Public Service Act (CA No. 1416).

—So understood, the concept of

“common carrier” under Article 1732 may be seen to coincide
neatly with the notion of “public service,” under the Public Service
Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which at least
partially supplements the law on common carriers set forth in the
Civil Code. Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the Public Service
Act, “public service” includes: “x x x every person that now or
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the
De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or limited
clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done
*
No. L-47822. December 22, 1988. for general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street
railway, traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight
PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF or passenger, or both, with or without fixed route and whatever
APPEALS and ERNESTO CENDAÑA, respondents. may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class,
express service, steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries
and water craft, engaged in the transportation of passengers or
Common Carriers; Definition of; Art. 1732 of the Civil Code freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice
makes no distinctions between a person or enterprise offering plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas,
transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and such electric light, heat and power, water supply and power petroleum,
service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.—The Civil sewerage system, wire or wireless communications systems, wire
Code defines “common carriers” in the following terms: “Article or wireless broadcasting stations and other similar public
1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms, or services. x x x.”
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for Same; Same; Same; Same; A certificate of public convenience
compensation, offering their services to the public.” The above is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under the Civil Code
article makes no distinction between one whose principal provisions governing common carriers.—The Court of Appeals
business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and referred to the fact that private respondent held no certificate of
one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local public convenience, and concluded he was not a common carrier.
idiom, as “a sideline”). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making This is palpable error. A certificate of public convenience is not a
any distinction between a person or enterprise offering requisite for the incurring of liability under the Civil Code
transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one provisions governing common carriers. That liability arises the
offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier, without
basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier regard to whether or not such carrier has also complied with the
offering its services to the “general public,” i.e., the general requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and
community or population, and one who offers services or solicits implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate of
business only from a narrow segment of the general population. public convenience or other franchise. To exempt private
We think that Article 1733 deliberately refrained from making respondent from the liabilities of a common carrier because he
such distinctions. has not secured the necessary certificate of public convenience,
would be offensive to sound public policy; that would be to reward
________________ private respondent precisely for failing to comply with applicable
statutory requirements. The business of a common carrier
* THIRD DIVISION. impinges directly and intimately upon the safety and well being
and property of those members of the general community who
happen to deal with such carrier. The law imposes duties and
613
liabilities upon common carriers for the safety and protection of
those who utilize their
VOL. 168, DECEMBER 22, 1988 613
614
De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Same; The concept of “common carrier” under

614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Art. 1732 coincides with the notion of “Public Service” under the
 De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals VOL. 168, DECEMBER 22, 1988 615

De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals

services and the law cannot allow a common carrier to render
such duties and liabilities merely facultative by simply failing to
obtain the necessary permits and authorizations. traordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods is, under Article
1733, given additional specification not only by Articles 1734 and
Same; Same; Same; Liability of common carriers in case of 1735 but also by Article 1745, numbers 4, 5 and 6. Article 1745
loss, destruction or deterioration or destruction of goods they carry; provides in relevant part: “Any of the following or similar
Extraordinary diligence, required; Exceptions.—Common carriers, stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, unjust and
“by the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy,” contrary to public policy: xxx xxx xxx (5) that the common carrier
are held to a very high degree of care and diligence shall not be responsible for the acts or omissions of his or its
(“extraordinary diligence”) in the carriage of goods as well as of employees; (6) that the common carrier’s liability for acts
passengers. The specific import of extraordinary diligence in the committed by thieves, or of robbers who do not act with grave or
care of goods transported by a common carrier is, according to irresistible threat, violence or force, is dispensed with or
Article 1733, “further expressed in Articles 1734, 1735 and 1745, diminished; and (7) that the common carrier shall not responsible
numbers 5, 6 and 7” of the Civil Code. Article 1734 establishes the for the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods on account of the
general rule that common carriers are responsible for the loss, defective condition of the car, vehicle, ship, airplane or other
destruction or deterioration of the goods which they carry, “unless equipment used in the contract of carriage.” Under Article 1745
the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood, (6) above, a common carrier is held responsible and will not be
storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or allowed to divest or to diminish such responsibility—even for acts
calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether of strangers like thieves or robbers, except where such thieves or
international or civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner robbers in fact acted “with grave or irresistible threat, violence or
of the goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the force.” We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of
packing or in the containers; and (5) Order or act of competent extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are
public authority.” It is important to point out that the above list of reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is
causes of loss, destruction or deterioration which exempt the attended by “grave or irresistible threat, violence or force.”
common carrier for responsibility therefor, is a closed list. Causes
falling outside the foregoing list, even if they appear to constitute Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Common carriers are not
a species of force majeure, fall within the scope of Article 1735. made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport
of goods and are not liable for fortuitous events; Case at bar.—In
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The hijacking of the carriers these circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of the loss must
truck does not fall within any of the five (5) categories of exempting reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the common
causes in Art. 1734.—Applying the above-quoted Articles 1734 carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is
and 1735, we note firstly that the specific cause alleged in the necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made
instant case—the hijacking of the carrier’s truck—does not fall absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of
within any of the five (5) categories of exempting causes listed in goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be
Article 1734. It would follow, therefore, that the hijacking of the foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have complied
carrier’s vehicle must be dealt with under the provisions of Article with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence. We,
1735, in other words, that the private respondent as common therefore, agree with the result reached by the Court of Appeals
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted that private respondent Cendaña is not liable for the value of the
negligently. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by undelivered merchandise which was lost because of an event
proof of extraordinary diligence on the part of private respondent. entirely beyond private respondent’s control.

