ /Corps District 102 , 276 , 297, 399, 157-159, 163, 168-169, 182, 189-211, 223-228 ,
445 , 450 242, 252, 285-288, 292, 305, 364, 393
Zagreb OZ/Corps District 103, 279, 368, Federation 220 , 227 , 284 , 287-288 , 326 , 396
370-373, 383-384, 421, 440 , 450 JointMilitary Headquarters 288
Karlovac OZ /Corps District 103, 368, 371, 375 , war 159, 179-183, 189-191, 202, 208 , 213,
440 , 452 219-221 , 225-226 , 243-244 , 251
Gospic OZ /Corps District 269, 367, 371-374 , peace treaty (Washington Agreement) 227-228
417, 452
Split OZ /Corps District 365, 369-374 , 417 , 453 D
Southern Front HQ (Dubrovnik ) 155-157, 454
Air Force (HRZ ) 269, 274-280 , 297-298 , 366-368 , Dalmatia 103
399 , 413 Northern 93 , 102-103 , 111
helicopter operations 276 , 297, 369, 373, 381, Southern 103 , 154
390 Dayton Agreement 163, 228 , 303, 361, 378 , 392, 396
Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) 84-86 Dedakovic , General Mile 99-101, 133 , 164
Special Police 84-86 , 90 , 93-94, 96 Delalic , Ramiz " Celo " 153, 166 , 186-187 , 208
combat operations 109-111 , 144 , 302-315 , Delic, Brigadier General Sead 302-306 , 384, 388, 393
398-400 , 413-414, 417 Delic, Army General Rasim 162, 180 , 187 , 193-194 ,
Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna (Hrvatska 197, 206-208, 211, 219, 223-227, 235 , 256-257,
Zajednica Herceg -Bosna, HZHB ) 144, 158, 284 , 425
196-201,9 226 , 285 Doboj 132, 141, 145-146 , 197, 208 , 229,
Croatian Defense Council/Bosnian Croat Army 236-237 , 253, 257, 303, 384, 387-388 , 394, 412 ,
(Hrvatska Vijece Odbrane, HVO ) 133-134 , 144 , 422-423
155-156 , 180-183, 190-192, 224-226 , 250-251, Domazet, Rear Admiral Davor 267, 271-279,
285-288 , 293, 295 , 298-300 , 304-305 , 362-366 , 413-415
380-381, 390-391, 393-394, 481 Donji Vakuf 195-198, 230-260, 287, 301,
Main Staff 134 , 481 380-382 , 394 , 418-420
OperationalZones 193, 201, 204, 285 Drekovic, Brigadier General Ramiz 150 , 167, 188,
Corps districts 285 311-312
Southeast Herzegovina OZ /Mostar Corps Drina valley 138-142 , 150-151, 160, 167-168 , 179,
District 285 , 366 , 482 184-190 , 207, 221, 231, 253, 290 , 317-318 , 325 ,
354 , 363

495
Drina Wolves special operations unit see under Halilovic, Sefer 159 , 163, 166 , 180 , 190-194, 208 ,
Bosnian Serb Army 252, 397, 406 , 409
Drnovsek , Janez 48-49, 88 , 94, 111 HDZ (Hrvatska DemokratskaZajednica ) see Croatian
Dubrovnik 97 , 99, 103-104 , 108, 110-113, 144 , Democratic Union
154-158 , 181, 290 Herzegovinian Croats 121
Dudakovic , Division General Atif 229, 245-254, 260 , Hocevar, Colonel General Ivan 49-50 , 56
292-295 , 305 , 363-364 , 374 , 380-382 , 387-425 Holbrooke , Ambassador Richard 292 , 391, 425
HOS (Hrvatske Oruzane Snage ) see Croatian Armed
E Force
HV (Hrvatska Vojska) see Croatian Army
ethnic cleansing 132, 135 , 141, 144-145, 165-169, HVO (Hrvatska Vijece Odbrane) see Croatian
207 , 340 , 358 , 398 , 410 Defense Council
European Community (EC) 49-50 ,68 , 73 , 91, 94, 105, I
108 , 111-113, 124 , 134,-136 , 152-153, 161, 169,
187 , 197
European Union (EU ) 157, 182, 227, 276 , 311, 327, “ Invincible Plan ” 182
392, 399, 410 Izetbegovic , Alija 122, 135 , 152-227, 291, 309-311,
exclusion zone see under United Nations 358 , 364 , 392, 404 , 425
J

