Republic of the Philippines On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G.

SUPREME COURT Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office
Manila of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections.
On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another
EN BANC candidate, filed a petition  with the Comelec docketed
4

as SPA No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be

  disqualified from seeking or holding any public office
or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the
Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996
canceled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the
Comelec promulgated a Resolution  granting the
5

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, petition with the following disposition : 6

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R.
WHEREFORE, this Division resolves
LEE, respondents.
to GRANT the petition and declares
that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to
G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996 run for the Office of Governor of
Sorsogon on the ground that he is
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, NOT a citizen of the Philippines.
vs. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. candidacy is canceled.
FRIVALDO, respondents.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo
  remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995
elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was
PANGANIBAN, J.:p voted for during the elections held on said date. On
May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc  affirmed the
7

The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who aforementioned Resolution of the Second Division.
should be declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon -

The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the

(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the
canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of
highest number of votes in three successive elections
Votes  dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the
8

but who was twice declared by this Court to be

following votes obtained by the candidates for the
disqualified to hold such office due to his alien
position of Governor of Sorsogon:
citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed
his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the
canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in favor of Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate
should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away Raul R. Lee 53,304
their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most
number of valid votes; or Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925

(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a
obviously was not voted directly to the position of (supplemental) petition  praying for his proclamation
9

governor, but who according to prevailing as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.

jurisprudence should take over the said post
inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a In an order  dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated
10

"permanent vacancy in the contested office has according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the
occurred"? Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning
doctrines on repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon
existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, on June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the
and upholds the superiority of substantial justice over evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed
pure legalisms. governor of Sorsogon.

G.R. No. 123755 On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a

new petition,  docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying
11

This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation
the Rules of Court for certiorari and preliminary of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that
injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his
respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), First oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after
Division,  promulgated on December 19, 1995  and
1 2 "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he
another Resolution of the Comelec en filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in
banc promulgated February 23, 1996  denying 3 September 1994 had been granted". As such, when
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the
Comelec) . . . was released and received by Frivaldo
The Facts on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there
was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of First -- The initiatory petition below
Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the alternative, he was so far insufficient in form and
averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo substance to warrant the exercise by
vs. Comelec,  the Vice-Governor - not Lee - should
12
the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with
occupy said position of governor. the result that, in effect, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division in taking cognizance of and deciding
promulgated the herein assailed Resolution  holding
13 said petition;
that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of
votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as Second -- The judicially declared
duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having disqualification of respondent was a
garnered the highest number of votes, continuing condition and rendered him
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by ineligible to run for, to be elected to
repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of and to hold the Office of Governor;
Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold
the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus: Third -- The alleged repatriation of
respondent was neither valid nor is the
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his
Commission (First Division), therefore ineligibility and qualify him to hold the
RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition. Office of Governor; and

Consistent with the decisions of the Fourth -- Correctly read and applied,
Supreme Court, the proclamation of the Labo Doctrine fully supports the
Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon validity of petitioner's proclamation as
is hereby ordered annulled, being duly elected Governor of Sorsogon.
contrary to law, he not having
garnered the highest number of votes G.R. No. 120295
to warrant his proclamation.
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the
Upon the finality of the annulment of respondent Comelec, the first two of which are also at
the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
Provincial Board of Canvassers is
directed to immediately reconvene 1. Resolution  of the Second Division,
16

and, on the basis of the completed promulgated on May 1, 1995,

canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. disqualifying Frivaldo from running for
Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor governor of Sorsogon in the May 8,
of Sorsogon having garnered the 1995 elections "on the ground that he
highest number of votes, and he is not a citizen of the Philippines";
having reacquired his Filipino
citizenship by repatriation on June 30,
2. Resolution 7 of the Comelec en
1

1995 under the provisions of

banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995;
Presidential Decree No. 725 and,
and
thus, qualified to hold the office of
Governor of Sorsogon.
3. Resolution  of the Comelec en
18

banc, promulgated also on May 11,

Conformably with Section 260 of the
1995 suspending the proclamation of,
Omnibus Election Code
among others, Frivaldo.
(B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the
Commission is directed to notify His
Excellency the President of the The Facts and the Issue
Philippines, and the Secretary of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the The facts of this case are essentially the same as
Province of Sorsogon of this resolution those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo assails
immediately upon the due the above-mentioned resolutions on a different
implementation thereof. ground: that under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:
On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec en Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course
banc in its Resolution   promulgated on February 23,
14 or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.
1996. On February 26, 1996, the present petition was -- A verified petition seeking to deny
filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining due course or to cancel a certificate of
order, this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a candidacy may be filed by any person
Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to exclusively on the ground that any
maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of material representation contained
this petition." therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755 filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy and shall
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may
be decided, after notice and
briefly be capsulized in the following propositions" :
15
 hearing, not later than fifteen days Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An
before the election. (Emphasis elective local official must be a citizen
supplied.) of the Philippines; a registered voter in
the barangay, municipality, city, or
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said province or, in the case of a member
Resolutions because they were not rendered of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
"within the period allowed by law" i.e., "not sangguniang panlungsod, or
later than fifteen days before the election." sangguniang bayan, the district where
he intends to be elected; a resident
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of therein for at least one (1) year
the Comelec to act on the petition for disqualification immediately preceding the day of the
within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as election; and able to read and write
provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which Filipino or any other local language or
renders the said Resolutions null and void. dialect.

By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court (b) Candidates for the
consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since position of governor,
they are intimately related in their factual environment vice governor or
and are identical in the ultimate question raised, viz., member of the
who should occupy the position of governor of the sangguniang
province of Sorsogon. panlalawigan, or
mayor, vice mayor or
member of the
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument
sangguniang
from the parties and required them thereafter to file
panlungsod of highly
simultaneously their respective memoranda.
urbanized cities must
be at least twenty-
The Consolidated Issues three (23) years of age
on election day.
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated
issues may be restated as follows: x x x           x x x          x x x

1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this
so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to Court  as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon
20

qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine,
Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under
so, from when? the said statute (R.A. 7160).

2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for Under Philippine law,  citizenship may be reacquired
21

lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by
eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No.
governorship of Sorsogon? 104654  and during the oral argument in this case
22

that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of

3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed
the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of
that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an several members of the House of Representatives"
election protest or a quo warranto case"? due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his
political rivals." In the same case, his attempt
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the at naturalization was rejected by this Court because
election, valid and legal in light of existing of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
jurisprudence?
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of
exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988
Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over
assuming the governorship of Sorsogon, considering the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially
that they were not rendered within the period referred declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified
to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., from holding and discharging his popular mandate.
"not later than fifteen days before the elections"? Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote
from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover,
he now boasts of having successfully passed through
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by
the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this case. All repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the
the other matters raised are secondary to this. Solicitor General himself, who was the prime
opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this
The Local Government Code of 1991  expressly
19
time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing
requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private
elective local officials, including that of provincial counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath
governor, thus: of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at
2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other
insists that he -- not Lee -- should have been interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum,
proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee,
when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 would visit unmitigated violence not only upon
p.m. on the said date since, clearly and statutory construction but on common sense as well.
unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of
votes in the elections and since at that time, he Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital
already reacquired his citizenship. irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings,"
asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is on June 29, 1995 . . . (and) was approved in just one
tainted with serious defects, which we shall now day or on June 30, 1995 . . .", which "prevented a
discuss in seriatim. judicious review and evaluation of the merits thereof."
Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been repatriation with the Office of the President in
effectively repealed", asserting that "then President Malacañang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is
Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the
the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8,
forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree 1995, when presumably the said Committee started
or Executive Issuances as the same poses a serious processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled
and contentious issue of policy which the present up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound required. Under these circumstances, it could not be
discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the said that there was "indecent haste" in the processing
first Congress under the 1987 Constitution", adding of his application.
that in her memorandum dated March 27, 1987 to the
members of the Special Committee on Naturalization Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of
constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. the Special Committee on Naturalization was intended
725, President Aquino directed them "to cease and solely for the personal interest of respondent," 7 the
2

desist from undertaking any and all proceedings Solicitor General explained during the oral argument
within your functional area of responsibility as defined on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply
under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April baseless as there were many others who applied and
11, 1975, as amended." 23
were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was
submitted by him to this Court, through a
This memorandum dated March 27, 1987  cannot by
24 Manifestation  filed on April 3, 1996.
28

any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a

law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are
725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent convinced that the presumption of regularity in the
ones   and a repeal may be express or implied. It is
25
performance of official duty and the presumption of
obvious that no express repeal was made because legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been
then President Aquino in her memorandum -- based successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the
on the copy furnished us by Lee -- did not proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground
categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily
being repealed or was being rendered without any tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation
legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor
specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D.
is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by 725  itself requires very little of an applicant, and even
29

implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not the rules and regulations to implement the said
be allowed "unless it is convincingly and decree were left to the Special Committee to
unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in
clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry
cannot co-exist".26
into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant
is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of
even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen
every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even who openly and faithfully served his country and his
under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 province prior to his naturalization in the United States
Constitution can nor should be regarded as an -- a naturalization he insists was made necessary only
exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he
be treated as an executive policy addressed to the abhorred and could not in conscience embrace -- and
Special Committee to halt the acceptance and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-
processing of applications for repatriation pending establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in
whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 returning to his country of birth to offer once more his
Constitution" might make. In other words, the former talent and services to his people.
President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first
Congress -- once created -- to deal with the matter. If So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to
she had intended to repeal such law, she should have by the Solicitor General, were granted repatriation
unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to argues convincingly and conclusively against the
Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her existence of favoritism vehemently posited by Raul
presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of
the intention of "the present government, in the Frivaldo's repatriation should have been pursued
exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the
Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of
"ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then
Third, Lee further contends that assuming the should such qualification be required at the time of
assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of
only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such
whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by the qualifications -- unless otherwise expressly
Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his conditioned, as in the case of age and residence --
election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is should thus be possessed when the "elective [or
filed," citing our decision in G.R. 104654  which held
30 elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he
that "both the Local Government Code and the is proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this
Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's
run and be elected to public office." Obviously, ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap &
however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in Sons,   if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is
33

said case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was to ensure that our people and country do not end up
valid or not -- and NOT the effective date thereof. being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing
Since the Court held his naturalization to be invalid, allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose
then the issue of when an aspirant for public office would not be thwarted but instead achieved by
should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the construing the citizenship qualification as applying to
Court. Which question we shall now directly rule on. the time of proclamation of the elected official and at
the start of his term.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n
elective local official must be: But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one
raised during the oral argument  to the effect that the
34

* a citizen of the Philippines; citizenship qualification should be possessed at the

time the candidate (or for that matter the elected
official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39,
* a registered voter in the barangay,
apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also
municipality, city, or province . . .
specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a
where he intends to be elected;
"registered voter". And, under the law  a "voter" must
35

be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo

* a resident therein for at least one (1) could not have been a voter -- much less
year immediately preceding the day of a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at the
the election; time of such registration.

* able to read and write Filipino or any The answer to this problem again lies in discerning
other local language or dialect. the purpose of the requirement. If the law intended
the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to
* In addition, "candidates for the election consistent with the requirement of being a
position of governor . . . must be at registered voter, then it would not have made
least twenty-three (23) years of age on citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law
election day. abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason
that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if
specify any particular date or time when the candidate being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also
must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence stands to reason that the voter requirement was
(which must consist of at least one year's residency included as another qualification (aside from
immediately preceding the day of election) and age "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality
(at least twenty three years of age on election day). but to require that the official be registered as a voter
IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the
for holding an elective public office,  and the purpose
31 barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he
of the citizenship qualification is none other than to intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that
ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance the Local Government Code requires an elective
to another nation, shall govern our people and our official to be a registered voter. It does not require him
country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official to vote actually. Hence, registration -- not the actual
begins to govern or to discharge his functions only voting -- is the core of this "qualification". In other
upon his proclamation and on the day the law words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is
mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo to ensure that the prospective official is actually
re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the registered in the area he seeks to govern -- and not
very day  the term of office of governor (and other
32 anywhere else.
elective officials) began -- he was therefore already
qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly
discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as emphasized -- and Lee has not disputed -- that he
of said date. In short, at that time, he was already "was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his
qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by
liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote in his
meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with precinct on May 8, 1995." 36

the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too,

even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal)
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective
steadfastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always for the purpose the parties intended."
been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in
1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in 1995. In On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e.,
fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the those statutes relating to remedies or modes of
court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a voter and he procedure, which do not create new or take away
was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
previous elections including on May 8, 1995."  7 3
remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do
not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the law, nor within the general rule against the
province where he intended to be elected. retrospective operation of statutes.43

There is yet another reason why the prime issue A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it
of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of creates a new right, and also provides for a new
proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus,
date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Section in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the
253 of the Omnibus Election Code   gives any voter,
38
plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their
presumably including the defeated candidate, the Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who
opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the could not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as
disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of
the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest their husbands or the termination of their marital
before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising status" and who could neither be benefitted by the
from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino
under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine
remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten citizenship . . ." because "such provision of the new
days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who
Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of had married aliens before said constitution took
ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these
Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's women -- the right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship
proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. even during their marital coverture, which right did not
Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute
taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor
the same day, then he should have been the of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their
candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire
the highest number of votes in the immediately Philippine citizenship", because prior to the
preceding elections and such oath had already cured promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would
his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome
such time, he was no longer ineligible. process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D.
725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we citizenship under the simplified procedure of
also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo repatriation.
RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his
application on August 17, 1994. The Solicitor General  argues:
44

