Organization of terrorism in the Phil

PHILLIPPINES

NAME: Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

DATE STARTED/FIRST ACTIVE: 1991.

GOALS: Promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the southern Philippines
heavily populated by Muslims.

MAIN ANTI-U.S. ACTIVITIES TO DATE: Kidnapped more than 30 foreigners, including a U.S. citizen, in 2000.

STRENGTH: 200 core fighters and more than 2,000 supporters.

OPERATIONAL LOCATIONS: Mainly southern Philippines with members occasionally traveling to Manila. Operated in Malaysia in
2000.

AFFILIATIONS: Probably receives support from Islamic extremists in the Middle East and South Asia. Some have ties
to Mujahidin in Afghanistan.

COMMENTS: Smallest and most radical of the Islamic separatist groups operating in the southern Philippines. The group split from
the Moro National Liberation Front in 1991. A Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) listed as "active" during 2000.

NAME: Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)

DATE STARTED/FIRST ACTIVE: Mid-1980s.

GOALS: [A breakaway urban hit squad of the Communist Party of the Philippines New People's Army.]

MAIN ANTI-U.S. ACTIVITIES TO DATE: Suspected involved in the murder in 1989 of U.S. Army Col. James Rowe in the
Philippines.

STRENGTH: 500.

OPERATIONAL LOCATIONS: Manila and central Philippines.

AFFILIATIONS: Formed an alliance with the Revolutionary Proletarian Army in 1997.

COMMENTS: Breakaway urban hit squad of the Communist Party of the Philippines New People's Army. NOT a Designated
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), but listed as "active" during 2000.

NAME: New People's Army (NPA)

DATE STARTED/FIRST ACTIVE: 1969.

GOALS: Overthrow the government of the Philippines through protracted guerrilla warfare.

MAIN ANTI-U.S. ACTIVITIES TO DATE: Opposes any U.S. military presence in the Philippines and attacked U.S. military interests
before the U.S. base closures in 1992. Press reports in 1999 indicated that the NPA would target U.S. troops participating in joint
military exercises under the Visiting Forces Agreement and U.S. embassy personnel.
STRENGTH: 6,000-8,000.

OPERATIONAL LOCATIONS: Rural Luzon, Visayas, and parts of Mindanao. Has cells in Manila and other metropolitan centers.

AFFILIATIONS: Derives most of its funding from contributions of supporters and so-called revolutionary taxes extorted from local
businesses.

COMMENTS: The military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). Although primarily a rural-based guerrilla group,
the NPA has an active urban infrastructure to conduct terrorism and uses city-based assassination squads called sparrow units.
NOT a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), but listed as "active" during 2000.

Different kind of terrorism in the Phil

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was formed out of the Moro resistance to Spanish colonization which was particularly
strong in Southwest Mindanao and Sulu Archipelago. The Moros fought Christian and foreign domination. This Muslim struggle
continued on to the United States colonial era. After independence, Filipino Muslims continued to resist Manila’s rule which lead to
widespread conflict in the 1970’s. In the late 1960’s, there was an increase in lawlessness and insurgency in the Southern
Philippines. Political disputes lead to an increase of armed gangs, which lead to an increase of tension between the Moro and
Christian communities. Between these two groups there was a competition for land, economic resources, political power, which lead
to an increase of immigration of Christians from the North and Moros began to feel as though they were a minority in their own
homeland. In 1972, this lead to the division, on religious lines, in Mindanao and Sulu-Archipelago. In 1972, the institution of martial
law led to more Moro rebellions. These Moro forces were brought together by Nur Misuari who consolidated the forces in the MNLF
framework, which he eventually chaired. This group fought for an independent Moro nation and received help and support from
Muslims in Libya and Malaysia. The peak of the Moro conflict took place from 1970-1975, and in the waning of the conflicts came
peace talks between the Manila government and MNLF in 1976. The 1976 Organization of Islamic Conference union of Muslim
nations is where Moros looked for support. Misuari signed, in this conference, the Tripoli Agreement (first peace agreement signed
between Muslim separists and Philippine government) which provided Moro autonomy in the Southern Philippines and a cease-fire.
However the truce was broken in 1977 when Moros charged the government of only allowing token self rule. This conflict thus lead
to a split in the MNLF into the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) lead by Hashim Salamat in 1977 and the Bangsa Moro
Liberation Organization which later turned into the Moro National Liberation Front/Reformist Movement. This fragmentation of the
MNLF led to a decrease in fighting strength. In 1986 President Aquino initiated talks with the MNLF which lead to a cease-fire. In
1987 MNLF signed an agreement with the goal of independence for Muslim regions alongside the government’s offer of autonomy.
The MNLF resumed armed insurrection in 1988 with little success. In 1987, Article 10 established an "Autonomous Region" in
Muslim Mindanao, a four-province fragmented region where there was primarily Muslim self-rule. Misuari was made the region’s
governor, whose rule ended in 2001 with a failed uprising against the government, and now is currently in jail. Parouk Hussin took
over the governor position in 2002.

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was formed in 1977 when Salamat Hashim split from the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF), and was supported by the ethnic Maguindanaos. This split was caused by the signing of the Tripoli Agreement in 1976 by
the Manila-based Filipino government and the MNLF. When formed, the MILF received support from Egypt, and on March, 1984,
Hashim officially declared the establishment of the MILF. The goals of MILF includes the establishment of an independent Islamic
state of Mindanao island, Palawan, Sulu, Archipelago, and neighboring island, as well as a more traditional Islamic religious
education system. MILF stresses the Islamic aspect of the separatist movement and refuses to accept treaties between the Moros
people and the Manila-based Filipino government. Currently the group is based in Bagsamoro region of Mindanaou and neighboring
islands. MILF is currently the largest Islamic liberation group with 15,000 members and 2,900 troops mostly deployed in Lanao del
Nonte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and North Cotabato. The assassination of Benigo Aquino lead to a surge in membership. In
2001, MILF gained a peace agreement with Manila, however this did not last long. In 2003, the Filipino government accused MILF of
the Davao City airport bombing that killed 21 people.