Foca 128 , 138-144 , 151, 165 Jablanica 159 , 169, 193-194 , 198-212, 226-227, 257 ,
Fojnica 181, 193, 202, 206 , 207, 211, 213 283
forward air controllers (FACs) 324 , 334-336 , 339 , 361 Jansa , Janez 49 , 51-54 , 56 , 59-67, 71-76
Janvier, Lieutenant General Bernard 319 , 328 ,

G 332-333, 336 ,-338, 354, 377-378, 406-407, 426

JNA see Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslovenska
Galic , Major General Stanislav 153, 234, 258 Narodna Armija )
Golic ,Major Ejup 343 , 346 Jokic , AdmiralMiodrag 104 , 105, 113
Gorazde 138-139, 145 , 151, 168 , 179 , Jovic , Borisav 48-49, 64, 74, 87-113, 128-129 , 162
184-186 , 208, 219-221 , 230 ,-232, 251-256 , 260,
283 , 290 , 306 , 318-319, 325, 332, K
352-361, 377, 397, 406-411, 418 , 426
Gornji Vakuf 159, 169, 181, 190-193, Kadijevic, Army General Veljko 46-48, 63-64,
198-199, 202-211, 226-227 , 308, 418 86-113. 128
Gotovina, General Ante 250 , 268, 277, 295 , Kakanj 181, 196
299-300 , 365-369, 380-381, 390, 399-401, Karadzic ,Radovan 123-142, 156 , 162, 165-167, 182
412-419, 424 318, 340 , 376 , 391, 397-398, 402
Grabez plateau 148-150 , 228 , 246-249, 255 , Karavelic , Brigadier General Vahid, 234 , 238 , 257 ,
293-294 , 304-305 , 363, 380 , 391-393 404
Grubac , Major General Radovan 157 , 231 Karremans, Lieutenant Colonel Ton 323, 327-342
Gvero , Lieutenant Colonel General Milan 252, Kiseljak 134 , 158, 168, 181, 192-193 , 196 ,
291-292, 397-398 , 426 202-227, 311
Kladanj 232-234 , 253, 341-342, 359, 409
H Kljuc 144-145 , 150, 380-382, 389-391, 395, 420, 424