It is true that under the Civil Code of the By their very nature, curative statutes
Philippines,   "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect,
39
are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96
unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled SCRA 342), since they are intended to
exceptions  to this general rule, such as when the
40
supply defects, abridge superfluities in
statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when existing laws (Del Castillo vs.
it CREATES NEW RIGHTS. Securities and Exchange Commission,
96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils
According to Tolentino,  curative statutes are those
41 (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).
which undertake to cure errors and irregularities,
thereby validating judicial or administrative In this case, P.D. No. 725 was
proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds enacted to cure the defect in the
and contracts which otherwise would not produce existing naturalization law, specifically
their intended consequences by reason of some C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino
statutory disability or failure to comply with some women are allowed to repatriate only
technical requirement. They operate on conditions upon the death of their husbands, and
already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in natural-born Filipinos who lost their
operation. Agpalo,  on the other hand, says that
42
citizenship by naturalization and other
curative statutes are causes faced the difficulty of
"healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the undergoing the rigid procedures of
means of enforcing existing obligations . . . (and) are C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino
intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in citizenship by naturalization.
existing laws, and curb certain evils. . . . By their very
nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and) Presidential Decree No. 725 provided
reach back to past events to correct errors or a remedy for the aforementioned legal
irregularities and to render valid and effective aberrations and thus its provisions are
 considered essentially remedial and Being a former Filipino who has served the people
curative. repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation
of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his
wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that the repatriation.
legislative intent was precisely to give the statute
retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective operation is Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing
given to a statute or amendment where the intent that is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D.
it should so operate clearly appears from a 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the
consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay
thereof."  It is obvious to the Court that the statute
45
the processing of applications for any substantial
was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be
and transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing stateless, as Frivaldo -- having already renounced his
law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been American citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for
held that citizenship is a political and civil right equally causes outside their control. This should not be. In
as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
abode, the right against unreasonable searches and laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body
seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of intended right and justice to prevail.  7
4

Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give

retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the And as experience will show, the Special Committee
fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a was able to process, act upon and grant applications
remedial statute must be so construed as to make it for repatriation within relatively short spans of time
effect the evident purpose for which it was enacted, after the same were filed.  The fact that such
48

so that if the reason of the statute extends to past interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the
transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it likelihood of prejudice to the government as a result of
will be so applied although the statute does not in giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind
terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is
vested right or violate some constitutional possible only where a person's repatriation has the
guaranty."  This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which
46
effect of wiping out a liability of his to the government
did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify arising in connection with or as a result of his being an
the right of repatriation granted therein. alien, and accruing only during the interregnum
between application and approval, a situation that is
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can not present in the instant case.
the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo
considering that said law was enacted on June 5, And it is but right and just that the mandate of the
1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship much people, already twice frustrated, should now prevail.
later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or
repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994? iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having
become effective as of the date of his application, i.e.,
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the on August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions
time that Frivaldo became an American citizen, about his possession of the nationality qualification --
nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995)
which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing
repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would
June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to become moot.
the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994.
The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it Based on the foregoing, any question regarding
was the intent of the legislative authority that the law Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be
should apply to past events -- i.e., situations and deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as
transactions existing even before the law came into having been repatriated -- i.e., his Filipino citizenship
being -- in order to benefit the greatest number of restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous
former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to registration as a voter is likewise deemed validated as
enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed of said date.
right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to
be given the fullest effect and expression, then there It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo
is all the more reason to have the law apply in a became an American. Would the retroactivity of his
retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship,
events and transactions subsequent to the passage which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code
of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to would disqualify him "from running for any elective
Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to local position?"  We answer this question in the
49

take effect as of date of his application. As earlier negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that
mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took
this or would show a contrary intention on the part of said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he
the legislative authority; and there is no showing that ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo
damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or wrote that he "had long renounced and had long
injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his abandoned his American citizenship -- long before
repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the
result the impairment of any contractual obligation, interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US
disturbance of any vested right or breach of some citizenship but before he was repatriated to his
constitutional guaranty. Filipino citizenship."
50
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution the Supreme Court, however, was in
dated December 19, 1995: 51
connection with the 1992 elections.

By the laws of the United States, Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of
petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with
citizenship when he took his oath of finality. This is because a person may subsequently
allegiance to the Philippine reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under
Government when he ran for any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,  we 56

1995. Every certificate of candidacy held:

contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government." Everytime the citizenship of a person
is material or indispensable in a
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his judicial or administrative case,
foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 whatever the corresponding court or
have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. administrative authority decides
Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the therein as to such citizenship is
Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent generally not considered res judicata,
any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or hence it has to be threshed out again
abuse. 52
and again, as the occasion demands.

The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction

a Continuing Disqualification? Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317

Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution   of the

53
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no
Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No. 95-317
affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution because the only "possible types of proceedings that
of May 11, 1995 "became final and executory after may be entertained by the Comelec are a pre-
five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no restraining order proclamation case, an election protest or a quo
having been issued by this Honorable Court.  Hence,
54
warranto case". Again, Lee reminds us that he was
before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed
on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation
executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds only on July 6, 1995 -- "beyond the 5-day
that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now reglementary period." Hence, according to him,
concedes were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election
alien have also become final and executory way protest or a quo warranto action."
before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial
pronouncements of his political status as an American This argument is not meritorious. The
citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) Constitution 7 has given the Comelec ample power to
5

from running for, and holding any public office in the "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all
Philippines." contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective . . . provincial . . . officials."
We do not agree. Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions
that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. prerogatives, may entertain, suffice it to say that this
87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in Court has invariably recognized the Commission's
connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of
No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992 proclamations -- of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously
elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is one.  Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,  we ruled:
58 59

is final and can no longer be changed. In the words of

the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its The petitioner argues that after
assailed Resolution: 55
proclamation and assumption of office,
a pre-proclamation controversy is no
The records show that the Honorable longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of
Supreme Court had decided that cases holding that pre-proclamation
Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and controversies may no longer be
thus disqualified for the purpose of the entertained by the COMELEC after
1988 and 1992 elections. However, the winning candidate has been
there is no record of any "final proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs.
judgment" of the disqualification of Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion
Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513;
1995 elections. What the Commission Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA
said in its Order of June 21, 1995 468.) This rule, however, is premised
(implemented on June 30, 1995), on an assumption that the
directing the proclamation of Raul R. proclamation is no proclamation at all
Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a and the proclaimed candidate's
Filipino citizen "having been declared assumption of office cannot deprive
by the Supreme Court in its Order the COMELEC of the power to make
dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of such declaration of nullity.
the Philippines." This declaration of (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23
 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, in 1992) and several others can still be voted for in the
186 SCRA 484.) May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.

The Court however cautioned that such power to Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence
annul a proclamation must "be done within ten (10) presented to show that the electorate of Sorsogon
days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's
Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after alleged disqualification as to "bring such awareness
Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the within the realm of notoriety;" in other words, that the
Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same. voters intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that,
in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the vice-
Valid? governor -- and not Lee -- should be pro- claimed,
since in losing the election, Lee was, to
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of
We uphold him for the following reasons: the people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic
teaching of Labo:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo
vs. COMELEC,  "the fact remains that he (Lee) was
60 The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility
not the choice of the sovereign will," and of a candidate receiving majority votes
in Aquino vs. COMELEC,  Lee is "a second
61 does not entitle the eligible candidate
placer, . . . just that, a second placer." receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate cannot
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the
be deemed elected to the office.
governorship on the pronouncement of this Court in
the aforesaid Labo  case, as follows:
62

Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have

seasonably reacquired his citizenship and inasmuch
The rule would have been different if
as he obtained the highest number of votes in the
the electorate fully aware in fact and in
1995 elections, he -- not Lee -- should be proclaimed.
law of a candidate's disqualification so
Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous
as to bring such awareness within the
and should now be corrected.
realm of notoriety, would nonetheless
cast their votes in favor of the
ineligible candidate. In such case, the The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the
electorate may be said to have waived Election Code Mandatory?
the validity and efficacy of their votes
by notoriously misapplying their In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed
franchise or throwing away their votes, Resolution of the Comelec (Second Division) dated
in which case, the eligible candidate May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution
obtaining the next higher number of of May 11, 1995 disqualifying him for want of
votes may be deemed elected. citizenship should be annulled because they were
rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day period
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, prescribed by Section 78, of the Omnibus Election
thus: Code which reads as follows:

But this is not the situation obtaining in Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course
the instant dispute. It has not been or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.
shown, and none was alleged, that -- A verified petition seeking to deny
petitioner Labo was notoriously known due course or to cancel a certificate of
as an ineligible candidate, much less candidacy may be filed by any person
the electorate as having known of exclusively on the ground that any
such fact. On the contrary, petitioner material representation contained
Labo was even allowed by no less therein as required under Section 74
than the Comelec itself in its resolution hereof is false. The petition may be
dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for filed at any time not later than twenty-
the office of the city Payor as its five days from the time of the filing of
resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying the certificate of candidacy and shall
due course to petitioner Labo's be decided after notice and
certificate of candidacy had not yet hearing, not later than fifteen days
become final and subject to the final before the election. (Emphasis
outcome of this case. supplied.)

The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as
Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case because these resolutions are deemed superseded by the
Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First
was in 1992 when the Comelec's cancellation of his Division) on December 19, 1995, affirmed en
certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election banc  on February 23, 1996; which both upheld his
63

day as there was in both cases a pending motion for election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is
reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646
(omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions
for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:
 Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent,
-- Any candidate who has been teaches that a petition to deny due course under
declared by final judgment to be Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period
disqualified shall not be voted for, and prescribed therein. The present case however deals
the votes cast for him shall not be with the period during which the Comelec
counted. If for any reason a candidate may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be
is not declared by final judgment decided even after the fifteen day period mentioned
before an election to be disqualified in Section 78. Here, we rule that a
and he is voted for and receives the decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the
winning number of votes in such elections is valid but Loong held that a
election, the Court or Commission petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time.
shall continue with the trial and There is no inconsistency nor conflict.
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest
and upon motion of the complainant or Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's
any intervenor, may during the holding that, given the unique factual circumstances
pendency thereof order the of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive
suspension of the proclamation of effect. He argues that such retroactivity "dilutes" our
such candidate whenever the holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and
evidence of his guilt is strong. even the second Frivaldo) decision did not directly
(emphasis supplied) involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship.
If we may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo
Refutation of was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his
Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is
settled. But his supervening repatriation has changed
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice his political status -- not in 1988 or 1992, but only in
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President Aquino's the 1995 elections.
memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be
viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that
Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension Frivaldo was stateless prior to his repatriation, saying
or a repeal is a purely academic distinction because that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a
the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or ground to lose American citizenship". Since our courts
abrogate an existing law. are charged only with the duty of determining who are
The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal
recognized in the first Frivaldo case;  viz., "(u)nder CA
64
question of who are or who are not Americans. It is
No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, basic in international law that a State determines
Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by . . . ONLY those who are its own citizens -- not who are
repatriation". He also contends that by allowing the citizens of other countries.  The issue here is: the
65

Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was
voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee
"mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled
him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or case law, such finding is binding and final.
mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as
discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost
there may have been in his registration as a voter for by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three previous
the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity elections, should be declared winner because
did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an American was
which were the subjects of such previous rulings. publicly known". First, there is absolutely no empirical
evidence for such "public" knowledge. Second, even if
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only
not the sole remedy to question the ineligibility of a of the last two previous elections. Third, even the
candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allowing the on his nationality before, during and after the 1995
denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a elections. How then can there be such "public"
false material representation therein as required by knowledge?
Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his
disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the
merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point Local Government Code refers to the qualifications
is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and
120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on not elected officials, and that the citizenship
May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be
they were issued "not later than fifteen days before possessed by candidates, not merely at the
the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In commencement of the term, but by election day at the
dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold latest. We see it differently. Section 39, par. (a)
that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b)
discretion because "Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes to (f) refer to "candidates". If the qualifications under
the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and
after the elections." In spite of his disagreement with not elected officials, the legislature would have said
us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of
directory", we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that
nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295". the citizenship qualification should be possessed at
election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital
stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the
(f) far other qualifications of candidates for governor, term of office of governor, and should have been
mayor, etc. proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his
reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17,
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is
retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the deemed to have been validated as of said date as
ground, among others, that the law specifically well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely
provides that it is only after taking the oath of consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship
allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have requirement is not a continuing disability or
reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not question disqualification to run for and hold public office. And
what the provision states. We hold however that the once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings
provision should be understood thus: that after taking recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to
the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have hear and decide petitions for annulment of
reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition proclamations.
(or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and
intents to have retroacted to the date of his This Court has time and again liberally and equitably
application therefor. construed the electoral laws of our country to give
fullest effect to the manifest will of our people,  for in
66