Abu Sayyaf

Abu Sayyaf (in Arabic meaning “Bearer of the Sword”) was founded in 1991 in Basilan Province by the Philippine
national, Abdurajak Janjalani as a radical splinter group from the Moro National Liberation Front which wished to Islamicize the Moro
identity. The current leader is reported to be Abdurajak Janjalani’s younger brother, Khadafi Janjalani. The group consists of what
the press calls "bandits", primarily recruited out of high school and universities, who seize hostages for money, hijack religion to gain
local support. The group is also involved in piracy, operating alongside Al Qaeda,extorting from companies and wealthy
businessmen, and attack the Catholic community through abductions of priests, nuns, and teachers. This group has terrorized the
Southern Philippines through bombings, massacres, and links to international terrorist plots and leaders. Abu Sayyaf resides
primarily on the island of Mindanao, but has ventured as far as Malaysia. The goal of Abu Sayyaf is to establish an independent,
Iranian style, Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Islands in the southern Philippines. Other goals of Abu Sayyaf include
improving the life of ethnic Filipinos in Malaysia and the release of World Trade Center bomber Ramsey Yousef, who trained the
group in explosives. Abu Sayyaf first mobilized in 1991 with the bombing of a ship in Zamboanga harbor also with a grenade attack
on Christian missionaries during that time. In the beginning, Abu Sayyaf remained primarily domestic, however, on April 23rd, 2000,
the group became an international threat when they took numerous foreigners and international journalists hostage for ransom in
Sipadan. After Janjalani’s death in 1998, Abu Sayyaf split into three less focused groups that participated mostly in murders and
kidnappings not terror attacks against Christians. After receiving $25 million in ransom money from Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, the
Libyan leader, in 2000 to free kidnapped hostages, the group used this money to finance an increase in arms, recruitment, and buy
speedboats for kidnappings. This lead to an increase in members, due to the attractive salary and weaponry. From the years 2000-
2002 Abu Sayyaf embarked on a series of kidnappings of Philippine Christians and foreign nationals. The bloodiest years of victims
of Abu Sayyaf took place between 2001-2003 in the Southern Philippines, when the group was reported to have killed over 300
government soldiers and kidnapped at least 140 people. Today, Abu Sayyaf is thought to possess around a hundred core members,
with supporters amounting to approximately a thousand. Seeing as the group’s membership is always changing, it is difficult to
attain accurate numbers of membership.

The New People’s Army (NPA)

The New People’s Army (NPA) is a military wing of the communist party of the Philippines (CPP). It is a Maoist group that was
formed in March of 1969 with an aim to overthrow the government through government warfare. The founder was Jose Maria Sison,
who reports and controls the group from his exile in the Netherlands. The group is primarily a rural-based guerilla group, yet it does
have an active urban infrastructure. NPA uses terrorism and city-based assassination squads called sparrow units. The funding for
NPA comes from the contributions of supporters in the Philippines and Europe and also from revolutionary taxes from local
businesses and politicians. The NPA opposes any United States military presence, and since the US has been gone from the
Philippines, the tactics of the NPA has been directed against the police, politicians, and drug traffickers.

Jemaah Islamiya

Jemaah Islamiya (JI) was founded in 1995 by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in Malaysia. The structure of this group is
an overarching organization that communicates and coordinates with a multitude of radical Islamic cells in Southeast Asia and has
proceeded to be more of a network of smaller organizations instead of one centralized group. The foundation of this group is based
on relationships formed in the Afghan war, mainly Janjalani of Abu Sayyaf and Al Qaeda, that has remained to the present day. At
first it was a loose group of Islamic purists trying to separate themselves from Western Society, which they viewed as very corrupt.
Ba'asyir, a strong believer in Darul Islam, recruited in the early 1980’s in Southeast Asia from Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines,
Singapore, and eventually developed the name Jemaah Islamiya (“Islam Group”). The goal of Jemaah Islamiya is to create an
idealized Islamic State including Brumei, Indonesia, Singapore, Southern Thailand, Malaysia, and Southern Philippines. In the
beginning of JI’s activities were just support operations for al-Qaeda sponsored operations in Philippines. Another part of their
organization included funneling financial support to a net of Southeast Islamic extremist groups. In 2000, JI took part in a large
series of church bombings in Indonesia, which then started to include malls, government centers, Singapore, and Malaysia. In
August of 2000, JI attacked the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia. On October 12th, 2002, the infamous Bali bombing occurred
which attracted a lot of international attention to the group. In March of 2003, JI bombed Davao City wharf in Mindanao. JI also
bombed the Jakarta Marriot Hotel in August of 2003, just a couple months after the bombing in Davao City.

Anti-Terror Initiatives and U.S.-Philippines Counterterrorism Cooperation

The Philippines combats terrorism through political, legal and military means. The U.S. assisted the Philippines in amending their
anti-money laundering legislation to meet international standards, and Manila passed its revised legislation in March 2003.

Washington also installed the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) in the Philippines with equipment, software and training to
enhance their capacity to secure their borders.U.S.-Philippines law enforcement cooperation is strong. In 2002, the two nations' law
enforcement agencies cooperated to bring charges against 15 Abu Sayyaf terrorists, implement an extradition treaty and train some
700 Filipino law enforcement officers.The Philippines receives anti-terrorist financial assistance from the U.S. Following Philippine
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's May 2003 visit to the U.S., Washington pledged to provide new funds to the Philippines for
training and equipping Philippine forces to deal with terrorist groups and funds to spur development in the Mindanao region, where
Islamic extremists are based.