Hadzhihasanovic , Brigadier General Enver 162, 195

496
Knin 84-85 , 93-94 , 99-122, 148 , 154 , 220 , Majevica 232-233, 238-239 , 253-256 , 289-303, 402
249-251, 260 , 269-270 , 295, 300 , 364-375 , 394 , Mamula, Admiral Branko 92
399-401, 412-425 Markale “marketplace massacre" 229, 377 , 417
Koljevic , Nikola 135 , 161, 164, 182, 252 Martic, Milan 84-85, 270, 295-298 , 362, 367, 400
Kolsek , Colonel General Konrad 57-59, 64 Maslenica bridge 93 , 103, 267
Kosovo 43-45 , 55 , 76 , 396 , 406 massacres 121, 210-213, 240, 255 , 325-409
Kovacevic ,Major General Slobodan 370-371 Ahmici 192-193, 209
Krajina 81-84 , 90, 93, 122-123, 140 , 145-167 by Ustashe (Croatian Fascists ) 81
Krajina Serb Republic 102, 106-108, 250, 267, ethnic cleansing 132 , 135, 141, 144, 165-169, 340 ,
269-276 , 279 , 291-292, 295-296 , 300 , 362-376 , 398
398 , 400 , 411 , 416 Markale marketplace 229, 377, 417
Eastern Slavonia 85-113, 296-298 , 374 , 390-392 Sarajevo marketplace 221, 377
Krajina Serb Army ( Srpska Vojske Krajina, SVK ) Srebrenica 325 , 340 , 354, 397-398 , 406 , 409
107, 113 , 150 , 188, 204, 211, 220-222 , Stupni Do 204-205
245-255, 267-272, 294, 297, 361-362, 375-378 , Tuzla outdoor cafe 387
400 , 455 Uzdol 203
Main Staff 269-271, 278 , 367-368 , 455 Visnjica 326
7th North Dalmatian Corps 268, 270 , 295, 300, Mesic , Stjepan ( Stipe) 45, 49, 88, 94 , 111
370-371, 401, 413, 455 Milosevic , Major General Dragomir 238
11th East Slavonian -Baranja Corps 270 , 465 Milosevic , Slobodan 44-45, 82-85 , 88 , 90, 92,
15th Lika Corps 150 , 249, 269-270 , 295 , 300, 96-98, 102, 105-106 , 108 , 110-113 , 124-129,
369-375 , 456 141-144 , 162 , 182 , 188-189, 209, 219-227, 232,
18th West Slavonian Corps 270 , 297, 399 , 456 238 , 258, 288-293 , 317 , 327 , 353 ,
21s Kordun Corps 270 , 363, 369, 372, 457 362-363, 374-376 , 391, 396-398 , 406 , 411
39th Banija Corps 270-271, 363, 368, 398 , 457 Milovanovic , Lieutenant Colonel GeneralManojlo
Corps of SpecialUnits (KSJ) 362-364, 368-371, 141, 241, 248-251, 292, 380 , 393-394, 426
373, 375 , 411 Mladic, General Ratko 93, 103, 112 , 141-142,
Operational Group " Pauk " 294-295 , 363-364 , 417 182-185, 208, 220-222 , 231, 247 , 251-256 , 269,
Krstic ,MajorGeneral Radislav 322-325 , 343-347 , 288-293 , 298, 322-325 , 333, 340-363, 376-378 ,
355-356 , 397 , 402-409 389-393, 397 , 405 , 410-411, 417, 425-426
Kucan , Milan 48-49, 52-53, 59, 63, 66 , 72, 76 Montenegro 43, 45 , 88 , 105 , 108, 113 , 120 ,
Kukanjac, General Milutin 129, 153-154, 164 128-129, 137, 142, 162, 252, 396
Kupres 136 , 154, 225, 237-244, 251, 259-260 , 287, Mostar 126 , 132-133, 141-143, 154-168 , 181, 189 ,
365 , 418 194 , 198-212 , 225-227 , 257-259, 278, 283-285,
308 , 366 , 419

L Mrksic , Lieutenant Colonel GeneralMile 290 , 298 ,

361-375 , 397 , 411-414
Lasva Valley 179 , 191-207, 226 , 401 Mt. Bjelasnica 185, 239-241, 290 , 312
Livno Valley (Livanjsko Polje ) 220, 250-251, 271, Mt. Igman 142, 179, 184-186 , 230 , 239-241, 257, 290 ,
275-276 , 290 , 295, 299, 365, 370, 374-376 , 401 378-379, 403-405, 418
“ Log Revolution " 84-85 Mt. Pljesevica 305
Mt. Stolice 232-234 , 251, 290 , 300-306
M Mt. Treskavica 239-241, 259, 306 , 314-315 , 404
Mt. Vlasic 195-196 , 231-238 , 251-252, 289-290 ,
Maglaj 181, 196-197, 221 , 226 , 229-231, 252-254 , 300-306 , 382, 401
387-388, 423 Muslim - Croat see Croat-Muslim
Mahmuljin , Brigadier Sakib 384