In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to
literal meaning of the word "elective" in reference to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely
Section 39 of the Local Authority Code, as well as expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal
regarding Mr. Justice Davide's thesis that the very niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of
wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
already taken up rather extensively earlier in this
Decision. . . . (L)aws governing election contests
must be liberally construed to the end
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: that the will of the people in the choice
"This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of of public officials may not be defeated
Law." We agree -- we must all follow the rule of law. by mere technical objections (citations
But that is NOT the issue here. The issue omitted). 7
6

is how should the law be interpreted and applied in

this case so it can be followed, so it can rule! The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every
possible protection, defense and refuge, in deference
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly
of philosophy and perception of how to interpret and stressed the importance of giving effect to the
apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our
letter or the spirit, the naked provision or its ultimate democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a
purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court
isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a
against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious manner that would give effect to the will of the
choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause
to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in elective offices to be filled by those who are the
complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, to choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a
inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must
of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently
tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this antagonistic  to constitutional and legal principles that
68

Court's conscience. overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to

the apparent will of the people, would ultimately
EPILOGUE create greater prejudice to the very democratic
institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution
and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the
undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
Local Government Code is to be possessed by an
elective official at the latest as of the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to In Frivaldo's case. it would have been technically easy
which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. to find fault with his cause. The Court could have
725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his
having been suspended or repealed expressly nor repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his
impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered
virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have
valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he
remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold
new right to resume his political status and the his consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification
legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique "from running for any elective local position." But the
situation of having been forced to give up his real essence of justice does not emanate from
citizenship and political aspiration as his means of quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It
escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the
be given retroactive effect as of the date of his dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate
application therefor, during the pendency of which he development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court
was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality. struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic,
technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the
law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger  
social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique
situation approximating venerability in Philippine PUNO, J., concurring:
political life. Concededly, he sought American
citizenship only to escape the clutches of the I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr.
dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously Justice Panganiban which is pro-people and pierces
entertain any doubt about his loyalty and dedication to the myopia of legalism. Upholding the sovereign will
this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this of the people which is the be-all and the end-all of
land, and sought to serve his people once more. The republicanism, it rests on a foundation that will endure
people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him time and its tempest.
three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this
Republic every time he filed his certificate of The sovereignty of our people is the primary
candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this reason, it
let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and appears as the first in our declaration of principles
sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of and state policies. Thus, section 1 of Article II of our
birth despite several legal set-backs speak more fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a
loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides
technicality, of his consuming intention and burning in the people and all government authority emanates
desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now from them." The same principle served as the bedrock
at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and of our 1973 and 1935 Constitutions.  It is one of the
1

love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot few principles whose truth has been cherished by the
be lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV of the
lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo U.S. Constitution makes it a duty of the Federal
was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of government to guarantee to every state a "republican
the most powerful country in the world. But he opted, form of government." With understandable fervor, the
nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and American authorities imposed republicanism as the
serving once more his struggling but beloved land of cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then being
birth. He therefore deserves every liberal crafted by its Filipino framers.2

interpretation of the law which can be applied in his

favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution,
Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon our 1987 Constitution is more people-oriented. Thus,
most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of section 4 of Article II provides as a state policy that
their overwhelming choice. the prime duty of the Government is "to serve and
protect the people." Section 1, Article XI also provides
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing: that ". . . public officers . . . must at all times be
accountable to the people . . ." Sections 15 and 1 of
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby Article XIII define the role and rights of people's
DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the organizations. Section 5(2) of Article XVI mandates
respondent Commission are AFFIRMED. that "[t]he state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and
nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also for people's rights in the performance of their duty."
DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any And section 2 of Article XVII provides that
event, it has no merit. "amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
No costs. the people through initiative . . ." All these provisions
and more are intended to breathe more life to the
sovereignty of our people.
SO ORDERED.
To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a
Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Francisco,
kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in
Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the
framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its
Melo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concurs in the result. broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme,
the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to
Narvasa, C.J. and Mendoza, J., took no part. govern.  Former Dean Vicente Sinco  states that an
3 4

essential quality of sovereignty is legal

  omnipotence, viz.: "Legal theory establishes certain
essential qualities inherent in the nature of
  sovereignty. The first is legal omnipotence. This
means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and
  absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has
the power to determine exclusively its legal
  competence. Its powers are original, not derivative. It
is the sole judge of what it should do at any given
time."  Citing Barker,  he adds that a more amplified
5 6

 
definition of sovereignty is that of "a final power of
final legal adjustment of all legal issues." The U.S.
  Supreme Court expressed the same thought in the
landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,  where it held
7

Separate Opinions
that ". . . sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to jurisprudence, both here and abroad, on this legal
law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our issue cannot be denied. In the United States,   there
10

system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the are two (2) principal schools of thought on the matter.
agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains One espouses the view that a candidate must
with the people, by whom and for whom all possess the qualifications for office at the time of his
government exists and acts." election. The other ventures the view that the
candidate should satisfy the qualifications at the time
In our Constitution, the people established a he assumes the powers of the office. I am unaware of
representative democracy as distinguished from a any Philippine decision that has squarely resolved this
pure democracy. Justice Isagani Cruz explains: 8 difficult question of law. The ponencia of Mr. Justice
Panganiban adhered to the second school of thought
xxx xxx xxx while Mr. Justice Davide dissents.

A republic is a representative I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in

government, a government run by and interpreting our law on the matter for this is vital to
for the people. It is not a pure dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that my opinion
democracy where the people govern can bring about ill effects to the State. Mr. Justice
themselves directly. The essence of Davide's fear is based on the assumption that
republicanism is representation and Frivaldo continues to be disqualified and we cannot
renovation, the selection by the allow him to sit as governor without transgressing the
citizenry of a corps of public law. I do not concede this assumption for as stressed
functionaries who derive their above, courts have been sharply divided by this mind
mandate from the people and act on boggling issue. Given this schism, I do not see how
their behalf, serving for a limited we can derogate on the sovereignty of the people by
period only, after which they are according more weight to the votes of the people of
replaced or retained, at the option of Sorsogon.
their principal. Obviously, a republican
government is a responsible Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of
government whose officials hold and Batanes stage a rebellion, we cannot prosecute them
discharge their position as a public "because of the doctrine of people's sovereignty."
trust and shall, according to the With due respect, the analogy is not appropriate. In
Constitution, "at all times be his hypothetical case, rebellion is concededly a crime,
accountable to the people" they are a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code,
sworn to serve. The purpose of a an offense against the sovereignty of our people. In
republican government it is almost the case at bar, it cannot be held with certitude that
needless to state, is the promotion of the people of Sorsogon violated the law by voting for
the common welfare according to the Frivaldo as governor. Frivaldo's name was in the list
will of the people themselves. of candidates allowed by COMELEC to run for
governor. At that time too, Frivaldo was taking all
I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice steps to establish his Filipino citizenship. And even
Davide. I agree that sovereignty is indivisible but it our jurisprudence has not settled the issue when a
need not always be exercised by the people together, candidate should possess the qualification of
all the time.  For this reason, the Constitution and our
9 citizenship. Since the meaning of the law is arguable
laws provide when the entire electorate or only some then and now, I cannot imagine how it will be
of them can elect those who make our laws and those disastrous for the State if we tilt the balance in the
who execute our laws. Thus, the entire electorate case at bar in favor of the people of Sorsogon.
votes for our senators but only our district electorates
vote for our congressmen, only our provincial In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of
electorates vote for the members of our provincial our people should be resolutory of the case at bar
boards, only our city electorates vote for our city which is one of its kind, unprecedented in our political
councilors, and only our municipal electorates vote for history. For three (3) times, Frivaldo ran as governor
our councilors. Also, the entire electorate votes for our of the province of Sorsogon. For two (2) times, he was
President and Vice-President but only our provincial disqualified on the ground of citizenship. The people
electorates vote for our governors, only our city of Sorsogon voted for him as their governor despite
electorates vote for our mayors, and only our his disqualification. The people never waffled in their
municipal electorates vote for our mayors. By defining support for Frivaldo. In 1988, they gave him a winning
and delimiting the classes of voters who can exercise margin of 27,000; in 1992, they gave him a winning
the sovereignty of the people in a given election, it spread of 57,000; in 1995, he posted a margin of
cannot be claimed that said sovereignty has been 20,000. Clearly then, Frivaldo is the overwhelming
fragmented. choice of the people of Sorsogon. In election cases,
we should strive to align the will of the legislature as
It is my respectful submission that the issue in the expressed in its law with the will of the sovereign
case at bar is not whether the people of Sorsogon people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign,
should be given the right to defy the law by allowing it must respect the will of the people. For in the
Frivaldo to sit as their governor. Rather, the issue is: eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an
whether the will of the voters of Sorsogon clearly enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular
choosing Frivaldo as governor ought to be given sovereignty and is the ultimate source of established
a decisive value considering the uncertainty of the authority."  The choice of the governed on who shall
11

law on when a candidate ought to satisfy the be their governor merits the highest consideration by
qualification of citizenship. The uncertainty of law and all agencies of government. In cases where the
sovereignty of the people is at stake, we must not only (by repatriation) of Philippine citizenship, and in light
be legally right but also politically correct. We cannot of Sections 1(4) and 3, Article IV of the 1987
fail by making the people succeed. Constitution (naturalization and reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship shall be in accordance with law),
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting: it is indubitable that these subjects are a matter of
legislative prerogative. In the same vein, the creation
After deliberating on the re-formulated issues and the of the Special Committee on Naturalization by LOI No.
conclusions reached by my distinguished colleague, 270 and the conferment of the power to accept and
Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, I find myself act on applications under P.D. No. 725 are
unable to join him. clearly legislative acts.