In 2002, the U.S. sent about 650 American advisers to train Philippine soldiers in counterterrorism techniques. The Bush
administration proposed sending U.S. combat troops to the Philippines in March 2003, but was met with strong Philippine opposition
to the idea.
History of terrorism

The Philippines - three decades of terrorism

In 1972 Attorney-General Lionel Murphy asked me to report on how police dealt with organised crime in South-East Asia. The
Philippines was my first destination and I arrived a few days after President Marcos declared martial law to meet the Police General,
a squat, tough looking man who had no hesitation answering for the rationale for martial law. It was essential to neutralise the
current crop of communist terrorists and other insurgents. “We did it before and we will do it again” and, explained how the national
government had brutally crushed communist guerrillas terrorising most of Luzon just after World War II, proudly pointing to the
medals he won during the campaign. If the New People's Army (NPA), an offshoot of the remnants of the guerrillas, was to be
eliminated then martial law, detention without trial and even the political assassination of NPA leaders would be used with a
vengeance.

The NPA, founded in 1969, was a Marxist guerrilla group that waged a protracted insurgency from the countryside aimed at
overthrowing the Marcos Government and establishing a communist state. The group enjoyed widespread support especially from
those sickened by the excesses and brutality of the Marcos regime and the ever-widening gap between the haves and the have-
nots. As it turned out, the NPA was never crushed by government forces but neither, on the other hand, was it able to overthrow the
Marcos regime. That task was left to “people power” on the streets of Manila in 1986.

Two years after Cory Aquino came to power I returned and found this euphoria had all but disappeared. Certainly, some democratic
institutions had been restored but rich oligarchies still held most of the land and the social gap was, if anything, widening. A renewed
sense of optimism appeared when President Fidel Ramos was elected in 1992.

Ramos promised to end the vicious civil war in Mindanao that had plagued the country for the previous two decades. The central
government was in conflict with two guerrilla groups - the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF). The former group once enjoyed support from Libya, Saudi Arabia and nearby Malaysia and originally demanded an
independent Muslim state in the south. The MILF, on the other hand, split from the MNLF in the late 1970s over ethnic and strategic
differences.

Both groups originated in a province with some of the richest agricultural land in the country yet the economy was in tatters after
years of neglect by the Manila government. Muslims in Mindanao also suffered political marginalisation and some of the highest
rates of infant mortality, illiteracy and unemployment in the country. But what really drove guerilla insurgencies was a sense of being
deliberately swamped by Christian settlers from Luzon.

The Spanish and American colonisations included massive resettlement programs encouraging Christian internal migration and later
governments continued this policy. By 1983 it was estimated that 80 per cent of the ten million people living in Mindanao were non-
Muslims. Christian agricultural communities were created deep in the heart of indigenous Muslim territories. The bitterness that
these settlements generated led to a civil war in 1971 and over the next 25 years led to the loss of 120,000 lives.

To deal with this bloodbath President Ramos signed a peace agreement in 1996 with MNLF leader Nur Misuari, in what was known
as the Davao consensus. Some degree of self-determination, and most importantly economic investment, was promised for the
region. It looked as though cultural, social and religious autonomy for Muslims living in Mindanao was at last to become a reality.
Unfortunately the civil war in Mindanao did not end mainly because the MILF rejected the peace plan on the grounds that the
government did not go far enough. To this day the group continues to fight on and so do elements of the MNLF.

I was in the Philippines again during Ramos's election campaign when he promised that his country would become part of the Asian
tiger-cub economy in which ordinary Filipinos would benefit under a regime of law and democracy where corruption would be
weeded out. I visited the violent, politically volatile slum district of Tondo. The impoverished area was a breeding ground for some of
the toughest criminals in the country and infamous for notorious NPA “Sparrow Squads”, who, during the 1960s and 1970s,
assassinated police officers and government officials. I began to realise that terrorism was never going to be stopped unless
something was done to improve intolerable conditions.

I have seen equally appalling conditions in many other parts of the country. These include rampant bribery and corruption that
affects every domain of Filipino society, from police officers to politicians. This spurs the population to behave as their leaders
behave, evidenced by the destruction of the huge Clark Air Base in Pampanga province in 1991 after the Americans departed where
I witnessed what could only be called mass vandalism and theft. My driver told me that the Americans left more than 116,000 items
for the Filipino government to use. But the population stole all of them including every piece of equipment from a five-storey hospital.

Under the Ramos Government Muslim Mindanao never received the economic packages the Davao consensus promised. The
planned economic revival that was going to lift the living standards of the Filipino masses never eventuated. Nor was Ramos able to
stem the endemic corrupt practices. Then came the election of Joseph Estrada in 1998. The rural masses heavily supported the
former B grade actor because he promised to lift them from the quagmire of poverty and despair. But his Government did little to
improve the condition of the masses. Though Estrada visited many towns and villages during his presidency and lavished gifts and
money on his supporters, the country's economy stagnated, unemployment grew, and corruption became even more endemic.

Estrada did try to deal with the terrorist networks and the civil war in Mindanao but he used brute military force, not social or
economic development, as his weapon. A large, well-equipped army was sent against the MILF. Stories of atrocities committed
against civilians by troops and vigilante groups abound and provide recruitment fodder to enlist future Muslim rebels. One tactic was
the use of special Christian vigilante groups, established by the military, who were formed to ostensibly secure “law and order” in
mixed Christian and Muslim areas in Mindanao. I heard stories about many random shootings of civilians by these militias. But I also
heard about similar massacres by Muslim vigilante groups in the same region

What was undoubtedly true was that there were some military successes during the Estrada era. The army closed down the
notorious Abu Bakar terrorist camp that trained not only men from Mindanao but also Muslims from Indonesia and the Middle East.
Though Estrada boasted that they had “pacified” the Muslim rebels it was clear that the MILF were far from defeated. It was also
apparent that corrupt members of the army and police were undermining attempts to deal with terrorist groups and especially with
the notorious Abu Sayyaf guerrillas, a radical Islamist group whose activities are now deeply etched within recent Filipino history.

In 1995 about 200 arrived by boats and attacked a largely Christian town on the western coast of Mindanao where they
indiscriminately fired on the population killing at least 53 people and wounding another 44. The town was previously almost entirely
Muslim in population but had been overtaken by Christians. The massacre was also a warning to other Muslim groups not to co-
operate with the government. In a statement after the attack an Abu Sayyaf spokesman criticised the mainstream MNLF leadership
for “betraying the Muslim cause”.