497
N " Oluja - 1 " 280 , 368-372, 412
" Oluja - 2 ” 368-375, 413, 421
nationalism " Oluja - 3 " 369-375, 413 , 421
Croatian 46 , 81-82 " Oluja - 4 " 369-371, 413
ethnic 44 , 82-84 " Osveta " (Revenge) 298
Serbian 44-45, 82 , 84 " Plamen 95" (Flame 95) 298
Slovenian 46 “ Sadejstvo 93” (Joint Action 93) 183
NATO 108 , 161, 179 , 186 , 212 , 221, 229-231, 249 , " Sadejstvo 95 " (Joint Action 95 ) 299, 303
255 , 259-261, 284, 292, 303-307, 312-339, " Sana 95 " 379-395
350-361, 374-379 , 388, 393-426 " Seminar 93" 253
airstrikes 184 , 186 , 221, 231-232, 239, 261, “ Skok ” (Leap ) 295
328-339, 354-358, 377-379, 385-386 , 394-398 " Skok - 1 ” 296
dual-key arrangement 328 , 377 “ Skok - 2 ” 299-300 , 365
Nevesinje 157, 241-242 " Spreca 95" 299, 303-304
Nicolai, Brigadier General Cees 327, 332-336 “ Stit 91” (Shield 91) 87
Norac ,Major GeneralMirko 269, 369-372 “ Stit 94” (Shield 94 ) 248-249
Novakovic, Lieutenant ColonelGeneral Mile 249 , " Stupcanica 95 " 356
270 , 278 , 294 , 363 , 373 , 417 “ Tigar-Sloboda 94” ( Tiger - Freedom 94 ) 245
“ Tiger ” 157
O “ Trebevic - 1" 187, 201
“ Trebevic -2 " 201
Operations " Trokut I" (Triangle I) 306
" Deliberate Force" 361, 377-378, 386 , 394-395 , “ Una 92 " 150
417-418 , 426 “ Una 94 " 246
" Cagalj" (Jackal) 155-157, 181 " Una 95" 305-306 , 383-384, 389
“ Bljesak ” (Flash ) 276 , 296-298 , 305, 399 “ Uragan 95 " (Hurricane 95) 384-388, 395, 423
" Breza 94” 221, 244 , 247 “ Zima94" (Winter 94 ) 250-251, 267, 276 , 287, 295
“ Brgule 94 " 238 " Zora 95 " (Dawn 95 ) 305
“ Cerska 93 " 184 “ Zvezda 94 " (Star 94 ) 231
" Cincar” 243 " Zvezda 95 " (Star 95 ) 290
" Corridor 92 " 146 BOR 54
" Daring Lion " 360 KANAL 54
“ Domet- 1 ” (Reach - 1) 301 Vlasic 401
" Drina 93" 228 Werewolf 420
“Grmec 94 ” 247-248 Orasje 146 , 166 , 181, 183, 285, 290, 298-300 , 304 ,
“ Juzni Potez " (Southern Move ) 390 322, 363, 394 , 400 , 477
“Kladanj 93” 229, 253 Oric , Naser 151, 167, 184-185, 317-325 , 346 , 352 ,
“ Krivaja 95" 322 406
“ Ljeto 95" (Summer 95 ) 364-374, 414, 418 Osijek 93, 99-101, 110-112
" Lukavac 93" 208 , 290 Ottoman Empire 119-121, 148
“Mac 95” (Sword 95) 208 Owen , Lord David 157 , 182, 208
" Maestral" (Breeze) 379-395 , 418-419 , 425 Owen - Stoltenberg 187 , 220
"Maslenica 93" 267-273 Ozren salient 228, 234-235, 283, 384-387
“Medak 93 ” 269-273
“ Neretva 93” 202
" Oluja" (Storm ) 107 , 268-279 , 290-291, 365-379 ,
391-392, 412-416