I Accordingly, the revocation of the cease and desist

order and the reactivation or revival of the Committee
can be done only by legislative fiat, i.e., by Congress,
I agree with petitioner Lee that Frivaldo's repatriation
since the President had long lost his authority to
was void, but not on the ground that President
exercise "legislative power." Considering that
Corazon C. Aquino's 27 March 1987 memorandum
Congress has not seen it fit to do so, the President
"effectively repealed" P.D. No. 725. In my view, the
cannot, in the exercise of executive power, lift the
said memorandum only suspended the
cease and desist order nor
implementation of the latter decree by divesting the
reactivate/reconstitute/revive the Committee. A multo
Special Committee on Naturalization of its authority to
fortiori, the Committee cannot validly accept Frivaldo's
further act on grants of citizenship under LOI No. 270,
application for repatriation and approve it.
as amended, P.D. No. 836, as amended; P.D. No.
1379; and "any other related laws, orders, issuances
and rules and regulations." A reading of the last II
paragraph of the memorandum can lead to no other
conclusion, thus: Even assuming arguendo that Frivaldo's repatriation
is valid, it did not "cure his lack of citizenship." I depart
In view of the foregoing, you as from the view in the ponencia that Section 39 of the
Chairman and members of the Special Local Government Code of 1991 does not specify the
Committee on Naturalization, are time when the citizenship requirement must be met,
hereby directed to cease and desist and that being the case, then it suffices that
from undertaking any and all citizenship be possessed upon commencement of the
proceedings within your functional term of the office involved; therefore, since Frivaldo
area of responsibility, as defined in "re-assumed" his Philippine citizenship at 2:00 p.m.
Letter of Instruction No. 270 dated on 30 June 1995 and the term of office of Governor
April 11, 1975, as amended, commenced at 12:00 noon of that day, he had,
Presidential Decree No. 836 dated therefore, complied with the citizenship requirement.
December 3, 1975, as amended, and
Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the
May 17, 1978, relative to the grant of qualifications of elective local officials and not those of
citizenship under the said laws, and an elected local official. These adjectives are not
any other related laws, orders, synonymous, as the ponencia seems to suggest. The
issuances and rules and regulations. first refers to the nature of the office, which requires
(emphasis supplied) the process of voting by the electorate involved; while
the second refers to a victorious candidate for an
It is self-evident that the underscored clause can only elective office. The section unquestionably refers
refer to those related to LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, to elective -- not elected -- local officials. It falls under
and P.D. No. 1379. There is no doubt in my mind that Title Two entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under
P.D. No. 725 is one such "related law" as it involves Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and Election; and
the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by paragraph (a) thereof begins with the phrase
repatriation and designates the Special Committee on "An elective local official," while paragraphs (b) to (f)
Naturalization created under LOI No. 270 to receive thereof speak of candidates. It reads as follows:
and act on (i.e., approve or disapprove) applications
under the said decree. The power of President Aquino Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a)
to suspend these issuances by virtue of the 27 March An elective local official must be a
1987 memorandum is beyond question considering citizen of the Philippines; a registered
that under Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 voter in the barangay, municipality,
Constitution, she exercised legislative power until the city, or province or, in the case of a
Congress established therein convened on the fourth member of the sangguniang
Monday of July 1987. panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan,
I disagree with the view expressed in the district where he intends to be
the ponencia that the memorandum of 27 March 1987 elected; a resident therein for at least
was merely a declaration of "executive policy," and one (1) year immediately preceding
not an exercise of legislative power. LOI No. 270, P.D. the day of the election; and able to
No. 836, P.D. No. 1379 and "any other related laws," read and write Filipino or any other
such as P.D. No. 725, were issued by President local language or dialect.
Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative
powers -- not executive power. These laws relate to (b) Candidates for the position of
the acquisition (by naturalization) and reacquisition governor, vice governor or member of
 the sangguniang panlalawigan, or And Section 117 of the Omnibus Election
mayor, vice mayor or member of the Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881)
sangguniang panlungsod of highly expressly provides for the qualifications of a
urbanized cities must be at least voter. Thus:
twenty-three (23) years of age on
election day. Sec. 117 Qualifications of a voter.
-- Every citizen of the Philippines, not
(c) Candidates for the position of otherwise disqualified by law, eighteen
mayor or vice mayor of independent years of age or over, who shall have
component cities, component cities, or resided in the Philippines for one year
municipalities must be at least twenty- and in the city or municipality wherein
one (21) years of age on election day. he proposes to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the
(d) Candidates for the position of election, may be a registered voter.
member of the sangguniang (emphasis supplied)
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan
must be at least eighteen (18) years of It is undisputed that this Court twice voided Frivaldo's
age on election day. election as Governor in the 1988 and 1992 elections
on the ground that for lack of Philippine citizenship --
(e) Candidates for the position of he being a naturalized citizen of the United States of
punong barangay or member of the America -- he was DISQUALIFIED to be elected as
sangguniang barangay must be at such and to serve the position (Frivaldo vs.
least eighteen (18) years of age on Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 [1989];
election day. Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, 232 SCRA
785 [1994]). This disqualification inexorably nullified
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang Frivaldo's registration as a voter and declared it
kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) void ab initio. Our judgments therein were self-
years of age but not more than twenty- executory and no further act, e.g., a COMELEC order
one (21) years of age on election day to cancel his registration as a voter or the physical
(emphasis supplied) destruction of his voter's certificate, was necessary for
the ineffectivity. Thus, he was never considered a
registered voter for the elections of May 1992, and
It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no
May 1995, as there is no showing that Frivaldo
other than the qualifications of candidates for
registered anew as a voter for the latter elections.
elective local offices and their election.
Even if he did -- in obvious defiance of his decreed
Hence, in no way may the section be
disqualification -- this did not make him a Filipino
construed to mean that possession of
citizen, hence it was equally void ab initio. That he
qualifications should be reckoned from the
filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections
commencement of the term of office of the
and was even allowed to vote therein were of no
elected candidate.
moment. Neither act made him a Filipino citizen nor
nullified the judgments of this Court. On the contrary,
For another, it is not at all true that Section 39 does said acts made a mockery of our judgments. For the
not specify the time when the citizenship requirement Court now to validate Frivaldo's registration as a voter
must be possessed. I submit that the requirement despite the judgments of disqualification is to modify
must be satisfied, or that Philippine citizenship must the said judgments by making their effectivity and
be possessed, not merely at the commencement of enforceability dependent on a COMELEC order
the term, but at an earlier time, the latest being cancelling his registration as a voter, or on the
election day itself. Section 39 is not at all ambiguous physical destruction of his certificate of registration as
nor uncertain that it meant this to be, as one basic a voter which, of course, was never our intention.
qualification of an elective local official is that he be "A Moreover, to sanction Frivaldo's registration as a
REGISTERED VOTER IN THE BARANGAY, voter would be to sacrifice substance in favor of form
MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE . . . WHERE (the piece of paper that is the book of voters or list of
HE INTENDS TO VOTE." This simply means that he voters or voter's ID), and abet the COMELEC's
possesses all the qualifications to exercise the right of incompetence in failing to cancel Frivaldo's
suffrage. The fundamental qualification for the registration and allowing him to vote.
exercise of this sovereign right is the possession of
Philippine citizenship. No less than the Constitution
The second reason in the ponencia as to why the
makes it the first qualification, as Section 1, Article V
citizenship disqualification should be reckoned not
thereof provides:
from the date of the election nor the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, but from the date of
Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by proclamation, is that the only available remedy to
all citizens of the Philippines not question the ineligibility (or disloyalty) of a candidate
otherwise disqualified by law, who are is a petition for quo warranto which, under Section
at least eighteen years of age, and 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, may be filed only
who shall have resided in the within ten days from proclamation and not earlier.
Philippines for at least one year and in
the place wherein they propose to
I beg to differ.
vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the
election. . . . (emphasis supplied) Clearly, quo warranto is not the sole remedy available
to question a candidate's ineligibility for public office.
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows the Rule 25 -- Disqualification of
filing of a petition to deny due course to or cancel the Candidates
certificate of candidacy on the ground that any
material representation contained therein, as required Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification.
by Section 74, is false. Section 74, in turn, requires Any candidate who does not possess
that the person filing the certificate of candidacy must all the qualifications of a candidate as
state, inter alia, that he is eligible for the office, which provided for by the Constitution or by
means that he has all the qualifications (including, of existing law or who commits any act
course, fulfilling the citizenship requirement) and none declared by law to be grounds for
of the disqualifications as provided by law. The disqualification may be disqualified
petition under Section 78 may be filed at any time not from continuing as a candidate.
later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The section reads in full as follows: xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The
to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. petition shall be filed any day after the
-- A verified petition seeking to deny last day for filing of certificates of
due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy but not later than the date
candidacy may be filed by any person of proclamation.
exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained
While the validity of this rule insofar as it
therein as required under Section 74
concerns petitions for disqualification on the
hereof is false. The petition may be
ground of lack of all qualifications may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-
doubtful, its invalidity is not in issue here.
five days from the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after due notice and In this connection, it would seem appropriate to take
hearing, not later than fifteen days up the last issue grappled within the ponencia, viz., is
before the election. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code mandatory?
The answer is provided in Loong.
This remedy was recognized in Loong
vs. Commission on Elections (216 SCRA 760, We also do not find merit in the
768 [1992]), where this Court held: contention of respondent Commission
that in the light of the provisions of
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No.
Thus, if a person qualified to file a
6646, a petition to deny due course to
petition to disqualify a certain
or cancel a certificate of candidacy
candidate fails to file the petition within
may be filed even beyond the 25-day
the 25-day period Section 78 of the
period prescribed by Section 78 of the
Code for whatever reasons, the
Code, as long as it is filed within
election laws do not leave him
a reasonable time from the discovery
completely helpless as he has another
of the ineligibility.
chance to raise the disqualification of
the candidate by filing a petition
for quo warranto within ten (10) days Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646
from the proclamation of the results of are here re-quoted:
the election, as provided under
Section 253 of the Code. Section 1, Sec. 6. Effect of
Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of Disqualification case.
Procedure similarly provides that any Any candidate who
voter contesting the election of any has been declared by
regional, provincial or city official on final judgment to be
the ground of ineligibility or of disqualified shall not
disloyalty to the Republic of the be voted for, and the
Philippines may file a petition for quo votes cast for him shall
warranto with the Electoral Contest not be counted. If for
Adjudication Department. The petition any reason a
may be filed within ten (10) days from candidate is not
the date the respondent is proclaimed declared by final
(Section 2). judgment before an
election to be
Likewise, Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of disqualified and he is
Procedure allows the filing of a petition for voted for and receives
disqualification on the ground of failure to possess all the winning number of
the qualifications of a candidate as provided by the votes in such election,
Constitution or by existing laws, "any day after the last the Court or
day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later Commission shall
than the date of proclamation." Sections 1 and 3 continue with the trial
thereof provide: and hearing of the
action, inquiry or
protest and, upon
motion of the
 complainant or any authority insane or incompetent, or
intervenor, may during has been sentenced by final judgment
the pendency thereof for subversion, insurrection, rebellion
order the suspension or for any offense for which he has
of the proclamation of been sentenced to a penalty of more
such candidate than eighteen months or for a crime
whenever the evidence involving moral turpitude, shall be
of his guilt is strong. disqualified to be a candidate and to
hold any office, unless he has been
Sec. 7. Petition to given plenary pardon or granted
Deny Due Course To amnesty.
or Cancel a Certificate
of Candidacy. The The disqualifications to be a candidate
procedure hereinabove herein provided shall be deemed
provided shall apply to removed upon declaration by
petitions to deny due competent authority that said insanity
course to or cancel a or incompetence had been removed
certificate of candidacy or after the expiration of a period of
as provided in Section five years from his service of
78 of Batas Pambansa sentence, unless within the same
Blg. 881. period he again becomes disqualified.

It will be noted that nothing in Sections xxx xxx xxx

6 or 7 modifies or alters the 25- day
period prescribed by Section 78 of the Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any
Code for filing the appropriate action candidate who, in an action or protest
to cancel a certificate of candidacy on in which he is a party is declared by
account of any false representation final decision of a competent court
made therein. On the contrary, said guilty of, or found by the Commission
Section 7 affirms and reiterates of having (a) given money or other
Section 78 of the Code. material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public
We note that Section 6 refers only to officials performing electoral functions;
the effects of a disqualification case (b) committed acts of terrorism to
which may be based on grounds other enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in
than that provided under Section 78 of his election campaign an amount in
the Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act excess of that allowed by this Code;
No. 6646 also makes the effects (d) solicited, received or made any
referred to in Section 6 applicable to contribution prohibited under Sections
disqualification cases filed under 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated
Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
is mention made of the period within sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified
which these disqualification cases from continuing as a candidate, or if
may be filed. This is because there he has been elected, from holding the
are provisions in the Code which office. Any person who is a permanent
supply the periods within which a resident of or an immigrant to a
petition relating to disqualification of foreign country shall not be qualified to
candidates must be filed, such as run for any elective office under this
Section 78, already discussed, and Code, unless said person has waived
Section 253 on petitions for quo his status as permanent resident or
warranto. immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence
I then disagree with the asseveration in requirement provided for in the
the ponencia that Section 78 is merely directory election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC)
because Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the
COMELEC to try and decide petitions for Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification
disqualification even after elections. I submit that cases and priority. The Commission
Section 6 refers to disqualifications under Sections 12 and the courts shall give priority to
and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and cases of disqualification by reason of
consequently modifies Section 72 thereof. As such, violation of this Act to the end that a
the proper court or the COMELEC are granted the final decision shall be rendered not
authority to continue hearing the case after the later than seven days before the
election, and during the pendency of the case, election in which the disqualification is
suspend the proclamation of the victorious candidate, sought.
if the evidence against him is strong. Sections 12, 68,
and 72 of the Code provide: Any candidate who has been declared
by final judgment to be disqualified
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person shall not be voted for, and the votes
who has been declared by competent cast for him shall not be counted.
 Nevertheless, if for any reason, a then it would also mean that if Frivaldo had chosen
candidate is not declared by final and reacquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization
judgment before an election to be or through Congressional action, such would retroact
disqualified and he is voted for and to the filing of the petition for naturalization or the bill
receives the winning number of votes granting him Philippine citizenship. This is a
in such election, his violation of the proposition which both the first and second Frivaldo
provisions of the preceding sections cases soundly rejected.
shall not prevent his proclamation and
assumption to office. The other reason adduced in the ponencia in support
of the proposition that P.D. No. 725 can be given
III retroactive effect is its alleged curative or remedial
nature.
Still assuming that the repatriation is valid, I am not
persuaded by the arguments in support of the thesis Again, I disagree. In the first place, by no stretch of
that Frivaldo's repatriation may be given retroactive legal hermeneutics may P.D. No. 725 be
effect, as such goes against the spirit and letter of characterized as a curative or remedial statute:
P.D. No. 725. The spirit adheres to the principle that
acquisition or re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship is Curative or remedial statutes are
not a right, but a mere privilege. Before the advent of healing acts. They are remedial by
P.D. No. 725, only the following could apply for curing defects and adding to the
repatriation: (a) Army, Navy, or Air Corps deserters; means of enforcing existing
and (b) a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of obligations. The rule in regard to
her marriage to an alien after the death of her spouse curative statutes is that if the thing
(Section 2[2], C.A. No. 63). P.D. NO. 725 expanded omitted or failed to be done, and
this to include Filipino women who lost their Philippine which constitutes the defect sought to
citizenship by marriage to aliens even before the be removed or made harmless, is
death of their alien husbands, or the termination of something the legislature might have
their marital status and to natural-born Filipino citizens dispensed with by a previous statute,
who lost their Philippine citizenship but subsequently it may do so by a subsequent one.
desired to reacquire the latter.
Curative statutes are intended to
Turning now to the letter of the law, P.D. No. 725 supply defects, abridge superfluities in
expressly provides that repatriation takes effect only existing laws, and curb certain evils.
after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of They are intended to enable a person
the Philippines, thus: to carry into effect that which they
have designed and intended, but has
. . . may reacquire Philippine failed of expected legal consequence
citizenship . . . by applying with the by reason of some statutory disability
Special Committee on Naturalization or irregularity in their own action. They
created by Letter of Instruction No. make valid that which, before the
270, and, if their applications are enactment of the statute, was invalid.
approved, taking the necessary oath (RUBEN E. AGPALO, Statutory
of allegiance to the Republic of the Construction, Second ed. [1990], 270-
Philippines, AFTER WHICH THEY 271, citations omitted).
SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE
REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of
CITIZENSHIP. (emphasis and Philippine citizenship lost through the marriage of a
capitalization supplied) Filipina to an alien and through naturalization in a
foreign country of natural-born Filipino citizens. It
Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine involves then the substantive, nay primordial, right of
citizenship by repatriation under the decree citizenship. To those for whom it is intended, it means,
are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the in reality, the acquisition of "a new right," as
committee; and (3) taking of the oath of the ponencia cannot but concede. Therefore, it may
allegiance if the application is approved. It is not be said to merely remedy or cure a defect
only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF considering that one who has lost Philippine
ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is citizenship does not have the right to reacquire it. As
deemed ipso jure to have reacquired earlier stated, the Constitution provides that
Philippine citizenship. If the decree had citizenship, once lost, may only be reacquired in the
intended the oath taking to retroact to the date manner provided by law. Moreover, it has also been
of the filing of the application, then it should observed that:
not have explicitly provided otherwise.
The idea is implicit from many of the
This theory in the ponencia likewise dilutes this cases that remedial statutes are
Court's pronouncement in the first Frivaldo case that statutes relating to procedure and not
what reacquisition of Filipino citizenship requires is an substantive rights. (Sutherland,
act "formally rejecting [the] adopted state and Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, Third
reaffirming . . . allegiance to the Philippines." That act ed. [1943], §5704 at 74, citations
meant nothing less than taking of the oath of omitted).
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. If we
now take this revision of doctrine to its logical end,
If we grant for the sake of argument, however, that to acquire another; or de facto, which is the status of
P.D. No. 725 is curative or remedial statute, it would individuals possessed of a nationality whose country
be an inexcusable error to give it a retroactive effect does not give them protection outside their own
since it explicitly provides the date of its effectivity. country, and who are commonly, albeit imprecisely,
Thus: referred to as refugees (JORGE R. COQUIA, et al.,
Conflict of Laws Cases, Materials and Comments,
This Decree shall take effect 1995 ed., 290).
immediately.
Specifically, under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United
Done in the city of Manila, this 5th day Nations Convention Regarding the Status of Stateless
of June, in the year of Our Lord, Persons (Philippine Treaty Series, Compiled and
nineteen hundred and seventy five. Annotated by Haydee B. Yorac, vol. III, 363), a
stateless person is defined as "a person who is not
Nevertheless, if the retroactivity is to relate only to the considered as a national by any State under the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, then nothing operation of its law." However, it has not been shown
therein supports such theory, for as the decree itself that the United States of America ever ceased to
unequivocally provides, it is only after taking the oath consider Frivaldo its national at any time before he
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines that took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
the applicant is DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED Philippines on 30 June 1995.
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.
VI
IV
Finally, I find it in order to also express my view on the
Assuming yet again, for the sake of argument, that concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I
taking the oath of allegiance retroacted to the date of am absolutely happy to join him in his statement that
Frivaldo's application for repatriation, the same could "[t]he sovereignty of our people is the primary
not be said insofar as it concerned the United States postulate of the 1987 Constitution" and that the said
of America, of which he was a citizen. For under the Constitution is "more people-oriented," "borne [as it is]
laws of the United States of America, Frivaldo out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution." I
remained an American national until he renounced his would even go further by saying that this Constitution
citizenship and allegiance thereto at 2:00 p.m. on 30 is pro-God (Preamble), pro-people (Article II,
June 1995, when he took his oath of allegiance to the Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16; Article XI, Section 1,
Republic of the Philippines. Section 401 of the Article XII, Sections 1, 6; Article XIII, Sections 1, 11,
Nationality Act of 1940 of the United States of 15, 16, 18; Article XVI, Sections 5(2), 6), pro-
America provides that a person who is a national of Filipino (Article XII, Sections 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 14;
the United States of America, whether by birth or Article XIV, Sections 1, 4(2), 13; Article XVI, Section
naturalization, loses his nationality by, inter alia, "(b) 11), pro-poor (Article II, Sections 9, 10, 18, 21; Article
Taking an oath or making an affirmation or other XII, Sections 1, 2(3); Article XIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6,
formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state" 7, 9, 10, 11, 13), pro-life (Article II, Section 12),
(SIDNEY KANSAS, U.S. Immigration Exclusion and and pro-family (Article II, Section 12; Article XV).
Deportation and Citizenship of the United States of
America, Third ed., [1948] 341-342). It follows then Nevertheless, I cannot be with him in carrying out the
that on election day and until the hour of the principle of sovereignty beyond what I perceive to be
commencement of the term for which he was elected - the reasonable constitutional parameters. The
noon of 30 June 1995 as per Section 43 of the Local doctrine of people's sovereignty is founded on the
Government Code - Frivaldo possessed dual principles of democracy and republicanism and refers
citizenship, viz., (a) as an American citizen; and (b) as exclusively to the sovereignty of the people of the
a Filipino citizen through the adoption of the theory Philippines. Section 1 of Article II is quite clear on this,
that the effects of his taking the oath of allegiance thus:
were retrospective. Hence, he was disqualified to run
for Governor for yet another reason: possession of Sec. 1. The Philippines is a
dual citizenship, in accordance with Section 40 (d) of democratic and republican State.
the Local Government Code. Sovereignty resides in the people and
all government authority emanates
V from them.