The Abu Sayyaf has also employed bandit-like tactics such as kidnapping and beheading of foreigners. In May 2001 the group
kidnapped 20 people, including three American hostages one of whom was beheaded. The rebels obtained millions of dollars from
these and other criminal activities (such as drug-running) and for years escaped massive military resources arraigned against them.

It now appears that the terrorist group's Houdini-like skill resulted from money-for-information deals between Abu Sayyaf and the
army, deals that led to much comment and criticism within the Philippines media. After the September 11 attacks the Filipino
government, with advice from American Special Forces, launched a major campaign against the Abu Sayyaf killing scores, perhaps
hundreds, of their fighters and sympathisers. The history of the Abu Sayyaf and the government's attempt to eliminate it illustrates a
common theme that emerges in the Philippine battle against terrorism. Bribery and brutality appear to go hand in hand; the terrorist
groups and the authorities practise both.

One example of this official brutality was illustrated to me in 1998 at the beginning of the Estrada regime by supporters of thrice-
elected Davao Mayor Rodrigo Duterte who attained almost cult-like status in the country after making the most lawless city in
Mindanao a relatively safe and secure place for locals and foreigners. They told me that when he was first elected, ten years earlier,
Duterte inherited a city plagued by kidnappings, murders, drug addiction and a huge communist insurgency problem. Duterte began
by negotiating with the communist terrorists. He told them that they had to stop assassinating government officials and robbery. He
promised housing, jobs and money for their followers and money for their leaders.

The negotiations were successful so he turned to kidnappers, bank-robbers and muggers and issued a public statement warning
criminals that unless they stopped, they would pay a great price. Many just laughed. But then the bodies of kidnappers, robbers and
remaining communist terrorists were found lying on the city's footpaths with bullets through their heads. Duterte denied any
involvement but no one in Davao had any doubts about the existence of death squads. Duterte's success was relatively short lived.
Five years later crime in Davao was increasing and so was terrorism, as was so dramatically shown by bombing attacks at Davao
airport.

It is clear to me that neither bribery nor brute force will end terrorism in the Philippines, a fact that the government of President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo is just coming to grips with. Though her Government, with the assistance of American military advisors and
personnel, appears to have had some successes against the Abu Sayyaf, this group is far from destroyed.

Similarly, as social and economic conditions remain abysmally bad and corruption continues unabated, the Moro groups grow from
strength to strength. That bribery still plagues the police and military was vividly illustrated during the escape and subsequent
shooting of the fanatic Jemmah Islamiyah terrorist Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi. He was originally a member of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front but as a Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist was responsible for many bombing deaths in the country. Al-Ghozi was able to
walk out of his high security cell with breathtaking ease.

Although hundreds of al Qaida recruits trained at Moro camps in the late 1990s, Jemaah Islamiyah and other fellow travellers move
freely around the Philippines, no overarching terrorist organisation yet exists. The Moro rebels aim for an independent Islamic State,
Abu Sayyaf has degenerated into a bunch of bandits and the NPA seems preoccupied with building up its financial resources and
members. But how long will it be before these metamorphose into an oligarchy that is structured and organised? Some terrorist
researchers such as Professor Rohan Gunaratna, author of Inside Al Qaeda, believe that over the past year groups like Jemmah
Islamiyah, Lasker Jihad, the Abu Sayyaf, the MILF and MNLF have formed interconnecting networks that eventually aim to create a
unified Islamic state across the region.
Unless President Arroyo, or her successor, begins to deal with the causes of terrorism, rather than just with its symptoms, we can
expect to see even more guerrilla violence and the tentacles of terrorism spreading throughout this complex and highly volatile
country. It is, however, difficult to be optimistic when the leaders of far more developed, affluent and politically sophisticated nations
also continue to try to combat terrorism by addressing its end result rather than its causes.

Modus Operandi of Terrorism

Tagalog Crime Common Crime

Tactics Description
Name Scene(s)

Hotel lounges, Suspects are typically well-dressed, mild-mannered, and

Salisi Gang
coffee bars, cafes, project an aura oflegitimate businessman or an affluent

and restaurants matron; complete with jewelry, attaché case and other

frequented by props to appear and look wealthy. The perpetrator moves

perceivably wealthy closer to the would-be victim and waits patiently until the

tourists and victim is engrossed in a serious conversation with a

businessmen companion or leaves his or her bags and other belongings

unattended. In a swift motion, the perpetrator

takes the unattended bag or belongings and casually

leaves the place.

Another variant, involves two or three accomplices who

distract the would-be victim by engaging them in a

conversation, often pretending to know the victim from

somewhere or ask for a lighter. When distracted, the

accomplice takes theunattended bag or

belongings of thevictim.

Another tactic involves a perpetrator who loiters around the

hotel’s front desk and waits for a guest to deposit his room

key or is busy conversing with the front desk staff during

registration. Once the victim is already busy talking with the

front desk staff, the perpetrator makes his move by walking

beside the victims and grab thebags or belongings

unattended in a swift motion and casually

leaves the location.

Tutok-Kalawit involves a man or woman suddenly hugging a

Tutok- Malls, sidewalks,
victim like they are old friends. In truth, the con man or
Kalawit schools, public
woman is discreetly poking a sharp object
Gang buses, and
on theside of the victim while quietly telling him to turn
jeepneys
over his cash and valuables.

Another variant of this criminal tactic would be two thieves

accusing a victim ofsomething bogus. The victim would

naturally deny the charge and confront his accuser. The

thieves would then ask thevictim to show his/her ID. Since

IDs are usually kept in wallets, thieves will grab the wallet

from the victim and run away.

Bars, boardwalks, Ativan perpetrators commonly victimize foreigners who

AtivanGang
Tagalog Crime Common Crime
Tactics Description
Name Scene(s)

restaurant, and roam alone in public places. The group is usually composed

othertourist spots of three (3) to four (4) males or females who befriend the

would-be victim. After gaining trust and confidence, the

victim will be taken for a ride to other tourist sites and

during meal time, the victim will be brought to their house

usually situated in a squatter colony where the victim will be

treated for lunch, snacks, or dinner. The served drink is

spiked with Ativan – a powerful anti-depressant/sleeping

pill. Even before finishing the drink, the victim will succumb

to a deep sleep and while sleeping, will be stripped of his

cash and valuables and will be brought out of the house and

left at a completely random location.