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Art. 1745(6), a
of Appeals.
common carrier is held responsible even for acts of strangers like
thieves or robbers except where such thieves or robbers acted “with The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
grave or irresistible threat, violence or force.”—As noted earlier,      Vicente D. Millora for petitioner.
the duty of ex-      Jacinto Callanta for private respondent.

615 616
616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
force majeure.
De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals
On 10 1
December 1975, the trial court rendered a
Decision finding private respondent to be a common
FELICIANO, J.: carrier and holding him liable for the value of the
undelivered goods (P22,150.00) as well as for P4,000.00 as
Respondent Ernesto Cendaña, a junk dealer, was engaged
damages and P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
in buying up used bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan.
On appeal before the Court of Appeals, respondent
Upon gathering sufficient quantities of such scrap
urged that the trial court had erred in considering him a
material, respondent would bring such material to Manila
common carrier; in finding that he had habitually offered
for resale. He utilized two (2) six-wheeler trucks which he
trucking services to the public; in not exempting him from
owned for hauling the material to Manila. On the return
liability on the ground of force majeure; and in ordering
trip to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicles
him to pay damages and attorney’s fees.
with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered to
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial
differing establishments in Pangasinan. For that service,
court and held that respondent had been engaged in
respondent charged freight rates which were commonly
transporting return loads of freight “as a casual occupation
lower than regular commercial rates.
—a sideline to his scrap iron business” and not as a
Sometime in November 1970, petitioner Pedro de
common carrier.
Guzman, a merchant and authorized dealer of General
Petitioner came to this Court by way of a Petition for
Milk Company (Philippines), Inc. in Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
Review assigning as errors the following conclusions of the
contracted with respondent for the hauling of 750 cartons
Court of Appeals:
of Liberty filled milk from a warehouse of General Milk in
Makati, Rizal, to petitioner’s establishment in Urdaneta on 1. that private respondent was not a common carrier;
or before 4 December 1970. Accordingly, on 1 December
2. that the hijacking of respondent’s truck was force
1970, respondent loaded in Makati the merchandise on to
majeure; and
his trucks: 150 cartons were loaded on a truck driven by
respondent himself; while 600 cartons were placed on board 3. that respondent was not liable for the value of the
the other truck which was driven by Manuel Estrada, undelivered cargo. (Rollo, p. 111)
respondent’s driver and employee.
Only 150 boxes of Liberty filled milk were delivered to We consider first the issue of whether or not private
petitioner. The other 600 boxes never reached petitioner, respondent Ernesto Cendaña may, under the facts earlier
since the truck which carried these boxes was hijacked set forth, be properly characterized as a common carrier.
somewhere along the MacArthur Highway in Paniqui, The Civil Code defines “common carriers” in the following
Tarlac, by armed men who took with them the truck, its terms:
driver, his helper and the cargo. “Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms
On 6 January 1971, petitioner commenced action or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
against private respondent in the Court of First Instance of transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air
Pangasinan, demanding payment of P22,150.00, the for compensation, offering their services to the public.”
claimed value of the lost merchandise, plus damages and
attorney’s fees. Petitioner argued that private respondent, The above article makes no distinction between one whose
being a common carrier, and having failed to exercise the principal business activity is the carrying of persons or
extraordinary diligence required of him by the law, should goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an
be held liable for the value of the undelivered goods. ancillary activity (in local idiom, as “a sideline”). Article
In his Answer, private respondent denied that he was a 1732 also
common carrier and argued that he could not be held
responsible for the value of the lost goods, such loss having _______________
been due to
1 Rollo, p. 14.
617
618

