Oakwood mutiny

The Oakwood Mutiny was a mutiny that occurred in the Philippines on July 27, 2003. A group of 321 armed soldiers who called
themselves "Magdalo" led by Lt. Antonio Trillanes of the Philippine Navy took over the Oakwood Premier Serviced Apartments in
Ayala Center, Makati City to show the Filipino people the alleged corruption of the Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo administration. They
also stated that they saw signs suggesting that the president was going to declare martial law.

Objective and Demands

Most of the mutineers were junior officers and young enlisted men from all branches of the Philippine military. By occupying a
business center, they had hoped "that it would destroy business (both local and foreign) confidence and create uncertainty over the
administration's ability to manage economic recovery".[1] Among their demands were the resignation of top-ranking officials of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as of the president herself.

Outcome

However, the bloodless mutiny ended unsuccessfully within 18 hours when the soldiers failed to rally support from the public or the
armed forces. All soldiers involved surrendered peacefully and were charged in a general court martial.

More than a year after the mutiny, its leaders apologized to the president for attempting the failed military rebellion. Arroyo accepted
the apology, but ruled out immediate pardon and said their trial would proceed. The officers face up to life in prison for the mutiny.

Then in November 2004, President Arroyo ordered 133 of the 321 soldiers freed, saying they were deceived by their officers into
joining the mutiny. But insiders say that this was made possible through backchannel negotiations in the wake of the Magdalo leaders'
apology.

Criticism

The mutineers were criticized for their judgments and political understanding regarding their claims that the president was going to
declare martial law. They were also widely criticized for attempting to further destabilize the country's shakey democracy and
sabotaging the already weak economy. However, a survey following the mutiny found that 55% of the population believed that the
grievances expressed by the mutineers were justified.

Continued Defiance

In a recently scheduled court hearing, more than 300 soldiers were deployed around the Makati City hall when about 20 Oakwood
mutineers attended their trial.

The heavy security did not prevent some of the mutineers from slipping messages to media representatives covering the hearing.

In a short message written in a piece of paper, Air Force First Lt. Francisco Ashley Acedillo reiterated an earlier statement issued by
Lt. Senior Grade Antonio Trillanes asking the people to choose between supporting President Arroyo or pushing for a change of
government.

“We are reiterating our appeal. Now is the right time,” Acedillo said.

Acedillo said they were leaving it up to the people how to achieve change.

He said efforts to unseat Arroyo had become more “timely” ahead of the 20th anniversary of the 1986 People Power uprising that
toppled the Marcos dictatorship.

“We believe that support [from the public] is there. They are just waiting for the right time,” he said, when asked to comment on the
military's claim that they did not have the backing of the people.

Acedillo said they supported the call of four of their comrades, who escaped last January 17, for the public to wear arm bands and join
street protests to press for Arroyo's resignation.
The mutineers are being charged with trying to mount a coup d’état in the Makati trial court Branch 148.

Insights from the Oakwood mutiny

Although the rebellion staged by a group of disgruntled young military officers was quashed within 18 hours of the rebel seizure of
Oakwood serviced-apartments building in the heart of the Makati business district, it unleashed a new blizzard of uncertainty over the
economic and political horizons and over the continuity of the Macapagal administration beyond next year's presidential elections.

The mutiny threw the spotlight on the infirmity of the democratic institutions restored by the EDSA People Power I uprising in 1986
and the vulnerability of the economy to political shocks and turbulence.

First, it revealed that the virus of military adventurism and interventionism still runs deep within the military establishment. The
quashing of the coup attempt should not be a cause for celebration. It should rather be a cause of concern over further new impulses of
military adventurism.

Second, the Makati attack showed the shortcomings of the Macapagal administration in crisis management. The rebellion highlighted
the weakness of the Macapagal administration in responding effectively to defend the government against armed attempts to seize
state power. It underlined an intelligence failure that prevented the government from preempting the attack in Makati, even though
troop movements -- albeit of small-force size -- had already been sighted moving into Metro Manila days before the rebels occupied
Oakwood.

Fortunately, for the administration, it survived its first armed challenge from soldiers not because of its dynamic response but because
of the ineptitude of the coup makers; the rebellion was sloppily planned; the rebels did not do their homework. It is not hard to see
why their rebellion fizzled.