Another variant of this tactic is when a male victim is

seduced and picked-up in a bar, restaurant, park and/or a

tourist site by a gorgeous female, well dressed and well-

mannered. The victim will be approached and befriended

until a casual conversation and seduction process takes

place which culminates in negotiated sexual activities. The

victim will either be brought to a pre-arranged hotel/motel

or to his own hotel room. Once at the designated

room, the victim will be offered liquor or drink which the

perpetrator mixes with highly potent Ativan pills. Once the

victim is unconscious, the suspect will divest the victim of

his cash/valuables, and then leave the victim at the scene.

Most ofthe victims of this crime wake-up after two to three

days and it takes another two days before the victim can

fully recover from the drugs and discover the losses.

Ipit gang members operate in groups offour or five. Gang

Ipit Gang Crowded areas such
members shove or push a prospective victim to distract him
as passenger
or her, while their accomplice picks his pocket. In jeepneys
jeepneys, railway
and buses, suspects squeeze-inand distract their victims
stations, and malls
while their accomplice snatches the victim’s wallet and/or

mobile phone.

Malls,airports, Budol-Budol is a transaction scam principally involving a

Budol-Budol
restaurants, and supposed bundle (budol) of cash that is actually padded
Gang
coffee shops inside with sheets of paper cut in the sizeof money.

frequented by Only the exposed sides however are real money, everything

perceivably wealthy in between are plain paper cuttings.

tourists and Budol-budol gang members are often described as sweet-

businessmen talking, charismatic, and convincing. Other victims even

report having been hypnotized by the group.

Reports and stories of the Budol-budol operations vary from

a balikbayan (returning overseas Filipinos) urgently needing

a huge amount in Philippine Peso in exchange for his

Tagalog Crime Common Crime
Tactics Description
Name Scene(s)

Dollars, to a stranger’s emergency offer to swap his bundle

of cash with a mobile phone or an expensive piece of

jewelry. After gaining the potential victim’s trust the two

parties barter their items – the bundle of money for

whatever product the to-be victim is peddling. Mobile

phones and jewelry are the most commonly lost items.

Some high profile cases involve rare paintings, expensive

furniture and millions worth of checks to the Budol-budol

gang. After the deal is made, the gang and the victim splits.

Another, more sensational and dramatic variant of this

crime is the use of fake gold bars, which the suspects use as

bait for their victims. The ploy commonly used involves a

Filipino treasure hunter or a Japanese survivor has

knowledge of a secret Japanese fortune which was

plundered by the retreating Japanese Army during World

War II which is yet to be completely recovered. A sample of

the gold bar is shown to the would be victim for

physical examination and since the gold bar actually looks

genuine, an offer is made to sell the whole fortune by

asking the victim to pay half the cost of the gold bars under

terms and conditions agreed upon. One of the conditions is

that the gold bars can be delivered or a map can be

provided and brought to the site where the bars can be dug

up. After the payment, the perpetrators will never show up

and the victim will soon discover that the gold bars which

were delivered or unearthed from the site are gold plated

lead bars.

The common victims of this MO are foreigners, balikbayans

Kotong Airports, hotels,
and their dependents who are lured into exchanging their
restaurants, malls,
foreign currencies into pesos at a rate higher than the
and public parks
prevailing exchange rates.The group/individual approaches
frequented by
andoffers a tempting high rate to the would-be victim.
foreigners and
During the transaction, which usually takes place outside or
balikbayans.
right in front of a foreign exchange shop, the equivalent

peso is counted before the victim three times. Initially, the

victim is allowed to count the money he will receive to make

him feel confident that he will get the exact amount for his

foreign currency. After, a recount is done by one of the

perpetrators spreading the pesos in his palm to cover his

fingers that are folding a portion of the bunch. The suspect

distracts the attention of thevictim, often by telling him to

be extra careful of robbers, while

wrapping thebundle of money in a newspaper or placing it

inside a paper bag. The victim eventually discovers that he

Tagalog Crime Common Crime
Tactics Description
Name Scene(s)

was shortchanged when he counts the money while inside a

car or upon arrival at his house or hotel.

Perpetrators of this crime usually target victims in crowded

Laslas Malls, open-air
areas. A man/woman/child pretending to be lost or selling
Bag/Laslas markets, and public
an item approaches the victim to distract his/her attention.
Bulsa transportation
An accomplice slashes the bag/pocket of the victim who is

busy being distracted by another suspect. All money and

goods are stolen.

The Ipit Taxi scheme usually involves three (3)

Ipit Taxi Taxis
perpetrators. The trio uses a taxi cab spray painted with a
Gang
different name and sporting stolen or fake license plates.

The driver usually drives around looking for a potential

victim who is hailing a taxi cab. Unknown to the victim, the

locking mechanisms of both rear doors are not working. The

driver then drives the cab to a pre-arranged area, usually a

dimly lit street or highway, and slows down pretending he

has engine/mechanical trouble. At this juncture his cohorts

approach both doors of the cab, jump inand

sandwich the victim who is forcibly divested of his cash and

valuables. After the victim is robbed, the driver

takes thevictim and dumps him in a quiet place or highway.

In another variant, the taxi driver, with the help of an illegal

solicitor, will ask the victim to pay an additional amount or

forcibly divest him of all cash and valuables, thenthe victim

is dumped in a remote area.

Attackers prey on passengers inside a bus or jeepney by

Estribo GangPublic
positioning themselves near the estribo or vehicle’s exit and
transportation
then hold up everyone inside. In other instances, a crafty

criminal will set up at the exit of a crowded bus or jeepney

and systematically pick the pocket of passengers passing

through.