VOL. 168, DECEMBER 22, 1988 617

De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals 618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals that that fee frequently fell below commercial freight rates
is not relevant here.
carefully avoids making any distinction between a person The Court of Appeals referred to the fact that private
or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or respondent held no certificate of public convenience, and
scheduled basis and one offering such service on an concluded he was not a common carrier. This is palpable
occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does error. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite
Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its for the incurring of liability under the Civil Code provisions
services to the “general public,” i.e., the general community governing common carriers. That liability arises the
or population, and one who offers services or solicits moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier, without
business only from a narrow segment of the general regard to whether or not such carrier has also complied
population. We think that Article 1733 deliberately with the requirements of the applicable regulatory statute
refrained from making such distinctions. and implementing regulations and has been granted a
So understood, the concept of “common carrier” under certificate of public convenience or other franchise. To
Article 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with the notion exempt private respondent from the liabilities of a common
of “public service,” under the Public Service Act carrier because he has not secured the necessary certificate
(Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which at least of public convenience, would be offensive to sound public
partially supplements the law on common carriers set forth policy; that would be to reward private respondent
in the Civil Code. Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the precisely for failing to comply with applicable statutory
Public Service Act, “public service” includes: requirements. The business of a common carrier impinges
directly and intimately upon the safety and well being and
“x x x every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, property of those members of the general community who
manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, happen to deal with such carrier. The law imposes duties
with general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or and liabilities upon common carriers for the safety and
accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common protection of those who utilize their services and the law
carrier, railroad, street railway, traction railway, subway motor cannot allow a common carrier to render such duties and
vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both, with or without liabilities merely facultative by simply failing to obtain the
fixed route and whatever may be its classification, freight or necessary permits and authorizations.
carrier service of any class, express service, steamboat, or We turn then to the liability of private respondent as a
steamship line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the common carrier.
transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine Common carriers, “by the nature of their business and
2
repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration plant, for reasons of public policy,” are held to a very high degree
canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water of care and diligence (“extraordinary diligence”) in the
supply and power petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless carriage of goods as well as of passengers. The specific
communications systems, wire or wireless broadcasting stations import of extraordinary diligence in the care of goods
and other similar public services. x x x.” (Italics supplied) transported by a common carrier is, according to Article
1733, “further expressed in Articles 1734, 1735 and 1745,
It appears to the Court that private respondent is properly numbers 5, 6 and 7” of the Civil Code.
characterized as a common carrier even though he merely
“back-hauled” goods for other merchants from Manila to
_______________
Pangasinan, although such backhauling was done on a
periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled 2 Article 1733, Civil Code.
manner, and even though private respondent’s principal
occupation was not the carriage of goods for others. There 620
is no dispute that private respondent charged his
customers a fee for hauling their goods; 620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
619 De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals

VOL. 168, DECEMBER 22, 1988 619 Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common
carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or
De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals
deterioration of the goods which they carry, “unless the
same is due to any of the following causes only:
 (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other The precise issue that we address here relates to the
natural disaster or calamity; specific requirements of the duty of extraordinary diligence
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether in the vigilance over the goods carried in the specific
international or civil; context of hijacking or armed robbery.
As noted earlier, the duty of extraordinary diligence in
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
the vigilance over goods is, under Article 1733, given
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing additional specification not only by Articles 1734 and 1735
or in the containers; and but also by Article 1745, numbers 4, 5 and 6, Article 1745
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.” provides in relevant part:

