POE-LLAMANZARES vs.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016
PEREZ, J.

FACTS:

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain
Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano
Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan
Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition
and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although
necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption, 2 the petitioner's adoptive
mother discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo
a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's mother
executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate
of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. 4

Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13
December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. 5

On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F927287 6 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently,
on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616. 7

ISSUE:

Whether or not persons of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship
is determinative of natural-born status?

HELD:

At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the
Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation. 110 That said, there is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents
and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino
citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift
the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high
probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4,
Rule 128:

Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters  - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or no-existence.
Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability of improbability of
the fact in issue.

The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) 111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of
foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that
any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo
Province for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the
population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were figures for the child
producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year, there were
210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That
same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these figures. Notably,
Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the population in
Iloilo was Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic
Church in Iloilo City.1âwphi1 She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval
face.

There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. 113 All of the
foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the
Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino,
would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on
which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm. In the words of the Solicitor General:

Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies
behind. We do not face a situation where the probability is such that every foundling would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50%
chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines
would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.

According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average, there were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to
Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to
natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born
Filipino is 99.93%.

From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is
15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the
Philippines on that decade would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.

We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but I am confident that the statistical probability that a child
born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not be affected by whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood that a
foundling would have a Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do
not imagine foreigners abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking those infants would have better economic opportunities or
believing that this country is a tropical paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a foreign couple has ever
considered their child excess baggage that is best left behind.

To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there may be a theoretical chance that one among the
thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just
doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision
denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable
hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and the use of
common sense are not separate disciplines.

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to
foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,114 this Court held that:

The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. 115

As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers
intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:

Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino
mother not recognized by the father.

xxxx

President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind of
illegitimate children?
Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown parents.

Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all
children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of unknown parentage
is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be Filipino,
and there is no need ...

Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.

Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for amendment.

Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of unknown parentage."

Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage.

Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child, is not unknown.

President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?

Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the child.
Their parentage is not unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should also be
considered as Filipinos.

President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.

Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the Legislature?

Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that the constitution need [not] refer to them.  By international
law the principle that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to
include a provision on the subject exhaustively.116

Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any objection to the notion that persons of "unknown parentage"
are not citizens but only because their number was not enough to merit specific mention. Such was the account, 117 cited by petitioner, of delegate
and constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:

During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children
with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily
because the Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to
them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the
effect that illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the place where
they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed amendment.

This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16 February 2016 Oral Arguments:

We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was declined was the proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of
foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional silence is by saying that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas which
prevailed that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers of a constitution can constitutionalize rules based
on assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn existing rules. This is basic. What matters here is that Montinola and
Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in the convention that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because they
are already impliedly so recognized.

In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is
to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973
and 1987 Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is not silently
silent, it is silently vocal. 118

The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just and humane society," that "they were reasonable patriots
and that it would be unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave implications of the
argument that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an
express intention to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against
foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board marginalization."

We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right
to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the present charter:
Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article
XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people
to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the "right of
children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their
unfortunate status.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship
upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code
which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines
even though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis
and Ellis v. Republic,119 a child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This Court said:

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem,  which no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the
subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also over the res,  which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein.
Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant
to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners,
who are foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied)

Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and
For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and
Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's
A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may
be adopted.

It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and
the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is
erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by
the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities. 121 Secondly, the object of the
process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to
naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother
under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.

In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her
favor.122 The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling. 123

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. 124 On the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law,
by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations. 125 International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two
elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive
necessitates  (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it.126 "General principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established by a process of
reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal systems generally," 127 such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general
principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment
and Occupation."128 These are the same core principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Bill of Rights. 129

Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law
and binding on the State.130 Article 15 thereof states:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations on
our country:

Article 7

1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as
possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant
international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.

In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right
of every child "to acquire a nationality:"

Article 24

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right,
to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is
stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws,
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.

The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law. The first is
Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to
have the "nationality of the country of birth," to wit:

Article 14

A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall
be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.

A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)

The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United
Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:

Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within the
territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State. That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930
Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich 131 effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the
UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis,  133 this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced disappearances in the said convention was
nonetheless binding as a "generally accepted principle of international law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the ban as a generally
accepted principle of international law although the convention had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not even come into force and
which needed the ratification of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was content with the practice of
international and regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the United States.

Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v. Ranada,  134 where only four countries had "either ratified
or acceded to"135 the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" when the case
was decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out that that nine member countries of the European Common Market had acceded to the Judgments
Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen countries
were considered and yet, there was pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was widespread practice.

Our approach in Razon and Mijares  effectively takes into account the fact that "generally accepted principles of international law" are based not
only on international custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1
paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill
of Rights and which are "basic to legal systems generally," 136 support the notion that the right against enforced disappearances and the recognition
of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as "generally accepted principles of international law" under the incorporation clause.

Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing
foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961
Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments
pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including the
practice of jus sanguinis  countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born of
nationals of the country in which the foundling is found.

Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552,
R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children
who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This
shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.

Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and
consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than
99% and is a virtual certainty.

In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a
defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country
which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor General's warning in his opening statement is relevant:

.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties and conventions were drafted because the world
community is concerned that the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up
using the international instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political status or to accord them second-class
citizenship.138

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.