The assertion in the ponencia that Frivaldo may be And the Preamble makes it clear when it
considered STATELESS on the basis of his claim that solemnly opens it with a clause "We, the
he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his sovereign Filipino people . . ." Thus,
American citizenship - long before May 8, 1985" - is this sovereignty is an attribute of the Filipino
untenable, for the following reasons: first, it is based people as one people, one body.
on Frivaldo's unproven, self-serving allegation;
second, informal renunciation or abandonment is not That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be
a ground to lose American citizenship; and third, fragmentized by looking at it as the supreme authority
simply put, never did the status of a STATELESS of the people of any of the political subdivisions to
person attach to Frivaldo. determine their own destiny; neither can we convert
and treat every fragment as the whole. In such a
Statelessness may be either de jure, which is the case, this Court would provide the formula for the
status of individuals stripped of their nationality by division and destruction of the State and render the
their former government without having an opportunity Government ineffective and inutile. To illustrate the
evil, we may consider the enforcement of laws or the form of government." With understandable fervor, the
pursuit of a national policy by the executive branch of American authorities imposed republicanism as the
the government, or the execution of a judgment by the cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then being
courts. If these are opposed by the overwhelming crafted by its Filipino framers. 2

majority of the people of a certain province, or even a

municipality, it would necessarily follow that the law, Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution,
national policy, or judgment must not be enforced, our 1987 Constitution is more people-oriented. Thus,
implemented, or executed in the said province or section 4 of Article II provides as a state policy that
municipality. More concretely, if, for instance, the vast the prime duty of the Government is "to serve and
majority of the people of Batanes rise publicly and protect the people." Section 1, Article XI also provides
take up arms against the Government for the purpose that ". . . public officers . . . must at all times be
of removing from the allegiance to the said accountable to the people . . ." Sections 15 and 1 of
Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of Article XIII define the role and rights of people's
the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of organizations. Section 5(2) of Article XVI mandates
land, naval, or other armed forces, or depriving the that "[t]he state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and
Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect
of any of their powers or prerogatives, then those who for people's rights in the performance of their duty."
did so -- and which are composed of the vast majority And section 2 of Article XVII provides that
of the people of Batanes -- a political subdivision -- "amendments to
cannot be prosecuted for or be held guilty of rebellion this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by
in violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code the people through initiative . . ." All these provisions
because of the doctrine of peoples' sovereignty. and more are intended to breathe more life to the
Indeed, the expansion of the doctrine of sovereignty sovereignty of our people.
by investing upon the people of a mere political
subdivision that which the Constitution places in the To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a
entire Filipino people, may be disastrous to the kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in
Nation. mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the
framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its
So it is in this case if we follow the thesis in the broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme,
concurring opinion. Thus, simply because Frivaldo the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to
had obtained a margin of 20,000 votes over his govern.  Former Dean Vicente Sinco  states that an
3 4

closest rival, Lee, i.e., a vast majority of the voters of essential quality of sovereignty is legal
Sorsogon had expressed their sovereign will for the omnipotence, viz.: "Legal theory establishes certain
former, then this Court must yield to that will and essential qualities inherent in the nature of
must, therefore, allow to be set aside, for Frivaldo, not sovereignty. The first is legal omnipotence. This
just the laws on qualifications of candidates and means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and
elective officials and naturalization and reacquisition absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has
of Philippine citizenship, but even the final and binding the power to determine exclusively its legal
decisions of this Court affecting him. competence. Its powers are original, not derivative. It
is the sole judge of what it should do at any given
This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law. time."  Citing Barker,  he adds that a more amplified
5 6

I vote then to DISMISS G.R. No. 120295 and GRANT definition of sovereignty is that of "a final power of
G.R. No. 123755. final legal adjustment of all legal issues." The U.S.
Supreme Court expressed the same thought in the
  landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,  where it held
7

that ". . . sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to

Separate Opinions law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our
system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the
agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains
PUNO, J., concurring:
with the people, by whom and for whom all
government exists and acts."
I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr.
Justice Panganiban which is pro-people and pierces
In our Constitution, the people established a
the myopia of legalism. Upholding the sovereign will
representative democracy as distinguished from a
of the people which is the be-all and the end-all of
pure democracy. Justice Isagani Cruz explains: 8

republicanism, it rests on a foundation that will endure

time and its tempest.
xxx xxx xxx
The sovereignty of our people is the primary
postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this reason, it A republic is a representative
appears as the first in our declaration of principles government, a government run by and
and state policies. Thus, section 1 of Article II of our for the people. It is not a pure
fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a democracy where the people govern
democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides themselves directly. The essence of
in the people and all government authority emanates republicanism is representation and
from them." The same principle served as the bedrock renovation, the selection by the
of our 1973 and 1935 Constitutions.  It is one of the
1 citizenry of a corps of public
few principles whose truth has been cherished by the functionaries who derive their
Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV of the mandate from the people and act on
U.S. Constitution makes it a duty of the Federal their behalf, serving for a limited
government to guarantee to every state a "republican period only, after which they are
 replaced or retained, at the option of according more weight to the votes of the people of
their principal. Obviously, a republican Sorsogon.
government is a responsible
government whose officials hold and Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of
discharge their position as a public Batanes stage a rebellion, we cannot prosecute them
trust and shall, according to the "because of the doctrine of people's sovereignty."
Constitution, "at all times be With due respect, the analogy is not appropriate. In
accountable to the people" they are his hypothetical case, rebellion is concededly a crime,
sworn to serve. The purpose of a a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code,
republican government it is almost an offense against the sovereignty of our people. In
needless to state, is the promotion of the case at bar, it cannot be held with certitude that
the common welfare according to the the people of Sorsogon violated the law by voting for
will of the people themselves. Frivaldo as governor. Frivaldo's name was in the list
of candidates allowed by COMELEC to run for
I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice governor. At that time too, Frivaldo was taking all
Davide. I agree that sovereignty is indivisible but it steps to establish his Filipino citizenship. And even
need not always be exercised by the people together, our jurisprudence has not settled the issue when a
all the time.  For this reason, the Constitution and our
9
candidate should possess the qualification of
laws provide when the entire electorate or only some citizenship. Since the meaning of the law is arguable
of them can elect those who make our laws and those then and now, I cannot imagine how it will be
who execute our laws. Thus, the entire electorate disastrous for the State if we tilt the balance in the
votes for our senators but only our district electorates case at bar in favor of the people of Sorsogon.
vote for our congressmen, only our provincial
electorates vote for the members of our provincial In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of
boards, only our city electorates vote for our city our people should be resolutory of the case at bar
councilors, and only our municipal electorates vote for which is one of its kind, unprecedented in our political
our councilors. Also, the entire electorate votes for our history. For three (3) times, Frivaldo ran as governor
President and Vice-President but only our provincial of the province of Sorsogon. For two (2) times, he was
electorates vote for our governors, only our city disqualified on the ground of citizenship. The people
electorates vote for our mayors, and only our of Sorsogon voted for him as their governor despite
municipal electorates vote for our mayors. By defining his disqualification. The people never waffled in their
and delimiting the classes of voters who can exercise support for Frivaldo. In 1988, they gave him a winning
the sovereignty of the people in a given election, it margin of 27,000; in 1992, they gave him a winning
cannot be claimed that said sovereignty has been spread of 57,000; in 1995, he posted a margin of
fragmented. 20,000. Clearly then, Frivaldo is the overwhelming
choice of the people of Sorsogon. In election cases,
It is my respectful submission that the issue in the we should strive to align the will of the legislature as
case at bar is not whether the people of Sorsogon expressed in its law with the will of the sovereign
should be given the right to defy the law by allowing people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign,
Frivaldo to sit as their governor. Rather, the issue is: it must respect the will of the people. For in the
whether the will of the voters of Sorsogon clearly eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an
choosing Frivaldo as governor ought to be given enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular
a decisive value considering the uncertainty of the sovereignty and is the ultimate source of established
law on when a candidate ought to satisfy the authority."  The choice of the governed on who shall
11