498
P Sarajevo Total Exclusion Zone 379 , 395
Serb Autonomous Regions 123, 138
Pakrac 89-102, 111-112 Serbia 43-45, 50 , 57 , 71-73, 81-82, 88-96 , 102-105,
Pale 151, 161, 168, 234 , 261, 288-289, 310-314 , 108-151, 161-165 , 169 , 184-185 , 222 , 227, 252 ,
377-378, 397, 405, 419 274, 288, 325, 342, 360-362, 396 , 406 , 410
Palic , Colonel Avdo 356 , 359 Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina (Srpska
Panic , Lieutenant Colonel General Zivota 100-102 Autonomna Oblast Krajina, SAOK ) 85 , 90 , 93,
Partisans 82 , 120-121 102-103 , 111
Party for Democratic Action , SDA (Stranka Serbian Autonomous Region of Western Slavonia 102
Demokratske Akcije) see under Bosnia Serbian Democratic Party , SDS (Srpska Demokratska
Pasalic , General Arif 200 , 245 Stranka ) 84 , 111, 122-145 , 161-164,
Patriotic League see under Bosnia 220-222, 252, 255, 288-292, 391, 397, 426
Pavelic , Ante 81-83 Serbian Government 84-85, 90, 105, 113
Pavlov,Major General Jovan 60 , 76 , 448 Serbian MUP 100 , 127-128 , 131, 162, 421
Pecigrad 245, 246 , 260, 363-364 Serbian National Council 84
Perisic , Colonel GeneralMomcilo 411 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina ( SRBH )
Peterle , Lojze 51, 57, 59, 67, 83 (Republika Serpska ) 123-124, 133-135, 140,
Republic of Serbian Krajina (Republika Srpska 142-147, 161-166 , 188 , 219-222 , 248-252, 271,
Krajina,RSK ) see Krajina Serb Republic 288-297 , 318 , 325 , 363-364, 372, 376 , 379,
Republic of Western Bosnia 362-364 390-396 , 421
Rose , General Michael 229 , 255 , 261 Serbian State Security Service /Department (Sluzba/
Roso , Ante 162, 206 , 225-227, 243, 260 , 421 Resor Drzavne Bezbednosti) (SDB /RDB ) 75 , 85 ,
Petkovic, Brigadier General Milivoj 134 , 164 , 88 , 90 , 111, 127-128 , 137-138 , 142, 162 , 184 , 222,
193-194 , 206 , 211 249, 252, 292 , 294, 322, 353, 363, 389 , 397-398 ,
pink zones 107 420
Posavina corridor 140-147 , 160-166 , 179-183, 201, Special Operations Unit “ Red Berets" 137, 294 ,
232-235 , 257 , 278, 285 , 298, 303-304 322 , 353, 383
Prazina, Juka 153, 158 Sevo,Major General Stevo 369, 372
Prevlaka peninsula 146 , 157 Simic ,Major GeneralNovica 183, 232 , 253, 304 , 402
Prijedor 132 , 144-145, 150 , 162, 255, 380, 383, 389, Slapar, Janez 50, 67
393-394 , 416 , 420 , 425 Slavonia , Eastern 85-113 , 271, 296-298 , 374 , 390-392
Prozor 159 , 168, 181, 191, 193, 198-206 , 227 Slavonia ,Western 85, 90, 93, 99, 102, 111-113, 271,
296-299, 400
R Slovenia 43-135 , 252 , 396
arms procurement47-75 , 85-109
Rajic , Ivica 204-206 , 212-213 army ( Territorial Defense , TO ) 48-55 , 60-70 ,
Rapid Reaction Force (RRF ) 326 , 357 , 360, 378 74-76 , 431
Real Threat strategy 271, 274, 279 declaration of independence 43, 56-61
Ministry of Internal Affairs ,MUP (Ministarstvo
S Unutarnjih poslova ) 52-54 , 75 , 434
special police 52-53, 67 , 72
SanskiMost 144-145 , 150 , 289, 380 , 382-383 , Security Intelligence Service — VIS
389-393, 397, 420-421, 425 (Varnostnalzvestajna Sluzba) 51-75
Sarajevo 120-121 parliament 45, 50 , 55 , 59, 64
siege 125 , 136-137, 139-141, 179 , 229-230 , 237 , Smith , Admiral Leighton 378
240-241, 290 , 307-316 Smith , General Rupert 357
Sarajevo agreement 134