Main roads under Thieves typically work in pairs. Spotting a potential victim
Bukas Kotse
heavy traffic, driving a car with unlocked doors, a pair will force their way
Gang
parking into an occupied parked car or a vehicle stopped at an

areas inmalls, intersection. Other times, using a car of their own, the pair

churches, schools, will force the victim to maneuver his or her vehicle

etc. off the road. One of the attackers will force the victim to

open his door. The attacker pushes the victim to the front

passenger seat, drives the car to a deserted area, and robs

the victim. Sometimes, the attackers also stealthe car.

Public This tactic is usually carried out by a group of three. The

Dura Boys
transportation first member informs the victim that a man/woman has spit

terminals, on her sleeve and back. The victim will be distracted trying

jeepneys, and to wipe the spit on her sleeve while one of the other
Tagalog Crime Common Crime
Tactics Description
Name Scene(s)

buses members ofthe gang steals the victim’s valuables, usually a

wallet or a mobile phone.

The Akyat-Bahay is the most common robbery scheme in

Akyat-Bahay Residential areas
the Philippines. This crime is usually orchestrated by three
Gang
to five people. These thieves target homes that are

unoccupied especially during theholiday season (i.e.

Christmas, Holy Week, and Summer Vacation) or during

severe weather conditions (i.e. typhoons) when

members of the household can barely notice break-ins into

their homes. Thegang also employs children who can easily

enter homes illegally through tight spaces.

Provincial and city Thieves typically target passengers seated

Pitas Gang
operation buses, near the windows of public buses, jeepneys, and tricycles.

jeepneys, Among the items usually snatched by thieves include wrist

motorized watches, rings, necklaces, mobile phones, and hand bags.

passenger sidecars Another variant occurs when a group of thieves

(tricycles), and grab the ears of women and young girls and steal their

schools earrings or snatch their bracelets from their wrists.

Provincial/city This scheme is usually executed by three members. One of

Zest-O Gang
operation buses. the perpetrators wears a bus conductor’s uniform and ask

their potential victim “ilan ho” or “how

many?”The unsuspecting victim assumes that the man is

the bus conductor and responds with the amount of fare the

victim should pay. The criminal then forcibly hands the

victim a Zest-O juice or any food item and demands that the

victim pay for the item. The two accomplices will vouch that

the victim ordered from the vendor. The victim will then be

forced to pay up.

Provincial/city Members of this gang drop coins or small bills near their

Laglag-
operation buses, victim. While the victim helps to scoop up the money, other
Barya Gang
jeepneys, railway gang members start robbing the victim. In mostinstances, a

stations gang member blends with thecrowd and serves as lookout

or “stopper,” when someone tries to run after his

companions.

Restaurants, Members of this gang are typically waiters and cashiers who

Baraha
shopping malls, target credit card users in business establishments. Once
Gang
department stores, the victim gives his credit card to the waiter/shop

supermarkets attendant the card is swiped to a skimming device that will

capture thevictim’s credit card account.

Bargain malls and This gang targets shoppers who check out items sold in
Besfren
open-air markets stalls (i.e. watches, jewelry, mobile phones, and other
Gang
electronic gadgets). One of the gang members stands next

to the victim and borrows theitem being checked,

pretending that he/she is a friend of the victim. The thief

Tagalog Crime Common Crime
Tactics Description
Name Scene(s)

will quickly flee the stall premises bringing with him/her the

said item. The store owner/attendant naturally assumes

that the victim is an accomplice and will ask him/her to pay

for the item.

RELATED LAWS OF TERRORISM

SECTION 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known and cited as the "Anti-

Terrorism Act of 2004."

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to

protect the lives and properties of the people against all acts of terrorism and to

condemn terrorism as a crime against humanity. Towards this end, the State shall

adopt all adequate, efficient and effective counter measures to fight, suppress and

penalize all acts of terrorism with due regard to and respect for the fundamental

rights and freedoms of the people guaranteed under the Constitution.

Further, the State recognizes the transnational nature of terrorism and shall

maintain full cooperation with all nations in the fight against the same in accordance

with due process, existing international, regional, multi-lateral and bi-lateral

agreements or instruments, and United Nations resolutions.

SEC. 3. Terrorism. - How Committed. - Terrorism is committed by the

premeditated use or threatened use of serious violence, force, or by any other means

of destruction perpetrated against civilians or non-combatants, or against properties

with the intention of instilling a state of common danger, panic or fear, or of coercing

or intimidating the public or government.

Acts of terrorism may be committed through any of the following means:

(1) hijacking or threatening to hijack any kind of aircraft, ship, vessel, electric

or railroad train, locomotive, passenger bus or other means of mass transportation, or

public conveyance;

(2) taking or threatening to kidnap, or take hostage any person, in order to

compel, coerce, or force another person, whether natural or juridical, including the

government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, to give something of value or a

sum of money as ransom, or in order for that other person to do or abstain from doing

any act or decision as a condition for the release or non-taking of the hostages; 2
(3) causing or threatening to cause death or serious bodily harm to a person or

persons, or to cause a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or any segment

thereof;

(4) killing of, or violent attack upon, an internationally protected person or upon

the liberty of such: person in violation of the Convention on the Protection and

Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic

Agents, and other international agreements;

(5) causing serious interference with, or serious disruption of an essential

service, vital facility, critical infrastructure, including the mass transmission of virus

in the internet other than as a result of advocacy, grievance, protest, dissent, strike, or

an armed conflict provided the same is in accordance with international humanitarian

law;

(6) causing serious damage to property, the environment and the national

patrimony;

(7) causing or threatening to cause mass destruction through the use of

biological or chemical agents, noxious, poisonous or radioactive substances or

materials, nuclear devices, explosives, firearms, or any other kind of lethal weapon,

material, or substance, or resorting to arson;

Any person who commits any act of terrorism shall suffer the penalty of life

imprisonment to death. If the penalty imposed is life imprisonment, a fine of ten

million pesos (Php 10,000,000.00) shall also be imposed.