qualification of citizenship. The uncertainty of law and be their governor merits the highest consideration by
jurisprudence, both here and abroad, on this legal all agencies of government. In cases where the
issue cannot be denied. In the United States,   there
10
sovereignty of the people is at stake, we must not only
are two (2) principal schools of thought on the matter. be legally right but also politically correct. We cannot
One espouses the view that a candidate must fail by making the people succeed.
possess the qualifications for office at the time of his
election. The other ventures the view that the DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
candidate should satisfy the qualifications at the time
he assumes the powers of the office. I am unaware of After deliberating on the re-formulated issues and the
any Philippine decision that has squarely resolved this conclusions reached by my distinguished colleague,
difficult question of law. The ponencia of Mr. Justice Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, I find myself
Panganiban adhered to the second school of thought unable to join him.
while Mr. Justice Davide dissents.
I
I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in
interpreting our law on the matter for this is vital to
I agree with petitioner Lee that Frivaldo's repatriation
dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that my opinion
was void, but not on the ground that President
can bring about ill effects to the State. Mr. Justice
Corazon C. Aquino's 27 March 1987 memorandum
Davide's fear is based on the assumption that
"effectively repealed" P.D. No. 725. In my view, the
Frivaldo continues to be disqualified and we cannot
said memorandum only suspended the
allow him to sit as governor without transgressing the
implementation of the latter decree by divesting the
law. I do not concede this assumption for as stressed
Special Committee on Naturalization of its authority to
above, courts have been sharply divided by this mind
further act on grants of citizenship under LOI No. 270,
boggling issue. Given this schism, I do not see how
as amended, P.D. No. 836, as amended; P.D. No.
we can derogate on the sovereignty of the people by
1379; and "any other related laws, orders, issuances
and rules and regulations." A reading of the last
paragraph of the memorandum can lead to no other Even assuming arguendo that Frivaldo's repatriation
conclusion, thus: is valid, it did not "cure his lack of citizenship." I depart
from the view in the ponencia that Section 39 of the
In view of the foregoing, you as Local Government Code of 1991 does not specify the
Chairman and members of the Special time when the citizenship requirement must be met,
Committee on Naturalization, are and that being the case, then it suffices that
hereby directed to cease and desist citizenship be possessed upon commencement of the
from undertaking any and all term of the office involved; therefore, since Frivaldo
proceedings within your functional "re-assumed" his Philippine citizenship at 2:00 p.m.
area of responsibility, as defined in on 30 June 1995 and the term of office of Governor
Letter of Instruction No. 270 dated commenced at 12:00 noon of that day, he had,
April 11, 1975, as amended, therefore, complied with the citizenship requirement.
Presidential Decree No. 836 dated
December 3, 1975, as amended, and In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the
Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated qualifications of elective local officials and not those of
May 17, 1978, relative to the grant of an elected local official. These adjectives are not
citizenship under the said laws, and synonymous, as the ponencia seems to suggest. The
any other related laws, orders, first refers to the nature of the office, which requires
issuances and rules and regulations. the process of voting by the electorate involved; while
(emphasis supplied) the second refers to a victorious candidate for an
elective office. The section unquestionably refers
It is self-evident that the underscored clause can only to elective -- not elected -- local officials. It falls under
refer to those related to LOI No. 270, P.D. No. 836, Title Two entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under
and P.D. No. 1379. There is no doubt in my mind that Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and Election; and
P.D. No. 725 is one such "related law" as it involves paragraph (a) thereof begins with the phrase
the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by "An elective local official," while paragraphs (b) to (f)
repatriation and designates the Special Committee on thereof speak of candidates. It reads as follows:
Naturalization created under LOI No. 270 to receive
and act on (i.e., approve or disapprove) applications Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a)
under the said decree. The power of President Aquino An elective local official must be a
to suspend these issuances by virtue of the 27 March citizen of the Philippines; a registered
1987 memorandum is beyond question considering voter in the barangay, municipality,
that under Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 city, or province or, in the case of a
Constitution, she exercised legislative power until the member of the sangguniang
Congress established therein convened on the fourth panlalawigan, sangguniang
Monday of July 1987. panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan,
the district where he intends to be
I disagree with the view expressed in elected; a resident therein for at least
the ponencia that the memorandum of 27 March 1987 one (1) year immediately preceding
was merely a declaration of "executive policy," and the day of the election; and able to
not an exercise of legislative power. LOI No. 270, P.D. read and write Filipino or any other
No. 836, P.D. No. 1379 and "any other related laws," local language or dialect.
such as P.D. No. 725, were issued by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative (b) Candidates for the position of
powers -- not executive power. These laws relate to governor, vice governor or member of
the acquisition (by naturalization) and reacquisition the sangguniang panlalawigan, or
(by repatriation) of Philippine citizenship, and in light mayor, vice mayor or member of the
of Sections 1(4) and 3, Article IV of the 1987 sangguniang panlungsod of highly
Constitution (naturalization and reacquisition of urbanized cities must be at least
Philippine citizenship shall be in accordance with law), twenty-three (23) years of age on
it is indubitable that these subjects are a matter of election day.
legislative prerogative. In the same vein, the creation
of the Special Committee on Naturalization by LOI No. (c) Candidates for the position of
270 and the conferment of the power to accept and mayor or vice mayor of independent
act on applications under P.D. No. 725 are component cities, component cities, or
clearly legislative acts. municipalities must be at least twenty-
one (21) years of age on election day.
Accordingly, the revocation of the cease and desist
order and the reactivation or revival of the Committee (d) Candidates for the position of
can be done only by legislative fiat, i.e., by Congress, member of the sangguniang
since the President had long lost his authority to panlungsod or sangguniang bayan
exercise "legislative power." Considering that must be at least eighteen (18) years of
Congress has not seen it fit to do so, the President age on election day.
cannot, in the exercise of executive power, lift the
cease and desist order nor (e) Candidates for the position of
reactivate/reconstitute/revive the Committee. A multo punong barangay or member of the
fortiori, the Committee cannot validly accept Frivaldo's sangguniang barangay must be at
application for repatriation and approve it. least eighteen (18) years of age on
election day.
II
 (f) Candidates for the sangguniang Frivaldo's registration as a voter and declared it
kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) void ab initio. Our judgments therein were self-
years of age but not more than twenty- executory and no further act, e.g., a COMELEC order
one (21) years of age on election day to cancel his registration as a voter or the physical
(emphasis supplied) destruction of his voter's certificate, was necessary for
the ineffectivity. Thus, he was never considered a
It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no registered voter for the elections of May 1992, and
other than the qualifications of candidates for May 1995, as there is no showing that Frivaldo
elective local offices and their election. registered anew as a voter for the latter elections.
Hence, in no way may the section be Even if he did -- in obvious defiance of his decreed
construed to mean that possession of disqualification -- this did not make him a Filipino
qualifications should be reckoned from the citizen, hence it was equally void ab initio. That he
commencement of the term of office of the filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections
elected candidate. and was even allowed to vote therein were of no
moment. Neither act made him a Filipino citizen nor
For another, it is not at all true that Section 39 does nullified the judgments of this Court. On the contrary,
not specify the time when the citizenship requirement said acts made a mockery of our judgments. For the
must be possessed. I submit that the requirement Court now to validate Frivaldo's registration as a voter
must be satisfied, or that Philippine citizenship must despite the judgments of disqualification is to modify
be possessed, not merely at the commencement of the said judgments by making their effectivity and
the term, but at an earlier time, the latest being enforceability dependent on a COMELEC order
election day itself. Section 39 is not at all ambiguous cancelling his registration as a voter, or on the
nor uncertain that it meant this to be, as one basic physical destruction of his certificate of registration as
qualification of an elective local official is that he be "A a voter which, of course, was never our intention.
REGISTERED VOTER IN THE BARANGAY, Moreover, to sanction Frivaldo's registration as a
MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE . . . WHERE voter would be to sacrifice substance in favor of form
HE INTENDS TO VOTE." This simply means that he (the piece of paper that is the book of voters or list of
possesses all the qualifications to exercise the right of voters or voter's ID), and abet the COMELEC's
suffrage. The fundamental qualification for the incompetence in failing to cancel Frivaldo's
exercise of this sovereign right is the possession of registration and allowing him to vote.
Philippine citizenship. No less than the Constitution
makes it the first qualification, as Section 1, Article V The second reason in the ponencia as to why the
thereof provides: citizenship disqualification should be reckoned not
from the date of the election nor the filing of the
Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by certificate of candidacy, but from the date of
all citizens of the Philippines not proclamation, is that the only available remedy to
otherwise disqualified by law, who are question the ineligibility (or disloyalty) of a candidate
at least eighteen years of age, and is a petition for quo warranto which, under Section
who shall have resided in the 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, may be filed only
Philippines for at least one year and in within ten days from proclamation and not earlier.
the place wherein they propose to
vote for at least six months I beg to differ.
immediately preceding the
election. . . . (emphasis supplied) Clearly, quo warranto is not the sole remedy available
to question a candidate's ineligibility for public office.
And Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows the
Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) filing of a petition to deny due course to or cancel the
expressly provides for the qualifications of a certificate of candidacy on the ground that any
voter. Thus: material representation contained therein, as required
by Section 74, is false. Section 74, in turn, requires
Sec. 117 Qualifications of a voter. that the person filing the certificate of candidacy must
-- Every citizen of the Philippines, not state, inter alia, that he is eligible for the office, which
otherwise disqualified by law, eighteen means that he has all the qualifications (including, of
years of age or over, who shall have course, fulfilling the citizenship requirement) and none
resided in the Philippines for one year of the disqualifications as provided by law. The
and in the city or municipality wherein petition under Section 78 may be filed at any time not
he proposes to vote for at least six later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of
months immediately preceding the candidacy. The section reads in full as follows:
election, may be a registered voter.
(emphasis supplied) Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course
to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
It is undisputed that this Court twice voided Frivaldo's -- A verified petition seeking to deny
election as Governor in the 1988 and 1992 elections due course or to cancel a certificate of
on the ground that for lack of Philippine citizenship -- candidacy may be filed by any person
he being a naturalized citizen of the United States of exclusively on the ground that any
America -- he was DISQUALIFIED to be elected as material representation contained
such and to serve the position (Frivaldo vs. therein as required under Section 74
Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 [1989]; hereof is false. The petition may be
Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, 232 SCRA filed at any time not later than twenty-
785 [1994]). This disqualification inexorably nullified five days from the time of the filing of
 the certificate of candidacy and shall In this connection, it would seem appropriate to take
be decided, after due notice and up the last issue grappled within the ponencia, viz., is
hearing, not later than fifteen days Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code mandatory?
before the election. The answer is provided in Loong.