499
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) Torbica , Lieutenant Colonel GeneralMilan 269-270 ,
see Yugoslav Federal Republic 278 , 435
" special police ” definition and description 53 TO see Territorial Defense
Spegelj, General Martin 61, 86-87,91, 111
Split Agreement 227 , 287, 364 U
Srebrenica 151, 179 , 184-191, 208 , 283-290 , 316-354 ,
377, 395-411 United Nations
StariMost (" old bridge" ) 155-156 , 200-201, 206 dual-key arrangement 328, 377
Stipetic , ColonelGeneral Petar 166 , 298 , 372-374 , UN exclusion zones 227-228 , 237 , 240-241,
399-400 , 416-417 255-259, 307-308 , 378-379, 386 , 394-395
strategic offensive, JNA 91-274, 365-367 UN Protected Areas (UNPA ) 106-108 , 113
Strugar, ColonelGeneral Pavle 103, 154, 442 UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR ) 106-107, 113 ,
Stupar,Major GeneralMilorad 362-363, 369 152 , 159, 164, 180, 188, 194, 200-407
Stupni Do massacre 204-205 , 212 UN safe areas 185-186 , 248-249, 261, 314 ,
318-319 , 354 , 360
T UNPROFOR battalions
British 190 , 192, 209, 360-361
Talic , Lieutenant Colonel GeneralMomir 146 , 247, Canadian 152, 185 , 313
257, 298 Dutch 319-342 , 350-353, 406-408
Tarbuk, Major General Slobodan 368 , 372-373 , 412 , French 240-241, 245-246 , 313 , 361
447 Nordic 204 , 379
Territorial Defense (Teritorijalna Odbyana, TO ) Russian 230
system 47-48 Ukrainian 355-358 , 361, 409-411
Bosnian 51, 125, 129-130 , 135-151 , 162 UN Security Council 164, 185, 213 , 349, 395, 403
Croatian 51, 87 , 112 Resolutions 131, 319-320 , 333
Montenegrin 99 Ustashe see Croatian Fascists
Serbian 92, 108 , 128, 162 Uzdolmassacre 203
Slovenian 48-76 , 431 Uzelac, Colonel General Nikola see in Volume II
Yugoslav 47-48 , 83, 101-103
Tesanj 197 , 202 , 208, 221, 228-237 , 251-254 , 287 V
Teslic 208
Travnik 130 , 140 , 147-148 , 181, 194-198 , Vance Plan 73, 94-95 , 105-106 , 112 , 268, 276
207-210, 224, 231, 238, 252, 283, 300 , 382 Vance -Owen Plan 182-183 , 190-194 , 220
Tudjman, Franjo 44 ,61, 81-112 , 122-124 , 133-134, Vance -Owen - Stoltenberg plan 189
144-146 , 158-159, 162-164 , 168 , 182 , 191, Vares 158 , 181, 196 , 204-232, 237, 253-256 , 404
196-198 , 227, 267-269, 279, 295-298, 364, 367, Vasiljevic ,MajorGeneral Aleksandar 55, 75, 89, 111 ,
392 , 400 , 412-416 , 425 130 , 163
Tus, Colonel General Anton 96 , 101, 268-272 , 277, Velika Kladusa 148-149, 166-167, 188, 245-261,
413 293-294 , 364 , 374 , 412-420
Tuzla 99 , 126 , 132, 143, 151, 165, 201-258, 283, 287, Vis 236
290 , 300-302, 311-312, 319, 322-324 , 337-354 , Visegrad 132 , 138-139 , 151, 165, 185 , 209, 409
379, 384-387, 402-409, 422-426 Visnjica 324-326
The Hague peace conference 105 , 124 Vitez 158-159, 168 , 181, 191-202, 225-226 , 252,
Tito , Josip Broz 43,47,66 , 82 , 120-125 , 140 , 168 , 313 285-287, 418-423
Tolimir ,Major General Zdravko 292 , 333 , 397 VJ (Vojske Jugoslavije ) see Yugoslav Army
Tomanic ,Major General Radivoje 365, 380, 382, 394 VRS (Vojske Republike Srpske) see Bosnian Serb
Topalovic , Musan “ Caco” 153, 186-187, 208 Army