It is important to point out that the above list of causes of “Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered
loss, destruction or deterioration which exempt the unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy:
common carrier for responsibility therefor, is a closed list. x x x      x x x      x x x
Causes falling outside the foregoing list, even if they
(5) that the common carrier shall not be responsible for the
appear to constitute a species of force majeure, fall within
acts or omissions of his or its employees;
the scope of Article 1735, which provides as follows:
(6) that the common carrier’s liability for acts committed by
“In all cases other than those mentioned in numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and thieves, or of robbers who do not act with grave or
5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or irresistible threat, violence or force, is dispensed with or
deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault diminished; and
or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed (7) that the common carrier shall not responsible for the loss,
extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733.” (Italics destruction or deterioration of goods on account of the
supplied) defective condition of the car, vehicle, ship, airplane or
other equipment used in the contract of carriage.” (Italics
Applying the above-quoted Articles 1734 and 1735, we note
supplied)
firstly that the specific cause alleged in the instant case—
the hijacking of the carrier’s truck—does not fall within
Under Article 1745 (6) above, a common carrier is held
any of the five (5) categories of exempting causes listed in
responsible—and will not be allowed to divest or to
Article 1734. It would follow, therefore, that the hijacking
diminish such responsibility—even for acts of strangers
of the carrier’s vehicle must be dealt with under the
like thieves or robbers, except where such thieves or
provisions of Article 1735, in other words, that the private
robbers in fact acted “with grave or irresistible threat,
respondent as common carrier is presumed to have been at
violence or force.” We believe and so hold that the limits of
fault or to have acted negligently. This presumption,
the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
however, may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary
goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as a
diligence on the part of private respondent.
result of a robbery which is attended by “grave or
Petitioner insists that private respondent had not
irresistible threat, violence or force.”
observed extraordinary diligence in the care of petitioner’s
In the instant case, armed men held up the second truck
goods. Petitioner argues that in the circumstances of this
owned by private respondent which carried petitioner’s
case, private respondent should have hired a security
cargo. The record shows that an information for robbery in
guard presumably to
band was
621
622

VOL. 168, DECEMBER 22, 1988 621

622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals
De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals

ride with the truck carrying the 600 cartons of Liberty

filed in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch 2, in
filled milk. We do not believe, however, that in the instant
Criminal Case No. 198 entitled “People of the Philippines v.
case, the standard of extraordinary diligence required
Felipe Boncorno, Napoleon Presno, Armando Mesina,
private respondent to retain a security guard to ride with
Oscar Oria and one John Doe.” There, the accused were
the truck and to engage brigands in a firefight at the risk of
charged with willfully and unlawfully taking and carrying
his own life and the lives of the driver and his helper.
away with them the second truck, driven by Manuel Notes.—Right of reimbursement of company held liable
Estrada and loaded with the 600 cartons of Liberty filled for damages against the owner/operator of ferry boat for
milk destined for delivery at petitioner’s store in Urdaneta, actual negligence for drawing passengers. (Sarkies Tours
Pangasinan. The decision of the trial court shows that the Phils, Inc. vs. IAC, 124 SCRA 588.)
accused 3acted with grave, if not irresistible, threat, violence The owner of a vessel is liable in damages arising from
or force. Three (3) of the five (5) hold-uppers were armed the act of its captain in by-passing a pre-scheduled port of
with firearms. The robbers not only took away the truck call. (Sweet Lines vs. Court of Appeals, 121 SCRA 769.)
and its cargo but also kidnapped the driver and his helper,
detaining them for several days and later releasing them in ———o0o———
another province (in Zambales). The hijacked truck was
subsequently found by the police in Quezon City. The Court
of First Instance convicted 4all the accused of robbery,
though not of robbery in band.
In these circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of
the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the
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control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a
fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall that even common
carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of
travel and of transport of goods, and are not held liable for
acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable,
provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous
standard of extraordinary diligence.
We, therefore, agree with the result reached by the
Court of Appeals that private respondent Cendaña is not
liable for the value of the undelivered merchandise which
was lost because of an event entirely beyond private
respondent’s control.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review on Certiorari
is hereby DENIED and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 3 August 1977 is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

_______________

3 Rollo, p. 22.
4 The evidence of the prosecution did not show that more than three (3)
of the five (5) hold-uppers were armed. Thus, the existence of a “band”
within the technical meaning of Article 306 of the Revised Penal Code,
was not affirmatively proved by the prosecution.

623

VOL. 168, DECEMBER 22, 1988 623

Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals

SO ORDERED.

     Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortés, JJ.,

concur.

Petition denied. Decision affirmed.