This remedy was recognized in Loong We also do not find merit in the
vs. Commission on Elections (216 SCRA 760, contention of respondent Commission
768 [1992]), where this Court held: that in the light of the provisions of
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No.
Thus, if a person qualified to file a 6646, a petition to deny due course to
petition to disqualify a certain or cancel a certificate of candidacy
candidate fails to file the petition within may be filed even beyond the 25-day
the 25-day period Section 78 of the period prescribed by Section 78 of the
Code for whatever reasons, the Code, as long as it is filed within
election laws do not leave him a reasonable time from the discovery
completely helpless as he has another of the ineligibility.
chance to raise the disqualification of
the candidate by filing a petition Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646
for quo warranto within ten (10) days are here re-quoted:
from the proclamation of the results of
the election, as provided under Sec. 6. Effect of
Section 253 of the Code. Section 1, Disqualification case.
Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of Any candidate who
Procedure similarly provides that any has been declared by
voter contesting the election of any final judgment to be
regional, provincial or city official on disqualified shall not
the ground of ineligibility or of be voted for, and the
disloyalty to the Republic of the votes cast for him shall
Philippines may file a petition for quo not be counted. If for
warranto with the Electoral Contest any reason a
Adjudication Department. The petition candidate is not
may be filed within ten (10) days from declared by final
the date the respondent is proclaimed judgment before an
(Section 2). election to be
disqualified and he is
Likewise, Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of voted for and receives
Procedure allows the filing of a petition for the winning number of
disqualification on the ground of failure to possess all votes in such election,
the qualifications of a candidate as provided by the the Court or
Constitution or by existing laws, "any day after the last Commission shall
day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later continue with the trial
than the date of proclamation." Sections 1 and 3 and hearing of the
thereof provide: action, inquiry or
protest and, upon
Rule 25 -- Disqualification of motion of the
Candidates complainant or any
intervenor, may during
Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. the pendency thereof
Any candidate who does not possess order the suspension
all the qualifications of a candidate as of the proclamation of
provided for by the Constitution or by such candidate
existing law or who commits any act whenever the evidence
declared by law to be grounds for of his guilt is strong.
disqualification may be disqualified
from continuing as a candidate. Sec. 7. Petition to
Deny Due Course To
xxx xxx xxx or Cancel a Certificate
of Candidacy. The
procedure hereinabove
Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The
provided shall apply to
petition shall be filed any day after the
petitions to deny due
last day for filing of certificates of
course to or cancel a
candidacy but not later than the date
certificate of candidacy
of proclamation.
as provided in Section
78 of Batas Pambansa
While the validity of this rule insofar as it Blg. 881.
concerns petitions for disqualification on the
ground of lack of all qualifications may be
It will be noted that nothing in Sections
doubtful, its invalidity is not in issue here.
6 or 7 modifies or alters the 25- day
period prescribed by Section 78 of the
 Code for filing the appropriate action Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any
to cancel a certificate of candidacy on candidate who, in an action or protest
account of any false representation in which he is a party is declared by
made therein. On the contrary, said final decision of a competent court
Section 7 affirms and reiterates guilty of, or found by the Commission
Section 78 of the Code. of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence,
We note that Section 6 refers only to induce or corrupt the voters or public
the effects of a disqualification case officials performing electoral functions;
which may be based on grounds other (b) committed acts of terrorism to
than that provided under Section 78 of enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in
the Code. But Section 7 of Rep. Act his election campaign an amount in
No. 6646 also makes the effects excess of that allowed by this Code;
referred to in Section 6 applicable to (d) solicited, received or made any
disqualification cases filed under contribution prohibited under Sections
Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and
is mention made of the period within 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
which these disqualification cases sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified
may be filed. This is because there from continuing as a candidate, or if
are provisions in the Code which he has been elected, from holding the
supply the periods within which a office. Any person who is a permanent
petition relating to disqualification of resident of or an immigrant to a
candidates must be filed, such as foreign country shall not be qualified to
Section 78, already discussed, and run for any elective office under this
Section 253 on petitions for quo Code, unless said person has waived
warranto. his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in
I then disagree with the asseveration in accordance with the residence
the ponencia that Section 78 is merely directory requirement provided for in the
because Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC)
COMELEC to try and decide petitions for
disqualification even after elections. I submit that Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification
Section 6 refers to disqualifications under Sections 12 cases and priority. The Commission
and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and and the courts shall give priority to
consequently modifies Section 72 thereof. As such, cases of disqualification by reason of
the proper court or the COMELEC are granted the violation of this Act to the end that a
authority to continue hearing the case after the final decision shall be rendered not
election, and during the pendency of the case, later than seven days before the
suspend the proclamation of the victorious candidate, election in which the disqualification is
if the evidence against him is strong. Sections 12, 68, sought.
and 72 of the Code provide:
Any candidate who has been declared
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person by final judgment to be disqualified
who has been declared by competent shall not be voted for, and the votes
authority insane or incompetent, or cast for him shall not be counted.
has been sentenced by final judgment Nevertheless, if for any reason, a
for subversion, insurrection, rebellion candidate is not declared by final
or for any offense for which he has judgment before an election to be
been sentenced to a penalty of more disqualified and he is voted for and
than eighteen months or for a crime receives the winning number of votes
involving moral turpitude, shall be in such election, his violation of the
disqualified to be a candidate and to provisions of the preceding sections
hold any office, unless he has been shall not prevent his proclamation and
given plenary pardon or granted assumption to office.
amnesty.
III
The disqualifications to be a candidate
herein provided shall be deemed Still assuming that the repatriation is valid, I am not
removed upon declaration by persuaded by the arguments in support of the thesis
competent authority that said insanity that Frivaldo's repatriation may be given retroactive
or incompetence had been removed effect, as such goes against the spirit and letter of
or after the expiration of a period of P.D. No. 725. The spirit adheres to the principle that
five years from his service of acquisition or re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship is
sentence, unless within the same not a right, but a mere privilege. Before the advent of
period he again becomes disqualified. P.D. No. 725, only the following could apply for
repatriation: (a) Army, Navy, or Air Corps deserters;
xxx xxx xxx and (b) a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of
her marriage to an alien after the death of her spouse
(Section 2[2], C.A. No. 63). P.D. NO. 725 expanded
this to include Filipino women who lost their Philippine which constitutes the defect sought to
citizenship by marriage to aliens even before the be removed or made harmless, is
death of their alien husbands, or the termination of something the legislature might have
their marital status and to natural-born Filipino citizens dispensed with by a previous statute,
who lost their Philippine citizenship but subsequently it may do so by a subsequent one.
desired to reacquire the latter.
Curative statutes are intended to
Turning now to the letter of the law, P.D. No. 725 supply defects, abridge superfluities in
expressly provides that repatriation takes effect only existing laws, and curb certain evils.
after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of They are intended to enable a person
the Philippines, thus: to carry into effect that which they
have designed and intended, but has
. . . may reacquire Philippine failed of expected legal consequence
citizenship . . . by applying with the by reason of some statutory disability
Special Committee on Naturalization or irregularity in their own action. They
created by Letter of Instruction No. make valid that which, before the
270, and, if their applications are enactment of the statute, was invalid.
approved, taking the necessary oath (RUBEN E. AGPALO, Statutory
of allegiance to the Republic of the Construction, Second ed. [1990], 270-
Philippines, AFTER WHICH THEY 271, citations omitted).
SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE
REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of
CITIZENSHIP. (emphasis and Philippine citizenship lost through the marriage of a
capitalization supplied) Filipina to an alien and through naturalization in a
foreign country of natural-born Filipino citizens. It
Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine involves then the substantive, nay primordial, right of
citizenship by repatriation under the decree citizenship. To those for whom it is intended, it means,
are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the in reality, the acquisition of "a new right," as
committee; and (3) taking of the oath of the ponencia cannot but concede. Therefore, it may
allegiance if the application is approved. It is not be said to merely remedy or cure a defect
only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF considering that one who has lost Philippine
ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is citizenship does not have the right to reacquire it. As
deemed ipso jure to have reacquired earlier stated, the Constitution provides that
Philippine citizenship. If the decree had citizenship, once lost, may only be reacquired in the
intended the oath taking to retroact to the date manner provided by law. Moreover, it has also been
of the filing of the application, then it should observed that:
not have explicitly provided otherwise.
The idea is implicit from many of the
This theory in the ponencia likewise dilutes this cases that remedial statutes are
Court's pronouncement in the first Frivaldo case that statutes relating to procedure and not
what reacquisition of Filipino citizenship requires is an substantive rights. (Sutherland,
act "formally rejecting [the] adopted state and Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, Third
reaffirming . . . allegiance to the Philippines." That act ed. [1943], §5704 at 74, citations
meant nothing less than taking of the oath of omitted).
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. If we
now take this revision of doctrine to its logical end, If we grant for the sake of argument, however, that
then it would also mean that if Frivaldo had chosen P.D. No. 725 is curative or remedial statute, it would
and reacquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization be an inexcusable error to give it a retroactive effect
or through Congressional action, such would retroact since it explicitly provides the date of its effectivity.
to the filing of the petition for naturalization or the bill Thus:
granting him Philippine citizenship. This is a
proposition which both the first and second Frivaldo This Decree shall take effect
cases soundly rejected. immediately.

The other reason adduced in the ponencia in support Done in the city of Manila, this 5th day
of the proposition that P.D. No. 725 can be given of June, in the year of Our Lord,
retroactive effect is its alleged curative or remedial nineteen hundred and seventy five.
nature.
Nevertheless, if the retroactivity is to relate only to the
Again, I disagree. In the first place, by no stretch of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, then nothing
legal hermeneutics may P.D. No. 725 be therein supports such theory, for as the decree itself
characterized as a curative or remedial statute: unequivocally provides, it is only after taking the oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines that
Curative or remedial statutes are the applicant is DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED
healing acts. They are remedial by PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.
curing defects and adding to the
means of enforcing existing IV
obligations. The rule in regard to
curative statutes is that if the thing
omitted or failed to be done, and
Assuming yet again, for the sake of argument, that Finally, I find it in order to also express my view on the
taking the oath of allegiance retroacted to the date of concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I
Frivaldo's application for repatriation, the same could am absolutely happy to join him in his statement that
not be said insofar as it concerned the United States "[t]he sovereignty of our people is the primary
of America, of which he was a citizen. For under the postulate of the 1987 Constitution" and that the said
laws of the United States of America, Frivaldo Constitution is "more people-oriented," "borne [as it is]
remained an American national until he renounced his out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution." I
citizenship and allegiance thereto at 2:00 p.m. on 30 would even go further by saying that this Constitution
June 1995, when he took his oath of allegiance to the is pro-God (Preamble), pro-people (Article II,
Republic of the Philippines. Section 401 of the Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16; Article XI, Section 1,
Nationality Act of 1940 of the United States of Article XII, Sections 1, 6; Article XIII, Sections 1, 11,
America provides that a person who is a national of 15, 16, 18; Article XVI, Sections 5(2), 6), pro-
the United States of America, whether by birth or Filipino (Article XII, Sections 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 14;
naturalization, loses his nationality by, inter alia, "(b) Article XIV, Sections 1, 4(2), 13; Article XVI, Section
Taking an oath or making an affirmation or other 11), pro-poor (Article II, Sections 9, 10, 18, 21; Article
formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state" XII, Sections 1, 2(3); Article XIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6,
(SIDNEY KANSAS, U.S. Immigration Exclusion and 7, 9, 10, 11, 13), pro-life (Article II, Section 12),
Deportation and Citizenship of the United States of and pro-family (Article II, Section 12; Article XV).
America, Third ed., [1948] 341-342). It follows then
that on election day and until the hour of the Nevertheless, I cannot be with him in carrying out the
commencement of the term for which he was elected - principle of sovereignty beyond what I perceive to be
noon of 30 June 1995 as per Section 43 of the Local the reasonable constitutional parameters. The
Government Code - Frivaldo possessed dual doctrine of people's sovereignty is founded on the
citizenship, viz., (a) as an American citizen; and (b) as principles of democracy and republicanism and refers
a Filipino citizen through the adoption of the theory exclusively to the sovereignty of the people of the
that the effects of his taking the oath of allegiance Philippines. Section 1 of Article II is quite clear on this,
were retrospective. Hence, he was disqualified to run thus:
for Governor for yet another reason: possession of
dual citizenship, in accordance with Section 40 (d) of Sec. 1. The Philippines is a
the Local Government Code. democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and
V all government authority emanates
from them.
The assertion in the ponencia that Frivaldo may be
considered STATELESS on the basis of his claim that And the Preamble makes it clear when it
he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his solemnly opens it with a clause "We, the
American citizenship - long before May 8, 1985" - is sovereign Filipino people . . ." Thus,
untenable, for the following reasons: first, it is based this sovereignty is an attribute of the Filipino
on Frivaldo's unproven, self-serving allegation; people as one people, one body.
second, informal renunciation or abandonment is not
a ground to lose American citizenship; and third, That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be
simply put, never did the status of a STATELESS fragmentized by looking at it as the supreme authority
person attach to Frivaldo. of the people of any of the political subdivisions to
determine their own destiny; neither can we convert
Statelessness may be either de jure, which is the and treat every fragment as the whole. In such a
status of individuals stripped of their nationality by case, this Court would provide the formula for the
their former government without having an opportunity division and destruction of the State and render the
to acquire another; or de facto, which is the status of Government ineffective and inutile. To illustrate the
individuals possessed of a nationality whose country evil, we may consider the enforcement of laws or the
does not give them protection outside their own pursuit of a national policy by the executive branch of
country, and who are commonly, albeit imprecisely, the government, or the execution of a judgment by the
referred to as refugees (JORGE R. COQUIA, et al., courts. If these are opposed by the overwhelming
Conflict of Laws Cases, Materials and Comments, majority of the people of a certain province, or even a
1995 ed., 290). municipality, it would necessarily follow that the law,
national policy, or judgment must not be enforced,
Specifically, under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United implemented, or executed in the said province or
Nations Convention Regarding the Status of Stateless municipality. More concretely, if, for instance, the vast
Persons (Philippine Treaty Series, Compiled and majority of the people of Batanes rise publicly and
Annotated by Haydee B. Yorac, vol. III, 363), a take up arms against the Government for the purpose
stateless person is defined as "a person who is not of removing from the allegiance to the said
considered as a national by any State under the Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of
operation of its law." However, it has not been shown the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of
that the United States of America ever ceased to land, naval, or other armed forces, or depriving the
consider Frivaldo its national at any time before he Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially,
took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the of any of their powers or prerogatives, then those who
Philippines on 30 June 1995. did so -- and which are composed of the vast majority
of the people of Batanes -- a political subdivision --
VI cannot be prosecuted for or be held guilty of rebellion
in violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code
because of the doctrine of peoples' sovereignty.
Indeed, the expansion of the doctrine of sovereignty B. Gorospe, Graduacion A. Reyes-Claravall, Julio F.
by investing upon the people of a mere political Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores; rollo, pp. 56-
subdivision that which the Constitution places in the 57.
entire Filipino people, may be disastrous to the
Nation. 8 Rollo, p. 60.

So it is in this case if we follow the thesis in the 9 Rollo, pp. 61-67.

concurring opinion. Thus, simply because Frivaldo
had obtained a margin of 20,000 votes over his 10 Rollo, pp. 86-87. The Comelec considered the
closest rival, Lee, i.e., a vast majority of the voters of votes cast for Frivaldo as "stray votes", and thus Lee
Sorsogon had expressed their sovereign will for the was held as having garnered the "highest number of
former, then this Court must yield to that will and votes."
must, therefore, allow to be set aside, for Frivaldo, not
just the laws on qualifications of candidates and
11 Rollo, pp. 88-97. This is the forerunner of the
elective officials and naturalization and reacquisition
present case.
of Philippine citizenship, but even the final and binding
decisions of this Court affecting him.
12 211 SCRA 297 (July 3, 1992) and 176 SCRA 1
(August 1, 1989).
This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law.
I vote then to DISMISS G.R. No. 120295 and GRANT
G.R. No. 123755. 13 Rollo, pp. 110-128.

1 Composed of Pres. CoFootnotesmm. Regalado E. 14 Rollo, pp. 159-170.

Maambong, ponente; Comm. Graduacion A.R.
Claravall, concurring, and Comm. Julio F. Desamito, 15 Rollo, pp. 16-17; petition, pp. 14-15.
dissenting.
16 Rollo, pp. 10-15. This is the same resolution
2 In SPC No. 95-317, entitled Juan G. Frivaldo, referred to in footnote no. 5.
petitioner, vs. Raul R. Lee, respondent; rollo, pp. 110-
129. 17 Rollo, pp. 16-17. This is the same resolution
referred to in footnote no. 7.
3 Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo, Comms.
Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar- 18 Rollo, pp. 18-21. This is signed also by the
Fernando, Manolo B. Gorospe and Teresita Dy-Liaco Chairman and the six other Comelec Commissioners.
Flores. Chairman Pardo certified that "Commissioner
Julio F. Desamito was on official travel at the time of 19 Republic Act No. 7160.
the deliberation and resolution of this case. However,
the Commission has reserved to Comm. Desamito the 20 See footnote no. 6, supra.
right to submit a dissenting opinion." Rollo, pp. 159-
171. 21 In debunking Frivaldo's claim of citizenship, this
Court in G.R. No. 87193, supra, p. 254, observed that
4 Rollo, pp. 46-49. "(i)f he (Frivaldo) really wanted to disavow his
American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
5 Rollo, pp. 50-55. The Second Division was citizenship, petitioner should have done so in
composed of Pres. Comm. Remedios A. Salazar- accordance with the laws of our country. Under C.A.
Fernando, ponente; Comm. Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473 and P.D. 725,
concurring, and Comm. Manolo B. Gorospe ("on Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act
official business"). of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation."