500
Vojna Krajina (military frontier) 81 Third Military District 64
Vojvodina 43-45, 88 , 396 Fourth Military District 129-130 , 154 , 163
volunteer units , JNA and Serbian see under Yugoslav Fifth Military District 57 , 59,61, 63-65,67, 70 ,
People's Army 75-76 , 96 , 99, 106 , 112 , 168
Vozuca 234-235, 385-386 , 422 Military -Maritime District 96 , 112
Vrnograc 294 Corps
Vukovar 73, 90 , 93 , 99-104, 108 , 110 , 112 , 133, 135, 2nd Podgorica 154
164 , 308 , 362, 411 2nd Titograd 103-104, 443
Vukovic , General Vladimir 103 4th Sarajevo 126 , 152-153, 442
5th Banja Luka 99 , 102, 126 , 142, 149, 154, 442
W 9th Knin 93, 99, 103, 154 , 413, 443
10th Bihac 149, 163, 166
Washington Agreement 220-221, 225-228 10th Zagreb 65 , 163, 435 , 442
12th Novi Sad 99 , 101, 441
Y 13th Bileca 154
13th Rijeka 65, 436
Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of 43-56 , 58, 63-169, 14th Ljubljana 51,60, 65 , 73, 152, 436
182-187 , 208-230 , 252, 271, 288-290 , 316 , 17th Tuzla 99 , 126 , 442
325-327, 364 , 376 , 391-397 , 406 , 425-426 31stMaribor 51, 65, 73, 437
Federal Presidency 45 , 48 ,67, 73-74 , 87-94 , 111 , 32nd Varazdin 65 , 95 , 438
128-131, 162 37th Uzice 138-139, 278 , 443
Constitution 43, 50 , 74-75 9th Boka Katorska Military Maritime Sector
declaration of war against Slovenia 59 ( 9th VPS ) 104
ethnic composition 46 Navy (RM ) 74
State Security Service (Sluzba Drzavne mobilization (against Slovenia and Croatia) 97-98 ,
Bezbednosti, SDB ) 55 108
Yugoslav Army (Vojske Jugoslavije , VJ) 142, 168 , personnel 89
184, 222, 249, 252-253, 269-272 , 283 , 294 , 322 , Security Directorate (Uprava Bezbednosti , UB ) 55 ,
353, 363, 368-376 , 397-398, 411 130 , 432 (see also Counterintelligence Service,
Air Force 84 , 101 KOS)
Corps of Special Units 252 , 294 , 362-363 , 411 volunteer units 87 , 99-104 , 108, 110 , 126 , 130 ,
Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna 141, 152
Armija , JNA ) 45-51, 55-76 , 86-89, 91-114 , 125 , weapons and equipment 47
129-130 , 136-137 , 139-140 , 152-153 , 435-443
Air and Air Defense Force (RV i PVO ) 50 , 69, 74 Z
Counterintelligence Service (KOS) 55-57 ,
69-70 , 75 , 87-89, 130-131, 163, 432 Z -4 plan 295, 367, 399
garrisons 53-73 Zenica 140 , 191-235, 253, 283, 311, 384-386
General Staff 47-49, 56-57, 88 , 92-98 Zepa 179-185, 283, 290 , 318-321, 325,
Ground Forces (KOV ) 47 , 69, 74 343-346 , 352-360 , 395-410
helicopters /helicopter operations 60-61 Zepce 180-202, 225-234, 252-254
military districts 47 Zivanovic, Major General Milenko 322
First Military District 98 , 99 , 100-102, 112 , 164 ZNG , Croatian NationalGuard Corps see under
Second Military District 129, 130 , 132 , 137 , 141, Croatian Army
153-154, 163-164 Zvornik 136-151, 164

501
一 -
 s
kan
Bal

ry
ita
Mil

y
tor
His
 Stanford University Libraries

909 hh2 21C SOT9 E