Obviously, the rebels mounted the reckless action without the necessary force to attack government centers, hoping to tie the
government in a long standoff and expecting such a stalemate would encourage other units of the Armed Forces to join the rebellion.
Their objective, commensurate to the number of their troops, was limited -- a business center, hoping that it would destroy business
(both local and foreign) confidence and create uncertainty over the administration's ability to manage economic recovery and even
survive the last few months of its term.

The rebels were disappointed that their mutiny did not catch fire inside the military and did not receive the support of the senior
military leadership, which cast its lot with the government.

It is clear that grievances alone are not enough to create a bandwagon inside the military. The grievances centered mainly on Defense
Secretary Angelo Reyes' alleged micromanagement style and on military corruption that they alleged to have allowed, among others,
the diversion of Armed Forces weapons to Islamic rebels in Mindanao. As the coups in the 1980s and the EDSA People Power II
revolt in 2001 demonstrated, it takes more than grievances centered on corruption inside the military to mobilize widespread public
support, as well as military support, for a bid to topple the government.

That the defense department did not address the grievances before they exploded into a mutiny showed the failure of the military
grievance mechanism. While these grievances should not be ignored, they are not sufficient grounds to stage a rebellion and
overthrow the ruling administration.

The rebels also misread the public mood. They failed to draw the extensive support they had hoped to get from the civilian population,
which was not prepared to back another military intervention to topple the government too soon after the military defection from the
Estrada administration in January 2001.

Apart from their grievances, the rebel leaders cited another flimsy reason for their rebellion. They said they saw signs that President
Macapagal-Arroyo was moving toward declaring martial law to extend her stay in office. They wanted her to step down and called for
the resignation of Defense Secretary Reyes. But these are political demands that went beyond the scope of their catalogue of
grievances.

For supposedly intelligent young officers who are said to be the "best and the brightest" of Philippine Military Academy (PMA) class
of 1995, their claim that the President intends to prolong her term by declaring martial law reflects faulty reading of the political
climate in the country. By such claim, the rebels showed political immaturity and amateurish judgments. It showed them as no better
than the opposition. They grossly misread the President's political style. They must have been thinking of Ferdinand Marcos' reasons
for declaring martial law.
The lack of careful preparation for the mutiny ensured its failure. PMA alumni are supposed to have been trained to go to war not to
lose but to win. The rebels failed to consider carefully the terrain they were jumping into before embarking on an adventure as
treasonous as overthrowing a government. Their demand for the President's resignation gave a political color to their rebellion more
than an expression of grievances. They did not even let us know with whom they wanted to replace President Macapagal-Arroyo.The
slipshod preparation of the mutiny should prompt the PMA to review whether it is producing effective military leaders. The manifesto
of the rebels reeks with messianic slogans. It takes more than being driven by messianic complex for coups to succeed and to show
that a junta is a better method of providing good leadership than democratic elections.

The Facts Behind the Oakwood Mutiny

Not many people know the result of the Fact Finding Commission’s report on the coup attempt last 27 July 2003. We are
providing the public the opportunity to review this report so we can continue to advocate for transparency and
accountability among our leaders, both civilian and military. Also, we must ensure that the recommendations of the
Commission will be acted upon in the interest of justice.

In summary, the Commission concluded that the soldiers went to Oakwood not simply to air grievances but to take power
in behalf of Gregorio Honasan and Joseph Estrada and to implement Honasan’s National Recovery Program.

The groups identified with Honasan (PGBI and Diablo) and Estrada (PMAP and DEMOKRASYA) were part of the civilian
support group for a planned replication of “people power,” marching from various points including the EDSA Shrine
towards Oakwood.

The following indicates extensive planning:

• wide recruitment of military personnel months before the mutiny at gripe sessions in which a bloodletting rite and the
oath of loyalty were undertaken by recruits, such as the ones at the Galleria Suites and an old house in San Juan on 4
and 12 June 2003;

• purchase of uniforms and combat boots, Magdalo flags, and arm bands used at Oakwood;

• provision of rebels with backpacks purchased ahead of time;

• purchase of expensive communications equipment and vehicles later recovered;

• reservation by Capt. Gerardo Gambala under the name of George Uy for 19 to 28 July and his actual occupation of the
room where Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes visited him on 24 July;

• rebels’ use of two staging points at Dasmariñas Village and Mandaluyong City; and

• prepositioning of rebel vehicles in the armories of Fort San Felipe and Sangley Point at Naval Base Cavite.

