A candidate who was elected to the office of municipal president and who at the time of the
election was registered as a voter of Manila and not of the municipality in which he was a
candidate, is nevertheless eligible to the office, and proceedings in the nature of quo
warranto instituted by virtue of the provisions of section 408 of the Election Law, as
amended.
Subject: Election Law
MARCOS YRA, petitioner and appellant
VS. MAXIMO ABAÑO, respondent and appellee
No. 30187
November 15, 1928
Ponente:, Malcolm, J.
Nature of the Case: APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
Parties:
FACTS:
These are proceedings in the nature of quo warranto instituted by virtue of the
provisions of section 408 of the Election Law, as amended, in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan by the petitioner, Marcos Yra, the vice-president elect of Meycauayan, Bulacan, who
challenges the right of the respondent, Maximo Abaño, the municipal president elect of
Meycauayan, to the position to which elected on the ground that the respondent is ineligible.
Respondent Maximo Abaño is a native of Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the proper age, he
transferred to Manila to study. While temporarily residing in Manila, Abaño registered as a
voter there. Shortly after qualifying as a member of the bar and after the death of his father,
Abaño returned to Meycauayan to live there.
From May 10, 1927, up to present, Abaño has considered himself a resident of
Meycauayan. When the 1928 elections were approaching, he made an application for
cancellation of registration in Manila dated April 3, 1928, but this application was rejected by
the city officials for the reason that it was not deposited in the mails on or before April 4, 1928.
Nevertheless Abaño presented himself as a candidate for municipal president of Meycauayan in
the 1928 elections and was elected by popular vote to that office.
Petitioner Marcos Yra assails the eligibility of Abaño on the ground that he had not been
a resident of Meycauayan for at least one year previous to the election.
Decision of the CFI: Judgment is in favor of the respondent; CFI declared the complaint as
without merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-eligibility of the respondent to hold a municipal office for the reason
that he was not a “qualified voter in his municipality”, connoting that he was not a “qualified
elector therein”, sufficient to nullify his election?
HELD:
No. One of the qualifications required by law of a person who announces his candidacy
is that he must be a duly qualified elector. The Executive Bureau has held that the term
"qualified" when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a
registered voter. To become a qualified candidate a person does not need to register as an
elector. It is sufficient that he possesses all the qualifications prescribed in section 431 and none
of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a candidate failed to register as
an elector in the municipality does not deprive him of the right to become a candidate to be
voted for.
Furthermore, the law of Kentucky provides that "No person shall be eligible to any office
who is not at time of his election a qualified voter of the city and who has not resided therein
three years preceding his election." It was said that "The act of registering is only one step
towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter. . . .
One may be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote. Registering does not confer
the right; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the right."
The distinction is between a qualified elector and the respondent is such, and a
registered qualified elector and the respondent is such although not in his home municipality.
Registration regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such
right. It should not be forgotten that the people of Meycauayan have spoken and their choice
to be their local chief executive is the respondent. The will of the electorate should be
respected.
The decision of the lower court is affirmed.