6 Frivaldo was naturalized as an American citizen on 22 Supra, p. 794.

January 20, 1983. In G.R. No. 87193, Frivaldo vs.
Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (June 23, 23 Petition, p. 27; rollo, p. 29.
1989), the Supreme Court, by reason of such
naturalization, declared Frivaldo "not a citizen of the 24 The full text of said memorandum reads as follows:
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from
serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon." On
February 28, 1992, the Regional Trial Court of Manila MEMORANDUM
granted the petition for naturalization of Frivaldo.
However, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 104654, TO : The Solicitor General
Republic of the Philippines vs. De la Rosa, et al., 232
SCRA 785 (June 6, 1994), overturned this grant, and The Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs
Frivaldo was "declared not a citizen of the Philippines"
and ordered to vacate his office. On the basis of this The Director-General
latter Supreme Court ruling, the Comelec disqualified
Frivaldo in SPA No. 95-028. National Intelligence Coordinating Agency

7 Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo and the six The previous administration's practice of granting
incumbent commissioners, namely, Regalado E. citizenship by Presidential Decree or any other
Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, Manolo executive issuance, and the derivative administrative
authority thereof, poses a serious and contentious PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO
issue of policy which the present government, in the WOMEN WHO HAD LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE
exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF
best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS.
the 1987 Constitution.
WHEREAS, there are many Filipino women who had
In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens;
members of the Special Committee on Naturalization,
are hereby directed to cease and desist from WHEREAS, while the new Constitution allows a
undertaking any and all proceedings within your Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her
functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission,
Instructions No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as she is deemed under the law to have renounced her
amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated Philippine citizenship, such provision of the new
December 3, 1975, as amended, and Presidential Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who
Decree No. 1379 dated May 17, 1978, relative to the had married aliens before said constitution took effect;
grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other
related laws, orders, issuances and rules and WHEREAS, the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as
regulations. amended) allows the repatriation of Filipino women
who lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage
(Sgd.) Corazon C. Aquino to aliens only after the death of their husbands or the
termination of their marital status; and
Manila, March 27, 1987.
WHEREAS, there are natural born Filipinos who have
25 Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines. lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship;
26 Cf. Ty, et al. vs. Trampe, et al., G.R. No. 117577
(December 1, 1995). Now, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in
27 Petition, p. 28; rollo, p. 30. me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree and
order that: (1) Filipino women who lost their Philippine
28 The aforesaid Manifestation reads as follows: citizenship by marriage to aliens; and (3) natural born
Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may
reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by
MANIFESTATION
applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization
created by Letter of Instructions No. 270, and, if their
The Solicitor General, as Chairman of the Special applications are approved, taking the necessary oath
Committee on Naturalization, hereby manifests that of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after
the following persons have been repatriated by virtue which they shall be deemed to have reacquired
of Presidential Decree No. 725, since June 8, 1995: Philippine citizenship. The Commission on
Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel
1. Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo R-000900 their certificate of registration.

2. Manuel Reyes Sanchez 901 The aforesaid Special Committee is hereby

authorized to promulgate rules and regulations and
3. Ma. Nelly Dessalla Ty 902 prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees
for the effective implementation of this Decree.
4. Terry Herrera and
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Antonio Ching 903
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the
5. Roberto Salas Benedicto 904 year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-five.

6. Winthrop Santos Liwag 905 30 See footnote no. 6, supra.

7. Samuel M. Buyco 906 31 Cf. Labo, Jr. vs. Comelec, 211 SCRA 297 (July 3,
1992).
8. Joselito Holganza Ruiz 907
32 The term of office of all local elective officials
9. Samuel Villanueva 908 elected after the effectivity of this Code shall be three
(3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such
10. Juan Leonardo Collas, Jr. 909 date as may be provided for by law, . . ." Sec. 43,
Local Government Code.
11. Felicilda Otilla Sacnanas-Chua 910
33 96 Phil. 447, 453 (1955).
29 The text of P.D. 725 is reproduced below:
34 The following are excerpts from the transcript of
stenographic notes of the oral argument held on
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 725 March 19, 1996:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Mr. been twice declared not citizen and
Counsel, it is your position then that we admit the ruling of the Supreme
the candidate should be a citizen at Court is correct but the fact is, Your
the time of proclamation? Honor, the matter of his eligibility to
vote as being a registered voter was
ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your likewise questioned before the
Honor, it is required that he must be a judiciary. There was a ruling by the
citizen at the time of proclamation and Municipal Court, there was a ruling by
not only that, at the time that he the Regional Trial Court and he was
assumes the office he must have the sustained as a valid voter, so he
continuing qualification as a citizen. voted.

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Should that JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I raised this

not be reckoned from the time of filing question in connection with your
of certificate of candidacy or at least contention that citizenship should be
the day of the election? determined as of the time of
proclamation and not as of the time of
ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your the election or at the time of the filing
Honor, there are positions taken that it of the certificate of candidacy.
should be reckoned from the date of
certificate of candidacy as in the case ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is true,
of qualification for Batasang Your Honor.
Pambansa before under B.P. 53 - it
says that for purposes of residence it JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: And is it
must be reckoned . . . from the time of your contention that under the law,
the filing of the certificate, for particularly the Local Autonomy Code,
purposes of age, from the time of the the law does not specify when
date of the election. But when we go citizenship should be possessed by
over all the provisions of law under the candidate, is that not correct?
current laws, Your Honor, there is no
qualification requirement insofar as ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right,
citizenship is concern(ed) as to when, Your Honor, there is no express
as to when you should be a citizen of provision.
the Philippines and we say that if there
is no provision under any existing law JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am also
which requires that you have to be a asking you that under the Local
citizen of the Philippines on the date of Autonomy Code the candidate for
the filing or on the date of election governor or for other local positions
then it has to be equitably interpreted should be a voter and to be a voter
to mean that if you are already one must be a citizen?
qualified at the time that the office is
supposed to be assumed then you
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is right,
should be allowed to assume the
Your Honor, but the fact of voting is
office.
not an issue here because he was
allowed to vote and he did in fact vote
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Is it not also and in fact, he was a registered voter.
true that under the Local Autonomy (TSN, March 19, 1996.)
Code the candidate should also be a
registered voter and to be a registered
35 Section 117, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise
voter one must be a citizen?
known as "The Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines", as amended, provides for the various
ATTY. BRILLANTES: Yes, Your qualifications of voters, one of which is Filipino
Honor, in fact, Mr. Frivaldo has always citizenship.
been a registered voter of Sorsogon.
He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992,
36 Comment, p. 11; rollo, p. 259.
then he voted again in 1995. In fact,
his eligibility as a voter was
questioned but the Court dismissed 37 See footnote no. 33.
(sic) his eligibility as a voter and he
was allowed to vote as in fact, he 38 Section 253 reads as follows:
voted in all the previous elections
including on May 8, 1995. Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. -- Any voter
contesting the election of any member of the
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: But the fact Congress, regional, provincial, or city officer on the
that he voted does not make him a ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of
citizen. The fact is, he was declared the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo
not a citizen by this Court twice. warranto with the Commission within ten days after
the proclamation of the results of the election. (Art.
ATTY. BRILLANTES: That is true, XIV, Sec. 60, BP 697; Art. XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2,
Your Honor, we admit that he has 1978 EC).
Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the
barangay officer on the ground of ineligibility or of petition and declares that respondent is
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a DISQUALIFIED to run for the office of Provincial
sworn petition for quo warranto with the regional trial Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is not a
court or metropolitan or municipal trial court, citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly respondent's
respectively, within ten days after the proclamation of certificate of candidacy is cancelled.
the results of the election. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2,
1978 EC). 54 Petition, p. 19; rollo, p. 21.

39 Art. 4, New Civil Code. See also Gallardo vs. 55 Resolution promulgated on December 19, 1995, p.
Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500 (May 25, 1988), and Nilo 7; rollo, p. 116.
vs. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519 (April 2, 1984).
56 42 SCRA 561, 565 (December 20,
40 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on 1971), citing Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. Immigration, L-21289, October 4, 1971.
23 states:
57 Art. IX, Sec. 2.
Exceptions to Rule. -- Statutes can be given
retroactive effect in the following cases: (1) when the 58 SPC No. 95-317 is entitled "Annulment of
law itself so expressly provides, (2) in case of Proclamation" and contains the following prayer:
remedial statutes, (3) in case of curative statutes, (4)
in case of laws interpreting others, and (5) in case of
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this
laws creating new rights.
Honorable Commission that after due notice and
hearing an Oder (sic) /Resolution/Decision be issued
41 Id., p. 25. as follows:

42 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., pp. 270- a) Annulling/setting aside the 30 June 1995
271. proclamation of respondent as the duly election (sic),
Governor of Sorsogon for being contrary to law;
43 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 354, p. 489, cited in Castro vs.
Sagales, 94 Phil. 208, 210 (1953). b) Ordering the proclamation of the petitioner as duly
elected governor of Sorsogon;
44 Memorandum, p. 9.
xxx xxx xxx
45 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 351, p. 488.
59 229 SCRA 666, 674 (February 4, 1994).
46 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 354, p. 490; emphasis
supplied. 60 211 SCRA 297, 309 (July 3, 1992).

47 Art. 10, Civil Code of the Philippines. 61 G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995.

48 Based on the "Corrected Compliance" dated May 62 Supra, at p. 312.

16, 1996 filed by the Solicitor General, it appears that,
excluding the case of Frivaldo, the longest interval
63 See footnotes 2 and 3.
between date of filing of an application for repatriation
and its approval was three months and ten days; the
swiftest action was a same-day approval. 64 174 SCRA 245, 254 (June 23, 1959).

49 Sec. 40. Disqualifications. -- The following persons 65 Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 1966
are disqualified from running for any elective local ed., p. 239.
position:
66 In Espinosa vs. Aquino, (Electoral Case No. 9,
xxx xxx xxx Senate Electoral Tribunal [SET]), the election of the
late Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was upheld,
despite his not being of the required age on the day of
(d) Those with dual citizenship;"
the election, although he celebrated his thirty-fifth
birthday before his proclamation. Much later, in 1990,
50 p. 11; rollo, p. 259. this Court held in Aznar vs. Comelec (185 SCRA 703,
May 25, 1990) that even if Emilio "Lito" Osmeña held
51 Resolution, p. 12; rollo, p. 121. an Alien Certificate of Registration as an American
citizen, he was still not disqualified from occupying the
52 Cf. Navarro vs. Commission on Elections, 228 local elective post of governor, since such certificate
SCRA 596 (December 17, 1993); Arao vs. did not preclude his being "still a Filipino." The holding
Commission on Elections, 210 SCRA 290 (June 23, in Aquino was subsequently nullified by the adoption
1992). of the 1987 Constitution (Art. VI, Sec. 3), which
specified that the age qualification must be possessed
53 The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads: on the day of the elections, and not on the day of the
proclamation of the winners by the board of
canvassers. On the other hand, Sec. 40 of Republic
Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) which
took effect on January 1, 1992, provides that those
with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for
any elective local position, and effectively overturns
the ruling in Aznar. But the point is that to the extent
possible, and unless there exist provisions to the
contrary, the laws have always been interpreted to
give fullest effect to the political will.

67 Benito vs. Commission on Elections, 235 SCRA

436, 442 (August 17, 1994).

68 This antagonism was clearly present in the two

earlier cases involving Frivaldo. See footnote no. 6.

PUNO, J., concurring:

1 The 1987 Constitution added the word "democratic"

in the statement of the principle.

2 Section 24(a) of the Tydings-McDuffie Law which

authorized the Filipino people to draft a Constitution in
1934 required that the "constitution formulated and
drafted shall be republican in form."

This Court has observed that even before the

Tydings-McDuffie Law, the Philippine Bill and the
Jones Law have ". . . extended the powers of a
republican form of government modeled after that of
the United States to the Philippines." Roa v. Collector
of Customs, 23 Phil. 315, 340 [1912], Severino v.
Gov. General, 16 Phil. 366, 383 [1910], US v. Bull, 15
Phil. 7, 27 [1910].

3 Words and Phrases, Vol. 39 A., p.

68 citing Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. R. Co.,
33 F. 900, 906.

4 Dean of the UP College of Law; later President of

U.P., and Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention.

5 Since, Philippine Political Law, Principles and

Concepts, 1954, ed., p. 22.

6 Barker, Principles of Social and Political Theory, p.

59 (1952 ed.).

7 118 US 356.

8 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, p. 49, [1991 ed.].

9 Sinco, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

10 3 AM JUR 2d 889-890; 63 AM JUR 2d 653; 67

CSJ 926.

11 Moya v. del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199.