Any person who manufactures, possesses, acquires, transports, diverts,

supplies, uses or sells explosives, biological agent, chemical agent, nuclear weapon,

materials or equipment and instruments in furtherance of terrorism shall suffer

the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00).

SEC. 4. Conspiracy to Commit Acts of Terrorism. - There is a conspiracy to

commit terrorism when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement to commit any

act of terrorism as defined in Section 3 of this Act and decide to commit it.

The conspiracy to commit any act of terrorism shall be punished by

imprisonment from ten (10) years and one (1) day to fifteen (15) years with a fine of five

million pesos (Php 5,000,000.00).

SEC. 5. Participation in any Act of Terrorism. - Any person who, With the intent

to facilitate any act of terrorism knowingly participates in any of the following

activities:

(1) establishing or maintaining, or in serving as, contact or link with any person

or persons that are known to have pursued or are pursuing terrorist activities;

(2) procuring weapons, bombs, explosives, devices, spare parts, and other

accessories thereof; 3

(3) providing training to any person or persons to carry out terrorist activities;

or

(4) arranging or assisting in the conduct of a meeting of two (2) or more

persons, knowing that the meeting is to support or further the terrorist activities; shall

suffer the penalty of imprisonment from fifteen (15) years and one (1) day to twenty

(20) years with a fine of eight million pesos (Php8,000,000.00).

SEC. 6. Financing or Materially Supporting Any Act of Terrorism. - (a) It shall be

unlawful for any person, group, organization or entity to knowingly provide properties

or finances, or possess them for the commission of terrorism as herein defined or

facilitate in any way the provision or possession of such properties or finances, and it

shall carry with it the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ten million pesos

(Php 10,000,000 -00).

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly solicit or invite financial

contribution or other support for the commission of terrorism as defined herein and

shall carry with it the penalty of imprisonment for ten (10) years and one (1) day to

fifteen (15) years and a fine of five million pesos (Php5,000,000.00).

SEC. 7. Harboring or Concealing. - Any person who harbors or conceals any

person whom he/she knows to be a person who has carried out or is about to carry

out a terrorist activity shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years and

one (1) day to fifteen (15) years and a fine of five million pesos (Php5,000,000.00).

SEC. 8. Penalty for Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners Under this Act. - Any

public officer or private person who shall have custody of a prisoner under the

provisions of this Act and who shall have caused the escape of such prisoner whether

through the public officers or the private persons consent or negligence shall suffer

the following penalties:

1) Imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day to fifteen(l5) years, if a

fugitive shall have been sentenced by final judgment to any penalty;

2) Imprisonment of five (5) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years if the fugitive
shall not have been finally convicted but only held as a detention prisoner.

SEC. 9. Making False Threats of Acts of Terrorism. - It shall be unlawful for any

person to:

(1) communicate or make available by any means, any information which

he/she knows or believes to be false to another person with the intention of inducing

in him/her any other person a false belief that a terrorist act has been, is being or will

be carried out; or 4

(2) place any article or substance in any place, or dispatch any article or

substance by mail or by any other means of sending things from one place to another,

with the intention of inducing in another person a false belief that -

(i) the article or substance is likely to explode or ignite and thereby cause

personal injury or damage to property; or

(ii) the article contains or the substance consists of any dangerous, hazardous,

radioactive or harmful substance; any toxic chemical; or any microbial or other

biological agent, or toxin, that is likely to cause death, disease or personal injury or

damage to property.

For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2), a reference to a person inducing in

another person a false belief does not require the first-mentioned person to have any

particular person in mind as the person in whom he/she intends to induce the false

belief.

If the false threat did not result to death, disease, personal injury or damage to

property, the penalty of imprisonment from six (6) months to one (1) year or a fine of

Fifty thousand pesos (Php 50,000.00) shall be imposed.

If the false threat resulted to death, disease, personal injury or damage to

property, the penalty of imprisonment from one (1) year and one (1) day to six (6) years

and a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (Php 100,000.00) shall be imposed.

SEC. 10. Awest and Detention. - Any person arrested for violation of this Act,

pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b), of the Rules of Court, may be

detained for an inquest period of not more than fifteen (15) days following his/her

arrest.

The period of detention may be extended beyond fifteen (15) days if the person

arrested without a warrant demands for a preliminary investigation and consents to it

in writing and in the presence of his or her counsel. He/She shall be entitled to all the
rights under the RA No. 7438, otherwise known as "An Act Defining Certain Rights of

Persons Arrested, Detained, or Under Custodial Investigation."

SEC. 11. Witness Protection. - Any person who provides material information,

whether testimonial or documentary, necessary for the investigation or prosecution of

individuals suspected or accused of committing any of the offense under Sections 3,

4, 5, 6 and 7 herein shall be placed under the Witness Protection Program pursuant to

Republic Act 698 1.

SEC. 12. Immunity from Prosecution. - Any person who serves as a witness for

the government or provides evidence in a criminal case involving any violation of this

Act, or who voluntarily or by virtue of a subpoena testificandum or duces tecum,

produces, identifies, or gives testimony on, but not limited to, books, papers,

documents, tapes containing words, sounds, pictures or images, photos, maps, 5

diagrams, sketches, recordings, disc, or any other form of witten, recorded, or real

evidence, shall be immune from any criminal prosecution, subject to the compliance

with the provisions of PD 1732, otherwise known as Decree Providing Immunity from

Criminal Prosecution to Government Witnesses and the pertinent provisions of the

Rules of Court.

SEC. 13. Prosecution, Judgment and/or Conviction. -Any person may be charged

with or convicted of acts of terrorism without prejudice to the prosecution of any other

act or acts penalized under the Revised Penal Code which are not absorbed in the

offense of terrorism.

When there is a variance between the act of terrorism charged in the complaint

or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, the accused shall be

convicted of the offense proved included in the charge of terrorism if the intent to sow

terror or intimidate or coerce the government or the public was not proven during the

trial. No person, however, shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same

offense.