The discovery of the plot prompted the rebels to implement Plan Charlie of a three-plan Oplan Andres (from “The Last
Revolution” and the recovered diskettes).

Discovery and Preemption

Fortuitous scheduling of the coup attempt close to the President’s 3rd SONA on 28 July helped in the timely adoption of
countermeasures such as Task Force Libra (Abu) and Task Force Ayala (Teodosio).

But the government failed to prevent Marines from Ternate, Cavite from moving in to Oakwood and the rebels from
occupying Oakwood.

Moreover, the rebels failed to elicit support from senior military officers, suggesting a) a breakdown in the chain of
command; b) alienation of the rebels from their senior officers; and c) general decline of professionalism in the AFP.

Rebels also failed to elicit the required civilian support for a replication of “people power” other than the Honasan and
Estrada support groups cited above.

Root Causes

The Commission cited the following root causes of the attempted coup:

• The “original sin” rooted in martial law where military role expansion occurred amidst the destruction of civilian
democratic institutions;

• The failure of the law to deter, due to its inadequate or lack of enforcement;

• Civilian dependence on the military for political survival, internal security, etc.;

• Ambitious personalities recruiting and using the military for their personal and political agenda;

• The “messianic complex” bred by socialization in the PMA and the harshness of the realities on the ground; and

• Commanding officers are not diligent in instilling and enforcing the duty of soldiers to subordinate themselves to civilian
authority, and the misinterpretation of the Constitutional provision on the role of the AFP as the savior of the people and
the state.

Provocations

The main provocations were military grievances; discovery of the plot leading them to implement Plan Charlie (and not
Plans Alpha and Bravo); dinner of PMA ’94 and ’95 members with President Arroyo on 23 July 2003; and the President’s
order of arrest for officers and men unaccounted for on 26 July 2003.

But it is not to say that the soldiers don’t have valid grievances. Among which are the

a) RSBS issue;

b) procurement system prone to “corrupt” practices such as “conversion”, “washing”, split POs, rigged biddings, “ghost”
deliveries, etc., especially by and with the collusion of the powerful “comptroller family”, also affecting POL;

c) sale or transfer of arms and ammo to unauthorized recipients;

d) modernization of the AFP and the Modernization Fund;

e) inadequate AFP grievance mechanism (IG and OESPA) due to hierarchy, seniority, military culture including obedience
to superiors, etc.;

f) inadequate health, medical, housing, and other services;

g) poor state of military equipage; and h) delays in payments of benefits to survivors of military personnel killed in action.

Negotiated Return to Barracks

The Commission further found out that: 1) the negotiation “to return to barracks” was actually under conditions of “mutual
ignorance” of applicable laws; 2) there was priority for a peaceful and speedy end to the mutiny; and 3) there was unclear
terms of reference for government negotiators.

Recommendations of the Commission

The Commission, in relation to the 27 July 2003 incident, has finally recommended the following:
1. Due diligence by commanding officers; 2. Effectively address legitimate grievances;

3. A civilian Secretary of National Defense; 4. Return NICA to its original mandate;

5. Enforce the law against violators; 6. Observe or respect the military’s political neutrality; and

7. Provide negotiators with clear terms of reference;

Concerning the grievances voiced by mutineers at Oakwood

1. Liquidate present Retirement and Separation Benefits System of the AFP in an orderly manner;

2. Return the soldiers’ RSBS contributions; 3. Initiate an AFP Service and Insurance System; and

4. Implement fully the recommendations of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee re: Ramiscal and Abadia.

The AFP Procurement System: Conversion and Other Problem

1. Simplify AFP procurement procedures;

2. Control commanders’ discretionary powers over the Centrally Managed Funds (CMF);

3. Reduce the amount of CMF in GHQ/service HQ hands; 4. Strictly implement control measures over supplies;

5. Set tenure limits for AFP finance and procurement officers; and 6. Establish an autonomous Internal Affairs office.

Modernizing the AFP: Funding and Consequential Problems

1. Vigorously pursue recovery of the JUSMAG and NOVAI properties; 2. Pursue the squatted land in Fort Bonifacio;

3. Substantially increase AFP’s share in Fort Bonifacio’s sale proceeds; and

4. Reinforce Office of the Ombudsman by increasing funding and other support.

Other recommendations include items on the state of the AFP medical services; the benefits for soldiers killed in action;
the pilot to aircraft ratio or too few aircraft; and the inadequacies of AFP housing for officers and enlisted personnel.