SEC. 14. Penalty for Juridical Person, Alien or Public Officer. - If the offender is a

corporation, association or partnership, the corresponding penalty provided in this Act

shall be imposed upon its responsible officers, directors or trustees who knowingly

participated in the commission of any violation of this Act or who knowingly permitted

or failed to prevent its commission. If the offender is an alien, he or she shall, in

addition to the penalties herein prescribed, be summarily deported after serving the
sentence. If the offender is a public official or employee, he or she shall, in addition to

the penalties prescribed herein, be barred from holding public office.

SEC. 15. Applicability of Republic Act No. 91 60, as Amended by Republic Act No.

9194. - Terrorism as defined and punished under this Act shall be considered an

unlawful activity under €U 9 160, otherwise known as the Anti-Money Laundering Act

of 2001, as amended by RA 9194. For this purpose, all matters involving monetary

instruments or property used or intended to be used for terrorist activities shall be

subject to provisions of Sections 10 and 11 thereof. Provided, that deposits or

investments with any banking institution or non-bank financial institution may be

inquired into or examined without prior court order pursuant to RA 9160, as

mended.

SEC. 16. Applicability of Republic Act No. 4200. - The provisions of RA 4200,

otherwise known as the Anti-Wire Tapping Act shall apply to include all offenses

punishable under this Act. 6

SEC. 17. Jurisdiction of Courts. - The Regional Trial Courts shall have

jurisdiction to try all cases for the prosecution of offenses punishable under this Act.

Those committed by public officers and private persons who act in conspiracy

with such public officers shall be under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject

to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7975 and Republic Act No. 8249.

SEC. 18. Mutual Assistance and Cooperation between the Philippines and other

States or International Organizations. - When a foreign State or International

Organization makes a request for assistance concerning any matter related to any act

of terrorism, the Council as created under Section 22 of this Act shall take the

appropriate action on the matter, provided that such request does not contravene the

Constitution or any existing law. Any request of the Philippine government to a foreign

State or International Organization shall be coursed through the Council.

SEC. 19. Anti-Terrorism Council. - There is hereby created an Anti-Terrorism

Council, hereinafter referred to as the "Council," which shall be under the supervision

and control of the President, who shall serve as its chairperson, with the Secretary of

Justice and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government as its

vice-chairpersons, and with the following members: Secretary of National Defense;

Secretary of Foreign Affairs; Secretary of Transportation and Communications; the

National Security Advisor; and such other members that may be appointed by the
President.

The Council shall serve as the central policy-making, supervising, coordinating

and monitoring body of the government on all matters of domestic and international

terrorism. The Council shall keep records of its proceedings and decisions, and such

records shall be subject to such security classifications as the Council may, in its

sound discretion, direct to safeguard the national interest.

The President may designate a primary agency which shall carry out and

implement policies of the Council. The President shall likewise designate a secretariat

for the Council from the existing government agencies involved on anti-terrorism

efforts without any additional salary, compensation, allowance, or any other form of

emoluments for such personnel to be assigned to the Council's secretariat.

In addition to their normal functions, the National Intelligence Coordinating

Agency shall be the technical adviser to the Council and with the following support

agencies to the Council: National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Immigration,

Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,

Anti-Money Laundering Council, Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the

intelligence and investigative elements of the Philippine National Police shall serve as

support agencies for the Council.

The Council shall, not later than one hundred eighty (180) days after the

effectivity of the Implementing Rules and Regulations, formulate and come up with a 7

comprehensive and effective anti-terrorism plan and program to deter and prevent acts

of terrorism to include, among others, exhaustive preparations necessary for the

government and the country to cope with all forms of terrorist attacks such as, but not

limited to, the use of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, or other weapons of

mass destruction.

SEC. 20. Functions ofthe Council. - In pursuit of its mandate under Section 19,

the Council shall have the following functions:

a. Formulate and conduct policy researches and studies in addressing

terrorism;

b. Direct the conduct of anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism measures and

post conflict actions to address the effects of terrorism;

c. Cause or direct the immediate investigation and speedy prosecution of cases

involving acts of terrorism and monitor the progress of such cases;

d. Transfer the conduct of investigation of specific cases from one law

enforcement agency to another;

e. Establish a comprehensive data-base systems on anti-terrorism and counter

terrorism operations and post-conflict actions;

f. Grant monetary rewards and incentives to informants who are willing to give

vital information to build up cases for the prosecution of those who committed acts of

terrorism;

g. Recommend the inclusion of vital witnesses under the Witness Protection,

Security and Benefits Program;

h. Call upon any department, bureau, office or other executive agency for

assistance; and,

i. Exercise such other functions as may be assigned by the President.

SEC. 2 1. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - Within sixty (60) days from the

effectivity of this Act, the Anti-Terrorism Council shall promulgate the Implementing

Rules and Regulations as may be necessary to ensure the efficient and effective

implementation of the provisions of this Act.

SEC. 22. Appropriations. - The amount of twenty five million pesos

(Php25,000,000.00) is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Council as initial

funding chargeable against the contingent fund of the Office of the President.

Thereafter, the amount needed by the Council to effectively carry out the

purpose of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

SEC. 23. Extra-TernYorial Application of this Act. - Except as provided in the

treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Act shall be

enforced not only within the Philippine archipelago, including its atmosphere, its 8

interior waters and maritime zone but also outside of its jurisdiction against those who

should commit any offense covered by this Act while on a Philippine ship, airship,

Philippine embassies and consulates, or other diplomatic premises.

SEC. 24. Separability Clause. - If any provision or portion of this Act or the

application thereof to any person or circumstance is declared to be unconstitutional or

invalid, the other provisions or portions of this Act, and the application of such

provision or section to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby.

SEC. 25. Amendatory Clause. - Republic Act No. 9160, as amended by

Republic Act No. 9194 and Republic Act No. 4200 are hereby amended or modified
accordingly.

SEC. 26. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders, d e s and

regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby

repealed, amended or modified accordingly.

SEC. 27. Suppletory Effect of the Revised Penal Code. - The provisions of the

Revised Penal Code shall have a suppletory effect to the provisions of this Act.

SEC. 28. Effeduity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its

complete publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers

of general circulation.